Introduction

What is the gap in the literature?
Why is it important this gap is filled?
What are the consequences of filling this gap?

Literature review

What is Scouse identity?
Brief history of Scouse identity
How is Scouse identity portrayed today?

Research Questions

What are the values associated with holding a Scouse identity?
How does the Scouse identity compare with other place-based identities across the UK?

Data and methodology

This study makes use of two datasets: the British Election Study and a poll of voters from across Merseyside, commissioned by the author and conducted by Panelbase. The poll has a representative sample of 616 voters from across Merseyside and the questions used were taken from the British Election Study to allow for direct comparison between the two datasets.

For respondents in the British Election Study, waves 15 (March 2019) to 21 (May 2021) were used, and for all variables used the respondent’s most recent response for a given variable. This was done to maximise the response rate across all the variables used.

The control variables for this study are gender, age (as an ordered factor, from ‘<25’, ‘25-34’, ‘35-44’, ‘45-54’, ‘55-64’, and ‘65+’), socio-economic group (ABC1 and C2DE), income (as an ordered factor, ‘Under £8,500’, ‘£8,500 — £13,499’, ‘£13,500 — £23,999’, ‘£24,000 — £33,999’, ‘£34,000 — £49,999’, ‘£50,000 — £70,000’, and ‘Over £70,000’).

The dependent variables used include the British Election Study’s left-right, authoritarian-libertarian, and populism scales, as well as an equality scale based on respondents’ views on whether attempts at equality for women, gays, and ethnic minorities has gone too far, and an immigration scale based on whether respondents view immigration as positive or not along cultural and economic dimensions.

In order to measure identity, respondents were asked to rank how strongly they associated with a given identity on a scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very strongly). In the Merseyside survey respondents were asked how Scouse they on the same scale, as well as whether they would consider themselves a Scouser (as a binary yes/no question). The identities used in this study are English, Scottish, Welsh, British, European and Scouse.

In order to answer the research questions, a series of regression model are presented, with the dependent variable being a given political value measured on a 5-point scale ranging from 0 to 4.

Results and analysis

This analysis begins by identifying the mean placement for each identity of interest across each political value explored. This is done in figure 1. Each row represents respondents within each country of Great Britain, from the British Election Study, and the final column represents respondents from the Merseyside survey. To that end, ‘sub-state identity’ refers to Englishness in England, Scottishness in Scotland, Welshness in Wales and Scouseness in Merseyside. Britishness is broken down across each area in order to test the findings of Henderson and Wyn Jones, who argue that Britishness means different things in different parts of Britain, and that “many of the attitudes that attach to Englishness in England attach to Britishness in Scotland and Wales” (Henderson and Wyn Jones 2021, 6).

Figure 1: TBC

Starting with left-right placement, we can see that, generally speaking, the mean values are quite closely clustered and all tend to hover between 1 and 1.5 on our scale. In the case of Englishness, strong identifiers are, on average, more right-wing than weak or none identifiers, whereas the reverse is true for Scottish, Welsh and Scouse identifiers. Britishness plays out the same across three nations, although the gap between strong and none identifiers is larger in Scotland and Wales than it is in England. European identity also plays out the same.

In terms of authoritarian-libertarian values, Englishness shows a clear difference between strong identifiers, who are more authoritarian, and weak/none. In contrast, the means for Scottish, Welsh and Scouse identifiers does not differ much from those who do not identify as these identities. Like with left-right values, when it comes to authoritarian-libertarian values Britishness plays out the same across all areas, with respondents who identify as strongly British averaging a higher authoritarian score than those who do not. For Europeanness, a strong European identity is associated with a lower authoritarian mean value, and this is consistent across all areas.

When it comes to populist values, English and Scouse identifiers are more populist than weak or none identifiers, whereas the gap between Scottish and Welsh identities is narrower. British identifiers tend to be slightly more populist than non-identifiers, but not by much. European identifiers tend to be much less populist too. These latter two relationships are not seen in the Merseyside sample, where the strong and weak British and European identifiers return equal mean populist values.

