[1] "Chief Justice BURGER announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and II, and an opinion with respect to Part III, in which Justice POWELL and Justice REHNQUIST join. "
[2] "The question presented is whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First amendment **2150 compels the Government to accommodate a religiously based objection to the statutory requirements that a Social Security number be provided by an applicant seeking to receive certain welfare benefits and that the States use these numbers in administering the benefit programs. "
[3] "I "
[4] "Appellees Stephen J. Roy and Karen Miller applied for and received benefits under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program and the Food Stamp program. They refused to comply, however, with the requirement, contained in 42 U.S.C. \xa4 602(a)(25)1 and 7 U.S.C. \xa4 2025(e), that participants in these programs furnish their state welfare agencies with the Social Security numbers of the members of their household as a condition of receiving benefits. Appellees contended that obtaining a Social Security number for their 2-year-old daughter, Little Bird of the Snow, would violate their Native American religious beliefs. The Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare thereafter terminated AFDC and medical benefits payable to appellees on the child's behalf and instituted proceedings to reduce the level of food stamps that appellees' household was receiving. Appellees then filed this action against the Secretary of the Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary of Agriculture, arguing that the Free Exercise Clause entitled them to an exemption from the Social Security number requirement. In their complaint, *696 appellees stated that \xd2[t]he sole basis\xd3 for the denial of welfare benefits was \xd2Mr. Roy's refusal to obtain a Social Security Number for Little Bird of the Snow,\xd3 and thus requested injunctive relief, damages, and benefits. In the statement of \xd2undisputed facts,\xd3 the parties agreed that Little Bird of the Snow did not have a Social Security number. "
[5] "At trial, Roy testified that he had recently developed a religious objection to obtaining a Social Security number for Little Bird of the Snow.2 Roy is a Native American descended from the Abenaki Tribe, and he asserts a religious belief that control over one's life is essential to spiritual purity and indispensable to \xd2becoming a holy person.\xd3 Based on recent conversations with an Abenaki chief, Roy believes that technology is \xd2robbing the spirit of man.\xd3 In order to prepare his daughter for greater spiritual power, therefore, Roy testified to his belief that he must keep her person and spirit unique and that the uniqueness of the Social Security number as an identifier, coupled with the other uses of the number over which she has no control, will serve to \xd2rob the spirit\xd3 of his daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power. "
[6] "For purposes of determining the breadth of Roy's religious concerns, the trial judge raised the possibility of using the phonetics of his daughter's name to derive a Social Security number. Although Roy saw \xd2a lot of good\xd3 in this suggestion, he stated it would violate his religious beliefs because the special number still would apply uniquely and identify her. Roy also testified that his religious objection would not be satisfied even if the Social Security Administration appended the daughter's full tribal name to her Social Security number. "
[7] "*697 In Roy's own testimony, he emphasized the evil that would flow simply from obtaining a number.3 On the last day of **2151 trial, however, a federal officer inquired whether Little Bird of the Snow already had a Social Security number; he learned that a number had been assigned\xd1under first name \xd2Little,\xd3 middle name \xd2Bird of the Snow,\xd3 and last name \xd2Roy.\xd3 "
[8] "The Government at this point suggested that the case had become moot because, under Roy's beliefs, Little Bird of the Snow's spirit had already been \xd2robbed.\xd3 Roy, however, was recalled to the stand and testified that her spirit would be robbed only by \xd2use\xd3 of the number. Since no known use of the number had yet been made, Roy expressed his belief that her spirit had not been damaged. The District Court concluded that the case was not moot because of Roy's beliefs regarding \xd2use\xd3 of the number. See Roy v. Cohen, 590 F.Supp. 600, 605 (MD Pa.1984) (finding of fact 33) (\xd2Roy believes that the establishment of a social security number for Little Bird of the Snow, without more, has not \xd4robbed her spirit,\xd5 but widespread use of the social security number by the federal or state governments in their computer systems would have that effect\xd3). "
[9] "After hearing all of the testimony, the District Court denied appellees' request for damages and benefits, but granted injunctive relief. Based on the testimony of the Government's experts and the obvious fact that many people share certain names, the District Court found that \xd2[u]tilization in *698 the computer system of the name of a benefit recipient alone frequently is not sufficient to ensure the proper payment of benefits.\xd3 The court nevertheless concluded that the public \xd2interest in maintaining an efficient and fraud resistant system can be met without requiring use of a social security number for Little Bird of the Snow,\xd3 elaborating: "
[10] "\xd2It appears to the Court that the harm that the Government might suffer if [appellees] prevailed in this case would be, at worst, that one or perhaps a few individuals could fraudulently obtain welfare benefits. Such a result would obtain only if (1) Little Bird of the Snow attempted fraudulently to obtain welfare benefits or someone else attempted fraudulently to obtain such benefits using Little Bird of the Snow's name and (2) identification procedures available to the Defendants that do not require utilization of a social security number failed to expose the fraud. This possibility appears to the Court to be remote.\xd3 Id., at 612\xd0613. "
[11] "Citing our decision in United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982), the court entered an injunction containing two basic components. First, the Secretary of Health and Human Services was \xd2permanently restrained from making any use of the social security number which was issued in the name of Little Bird of the Snow Roy and from disseminating the number to any agency, individual, business entity, or any other third party.\xd3 Second, the federal and state defendants were enjoined until Little Bird of the Snow's 16th birthday from denying Roy cash assistance, medical assistance, and food stamps \xd2because of the [appellees'] refusal to provide a social security number for her.\xd3 "
[12] "We noted probable jurisdiction, 472 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 3474, 87 L.Ed.2d 611 (1985), and we vacate and remand. "
[13] "*699 II "
[14] "Appellees raise a constitutional challenge to two features of the statutory scheme here.4 They object to Congress' requirement **2152 that a state AFDC plan \xd2must ... provide (A) that, as a condition of eligibility under the plan, each applicant for or recipient of aid shall furnish to the State agency his social security account number.\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4 602(a)(25) (emphasis added). They also object to Congress' requirement that \xd2such State agency shall utilize such account numbers ... in the administration of such plan.\xd3 Ibid. (emphasis added).5 We analyze each of these contentions, turning to the latter contention first. "
[15] "1Our cases have long recognized a distinction between the freedom of individual belief, which is absolute, and the freedom of individual conduct, which is not absolute. This case implicates only the latter concern. Roy objects to the statutory requirement that state agencies \xd2shall utilize\xd3 Social Security numbers not because it places any restriction on what he may believe or what he may do, but because he believes the use of the number may harm his daughter's spirit. "
[16] "234Never to our knowledge has the Court interpreted the First Amendment to require the Government itself to behave in ways that the individual believes will further his or her spiritual development or that of his or her family. The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just as the Government may not insist that appellees engage in *700 any set form of religious observance, so appellees may not demand that the Government join in their chosen religious practices by refraining from using a number to identify their daughter. \xd2[T]he Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can extract from the government.\xd3 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1798, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring). "
[17] "As a result, Roy may no more prevail on his religious objection to the Government's use of a Social Security number for his daughter than he could on a sincere religious objection to the size or color of the Government's filing cabinets. The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures. "
[18] "As Roy points out, eight years ago Congress passed a Joint Resolution concerning American Indian religious freedom that provides guidance with respect to this case. As currently codified, the Resolution provides: "
[19] "\xd2On and after August 11, 1978, it shall be the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions of the American Indian, Eskimo, Aleut, and Native Hawaiians, including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4 1996. "
[20] "That Resolution\xd1with its emphasis on protecting the freedom to believe, express, and exercise a religion\xd1accurately identifies the mission of the Free Exercise Clause itself. The Federal Government's use of a Social Security number for Little Bird of the Snow does not itself in any degree impair Roy's \xd2freedom to believe, express, and exercist\xd3 his religion. *701 6 consequently, **2153 appellees' objection to the statutory requirement that each state agency \xd2shall utilize\xd3 a Social Security number in the administration of its plan is without merit. It follows that their request for an injunction against use of the Social Security number in processing benefit applications should have been rejected. We therefore hold that the portion of the District Court's injunction that permanently restrained the Secretary from making any use of the Social Security number that had been issued in the name of Little Bird of the Snow Roy must be vacated. "
[21] "III "
[22] "5Roy also challenges Congress' requirement that a state AFDC plan \xd2must ... provide (A) that, as a condition of eligibility under the plan, each applicant for or recipient of aid shall furnish to the State agency his social security account number.\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4 602(a)(25) (emphasis added).7 The *702 First Amendment's guarantee that \xd2Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise\xd3 of religion holds an important place in our scheme of ordered liberty, but the Court has steadfastly maintained that claims of religious conviction do not automatically entitle a person to fix unilaterally the conditions and terms of dealings with the Government. Not all burdens on religion are unconstitutional. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 8 Otto 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879). This was treated recently in United States v. Lee: "
[23] "\xd2To maintain an organized society that guarantees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some religious practices yield to the common good. Religious beliefs can be accommodated, but there is a point at which accommodation would \xd4radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature.\xd5 \xd3 455 U.S., at 259, 102 S.Ct., at 1056. "
[24] "*703 The statutory requirement that applicants provide a Social Security number is wholly neutral in religious terms and uniformly applicable. There is no claim that **2154 there is any attempt by Congress to discriminate invidiously or any covert suppression of particular religious beliefs. The administrative requirement does not create any danger of censorship8 or place a direct condition or burden on the dissemination of religious views.9 It does not intrude on the organization of a religious institution10 or school.11 It may indeed confront some applicants for benefits with choices, but in no sense does it affirmatively compel appellees, by threat of sanctions, to refrain from religiously motivated conduct12 or to engage in conduct that they find objectionable for religious reasons.13 Rather, it is appellees who seek benefits from the Government and who assert that, because of certain religious beliefs, they should be excused from compliance with a condition that is binding on all other persons who seek the same benefits from the Government. "
[25] "This is far removed from the historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See generally M. Malbin, Religion and Politics: The Intentions of the Authors of the First Amendment (1978). We are not unmindful of the importance of many government benefits today or of the value of sincerely held religious beliefs. *704 However, while we do not believe that no government compulsion is involved, we cannot ignore the reality that denial of such benefits by a uniformly applicable statute neutral on its face is of a wholly different, less intrusive nature than affirmative compulsion or prohibition, by threat of penal sanctions, for conduct that has religious implications. "
[26] "This distinction is clearly revealed in the Court's opinions. Decisions rejecting religiously based challenges have often recited the fact that a mere denial of a governmental benefit by a uniformly applicable statute does not constitute infringement of religious liberty. In Hamilton v. Regents of University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 55 S.Ct. 197, 79 L.Ed. 343 (1934), for example, the Court rejected a religious challenge by students to military courses required as part of their curriculum, explaining: "
[27] "\xd2The fact that they are able to pay their way in this university but not in any other institution in California is without significance upon any constitutional or other question here involved. California has not drafted or called them to attend the university. They are seeking education offered by the State and at the same time insisting that they be excluded from the prescribed course solely upon grounds of their religious beliefs and conscientious objections to war....\xd3 Id., at 262, 55 S.Ct., at 204.14 "
[28] "**2155 In cases upholding First Amendment challenges, on the other hand, the Court has often relied on the showing that compulsion of certain activity with religious significance was involved. *705 In West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), for example, the Court distinguished the earlier Hamilton holding and upheld a challenge to a flag salute requirement: "
[29] "\xd2Here ... we are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief.... This issue is not prejudiced by the Court's previous holding that where a State, without compelling attendance, extends college facilities to pupils who voluntarily enroll, it may prescribe military training as part of the course without offense to the Constitution. It was held that those who take advantage of its opportunities may not on ground of conscience refuse compliance with such conditions. Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245 [55 S.Ct. 197, 79 L.Ed. 343]. In the present case attendance is not optional.\xd3 319 U.S., at 631\xd0632, 63 S.Ct., at 1182.15 "
[30] "The distinction between governmental compulsion and conditions relating to governmental benefits contained in these two cases was emphasized by Justice BRENNAN in his concurring opinion in Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963): "
[31] "\xd2The different results of Hamilton and Barnette are attributable only in part to a difference in the strength of the particular state interests which the respective statutes were designed to serve. Far more significant is the fact that Hamilton dealt with the voluntary attendance at college of young adults, while Barnette involved the compelled attendance of young children at elementary and secondary schools. This distinction warrants a difference in constitutional results.\xd3 Id., at 252\xd0253, 83 S.Ct., at 1587 (footnote omitted). "
[32] "*706 We have repeatedly emphasized this distinction: In rejecting a Free Exercise challenge in Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603\xd0604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2034\xd035, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983), for example, we observed that the \xd2[d]enial of tax benefits will inevitably have a substantial impact on the operation of private religious schools, but will not prevent those schools from observing their religious tenets.\xd316 "
[33] "We conclude then that government regulation that indirectly and incidentally calls for a choice between securing a governmental benefit and adherence to religious beliefs is wholly different from governmental action or legislation that criminalizes religiously inspired activity or inescapably **2156 compels conduct that some find objectionable for religious reasons. Although the denial of government benefits over religious objection can raise serious Free Exercise problems, these two very different forms of government action are not governed by the same constitutional standard. A governmental burden on religious liberty is not insulated from review simply because it is indirect, Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717\xd0718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1432, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S., at 404, 83 S.Ct., at 1794); *707 but the nature of the burden is relevant to the standard the government must meet to justify the burden. "
[34] "The general governmental interests involved here buttress this conclusion. Governments today grant a broad range of benefits; inescapably at the same time the administration of complex programs requires certain conditions and restrictions. Although in some situations a mechanism for individual consideration will be created, a policy decision by a government that it wishes to treat all applicants alike and that it does not wish to become involved in case-by-case inquiries into the genuineness of each religious objection to such condition or restrictions is entitled to substantial deference. Moreover, legitimate interests are implicated in the need to avoid any appearance of favoring religious over nonreligious applicants. "
[35] "The test applied in cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), is not appropriate in this setting. In the enforcement of a facially neutral and uniformly applicable requirement for the administration of welfare programs reaching many millions of people, the Government is entitled to wide latitude. The Government should not be put to the strict test applied by the District Court; that standard required the Government to justify enforcement of the use of Social Security number requirement as the least restrictive means of accomplishing a compelling state interest.17 Absent proof of an intent to discriminate against particular religious beliefs or against religion in general, the Government *708 meets its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest. "
[36] "We reject appellees' contention that Sherbert and Thomas compel affirmance. The statutory conditions at issue in those cases provided that a person was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if, \xd2without good cause,\xd3 he had quit work or refused available work. The \xd2good cause\xd3 standard created a mechanism for individualized exemptions. If a state creates such a mechanism, its refusal to extend an exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory intent. Thus, as was urged in Thomas, to consider a religiously motivated resignation to be \xd2without good cause\xd3 tends to exhibit hostility, not neutrality, towards religion. See Brief for Petitioner 15, and Brief for American Jewish Congress as Amicus Curiae 11, in Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Div., O.T.1979, No. 79\xd0952. See also Sherbert, supra, at 401\xd0402, n. 4, 83 S.Ct., at 1792\xd093, n. 4; United States v. Lee, 455 U.S., at 264, n. 3, 102 S.Ct., at 1059, n. 3 (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment) (Thomas and Sherbert may be viewed \xd2as a protection against unequal treatment rather than a grant of favored treatment **2157 for the members of the religious sect\xd3). In those cases, therefore, it was appropriate to require the State to demonstrate a compelling reason for denying the requested exemption. "
[37] "Here there is nothing whatever suggesting antagonism by Congress towards religion generally or towards any particular religious beliefs. The requirement that applicants provide a Social Security number is facially neutral and applies to all applicants for the benefits involved. Congress has made no provision for individual exemptions to the requirement in the two statutes in question. Indeed, to the contrary, Congress has specified that a state AFDC plan \xd2must ... provide (A) that, as a condition of eligibility under the plan, each applicant for or recipient of aid shall furnish to the *709 State agency his social security account number,\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4 602(a)(25) (emphasis added), and that \xd2[s]tate agencies shall (1) require, as a condition of eligibility for participation in the food stamp program, that each household member furnish to the State agency their social security account number,\xd3 7 U.S.C. \xa4 2025(e) (emphasis added). Nor are these requirements relics from the past; Congress made the requirement mandatory for the Food Stamp program in 1981. Compare 7 U.S.C. \xa4 2025(f) (1976 ed., Supp. IV) (State agencies \xd2may\xd3 require that each household member furnish their Social Security number), with 7 U.S.C. \xa4 2025(e) (States \xd2shall\xd3 require that such numbers be furnished). Congress also recently extended to several other aid programs the mandatory requirement that the States use Social Security numbers in verifying eligibility for benefits. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98\xd0369, \xa4 2651(a), 98 Stat. 1147. "
[38] "The Social Security number requirement clearly promotes a legitimate and important public interest. No one can doubt that preventing fraud in these benefits programs is an important goal. As Representative Richmond explained in support of the bill that made the Social Security number requirement mandatory for the Food Stamp program: "
[39] "\xd2We know that however generously motivated Americans may be to furnish resources to the poor to enable them to survive, ... they understandably object if they believe that those resources are being abused or wasted.... "
[40] "\xd2We want to be certain that the food stamp program is run as efficiently and as error-free as possible. "
[41] "\xd2We want applicants and recipients alike constantly to be aware that the Congress does not and will not tolerate any refusal to disclose earnings accurately, and underreporting of welfare or other assistance program benefits, any efforts to evade the work requirement or any other attempts to take advantage of the program and dollars intended only for those who completely satisfy the stringent *710 eligibility requirements set forth in sections 5 and 7 of the Food Stamp Act of 1977 and further tightened this year and in this bill.\xd3 127 Cong.Rec. 24783 (1981). "
[42] "We also think it plain that the Social Security number requirement is a reasonable means of promoting that goal. The programs at issue are of truly staggering magnitude. Each year roughly 3.8 million families receive $7.8 billion through federally funded AFDC programs and 20 million persons receive $11 billion in food stamps. The Social Security program itself is the largest domestic governmental program in the United States today, distributing approximately $51 billion monthly to 36 million recipients. Because of the tremendous administrative problems associated with managing programs of this size, the District Court found that "
[43] "\xd2Social security numbers are used in making the determination that benefits in the programs are properly paid and that there is no duplication of benefits or failure of payment.... Utilization in the computer system of the name of a benefit recipient alone frequently is not sufficient **2158 to ensure the proper payment of benefits.\xd3 "
[44] "Social Security numbers are unique numerical identifiers and are used pervasively in these programs. The numbers are used, for example, to keep track of persons no longer entitled to receive food stamps because of past fraud or abuses of the program. Moreover, the existence of this unique numerical identifier creates opportunities for ferreting out fraudulent applications through computer \xd2matching\xd3 techniques. One investigation, \xd2Project Match,\xd3 compared federal employee files against AFDC and Medicaid files to determine instances of Government employees receiving welfare benefits improperly. Data from 26 States were examined, and 9,000 individuals were identified as receiving duplicate welfare payments. While undoubtedly some fraud escapes detection in spite of such investigations, the President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, known more popularly as the \xd2Grace Commission,\xd3 *711 recently reported that matching \xd2is the Federal Government's most cost-effective tool for verification or investigation in the prevention and detection of fraud, waste and abuse.\xd3 7 The President's Private Sector Survey on Cost Control, Management Office Selected Issues\xd1Information Gap in the Federal Government 90 (1984). "
[45] "The importance of the Social Security number to these matching techniques is illustrated by the facts of this case. The District Court found that \xd2efficient operation of these [matching] programs requires the use of computer systems that utilize unique numerical identifiers such as the social security number.\xd3 590 F.Supp., at 606. It further found that exempting even appellees alone from this requirement could result in \xd2one or perhaps a few individuals ... fraudulently obtain[ing] welfare benefits,\xd3 id., at 612, a prospect the court termed \xd2remote.\xd3 Id., at 613. The District Court's assessment of this probability seems quite dubious.18 But in any event, we know of no case obligating the Government to tolerate a slight risk of \xd2one or perhaps a few individuals\xd3 fraudulently obtaining benefits in order to satisfy a religious objection to a requirement designed to combat that very risk. Appellees may not use the Free Exercise Clause to demand *712 Government benefits, but only on their own terms, particularly where that insistence works a demonstrable disadvantage to the Government in the administration of the programs. "
[46] "As the Court has recognized before, given the diversity of beliefs in our pluralistic society and the necessity of providing governments with sufficient operating latitude, some incidental neutral restraints on the free exercise of religion are inescapable. As a matter of legislative policy, a legislature might decide to make religious accommodations to a general and neutral system of awarding benefits,19 \xd2[b]ut our concern is not with the wisdom of legislation but with its constitutional limitation.\xd3 **2159 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 608, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1148, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion). We conclude that the Congress' refusal to grant appellees a special exemption does not violate the Free Exercise Clause. "
[47] "The judgment of the District Court is vacated, and the case is remanded. "
[48] "It is so ordered. "
[49] "Mr. Chief Justice WARREN announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice CLARK, and Mr. Justice WHITTAKER concur. "
[50] "This case concerns the constitutional validity of the application to appellants of the Pennsylvania criminal statute,1 enacted in 1959, which proscribes the Sunday retail sale of certain enumerated commodities. Among the questions presented are whether the statute is a law *601 respecting an establishment of religion and whether the statute violates equal protection. Since both of these questions, **1145 in reference to this very statute, have already been answered in the negative, Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 81 S.Ct. 1135, 6 L.Ed.2d 551, and since appellants present nothing new regarding them, they need not be considered here. Thus the only question for consideration is whether the statute interferes with the free exercise of appellants' religion. "
[51] "Appellants are merchants in Philadelphia who engage in the retail sale of clothing and home furnishings within the proscription of the statute in issue. Each of the appellants is a member of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which requires the closing of their places of business and a total abstention from all manner of work from nightfall each Friday until nightfall each Saturday. They instituted a suit in the court below seeking a permanent injunction against the enforcement of the 1959 statute. Their complaint, as amended, alleged that appellants had previously kept their places of business open on Sunday; that each of appellants had done a substantial amount of business on Sunday, compensating somewhat for their closing on Saturday; that Sunday closing will result in impairing the ability of all appellants to earn a livelihood and will render appellant Braunfeld unable to continue in his business, thereby losing his capital investment; that the statute is unconstitutional for the reasons stated above. "
[52] "A three-judge court was properly convened and it dismissed the complaint on the authority of the Two Guys from Harrison case. 184 F.Supp. 352. On appeal brought under 28 U.S.C. s 1253, 28 U.S.C.A. s 1253, we noted probable jurisdiction, 362 U.S. 987, 80 S.Ct. 1078, 4 L.Ed.2d 1020. "
[53] "Appellants contend that the enforcement against them of the Pennsylvania statute will prohibit the free exercise *602 of their religion because, due to the statute's compulsion to close on Sunday, appellants will suffer substantial economic loss, to the benefit of their non-Sabbatarian competitors, if appellants also continue their Sabbath observance by closing their businesses on Saturday; that this result will either compel appellants to give up their Sabbath observance, a basic tenet of the Orthodox Jewish faith, or will put appellants at a serious economic disadvantage if they continue to adhere to their Sabbath. Appellants also assert that the statute will operate so as to hinder the Orthodox Jewish faith in gaining new adherents. And the corollary to these arguments is that if the free exercise of appellants' religion is impeded, that religion is being subjected to discriminatory treatment by the State. "
[54] "In McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at pages 437\xd1440, 81 S.Ct. at page 1111, we noted the significance that this Court has attributed to the development of religious freedom in Virginia in determining the scope of the First Amendment's protection. We observed that when Virginia passed its Declaration of Rights in 1776, providing that \xd4all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion,\xd5 Virginia repealed its laws which in any way penalized \xd4maintaining any opinions in matters of religion, forbearing to repair to church, or the exercising any mode of worship whatsoever.\xd5 But Virginia retained its laws prohibiting Sunday labor. "
[55] "We also took cognizance, in McGowan, of the evolution of Sunday Closing Laws from wholly religious sanctions to legislation concerned with the establishment of a day of community tranquillity, respite and recreation, a day when the atmosphere is one of calm and relaxation rather than one of commercialism, as it is during the other six days of the week. We reviewed the still growing state *603 preoccupation with improving the health, safety, morals and general well-being of our citizens. "
[56] "Concededly, appellants and all other persons who wish to work on Sunday will be burdened economically by the State's day of rest mandate; and appellants **1146 point out that their religion requires them to refrain from work on Saturday as well. Our inquiry then is whether, in these circumstances, the First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid application of the Sunday Closing Law to appellants. "
[57] "Certain aspects of religious exercise cannot, in any way, be restricted or burdened by either federal or state legislation. Compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship is strictly forbidden. The freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute. Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213; Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166, 25 L.Ed. 244. Thus, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628, this Court held that state action compelling school children to salute the flag, on pain of expulsion from public shool, was contrary to the First and Fourteenth Amendments when applied to those students whose religious beliefs forbade saluting a flag. But this is not the case at bar; the statute before us does not make criminal the holding of any religious belief or opinion, nor does it force anyone to embrace any religious belief or to say or believe anything in conflict with his religious tenets. "
[58] "However, the freedom to act, even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, is not totally free from legislative restrictions. Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at pages 303\xd1304, 306, 60 S.Ct. at pages 903\xd1904. As pointed out in Reynolds v. United States, supra, 98 U.S. at page 164, legislative power over mere opinion is forbidden but it may reach people's actions when they are found to be in violation of important social duties or subversive of good order, even when *604 the actions are demanded by one's religion. This was articulated by Thomas Jefferson when he said: "
[59] "\xd4Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between man and his God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legislative powers of government reach actions only, and not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should \xd4make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,\xd5 thus building a wall of separation between church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend to restore to man all his natural rights, convinced he has no natural right in opposition to his social duties.' (Emphasis added.) 8 Works of Thomas Jefferson 113.2 "
[60] "And, in the Barnette case, the Court was careful to point out that \xd4The freedom asserted by these appellees does not bring them into collision with rights asserted by any other individual. It is such conflicts which most frequently require intervention of the State to determine where the rights of one end and those of another begin. * * * It is * * * to be noted that the compulsory flag salute and *605 pledge requires affirmation of a belief and an attitude of mind.\xd5 319 U.S. at pages 630, 633, 63 S.Ct. at page 1181. (Emphasis added.) "
[61] "**1147 Thus, in Reynolds v. United States, this Court upheld the polygamy conviction of a member of the Mormon faith despite the fact that an accepted doctrine of his church then imposed upon its male members the duty to practice polygamy. And, in Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645, this Court upheld a statute making it a crime for a girl under eighteen years of age to sell any newspapers, periodicals or merchandise in public places despite the fact that a child of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith believed that it was her religious duty to perform this work. "
[62] "It is to be noted that, in the two cases just mentioned, the religious practices themselves conflicted with the public interest. In such cases, to make accommodation between the religious action and an exercise of state authority is a particularly delicate task, id., 321 U.S. at page 165, 64 S.Ct. at page 441, because resolution in favor of the State results in the choice to the individual of either abandoning his religious principle or facing criminal prosecution. "
[63] "But, again, this is not the case before us because the statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices of appellants; the Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive. Furthermore, the law's effect does not inconvenience all members of the Orthodox Jewish faith but only those who believe it necessary to work on Sunday.3 And even these are not faced with as serious a choice as forsaking their religious practices or subjecting themselves to criminal prosecution. Fully recognizing that the alternatives *606 open to appellants and others similarly situated\xd1retaining their present occupations and incurring economic disadvantage or engaging in some other commercial activity which does not call for either Saturday or Sunday labor\xd1may well result in some financial sacrifice in order to observe their religious beliefs, still the option is wholly different than when the legislation attempts to make a religious practice itself unlawful. "
[64] "To strike down, without the most critical scrutiny, legislation which imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of religion, i.e., legislation which does not make unlawful the religious practice itself, would radically restrict the operating latitude of the legislature. Statutes which tax income and limit the amount which may be deducted for religious contributions impose an indirect economic burden on the observance of the religion of the citizen whose religion requires him to donate a greater amount to his church; statutes which require the courts to be closed on Saturday and Sunday impose a similar indirect burden on the observance of the religion of the trial lawyer whose religion requires him to rest on a weekday. The list of legislation of this nature is nearly limitless. "
