Science, Social Norms, and Social Interests
Things exist because they perform functions necessary for society
Functions can be manifest and latent
Manifest function of schooling is education
Latent function of schooling is socialization
There are also dysfunctions
Both manifest, like curving makes students compete with each other in toxic ways
And latent, like toxic competition causes emotional damage
Key Figures: Robert Merton (1910-2003)
Function of science is to provide reliable knowledge
Therefore, as practice and institution science must be organized around certain norms
Sociology of science, then, studies scientific norms and mechanisms of their reinforcement and sanctions applied when scientists fail to follow the norms
Merton identified 4 main norms of science:
Universalism: “race, nationality, religion, class, and personal qualities are irrelevant” (Merton 1973: 270)
Communism: scientific knowledge is collectively owned; that is one cannot claim property rights over scientific knowledge
Disinteretedness: scientists should not have their own interest in the results of their studies
Organised skepticism: systematic disbelieve in new ideas until they are proven beyond doubt
Beside moral norms there are also cognitive norms governing the way scientists actually do science (e.g. what counts as evidence)
Merton was not interested in cognitive norms, because he drew a firm distinction between the practice of science and the content of science
In general, he was interested in the practice and did not question the content of science (mark this idea!)
Rewards in science are almost all honorific (that is based on fame)
the highest rewards come in the form of eponymy: e.g. Halley’s comet
Other forms: citations
It is assumed that people do science out of true and unconditional love for science
Do really scientists follow the norms identified by Merton?
Can these norms be flexible and interpretable?
Can we even talk about a goal of something so complex as science?
To understand to what degree scientists follow the norms, it is interesting to look at cases when they actually failed to follow the norms
When you start digging deeper into the history of scientific frauds, you realize that lots of prominent scientists of the past were … basically fraudsters
Claudius Ptolemy, known as “the greatest astronomer of antiquity,” did not do most of his observing, but rather exappropriated the work of another Greek astronomer
Galileo Galilei actually didn’t do many of his experiments (though he was insisting that he did). His colleagues also had hard time reproducing his “experiments”
Isaac Newton relied on a fudge factor to make his predictions look better
Mendel was meticulously experimenting with peas
Discovered what we know call genes
Identified dominant and recessive traits and the proportions in which they are expected in the offspring
Widely recognized as the founder of modern genetics
His data was extremely precise, too good to be true actually
The famous statistician, Ronald A. Fisher, examined Mendel’s data in 1936 and concluded that
“Another explanation would be that Mendel performed one or two more experiments and reported only those results that agreed with his expectation” (van der Waerden 1968)
From a Kuhnian perspective, we could say that science (in its normal stage) is shaped by solidarities built around key ideas, not around general behaviors
Michel Mulkay (1969) expands on this idea and gives an example of the Velikofsky affair
Immanuel Velikovsky (1895-1979) was a Russian-American psychoanalyst largely known for his pseudo-scientific interpretation of history
We may think of norms as of a part epistemic cultures that characterize scientific disciplines
From that point of view, we can also recall Ann Swidler’s understanding of culture: a toolbox of resources
So norms do not guide behavior of scientists, but rather provide them with a repertoire of actions whcih scientists can creatively combine depending on their goal