Finally, we see a similar pattern for pro-equality and pro-immigration values. English identifiers have lower mean values on both counts than weak or none identifiers, whereas there are no large differences among Scottish, Welsh and Scouse identifiers. Holding a British identity is associated with lower levels of pro-equality and pro-immigration sentiment in in England, Scotland, and Wales, whereas the reverse is true for holding a European identity.

What does this tell us? Firstly, Britishness and English have similar value profiles and this does not seem to change based on where in Great Britain we look. The European identity also operates in a broadly uniform way across the country, and has the opposite value profile to Britishness/Englishness. The Scouse identity shows some differentiation insofar as identifiers are more left-wing and populist than non-identifiers. The value profiles for Scottish and Welsh identity do not show much of a range compared to the value profiles of Englishness, Britishness and Europeanness, which is an interesting point that will be explored in further detail below.

While enlightening, the above analysis was largely descriptive and based simply on group means. We can use regression analysis to explore the relationship between strength of a given identity and holding certain values, while controlling for basic socio-demographic variables, in this case gender, age, class, and income.

The coefficient estimates for each identity are shown in figure 2, and the full regression tables are provided in appendix 1. Relationships which are statistically significant are in blue and represented by a triangle, with the lines representing the 95% confidence interval. All models control for gender, age, class and income.

Figure 2: TBC

The analysis clearly shows that the Scouse identity is associated with left-wing and populist values. Scouseness is also associated with being less authoritarian, less pro-immigration, and more pro-equality but these estimates are not statistically significant at the 95% level.

The European, Welsh and Scottish identities are also associated with a greater likelihood of holding left-wing values, but beyond that there are key differences. Europeanness is associated with left-wing, anti-authoritarian and anti-populist values, as well as a strong pro-equality and pro-immigration hue. Welsh identity, on the other hand, is associated with being left-wing (although less so than Scouse, European, and Scottish identity), more authoritarian and slightly less pro-immigration whereas the Scottish identity is associated with left-wing, populist, pro-equality and pro-immigration sentiment. On the whole, the Scouse value profile looks more akin to the Scottish identity than the more geographically proximate Welsh identity (which is also especially interesting given Liverpool has often been referred to as the capital of North Wales).

Finally, Britishness and Englishness look fairly similar across the board: both are associated with an increased likelihood of being right wing, authoritarian, populist (less so for British identity), against attempts to expand quality initiatives and anti-immigration. All relationships here are statistically significant. Further analysis, not presented here, finds that estimates for Europeanness and Britishness on a separate nation-by-nation regression analysis all act in the expected direction and are all statistically significant, except for the impact of Britishness on holding populist values in Scotland, which is not statistically significant.

Given the focus of this study is classifying the value profile of the Scouse identity, it would be the case that the above analysis Scottish identity is strongly correlated with European identity and thus what we might be attributing to the Scouse identity is actually due to holding an associated identity rather than Scouse itself. We can test this through a regression model which includes other identities as controls. This coefficient estimates for all variables in each model, including controls, are shown in 3, with the full table presented as table 7 in appendix 1.

Figure 3: TBC

We see that, controlling for other identities, the Scouse identity is statistically significantly associated with left-wing values and populist values. Of the other statistically significant variables, we see that Englishness and Europeanness are diametrically opposed on authoritarian, populism, equality and immigration, whereas, compared to what was shown in figure 2, the significance of Britishness across all variables but authoritarianism — which still acts in the same direction — has disappeared.

The final aspect of this analysis involves the mapping out the Scouse identity’s value profile relative to other identities, rather than relative to not holding that identity. To do this, we utilise Henderson et al’s relative territorial identity (RTI) measure, which aims “to capture the priority given to sub-state or state-level identity” (Henderson et al. 2021). We will present three RTIs of interest, presenting the Scouse identity relative to an English, a British, and a European identity.

An RTI measure is generated thus: firstly, respondents are asked to place themselves on a scale of 1 to 7 based on how strongly they identify with a given identity, with 7 being the strongest and 1 the weakest. The respondent’s Englishness/Britishness/Europeanness score is then subtracted from their sub-state identity score to produce a 13-point measure of relative identity, which is then rescaled to between -1 and 1. A measure of -1 means a respondent is completely English/British/European not Scouse, whereas +1 means the respondent is completely Scouse and not English/British/European. 0 means that a respondent holds both identities equally. For comparison, we also include Scottish and Welsh identities in the measures. The regression coefficients are shown in figure 4.