[65] "Needless to say, when entering the area of religious freedom, we must be fully cognizant of the particular protection that the Constitution has accorded it. Abhorrence of religious persecution and intolerance is a basic part of our heritage. But we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference. These denominations number almost three hundred. Year Book of American Churches for 1958, 257 et seq. Consequently, it cannot be expected, much less required, that legislators enact no law regulating conduct that may in some way result in an economic disadvantage to some religious sects and not to others because of the special practices of the various religions. We do not believe that such an effect **1148 is an absolute test *607 for determining whether the legislation violates the freedom of religion protected by the First Amendment. "
[66] "Of course, to hold unassailable all legislation regulating conduct which imposes solely an indirect burden on the observance of religion would be a gross oversimplification. If the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect. But if the State regulates conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which is to advance the State's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a burden. See Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S. at pages 304\xd1305, 60 S.Ct. at pages 903\xd1904.4 "
[67] "As we pointed out in McGowan v. Maryland, supra, 366 U.S. at pages 444\xd1445, 81 S.Ct. at page 1115, we cannot find a State without power to provide a weekly respite from all labor and, at the same time, to set one day of the week apart from the others as a day of rest, repose, recreation and tranquillity\xd1a day when the hectic tempo of everyday existence ceases and a more pleasant atmosphere is created, a day which all members of the family and community have the opportunity to spend and enjoy together, a day on which people may visit friends and relatives who are not available during working days, a day when the weekly laborer may best regenerate himself. This is particularly true in this day and age of increasing state concern with public welfare legislation. "
[68] "*608 Also, in McGowan, we examined several suggested alternative means by which it was argued that the State might accomplish its secular goals without even remotely or incidentally affecting religious freedom. 366 U.S. at pages 450\xd1452, 81 S.Ct. at pages 1118\xd11119. We found there that a State might well find that those alternatives would not accomplish bringing about a general day of rest. We need not examine them again here. "
[69] "However, appellants advance yet another means at the State's disposal which they would find unobjectionable. They contend that the State should cut an exception from the Sunday labor proscription for those people who, because of religious conviction, observe a day of rest other than Sunday. By such regulation, appellants contend, the economic disadvantages imposed by the present system would be removed and the State's interest in having all people rest one day would be satisfied. "
[70] "A number of States provide such an exemption,5 and this may well be the wiser solution to the problem. But our concern is not with the wisdom of legislation but with its constitutional limitation. Thus, reason and experience teach that to permit the exemption might well undermine the State's goal of providing a day that, as best possible, eliminates the atmosphere of commercial noise and activity. Although not dispositive of the issue, enforcement problems would be more difficult since there would be two or more days to police rather than one and it would be more difficult to observe whether violations were occurring. "
[71] "Additional problems might also be presented by a regulation of this sort. To allow only people who rest on a day other **1149 than Sunday to keep their businesses open on that day might well provide these people with an economic advantage over their competitors who must *609 remain closed on that day;6 this might cause the Sunday-observers to complain that their religions are being discriminated against. With this competitive advantage existing, there could well be the temptation for some, in order to keep their businesses open on Sunday, to assert that they have religious convictions which compel them to close their businesses on what had formerly been their least profitable day. This might make necessary a state-conducted inquiry into the sincerity of the individual's religious beliefs,7 a practice which a State might believe would itself run afoul of the spirit of constitutionally protected religious guarantees. Finally, in order to keep the disruption of the day at a minimum, exempted employers would probably have to hire employees who themselves qualified for the exemption because of their own religious beliefs,8 a practice which a State might feel to be opposed to its general policy prohibiting religious discrimination in hiring.9 For all of these reasons, we cannot say that the Pennsylvania statute before us is invalid, either on its face or as applied. "
[72] "Mr. Justice HARLAN concurs in the judgment. Mr. Justice BRENNAN and Mr. Justice STEWART concur in *610 our disposition of appellants' claims under the Establishment Clause and the Equal Protection Clause. Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice HARLAN have rejected appellants' claim under the Free Exercise Clause in a separate opinion. "
[73] "Accordingly, the decision is affirmed. "
[74] "Affirmed. "
[75] "(For opinion of Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER, joined by Mr. Justice HARLAN, see 366 U.S. 459, 81 S.Ct. 1153.) "
[76] "(For dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, see 366 U.S. 561, 81 S.Ct. 1218.). "
[77] "Mr. Justice BRENNAN, concurring and dissenting. "
[78] "ustice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[79] "*688 We must decide in these cases whether the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, *689 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb et seq., permits the United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to demand that three closely held corporations provide health-insurance coverage for methods of contraception that violate the sincerely *690 held religious beliefs of the companies' owners. We hold that the regulations that impose this obligation violate RFRA, which prohibits the Federal Government from taking any action that substantially burdens the exercise of religion *691 unless that action constitutes the least restrictive means of serving a compelling government interest. "
[80] "In holding that the HHS mandate is unlawful, we reject HHS's argument that the owners of the companies forfeited all RFRA protection when they decided to organize their businesses as corporations rather than sole proprietorships or general partnerships. The plain terms of RFRA make it perfectly clear that Congress did not discriminate in this way against men and women who wish to run their businesses as for-profit corporations in the manner required by their religious beliefs. "
[81] "Since RFRA applies in these cases, we must decide whether the challenged HHS regulations substantially burden the exercise of religion, and we hold that they do. The owners of the businesses have religious objections to abortion, and according to their religious beliefs the four contraceptive methods at issue are abortifacients. If the owners comply with the HHS mandate, they believe they will be facilitating abortions, and if they do not comply, they will pay a very heavy price\xd1as much as $1.3 million per day, or about $475 million per year, in the case of one of the companies. If these consequences do not amount to a substantial burden, it is hard to see what would. "
[82] "Under RFRA, a Government action that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise must serve a compelling government interest, and we assume that the HHS regulations *692 satisfy this requirement. But in order for the HHS mandate to be sustained, it must also constitute the least restrictive means of serving that interest, and the mandate plainly fails that test. There are other ways in which Congress or HHS could equally ensure that every woman has cost-free access to the particular contraceptives at issue here and, indeed, to all FDA-approved contraceptives. "
[83] "In fact, HHS has already devised and implemented a system that seeks to respect the religious liberty of religious nonprofit corporations while ensuring that the employees of these entities have precisely the same access to all FDA-approved contraceptives as employees of companies whose owners have no religious objections to providing such coverage. The employees of these religious nonprofit corporations still have access to insurance coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved contraceptives; and according to HHS, this system imposes no net economic burden on the insurance companies that are required to provide or secure the coverage. "
[84] "Although HHS has made this system available to religious nonprofits that have religious objections to the contraceptive mandate, HHS has provided no reason why the same system cannot be made available when the owners of for-profit corporations have similar religious objections. We therefore conclude that this system constitutes an alternative that achieves all of the Government's aims while providing greater respect for religious liberty. And under RFRA, that conclusion means that enforcement of the **2760 HHS contraceptive mandate against the objecting parties in these cases is unlawful. "
[85] "As this description of our reasoning shows, our holding is very specific. We do not hold, as the principal dissent alleges, that for-profit corporations and other commercial enterprises can \xd2opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their sincerely held religious beliefs.\xd3 *693 Post, at 2787 (opinion of GINSBURG, J.). Nor do we hold, as the dissent implies, that such corporations have free rein to take steps that impose \xd2 disadvantages ... on others\xd3 or that require \xd2the general public [to] pick up the tab.\xd3 Post, at 2787. And we certainly do not hold or suggest that \xd2 RFRA demands accommodation of a for-profit corporation's religious beliefs no matter the impact that accommodation may have on ... thousands of women employed by Hobby Lobby.\xd3 Post, at 2787.1 The effect of the HHS-created accommodation on the women employed by Hobby Lobby and the other companies involved in these cases would be precisely zero. Under that accommodation, these women would still be entitled to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing. "
[86] "I "
[87] "A "
[88] "Congress enacted RFRA in 1993 in order to provide very broad protection for religious liberty. RFRA's enactment came three years after this Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), which largely repudiated the method of analyzing free-exercise claims that had been used in cases like Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). In determining whether challenged government actions violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, those decisions used a balancing test that took into account whether the challenged action imposed a substantial burden on the practice of religion, and if it did, whether it was needed to serve a compelling government interest. Applying this test, the Court held in Sherbert that an employee who was fired for refusing to work on her Sabbath could not be denied unemployment benefits. *694 374 U.S., at 408\xd0409, 83 S.Ct. 1790. And in Yoder, the Court held that Amish children could not be required to comply with a state law demanding that they remain in school until the age of 16 even though their religion required them to focus on uniquely Amish values and beliefs during their formative adolescent years. 406 U.S., at 210\xd0211, 234\xd0236, 92 S.Ct. 1526. "
[89] "In Smith, however, the Court rejected \xd2the balancing test set forth in Sherbert.\xd3 494 U.S., at 883, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Smith concerned two members of the Native American Church who were fired for ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes. When they sought unemployment benefits, the State of Oregon rejected their claims on the ground that consumption of peyote was a crime, but the Oregon Supreme Court, applying the Sherbert test, held that the denial of benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause. 494 U.S., at 875, 110 S.Ct. 1595. "
[90] "This Court then reversed, observing that use of the Sherbert test whenever a person objected on religious grounds to the enforcement of a generally applicable law \xd2would open the prospect of constitutionally **2761 required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.\xd3 494 U.S., at 888, 110 S.Ct. 1595. The Court therefore held that, under the First Amendment, \xd2neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest.\xd3 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997). "
[91] "1Congress responded to Smith by enacting RFRA. \xd2[L]aws [that are] \xd4neutral\xd5 toward religion,\xd3 Congress found, \xd2may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise.\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb(a)(2); see also \xa4 2000bb(a)(4). In order to ensure broad protection for religious liberty, RFRA provides that \xd2Government shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.\xd3 \xa4 2000bb\xd01(a).2 If the Government substantially burdens a *695 person's exercise of religion, under the Act that person is entitled to an exemption from the rule unless the Government \xd2demonstrates that application of the burden to the person\xd1(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.\xd3 \xa4 2000bb\xd01(b).3 "
[92] "2As enacted in 1993, RFRA applied to both the Federal Government and the States, but the constitutional authority invoked for regulating federal and state agencies differed. As applied to a federal agency, RFRA is based on the enumerated power that supports the particular agency's work,4 but in attempting to regulate the States and their subdivisions, Congress relied on its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the First Amendment. 521 U.S., at 516\xd0517, 117 S.Ct. 2157. In City of Boerne, however, we held that Congress had overstepped its Section 5 authority because \xd2[t]he stringent test RFRA demands\xd3 \xd2far exceed[ed] any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith.\xd3 Id., at 533\xd0534, 117 S.Ct. 2157. See also id., at 532, 117 S.Ct. 2157. "
[93] "3Following our decision in City of Boerne, Congress passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat. 803, 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000cc et seq. That statute, enacted under Congress's Commerce and Spending Clause powers, imposes the same general test as RFRA but on a more limited category of governmental actions. See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 715\xd0716, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). And, what is most relevant for present purposes, *696 RLUIPA amended RFRA's definition of the \xd2exercise of religion.\xd3 See \xa4 2000bb\xd02(4) (importing RLUIPA definition). Before RLUIPA, RFRA's definition made reference to the First Amendment. See \xa4 2000bb\xd02(4) (1994 ed.) (defining \xd2exercise of religion\xd3 as \xd2the exercise of religion under the First Amendment\xd3). In RLUIPA, in an obvious **2762 effort to effect a complete separation from First Amendment case law, Congress deleted the reference to the First Amendment and defined the \xd2exercise of religion\xd3 to include \xd2any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.\xd3 \xa4 2000cc\xd05(7)(A). And Congress mandated that this concept \xd2be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.\xd3 \xa4 2000cc\xd03(g).5 "
[94] "B "
[95] "At issue in these cases are HHS regulations promulgated under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010(ACA), 124 Stat. 119. ACA generally requires employers with 50 or more full-time employees to offer \xd2a group health plan or group health insurance coverage\xd3 that provides \xd2minimum essential coverage.\xd3 26 U.S.C. \xa4 5000A(f)(2); \xa4\xa4 4980H(a), (c)(2). Any covered employer that does not provide such coverage must pay a substantial price. Specifically, if a covered employer provides group health insurance but its plan fails to comply with ACA's *697 group-health-plan requirements, the employer may be required to pay $100 per day for each affected \xd2individual.\xd3 \xa4\xa4 4980D(a)-(b). And if the employer decides to stop providing health insurance altogether and at least one full-time employee enrolls in a health plan and qualifies for a subsidy on one of the government-run ACA exchanges, the employer must pay $2,000 per year for each of its full-time employees. \xa4\xa4 4980H(a), (c)(1). "
[96] "Unless an exception applies, ACA requires an employer's group health plan or group-health-insurance coverage to furnish \xd2preventive care and screenings\xd3 for women without \xd2any cost sharing requirements.\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4 300gg\xd013(a)(4). Congress itself, however, did not specify what types of preventive care must be covered. Instead, Congress authorized the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), a component of HHS, to make that important and sensitive decision. Ibid. The HRSA in turn consulted the Institute of Medicine, a nonprofit group of volunteer advisers, in determining which preventive services to require. See 77 Fed.Reg. 8725\xd08726 (2012). "
[97] "In August 2011, based on the Institute's recommendations, the HRSA promulgated the Women's Preventive Services Guidelines. See id., at 8725\xd08726, and n. 1; online at http://hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (all Internet materials as visited June 26, 2014, and available in Clerk of Court's case file). The Guidelines provide that nonexempt employers are generally required to provide \xd2coverage, without cost sharing\xd3 for \xd2[a]ll Food and Drug Administration [ (FDA) ] approved contraceptive methods, sterilization procedures, and patient education and counseling.\xd3 77 Fed.Reg. 8725 (internal quotation marks omitted). Although many of the required, FDA-approved methods of contraception work by preventing the fertilization of an egg, four of those methods (those specifically at issue in these cases) may have the effect of preventing an already fertilized egg from **2763 developing any further by inhibiting *698 its attachment to the uterus. See Brief for HHS in No. 13\xd0354, pp. 9\xd010, n. 4;6 FDA, Birth Control: Medicines to Help You.7 "
[98] "HHS also authorized the HRSA to establish exemptions from the contraceptive mandate for \xd2religious employers.\xd3 45 CFR \xa4 147.131(a). That category encompasses \xd2churches, their integrated auxiliaries, and conventions or associations of churches,\xd3 as well as \xd2the exclusively religious activities of any religious order.\xd3 See ibid (citing 26 U.S.C. \xa4\xa4 6033(a)(3)(A)(i), (iii)). In its Guidelines, HRSA exempted these organizations from the requirement to cover contraceptive services. See http://hrsa.gov/womens guidelines. "
[99] "In addition, HHS has effectively exempted certain religious nonprofit organizations, described under HHS regulations as \xd2eligible organizations,\xd3 from the contraceptive mandate. See 45 CFR \xa4 147.131(b); 78 Fed.Reg. 39874 (2013). An \xd2eligible organization\xd3 means a nonprofit organization that \xd2holds itself out as a religious organization\xd3 and \xd2opposes providing coverage for some or all of any contraceptive services required to be covered ... on account of religious objections.\xd3 45 CFR \xa4 147.131(b). To qualify for this accommodation, an employer must certify that it is such an organization. \xa4 147.131(b)(4). When a group-health-insurance issuer receives notice that one of its clients has invoked this provision, the issuer must then exclude contraceptive *699 coverage from the employer's plan and provide separate payments for contraceptive services for plan participants without imposing any cost-sharing requirements on the eligible organization, its insurance plan, or its employee beneficiaries. \xa4 147.131(c).8 Although this procedure requires the issuer to bear the cost of these services, HHS has determined that this obligation will not impose any net expense on issuers because its cost will be less than or equal to the cost savings resulting from the services. 78 Fed.Reg. 39877.9 "
[100] "In addition to these exemptions for religious organizations, ACA exempts a great **2764 many employers from most of its coverage requirements. Employers providing \xd2grandfathered health plans\xd3\xd1those that existed prior to March 23, 2010, and that have not made specified changes after that date\xd1need not comply with many of the Act's requirements, including the contraceptive mandate. 42 U.S.C. \xa4\xa4 18011(a), (e). And employers with fewer than 50 employees are not required to provide health insurance at all. 26 U.S.C. \xa4 4980H(c)(2). "
[101] "*700 All told, the contraceptive mandate \xd2presently does not apply to tens of millions of people.\xd3 723 F.3d 1114, 1143 (C.A.10 2013). This is attributable, in large part, to grandfathered health plans: Over one-third of the 149 million nonelderly people in America with employer-sponsored health plans were enrolled in grandfathered plans in 2013. Brief for HHS in No. 13\xd0354, at 53; Kaiser Family Foundation & Health Research & Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits, 2013 Annual Survey 43, 221.10 The count for employees working for firms that do not have to provide insurance at all because they employ fewer than 50 employees is 34 million workers. See The Whitehouse, Health Reform for Small Businesses: The Affordable Care Act Increases Choice and Saving Money for Small Businesses 1.11 "
[102] "II "
[103] "A "
[104] "Norman and Elizabeth Hahn and their three sons are devout members of the Mennonite Church, a Christian denomination. The Mennonite Church opposes abortion and believes that \xd2[t]he fetus in its earliest stages ... shares humanity with those who conceived it.\xd312 "
[105] "Fifty years ago, Norman Hahn started a wood-working business in his garage, and since then, this company, Conestoga Wood Specialties, has grown and now has 950 employees. Conestoga is organized under Pennsylvania law as a for-profit corporation. The Hahns exercise sole ownership *701 of the closely held business; they control its board of directors and hold all of its voting shares. One of the Hahn sons serves as the president and CEO. "
[106] "The Hahns believe that they are required to run their business \xd2in accordance with their religious beliefs and moral principles.\xd3 917 F.Supp.2d 394, 402 (E.D.Pa.2013). To that end, the company's mission, as they see it, is to \xd2operate in a professional environment founded upon the highest ethical, moral, and Christian principles.\xd3 Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The company's \xd2Vision and Values Statements\xd3 affirms that Conestoga endeavors to \xd2ensur[e] a reasonable profit in [a] manner that reflects [the Hahns'] Christian heritage.\xd3 App. in No. 13\xd0356, p. 94 (complaint). "
[107] "As explained in Conestoga's board-adopted \xd2Statement on the Sanctity of Human Life,\xd3 the Hahns believe that \xd2human life begins at conception.\xd3 **2765 724 F.3d 377, 382, and n. 5 (C.A.3 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is therefore \xd2against [their] moral conviction to be involved in the termination of human life\xd3 after conception, which they believe is a \xd2sin against God to which they are held accountable.\xd3 Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). The Hahns have accordingly excluded from the group-health-insurance plan they offer to their employees certain contraceptive methods that they consider to be abortifacients. Id., at 382. "
[108] "The Hahns and Conestoga sued HHS and other federal officials and agencies under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, seeking to enjoin application of ACA's contraceptive mandate insofar as it requires them to provide health-insurance coverage for four FDA-approved contraceptives that may operate after the fertilization of an egg.13 These include two forms of emergency contraception *702 commonly called \xd2morning after\xd3 pills and two types of intrauterine devices.14 "
[109] "In opposing the requirement to provide coverage for the contraceptives to which they object, the Hahns argued that \xd2it is immoral and sinful for [them] to intentionally participate in, pay for, facilitate, or otherwise support these drugs.\xd3 Ibid. The District Court denied a preliminary injunction, see 917 F.Supp.2d, at 419, and the Third Circuit affirmed in a divided opinion, holding that \xd2for-profit, secular corporations cannot engage in religious exercise\xd3 within the meaning of RFRA or the First Amendment. 724 F.3d, at 381. The Third Circuit also rejected the claims brought by the Hahns themselves because it concluded that the HHS \xd2[m]andate does not impose any requirements on the Hahns\xd3 in their personal capacity. Id., at 389. "
[110] "B "
[111] "David and Barbara Green and their three children are Christians who own and operate two family businesses. Forty-five years ago, David Green started an arts-and-crafts store that has grown into a nationwide chain called Hobby Lobby. There are now 500 Hobby Lobby stores, and the company has more than 13,000 employees. 723 F.3d, at 1122. Hobby Lobby is organized as a for-profit corporation under Oklahoma law. "
[112] "One of David's sons started an affiliated business, Mardel, which operates 35 Christian bookstores and employs close to 400 people. Ibid. Mardel is also organized as a for-profit corporation under Oklahoma law. "
[113] "Though these two businesses have expanded over the years, they remain closely held, and David, Barbara, and their children retain exclusive control of both companies. Ibid. David serves as the CEO of Hobby Lobby, and his *703 three children serve as the president, vice president, and vice CEO. See Brief for Respondents in No. 13\xd0354, p. 8.15 "
[114] "**2766 Hobby Lobby's statement of purpose commits the Greens to \xd2[h]onoring the Lord in all [they] do by operating the company in a manner consistent with Biblical principles.\xd3 App. in No. 13\xd0354, pp. 134\xd0135 (complaint). Each family member has signed a pledge to run the businesses in accordance with the family's religious beliefs and to use the family assets to support Christian ministries. 723 F.3d, at 1122. In accordance with those commitments, Hobby Lobby and Mardel stores close on Sundays, even though the Greens calculate that they lose millions in sales annually by doing so. Id., at 1122; App. in No. 13\xd0354, at 136\xd0137. The businesses refuse to engage in profitable transactions that facilitate or promote alcohol use; they contribute profits to Christian missionaries and ministries; and they buy hundreds of full-page newspaper ads inviting people to \xd2know Jesus as Lord and Savior.\xd3 Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). "
[115] "Like the Hahns, the Greens believe that life begins at conception and that it would violate their religion to facilitate access to contraceptive drugs or devices that operate after that point. 723 F.3d, at 1122. They specifically object to the same four contraceptive methods as the Hahns and, like the Hahns, they have no objection to the other 16 FDA-approved methods of birth control. Id., at 1125. Although their group-health-insurance plan predates the enactment of ACA, it is not a grandfathered plan because Hobby Lobby elected not to retain grandfathered status before the contraceptive mandate was proposed. Id., at 1124. "
[116] "The Greens, Hobby Lobby, and Mardel sued HHS and other federal agencies and officials to challenge the contraceptive *704 mandate under RFRA and the Free Exercise Clause.16 The District Court denied a preliminary injunction, see 870 F.Supp.2d 1278 (W.D.Okla.2012), and the plaintiffs appealed, moving for initial en banc consideration. The Tenth Circuit granted that motion and reversed in a divided opinion. Contrary to the conclusion of the Third Circuit, the Tenth Circuit held that the Greens' two for-profit businesses are \xd2persons\xd3 within the meaning of RFRA and therefore may bring suit under that law. "
[117] "The court then held that the corporations had established a likelihood of success on their RFRA claim. 723 F.3d, at 1140\xd01147. The court concluded that the contraceptive mandate substantially burdened the exercise of religion by requiring the companies to choose between \xd2compromis[ing] their religious beliefs\xd3 and paying a heavy fee\xd1either \xd2close to $475 million more in taxes every year\xd3 if they simply refused to provide coverage for the contraceptives at issue, or \xd2roughly $26 million\xd3 annually if they \xd2drop[ped] health-insurance benefits for all employees.\xd3 Id., at 1141. "
[118] "The court next held that HHS had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in enforcing the mandate against the Greens' businesses and, in the alternative, that HHS had failed to prove that enforcement of the mandate was the \xd2least restrictive means\xd3 of furthering the Government's asserted interests. Id., at 1143\xd01144 (emphasis deleted; internal quotation marks omitted). After concluding that the companies had \xd2demonstrated irreparable harm,\xd3 the court reversed and remanded for the District Court to consider the remaining factors of the preliminary-injunction test. Id., at 1147.17 "
[119] "**2767 *705 We granted certiorari. 571 U.S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 134 S.Ct. 678, 187 L.Ed.2d 544 (2013). "
[120] "III "
[121] "A "
[122] "RFRA prohibits the \xd2Government [from] substantially burden[ing] a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability\xd3 unless the Government \xd2demonstrates that application of the burden to the person\xd1(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4\xa4 2000bb\xd01(a), (b) (emphasis added). The first question that we must address is whether this provision applies to regulations that govern the activities of for-profit corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel. "
[123] "HHS contends that neither these companies nor their owners can even be heard under RFRA. According to HHS, the companies cannot sue because they seek to make a profit for their owners, and the owners cannot be heard because the regulations, at least as a formal matter, apply only to the companies and not to the owners as individuals. HHS's argument would have dramatic consequences. "
[124] "Consider this Court's decision in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion). In that case, five Orthodox Jewish merchants who ran small retail businesses in Philadelphia challenged a Pennsylvania Sunday closing law as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. Because of their faith, these merchants closed their shops on Saturday, and they argued that requiring them to remain shut on Sunday threatened them with financial ruin. The Court entertained their claim (although it ruled against them on the merits), *706 and if a similar claim were raised today under RFRA against a jurisdiction still subject to the Act (for example, the District of Columbia, see 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd02(2)), the merchants would be entitled to be heard. According to HHS, however, if these merchants chose to incorporate their businesses\xd1without in any way changing the size or nature of their businesses\xd1they would forfeit all RFRA (and free-exercise) rights. HHS would put these merchants to a difficult choice: either give up the right to seek judicial protection of their religious liberty or forgo the benefits, available to their competitors, of operating as corporations. "
[125] "As we have seen, RFRA was designed to provide very broad protection for religious liberty. By enacting RFRA, Congress went far beyond what this Court has held is constitutionally required.18 Is there any reason to think that the Congress that enacted such sweeping protection put small-business owners to the choice that HHS suggests? An examination of **2768 RFRA's text, to which we turn in the next part of this opinion, reveals that Congress did no such thing. "
[126] "4As we will show, Congress provided protection for people like the Hahns and Greens by employing a familiar legal fiction: It included corporations within RFRA's definition of \xd2persons.\xd3 But it is important to keep in mind that the purpose of this fiction is to provide protection for human beings. A corporation is simply a form of organization used by human beings to achieve desired ends. An established body of law specifies the rights and obligations of the people (including shareholders, officers, and employees) who are associated with a corporation in one way or another. When *707 rights, whether constitutional or statutory, are extended to corporations, the purpose is to protect the rights of these people. For example, extending Fourth Amendment protection to corporations protects the privacy interests of employees and others associated with the company. Protecting corporations from government seizure of their property without just compensation protects all those who have a stake in the corporations' financial well-being. And protecting the free-exercise rights of corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel protects the religious liberty of the humans who own and control those companies. "
[127] "In holding that Conestoga, as a \xd2secular, for-profit corporation,\xd3 lacks RFRA protection, the Third Circuit wrote as follows: "
[128] "\xd2General business corporations do not, separate and apart from the actions or belief systems of their individual owners or employees, exercise religion. They do not pray, worship, observe sacraments or take other religiously-motivated actions separate and apart from the intention and direction of their individual actors.\xd3 724 F.3d, at 385 (emphasis added). "
[129] "All of this is true\xd1but quite beside the point. Corporations, \xd2separate and apart from\xd3 the human beings who own, run, and are employed by them, cannot do anything at all. "
[130] "B "
[131] "1 "
[132] "5As we noted above, RFRA applies to \xd2a person's\xd3 exercise of religion, 42 U.S.C. \xa4\xa4 2000bb\xd01(a), (b), and RFRA itself does not define the term \xd2person.\xd3 We therefore look to the Dictionary Act, which we must consult \xd2[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the context indicates otherwise.\xd3 1 U.S.C. \xa4 1. "
[133] "Under the Dictionary Act, \xd2the wor[d] \xd4person\xd5 ... include[s] corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as *708 individuals.\xd3 Ibid.; see FCC v. AT & T Inc., 562 U.S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 131 S.Ct. 1177, 1182\xd01183, 179 L.Ed.2d 132 (2011) ( \xd2We have no doubt that \xd4person,\xd5 in a legal setting, often refers to artificial entities. The Dictionary Act makes that clear\xd3). Thus, unless there is something about the RFRA context that \xd2indicates otherwise,\xd3 the Dictionary Act provides a quick, clear, and affirmative answer to the question whether the companies involved in these cases may be heard. "
[134] "We see nothing in RFRA that suggests a congressional intent to depart from the Dictionary Act definition, and HHS makes little effort to argue otherwise. We have entertained RFRA and free-exercise claims brought by nonprofit corporations, see Gonzales v. O Centro Esp\x92rita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) (RFRA); **2769 Hosanna\xd0Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012) (Free Exercise); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (Free Exercise), and HHS concedes that a nonprofit corporation can be a \xd2person\xd3 within the meaning of RFRA. See Brief for HHS in No. 13\xd0354, at 17; Reply Brief in No. 13\xd0354, at 7\xd08.19 "
[135] "This concession effectively dispatches any argument that the term \xd2person\xd3 as used in RFRA does not reach the closely held corporations involved in these cases. No known understanding of the term \xd2person\xd3 includes some but not all corporations. The term \xd2person\xd3 sometimes encompasses artificial persons (as the Dictionary Act instructs), and it sometimes is limited to natural persons. But no conceivable definition of the term includes natural persons and nonprofit corporations, but not for-profit corporations.20 Cf. *709 Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 378, 125 S.Ct. 716, 160 L.Ed.2d 734 (2005) (\xd2To give th[e] same words a different meaning for each category would be to invent a statute rather than interpret one\xd3). "
[136] "2 "
[137] "The principal argument advanced by HHS and the principal dissent regarding RFRA protection for Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel focuses not on the statutory term \xd2person,\xd3 but on the phrase \xd2exercise of religion.\xd3 According to HHS and the dissent, these corporations are not protected by RFRA because they cannot exercise religion. Neither HHS nor the dissent, however, provides any persuasive explanation for this conclusion. "
[138] "Is it because of the corporate form? The corporate form alone cannot provide the explanation because, as we have pointed out, HHS concedes that nonprofit corporations can be protected by RFRA. The dissent suggests that nonprofit corporations are special because furthering their religious \xd2autonomy ... often furthers individual religious freedom as well.\xd3 Post, at 2794 (quoting Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter\xd0day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 342, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 97 L.Ed.2d 273 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment)). But this principle applies equally to for-profit corporations: Furthering their religious freedom also \xd2furthers individual religious freedom.\xd3 In these cases, for example, allowing Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel to assert RFRA claims protects the religious liberty of the Greens and the Hahns.21 "
