Science, Social Norms, and Social Interests
Things exist because they perform functions necessary for society
Functions can be manifest and latent
Manifest function of schooling is education
Latent function of schooling is socialization
There are also dysfunctions
Both manifest, like curving makes students compete with each other in toxic ways
And latent, like toxic competition causes emotional damage
Key Figures: Robert Merton (1910-2003)
Function of science is to provide reliable knowledge
Therefore, as practice and institution science must be organized around certain norms
Sociology of science, then, studies scientific norms and mechanisms of their reinforcement and sanctions applied when scientists fail to follow the norms
Merton identified 4 main norms of science:
Universalism: “race, nationality, religion, class, and personal qualities are irrelevant” (Merton 1973: 270)
Communism: scientific knowledge is collectively owned; that is one cannot claim property rights over scientific knowledge
Disinteretedness: scientists should not have their own interest in the results of their studies
Organised skepticism: systematic disbelieve in new ideas until they are proven beyond doubt
Beside moral norms there are also cognitive norms governing the way scientists actually do science (e.g. what counts as evidence)
Merton was not interested in cognitive norms, because he drew a firm distinction between the practice of science and the content of science
In general, he was interested in the practice and did not question the content of science (mark this idea!)
Rewards in science are almost all honorific (that is based on fame)
the highest rewards come in the form of eponymy: e.g. Halley’s comet
Other forms: citations
It is assumed that people do science out of true and unconditional love for science
Do really scientists follow the norms identified by Merton?
Can these norms be flexible and interpretable?
Can we even talk about a goal of something so complex as science?
To understand to what degree scientists follow the norms, it is interesting to look at cases when they actually failed to follow the norms
When you start digging deeper into the history of scientific frauds, you realize that lots of prominent scientists of the past were … basically fraudsters
Claudius Ptolemy, known as “the greatest astronomer of antiquity,” did not do most of his observing, but rather exappropriated the work of another Greek astronomer
Galileo Galilei actually didn’t do many of his experiments (though he was insisting that he did). His colleagues also had hard time reproducing his “experiments”
Isaac Newton relied on a fudge factor to make his predictions look better
Mendel was meticulously experimenting with peas
Discovered what we know call genes
Identified dominant and recessive traits and the proportions in which they are expected in the offspring
Widely recognized as the founder of modern genetics
His data was extremely precise, too good to be true actually
The famous statistician, Ronald A. Fisher, examined Mendel’s data in 1936 and concluded that
“Another explanation would be that Mendel performed one or two more experiments and reported only those results that agreed with his expectation” (van der Waerden 1968)
From a Kuhnian perspective, we could say that science (in its normal stage) is shaped by solidarities built around key ideas, not around general behaviors
Michel Mulkay (1969) expands on this idea and gives an example of the Velikofsky affair
Immanuel Velikovsky (1895-1979) was a Russian-American psychoanalyst largely known for his pseudo-scientific interpretation of history
We may think of norms as of a part epistemic cultures that characterize scientific disciplines
From that point of view, we can also recall Ann Swidler’s understanding of culture: a toolbox of resources
So norms do not guide behavior of scientists, but rather provide them with a repertoire of actions whcih scientists can creatively combine depending on their goal
In the 1970s a group of Edinburg based scholars set out to understand the content of scientific knowledge from a sociological perspective
This endeavor was part of the large social constructivism movement that argued (roughly) that studying scientific knowledge we should look at all the factors relevant for the acceptance of a scientific idea, not only those considered legitimate
This, in turn, meant that sociologists should stop distinguishing between science and pseudoscience and treat both equally, as knowledge produced collectively
In general, Strong Programme would consider scientific knowledge as the outcome of social relationships between scholars
And it was particularly interested in the role of large scale social phenomena (e.g. political ideologies) on the content of scientific knowledge
David Bloor in 1976 formulated four tenets of the Strong Programme
It is causal: that shows how social conditions shape scientific knowledge
It is impartial: it does not privilege true science over false science
It is symmetric: same causes explain both true and false science
It is reflexive: it applies the same principles to itself
Andrew Pickering (1984): “Constructing Quarks: A sociological history of particle physics”
Steven Shapin and Simon Shaffer (1985): “Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life”
Beliefs are products of society so one must study how they come about
Typical common sense explanation is assymmetric: true beliefs are explained internally, whereas false beliefs are explained externally
internal: heliocentric system has been adopted because it agreed with data
external: Lysenkov’s doctrine has been adopted because it was ideologically appealing
Critique on Foundationalism (true knowledge is accepted because it has foundations in objective nature)
Induction requires human judgement on similarity of cases: “No case is or is not the same as cases that came before it in the absence of a human decision about sameness” (Sismondo 2010, 48)
External explanation:
identify a scientific controversy.
identify a social conflict, the sides of which can be correlated to the sides of the debate.
???
explain the scientific conflict as the product of the social conflict
Steven Shapin (1975): Phrenological knowledge and the social structure of early nineteenth-century Edinburgh
Plot: the 19the century Edinburgh; two groups of scientists The Edinburgh Phrenological Society (lower and middle classes, proponents)and the Royal Society of Edinburgh (upper classes, oponents)
Conclusion: Class defines Scientific Beliefs (has been widely debated ofc)
Did you like the paper?
How would you summarize its content?
What is phrenology anyway?
Any other interesting insights/trivia from the paper?
What was the class composition of The Edinburgh Phrenological Society?
How it was different from The Royal Society of Edinburgh
What was the general societal agenda of the Edinburgh phrenologists?
What do you think of phrenology yourselves?