Figure 4: TBC

Onec again starting with the Scouse identity, we can see that relative to European, British, and English identities Scouse is still more left-wing. This is similar to the case of the Scottish and Welsh identities compared to the British identity, but not the case when these identities are compared to the European one. English identity is more right-wing than both the British and the European identity. As such, we can say the Scouse identity is the most left-wing, followed by European identities and then the Scottish and Welsh identities.

The Scouse identity is also less authoritarian than Britishness or Englishness, but slightly more so than Europeanness (although it is worth noting that no identity is less authoritarian, and of all the comparisons Scouseness is the more authoritarian by the lowest amount). The British identity is more authoritarian than all others bar Englishness. Thus, the Scouse identity is the second most non-authoritarian after Europeanness.

Interestingly, the Scouse identity is no more populist than the English identity, whereas it is more populist than both the British and European identity. The Welsh identity is no more populist than the British identity, but is more populist than the European identity. All identities are more populist than the European identity.

Finally, the Scouse identity just as pro-equality and pro-immigration as the British identity, moreso than the English and less so than the European. We see the same patter across both variables ofr all identities. European, Scottish and Welsh are more progressive than Britishness, but less so than Europeanness. Englishless is the least progressive identity out of those sampled.

So, it is fair to describe the Scouse identity as a left-wing populist one. Placed into a comparative ranking, the Scouse identity is more left-wing than other identities, and just as populist as the English identity but moreso than British and European identities. It is less authoritarian than English and British identities. While it is more progressive on questions of equality and immigration than the English identity, it is on par with the British identity and less progressive than the European identity.

Conclusion

What has this study shown?
Why is this important?
What next?

Bibliography

Academic Sources

Henderson, Ailsa, Ed Gareth Poole, Richard Wyn Jones, Daniel Wincott, Jac Larner, and Charlie Jeffery. 2021. “Analysing Vote-Choice in a Multinational State: National Identity and Territorial Differentiation in the 2016 Brexit Vote.” Regional Studies 55 (9): 1502–1516. doi:10.1080/00343404.2020.1813883.

Henderson, Ailsa, and Richard Wyn Jones. 2021. Englishness: The Political Force Transforming Britain. First. Oxford University Press. doi:10.1093/oso/9780198870784.001.0001.