[139] "67If the corporate form is not enough, what about the profit-making objective? In Braunfeld, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563, we entertained *710 the free-exercise claims of individuals who were attempting to make a profit as retail merchants, and the Court never even hinted that this objective precluded their **2770 claims. As the Court explained in a later case, the \xd2exercise of religion\xd3 involves \xd2not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts\xd3 that are \xd2engaged in for religious reasons.\xd3 Smith, 494 U.S., at 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Business practices that are compelled or limited by the tenets of a religious doctrine fall comfortably within that definition. Thus, a law that \xd2operates so as to make the practice of ... religious beliefs more expensive\xd3 in the context of business activities imposes a burden on the exercise of religion. Braunfeld, supra, at 605, 81 S.Ct. 1144; see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (recognizing that \xd2compulsory participation in the social security system interferes with [Amish employers'] free exercise rights\xd3). "
[140] "If, as Braunfeld recognized, a sole proprietorship that seeks to make a profit may assert a free-exercise claim,22 why can't Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel do the same? "
[141] "8Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not protect for-profit corporations because the purpose of such corporations is simply to make money.23 This argument *711 flies in the face of modern corporate law. \xd2Each American jurisdiction today either expressly or by implication authorizes corporations to be formed under its general corporation act **2771 for any lawful purpose or business.\xd3 1 J. Cox & T. Hazen, Treatise of the Law of Corporations \xa4 4:1, p. 224 (3d ed. 2010) (emphasis added); see 1A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Corporations \xa4 102 (rev. ed. 2010). While it is certainly true that a central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to pursue *712 profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not do so. For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, support a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and other altruistic objectives. Many examples come readily to mind. So long as its owners agree, a for-profit corporation may take costly pollution-control and energy-conservation measures that go beyond what the law requires. A for-profit corporation that operates facilities in other countries may exceed the requirements of local law regarding working conditions and benefits. If for-profit corporations may pursue such worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason why they may not further religious objectives as well. "
[142] "HHS would draw a sharp line between nonprofit corporations (which, HHS concedes, are protected by RFRA) and for-profit corporations (which HHS would leave unprotected), but the actual picture is less clear-cut. Not all corporations that decline to organize as nonprofits do so in order to maximize profit. For example, organizations with religious and charitable aims might organize as for-profit corporations because of the potential advantages of that corporate form, such as the freedom to participate in lobbying for legislation or campaigning for political candidates who promote their religious or charitable goals.24 In fact, recognizing the inherent compatibility between establishing a for-profit corporation and pursuing nonprofit goals, States have increasingly adopted laws formally recognizing hybrid corporate forms. Over half of the States, for instance, now recognize the \xd2benefit corporation,\xd3 *713 a dual-purpose entity that seeks to achieve both a benefit for the public and a profit for its owners.25 "
[143] "In any event, the objectives that may properly be pursued by the companies in these cases are governed by the laws of the States in which they were incorporated\xd1Pennsylvania and Oklahoma\xd1and the laws of those States permit for-profit corporations to pursue \xd2any lawful purpose\xd3 or \xd2act,\xd3 including the pursuit of profit in conformity with the owners' religious principles. 15 Pa. Cons.Stat. \xa4 1301 (2001) (\xd2Corporations may be incorporated under **2772 this subpart for any lawful purpose or purposes\xd3); Okla. Stat., Tit. 18, \xa4\xa4 1002, 1005 (West 2012) (\xd2[E]very corporation, whether profit or not for profit\xd3 may \xd2be incorporated or organized ... to conduct or promote any lawful business or purposes\xd3); see also \xa4 1006(A)(3); Brief for State of Oklahoma as Amicus Curiae in No. 13\xd0354. "
[144] "3 "
[145] "HHS and the principal dissent make one additional argument in an effort to show that a for-profit corporation cannot engage in the \xd2exercise of religion\xd3 within the meaning of RFRA: HHS argues that RFRA did no more than codify this Court's pre-Smith Free Exercise Clause precedents, and because none of those cases squarely held that a for-profit corporation has free-exercise rights, RFRA does not confer such protection. This argument has many flaws. "
[146] "9*714 First, nothing in the text of RFRA as originally enacted suggested that the statutory phrase \xd2exercise of religion under the First Amendment\xd3 was meant to be tied to this Court's pre-Smith interpretation of that Amendment. When first enacted, RFRA defined the \xd2exercise of religion\xd3 to mean \xd2the exercise of religion under the First Amendment\xd3\xd1not the exercise of religion as recognized only by then-existing Supreme Court precedents. 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd02(4) (1994 ed.). When Congress wants to link the meaning of a statutory provision to a body of this Court's case law, it knows how to do so. See, e.g., Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. \xa4 2254(d)(1) (authorizing habeas relief from a state-court decision that \xd2was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States\xd3). "
[147] "Second, if the original text of RFRA was not clear enough on this point\xd1and we think it was\xd1the amendment of RFRA through RLUIPA surely dispels any doubt. That amendment deleted the prior reference to the First Amendment, see 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd02(4) (2000 ed.) (incorporating \xa4 2000cc\xd05), and neither HHS nor the principal dissent can explain why Congress did this if it wanted to tie RFRA coverage tightly to the specific holdings of our pre-Smith free-exercise cases. Moreover, as discussed, the amendment went further, providing that the exercise of religion \xd2shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.\xd3 \xa4 2000cc\xd03(g). It is simply not possible to read these provisions as restricting the concept of the \xd2exercise of religion\xd3 to those practices specifically addressed in our pre-Smith decisions. "
[148] "Third, the one pre-Smith case involving the free-exercise rights of a for-profit corporation suggests, if anything, that for-profit corporations possess such rights. In *715 Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617, 81 S.Ct. 1122, 6 L.Ed.2d 536 (1961), the Massachusetts Sunday closing law was challenged by a kosher market that was organized as a for-profit corporation, by customers of the market, and by a rabbi. The Commonwealth argued that the corporation lacked \xd2standing\xd3 to assert a free-exercise claim,26 but not one member of the Court expressed agreement with that argument. The plurality opinion for four Justices rejected the First Amendment claim on the **2773 merits based on the reasoning in Braunfeld, and reserved decision on the question whether the corporation had \xd2standing\xd3 to raise the claim. See 366 U.S., at 631, 81 S.Ct. 1122. The three dissenters, Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, found the law unconstitutional as applied to the corporation and the other challengers and thus implicitly recognized their right to assert a free-exercise claim. See id., at 642, 81 S.Ct. 1122 (Brennan, J., joined by Stewart, J., dissenting); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 578\xd0579, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting as to related cases including Gallagher ). Finally, Justice Frankfurter's opinion, which was joined by Justice Harlan, upheld the Massachusetts law on the merits but did not question or reserve decision on the issue of the right of the corporation or any of the other challengers to be heard. See McGowan, 366 U.S., at 521\xd0522, 81 S.Ct. 1101. It is quite a stretch to argue that RFRA, a law enacted to provide very broad protection for religious liberty, left for-profit corporations unprotected simply because in Gallagher\xd1the only pre-Smith case in which the issue was raised\xd1a majority of the Justices did not find it necessary to decide whether the kosher market's corporate status barred it from raising a free-exercise claim. "
[149] "Finally, the results would be absurd if RFRA merely restored this Court's pre-Smith decisions in ossified form and did not allow a plaintiff to raise a RFRA claim unless *716 that plaintiff fell within a category of plaintiffs one of whom had brought a free-exercise claim that this Court entertained in the years before Smith. For example, we are not aware of any pre-Smith case in which this Court entertained a free-exercise claim brought by a resident noncitizen. Are such persons also beyond RFRA's protective reach simply because the Court never addressed their rights before Smith ? "
[150] "Presumably in recognition of the weakness of this argument, both HHS and the principal dissent fall back on the broader contention that the Nation lacks a tradition of exempting for-profit corporations from generally applicable laws. By contrast, HHS contends, statutes like Title VII, 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000e\xd019(A), expressly exempt churches and other nonprofit religious institutions but not for-profit corporations. See Brief for HHS in No. 13\xd0356, p. 26. In making this argument, however, HHS did not call to our attention the fact that some federal statutes do exempt categories of entities that include for-profit corporations from laws that would otherwise require these entities to engage in activities to which they object on grounds of conscience. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. \xa4 300a\xd07(b)(2); \xa4 238n(a).27 If Title VII and similar **2774 *717 laws show anything, it is that Congress speaks with specificity when it intends a religious accommodation not to extend to for-profit corporations. "
[151] "4 "
[152] "Finally, HHS contends that Congress could not have wanted RFRA to apply to for-profit corporations because it is difficult as a practical matter to ascertain the sincere \xd2beliefs\xd3 of a corporation. HHS goes so far as to raise the specter of \xd2divisive, polarizing proxy battles over the religious identity of large, publicly traded corporations such as IBM or General Electric.\xd3 Brief for HHS in No. 13\xd0356, at 30. "
[153] "10These cases, however, do not involve publicly traded corporations, and it seems unlikely that the sort of corporate giants to which HHS refers will often assert RFRA claims. HHS has not pointed to any example of a publicly traded corporation asserting RFRA rights, and numerous practical restraints would likely prevent that from occurring. For example, the idea that unrelated shareholders\xd1including institutional investors with their own set of stakeholders\xd1would agree to run a corporation under the same religious beliefs seems improbable. In any event, we have no occasion in these cases to consider RFRA's applicability to such companies. The companies in the cases before us are closely held corporations, each owned and controlled by members of a single family, and no one has disputed the sincerity of their religious beliefs.28 "
[154] "HHS has also provided no evidence that the purported problem of determining the sincerity of an asserted religious *718 belief moved Congress to exclude for-profit corporations from RFRA's protection. On the contrary, the scope of RLUIPA shows that Congress was confident of the ability of the federal courts to weed out insincere claims. RLUIPA applies to \xd2institutionalized persons,\xd3 a category that consists primarily of prisoners, and by the time of RLUIPA's enactment, the propensity of some prisoners to assert claims of dubious sincerity was well documented.29 Nevertheless, after our decision in City of Boerne, Congress enacted RLUIPA to preserve the right of prisoners to raise religious liberty claims. If Congress thought that the federal courts were up to the job of dealing with insincere prisoner claims, there is no reason to believe that Congress limited RFRA's reach out of concern for the seemingly less difficult task of doing the same in corporate cases. And if, as HHS seems to concede, Congress wanted RFRA to apply to nonprofit corporations, see, Reply Brief in No. 13\xd0354, at 7\xd08, what reason is there to think that Congress believed that spotting insincere claims would be tougher in cases involving for-profits? "
[155] "HHS and the principal dissent express concern about the possibility of disputes among the owners of corporations, but that is not a problem that arises because of RFRA or that is unique to this context. The owners of closely held corporations may\xd1and sometimes do\xd1disagree about **2775 the conduct of business. 1 Treatise of the Law of Corporations \xa4 14:11. And even if RFRA did not exist, the owners of a company might well have a dispute relating to religion. For example, some might want a company's stores to remain open on the Sabbath in order to make more money, and others might want the stores to close for religious reasons. State corporate law provides a ready means for resolving any conflicts by, for example, dictating how a corporation can establish its governing structure. See, e.g., ibid; id., \xa4 3:2; *719 Del.Code Ann., Tit. 8, \xa4 351 (2011) (providing that certificate of incorporation may provide how \xd2the business of the corporation shall be managed\xd3). Courts will turn to that structure and the underlying state law in resolving disputes. "
[156] "For all these reasons, we hold that a federal regulation's restriction on the activities of a for-profit closely held corporation must comply with RFRA.30 "
[157] "IV "
[158] "Because RFRA applies in these cases, we must next ask whether the HHS contraceptive mandate \xd2substantially burden[s]\xd3 the exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd01(a). We have little trouble concluding that it does. "
[159] "*720 A "
[160] "11As we have noted, the Hahns and Greens have a sincere religious belief that life begins at conception. They therefore object on religious grounds to providing health insurance that covers methods of birth control that, as HHS acknowledges, see Brief for HHS in No. 13\xd0354, at 9, n. 4, may result in the destruction of an embryo. By requiring the Hahns and Greens and their companies to arrange for such coverage, the HHS mandate demands that they engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs. "
[161] "If the Hahns and Greens and their companies do not yield to this demand, the economic consequences will be severe. If the companies continue to offer group health plans that do not cover the contraceptives at issue, they will be taxed $100 per day for each affected individual. 26 U.S.C. \xa4 4980D. For Hobby Lobby, the bill could amount to $1.3 million per day or **2776 about $475 million per year; for Conestoga, the assessment could be $90,000 per day or $33 million per year; and for Mardel, it could be $40,000 per day or about $15 million per year. These sums are surely substantial. "
[162] "It is true that the plaintiffs could avoid these assessments by dropping insurance coverage altogether and thus forcing their employees to obtain health insurance on one of the exchanges established under ACA. But if at least one of their full-time employees were to qualify for a subsidy on one of the government-run exchanges, this course would also entail substantial economic consequences. The companies could face penalties of $2,000 per employee each year. \xa4 4980H. These penalties would amount to roughly $26 million for Hobby Lobby, $1.8 million for Conestoga, and $800,000 for Mardel. "
[163] "B "
[164] "1213Although these totals are high, amici supporting HHS have suggested that the $2,000 per-employee penalty is actually less than the average cost of providing health insurance, *721 see Brief for Religious Organizations 22, and therefore, they claim, the companies could readily eliminate any substantial burden by forcing their employees to obtain insurance in the government exchanges. We do not generally entertain arguments that were not raised below and are not advanced in this Court by any party, see United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56, 60, n. 2, 101 S.Ct. 1559, 67 L.Ed.2d 732 (1981); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 532, n. 13, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979); Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361, 370, 81 S.Ct. 132, 5 L.Ed.2d 128 (1960), and there are strong reasons to adhere to that practice in these cases. HHS, which presumably could have compiled the relevant statistics, has never made this argument\xd1not in its voluminous briefing or at oral argument in this Court nor, to our knowledge, in any of the numerous cases in which the issue now before us has been litigated around the country. As things now stand, we do not even know what the Government's position might be with respect to these amici's intensely empirical argument.31 For this same reason, the plaintiffs have never had an opportunity to respond to this novel claim that\xd1contrary to their longstanding practice and that of most large employers\xd1they would be better off discarding their employer insurance plans altogether. "
[165] "Even if we were to reach this argument, we would find it unpersuasive. As an initial matter, it entirely ignores the fact that the Hahns and Greens and their companies have religious reasons for providing health-insurance coverage for their employees. Before the advent of ACA, they were not legally compelled to provide insurance, but they nevertheless did so\xd1in part, no doubt, for conventional business reasons, but also in part because their religious beliefs govern their relations with their employees. See App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 13\xd0356, p. 11g; App. in No. 13\xd0354, at 139. "
[166] "*722 Putting aside the religious dimension of the decision to provide insurance, moreover, it is far from clear that the net cost to the companies of providing insurance is more than the cost of dropping their insurance plans and paying the ACA penalty. Health insurance is a benefit that employees value. If the companies simply eliminated that benefit and forced employees to **2777 purchase their own insurance on the exchanges, without offering additional compensation, it is predictable that the companies would face a competitive disadvantage in retaining and attracting skilled workers. See App. in No. 13\xd0354, at 153. "
[167] "The companies could attempt to make up for the elimination of a group health plan by increasing wages, but this would be costly. Group health insurance is generally less expensive than comparable individual coverage, so the amount of the salary increase needed to fully compensate for the termination of insurance coverage may well exceed the cost to the companies of providing the insurance. In addition, any salary increase would have to take into account the fact that employees must pay income taxes on wages but not on the value of employer-provided health insurance. 26 U.S.C. \xa4 106(a). Likewise, employers can deduct the cost of providing health insurance, see \xa4 162(a)(1), but apparently cannot deduct the amount of the penalty that they must pay if insurance is not provided; that difference also must be taken into account. Given these economic incentives, it is far from clear that it would be financially advantageous for an employer to drop coverage and pay the penalty.32 "
[168] "*723 In sum, we refuse to sustain the challenged regulations on the ground\xd1never maintained by the Government\xd1that dropping insurance coverage eliminates the substantial burden that the HHS mandate imposes. We doubt that the Congress that enacted RFRA\xd1or, for that matter, ACA\xd1would have believed it a tolerable result to put family-run businesses to the choice of violating their sincerely held religious beliefs or making all of their employees lose their existing healthcare plans. "
[169] "C "
[170] "In taking the position that the HHS mandate does not impose a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, HHS's main argument (echoed by the principal dissent) is basically that the connection between what the objecting parties must do (provide health-insurance coverage for four methods of contraception that may operate after the fertilization of an egg) and the end that they find to be morally wrong (destruction of an embryo) is simply too attenuated. Brief for HHS in 13\xd0354, pp. 31\xd034; post, at 2798 \xd0 2799. HHS and the dissent note that providing the coverage would not itself result in the destruction of an embryo; that would occur only if an employee chose to take advantage of the coverage and to use one of the four methods at issue.33 Ibid. "
[171] "**2778 14*724 This argument dodges the question that RFRA presents (whether the HHS mandate imposes a substantial burden on the ability of the objecting parties to conduct business in accordance with their religious beliefs ) and instead addresses a very different question that the federal courts have no business addressing (whether the religious belief asserted in a RFRA case is reasonable). The Hahns and Greens believe that providing the coverage demanded by the HHS regulations is connected to the destruction of an embryo in a way that is sufficient to make it immoral for them to provide the coverage. This belief implicates a difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy, namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by another.34 Arrogating the authority to provide a binding national answer to this religious and philosophical question, HHS and the principal dissent in effect tell the plaintiffs that their beliefs are flawed. For good reason, we have repeatedly refused to take such a step. See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S., at 887, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (\xd2Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine ... the plausibility of a religious claim\xd3); Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989); Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). "
[172] "*725 Moreover, in Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), we considered and rejected an argument that is nearly identical to the one now urged by HHS and the dissent. In Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness was initially employed making sheet steel for a variety of industrial uses, but he was later transferred to a job making turrets for tanks. Id., at 710, 101 S.Ct. 1425. Because he objected on religious grounds to participating in the manufacture of weapons, he lost his job and sought unemployment compensation. Ruling against the employee, the state court had difficulty with the line that the employee drew between work that he found to be consistent with his religious beliefs (helping to manufacture steel that was used in making weapons) and work that he found morally objectionable (helping to make the weapons themselves). This Court, however, held that \xd2it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one.\xd3 Id., at 715, 101 S.Ct. 1425.35 "
[173] "**2779 Similarly, in these cases, the Hahns and Greens and their companies sincerely believe that providing the insurance coverage demanded by the HHS regulations lies on the forbidden side of the line, and it is not for us to say that their religious beliefs are mistaken or insubstantial. Instead, our \xd2narrow function ... in this context is to determine\xd3 whether the line drawn reflects \xd2an honest conviction,\xd3 id., at 716, 101 S.Ct. 1425, and there is no dispute that it does. "
[174] "HHS nevertheless compares these cases to decisions in which we rejected the argument that the use of general tax revenue to subsidize the secular activities of religious institutions violated the Free Exercise Clause. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 689, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971) (plurality); Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 248\xd0249, 88 S.Ct. 1923, 20 L.Ed.2d 1060 (1968). But in those cases, while the subsidies were clearly contrary to the challengers' views on a secular issue, namely, proper church-state relations, the challengers *726 never articulated a religious objection to the subsidies. As we put it in Tilton, they were \xd2unable to identify any coercion directed at the practice or exercise of their religious beliefs.\xd3 403 U.S., at 689, 91 S.Ct. 2091 (plurality opinion); see Allen, supra, at 249, 88 S.Ct. 1923 (\xd2[A]ppellants have not contended that the New York law in any way coerces them as individuals in the practice of their religion\xd3). Here, in contrast, the plaintiffs do assert that funding the specific contraceptive methods at issue violates their religious beliefs, and HHS does not question their sincerity. Because the contraceptive mandate forces them to pay an enormous sum of money\xd1as much as $475 million per year in the case of Hobby Lobby\xd1if they insist on providing insurance coverage in accordance with their religious beliefs, the mandate clearly imposes a substantial burden on those beliefs. "
[175] "V "
[176] "Since the HHS contraceptive mandate imposes a substantial burden on the exercise of religion, we must move on and decide whether HHS has shown that the mandate both \xd2(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd01(b). "
[177] "A "
[178] "15HHS asserts that the contraceptive mandate serves a variety of important interests, but many of these are couched in very broad terms, such as promoting \xd2public health\xd3 and \xd2gender equality.\xd3 Brief for HHS in No. 13\xd0354, at 46, 49. RFRA, however, contemplates a \xd2more focused\xd3 inquiry: It \xd2requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law \xd4to the person\xd5\xd1the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.\xd3 O Centro, 546 U.S., at 430\xd0431, 126 S.Ct. 1211 (quoting \xa4 2000bb\xd01(b)). This requires us to \xd2loo[k] beyond broadly formulated interests\xd3 and to \xd2scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific *727 exemptions to particular religious claimants\xd3\xd1in other words, to look to the marginal interest in enforcing the contraceptive mandate in these cases. O Centro, supra, at 431, 126 S.Ct. 1211. "
[179] "16In addition to asserting these very broadly framed interests, HHS maintains that the mandate serves a compelling interest in ensuring that all women have access to all FDA-approved contraceptives without cost sharing. See Brief for HHS in No. 13\xd0354, at 14\xd015, 49; see Brief for HHS in No. 13\xd0356, at 10, 48. Under our **2780 cases, women (and men) have a constitutional right to obtain contraceptives, see Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485\xd0486, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965), and HHS tells us that \xd2[s]tudies have demonstrated that even moderate copayments for preventive services can deter patients from receiving those services.\xd3 Brief for HHS in No. 13\xd0354, at 50 (internal quotation marks omitted). "
[180] "The objecting parties contend that HHS has not shown that the mandate serves a compelling government interest, and it is arguable that there are features of ACA that support that view. As we have noted, many employees\xd1those covered by grandfathered plans and those who work for employers with fewer than 50 employees\xd1may have no contraceptive coverage without cost sharing at all. "
[181] "HHS responds that many legal requirements have exceptions and the existence of exceptions does not in itself indicate that the principal interest served by a law is not compelling. Even a compelling interest may be outweighed in some circumstances by another even weightier consideration. In these cases, however, the interest served by one of the biggest exceptions, the exception for grandfathered plans, is simply the interest of employers in avoiding the inconvenience of amending an existing plan. Grandfathered plans are required \xd2to comply with a subset of the Affordable Care Act's health reform provisions\xd3 that provide what HHS has described as \xd2particularly significant protections.\xd3 75 Fed.Reg. 34540 (2010). But the contraceptive mandate is expressly excluded from this subset. Ibid. "
[182] "*728 We find it unnecessary to adjudicate this issue. We will assume that the interest in guaranteeing cost-free access to the four challenged contraceptive methods is compelling within the meaning of RFRA, and we will proceed to consider the final prong of the RFRA test, i.e., whether HHS has shown that the contraceptive mandate is \xd2the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.\xd3 \xa4 2000bb\xd01(b)(2). "
[183] "B "
[184] "1718The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding, see City of Boerne, 521 U.S., at 532, 117 S.Ct. 2157, and it is not satisfied here. HHS has not shown that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion by the objecting parties in these cases. See \xa4\xa4 2000bb\xd01(a), (b) (requiring the Government to \xd2demonstrat[e] that application of [a substantial] burden to the person ... is the least restrictive means of furthering [a] compelling governmental interest\xd3 (emphasis added)). "
[185] "The most straightforward way of doing this would be for the Government to assume the cost of providing the four contraceptives at issue to any women who are unable to obtain them under their health-insurance policies due to their employers' religious objections. This would certainly be less restrictive of the plaintiffs' religious liberty, and HHS has not shown, see \xa4 2000bb\xd01(b)(2), that this is not a viable alternative. HHS has not provided any estimate of the average cost per employee of providing access to these contraceptives, two of which, according to the FDA, are designed primarily for emergency use. See Birth Control: Medicines to Help You, online at http:// www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/freepublications/ucm313215.htm. Nor has HHS provided any statistics regarding the number of employees who might be affected because they work for corporations like Hobby Lobby, Conestoga, and Mardel. Nor *729 has HHS told us that it is unable to provide such **2781 statistics. It seems likely, however, that the cost of providing the forms of contraceptives at issue in these cases (if not all FDA-approved contraceptives) would be minor when compared with the overall cost of ACA. According to one of the Congressional Budget Office's most recent forecasts, ACA's insurance-coverage provisions will cost the Federal Government more than $1.3 trillion through the next decade. See CBO, Updated Estimates of the Effects of the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable Care Act, April 2014, p. 2.36 If, as HHS tells us, providing all women with cost-free access to all FDA-approved methods of contraception is a Government interest of the highest order, it is hard to understand HHS's argument that it cannot be required under RFRA to pay anything in order to achieve this important goal. "
[186] "19HHS contends that RFRA does not permit us to take this option into account because \xd2RFRA cannot be used to require creation of entirely new programs.\xd3 Brief for HHS in 13\xd0354, at 15.37 But we see nothing in RFRA that supports *730 this argument, and drawing the line between the \xd2 creation of an entirely new program\xd3 and the modification of an existing program (which RFRA surely allows) would be fraught with problems. We do not doubt that cost may be an important factor in the least-restrictive-means analysis, but both RFRA and its sister statute, RLUIPA, may in some circumstances require the Government to expend additional funds to accommodate citizens' religious beliefs. Cf. \xa4 2000cc\xd03(c) (RLUIPA: \xd2[T]his chapter may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.\xd3). HHS's view that RFRA can never require the Government to spend even a small amount reflects a judgment about the importance of religious liberty that was not shared by the Congress that enacted that law. "
[187] "In the end, however, we need not rely on the option of a new, government-funded **2782 program in order to conclude that the HHS regulations fail the least-restrictive-means test. HHS itself has demonstrated that it has at its disposal an approach that is less restrictive than requiring employers to fund contraceptive methods that violate their religious beliefs. As we explained above, HHS has already established an accommodation for nonprofit organizations with religious objections. See supra, at 2763 \xd0 2764, and nn. 8\xd09. *731 Under that accommodation, the organization can self-certify that it opposes providing coverage for particular contraceptive services. See 45 CFR \xa4\xa4 147.131(b)(4), (c)(1); 26 CFR \xa4\xa4 54.9815\xd02713A(a)(4), (b). If the organization makes such a certification, the organization's insurance issuer or third-party administrator must \xd2[e]xpressly exclude contraceptive coverage from the group health insurance coverage provided in connection with the group health plan\xd3 and \xd2[p]rovide separate payments for any contraceptive services required to be covered\xd3 without imposing \xd2any cost-sharing requirements ... on the eligible organization, the group health plan, or plan participants or beneficiaries.\xd3 45 CFR \xa4 147.131(c)(2); 26 CFR \xa4 54. 9815\xd02713A(c)(2).38 "
[188] "We do not decide today whether an approach of this type complies with RFRA for purposes of all religious claims.39 At a minimum, however, it does not impinge on the plaintiffs' religious belief that providing insurance coverage for the contraceptives at issue here violates their religion, and it serves HHS's stated interests equally well.40 "
[189] "*732 The principal dissent identifies no reason why this accommodation would fail to protect the asserted needs of women as effectively as the contraceptive mandate, and there is none.41 Under the accommodation, the plaintiffs' female employees would continue to receive contraceptive coverage without cost sharing for all FDA-approved contraceptives, and they would continue to \xd2face minimal logistical and administrative obstacles,\xd3 post, at 2802 (internal quotation marks omitted), because their employers' insurers would be responsible for providing information and coverage, see, e.g., 45 CFR \xa4\xa4 147.131(c)-(d); cf. **2783 26 CFR \xa4\xa4 54.9815\xd02713A(b), (d). Ironically, it is the dissent's approach that would \xd2 [i]mped[e] women's receipt of benefits by \xd4requiring them to take steps to learn about, and to sign up for, a new government funded and administered health benefit,\xd5 \xd3 post, at 2802, because the dissent would effectively compel religious employers to drop health-insurance coverage altogether, leaving their employees to find individual plans on government-run exchanges or elsewhere. This is indeed \xd2scarcely what Congress contemplated.\xd3 Ibid. "
[190] "C "
[191] "HHS and the principal dissent argue that a ruling in favor of the objecting parties in these cases will lead to a flood of religious objections regarding a wide variety of medical procedures and drugs, such as vaccinations and blood transfusions, but HHS has made no effort to substantiate this prediction.42 HHS points to no evidence that insurance plans *733 in existence prior to the enactment of ACA excluded coverage for such items. Nor has HHS provided evidence that any significant number of employers sought exemption, on religious grounds, from any of ACA's coverage requirements other than the contraceptive mandate. "
[192] "It is HHS's apparent belief that no insurance-coverage mandate would violate RFRA\xd1no matter how significantly it impinges on the religious liberties of employers\xd1that would lead to intolerable consequences. Under HHS's view, RFRA would permit the Government to require all employers to provide coverage for any medical procedure allowed by law in the jurisdiction in question\xd1for instance, third-trimester abortions or assisted suicide. The owners of many closely held corporations could not in good conscience provide such coverage, and thus HHS would effectively exclude these people from full participation in the economic life of the Nation. RFRA was enacted to prevent such an outcome. "
[193] "In any event, our decision in these cases is concerned solely with the contraceptive mandate. Our decision should not be understood to hold that an insurance-coverage mandate must necessarily fall if it conflicts with an employer's religious beliefs. Other coverage requirements, such as immunizations, may be supported by different interests (for example, the need to combat the spread of infectious diseases) and may involve different arguments about the least restrictive means of providing them. "
[194] "The principal dissent raises the possibility that discrimination in hiring, for example on the basis of race, might be cloaked as religious practice to escape legal sanction. See post, at 2804 \xd0 2805. Our decision today provides no such shield. The Government has a compelling interest in providing an equal opportunity to participate in the workforce without regard to race, and prohibitions on racial discrimination are precisely tailored to achieve that critical goal. "
