mean probability of change indicating LIMITATION by the Council” (using only meaningful provisions
##
## Table 1: Change as a DV
## ===========================================================================================================
## Dependent variable:
## ---------------------------------------
## change_pr_limit_meaningf
## (1) (2) (3) (4)
## -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
## PO_oppose_change 0.663*** -0.258 0.758*** 2.286***
## (0.111) (0.222) (0.153) (0.415)
##
## wmean_Salience_DK_cntr_cap_year_t_trilogue_imputed 0.144* 0.162** 0.147* 0.115
## (0.080) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081)
##
## cntr_polarization_t_trilogue_imputed -0.125 -0.077 -0.124 -0.123
## (0.076) (0.077) (0.077) (0.077)
##
## weighted.mean_EU_position_lowe -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.058***
## (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
##
## n_comm_consulted -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.051*** -0.053***
## (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
##
## NEW_LR_Proposal_Probability 0.512*** 0.508*** 0.511*** 0.491***
## (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)
##
## factor(as.character(form))Directive 0.382*** 0.358*** 0.382*** 0.376***
## (0.057) (0.058) (0.057) (0.058)
##
## factor(as.character(form))Regulation 0.226*** 0.195*** 0.224*** 0.217***
## (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.056)
##
## PO_oppose_change:cntr_polarization_t_trilogue_imputed 1.811***
## (0.382)
##
## PO_oppose_change:weighted.mean_EU_position_lowe 0.055
## (0.062)
##
## PO_oppose_change:wmean_Salience_DK_cntr_cap_year_t_trilogue_imputed -1.970***
## (0.484)
##
## Constant -2.448*** -2.489*** -2.449*** -2.409***
## (0.122) (0.122) (0.122) (0.123)
##
## -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
## Country FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
## -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
## Observations 5,702 5,702 5,702 5,702
## ===========================================================================================================
## Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
Model set up:
dv: cn_sq_ratio
IV: PO_oppose_change wmean_Salience_DK_cntr_cap_year_t_trilogue_imputed cntr_polarization_t_trilogue_imputed weighted.mean_EU_position_lowe n_comm_consulted NEW_LR_Proposal_Probability +
FE: Form, country_name
Method: GLM quasibinom
##
## Table 2: DV= Mean Probability of the Council maintaining the SQ in EU authoirty
## ===========================================================================================================
## Dependent variable:
## ---------------------------------------
## cn_sq_ratio
## (1) (2) (3) (4)
## -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
## PO_oppose_change 0.467*** 2.107*** 0.313** 1.739***
## (0.098) (0.212) (0.131) (0.359)
##
## wmean_Salience_DK_cntr_cap_year_t_trilogue_imputed -0.090 -0.122* -0.094 -0.137**
## (0.068) (0.067) (0.068) (0.069)
##
## cntr_polarization_t_trilogue_imputed -0.696*** -0.816*** -0.697*** -0.702***
## (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.069)
##
## weighted.mean_EU_position_lowe 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.039***
## (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
##
## n_comm_consulted -0.011* -0.012** -0.011* -0.012**
## (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
##
## NEW_LR_Proposal_Probability 0.103** 0.114*** 0.105** 0.080*
## (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
##
## factor(as.character(form))Directive 0.262*** 0.304*** 0.263*** 0.260***
## (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
##
## factor(as.character(form))Regulation 0.376*** 0.429*** 0.379*** 0.373***
## (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051)
##
## PO_oppose_change:cntr_polarization_t_trilogue_imputed -3.296***
## (0.376)
##
## PO_oppose_change:weighted.mean_EU_position_lowe -0.095*
## (0.054)
##
## PO_oppose_change:wmean_Salience_DK_cntr_cap_year_t_trilogue_imputed -1.544***
## (0.419)
##
## Constant -0.835*** -0.750*** -0.838*** -0.778***
## (0.105) (0.105) (0.105) (0.106)
##
## -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
## Country FE? Yes Yes Yes Yes
## -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
## Observations 5,453 5,453 5,453 5,453
## ===========================================================================================================
## Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01
When the public becomes highly critical of the EU engagment in the policy area by the time of negotitiations start, the council is less likely to adhere to the SQ if the public is divided; BUT They will listen and maintain the SQ when the public is NOT polarized and critical of the EU.
The Council position is more likely to respond to the changes in public preferences over EU policy action (between the time proposals was initiated by the Commission and the time when the negotiations started,) in the Member States governed by pro-EU governments than in the Member States governed by Euroskeptic governments
Likelihood of the Council adhering to the SQ position increases for non-salient issues as the opposition to the EU action in policy domain increases from the time of proposals till the time of negotiations.