R Packages

Appendix

Appendix 1: Basic Regression Outputs

Table 1: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.08 ***	-0.01	0.00	-0.23 ***	-0.11 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.06 ***	0.11 ***	-0.00	-0.10 ***	-0.11 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ABC1	0.09 ***	-0.20 ***	-0.16 ***	0.09 ***	0.25 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.08 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.07 ***	0.00	0.05 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Britishness	0.11 ***	0.15 ***	0.02 ***	-0.10 ***	-0.14 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	42628	42093	19387	31808	40848
R2	0.09	0.16	0.07	0.10	0.12
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 2: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.07 ***	-0.01	0.01	-0.23 ***	-0.11 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.06 ***	0.09 ***	-0.01	-0.09 ***	-0.09 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ABC1	0.11 ***	-0.16 ***	-0.15 ***	0.06 ***	0.21 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.09 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.06 ***	0.00	0.04 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Englishness	0.09 ***	0.18 ***	0.08 ***	-0.14 ***	-0.21 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	33410	33069	15115	26105	31878
R2	0.09	0.22	0.10	0.15	0.18
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 3: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.12 ***	-0.07 *	-0.05	-0.22 ***	-0.07
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.06 ***	0.13 ***	-0.02	-0.11 ***	-0.11 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ABC1	0.06 ***	-0.18 ***	-0.15 ***	0.09 ***	0.26 ***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income	0.08 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.07 ***	-0.00	0.04 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Scottishness	-0.06 ***	-0.00	0.03 ***	0.02 *	0.03 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	4180	4094	1935	3194	3960
R2	0.06	0.07	0.07	0.05	0.06
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 4: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.09 **	-0.01	0.01	-0.25 ***	-0.19 ***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Age	0.07 ***	0.13 ***	-0.00	-0.11 ***	-0.10 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
ABC1	0.10 ***	-0.25 ***	-0.20 ***	0.08 *	0.28 ***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Income	0.06 ***	-0.02	-0.06 ***	0.01	0.06 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Welshness	-0.02 **	0.02 *	0.01	0.01	-0.02 *
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	2467	2432	1210	1921	2396
R2	0.04	0.09	0.06	0.06	0.07
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 5: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.08 ***	-0.01	0.01	-0.23 ***	-0.12 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.07 ***	0.12 ***	-0.01 **	-0.10 ***	-0.10 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ABC1	0.12 ***	-0.14 ***	-0.12 ***	0.04 ***	0.15 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.09 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.01 **	0.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Europeanness	-0.08 ***	-0.18 ***	-0.11 ***	0.16 ***	0.28 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
N	42486	41964	19360	31764	40762
R2	0.09	0.25	0.15	0.20	0.32
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 6: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.02	0.00	0.00	-0.41 ***	-0.21 *
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Age	-0.04 *	0.10 ***	-0.03	-0.10 ***	-0.14 ***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ABC1	-0.07	-0.14 **	-0.03	0.06	0.19 *
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Income	0.06 **	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Scouseness	-0.06 ***	-0.01	0.04 **	0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	562	562	562	562	562
R2	0.06	0.06	0.03	0.09	0.06
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 7: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	0.03	0.11	0.01	-0.44 ***	-0.30 **
	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Age	-0.05 *	0.06 **	-0.04 *	-0.07 **	-0.08 *
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ABC1	-0.06	-0.07	-0.01	0.02	0.10
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)
Income	0.06 **	0.03	-0.03	-0.02	-0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Scouseness	-0.07 ***	-0.01	0.04 **	0.02	-0.01
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Englishness	0.03	0.12 ***	0.04 *	-0.08 **	-0.14 ***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Britishness	0.04	0.05 *	-0.02	0.02	-0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Europeanness	-0.01	-0.08 ***	-0.04 **	0.08 ***	0.19 ***
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	562	562	562	562	562
R2	0.08	0.24	0.06	0.15	0.21
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Appendix 2: RTI Regression Outputs