[195] "HHS also raises for the first time in this Court the argument that applying the contraceptive mandate to for-profit *734 employers with sincere religious objections is essential to the comprehensive health-insurance scheme that ACA establishes. HHS analogizes the contraceptive mandate to the requirement to pay Social Security taxes, which we upheld in Lee despite the religious objection of an employer, but these **2784 cases are quite different. Our holding in Lee turned primarily on the special problems associated with a national system of taxation. We noted that \xd2[t]he obligation to pay the social security tax initially is not fundamentally different from the obligation to pay income taxes.\xd3 455 U.S., at 260, 102 S.Ct. 1051. Based on that premise, we explained that it was untenable to allow individuals to seek exemptions from taxes based on religious objections to particular Government expenditures: \xd2If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax.\xd3 Ibid. We observed that \xd2[t]he tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.\xd3 Ibid.; see O Centro, 546 U.S., at 435, 126 S.Ct. 1211. "
[196] "Lee was a free-exercise, not a RFRA, case, but if the issue in Lee were analyzed under the RFRA framework, the fundamental point would be that there simply is no less restrictive alternative to the categorical requirement to pay taxes. Because of the enormous variety of government expenditures funded by tax dollars, allowing taxpayers to withhold a portion of their tax obligations on religious grounds would lead to chaos. Recognizing exemptions from the contraceptive mandate is very different. ACA does not create a large national pool of tax revenue for use in purchasing healthcare coverage. Rather, individual employers like the plaintiffs purchase insurance for their own employees. And contrary to the principal dissent's characterization, the employers' contributions do not necessarily funnel into \xd2undifferentiated *735 funds.\xd3 Post, at 2799. The accommodation established by HHS requires issuers to have a mechanism by which to \xd2segregate premium revenue collected from the eligible organization from the monies used to provide payments for contraceptive services.\xd3 45 CFR \xa4 147.131(c)(2)(ii). Recognizing a religious accommodation under RFRA for particular coverage requirements, therefore, does not threaten the viability of ACA's comprehensive scheme in the way that recognizing religious objections to particular expenditures from general tax revenues would.43 "
[197] "In its final pages, the principal dissent reveals that its fundamental objection to the claims of the plaintiffs is an objection to RFRA itself. The dissent worries about forcing the federal courts to apply RFRA to a host of claims made by litigants seeking a religious exemption from generally applicable laws, and the dissent expresses a desire to keep the courts out of this business. See post, at 2804 \xd0 2806. In making this plea, the dissent reiterates a point made forcefully by the Court in Smith. 494 U.S., at 888\xd0889, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (applying the Sherbert test to all free- **2785 exercise claims \xd2would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind\xd3). But Congress, in enacting RFRA, took the position that \xd2the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court *736 rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb(a)(5). The wisdom of Congress's judgment on this matter is not our concern. Our responsibility is to enforce RFRA as written, and under the standard that RFRA prescribes, the HHS contraceptive mandate is unlawful. "
[198] "* * * "
[199] "The contraceptive mandate, as applied to closely held corporations, violates RFRA. Our decision on that statutory question makes it unnecessary to reach the First Amendment claim raised by Conestoga and the Hahns. "
[200] "The judgment of the Tenth Circuit in No. 13\xd0354 is affirmed; the judgment of the Third Circuit in No. 13\xd0356 is reversed, and that case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. "
[201] "It is so ordered. "
[202] "Justice GINSBURG delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[203] "*667 In a series of decisions, this Court has emphasized that the First Amendment generally precludes public universities *668 from denying student organizations access to school-sponsored forums because of the groups' viewpoints. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 92 S.Ct. 2338, 33 L.Ed.2d 266 (1972). This case concerns a novel question regarding student activities at public universities: May a public law school condition its official recognition of a student group\xd1and the attendant use of school funds and facilities\xd1on the organization's agreement to open eligibility for membership and leadership to all students? "
[204] "In the view of petitioner Christian Legal Society (CLS), an accept-all-comers policy impairs its First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion by prompting it, on pain of relinquishing the advantages of recognition, to accept members who do not share the organization's core beliefs about religion and sexual orientation. From the perspective of respondent Hastings College of the Law (Hastings or the Law School), CLS seeks special dispensation from an across-the-board open-access requirement designed to further the reasonable educational purposes underpinning the school's student-organization program. "
[205] "*669 In accord with the District Court and the Court of Appeals, we reject CLS's First Amendment challenge. Compliance with Hastings' all-comers policy, we conclude, is a reasonable, viewpoint-neutral condition on access to the student-organization forum. In requiring CLS\xd1in common with all other student organizations\xd1to choose between welcoming all students and forgoing the benefits of official recognition, we hold, Hastings did not transgress constitutional limitations. CLS, it bears emphasis, seeks not parity with other organizations, but a preferential exemption from Hastings' policy. The First Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the organization's expressive activity, however exclusionary that activity may be. But CLS enjoys no constitutional right to state subvention of its selectivity. "
[206] "I "
[207] "Founded in 1878, Hastings was the first law school in the University of California public school system. Like many institutions of higher education, Hastings encourages students to form extracurricular associations that \xd2contribute to the Hastings community and experience.\xd3 App. 349. These groups offer students \xd2opportunities to pursue academic and social interests outside of the classroom [to] further their **2979 education\xd3 and to help them \xd2develo[p] leadership skills.\xd3 Ibid. "
[208] "Through its \xd2Registered Student Organization\xd3 (RSO) program, Hastings extends official recognition to student groups. Several benefits attend this school-approved status. RSOs are eligible to seek financial assistance from the Law School, which subsidizes their events using funds from a mandatory student-activity fee imposed on all students. Id., at 217. RSOs may also use Law\xd0School channels to communicate with students: They may place announcements in a weekly Office\xd0of\xd0Student\xd0Services newsletter, advertise events on designated bulletin boards, send e-mails using a Hastings-organization address, and participate in an annual *670 Student Organizations Fair designed to advance recruitment efforts. Id., at 216\xd0219. In addition, RSOs may apply for permission to use the Law School's facilities for meetings and office space. Id., at 218\xd0219. Finally, Hastings allows officially recognized groups to use its name and logo. Id., at 216. "
[209] "In exchange for these benefits, RSOs must abide by certain conditions. Only a \xd2non-commercial organization whose membership is limited to Hastings students may become [an RSO].\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a. A prospective RSO must submit its bylaws to Hastings for approval, id., at 83a\xd084a; and if it intends to use the Law School's name or logo, it must sign a license agreement, App. 219. Critical here, all RSOs must undertake to comply with Hastings' \xd2Policies and Regulations Applying to College Activities, Organizations and Students.\xd3 Ibid.1 "
[210] "The Law School's Policy on Nondiscrimination (Nondiscrimination Policy), which binds RSOs, states: "
[211] "\xd2[Hastings] is committed to a policy against legally impermissible, arbitrary or unreasonable discriminatory practices. All groups, including administration, faculty, student governments, [Hastings]-owned student residence facilities and programs sponsored by [Hastings], are governed by this policy of nondiscrimination. [Hastings'] policy on nondiscrimination is to comply fully with applicable law. "
[212] "\xd2[Hastings] shall not discriminate unlawfully on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, ancestry, disability, age, sex or sexual orientation. This nondiscrimination policy covers admission, access and treatment in Hastings-sponsored programs and activities.\xd3 Id., at 220. "
[213] "*671 Hastings interprets the Nondiscrimination Policy, as it relates to the RSO program, to mandate acceptance of all comers: School-approved groups must \xd2allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs.\xd3 Id., at 221.2 Other law **2980 schools have adopted similar all-comers policies. See, e.g., Georgetown University Law Center, Office of Student Life: Student Organizations, available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/StudentLife/StudentOrgs/NewGroup.htm (All Internet materials as visited June 24, 2010, and included in Clerk of Court's case file) (Membership in registered groups must be \xd2open to all students.\xd3); Hofstra Law School Student Handbook 2009\xd02010, p. 49, available at http:// law.hofstra.edu/pdf/StudentLife/StudentAffairs/Handbook/ stuhb_handbook.pdf (\xd2[Student] organizations are open to all students.\xd3). From Hastings' adoption of its Nondiscrimination Policy in 1990 until the events stirring *672 this litigation, \xd2no student organization at Hastings ... ever sought an exemption from the Policy.\xd3 App. 221. "
[214] "In 2004, CLS became the first student group to do so. At the beginning of the academic year, the leaders of a predecessor Christian organization\xd1which had been an RSO at Hastings for a decade\xd1formed CLS by affiliating with the national Christian Legal Society (CLS\xd0National). Id., at 222\xd0223, 225. CLS\xd0National, an association of Christian lawyers and law students, charters student chapters at law schools throughout the country. Id., at 225. CLS chapters must adopt bylaws that, inter alia, require members and officers to sign a \xd2Statement of Faith\xd3 and to conduct their lives in accord with prescribed principles. Id., at 225\xd0226; App. to Pet. for Cert. 101a.3 Among those tenets is the belief that sexual activity should not occur outside of marriage between a man and a woman; CLS thus interprets its bylaws to exclude from affiliation anyone who engages in \xd2unrepentant homosexual conduct.\xd3 App. 226. CLS also excludes students who hold religious convictions different from those in the Statement of Faith. Id., at 227. "
[215] "On September 17, 2004, CLS submitted to Hastings an application for RSO status, accompanied by all required documents, including the set of bylaws mandated by CLS\xd0National. Id., at 227\xd0228. Several days later, the Law School rejected the application; CLS's bylaws, Hastings explained, did not comply with the Nondiscrimination Policy *673 because CLS barred students based on religion and sexual orientation. Id., at 228. "
[216] "CLS formally requested an exemption from the Nondiscrimination Policy, id., at 281, but Hastings declined to grant one. \xd2[T]o be one of our student-recognized organizations,\xd3 Hastings reiterated, \xd2CLS must open its membership to all students irrespective of their religious beliefs or **2981 sexual orientation.\xd3 Id., at 294. If CLS instead chose to operate outside the RSO program, Hastings stated, the school \xd2would be pleased to provide [CLS] the use of Hastings facilities for its meetings and activities.\xd3 Ibid. CLS would also have access to chalkboards and generally available campus bulletin boards to announce its events. Id., at 219, 233. In other words, Hastings would do nothing to suppress CLS's endeavors, but neither would it lend RSO-level support for them. "
[217] "Refusing to alter its bylaws, CLS did not obtain RSO status. It did, however, operate independently during the 2004\xd02005 academic year. CLS held weekly Bible-study meetings and invited Hastings students to Good Friday and Easter Sunday church services. Id., at 229. It also hosted a beach barbeque, Thanksgiving dinner, campus lecture on the Christian faith and the legal practice, several fellowship dinners, an end-of-year banquet, and other informal social activities. Ibid. "
[218] "On October 22, 2004, CLS filed suit against various Hastings officers and administrators under 42 U.S.C. \xa4 1983. Its complaint alleged that Hastings' refusal to grant the organization RSO status violated CLS's First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion. The suit sought injunctive and declaratory relief.4 "
[219] "On cross-motions for summary judgment, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California ruled in favor *674 of Hastings. The Law School's all-comers condition on access to a limited public forum, the court held, was both reasonable and viewpoint neutral, and therefore did not violate CLS's right to free speech. App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a\xd038a. "
[220] "Nor, in the District Court's view, did the Law School impermissibly impair CLS's right to expressive association. \xd2Hastings is not directly ordering CLS to admit [any] studen[t],\xd3 the court observed, id., at 42a; \xd2[r]ather, Hastings has merely placed conditions on\xd3 the use of its facilities and funds, ibid. \xd2Hastings' denial of official recognition,\xd3 the court added, \xd2was not a substantial impediment to CLS's ability to meet and communicate as a group.\xd3 Id., at 49a. "
[221] "The court also rejected CLS's Free Exercise Clause argument. \xd2[T]he Nondiscrimination Policy does not target or single out religious beliefs,\xd3 the court noted; rather, the policy \xd2is neutral and of general applicability.\xd3 Id., at 63a. \xd2CLS may be motivated by its religious beliefs to exclude students based on their religion or sexual orientation,\xd3 the court explained, \xd2but that does not convert the reason for Hastings' [Nondiscrimination Policy] to be one that is religiously-based.\xd3 Id., at 63a\xd064a. "
[222] "On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in an opinion that stated, in full: "
[223] "\xd2The parties stipulate that Hastings imposes an open membership rule on all student groups\xd1all groups must accept all comers as voting members even if those individuals disagree with the mission of the group. The conditions on recognition are therefore viewpoint neutral and reasonable. Truth v. Kent Sch. Dist., 542 F.3d 634, 649\xd050 (9th Cir.2008).\xd3 Christian Legal Soc. Chapter of Univ. of Cal. v. Kane, 319 Fed.Appx. 645, 645\xd0646 (C.A.9 2009). "
[224] "**2982 We granted certiorari, 558 U.S. 1076, 130 S.Ct. 795, 175 L.Ed.2d 558 (2009), and now affirm the Ninth Circuit's judgment. "
[225] "*675 II "
[226] "Before considering the merits of CLS's constitutional arguments, we must resolve a preliminary issue: CLS urges us to review the Nondiscrimination Policy as written\xd1prohibiting discrimination on several enumerated bases, including religion and sexual orientation\xd1and not as a requirement that all RSOs accept all comers. The written terms of the Nondiscrimination Policy, CLS contends, \xd2targe[t] solely those groups whose beliefs are based on religion or that disapprove of a particular kind of sexual behavior,\xd3 and leave other associations free to limit membership and leadership to individuals committed to the group's ideology. Brief for Petitioner 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). For example, \xd2[a] political ... group can insist that its leaders support its purposes and beliefs,\xd3 CLS alleges, but \xd2a religious group cannot.\xd3 Id., at 20. "
[227] "1CLS's assertion runs headlong into the stipulation of facts it jointly submitted with Hastings at the summary-judgment stage. In that filing, the parties specified: "
[228] "\xd2Hastings requires that registered student organizations allow any student to participate, become a member, or seek leadership positions in the organization, regardless of [her] status or beliefs. Thus, for example, the Hastings Democratic Caucus cannot bar students holding Republican political beliefs from becoming members or seeking leadership positions in the organization.\xd3 App. 221 (Joint Stipulation \xa6 18) (emphasis added; citations omitted).5 "
[229] "*676 Under the District Court's local rules, stipulated facts are deemed \xd2undisputed.\xd3 Civil Local Rule 56\xd02 (ND Cal.2010). See also Pet. for Cert. 2 (\xd2The material facts of this case are undisputed.\xd3).6 "
[230] "**2983 Litigants, we have long recognized, \xd2[a]re entitled to have [their] case tried upon the assumption that ... facts, stipulated into the record, were established.\xd3 H. Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U.S. 442, 447, 25 S.Ct. 456, 49 L.Ed. 826 (1905).7 This entitlement *677 is the bookend to a party's undertaking to be bound by the factual stipulations it submits. See post, at 3005 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (agreeing that \xd2the parties must be held to their Joint Stipulation\xd3). As a leading legal reference summarizes: "
[231] "\xd2[Factual stipulations are] binding and conclusive ..., and the facts stated are not subject to subsequent variation. So, the parties will not be permitted to deny the truth of the facts stated, ... or to maintain a contention contrary to the agreed statement, ... or to suggest, on appeal, that the facts were other than as stipulated or that any material fact was omitted. The burden is on the party seeking to recover to show his or her right from the facts actually stated.\xd3 83 C.J.S., Stipulations \xa4 93 (2000) (footnotes omitted). "
[232] "2This Court has accordingly refused to consider a party's argument that contradicted a joint \xd2stipulation [entered] at the outset of th[e] litigation.\xd3 Board of Regents of Univ. of Wis. System v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 226, 120 S.Ct. 1346, 146 L.Ed.2d 193 (2000). Time and again, the dissent races away from the facts to which CLS stipulated. See, e.g., post, at 3001, 3002, 3003, 3005 \xd0 3006, 3012 \xd0 3013.8 But factual stipulations are \xd2formal concessions *678 ... that have the effect of withdrawing a fact from issue and dispensing wholly with the need for proof of the fact. Thus, a judicial admission ... is conclusive in the case.\xd3 2 K. Broun, McCormick on Evidence \xa4 254, p. 181 (6th ed.2006) (footnote omitted). See also, e.g., Oscanyan v. Arms Co., 103 U.S. 261, 263, 26 L.Ed. 539 (1881) (\xd2The power of the court to act in the disposition of a trial upon facts conceded by counsel is as plain as its power to act upon the evidence produced.\xd3).9 "
[233] "**2984 In light of the joint stipulation, both the District Court and the Ninth Circuit trained their attention on the constitutionality of the all-comers requirement, as described in the parties' accord. See 319 Fed. Appx., at 645\xd0646; App. to Pet. for Cert. 32a; id., at 36a. We reject CLS's unseemly attempt to escape from the stipulation and shift its target to Hastings' policy as written. This opinion, therefore, considers only whether conditioning access to a student-organization forum on compliance with an all-comers policy violates the Constitution.10 "
[234] "III "
[235] "A "
[236] "3In support of the argument that Hastings' all-comers policy treads on its First Amendment rights to free speech and *679 expressive association, CLS draws on two lines of decisions. First, in a progression of cases, this Court has employed forum analysis to determine when a governmental entity, in regulating property in its charge, may place limitations on speech.11 Recognizing a State's right \xd2to preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated,\xd3 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985) (internal quotation marks omitted), the Court has permitted restrictions on access to a limited public forum, like the RSO program here, with this key caveat: Any access barrier must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, e.g., Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. See also, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 533 U.S. 98, 106\xd0107, 121 S.Ct. 2093, 150 L.Ed.2d 151 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392\xd0393, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983).12 "
[237] "4*680 Second, as evidenced by another set of decisions, this Court has rigorously **2985 reviewed laws and regulations that constrain associational freedom. In the context of public accommodations, we have subjected restrictions on that freedom to close scrutiny; such restrictions are permitted only if they serve \xd2compelling state interests\xd3 that are \xd2unrelated to the suppression of ideas\xd3\xd1interests that cannot be advanced \xd2through ... significantly less restrictive [means].\xd3 Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). See also, e.g., Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000). \xd2Freedom of association,\xd3 we have recognized, \xd2plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate.\xd3 Roberts, 468 U.S., at 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244. Insisting that an organization embrace unwelcome members, we have therefore concluded, \xd2directly and immediately affects associational rights.\xd3 Dale, 530 U.S., at 659, 120 S.Ct. 2446. "
[238] "CLS would have us engage each line of cases independently, but its expressive-association and free-speech arguments merge: Who speaks on its behalf, CLS reasons, colors what concept is conveyed. See Brief for Petitioner 35 (expressive association in this case is \xd2the functional equivalent of speech itself\xd3). It therefore makes little sense to treat CLS's speech and association claims as discrete. See Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 300, 102 S.Ct. 434, 70 L.Ed.2d 492 (1981). Instead, three observations lead us to conclude that our limited-public-forum precedents supply the appropriate framework for assessing both CLS's speech and association rights. "
[239] "First, the same considerations that have led us to apply a less restrictive level of scrutiny to speech in limited public forums as compared to other environments, see supra, at 2984 \xd0 2985, and n. 11, apply with equal force to expressive association occurring in limited public forums. As just noted, speech and expressive-association rights are closely linked. See Roberts, 468 U.S., at 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (Associational freedom is \xd2implicit in the right to engage in activities protected by the First *681 Amendment.\xd3). When these intertwined rights arise in exactly the same context, it would be anomalous for a restriction on speech to survive constitutional review under our limited-public-forum test only to be invalidated as an impermissible infringement of expressive association. Accord Brief for State Universities et al. as Amici Curiae 37\xd038. That result would be all the more anomalous in this case, for CLS suggests that its expressive-association claim plays a part auxiliary to speech's starring role. See Brief for Petitioner 18. "
[240] "Second, and closely related, the strict scrutiny we have applied in some settings to laws that burden expressive association would, in practical effect, invalidate a defining characteristic of limited public forums\xd1the State may \xd2reserv[e] [them] for certain groups.\xd3 Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. See also Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U.S., at 49, 103 S.Ct. 948 (\xd2Implicit in the concept\xd3 of a limited public forum is the State's \xd2right to make distinctions in access on the basis of ... speaker identity.\xd3); Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 806, 105 S.Ct. 3439 (\xd2[A] speaker may be excluded from\xd3 a limited public forum \xd2if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created.\xd3). "
[241] "An example sharpens the tip of this point: Schools, including Hastings, see App. to Pet. for Cert. 83a, ordinarily, and without controversy, limit official student-group recognition to organizations comprising only students\xd1even if those groups wish to associate with nonstudents. See, e.g., Volokh, Freedom of Expressive **2986 Association and Government Subsidies, 58 Stan. L.Rev.1919, 1940 (2006). The same ground rules must govern both speech and association challenges in the limited-public-forum context, lest strict scrutiny trump a public university's ability to \xd2confin[e] a [speech] forum to the limited and legitimate purposes for which it was created.\xd3 Rosenberger, 515 U.S., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. See also Healy, 408 U.S., at 189, 92 S.Ct. 2338 (\xd2Associational activities need not be tolerated where they infringe reasonable campus rules.\xd3). "
[242] "*682 Third, this case fits comfortably within the limited-public-forum category, for CLS, in seeking what is effectively a state subsidy, faces only indirect pressure to modify its membership policies; CLS may exclude any person for any reason if it forgoes the benefits of official recognition.13 The expressive-association precedents on which CLS relies, in contrast, involved regulations that compelled a group to include unwanted members, with no choice to opt out. See, e.g., Dale, 530 U.S., at 648, 120 S.Ct. 2446 (regulation \xd2forc[ed] [the Boy Scouts] to accept members it [did] not desire\xd3 (internal quotation marks omitted)); Roberts, 468 U.S., at 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (\xd2There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal structure or affairs of an association than\xd3 forced inclusion of unwelcome participants.).14 "
[243] "In diverse contexts, our decisions have distinguished between policies that require action and those that withhold benefits. See, e.g., Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 575\xd0576, 104 S.Ct. 1211, 79 L.Ed.2d 516 (1984); *683 Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 602\xd0604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983). Application of the less restrictive limited-public-forum analysis better accounts for the fact that Hastings, through its RSO program, is dangling the carrot of subsidy, not wielding the stick of prohibition. Cf. Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 463, 93 S.Ct. 2804, 37 L.Ed.2d 723 (1973) (\xd2That the Constitution may compel toleration of private discrimination in some circumstances does not mean that it requires state support for such discrimination.\xd3). "
[244] "5In sum, we are persuaded that our limited-public-forum precedents adequately respect both CLS's speech and expressive-association rights, and fairly balance those rights against Hastings' interests as property owner and educational institution. We turn to the merits of the instant dispute, therefore, with the limited-public-forum decisions as our guide. "
[245] "**2987 B "
[246] "As earlier pointed out, supra, at 2978, 2984 \xd0 2985, we do not write on a blank slate; we have three times before considered clashes between public universities and student groups seeking official recognition or its attendant benefits. First, in Healy, a state college denied school affiliation to a student group that wished to form a local chapter of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). 408 U.S., at 170, 92 S.Ct. 2338. Characterizing SDS's mission as violent and disruptive, and finding the organization's philosophy repugnant, the college completely banned the SDS chapter from campus; in its effort to sever all channels of communication between students and the group, university officials went so far as to disband a meeting of SDS members in a campus coffee shop. Id., at 174\xd0176, 92 S.Ct. 2338. The college, we noted, could require \xd2that a group seeking official recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to reasonable campus law,\xd3 including \xd2reasonable standards respecting conduct.\xd3 Id., at 193, 92 S.Ct. 2338. But a public educational institution exceeds constitutional bounds, we held, when it \xd2restrict[s] speech or association simply because *684 it finds the views expressed by [a] group to be abhorrent.\xd3 Id., at 187\xd0188, 92 S.Ct. 2338.15 "
[247] "We later relied on Healy in Widmar. In that case, a public university, in an effort to avoid state support for religion, had closed its facilities to a registered student group that sought to use university space for religious worship and discussion. 454 U.S., at 264\xd0265, 102 S.Ct. 269. \xd2A university's mission is education,\xd3 we observed, \xd2and decisions of this Court have never denied a university's authority to impose reasonable regulations compatible with that mission upon the use of its campus and facilities.\xd3 Id., at 268, n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269. But because the university singled out religious organizations for disadvantageous treatment, we subjected the university's regulation to *685 strict scrutiny. Id., at 269\xd0270, 102 S.Ct. 269. The school's interest \xd2in maintaining strict separation of church and State,\xd3 we held, was not \xd2sufficiently compelling to justify ... **2988 [viewpoint] discrimination against ... religious speech.\xd3 Id., at 270, 276, 102 S.Ct. 269 (internal quotation marks omitted). "
[248] "Most recently and comprehensively, in Rosenberger, we reiterated that a university generally may not withhold benefits from student groups because of their religious outlook. The officially recognized student group in Rosenberger was denied student-activity-fee funding to distribute a newspaper because the publication discussed issues from a Christian perspective. 515 U.S., at 825\xd0827, 115 S.Ct. 2510. By \xd2select[ing] for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints,\xd3 we held, the university had engaged in \xd2viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the forum's limitations.\xd3 Id., at 831, 830, 115 S.Ct. 2510. "
[249] "6In all three cases, we ruled that student groups had been unconstitutionally singled out because of their points of view. \xd2Once it has opened a limited [public] forum,\xd3 we emphasized, \xd2the State must respect the lawful boundaries it has itself set.\xd3 Id., at 829, 115 S.Ct. 2510. The constitutional constraints on the boundaries the State may set bear repetition here: \xd2The State may not exclude speech where its distinction is not reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum, ... nor may it discriminate against speech on the basis of ... viewpoint.\xd3 Ibid. (internal quotation marks omitted). "
[250] "C "
[251] "We first consider whether Hastings' policy is reasonable taking into account the RSO forum's function and \xd2all the surrounding circumstances.\xd3 Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 809, 105 S.Ct. 3439. "
[252] "1 "
[253] "Our inquiry is shaped by the educational context in which it arises: \xd2First Amendment rights,\xd3 we have observed, *686 \xd2must be analyzed in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.\xd3 Widmar, 454 U.S., at 268, n. 5, 102 S.Ct. 269 (internal quotation marks omitted). This Court is the final arbiter of the question whether a public university has exceeded constitutional constraints, and we owe no deference to universities when we consider that question. Cf. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974) (\xd2Courts cannot, of course, abdicate their constitutional responsibility to delineate and protect fundamental liberties.\xd3). Cognizant that judges lack the on-the-ground expertise and experience of school administrators, however, we have cautioned courts in various contexts to resist \xd2substitut[ing] their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.\xd3 Board of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Central School Dist., Westchester Cty. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 206, 102 S.Ct. 3034, 73 L.Ed.2d 690 (1982). See also, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (noting our \xd2oft-expressed view that the education of the Nation's youth is primarily the responsibility of parents, teachers, and state and local school officials, and not of federal judges\xd3); Healy, 408 U.S., at 180, 92 S.Ct. 2338 (\xd2[T]his Court has long recognized \xd4the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.\xd5 \xd3 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 507, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969))). "
[254] "A college's commission\xd1and its concomitant license to choose among pedagogical **2989 approaches\xd1is not confined to the classroom, for extracurricular programs are, today, essential parts of the educational process. See Board of Ed. of Independent School Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831, n. 4, 122 S.Ct. 2559, 153 L.Ed.2d 735 (2002) (involvement in student groups is \xd2a significant contributor to the breadth and quality of the educational experience\xd3 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Schools, we have emphasized, enjoy \xd2a significant measure of authority over the type of officially recognized activities in *687 which their students participate.\xd3 Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist.66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 240, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990). We therefore \xd2approach our task with special caution,\xd3 Healy, 408 U.S., at 171, 92 S.Ct. 2338, mindful that Hastings' decisions about the character of its student-group program are due decent respect.16 "
[255] "2 "
[256] "7With appropriate regard for school administrators' judgment, we review the justifications Hastings offers in defense of its all-comers requirement.17 First, the open-access policy *688 \xd2ensures that the leadership, educational, and social opportunities afforded by [RSOs] are available to all students.\xd3 Brief for Hastings 32; see Brief for American Civil Liberties Union et al. as Amici Curiae 11. Just as \xd2Hastings does not allow its professors to host classes open only to those students with a certain status or belief,\xd3 so the Law School may decide, reasonably in our view, \xd2that the ... educational experience is best promoted when all participants in the forum must provide equal access to all students.\xd3 Brief for Hastings 32. RSOs, we count it significant, are eligible for financial assistance drawn from mandatory student-activity fees, see supra, at 2979; the all-comers policy ensures that no Hastings student is forced to fund a group that would reject her as a member.18 "
[257] "**2990 Second, the all-comers requirement helps Hastings police the written terms of its Nondiscrimination Policy without inquiring into an RSO's motivation for membership restrictions. To bring the RSO program within CLS's view of the Constitution's limits, CLS proposes that Hastings permit exclusion because of belief but forbid discrimination due to status. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 18. But that proposal would impose on Hastings a daunting labor. How should the Law School go about determining whether a student organization cloaked prohibited status exclusion in belief-based garb? If a hypothetical Male\xd0Superiority Club barred a female student from running for its presidency, for example, how could the Law School tell whether the group rejected her bid because of her sex or because, by seeking to lead the club, she manifested a lack of belief in its fundamental philosophy? "
[258] "*689 This case itself is instructive in this regard. CLS contends that it does not exclude individuals because of sexual orientation, but rather \xd2on the basis of a conjunction of conduct and the belief that the conduct is not wrong.\xd3 Brief for Petitioner 35\xd036 (emphasis deleted). Our decisions have declined to distinguish between status and conduct in this context. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575, 123 S.Ct. 2472, 156 L.Ed.2d 508 (2003) (\xd2When homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination.\xd3 (emphasis added)); id., at 583, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (\xd2While it is true that the law applies only to conduct, the conduct targeted by this law is conduct that is closely correlated with being homosexual. Under such circumstances, [the] law is targeted at more than conduct. It is instead directed toward gay persons as a class.\xd3); cf. Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270, 113 S.Ct. 753, 122 L.Ed.2d 34 (1993) (\xd2A tax on wearing yarmulkes is a tax on Jews.\xd3). See also Brief for Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, Inc., et al. as Amici Curiae 7\xd020. "
[259] "Third, the Law School reasonably adheres to the view that an all-comers policy, to the extent it brings together individuals with diverse backgrounds and beliefs, \xd2encourages tolerance, cooperation, and learning among students.\xd3 App. 349.19 And if the policy sometimes produces discord, Hastings can rationally rank among RSO-program goals development of conflict-resolution skills, toleration, and readiness to find common ground. "
[260] "Fourth, Hastings' policy, which incorporates\xd1in fact, subsumes\xd1state-law proscriptions on discrimination, conveys *690 the Law School's decision \xd2to decline to subsidize with public monies and benefits conduct of which the people of California disapprove.\xd3 Brief for Hastings 35; id., at 33\xd034 (citing Cal. Educ. Code Ann. \xa4 66270 (West Supp. 2010) (prohibiting discrimination on various bases)). State **2991 law, of course, may not command that public universities take action impermissible under the First Amendment. But so long as a public university does not contravene constitutional limits, its choice to advance state-law goals through the school's educational endeavors stands on firm footing. "
[261] "In sum, the several justifications Hastings asserts in support of its all-comers requirement are surely reasonable in light of the RSO forum's purposes.20 "
[262] "3 "
[263] "The Law School's policy is all the more creditworthy in view of the \xd2substantial alternative channels that remain open for [CLS-student] communication to take place.\xd3 Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U.S., at 53, 103 S.Ct. 948. If restrictions on access to a limited public forum are viewpoint discriminatory, the ability of a group to exist outside the forum would not cure the constitutional shortcoming. But when access barriers are viewpoint neutral, our decisions have counted it significant that other available avenues for the group to exercise its First Amendment rights lessen the burden created by those barriers. See ibid.; Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 809, 105 S.Ct. 3439; Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 839, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976); Pell, 417 U.S., at 827\xd0828, 94 S.Ct. 2800. "
[264] "In this case, Hastings offered CLS access to school facilities to conduct meetings and the use of chalkboards and generally available bulletin boards to advertise events. App. 232\xd0233. Although CLS could not take advantage of RSO-specific methods of communication, see supra, at 2979, *691 the advent of electronic media and social-networking sites reduces the importance of those channels. See App. 114\xd0115 (CLS maintained a Yahoo! message group to disseminate information to students.); Christian Legal Society v. Walker, 453 F.3d 853, 874 (C.A.7 2006) (Wood, J., dissenting) (\xd2Most universities and colleges, and most college-aged students, communicate through email, websites, and hosts like MySpace .... If CLS had its own website, any student at the school with access to Google\xd1that is, all of them\xd1could easily have found it.\xd3). See also Brief for Associated Students of the University of California, Hastings College of Law, as Amicus Curiae 14\xd018 (describing host of ways CLS could communicate with Hastings' students outside official channels). "
[265] "Private groups, from fraternities and sororities to social clubs and secret societies, commonly maintain a presence at universities without official school affiliation.21 Based on the record before us, CLS was similarly situated: It hosted a variety of activities the year after Hastings denied it recognition, and the number of students attending those meetings and events doubled. App. 224, 229\xd0230. \xd2The variety and type of alternative modes of access present here,\xd3 in short, \xd2compare favorably with those in other [limited public] forum cases where we have upheld restrictions on access.\xd3 Perry Ed. Assn., 460 U.S., at 53\xd054, 103 S.Ct. 948. It is beyond dissenter's license, we note again, see supra, **2992 at 2989, n. 17, constantly to maintain that nonrecognition of a student organization is equivalent to prohibiting its members from speaking. "
[266] "*692 4 "
[267] "CLS nevertheless deems Hastings' all-comers policy \xd2frankly absurd.\xd3 Brief for Petitioner 49. \xd2There can be no diversity of viewpoints in a forum,\xd3 it asserts, \xd2if groups are not permitted to form around viewpoints.\xd3 Id., at 50; accord post, at 3013 (ALITO, J., dissenting). This catchphrase confuses CLS's preferred policy with constitutional limitation\xd1the advisability of Hastings' policy does not control its permissibility. See Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326, 95 S.Ct. 992, 43 L.Ed.2d 214 (1975). Instead, we have repeatedly stressed that a State's restriction on access to a limited public forum \xd2need not be the most reasonable or the only reasonable limitation.\xd3 Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 808, 105 S.Ct. 3439.22 "
[268] "CLS also assails the reasonableness of the all-comers policy in light of the RSO forum's function by forecasting that the policy will facilitate hostile takeovers; if organizations must open their arms to all, CLS contends, saboteurs will infiltrate groups to subvert their mission and message. This supposition strikes us as more hypothetical than real. CLS points to no history or prospect of RSO hijackings at Hastings. Cf. National Endowment for Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 584, 118 S.Ct. 2168, 141 L.Ed.2d 500 (1998) ( \xd2[W]e are reluctant ... to invalidate legislation on the basis of its hypothetical application to situations not before the Court.\xd3 (internal quotation marks omitted)). Students tend to self-sort and presumably will not endeavor en masse to join\xd1let alone seek leadership positions in\xd1groups pursuing missions wholly at odds with their *693 personal beliefs. And if a rogue student intent on sabotaging an organization's objectives nevertheless attempted a takeover, the members of that group would not likely elect her as an officer. "
[269] "RSOs, moreover, in harmony with the all-comers policy, may condition eligibility for membership and leadership on attendance, the payment of dues, or other neutral requirements designed to ensure that students join because of their commitment to a group's vitality, not its demise. See supra, at 2979, n. 2. Several RSOs at Hastings limit their membership rolls and officer slates in just this way. See, e.g., App. 192 (members must \xd2[p]ay their dues on a timely basis\xd3 and \xd2attend meetings regularly\xd3); id., at 173 (members must complete an application and pay dues; \xd2[a]ny active member who misses a semester of regularly scheduled meetings shall be dropped from rolls\xd3); App. to Pet. for Cert. 129a (\xd2Only Hastings students who have held membership in this organization for a minimum of one semester shall be eligible to be an officer.\xd3).23 "
[270] "**2993 Hastings, furthermore, could reasonably expect more from its law students than the disruptive behavior CLS hypothesizes\xd1and to build this expectation into its educational approach. A reasonable policy need not anticipate and preemptively close off every opportunity for avoidance or manipulation. If students begin to exploit an all-comers policy by hijacking organizations to distort or destroy their missions, Hastings presumably would revisit and revise its policy. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 41 (counsel for Hastings); Brief for Hastings 38. "
[271] "Finally, CLS asserts (and the dissent repeats, post, at 3015 \xd0 3016) that the Law School lacks any legitimate interest\xd1let *694 alone one reasonably related to the RSO forum's purposes\xd1in urging \xd2religious groups not to favor co-religionists for purposes of their religious activities.\xd3 Brief for Petitioner 43; id., at 50. CLS's analytical error lies in focusing on the benefits it must forgo while ignoring the interests of those it seeks to fence out: Exclusion, after all, has two sides. Hastings, caught in the crossfire between a group's desire to exclude and students' demand for equal access, may reasonably draw a line in the sand permitting all organizations to express what they wish but no group to discriminate in membership.24 "
[272] "D "
[273] "We next consider whether Hastings' all-comers policy is viewpoint neutral. "
[274] "1 "
[275] "8Although this aspect of limited-public-forum analysis has been the constitutional sticking point in our prior decisions, as earlier recounted, supra, at 2987 \xd0 2988, we need not dwell on it here. It is, after all, hard to imagine a more viewpoint-neutral policy than one requiring all student groups to accept all comers. In contrast to Healy, Widmar, and Rosenberger, in which universities singled out organizations for disfavored treatment because of their points of view, Hastings' all-comers requirement draws no distinction between groups based on their message or perspective. An all-comers *695 condition on access to RSO status, in short, is textbook viewpoint neutral.25 "
[276] "**2994 2 "
[277] "9Conceding that Hastings' all-comers policy is \xd2nominally neutral,\xd3 CLS attacks the regulation by pointing to its effect: The policy is vulnerable to constitutional assault, CLS contends, because \xd2it systematically and predictably burdens most heavily those groups whose viewpoints are out of favor with the campus mainstream.\xd3 Brief for Petitioner 51; cf. post, at 3000 (ALITO, J., dissenting) (charging that Hastings' policy favors \xd2political[ly] correc[t]\xd3 student expression). This argument stumbles from its first step because \xd2[a] regulation that serves purposes unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.\xd3 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746, 105 L.Ed.2d 661 (1989). See also Madsen v. Women's Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763, 114 S.Ct. 2516, 129 L.Ed.2d 593 (1994) (\xd2[T]he fact that the injunction covered people with *696 a particular viewpoint does not itself render the injunction content or viewpoint based.\xd3). "
[278] "10Even if a regulation has a differential impact on groups wishing to enforce exclusionary membership policies, \xd2[w]here the [State] does not target conduct on the basis of its expressive content, acts are not shielded from regulation merely because they express a discriminatory idea or philosophy.\xd3 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390, 112 S.Ct. 2538, 120 L.Ed.2d 305 (1992). See also Roberts, 468 U.S., at 623, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (State's nondiscrimination law did not \xd2distinguish between prohibited and permitted activity on the basis of viewpoint.\xd3); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 549, 107 S.Ct. 1940, 95 L.Ed.2d 474 (1987) (same). "
[279] "11Hastings' requirement that student groups accept all comers, we are satisfied, \xd2is justified without reference to the content [or viewpoint] of the regulated speech.\xd3 Ward, 491 U.S., at 791, 109 S.Ct. 2746 (internal quotation marks and emphasis omitted). The Law School's policy aims at the act of rejecting would-be group members without reference to the reasons motivating that behavior: Hastings' \xd2desire to redress th[e] perceived harms\xd3 of exclusionary membership policies \xd2provides an adequate explanation for its [all-comers condition] over and above mere disagreement with [any student group's] beliefs or biases.\xd3 Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 488, 113 S.Ct. 2194, 124 L.Ed.2d 436 (1993). CLS's conduct\xd1not its Christian perspective\xd1is, from Hastings' vantage point, what stands between the group and RSO status. \xd2In the end,\xd3 as Hastings observes, \xd2CLS is simply confusing its own viewpoint-based objections to ... nondiscrimination laws (which it is entitled to have and [to] voice) with viewpoint discrimination.\xd3 Brief for Hastings 31.26 "
[280] "**2995 12*697 Finding Hastings' open-access condition on RSO status reasonable and viewpoint neutral, we reject CLS's free-speech and expressive-association claims.27 "
[281] "IV "
[282] "13In its reply brief, CLS contends that \xd2[t]he peculiarity, incoherence, and suspect history of the all-comers policy all point to pretext.\xd3 Reply Brief 23. Neither the District Court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed an argument that Hastings selectively enforces its all-comers policy, and this Court is not the proper forum to air the issue in the first instance.28 On remand, the Ninth Circuit may consider *698 CLS's pretext argument if, and to the extent, it is preserved.29 "
[283] "* * * "
[284] "For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the Court of Appeals' ruling that the all-comers policy is constitutional and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. "
[285] "It is so ordered. "
[286] "Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to Part II\xd0A\xd02.* "
[287] "The principle that government may not enact laws that suppress religious belief or practice is so well understood that few violations are recorded in our opinions. Cf. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953). Concerned that this fundamental nonpersecution principle of the First Amendment was implicated here, however, we granted certiorari. 503 U.S. 935, 112 S.Ct. 1472, 117 L.Ed.2d 616 (1992). "
[288] "*524 Our review confirms that the laws in question were enacted by officials who did not understand, failed to perceive, or chose to ignore the fact that their official actions violated the Nation's essential commitment to religious freedom. The challenged laws had an impermissible object; and in all events the principle of general applicability was violated because the secular ends asserted in defense of the laws were pursued only with respect to conduct motivated by religious beliefs. We invalidate the challenged enactments and reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals. "
[289] "I "
[290] "A "
[291] "This case involves practices of the Santeria religion, which originated in the 19th century. When hundreds of thousands of members of the Yoruba people were brought as slaves from western Africa to Cuba, their traditional African religion absorbed significant elements of Roman Catholicism. The resulting syncretion, or fusion, is Santeria, \xd2the way of the saints.\xd3 The Cuban Yoruba express their devotion to spirits, called orishas, through the iconography of Catholic saints, Catholic symbols are often present at Santeria rites, and Santeria devotees attend the Catholic sacraments. 723 F.Supp. 1467, 1469\xd01470 (SD Fla.1989); 13 Encyclopedia of Religion 66 (M. Eliade ed. 1987); 1 Encyclopedia of the American Religious Experience 183 (C. Lippy & P. Williams eds. 1988). "
[292] "The Santeria faith teaches that every individual has a destiny from God, a destiny fulfilled with the aid and energy of the orishas. The basis of the Santeria religion is the nurture of a personal relation with the orishas, and one of the principal forms of devotion is an animal sacrifice. 13 Encyclopedia of Religion, supra, at 66. The sacrifice of animals as part of religious rituals has ancient roots. See generally 12 id., at 554\xd0556. Animal sacrifice is mentioned throughout the Old Testament, see 14 Encyclopaedia Judaica 600, 600\xd0605 *525 (1971), and it played an important role in the practice of Judaism before destruction of the second Temple in Jerusalem, see id., at 605\xd0612. In modern Islam, there is an annual sacrifice commemorating Abraham's sacrifice of a ram in the stead of his son. See C. Glass\x8e, Concise Encyclopedia of Islam 178 (1989); 7 Encyclopedia of Religion, supra, at 456. "
[293] "According to Santeria teaching, the orishas are powerful but not immortal. They depend for survival on the sacrifice. Sacrifices are performed at birth, marriage, and death rites, for the cure of the sick, for the initiation of new members and priests, and during an annual celebration. Animals sacrificed in Santeria rituals include chickens, pigeons, doves, ducks, guinea pigs, goats, sheep, and turtles. The animals are killed by the cutting of the carotid arteries in the neck. The sacrificed animal is cooked and eaten, except after healing and death rituals. See 723 F.Supp., at 1471\xd01472; 13 Encyclopedia of Religion, supra, at 66; M. Gonz\x87lex\xd0Wippler, The Santeria Experience 105 (1982). "
[294] "Santeria adherents faced widespread persecution in Cuba, so the religion and its **2223 rituals were practiced in secret. The open practice of Santeria and its rites remains infrequent. See 723 F.Supp., at 1470; 13 Encyclopedia of Religion, supra, at 67; M. Gonz\x87lez\xd0Wippler, Santer\x92a: The Religion 3\xd04 (1989). The religion was brought to this Nation most often by exiles from the Cuban revolution. The District Court estimated that there are at least 50,000 practitioners in South Florida today. See 723 F.Supp., at 1470. "
[295] "B "
[296] "Petitioner Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. (Church), is a not-for-profit corporation organized under Florida law in 1973. The Church and its congregants practice the Santeria religion. The president of the Church is petitioner Ernesto Pichardo, who is also the Church's priest and holds the religious title of Italero, the second highest in the Santeria faith. In April 1987, the Church leased land in *526 the City of Hialeah, Florida, and announced plans to establish a house of worship as well as a school, cultural center, and museum. Pichardo indicated that the Church's goal was to bring the practice of the Santeria faith, including its ritual of animal sacrifice, into the open. The Church began the process of obtaining utility service and receiving the necessary licensing, inspection, and zoning approvals. Although the Church's efforts at obtaining the necessary licenses and permits were far from smooth, see 723 F.Supp., at 1477\xd01478, it appears that it received all needed approvals by early August 1987. "
[297] "The prospect of a Santeria church in their midst was distressing to many members of the Hialeah community, and the announcement of the plans to open a Santeria church in Hialeah prompted the city council to hold an emergency public session on June 9, 1987. The resolutions and ordinances passed at that and later meetings are set forth in the Appendix following this opinion. "
[298] "A summary suffices here, beginning with the enactments passed at the June 9 meeting. First, the city council adopted Resolution 87\xd066, which noted the \xd2concern\xd3 expressed by residents of the city \xd2that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety,\xd3 and declared that \xd2[t]he City reiterates its commitment to a prohibition against any and all acts of any and all religious groups which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety.\xd3 Next, the council approved an emergency ordinance, Ordinance 87\xd040, which incorporated in full, except as to penalty, Florida's animal cruelty laws. Fla.Stat. ch. 828 (1987). Among other things, the incorporated state law subjected to criminal punishment \xd2[w]hoever ... unnecessarily or cruelly ... kills any animal.\xd3 \xa4 828.12. "
[299] "The city council desired to undertake further legislative action, but Florida law prohibited a municipality from enacting legislation relating to animal cruelty that conflicted with *527 state law. \xa4 828.27(4). To obtain clarification, Hialeah's city attorney requested an opinion from the attorney general of Florida as to whether \xa4 828.12 prohibited \xd2a religious group from sacrificing an animal in a religious ritual or practice\xd3 and whether the city could enact ordinances \xd2making religious animal sacrifice unlawful.\xd3 The attorney general responded in mid-July. He concluded that the \xd2ritual sacrifice of animals for purposes other than food consumption\xd3 was not a \xd2necessary\xd3 killing and so was prohibited by \xa4 828.12. Fla.Op.Atty.Gen. 87\xd056, Annual Report of the Atty.Gen. 146, 147, 149 (1988). The attorney general appeared to define \xd2unnecessary\xd3 as \xd2done without any useful motive, in a spirit of wanton cruelty or for the mere pleasure of destruction without being in any sense beneficial or useful to the person killing the animal.\xd3 Id., at 149, n. 11. He advised that religious animal sacrifice was against state law, so that a city ordinance prohibiting it would not be in conflict. Id., at 151. "
[300] "The city council responded at first with a hortatory enactment, Resolution 87\xd090, that noted its residents' \xd2great concern regarding the possibility of public ritualistic animal sacrifices\xd3 **2224 and the state-law prohibition. The resolution declared the city policy \xd2to oppose the ritual sacrifices of animals\xd3 within Hialeah and announced that any person or organization practicing animal sacrifice \xd2will be prosecuted.\xd3 "
[301] "In September 1987, the city council adopted three substantive ordinances addressing the issue of religious animal sacrifice. Ordinance 87\xd052 defined \xd2sacrifice\xd3 as \xd2to unnecessarily kill, torment, torture, or mutilate an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the primary purpose of food consumption,\xd3 and prohibited owning or possessing an animal \xd2intending to use such animal for food purposes.\xd3 It restricted application of this prohibition, however, to any individual or group that \xd2kills, slaughters or sacrifices animals for any type of ritual, regardless of whether or not the flesh or blood of the animal is to be consumed.\xd3 The ordinance *528 contained an exemption for slaughtering by \xd2licensed establishment[s]\xd3 of animals \xd2specifically raised for food purposes.\xd3 Declaring, moreover, that the city council \xd2has determined that the sacrificing of animals within the city limits is contrary to the public health, safety, welfare and morals of the community,\xd3 the city council adopted Ordinance 87\xd071. That ordinance defined sacrifice as had Ordinance 87\xd052, and then provided that \xd2[i]t shall be unlawful for any person, persons, corporations or associations to sacrifice any animal within the corporate limits of the City of Hialeah, Florida.\xd3 The final Ordinance, 87\xd072, defined \xd2slaughter\xd3 as \xd2the killing of animals for food\xd3 and prohibited slaughter outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouse use. The ordinance provided an exemption, however, for the slaughter or processing for sale of \xd2small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accordance with an exemption provided by state law.\xd3 All ordinances and resolutions passed the city council by unanimous vote. Violations of each of the four ordinances were punishable by fines not exceeding $500 or imprisonment not exceeding 60 days, or both. "
[302] "Following enactment of these ordinances, the Church and Pichardo filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. \xa4 1983 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Named as defendants were the city of Hialeah and its mayor and members of its city council in their individual capacities. Alleging violations of petitioners' rights under, inter alia, the Free Exercise Clause, the complaint sought a declaratory judgment and injunctive and monetary relief. The District Court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants, finding that they had absolute immunity for their legislative acts and that the ordinances and resolutions adopted by the council did not constitute an official policy of harassment, as alleged by petitioners. 688 F.Supp. 1522 (SD Fla.1988). "
[303] "After a 9\xd0day bench trial on the remaining claims, the District Court ruled for the city, finding no violation of petitioners' *529 rights under the Free Exercise Clause. 723 F.Supp. 1467 (SD Fla.1989). (The court rejected as well petitioners' other claims, which are not at issue here.) Although acknowledging that \xd2the ordinances are not religiously neutral,\xd3 id., at 1476, and that the city's concern about animal sacrifice was \xd2prompted\xd3 by the establishment of the Church in the city, id., at 1479, the District Court concluded that the purpose of the ordinances was not to exclude the Church from the city but to end the practice of animal sacrifice, for whatever reason practiced, id., at 1479, 1483. The court also found that the ordinances did not target religious conduct \xd2on their face,\xd3 though it noted that in any event \xd2specifically regulating [religious] conduct\xd3 does not violate the First Amendment \xd2when [the conduct] is deemed inconsistent with public health and welfare.\xd3 Id., at 1483\xd01484. Thus, the court concluded that, at most, the ordinances' effect on petitioners' religious conduct was \xd2incidental to [their] secular purpose and effect.\xd3 Id., at 1484. "
[304] "The District Court proceeded to determine whether the governmental interests underlying the ordinances were compelling and, if **2225 so, to balance the \xd2governmental and religious interests.\xd3 The court noted that \xd2[t]his \xd4balance depends upon the cost to the government of altering its activity to allow the religious practice to continue unimpeded versus the cost to the religious interest imposed by the government activity.\xd5 \xd3 Ibid., quoting Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 734 (CA 11 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 827, 105 S.Ct. 108, 83 L.Ed.2d 52 (1984). The court found four compelling interests. First, the court found that animal sacrifices present a substantial health risk, both to participants and the general public. According to the court, animals that are to be sacrificed are often kept in unsanitary conditions and are uninspected, and animal remains are found in public places. 723 F.Supp., at 1474\xd01475, 1485. Second, the court found emotional injury to children who witness the sacrifice of animals. Id., at 1475\xd01476, 1485\xd01486. Third, the court found compelling the city's interest *530 in protecting animals from cruel and unnecessary killing. The court determined that the method of killing used in Santeria sacrifice was \xd2unreliable and not humane, and that the animals, before being sacrificed, are often kept in conditions that produce a great deal of fear and stress in the animal.\xd3 Id., at 1472\xd01473, 1486. Fourth, the District Court found compelling the city's interest in restricting the slaughter or sacrifice of animals to areas zoned for slaughterhouse use. Id., at 1486. This legal determination was not accompanied by factual findings. "
[305] "Balancing the competing governmental and religious interests, the District Court concluded the compelling governmental interests \xd2fully justify the absolute prohibition on ritual sacrifice\xd3 accomplished by the ordinances. Id., at 1487. The court also concluded that an exception to the sacrifice prohibition for religious conduct would \xd2 \xd4unduly interfere with fulfillment of the governmental interest\xd5 \xd3 because any more narrow restrictions\xd1e.g., regulation of disposal of animal carcasses\xd1would be unenforceable as a result of the secret nature of the Santeria religion. Id., at 1486\xd01487, and nn. 57\xd059. A religious exemption from the city's ordinances, concluded the court, would defeat the city's compelling interests in enforcing the prohibition. Id., at 1487. "
[306] "The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion. Judgt. order reported at 936 F.2d 586 (1991). Choosing not to rely on the District Court's recitation of a compelling interest in promoting the welfare of children, the Court of Appeals stated simply that it concluded the ordinances were consistent with the Constitution. App. to Pet. for Cert. A2. It declined to address the effect of Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), decided after the District Court's opinion, because the District Court \xd2employed an arguably stricter standard\xd3 than that applied in Smith. App. to Pet. for Cert. A2, n. 1. "
[307] "*531 II "
[308] "The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), provides that \xd2Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....\xd3 (Emphasis added). The city does not argue that Santeria is not a \xd2religion\xd3 within the meaning of the First Amendment. Nor could it. Although the practice of animal sacrifice may seem abhorrent to some, \xd2religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.\xd3 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1430, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). Given the historical association between animal sacrifice and religious worship, see supra, at 2, petitioners' assertion that animal sacrifice is an integral part of their religion \xd2cannot be **2226 deemed bizarre or incredible.\xd3 Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829, 834, n. 2, 109 S.Ct. 1514, 1518, n. 2, 103 L.Ed.2d 914 (1989). Neither the city nor the courts below, moreover, have questioned the sincerity of petitioners' professed desire to conduct animal sacrifices for religious reasons. We must consider petitioners' First Amendment claim. "
[309] "12In addressing the constitutional protection for free exercise of religion, our cases establish the general proposition that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, supra. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated, and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be narrowly tailored to advance *532 that interest. These ordinances fail to satisfy the Smith requirements. We begin by discussing neutrality. "
[310] "A "
[311] "In our Establishment Clause cases we have often stated the principle that the First Amendment forbids an official purpose to disapprove of a particular religion or of religion in general. See, e.g., Board of Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248, 110 S.Ct. 2356, 2370\xd071, 110 L.Ed.2d 191 (1990) (plurality opinion); School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 389, 105 S.Ct. 3216, 3225\xd026, 87 L.Ed.2d 267 (1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56, 105 S.Ct. 2479, 2489\xd090, 86 L.Ed.2d 29 (1985); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 106\xd0107, 89 S.Ct. 266, 271\xd072, 21 L.Ed.2d 228 (1968); School Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1573, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963); Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15\xd016, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511\xd012, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). These cases, however, for the most part have addressed governmental efforts to benefit religion or particular religions, and so have dealt with a question different, at least in its formulation and emphasis, from the issue here. Petitioners allege an attempt to disfavor their religion because of the religious ceremonies it commands, and the Free Exercise Clause is dispositive in our analysis. "
[312] "3At a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons. See, e.g., Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1148, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69\xd070, 73 S.Ct. 526, 527, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953). Indeed, it was \xd2historical instances of religious persecution and intolerance that gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause.\xd3 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2154, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (opinion of Burger, C.J.). See J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States \xa4\xa4 991\xd0992 (abridged ed. 1833) (reprint 1987); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 467 (1868) (reprint 1972); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 464, and n. 2, 81 S.Ct. 1153, 1156, and n. 2, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) (opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179, 63 S.Ct. 882, 888, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in result); *533 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342, 10 S.Ct. 299, 300, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890). These principles, though not often at issue in our Free Exercise Clause cases, have played a role in some. In McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978), for example, we invalidated a State law that disqualified members of the clergy from holding certain public offices, because it \xd2impose[d] special disabilities on the basis of ... religious status,\xd3 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S., at 877, 110 S.Ct., at 1599. On the **2227 same principle, in Fowler v. Rhode Island, supra, we found that a municipal ordinance was applied in an unconstitutional manner when interpreted to prohibit preaching in a public park by a Jehovah's Witness but to permit preaching during the course of a Catholic mass or Protestant church service. See also Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 272\xd0273, 71 S.Ct. 325, 327\xd028, 95 L.Ed. 267 (1951). Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982) (state statute that treated some religious denominations more favorably than others violated the Establishment Clause). "
[313] "1 "
[314] "45Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible, McDaniel v. Paty, supra, 435 U.S., at 626, 98 S.Ct., at 1327\xd028 (plurality opinion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S., at 303\xd0304, 60 S.Ct., at 903 if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not neutral, see Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, supra, 494 U.S., at 878\xd0879, 110 S.Ct., at 1599\xd01600; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest. There are, of course, many ways of demonstrating that the object or purpose of a law is the suppression of religion or religious conduct. To determine the object of a law, we must begin with its text, for the minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable from the language or context. Petitioners contend that three of the ordinances fail this test of facial neutrality because they use the words *534 \xd2sacrifice\xd3 and \xd2ritual,\xd3 words with strong religious connotations. Brief for Petitioners 16\xd017. We agree that these words are consistent with the claim of facial discrimination, but the argument is not conclusive. The words \xd2sacrifice\xd3 and \xd2ritual\xd3 have a religious origin, but current use admits also of secular meanings. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1961, 1996 (1971). See also 12 Encyclopedia of Religion, at 556 (\xd2[T]he word sacrifice ultimately became very much a secular term in common usage\xd3). The ordinances, furthermore, define \xd2sacrifice\xd3 in secular terms, without referring to religious practices. "
[315] "67We reject the contention advanced by the city, see Brief for Respondent 15, that our inquiry must end with the text of the laws at issue. Facial neutrality is not determinative. The Free Exercise Clause, like the Establishment Clause, extends beyond facial discrimination. The Clause \xd2forbids subtle departures from neutrality,\xd3 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 452, 91 S.Ct. 828, 837, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971), and \xd2covert suppression of particular religious beliefs,\xd3 Bowen v. Roy, supra, 476 U.S., at 703, 106 S.Ct., at 2154 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality. The Free Exercise Clause protects against governmental hostility which is masked, as well as overt. \xd2The Court must survey meticulously the circumstances of governmental categories to eliminate, as it were, religious gerrymanders.\xd3 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 696, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1425, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). "
[316] "8The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of the ordinances. First, though use of the words \xd2sacrifice\xd3 and \xd2ritual\xd3 does not compel a finding of improper targeting of the Santeria religion, the choice of these words is support for our conclusion. There are further respects in which the text of the city council's enactments discloses the improper attempt to target Santeria. *535 Resolution 87\xd066, adopted June 9, 1987, recited that \xd2residents and citizens of the City of Hialeah have expressed their concern **2228 that certain religions may propose to engage in practices which are inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety,\xd3 and \xd2reiterate[d]\xd3 the city's commitment to prohibit \xd2any and all [such] acts of any and all religious groups.\xd3 No one suggests, and on this record it cannot be maintained, that city officials had in mind a religion other than Santeria. "
[317] "9It becomes evident that these ordinances target Santeria sacrifice when the ordinances' operation is considered. Apart from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object. To be sure, adverse impact will not always lead to a finding of impermissible targeting. For example, a social harm may have been a legitimate concern of government for reasons quite apart from discrimination. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S., at 442, 81 S.Ct., at 1113\xd014. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 10 S.Ct. 299, 33 L.Ed. 637 (1890). See also Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205, 1319 (1970). The subject at hand does implicate, of course, multiple concerns unrelated to religious animosity, for example, the suffering or mistreatment visited upon the sacrificed animals and health hazards from improper disposal. But the ordinances when considered together disclose an object remote from these legitimate concerns. The design of these laws accomplishes instead a \xd2religious gerrymander,\xd3 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, supra, 397 U.S., at 696, 90 S.Ct., at 1425 (Harlan, J., concurring), an impermissible attempt to target petitioners and their religious practices. "
[318] "It is a necessary conclusion that almost the only conduct subject to Ordinances 87\xd040, 87\xd052, and 87\xd071 is the religious exercise of Santeria church members. The texts show that they were drafted in tandem to achieve this result. We begin with Ordinance 87\xd071. It prohibits the sacrifice of animals, but defines sacrifice as \xd2to unnecessarily kill ... an animal in a public or private ritual or ceremony not for the *536 primary purpose of food consumption.\xd3 The definition excludes almost all killings of animals except for religious sacrifice, and the primary purpose requirement narrows the proscribed category even further, in particular by exempting kosher slaughter, see 723 F.Supp., at 1480. We need not discuss whether this differential treatment of two religions is itself an independent constitutional violation. Cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S., at 244\xd0246, 102 S.Ct., at 1683\xd084. It suffices to recite this feature of the law as support for our conclusion that Santeria alone was the exclusive legislative concern. The net result of the gerrymander is that few if any killings of animals are prohibited other than Santeria sacrifice, which is proscribed because it occurs during a ritual or ceremony and its primary purpose is to make an offering to the orishas, not food consumption. Indeed, careful drafting ensured that, although Santeria sacrifice is prohibited, killings that are no more necessary or humane in almost all other circumstances are unpunished. "