Table 8: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	0.02	0.04	-0.00	-0.43 ***	-0.25 *
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Age	-0.05 *	0.08 ***	-0.03	-0.09 ***	-0.11 **
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ABC1	-0.06	-0.12 *	-0.03	0.05	0.18 *
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Income	0.06 **	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
RTI_eng_scouse	-0.36 ***	-0.41 ***	0.05	0.27 ***	0.36 ***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)
N	562	562	562	562	562
R2	0.07	0.12	0.02	0.11	0.07
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 9: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	0.03	0.05	-0.02	-0.43 ***	-0.24 *
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)
Age	-0.05 *	0.09 ***	-0.03	-0.10 ***	-0.13 ***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)
ABC1	-0.06	-0.13 **	-0.04	0.06	0.19 *
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Income	0.06 **	0.02	-0.03	-0.01	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
RTI_brit_scouse	-0.37 ***	-0.32 ***	0.12 *	0.15	0.18
	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.11)
N	562	562	562	562	562
R2	0.08	0.10	0.02	0.10	0.06
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 10: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.02	0.00	-0.00	-0.41 ***	-0.21 *
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.10)
Age	-0.03	0.11 ***	-0.04	-0.10 ***	-0.14 ***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
ABC1	-0.08	-0.13 **	-0.02	0.06	0.16 *
	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)
Income	0.06 **	0.03	-0.03	-0.02	0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
RTI_eur_scouse	-0.19 **	0.22 ***	0.23 ***	-0.19 *	-0.58 ***
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.10)
N	562	562	562	562	562
R2	0.04	0.08	0.05	0.10	0.11
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 11: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.08 ***	-0.02	0.01	-0.23 ***	-0.10 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.08 ***	0.13 ***	-0.00	-0.12 ***	-0.14 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ABC1	0.10 ***	-0.19 ***	-0.15 ***	0.08 ***	0.23 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.09 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.07 ***	0.00	0.05 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
RTI_brit_eng	0.17 ***	0.56 ***	0.42 ***	-0.56 ***	-0.86 ***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
N	33952	33613	15673	26654	32421
R2	0.06	0.13	0.09	0.10	0.12
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 12: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.07 ***	-0.01	0.01	-0.24 ***	-0.13 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.05 ***	0.09 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.08 ***	-0.07 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ABC1	0.12 ***	-0.14 ***	-0.14 ***	0.04 ***	0.17 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.09 ***	-0.02 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.01 *	0.03 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
RTI_brit_eur	-0.50 ***	-0.92 ***	-0.41 ***	0.76 ***	1.26 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	42439	41922	19348	31740	40717
R2	0.12	0.29	0.13	0.21	0.31
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 13: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.07 ***	-0.00	0.01	-0.24 ***	-0.12 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age	0.05 ***	0.08 ***	-0.03 ***	-0.07 ***	-0.06 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
ABC1	0.13 ***	-0.12 ***	-0.12 ***	0.02 **	0.13 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Income	0.09 ***	-0.01 ***	-0.06 ***	-0.01 ***	0.02 ***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
RTI_eur_eng	0.41 ***	0.88 ***	0.47 ***	-0.74 ***	-1.25 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
N	33845	33516	15651	26611	32357
R2	0.11	0.31	0.16	0.23	0.35
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 14: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.08 *	0.01	0.02	-0.26 ***	-0.20 ***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Age	0.05 ***	0.11 ***	-0.01	-0.09 ***	-0.08 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
ABC1	0.10 ***	-0.25 ***	-0.20 ***	0.08 *	0.28 ***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)
Income	0.06 ***	-0.02	-0.05 ***	0.01	0.06 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
RTI_brit_welsh	-0.30 ***	-0.25 ***	-0.04	0.33 ***	0.25 ***
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
N	2466	2432	1209	1920	2395
R2	0.07	0.10	0.06	0.09	0.08
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 15: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.10 **	-0.03	-0.01	-0.24 ***	-0.16 ***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.08 ***	0.14 ***	-0.00	-0.11 ***	-0.11 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)
ABC1	0.11 ***	-0.19 ***	-0.17 ***	0.02	0.19 ***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Income	0.06 ***	-0.01	-0.05 ***	0.00	0.05 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
RTI_eur_welsh	0.16 ***	0.61 ***	0.44 ***	-0.49 ***	-0.93 ***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
N	2457	2425	1206	1918	2392
R2	0.05	0.20	0.14	0.12	0.23
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 16: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.12 ***	-0.08 **	-0.06	-0.22 ***	-0.07 *
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.04 ***	0.12 ***	-0.01	-0.09 ***	-0.09 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ABC1	0.06 ***	-0.19 ***	-0.15 ***	0.10 ***	0.26 ***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Income	0.07 ***	-0.04 ***	-0.08 ***	0.00	0.04 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
RTI_brit_scot	-0.52 ***	-0.39 ***	0.06 *	0.34 ***	0.47 ***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
N	4170	4087	1930	3190	3952
R2	0.15	0.12	0.07	0.09	0.10
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Table 17: TBC
	Left-right	Authoritarian	Populist	Pro-Equality	Pro-Immigration
Male	-0.10 ***	-0.03	-0.04	-0.25 ***	-0.12 ***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.05 ***	0.11 ***	-0.02	-0.09 ***	-0.08 ***
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
ABC1	0.09 ***	-0.12 ***	-0.12 ***	0.05	0.18 ***
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Income	0.08 ***	-0.02 *	-0.07 ***	-0.01	0.02 *
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
RTI_eur_scot	0.19 ***	0.76 ***	0.47 ***	-0.62 ***	-0.99 ***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)
N	4165	4082	1931	3186	3949
R2	0.05	0.19	0.14	0.14	0.21
* p < 0.001; p < 0.01; * p < 0.05.

Understanding Scouse identity: values in a comparative perspective

Version 0.00

20 May 2022