[319] "Operating in similar fashion is Ordinance 87\xd052, which prohibits the \xd2possess [ion], sacrifice, or slaughter\xd3 of an animal with the \xd2inten[t] to use such animal for food purposes.\xd3 This prohibition, extending to the keeping of an animal as well as the killing itself, applies if the animal is killed in \xd2any type of ritual\xd3 and there is an intent to use the animal for food, whether or not it is in fact consumed for food. The ordinance exempts, however, \xd2any licensed [food] establishment\xd3 with regard to \xd2any animals which are specifically raised for food purposes,\xd3 if the activity is permitted by zoning and other laws. This exception, too, seems intended to cover kosher slaughter. Again, the burden of the ordinance, in practical terms, falls on Santeria adherents but almost no others: If the killing is\xd1unlike most Santeria sacrifices\xd1unaccompanied by the intent to use the animal for food, then it is not prohibited by Ordinance 87\xd052; if the killing is specifically for food but does not occur during the **2229 course of \xd2any type of ritual,\xd3 it again falls outside the prohibition; and if *537 the killing is for food and occurs during the course of a ritual, it is still exempted if it occurs in a properly zoned and licensed establishment and involves animals \xd2specifically raised for food purposes.\xd3 A pattern of exemptions parallels the pattern of narrow prohibitions. Each contributes to the gerrymander. "
[320] "Ordinance 87\xd040 incorporates the Florida animal cruelty statute, Fla.Stat. \xa4 828.12 (1987). Its prohibition is broad on its face, punishing \xd2[w]hoever ... unnecessarily ... kills any animal.\xd3 The city claims that this ordinance is the epitome of a neutral prohibition. Brief for Respondent 13\xd014. The problem, however, is the interpretation given to the ordinance by respondent and the Florida attorney general. Killings for religious reasons are deemed unnecessary, whereas most other killings fall outside the prohibition. The city, on what seems to be a per se basis, deems hunting, slaughter of animals for food, eradication of insects and pests, and euthanasia as necessary. See id., at 22. There is no indication in the record that respondent has concluded that hunting or fishing for sport is unnecessary. Indeed, one of the few reported Florida cases decided under \xa4 828.12 concludes that the use of live rabbits to train greyhounds is not unnecessary. See Kiper v. State, 310 So.2d 42 (Fla.App.), cert. denied, 328 So.2d 845 (Fla.1975). Further, because it requires an evaluation of the particular justification for the killing, this ordinance represents a system of \xd2individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,\xd3 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S., at 884, 110 S.Ct., at 1603. As we noted in Smith, in circumstances in which individualized exemptions from a general requirement are available, the government \xd2may not refuse to extend that system to cases of \xd4religious hardship\xd5 without compelling reason.\xd3 Ibid., quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S., at 708, 106 S.Ct., at 2156 (opinion of Burger, C.J.). Respondent's application of the ordinance's test of necessity devalues religious reasons for killing by judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligiousreasons. *538 Thus, religious practice is being singled out for discriminatory treatment. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S., at 722, and n. 17, 106 S.Ct., at 2164, and n. 17 (STEVENS, J., concurring in part and concurring in result); id., at 708, 106 S.Ct. 2156 (opinion of Burger, C.J.); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 264, n. 3, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1059, n. 3, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment). "
[321] "We also find significant evidence of the ordinances' improper targeting of Santeria sacrifice in the fact that they proscribe more religious conduct than is necessary to achieve their stated ends. It is not unreasonable to infer, at least when there are no persuasive indications to the contrary, that a law which visits \xd2gratuitous restrictions\xd3 on religious conduct, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S., at 520, 81 S.Ct., at 1186 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.), seeks not to effectuate the stated governmental interests, but to suppress the conduct because of its religious motivation. "
[322] "10The legitimate governmental interests in protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals could be addressed by restrictions stopping far short of a flat prohibition of all Santeria sacrificial practice.* If improper disposal, not the sacrifice itself, is the harm to be prevented, the city could have imposed a general regulation **2230 on the disposal of organic garbage. It did not do so. Indeed, counsel for the city conceded at oral argument that, under the ordinances, Santeria sacrifices would be illegal even if they occurred in licensed, inspected, and zoned slaughterhouses. Tr. of Oral Arg. 45. See also id., at 42, 48. Thus, these broad ordinances prohibit Santeria sacrifice even when it does not threaten the city'sinterest *539 in the public health. The District Court accepted the argument that narrower regulation would be unenforceable because of the secrecy in the Santeria rituals and the lack of any central religious authority to require compliance with secular disposal regulations. See 723 F.Supp., at 1486\xd01487, and nn. 58\xd059. It is difficult to understand, however, how a prohibition of the sacrifices themselves, which occur in private, is enforceable if a ban on improper disposal, which occurs in public, is not. The neutrality of a law is suspect if First Amendment freedoms are curtailed to prevent isolated collateral harms not themselves prohibited by direct regulation. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 162, 60 S.Ct. 146, 151\xd052, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). "
[323] "Under similar analysis, narrower regulation would achieve the city's interest in preventing cruelty to animals. With regard to the city's interest in ensuring the adequate care of animals, regulation of conditions and treatment, regardless of why an animal is kept, is the logical response to the city's concern, not a prohibition on possession for the purpose of sacrifice. The same is true for the city's interest in prohibiting cruel methods of killing. Under federal and Florida law and Ordinance 87\xd040, which incorporates Florida law in this regard, killing an animal by the \xd2simultaneous and instantaneous severance of the carotid arteries with a sharp instrument\xd3\xd1the method used in kosher slaughter\xd1is approved as humane. See 7 U.S.C. \xa4 1902(b); Fla.Stat. \xa4 828.23(7)(b) (1991); Ordinance 87\xd040, \xa4 1. The District Court found that, though Santeria sacrifice also results in severance of the carotid arteries, the method used during sacrifice is less reliable and therefore not humane. See 723 F.Supp., at 1472\xd01473. If the city has a real concern that other methods are less humane, however, the subject of the regulation should be the method of slaughter itself, not a religious classification that is said to bear some general relation to it. "
[324] "11Ordinance 87\xd072\xd1unlike the three other ordinances\xd1does appear to apply to substantial nonreligious conduct and *540 not to be overbroad. For our purposes here, however, the four substantive ordinances may be treated as a group for neutrality purposes. Ordinance 87\xd072 was passed the same day as Ordinance 87\xd071 and was enacted, as were the three others, in direct response to the opening of the Church. It would be implausible to suggest that the three other ordinances, but not Ordinance 87\xd072, had as their object the suppression of religion. We need not decide whether the Ordinance 87\xd072 could survive constitutional scrutiny if it existed separately; it must be invalidated because it functions, with the rest of the enactments in question, to suppress Santeria religious worship. "
[325] "2 "
[326] "In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one under the Free Exercise Clause, we can also find guidance in our equal protection cases. As Justice Harlan noted in the related context of the Establishment Clause, \xd2[n]eutrality in its application requires an equal protection mode of analysis.\xd3 Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S., at 696, 90 S.Ct., at 1425 (concurring opinion). Here, as in equal protection cases, we may determine the city council's object from both direct and circumstantial evidence. Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266, 97 S.Ct. 555, 563\xd064, 50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977). Relevant evidence includes, among other things, the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous **2231 statements made by members of the decisionmaking body. Id., at 267\xd0268, 97 S.Ct., at 564\xd065. These objective factors bear on the question of discriminatory object. Personnel Administrator of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, n. 24, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296, n. 24, 60 L.Ed.2d 870 (1979). "
[327] "That the ordinances were enacted \xd2 \xd4because of,\xd5 not merely \xd4in spite of,\xd5 \xd3 their suppression of Santeria religious practice, id., at 279, 99 S.Ct., at 2296 is revealed by the events preceding their enactment. Although respondent claimed at oral argument *541 that it had experienced significant problems resulting from the sacrifice of animals within the city before the announced opening of the Church, Tr. of Oral Arg. 27, 46, the city council made no attempt to address the supposed problem before its meeting in June 1987, just weeks after the Church announced plans to open. The minutes and taped excerpts of the June 9 session, both of which are in the record, evidence significant hostility exhibited by residents, members of the city council, and other city officials toward the Santeria religion and its practice of animal sacrifice. The public crowd that attended the June 9 meetings interrupted statements by council members critical of Santeria with cheers and the brief comments of Pichardo with taunts. When Councilman Martinez, a supporter of the ordinances, stated that in prerevolution Cuba \xd2people were put in jail for practicing this religion,\xd3 the audience applauded. Taped excerpts of Hialeah City Council Meeting, June 9, 1987. "
[328] "Other statements by members of the city council were in a similar vein. For example, Councilman Martinez, after noting his belief that Santeria was outlawed in Cuba, questioned: \xd2[I]f we could not practice this [religion] in our homeland [Cuba], why bring it to this country?\xd3 Councilman Cardoso said that Santeria devotees at the Church \xd2are in violation of everything this country stands for.\xd3 Councilman Mejides indicated that he was \xd2totally against the sacrificing of animals\xd3 and distinguished kosher slaughter because it had a \xd2real purpose.\xd3 The \xd2Bible says we are allowed to sacrifice an animal for consumption,\xd3 he continued, \xd2but for any other purposes, I don't believe that the Bible allows that.\xd3 The president of the city council, Councilman Echevarria, asked: \xd2What can we do to prevent the Church from opening?\xd3 "
[329] "Various Hialeah city officials made comparable comments. The chaplain of the Hialeah Police Department told the city council that Santeria was a sin, \xd2foolishness,\xd3 \xd2an abomination to the Lord,\xd3 and the worship of \xd2demons.\xd3 He advised *542 the city council: \xd2We need to be helping people and sharing with them the truth that is found in Jesus Christ.\xd3 He concluded: \xd2I would exhort you ... not to permit this Church to exist.\xd3 The city attorney commented that Resolution 87\xd066 indicated: \xd2This community will not tolerate religious practices which are abhorrent to its citizens....\xd3 Ibid. Similar comments were made by the deputy city attorney. This history discloses the object of the ordinances to target animal sacrifice by Santeria worshippers because of its religious motivation. "
[330] "3 "
[331] "In sum, the neutrality inquiry leads to one conclusion: The ordinances had as their object the suppression of religion. The pattern we have recited discloses animosity to Santeria adherents and their religious practices; the ordinances by their own terms target this religious exercise; the texts of the ordinances were gerrymandered with care to proscribe religious killings of animals but to exclude almost all secular killings; and the ordinances suppress much more religious conduct than is necessary in order to achieve the legitimate ends asserted in their defense. These ordinances are not neutral, and the court below committed clear error in failing to reach this conclusion. "
[332] "B "
[333] "12We turn next to a second requirement of the Free Exercise Clause, the rule **2232 that laws burdening religious practice must be of general applicability. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S., at 879\xd0881, 110 S.Ct., at 1600\xd01601. All laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice. The Free Exercise Clause \xd2protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment,\xd3 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 148, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1053, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment), and inequality results when a legislature decides that *543 the governmental interests it seeks to advance are worthy of being pursued only against conduct with a religious motivation. "
[334] "13The principle that government, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious belief is essential to the protection of the rights guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. The principle underlying the general applicability requirement has parallels in our First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 669\xd0670, 111 S.Ct. 2513, 2518\xd02519, 115 L.Ed.2d 586 (1991); University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 201, 110 S.Ct. 577, 588\xd089, 107 L.Ed.2d 571 (1990); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 1371\xd072, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S., at 245\xd0246, 102 S.Ct., at 1683\xd084; Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). In this case we need not define with precision the standard used to evaluate whether a prohibition is of general application, for these ordinances fall well below the minimum standard necessary to protect First Amendment rights. "
[335] "14Respondent claims that Ordinances 87\xd040, 87\xd052, and 87\xd071 advance two interests: protecting the public health and preventing cruelty to animals. The ordinances are underinclusive for those ends. They fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does. The underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential. Despite the city's proffered interest in preventing cruelty to animals, the ordinances are drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice. Many types of animal deaths or kills for nonreligious reasons are either not prohibited or approved by express provision. For example, fishing\xd1which occurs in Hialeah, see A. Khedouri & F. Khedouri, South Florida Inside Out 57 (1991)\xd1is legal. Extermination of mice and rats within a home is also permitted. Florida law incorporated by Ordinance 87\xd040 sanctions *544 euthanasia of \xd2stray, neglected, abandoned, or unwanted animals,\xd3 Fla.Stat. \xa4 828.058 (1987); destruction of animals judicially removed from their owners \xd2for humanitarian reasons\xd3 or when the animal \xd2is of no commercial value,\xd3 \xa4 828.073(4)(c)(2); the infliction of pain or suffering \xd2in the interest of medical science,\xd3 \xa4 828.02; the placing of poison in one's yard or enclosure, \xa4 828.08; and the use of a live animal \xd2to pursue or take wildlife or to participate in any hunting,\xd3 \xa4 828.122(6)(b), and \xd2to hunt wild hogs,\xd3 \xa4 828.122(6)(e). "
[336] "The city concedes that \xd2neither the State of Florida nor the City has enacted a generally applicable ban on the killing of animals.\xd3 Brief for Respondent 21. It asserts, however, that animal sacrifice is \xd2different\xd3 from the animal killings that are permitted by law. Ibid. According to the city, it is \xd2self-evident\xd3 that killing animals for food is \xd2important\xd3; the eradication of insects and pests is \xd2obviously justified\xd3; and the euthanasia of excess animals \xd2makes sense.\xd3 Id., at 22. These ipse dixits do not explain why religion alone must bear the burden of the ordinances, when many of these secular killings fall within the city's interest in preventing the cruel treatment of animals. "
[337] "**2233 15The ordinances are also underinclusive with regard to the city's interest in public health, which is threatened by the disposal of animal carcasses in open public places and the consumption of uninspected meat, see Brief for Respondent 32, citing 723 F.Supp., at 1474\xd01475, 1485. Neither interest is pursued by respondent with regard to conduct that is not motivated by religious conviction. The health risks posed by the improper disposal of animal carcasses are the same whether Santeria sacrifice or some nonreligious killing preceded it. The city does not, however, prohibit hunters from bringing their kill to their houses, nor does it regulate disposal after their activity. Despite substantial testimony at trial that the same public health hazards result from improper disposal of garbage by restaurants, see 11 Record 566, *545 590\xd0591, restaurants are outside the scope of the ordinances. Improper disposal is a general problem that causes substantial health risks, 723 F.Supp., at 1485, but which respondent addresses only when it results from religious exercise. "
[338] "The ordinances are underinclusive as well with regard to the health risk posed by consumption of uninspected meat. Under the city's ordinances, hunters may eat their kill and fishermen may eat their catch without undergoing governmental inspection. Likewise, state law requires inspection of meat that is sold but exempts meat from animals raised for the use of the owner and \xd2members of his household and nonpaying guests and employees.\xd3 Fla.Stat. \xa4 585.88(1)(a) (1991). The asserted interest in inspected meat is not pursued in contexts similar to that of religious animal sacrifice. "
[339] "Ordinance 87\xd072, which prohibits the slaughter of animals outside of areas zoned for slaughterhouses, is underinclusive on its face. The ordinance includes an exemption for \xd2any person, group, or organization\xd3 that \xd2slaughters or processes for sale, small numbers of hogs and/or cattle per week in accordance with an exemption provided by state law.\xd3 See Fla.Stat. \xa4 828.24(3) (1991). Respondent has not explained why commercial operations that slaughter \xd2small numbers\xd3 of hogs and cattle do not implicate its professed desire to prevent cruelty to animals and preserve the public health. Although the city has classified Santeria sacrifice as slaughter, subjecting it to this ordinance, it does not regulate other killings for food in like manner. "
[340] "We conclude, in sum, that each of Hialeah's ordinances pursues the city's governmental interests only against conduct motivated by religious belief. The ordinances \xd2ha[ve] every appearance of a prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshippers] but not upon itself.\xd3 Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 542, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 2614, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989) (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). This *546 precise evil is what the requirement of general applicability is designed to prevent. "
[341] "III "
[342] "161718A law burdening religious practice that is not neutral or not of general application must undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny. To satisfy the commands of the First Amendment, a law restrictive of religious practice must advance \xd2 \xd4interests of the highest order\xd5 \xd3 and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S., at 628, 98 S.Ct., at 1328, quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). The compelling interest standard that we apply once a law fails to meet the Smith requirements is not \xd2water[ed] ... down\xd3 but \xd2really means what it says.\xd3 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S., at 888, 110 S.Ct., at 1605. A law that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advances legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases. It follows from what we have already said that these ordinances cannot withstand this scrutiny. "
[343] "**2234 First, even were the governmental interests compelling, the ordinances are not drawn in narrow terms to accomplish those interests. As we have discussed, see supra, at 16\xd018, 21\xd024, all four ordinances are overbroad or underinclusive in substantial respects. The proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous non-religious conduct, and those interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree. The absence of narrow tailoring suffices to establish the invalidity of the ordinances. See Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 232, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1729, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987). "
[344] "Respondent has not demonstrated, moreover, that, in the context of these ordinances, its governmental interests are compelling. Where government restricts only conduct protected by the First Amendment and fails to enact feasible *547 measures to restrict other conduct producing substantial harm or alleged harm of the same sort, the interest given in justification of the restriction is not compelling. It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that \xd2a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest \xd4of the highest order\xd5 ... when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.\xd3 Florida Star v. B.J.F., supra, 491 U.S., at 541\xd0542, 109 S.Ct., at 2613\xd014 (SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (citation omitted). See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 119\xd0120, 112 S.Ct. 501, 510\xd011, 116 L.Ed.2d 476 (1991). Cf. Florida Star v. B.J.F., supra, at 540\xd0541, 109 S.Ct., at 2612\xd013; Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co., 443 U.S. 97, 104\xd0105, 99 S.Ct. 2667, 2671\xd072, 61 L.Ed.2d 399 (1979); id., at 110, 99 S.Ct., at 2674\xd075 (REHNQUIST, J., concurring in judgment). As we show above, see supra, at 21\xd024, the ordinances are underinclusive to a substantial extent with respect to each of the interests that respondent has asserted, and it is only conduct motivated by religious conviction that bears the weight of the governmental restrictions. There can be no serious claim that those interests justify the ordinances. "
[345] "IV "
[346] "The Free Exercise Clause commits government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures. Those in office must be resolute in resisting importunate demands and must ensure that the sole reasons for imposing the burdens of law and regulation are secular. Legislators may not devise mechanisms, overt or disguised, designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices. The laws here in question were enacted contrary to these constitutional principles, and they are void. "
[347] "Reversed. "
[348] "Justice KENNEDY delivered the opinion of the Court.* "
[349] "A decision by local zoning authorities to deny a church a building permit was challenged under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA or Act), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb et seq. The case calls into question the authority of Congress to enact RFRA. We conclude the statute exceeds Congress' power. "
[350] "I "
[351] "Situated on a hill in the city of Boerne, Texas, some 28 miles northwest of San Antonio, is St. Peter Catholic Church. Built in 1923, the church's structure replicates the mission *512 style of the region's earlier history. The church seats about 230 worshippers, a number too small for its growing parish. Some 40 to 60 parishioners cannot be accommodated at some Sunday masses. In order to meet the needs of the congregation the Archbishop of San Antonio gave permission to the parish to plan alterations to enlarge the building. "
[352] "A few months later, the Boerne City Council passed an ordinance authorizing the city's Historic Landmark Commission to prepare a preservation plan with proposed historic landmarks and districts. Under the ordinance, the commission must preapprove construction affecting historic landmarks or buildings in a historic district. "
[353] "Soon afterwards, the Archbishop applied for a building permit so construction to enlarge the church could proceed. City authorities, relying on the ordinance and the designation of a historic district (which, they argued, included the church), denied the application. The Archbishop brought this suit challenging the permit denial in the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas. 877 F.Supp. 355 (1995). "
[354] "The complaint contained various claims, but to this point the litigation has centered on RFRA and the question of its constitutionality. The Archbishop relied upon RFRA as one basis for relief from the refusal to issue the permit. The District Court concluded that by enacting RFRA Congress exceeded the scope of its enforcement power under \xa4 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court certified its order for interlocutory appeal and the Fifth Circuit reversed, finding RFRA to be constitutional. 73 F.3d 1352 (1996). We granted certiorari, 519 U.S. 926, 117 S.Ct. 293, 136 L.Ed.2d 212 (1996), and now reverse. "
[355] "II "
[356] "Congress enacted RFRA in direct response to the Court's decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). There we considered a Free Exercise Clause claim brought by members of the *513 Native American Church who were denied unemployment benefits when they lost their jobs because they had used peyote. Their practice was to ingest peyote for sacramental purposes, and they challenged an Oregon statute of general applicability which made use of the drug criminal. In evaluating the claim, we declined to apply the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), under which we **2161 would have asked whether Oregon's prohibition substantially burdened a religious practice and, if it did, whether the burden was justified by a compelling government interest. We stated: "
[357] "\xd2[G]overnment's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct ... cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development. To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is \xd4compelling\xd5 ... contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.\xd3 494 U.S., at 885, 110 S.Ct., at 1603 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "
[358] "The application of the Sherbert test, the Smith decision explained, would have produced an anomaly in the law, a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability. The anomaly would have been accentuated, the Court reasoned, by the difficulty of determining whether a particular practice was central to an individual's religion. We explained, moreover, that it \xd2is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds.\xd3 494 U.S., at 887, 110 S.Ct., at 1604 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). "
[359] "The only instances where a neutral, generally applicable law had failed to pass constitutional muster, the Smith Court *514 noted, were cases in which other constitutional protections were at stake. Id., at 881\xd0882, 110 S.Ct., at 1601\xd01602. In Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), for example, we invalidated Wisconsin's mandatory school-attendance law as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school. That case implicated not only the right to the free exercise of religion but also the right of parents to control their children's education. "
[360] "The Smith decision acknowledged the Court had employed the Sherbert test in considering free exercise challenges to state unemployment compensation rules on three occasions where the balance had tipped in favor of the individual. See Sherbert, supra; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987). Those cases, the Court explained, stand for \xd2the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of religious hardship without compelling reason.\xd3 494 U.S., at 884, 110 S.Ct., at 1603 (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, where a general prohibition, such as Oregon's, is at issue, \xd2the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to [free exercise] challenges.\xd3 Id., at 885, 110 S.Ct., at 1603. Smith held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling governmental interest. "
[361] "Four Members of the Court disagreed. They argued the law placed a substantial burden on the Native American Church members so that it could be upheld only if the law served a compelling state interest and was narrowly tailored to achieve that end. Id., at 894, 110 S.Ct., at 1608. Justice O'CONNOR concluded Oregon had satisfied the test, while Justice Blackmun, joined by Justice Brennan and Justice Marshall, could see no compelling interest justifying the law's application to the members. "
[362] "*515 These points of constitutional interpretation were debated by Members of Congress in hearings and floor debates. Many criticized the Court's reasoning, and this disagreement resulted in the passage of RFRA. Congress announced: "
[363] "\xd2(1) [T]he framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution; "
[364] "\xd2(2) laws \xd4neutral\xd5 toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise; "
[365] "**2162 \xd2(3) governments should not substantially burden religious exercise without compelling justification; "
[366] "\xd2(4) in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), the Supreme Court virtually eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion; and "
[367] "\xd2(5) the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb(a). "
[368] "The Act's stated purposes are: "
[369] "\xd2(1) to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and "
[370] "\xd2(2) to provide a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.\xd3 \xa4 2000bb(b). "
[371] "RFRA prohibits \xd2[g]overnment\xd3 from \xd2substantially burden[ing]\xd3 a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability unless the government can demonstrate the burden \xd2(1) is in furtherance of *516 a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.\xd3 \xa4 2000bb\xd01. The Act's mandate applies to any \xd2branch, department, agency, instrumentality, and official (or other person acting under color of law) of the United States,\xd3 as well as to any \xd2State, or ... subdivision of a State.\xd3 \xa4 2000bb\xd02(1). The Act's universal coverage is confirmed in \xa4 2000bb\xd03(a), under which RFRA \xd2applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law, whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after [RFRA's enactment].\xd3 In accordance with RFRA's usage of the term, we shall use \xd2state law\xd3 to include local and municipal ordinances. "
[372] "III "
[373] "A "
[374] "1Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of enumerated powers. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405, 4 L.Ed. 579 (1819); see also The Federalist No. 45, p. 292 (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (J. Madison). The judicial authority to determine the constitutionality of laws, in cases and controversies, is based on the premise that the \xd2powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.\xd3 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 176, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). "
[375] "Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in enacting the most far-reaching and substantial of RFRA's provisions, those which impose its requirements on the States. See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, S.Rep. No. 103\xd0111, pp. 13\xd014 (1993) (Senate Report); H.R.Rep. No. 103\xd088, p. 9 (1993) (House Report). The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in relevant part: "
[376] "\xd2Section 1.... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process *517 of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "
[377] ". . . . . "
[378] "\xd2Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.\xd3 "
[379] "The parties disagree over whether RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress' \xa4 5 power \xd2to enforce\xd3 by \xd2appropriate legislation\xd3 the constitutional guarantee that no State shall deprive any person of \xd2life, liberty, or property, without due process of law\xd3 nor deny any person \xd2equal protection of the laws.\xd3 "
[380] "In defense of the Act, respondent the Archbishop contends, with support from the United States, that RFRA is permissible enforcement **2163 legislation. Congress, it is said, is only protecting by legislation one of the liberties guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, the free exercise of religion, beyond what is necessary under Smith. It is said the congressional decision to dispense with proof of deliberate or overt discrimination and instead concentrate on a law's effects accords with the settled understanding that \xa4 5 includes the power to enact legislation designed to prevent, as well as remedy, constitutional violations. It is further contended that Congress' \xa4 5 power is not limited to remedial or preventive legislation. "
[381] "23All must acknowledge that \xa4 5 is \xd2a positive grant of legislative power\xd3 to Congress, Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 1723, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966). In Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345\xd0346, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1879), we explained the scope of Congress' \xa4 5 power in the following broad terms: "
[382] "\xd2Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not *518 prohibited, is brought within the domain of congressional power.\xd3 "
[383] "Legislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into \xd2legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to the States.\xd3 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455, 96 S.Ct. 2666, 2671, 49 L.Ed.2d 614 (1976). For example, the Court upheld a suspension of literacy tests and similar voting requirements under Congress' parallel power to enforce the provisions of the Fifteenth Amendment, see U.S. Const., Amdt. 15, \xa4 2, as a measure to combat racial discrimination in voting, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308, 86 S.Ct. 803, 808, 15 L.Ed.2d 769 (1966), despite the facial constitutionality of the tests under Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 79 S.Ct. 985, 3 L.Ed.2d 1072 (1959). We have also concluded that other measures protecting voting rights are within Congress' power to enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, despite the burdens those measures placed on the States. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra (upholding several provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Katzenbach v. Morgan, supra (upholding ban on literacy tests that prohibited certain people schooled in Puerto Rico from voting); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 91 S.Ct. 260, 27 L.Ed.2d 272 (1970) (upholding 5\xd0year nationwide ban on literacy tests and similar voting requirements for registering to vote); City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 161, 100 S.Ct. 1548, 1553, 64 L.Ed.2d 119 (1980) (upholding 7\xd0year extension of the Voting Rights Act's requirement that certain jurisdictions preclear any change to a \xd2 \xd4standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting\xd5 \xd3); see also James Everard's Breweries v. Day, 265 U.S. 545, 44 S.Ct. 628, 68 L.Ed. 1174 (1924) (upholding ban on medical prescription of intoxicating malt liquors as appropriate to enforce Eighteenth Amendment ban on manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors for beverage purposes). "
[384] "4It is also true, however, that \xd2[a]s broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it is not unlimited.\xd3 Oregon v. *519 Mitchell, supra, at 128, 91 S.Ct., at 266 (opinion of Black, J.). In assessing the breadth of \xa4 5 's enforcement power, we begin with its text. Congress has been given the power \xd2to enforce\xd3 the \xd2provisions of this article.\xd3 We agree with respondent, of course, that Congress can enact legislation under \xa4 5 enforcing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion. The \xd2provisions of this article,\xd3 to which \xa4 5 refers, include the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress' power to enforce the Free Exercise Clause follows from our holding in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), that the \xd2fundamental concept of liberty embodied in [the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause] embraces the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.\xd3 See also **2164 United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 789, 86 S.Ct. 1152, 1154, 16 L.Ed.2d 267 (1966) (there is \xd2no doubt of the power of Congress to enforce by appropriate criminal sanction every right guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment\xd3 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)). "
[385] "5Congress' power under \xa4 5, however, extends only to \xd2enforc [ing]\xd3 the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court has described this power as \xd2remedial,\xd3 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, at 326, 86 S.Ct., at 817\xd0818. The design of the Amendment and the text of \xa4 5 are inconsistent with the suggestion that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment's restrictions on the States. Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power \xd2to enforce,\xd3 not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation. Were it not so, what Congress would be enforcing would no longer be, in any meaningful sense, the \xd2provisions of [the Fourteenth Amendment].\xd3 "
[386] "While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and *520 Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect. History and our case law support drawing the distinction, one apparent from the text of the Amendment. "
[387] "1 "
[388] "The Fourteenth Amendment's history confirms the remedial, rather than substantive, nature of the Enforcement Clause. The Joint Committee on Reconstruction of the 39th Congress began drafting what would become the Fourteenth Amendment in January 1866. The objections to the Committee's first draft of the Amendment, and the rejection of the draft, have a direct bearing on the central issue of defining Congress' enforcement power. In February, Republican Representative John Bingham of Ohio reported the following draft Amendment to the House of Representatives on behalf of the Joint Committee: "
[389] "\xd2The Congress shall have power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper to secure to the citizens of each State all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States, and to all persons in the several States equal protection in the rights of life, liberty, and property.\xd3 Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., 1034 (1866). "
[390] "The proposal encountered immediate opposition, which continued through three days of debate. Members of Congress from across the political spectrum criticized the Amendment, and the criticisms had a common theme: The proposed Amendment gave Congress too much legislative power at the expense of the existing constitutional structure. E.g., id., at 1063\xd01065 (statement of Rep. Hale); id., at 1082 *521 statement of Sen. Stewart); id., at 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss); id., at App. 133\xd0135 (statement of Rep. Rogers). Democrats and conservative Republicans argued that the proposed Amendment would give Congress a power to intrude into traditional areas of state responsibility, a power inconsistent with the federal design central to the Constitution. Typifying these views, Republican Representative Robert Hale of New York labeled the Amendment \xd2an utter departure from every principle ever dreamed of by the men who framed our Constitution,\xd3 id., at 1063, and warned that under it \xd2all State legislation, in its codes of civil and criminal jurisprudence and procedure ... may be overridden, may be repealed or abolished, and the law of Congress established instead.\xd3 Ibid. Senator William Stewart of Nevada likewise stated the Amendment would permit \xd2Congress to legislate fully upon all subjects affecting life, liberty, and property,\xd3 such that \xd2there would not be much left for the State Legislatures,\xd3 and would thereby \xd2work an entire change in our form of government.\xd3 Id., at 1082; accord, id., at 1087 (statement of Rep. **2165 Davis); id., at App. 133 (statement of Rep. Rogers). Some radicals, like their brethren \xd2unwilling that Congress shall have any such power ... to establish uniform laws throughout the United States upon ... the protection of life, liberty, and property,\xd3 id., at 1095 (statement of Rep. Hotchkiss), also objected that giving Congress primary responsibility for enforcing legal equality would place power in the hands of changing congressional majorities, ibid. See generally Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 Harv. L.Rev. 1, 57 (1955); Graham, Our \xd2Declaratory\xd3 Fourteenth Amendment, 7 Stan. L.Rev. 3, 21 (1954). "
[391] "As a result of these objections having been expressed from so many different quarters, the House voted to table the proposal until April. See, e.g., B. Kendrick, Journal of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction 215, 217 (1914); Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 115 (1871) (statement *522 of Rep. Farnsworth). The congressional action was seen as marking the defeat of the proposal. See The Nation, Mar. 8, 1866, p. 291 (\xd2The postponement of the amendment ... is conclusive against the passage of [it]\xd3); New York Times, Mar. 1, 1866, p. 4 (\xd2It is doubtful if this ever comes before the House again ...\xd3); see also Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 115 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth) (The Amendment was \xd2given its quietus by a postponement for two months, where it slept the sleep that knows no waking\xd3). The measure was defeated \xd2chiefly because many members of the legal profession s[aw] in [it] ... a dangerous centralization of power,\xd3 The Nation, supra, at 291, and \xd2many leading Republicans of th[e] House [of Representatives] would not consent to so radical a change in the Constitution,\xd3 Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App., at 151 (statement of Rep. Garfield). The Amendment in its early form was not again considered. Instead, the Joint Committee began drafting a new article of Amendment, which it reported to Congress on April 30, 1866. "
[392] "Section 1 of the new draft Amendment imposed self-executing limits on the States. Section 5 prescribed that \xd2[t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.\xd3 See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 2286. Under the revised Amendment, Congress' power was no longer plenary but remedial. Congress was granted the power to make the substantive constitutional prohibitions against the States effective. Representative Bingham said the new draft would give Congress \xd2the power ... to protect by national law the privileges and immunities of all the citizens of the Republic ... whenever the same shall be abridged or denied by the unconstitutional acts of any State.\xd3 Id., at 2542. Representative Stevens described the new draft Amendment as \xd2allow[ing] Congress to correct the unjust legislation of the States.\xd3 Id., at 2459. See also id., at 2768 (statement of Sen. Howard) (\xa4 5 \xd2enables Congress, in case the States shall enact *523 laws in conflict with the principles of the amendment, to correct that legislation by a formal congressional enactment\xd3). See generally H. Brannon, The Rights and Privileges Guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 387 (1901) (Congress' \xd2powers are only prohibitive, corrective, vetoing, aimed only at undue process of law\xd3); id., at 420, 452\xd0455 (same); T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 294, n. 1 (2d ed. 1871) (\xd2This amendment of the Constitution does not concentrate power in the general government for any purpose of police government within the States; its object is to preclude legislation by any State which shall \xd4abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States' \xd3). The revised Amendment proposal did not raise the concerns expressed earlier regarding broad congressional power to prescribe uniform national laws with respect to life, liberty, and property. See, e.g., Cong. Globe, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., at App. 151 (statement of Rep. Garfield) (\xd2The [Fourteenth Amendment] limited but did not oust the jurisdiction of the State[s]\xd3). After revisions not relevant here, the new measure passed both Houses and was ratified in July 1868 as the Fourteenth Amendment. "
[393] "The significance of the defeat of the Bingham proposal was apparent even then. During the debates over the Ku Klux Klan Act only a few years after the Amendment's ratification, **2166 Representative James Garfield argued there were limits on Congress' enforcement power, saying \xd2unless we ignore both the history and the language of these clauses we cannot, by any reasonable interpretation, give to [\xa4 5] ... the force and effect of the rejected [Bingham] clause.\xd3 Ibid.; see also id., at App. 115\xd0116 (statement of Rep. Farnsworth). Scholars of successive generations have agreed with this assessment. See H. Flack, The Adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment 64 (1908); Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 S.Ct. Rev. 79, 97. "
[394] "The design of the Fourteenth Amendment has proved significant also in maintaining the traditional separation of powers *524 between Congress and the Judiciary. The first eight Amendments to the Constitution set forth self-executing prohibitions on governmental action, and this Court has had primary authority to interpret those prohibitions. The Bingham draft, some thought, departed from that tradition by vesting in Congress primary power to interpret and elaborate on the meaning of the new Amendment through legislation. Under it, \xd2Congress, and not the courts, was to judge whether or not any of the privileges or immunities were not secured to citizens in the several States.\xd3 Flack, supra, at 64. While this separation-of-powers aspect did not occasion the widespread resistance which was caused by the proposal's threat to the federal balance, it nonetheless attracted the attention of various Members. See Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., at 1064 (statement of Rep. Hale) (noting that Bill of Rights, unlike the Bingham proposal, \xd2provide[s] safeguards to be enforced by the courts, and not to be exercised by the Legislature\xd3); id., at App. 133 (statement of Rep. Rogers) (prior to Bingham proposal it \xd2was left entirely for the courts ... to enforce the privileges and immunities of the citizens\xd3). As enacted, the Fourteenth Amendment confers substantive rights against the States which, like the provisions of the Bill of Rights, are self-executing. Cf. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 325, 86 S.Ct., at 816\xd0817 (discussing Fifteenth Amendment). The power to interpret the Constitution in a case or controversy remains in the Judiciary. "
[395] "2 "
[396] "The remedial and preventive nature of Congress' enforcement power, and the limitation inherent in the power, were confirmed in our earliest cases on the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883), the Court invalidated sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1875 which prescribed criminal penalties for denying to any person \xd2the full enjoyment of\xd3 public accommodations and conveyances, on the grounds that it exceeded Congress' power *525 by seeking to regulate private conduct. The Enforcement Clause, the Court said, did not authorize Congress to pass \xd2general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from making or enforcing....\xd3 Id., at 13\xd014, 3 S.Ct., at 23. The power to \xd2legislate generally upon\xd3 life, liberty, and property, as opposed to the \xd2power to provide modes of redress\xd3 against offensive state action, was \xd2repugnant\xd3 to the Constitution. Id., at 15, 3 S.Ct., at 24. See also United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 218, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1875); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 639, 1 S.Ct. 601, 609\xd0610, 27 L.Ed. 290 (1883); James v. Bowman, 190 U.S. 127, 139, 23 S.Ct. 678, 679\xd0680, 47 L.Ed. 979 (1903). Although the specific holdings of these early cases might have been superseded or modified, see, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 85 S.Ct. 348, 13 L.Ed.2d 258 (1964); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 86 S.Ct. 1170, 16 L.Ed.2d 239 (1966), their treatment of Congress' \xa4 5 power as corrective or preventive, not definitional, has not been questioned. "
[397] "Recent cases have continued to revolve around the question whether \xa4 5 legislation can be considered remedial. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, supra, we emphasized that \xd2[t]he constitutional propriety of [legislation adopted under the Enforcement Clause] must be judged with reference to the historical experience ... it reflects.\xd3 383 U.S., at 308, 86 S.Ct., at 808. **2167 There we upheld various provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, finding them to be \xd2remedies aimed at areas where voting discrimination has been most flagrant,\xd3 id., at 315, 86 S.Ct., at 811, and necessary to \xd2banish the blight of racial discrimination in voting, which has infected the electoral process in parts of our country for nearly a century,\xd3 id., at 308, 86 S.Ct., at 808. We noted evidence in the record reflecting the subsisting and pervasive discriminatory\xd1and therefore unconstitutional\xd1use of literacy tests. Id., at 333\xd0334, 86 S.Ct., at 821\xd0822. The Act's new remedies, which used the administrative resources of the Federal Government, included the suspension of both literacy tests and, *526 pending federal review, all new voting regulations in covered jurisdictions, as well as the assignment of federal examiners to list qualified applicants enabling those listed to vote. The new, unprecedented remedies were deemed necessary given the ineffectiveness of the existing voting rights laws, see id., at 313\xd0315, 86 S.Ct., at 810\xd0812, and the slow, costly character of case-by-case litigation, id., at 328, 86 S.Ct., at 818\xd0819. "
[398] "After South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the Court continued to acknowledge the necessity of using strong remedial and preventive measures to respond to the widespread and persisting deprivation of constitutional rights resulting from this country's history of racial discrimination. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S., at 132, 91 S.Ct., at 268 (\xd2In enacting the literacy test ban ... Congress had before it a long history of the discriminatory use of literacy tests to disfranchise voters on account of their race\xd3) (opinion of Black, J.); id., at 147, 91 S.Ct., at 276 (Literacy tests \xd2have been used at times as a discriminatory weapon against some minorities, not only Negroes but Americans of Mexican ancestry, and American Indians\xd3) (opinion of Douglas, J.); id., at 216, 91 S.Ct., at 311 (\xd2Congress could have determined that racial prejudice is prevalent throughout the Nation, and that literacy tests unduly lend themselves to discriminatory application, either conscious or unconscious\xd3) (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 235, 91 S.Ct., at 320 (\xd2[T]here is no question but that Congress could legitimately have concluded that the use of literacy tests anywhere within the United States has the inevitable effect of denying the vote to members of racial minorities whose inability to pass such tests is the direct consequence of previous governmental discrimination in education\xd3) (opinion of Brennan, J.); id., at 284, 91 S.Ct., at 344 (\xd2[N]ationwide [suspension of literacy tests] may be reasonably thought appropriate when Congress acts against an evil such as racial discrimination which in varying degrees manifests itself in every part of the country\xd3) (opinion of Stewart, J.); City of Rome, 446 U.S., at 182, 100 S.Ct., at 1564 (\xd2Congress' considered determination that at least another 7 years of statutory remedies were necessary to counter the *527 perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive voting discrimination is both unsurprising and unassailable\xd3); Morgan, 384 U.S., at 656, 86 S.Ct., at 1726 (Congress had a factual basis to conclude that New York's literacy requirement \xd2constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause\xd3). "
[399] "3 "
[400] "Any suggestion that Congress has a substantive, non-remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment is not supported by our case law. In Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 112, 91 S.Ct., at 333, a majority of the Court concluded Congress had exceeded its enforcement powers by enacting legislation lowering the minimum age of voters from 21 to 18 in state and local elections. The five Members of the Court who reached this conclusion explained that the legislation intruded into an area reserved by the Constitution to the States. See 400 U.S., at 125, 91 S.Ct., at 265 (concluding that the legislation was unconstitutional because the Constitution \xd2reserves to the States the power to set voter qualifications in state and local elections\xd3) (opinion of Black, J.); id., at 154, 91 S.Ct., at 280 (explaining that the \xd2Fourteenth Amendment was never intended to restrict the authority of the States to allocate their political power as they see fit\xd3) (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 294, 91 S.Ct., at 349 (concluding that States, not Congress, have the power \xd2to establish a qualification for voting based on age\xd3) (opinion of Stewart, J., joined by Burger, C. J., and Blackmun, J.). Four of these **2168 five were explicit in rejecting the position that \xa4 5 endowed Congress with the power to establish the meaning of constitutional provisions. See id., at 209, 91 S.Ct., at 307\xd0308 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id., at 296, 91 S.Ct., at 350 (opinion of Stewart, J.). Justice Black's rejection of this position might be inferred from his disagreement with Congress' interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause. See id., at 125, 91 S.Ct., at 265. "
[401] "There is language in our opinion in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), which could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands *528 the rights contained in \xa4 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. This is not a necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one. In Morgan, the Court considered the constitutionality of \xa4 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which provided that no person who had successfully completed the sixth primary grade in a public school in, or a private school accredited by, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico in which the language of instruction was other than English could be denied the right to vote because of an inability to read or write English. New York's Constitution, on the other hand, required voters to be able to read and write English. The Court provided two related rationales for its conclusion that \xa4 4(e) could \xd2be viewed as a measure to secure for the Puerto Rican community residing in New York nondiscriminatory treatment by government.\xd3 Id., at 652, 86 S.Ct., at 1724. Under the first rationale, Congress could prohibit New York from denying the right to vote to large segments of its Puerto Rican community, in order to give Puerto Ricans \xd2enhanced political power\xd3 that would be \xd2helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for the entire Puerto Rican community.\xd3 Ibid. Section 4(e) thus could be justified as a remedial measure to deal with \xd2discrimination in governmental services.\xd3 Id., at 653, 86 S.Ct., at 1725. The second rationale, an alternative holding, did not address discrimination in the provision of public services but \xd2discrimination in establishing voter qualifications.\xd3 Id., at 654, 86 S.Ct., at 1725. The Court perceived a factual basis on which Congress could have concluded that New York's literacy requirement \xd2constituted an invidious discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.\xd3 Id., at 656, 86 S.Ct., at 1726. Both rationales for upholding \xa4 4(e) rested on unconstitutional discrimination by New York and Congress' reasonable attempt to combat it. As Justice Stewart explained in Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, at 296, 91 S.Ct., at 350, interpreting Morgan to give Congress the power to interpret the Constitution \xd2would require an enormous extension of that decision's rationale.\xd3 "
[402] "*529 If Congress could define its own powers by altering the Fourteenth Amendment's meaning, no longer would the Constitution be \xd2superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.\xd3 It would be \xd2on a level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other acts, ... alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it.\xd3 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 177, 2 L.Ed. 60. Under this approach, it is difficult to conceive of a principle that would limit congressional power. See Van Alstyne, The Failure of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 46 Duke L.J. 291, 292\xd0303 (1996). Shifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V. "
[403] "We now turn to consider whether RFRA can be considered enforcement legislation under \xa4 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. "
[404] "B "
[405] "Respondent contends that RFRA is a proper exercise of Congress' remedial or preventive power. The Act, it is said, is a reasonable means of protecting the free exercise of religion as defined by Smith. It prevents and remedies laws which are enacted with the unconstitutional object of targeting religious beliefs and practices. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2227, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (\xd2[A] law targeting religious beliefs as such is never permissible\xd3). To avoid the difficulty of proving such violations, it is said, Congress can simply invalidate any law which imposes a substantial **2169 burden on a religious practice unless it is justified by a compelling interest and is the least restrictive means of accomplishing that interest. If Congress can prohibit laws with discriminatory effects in order to prevent racial discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, see Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 477, 100 S.Ct. 2758, 2774, 65 L.Ed.2d 902 (1980) (plurality opinion); City of Rome, 446 U.S., at 177, 100 S.Ct., at 1561\xd01562, then it can do the same, respondent argues, to promote religious liberty. "
[406] "6*530 While preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of remedial measures must be considered in light of the evil presented. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 308, 86 S.Ct., at 808. Strong measures appropriate to address one harm may be an unwarranted response to another, lesser one. Id., at 334, 86 S.Ct., at 821\xd0822. "
[407] "A comparison between RFRA and the Voting Rights Act is instructive. In contrast to the record which confronted Congress and the Judiciary in the voting rights cases, RFRA's legislative record lacks examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of religious bigotry. The history of persecution in this country detailed in the hearings mentions no episodes occurring in the past 40 years. See, e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1991, Hearings on H.R. 2797 before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 331\xd0334 (1993) (statement of Douglas Laycock) (House Hearings); The Religious Freedom Restoration Act, Hearing on S. 2969 before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., 30\xd031 (1993) (statement of Dallin H. Oaks) (Senate Hearing); id., at 68\xd076 (statement of Douglas Laycock); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1990, Hearing on H.R. 5377 before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., 49 (1991) (statement of John H. Buchanan, Jr.) (1990 House Hearing). The absence of more recent episodes stems from the fact that, as one witness testified, \xd2deliberate persecution is not the usual problem in this country.\xd3 House Hearings 334 (statement of Douglas Laycock). See also House Report 2 (\xd2[L]aws directly targeting religious practices have become increasingly rare\xd3). Rather, the emphasis of the hearings was on laws of general applicability which place incidental burdens on religion. Much of the discussion centered *531 upon anecdotal evidence of autopsies performed on Jewish individuals and Hmong immigrants in violation of their religious beliefs, see, e.g., House Hearings 81 (statement of Nadine Strossen); id., at 107\xd0110 (statement of William Yang); id., at 118 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz); id., at 336 (statement of Douglas Laycock); Senate Hearing 5\xd06, 14\xd026 (statement of William Yang); id., at 27\xd028 (statement of Hmong\xd0Lao Unity Assn., Inc.); id., at 50 (statement of Baptist Joint Committee); see also Senate Report 8; House Report 5\xd06, and n. 14, and on zoning regulations and historic preservation laws (like the one at issue here), which, as an incident of their normal operation, have adverse effects on churches and synagogues. See, e.g., House Hearings 17, 57 (statement of Robert P. Dugan, Jr.); id., at 81 (statement of Nadine Strossen); id., at 122\xd0123 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz); id., at 157 (statement of Edward M. Gaffney, Jr.); id., at 327 (statement of Douglas Laycock); Senate Hearing 143\xd0144 (statement of Forest D. Montgomery); 1990 House Hearing 39 (statement of Robert P. Dugan, Jr.); see also Senate Report 8; House Report 5\xd06, and n. 14. It is difficult to maintain that they are examples of legislation enacted or enforced due to animus or hostility to the burdened religious practices or that they indicate some widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this country. Congress' concern was with the incidental burdens imposed, not the object or purpose of the legislation. See House Report 2; Senate Report 4\xd05; House Hearings 64 (statement of Nadine Strossen); id., at 117\xd0118 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz); 1990 House Hearing 14 (statement of Rep. Stephen J. Solarz). This lack of support in the legislative record, however, is not RFRA's most serious shortcoming. **2170 Judicial deference, in most cases, is based not on the state of the legislative record Congress compiles but \xd2on due regard for the decision of the body constitutionally appointed to decide.\xd3 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S., at 207, 91 S.Ct., at 306\xd0308 (opinion of Harlan, J.). As a general *532 matter, it is for Congress to determine the method by which it will reach a decision. "
[408] "7Regardless of the state of the legislative record, RFRA cannot be considered remedial, preventive legislation, if those terms are to have any meaning. RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional behavior. It appears, instead, to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections. Preventive measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be appropriate when there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the congressional enactment have a significant likelihood of being unconstitutional. See City of Rome, 446 U.S., at 177, 100 S.Ct., at 1562 (since \xd2jurisdictions with a demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination ... create the risk of purposeful discrimination,\xd3 Congress could \xd2prohibit changes that have a discriminatory impact\xd3 in those jurisdictions). Remedial legislation under \xa4 5 \xd2should be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment was intended to provide against.\xd3 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S., at 13, 3 S.Ct., at 23. "
[409] "8RFRA is not so confined. Sweeping coverage ensures its intrusion at every level of government, displacing laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and regardless of subject matter. RFRA's restrictions apply to every agency and official of the Federal, State, and local Governments. 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd02(1). RFRA applies to all federal and state law, statutory or otherwise, whether adopted before or after its enactment. \xa4 2000bb\xd03(a). RFRA has no termination date or termination mechanism. Any law is subject to challenge at any time by any individual who alleges a substantial burden on his or her free exercise of religion. "
[410] "The reach and scope of RFRA distinguish it from other measures passed under Congress' enforcement power, even in the area of voting rights. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, the challenged provisions were confined to those regions *533 of the country where voting discrimination had been most flagrant, see 383 U.S., at 315, 86 S.Ct., at 811\xd0812, and affected a discrete class of state laws, i.e., state voting laws. Furthermore, to ensure that the reach of the Voting Rights Act was limited to those cases in which constitutional violations were most likely (in order to reduce the possibility of overbreadth), the coverage under the Act would terminate \xd2at the behest of States and political subdivisions in which the danger of substantial voting discrimination has not materialized during the preceding five years.\xd3 Id., at 331, 86 S.Ct., at 820. The provisions restricting and banning literacy tests, upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 16 L.Ed.2d 828 (1966), and Oregon v. Mitchell, supra, attacked a particular type of voting qualification, one with a long history as a \xd2notorious means to deny and abridge voting rights on racial grounds.\xd3 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S., at 355, 86 S.Ct., at 832 (Black, J., concurring and dissenting). In City of Rome, supra, the Court rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of a Voting Rights Act provision which required certain jurisdictions to submit changes in electoral practices to the Department of Justice for preimplementation review. The requirement was placed only on jurisdictions with a history of intentional racial discrimination in voting. Id., at 177, 100 S.Ct., at 1561\xd01562. Like the provisions at issue in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, this provision permitted a covered jurisdiction to avoid preclearance requirements under certain conditions and, moreover, lapsed in seven years. This is not to say, of course, that \xa4 5 legislation requires termination dates, geographic restrictions, or egregious predicates. Where, however, a congressional enactment pervasively prohibits constitutional state action in an effort to remedy or to prevent unconstitutional state action, limitations of this kind tend to ensure Congress' **2171 means are proportionate to ends legitimate under \xa4 5. "
[411] "The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved. If an objector can show a substantial burden on his free exercise, the *534 State must demonstrate a compelling governmental interest and show that the law is the least restrictive means of furthering its interest. Claims that a law substantially burdens someone's exercise of religion will often be difficult to contest. See Smith, 494 U.S., at 887, 110 S.Ct., at 1604 (\xd2What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is \xd4central\xd5 to his personal faith?\xd3); id., at 907, 110 S.Ct., at 1615 (\xd2The distinction between questions of centrality and questions of sincerity and burden is admittedly fine ...\xd3) (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in judgment). Requiring a State to demonstrate a compelling interest and show that it has adopted the least restrictive means of achieving that interest is the most demanding test known to constitutional law. If \xd2 \xd4compelling interest\xd5 really means what it says ..., many laws will not meet the test.... [The test] would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind.\xd3 Id., at 888, 110 S.Ct., at 1605. Laws valid under Smith would fall under RFRA without regard to whether they had the object of stifling or punishing free exercise. We make these observations not to reargue the position of the majority in Smith but to illustrate the substantive alteration of its holding attempted by RFRA. Even assuming RFRA would be interpreted in effect to mandate some lesser test, say, one equivalent to intermediate scrutiny, the statute nevertheless would require searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant likelihood of invalidation. This is a considerable congressional intrusion into the States' traditional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens. "
[412] "The substantial costs RFRA exacts, both in practical terms of imposing a heavy litigation burden on the States and in terms of curtailing their traditional general regulatory power, far exceed any pattern or practice of unconstitutional conduct under the Free Exercise Clause as interpreted in Smith. Simply put, RFRA is not designed to identify and counteract state laws likely to be unconstitutional because of *535 their treatment of religion. In most cases, the state laws to which RFRA applies are not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry. If a state law disproportionately burdened a particular class of religious observers, this circumstance might be evidence of an impermissible legislative motive. Cf. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 96 S.Ct. 2040, 2048, 48 L.Ed.2d 597 (1976). RFRA's substantial-burden test, however, is not even a discriminatory effects or disparate-impact test. It is a reality of the modern regulatory state that numerous state laws, such as the zoning regulations at issue here, impose a substantial burden on a large class of individuals. When the exercise of religion has been burdened in an incidental way by a law of general application, it does not follow that the persons affected have been burdened any more than other citizens, let alone burdened because of their religious beliefs. In addition, the Act imposes in every case a least restrictive means requirement\xd1a requirement that was not used in the pre-Smith jurisprudence RFRA purported to codify\xd1which also indicates that the legislation is broader than is appropriate if the goal is to prevent and remedy constitutional violations. "
[413] "When Congress acts within its sphere of power and responsibilities, it has not just the right but the duty to make its own informed judgment on the meaning and force of the Constitution. This has been clear from the early days of the Republic. In 1789, when a Member of the House of Representatives objected to a debate on the constitutionality of legislation based on the theory that \xd2it would be officious\xd3 to consider the constitutionality of a measure that did not affect the House, James Madison explained that \xd2it is incontrovertibly of as much importance to this branch of the Government as to any other, that the constitution should be preserved entire. It is our duty.\xd3 1 Annals of Congress 500 (1789). Were it otherwise, we **2172 would not afford Congress the presumption of validity its enactments now enjoy. "
[414] "Our national experience teaches that the Constitution is preserved best when each part of the Government respects *536 both the Constitution and the proper actions and determinations of the other branches. When the Court has interpreted the Constitution, it has acted within the province of the Judicial Branch, which embraces the duty to say what the law is. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, at 177, 2 L.Ed. 60. When the political branches of the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations must be disappointed. RFRA was designed to control cases and controversies, such as the one before us; but as the provisions of the federal statute here invoked are beyond congressional authority, it is this Court's precedent, not RFRA, which must control. "
[415] "* * * "
[416] "It is for Congress in the first instance to \xd2determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,\xd3 and its conclusions are entitled to much deference. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S., at 651, 86 S.Ct., at 1723\xd01724. Congress' discretion is not unlimited, however, and the courts retain the power, as they have since Marbury v. Madison, to determine if Congress has exceeded its authority under the Constitution. Broad as the power of Congress is under the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, RFRA contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance. The judgment of the Court of Appeals sustaining the Act's constitutionality is reversed. "
[417] "It is so ordered. "
[418] "Justice SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[419] "This case requires us to decide whether the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment permits the State of Oregon to include religiously inspired peyote use within the reach of its general criminal prohibition on use of that drug, and thus permits the State to deny unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs because of such religiously inspired use. "
[420] "I "
[421] "Oregon law prohibits the knowing or intentional possession of a \xd2controlled substance\xd3 unless the substance has been prescribed by a medical practitioner. Ore.Rev.Stat. \xa4 475.992(4) (1987). The law defines \xd2controlled substance\xd3 as a drug classified in Schedules I through V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. \xa4\xa4 811\xd0812, as modified by the State Board of Pharmacy. Ore.Rev.Stat. \xa4 475.005(6) (1987). Persons who violate this provision by possessing a controlled substance listed on Schedule I are \xd2guilty of a Class B felony.\xd3 \xa4 475.992(4)(a). As compiled by the State Board of Pharmacy under its statutory authority, see, \xa4 475.035, Schedule I contains the drug peyote, a hallucinogen derived from the plant Lophophora williamsii Lemaire. Ore.Admin.Rule 855\xd080\xd0021(3)(s) (1988). "
[422] "Respondents Alfred Smith and Galen Black (hereinafter respondents) were fired from their jobs with a private drug rehabilitation organization because they ingested peyote for sacramental purposes at a ceremony of the Native American Church, of which **1598 both are members. When respondents applied to petitioner Employment Division (hereinafter petitioner) for unemployment compensation, they were determined to be ineligible for benefits because they had been discharged for work-related \xd2misconduct.\xd3 The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed that determination, holding that the denial of benefits violated respondents' free exercise rights under the First Amendment. "
[423] "*875 On appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, petitioner argued that the denial of benefits was permissible because respondents' consumption of peyote was a crime under Oregon law. The Oregon Supreme Court reasoned, however, that the criminality of respondents' peyote use was irrelevant to resolution of their constitutional claim\xd1since the purpose of the \xd2misconduct\xd3 provision under which respondents had been disqualified was not to enforce the State's criminal laws but to preserve the financial integrity of the compensation fund, and since that purpose was inadequate to justify the burden that disqualification imposed on respondents' religious practice. Citing our decisions in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Thomas v. Review Bd., Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981), the court concluded that respondents were entitled to payment of unemployment benefits. Smith v. Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources, 301 Or. 209, 217\xd0219, 721 P.2d 445, 449\xd0450 (1986). We granted certiorari. 480 U.S. 916, 107 S.Ct. 1368, 94 L.Ed.2d 684 (1987). "
[424] "Before this Court in 1987, petitioner continued to maintain that the illegality of respondents' peyote consumption was relevant to their constitutional claim. We agreed, concluding that \xd2if a State has prohibited through its criminal laws certain kinds of religiously motivated conduct without violating the First Amendment, it certainly follows that it may impose the lesser burden of denying unemployment compensation benefits to persons who engage in that conduct.\xd3 Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 485 U.S. 660, 670, 108 S.Ct. 1444, 1450, 99 L.Ed.2d 753 (1988) (Smith I ). We noted, however, that the Oregon Supreme Court had not decided whether respondents' sacramental use of peyote was in fact proscribed by Oregon's controlled substance law, and that this issue was a matter of dispute between the parties. Being \xd2uncertain about the legality of the religious use of peyote in Oregon,\xd3 we determined that it would not be \xd2appropriate for us to decide whether the practice is protected by the Federal Constitution.\xd3 Id., at 673, 108 S.Ct., at 1452. Accordingly, we *876 vacated the judgment of the Oregon Supreme Court and remanded for further proceedings. Id., at 674, 108 S.Ct., at 1452. "
[425] "On remand, the Oregon Supreme Court held that respondents' religiously inspired use of peyote fell within the prohibition of the Oregon statute, which \xd2makes no exception for the sacramental use\xd3 of the drug. 307 Or. 68, 72\xd073, 763 P.2d 146, 148 (1988). It then considered whether that prohibition was valid under the Free Exercise Clause, and concluded that it was not. The court therefore reaffirmed its previous ruling that the State could not deny unemployment benefits to respondents for having engaged in that practice. "
[426] "We again granted certiorari. 489 U.S. 1077, 109 S.Ct. 1526, 103 L.Ed.2d 832 (1989). "
[427] "II "
[428] "Respondents' claim for relief rests on our decisions in Sherbert v. Verner, supra, Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., supra, and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987), in which we held that a State could not condition the availability of unemployment insurance on an individual's willingness to forgo conduct required by his religion. As we observed in Smith I, however, the conduct at issue in those cases was not prohibited by law. We held that distinction to be critical, for \xd2if Oregon does prohibit the religious **1599 use of peyote, and if that prohibition is consistent with the Federal Constitution, there is no federal right to engage in that conduct in Oregon,\xd3 and \xd2the State is free to withhold unemployment compensation from respondents for engaging in work-related misconduct, despite its religious motivation.\xd3 485 U.S., at 672, 108 S.Ct., at 1451. Now that the Oregon Supreme Court has confirmed that Oregon does prohibit the religious use of peyote, we proceed to consider whether that prohibition is permissible under the Free Exercise Clause. "
[429] "A "
[430] "12The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which has been made applicable to the States by incorporation into *877 the Fourteenth Amendment, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), provides that \xd2Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.... \xd3 U.S. Const., Amdt. 1 (emphasis added.) The free exercise of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever religious doctrine one desires. Thus, the First Amendment obviously excludes all \xd2governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.\xd3 Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S., at 402, 83 S.Ct., at 1793. The government may not compel affirmation of religious belief, see Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961), punish the expression of religious doctrines it believes to be false, United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86\xd088, 64 S.Ct. 882, 886\xd087, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944), impose special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status, see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69, 73 S.Ct. 526, 527, 97 L.Ed. 828 (1953); cf. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 245, 102 S.Ct. 1673, 1683\xd084, 72 L.Ed.2d 33 (1982), or lend its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma, see Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 445 452, 89 S.Ct. 601, 604\xd0608, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 95\xd0119, 73 S.Ct. 143, 143\xd056, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 708\xd0725, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2380\xd02388, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976). "
[431] "3But the \xd2exercise of religion\xd3 often involves not only belief and profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation. It would be true, we think (though no case of ours has involved the point), that a State would be \xd2prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]\xd3 if it sought to ban such acts or abstentions only when they are engaged in for religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display. It would doubtless be unconstitutional, for example, to ban the casting of \xd2statues that are to be used *878 for worship purposes,\xd3 or to prohibit bowing down before a golden calf. "
[432] "Respondents in the present case, however, seek to carry the meaning of \xd2prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]\xd3 one large step further. They contend that their religious motivation for using peyote places them beyond the reach of a criminal law that is not specifically directed at their religious practice, and that is concededly constitutional as applied to those who use the drug for other reasons. They assert, in other words, that \xd2prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]\xd3 includes requiring any individual to observe a generally applicable law that requires (or forbids) the performance of an act that his religious belief forbids (or requires). As a textual matter, we do not think the words must be given that meaning. It is no more necessary to regard the collection of a general tax, for example, as \xd2prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]\xd3 by those citizens who believe support of organized government to be sinful, than it is to regard the same tax as \xd2abridging the freedom ... of the press\xd3 of **1600 those publishing companies that must pay the tax as a condition of staying in business. It is a permissible reading of the text, in the one case as in the other, to say that if prohibiting the exercise of religion (or burdening the activity of printing) is not the object of the tax but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been offended. Compare Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131, 139, 89 S.Ct. 927, 931\xd032, 22 L.Ed.2d 148 (1969) (upholding application of antitrust laws to press), with Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250\xd0251, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936) (striking down license tax applied only to newspapers with weekly circulation above a specified level); see generally Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 581, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 1369\xd070, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983). "
[433] "Our decisions reveal that the latter reading is the correct one. We have never held that an individual's religious beliefs *879 excuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate. On the contrary, the record of more than a century of our free exercise jurisprudence contradicts that proposition. As described succinctly by Justice Frankfurter in Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594\xd0595, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 1012\xd01013, 84 L.Ed. 1375 (1940): \xd2Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities (footnote omitted).\xd3 We first had occasion to assert that principle in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1878), where we rejected the claim that criminal laws against polygamy could not be constitutionally applied to those whose religion commanded the practice. \xd2Laws,\xd3 we said, \xd2are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.... Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself.\xd3 Id., at 166\xd0167. "
[434] "Subsequent decisions have consistently held that the right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a \xd2valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).\xd3 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n. 3, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1058, n. 3, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982) (STEVENS, J., concurring in judgment); see Minersville School Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Gobitis, supra, 310 U.S., at 595, 60 S.Ct., at 1013 (collecting cases). In Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), we held that a mother could be prosecuted under the child labor laws *880 for using her children to dispense literature in the streets, her religious motivation notwithstanding. We found no constitutional infirmity in \xd2excluding [these children] from doing there what no other children may do.\xd3 Id., at 171, 64 S.Ct., at 444. In Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion), we upheld Sunday-closing laws against the claim that they burdened the religious practices of persons whose religions compelled them to refrain from work on other days. In Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 461, 91 S.Ct. 828, 842, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971), we sustained the military Selective Service System against the claim that it violated free exercise by conscripting persons who opposed a particular war on religious grounds. "
[435] "**1601 Our most recent decision involving a neutral, generally applicable regulatory law that compelled activity forbidden by an individual's religion was United States v. Lee, 455 U.S., at 258\xd0261, 102 S.Ct., at 1055\xd01057. There, an Amish employer, on behalf of himself and his employees, sought exemption from collection and payment of Social Security taxes on the ground that the Amish faith prohibited participation in governmental support programs. We rejected the claim that an exemption was constitutionally required. There would be no way, we observed, to distinguish the Amish believer's objection to Social Security taxes from the religious objections that others might have to the collection or use of other taxes. \xd2If, for example, a religious adherent believes war is a sin, and if a certain percentage of the federal budget can be identified as devoted to war-related activities, such individuals would have a similarly valid claim to be exempt from paying that percentage of the income tax. The tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.\xd3 Id., at 260, 102 S.Ct., at 1056\xd057. Cf. Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) (rejecting free exercise challenge to payment of income taxes alleged to make religious activities more difficult). "
[436] "*881 The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press, see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S., at 304\xd0307, 60 S.Ct., at 903\xd0905 (invalidating a licensing system for religious and charitable solicitations under which the administrator had discretion to deny a license to any cause he deemed nonreligious); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943) (invalidating a flat tax on solicitation as applied to the dissemination of religious ideas); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 64 S.Ct. 717, 88 L.Ed. 938 (1944) (same), or the right of parents, acknowledged in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925), to direct the education of their children, see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (invalidating compulsory school-attendance laws as applied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school).1 *882 Some of our cases prohibiting compelled expression, decided exclusively upon free speech grounds, have also involved freedom of religion, cf. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 97 S.Ct. 1428, 51 L.Ed.2d 752 (1977) (invalidating compelled display of a license plate slogan that offended individual religious beliefs); West Virginia Bd. of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943) (invalidating **1602 compulsory flag salute statute challenged by religious objectors). And it is easy to envision a case in which a challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be reinforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns. Cf. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 3251\xd052, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984) (\xd2An individual's freedom to speak, to worship, and to petition the government for the redress of grievances could not be vigorously protected from interference by the State [if] a correlative freedom to engage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed\xd3). "
[437] "The present case does not present such a hybrid situation, but a free exercise claim unconnected with any communicative activity or parental right. Respondents urge us to hold, quite simply, that when otherwise prohibitable conduct is accompanied by religious convictions, not only the convictions but the conduct itself must be free from governmental regulation. We have never held that, and decline to do so now. There being no contention that Oregon's drug law represents an attempt to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of one's children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds plainly controls. \xd2Our cases do not at their farthest reach support the proposition that a stance of conscientious opposition relieves an objector from any colliding duty fixed by a democratic government.\xd3 Gillette v. United States, supra, 401 U.S., at 461, 91 S.Ct., at 842. "
[438] "B "
[439] "4Respondents argue that even though exemption from generally applicable criminal laws need not automatically be extended to religiously motivated actors, at least the claim for a *883 religious exemption must be evaluated under the balancing test set forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). Under the Sherbert test, governmental actions that substantially burden a religious practice must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. See id., at 402\xd0403, 83 S.Ct., at 1792\xd01794; see also Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S., at 699, 109 S.Ct., at 2148. Applying that test we have, on three occasions, invalidated state unemployment compensation rules that conditioned the availability of benefits upon an applicant's willingness to work under conditions forbidden by his religion. See Sherbert v. Verner, supra; Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987). We have never invalidated any governmental action on the basis of the Sherbert test except the denial of unemployment compensation. Although we have sometimes purported to apply the Sherbert test in contexts other than that, we have always found the test satisfied, see United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971). In recent years we have abstained from applying the Sherbert test (outside the unemployment compensation field) at all. In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986), we declined to apply Sherbert analysis to a federal statutory scheme that required benefit applicants and recipients to provide their Social Security numbers. The plaintiffs in that case asserted that it would violate their religious beliefs to obtain and provide a Social Security number for their daughter. We held the statute's application to the plaintiffs valid regardless of whether it was necessary to effectuate a compelling interest. See 476 U.S., at 699\xd0701, 106 S.Ct., at 2151\xd053. In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988), we declined to apply Sherbert analysis to the Government's logging and road construction activities on lands used for religious purposes by several Native American Tribes, even though it was undisputed that the activities **1603 \xd2could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices,\xd3 485 U.S., at 451, 108 S.Ct., at 1326. *884 In Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 106 S.Ct. 1310, 89 L.Ed.2d 478 (1986), we rejected application of the Sherbert test to military dress regulations that forbade the wearing of yarmulkes. In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987), we sustained, without mentioning the Sherbert test, a prison's refusal to excuse inmates from work requirements to attend worship services. "
[440] "Even if we were inclined to breathe into Sherbert some life beyond the unemployment compensation field, we would not apply it to require exemptions from a generally applicable criminal law. The Sherbert test, it must be recalled, was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct. As a plurality of the Court noted in Roy, a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment: \xd2The statutory conditions [in Sherbert and Thomas ] provided that a person was not eligible for unemployment compensation benefits if, \xd4without good cause,\xd5 he had quit work or refused available work. The \xd4good cause\xd5 standard created a mechanism for individualized exemptions.\xd3 Bowen v. Roy, supra, 476 U.S., at 708, 106 S.Ct., at 2156 (opinion of Burger, C.J., joined by Powell and REHNQUIST, JJ.). See also Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S., at 401, n. 4, 83 S.Ct., at 1792, n. 4 (reading state unemployment compensation law as allowing benefits for unemployment caused by at least some \xd2personal reasons\xd3). As the plurality pointed out in Roy, our decisions in the unemployment cases stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of \xd2religious hardship\xd3 without compelling reason. Bowen v. Roy, supra, 476 U.S., at 708, 106 S.Ct., at 2156\xd057. "
[441] "Whether or not the decisions are that limited, they at least have nothing to do with an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct. Although, as noted earlier, we have sometimes used the Sherbert test to analyze free exercise challenges to such laws, see United States v. *885 Lee, supra, 455 U.S., at 257\xd0260, 102 S.Ct., at 1055\xd01057; Gillette v. United States, supra, 401 U.S., at 462, 91 S.Ct., at 842\xd043, we have never applied the test to invalidate one. We conclude today that the sounder approach, and the approach in accord with the vast majority of our precedents, is to hold the test inapplicable to such challenges. The government's ability to enforce generally applicable prohibitions of socially harmful conduct, like its ability to carry out other aspects of public policy, \xd2cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development.\xd3 Lyng, supra, 485 U.S., at 451, 108 S.Ct., at 1326. To make an individual's obligation to obey such a law contingent upon the law's coincidence with his religious beliefs, except where the State's interest is \xd2compelling\xd3\xd1permitting him, by virtue of his beliefs, \xd2to become a law unto himself,\xd3 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S., at 167\xd1contradicts both constitutional tradition and common sense.2 "
[442] "**1604 The \xd2compelling government interest\xd3 requirement seems benign, because it is familiar from other fields. But using it as the standard that must be met before the government may accord different treatment on the basis of race, see, e.g., *886 Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432, 104 S.Ct. 1879, 1881\xd082, 80 L.Ed.2d 421 (1984), or before the government may regulate the content of speech, see, e.g., Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126, 109 S.Ct. 2829, 2836, 106 L.Ed.2d 93 (1989), is not remotely comparable to using it for the purpose asserted here. What it produces in those other fields\xd1equality of treatment and an unrestricted flow of contending speech\xd1are constitutional norms; what it would produce here\xd1a private right to ignore generally applicable laws\xd1is a constitutional anomaly.3 "
[443] "Nor is it possible to limit the impact of respondents' proposal by requiring a \xd2compelling state interest\xd3 only when the conduct prohibited is \xd2central\xd3 to the individual's religion. Cf. Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S., at 474\xd0476, 108 S.Ct., at 1338\xd01339 (BRENNAN, J., dissenting). It is no *887 more appropriate for judges to determine the \xd2centrality\xd3 of religious beliefs before applying a \xd2compelling interest\xd3 test in the free exercise field, than it would be for them to determine the \xd2importance\xd3 of ideas before applying the \xd2compelling interest\xd3 test in the free speech field. What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer's assertion that a particular act is \xd2central\xd3 to his personal faith? Judging the centrality of different religious practices is akin to the unacceptable \xd2business of evaluating the relative merits of differing religious claims.\xd3 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S., at 263 n. 2, 102 S.Ct., at 1058 n. 2 (STEVENS, J., concurring). As we reaffirmed only last Term, \xd2[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants' interpretations of those creeds.\xd3 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S., at 699, 109 S.Ct., at 2148. Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a religious claim. See, e.g., Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S., at 716, 101 S.Ct., at 1431; Presbyterian Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth **1605 Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S., at 450, 89 S.Ct., at 606\xd007; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602\xd0606, 99 S.Ct. 3020, 3024\xd03027, 61 L.Ed.2d 775 (1979); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85\xd087, 64 S.Ct. 882, 885\xd087, 88 L.Ed. 1148 (1944).4 "
[444] "*888 If the \xd2compelling interest\xd3 test is to be applied at all, then, it must be applied across the board, to all actions thought to be religiously commanded. Moreover, if \xd2compelling interest\xd3 really means what it says (and watering it down here would subvert its rigor in the other fields where it is applied), many laws will not meet the test. Any society adopting such a system would be courting anarchy, but that danger increases in direct proportion to the society's diversity of religious beliefs, and its determination to coerce or suppress none of them. Precisely because \xd2we are a cosmopolitan nation made up of people of almost every conceivable religious preference,\xd3 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S., at 606, 81 S.Ct., at 1147, and precisely because we value and protect that religious divergence, we cannot afford the luxury of deeming presumptively invalid, as applied to the religious objector, every regulation of conduct that does not protect an interest of the highest order. The rule respondents favor would open the prospect of constitutionally required religious exemptions from civic obligations of almost every conceivable kind\xd1ranging from *889 compulsory military service, see, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971), to the payment of taxes, see, e.g., United States v. Lee, supra; to health and safety regulation such as manslaughter and child neglect laws, see, e.g., Funkhouser v. State, 763 P.2d 695 (Okla.Crim.App.1988), compulsory vaccination laws, see, e.g., Cude v. State, 237 Ark. 927, 377 S.W.2d 816 (1964), drug laws, see, e.g., Olsen v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 279 U.S.App.D.C. 1, 878 F.2d 1458 (1989), and traffic laws, see Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941); to social welfare legislation such as minimum wage laws, see Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 105 S.Ct. 1953, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985), child labor laws, see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944), animal cruelty laws, see, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 723 F.Supp. 1467 (SD Fla.1989), cf. State v. Massey, 229 N.C. 734, 51 S.E.2d 179, appeal dism'd, 336 U.S. 942, 69 S.Ct. 813, 93 L.Ed. 1099 (1949), environmental protection laws, **1606 see United States v. Little, 638 F.Supp. 337 (Mont.1986), and laws providing for equality of opportunity for the races, see, e.g., Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603\xd0604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2034\xd02035, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983). The First Amendment's protection of religious liberty does not require this.5 "
[445] "5*890 Values that are protected against government interference through enshrinement in the Bill of Rights are not thereby banished from the political process. Just as a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to the press by the First Amendment is likely to enact laws that affirmatively foster the dissemination of the printed word, so also a society that believes in the negative protection accorded to religious belief can be expected to be solicitous of that value in its legislation as well. It is therefore not surprising that a number of States have made an exception to their drug laws for sacramental peyote use. See, e.g., Ariz.Rev.Stat.Ann. \xa4\xa4 13\xd03402(B)(1)\xd0(3) (1989); Colo.Rev.Stat. \xa4 12\xd022\xd0317(3) (1985); N.M.Stat.Ann. \xa4 30\xd031\xd06(D) (Supp.1989). But to say that a nondiscriminatory religious-practice exemption is permitted, or even that it is desirable, is not to say that it is constitutionally required, and that the appropriate occasions for its creation can be discerned by the courts. It may fairly be said that leaving accommodation to the political process will place at a relative disadvantage those religious practices that are not widely engaged in; but that unavoidable consequence of democratic government must be preferred to a system in which each conscience is a law unto itself or in which judges weigh the social importance of all laws against the centrality of all religious beliefs. "
[446] "* * * "
[447] "6Because respondents' ingestion of peyote was prohibited under Oregon law, and because that prohibition is constitutional, Oregon may, consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, deny respondents unemployment compensation when their dismissal results from use of the drug. The decision of the Oregon Supreme Court is accordingly reversed. "
[448] "It is so ordered. "
[449] "Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[450] "*2251 The Montana Legislature established a program to provide tuition assistance to parents who send their children to private schools. The program grants a tax credit to anyone who donates to certain organizations that in turn award scholarships to selected students attending such schools. When petitioners sought to use the scholarships at a religious school, the Montana Supreme Court struck down the program. The Court relied on the \xd2no-aid\xd3 provision of the State Constitution, which prohibits any aid to a school controlled by a \xd2church, sect, or denomination.\xd3 The question presented is whether the Free Exercise Clause of the United States Constitution barred that application of the no-aid provision. "
[451] "I "
[452] "A "
[453] "In 2015, the Montana Legislature sought \xd2to provide parental and student choice in education\xd3 by enacting a scholarship program for students attending private schools. 2015 Mont. Laws p. 2168, \xa4 7. The program grants a tax credit of up to $150 to any taxpayer who donates to a participating \xd2student scholarship organization.\xd3 Mont. Code Ann. \xa4\xa4 15\xd030\xd03103(1), \xd03111(1) (2019). The scholarship organizations then use the donations to award scholarships to children for tuition at a private school. \xa4\xa4 15\xd030\xd03102(7)(a), \xd03103(1)(c).1 "
[454] "So far only one scholarship organization, Big Sky Scholarships, has participated in the program. Big Sky focuses on providing scholarships to families who face financial hardship or have children with disabilities. Scholarship organizations like Big Sky must, among other requirements, maintain an application process for awarding the scholarships; use at least 90% of all donations on scholarship awards; and comply with state reporting and monitoring requirements. \xa4\xa4 15\xd030\xd03103(1), \xd03105(1), \xd03113(1). "
[455] "A family whose child is awarded a scholarship under the program may use it at any \xd2qualified education provider\xd3\xd1that is, any private school that meets certain accreditation, testing, and safety requirements. See \xa4 15\xd030\xd03102(7). Virtually every private school in Montana qualifies. Upon receiving a scholarship, the family designates its school of choice, and the scholarship organization sends the scholarship funds directly to the school. \xa4 15\xd030\xd03104(1). Neither the scholarship organization nor its donors can restrict awards to particular types of schools. See \xa4\xa4 15\xd030\xd03103(1)(b), \xd03111(1). "
[456] "The Montana Legislature allotted $3 million annually to fund the tax credits, beginning in 2016. \xa4 15\xd030\xd03111(5)(a). If the annual allotment is exhausted, it increases by 10% the following year. Ibid. *2252 The program is slated to expire in 2023. 2015 Mont. Laws p. 2186, \xa4 33. "
[457] "The Montana Legislature also directed that the program be administered in accordance with Article X, section 6, of the Montana Constitution, which contains a \xd2no-aid\xd3 provision barring government aid to sectarian schools. See Mont. Code Ann. \xa4 15\xd030\xd03101. In full, that provision states: "
[458] "\xd2Aid prohibited to sectarian schools. ... The legislature, counties, cities, towns, school districts, and public corporations shall not make any direct or indirect appropriation or payment from any public fund or monies, or any grant of lands or other property for any sectarian purpose or to aid any church, school, academy, seminary, college, university, or other literary or scientific institution, controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination.\xd3 Mont. Const., Art. X, \xa4 6(1). "
[459] "Shortly after the scholarship program was created, the Montana Department of Revenue promulgated \xd2Rule 1,\xd3 over the objection of the Montana Attorney General. That administrative rule prohibited families from using scholarships at religious schools. Mont. Admin. Rule \xa4 42.4.802(1)(a) (2015). It did so by changing the definition of \xd2qualified education provider\xd3 to exclude any school \xd2owned or controlled in whole or in part by any church, religious sect, or denomination.\xd3 Ibid. The Department explained that the Rule was needed to reconcile the scholarship program with the no-aid provision of the Montana Constitution. "
[460] "The Montana Attorney General disagreed. In a letter to the Department, he advised that the Montana Constitution did not require excluding religious schools from the program, and if it did, it would \xd2very likely\xd3 violate the United States Constitution by discriminating against the schools and their students. See Complaint in No. DV\xd015\xd01152A (Dist. Ct. Flathead Cty.), Exh. 3, pp. 2, 5\xd06. The Attorney General is not representing the Department in this case. "
[461] "B "
[462] "This suit was brought by three mothers whose children attend Stillwater Christian School in northwestern Montana. Stillwater is a private Christian school that meets the statutory criteria for \xd2qualified education providers.\xd3 It serves students in prekindergarten through 12th grade, and petitioners chose the school in large part because it \xd2teaches the same Christian values that [they] teach at home.\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. 152; see id., at 138, 167. The child of one petitioner has already received scholarships from Big Sky, and the other petitioners' children are eligible for scholarships and planned to apply. While in effect, however, Rule 1 blocked petitioners from using scholarship funds for tuition at Stillwater. To overcome that obstacle, petitioners sued the Department of Revenue in Montana state court. Petitioners claimed that Rule 1 conflicted with the statute that created the scholarship program and could not be justified on the ground that it was compelled by the Montana Constitution's no-aid provision. Petitioners further alleged that the Rule discriminated on the basis of their religious views and the religious nature of the school they had chosen for their children. "
[463] "The trial court enjoined Rule 1, holding that it was based on a mistake of law. The court explained that the Rule was not required by the no-aid provision, because that provision prohibits only \xd2appropriations\xd3 that aid religious schools, \xd2not tax credits.\xd3 Id., at 94. "
[464] "The injunctive relief freed Big Sky to award scholarships to students regardless of whether they attended a religious or secular school. For the school year beginning *2253 in fall 2017, Big Sky received 59 applications and ultimately awarded 44 scholarships of $500 each. The next year, Big Sky received 90 applications and awarded 54 scholarships of $500 each. Several families, most with incomes of $30,000 or less, used the scholarships to send their children to Stillwater Christian. "
[465] "In December 2018, the Montana Supreme Court reversed the trial court. 393 Mont. 446, 435 P.3d 603. The Court first addressed the scholarship program unmodified by Rule 1, holding that the program aided religious schools in violation of the no-aid provision of the Montana Constitution. In the Court's view, the no-aid provision \xd2broadly and strictly prohibits aid to sectarian schools.\xd3 Id., at 459, 435 P.3d at 609. The scholarship program provided such aid by using tax credits to \xd2subsidize tuition payments\xd3 at private schools that are \xd2religiously affiliated\xd3 or \xd2controlled in whole or in part by churches.\xd3 Id., at 464\xd0467, 435 P.3d at 612\xd0613. In that way, the scholarship program flouted the State Constitution's \xd2guarantee to all Montanans that their government will not use state funds to aid religious schools.\xd3 Id., at 467, 435 P.3d at 614. "
[466] "The Montana Supreme Court went on to hold that the violation of the no-aid provision required invalidating the entire scholarship program. The Court explained that the program provided \xd2no mechanism\xd3 for preventing aid from flowing to religious schools, and therefore the scholarship program could not \xd2under any circumstance\xd3 be construed as consistent with the no-aid provision. Id., at 466\xd0468, 435 P.3d at 613\xd0614. As a result, the tax credit is no longer available to support scholarships at either religious or secular private schools. "
[467] "The Montana Supreme Court acknowledged that \xd2an overly-broad\xd3 application of the no-aid provision \xd2could implicate free exercise concerns\xd3 and that \xd2there may be a case\xd3 where \xd2prohibiting the aid would violate the Free Exercise Clause.\xd3 Id., at 468, 435 P.3d at 614. But, the Court concluded, \xd2this is not one of those cases.\xd3 Ibid. "
[468] "Finally, the Court agreed with petitioners that the Department had exceeded its authority in promulgating Rule 1. The Court explained that the statute creating the scholarship program had broadly defined qualifying schools to include all private schools, including religious ones, and the Department lacked authority to \xd2transform\xd3 that definition with an administrative rule. Id., at 468\xd0469, 435 P.3d at 614\xd0615. "
[469] "Several Justices wrote separately. All agreed that Rule 1 was invalid, but they expressed differing views on whether the scholarship program was consistent with the Montana and United States Constitutions. Justice Gustafson's concurrence argued that the program violated not only Montana's no-aid provision but also the Federal Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses. Id., at 475\xd0479, 435 P.3d at 619\xd0621. Justice Sandefur echoed the majority's conclusion that applying the no-aid provision was consistent with the Free Exercise Clause, and he dismissed the \xd2modern jurisprudence\xd3 of that Clause as \xd2unnecessarily complicate[d]\xd3 due to \xd2increasingly value-driven hairsplitting and overstretching.\xd3 Id., at 482\xd0484, 435 P.3d at 623\xd0624. "
[470] "Two Justices dissented. Justice Rice would have held that the scholarship program was permissible under the no-aid provision. He criticized the majority for invalidating the program \xd2sua sponte,\xd3 contending that no party had challenged it under the State Constitution. Id., at 495, 435 P.3d at 631. Justice Baker also would have upheld the program. In her view, the no-aid provision did not bar the use of *2254 scholarships at religious schools, and free exercise concerns could arise under the Federal Constitution if it did. Id., at 493\xd0494, 435 P.3d at 630. "
[471] "We granted certiorari. 588 U.S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 139 S.Ct. 2777, 204 L.Ed.2d 1157 (2019). "
[472] "II "
[473] "A "
[474] "12The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment provide that \xd2Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.\xd3 We have recognized a \xd2 \xd4play in the joints\xd5 between what the Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels.\xd3 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct. 2012, 2019, 198 L.Ed.2d 551 (2017) (quoting Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 718, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004)). Here, the parties do not dispute that the scholarship program is permissible under the Establishment Clause. Nor could they. We have repeatedly held that the Establishment Clause is not offended when religious observers and organizations benefit from neutral government programs. See, e.g., Locke, 540 U.S. at 719, 124 S.Ct. 1307; Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 839, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995). See also Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2019\xd02020 (noting the parties' agreement that the Establishment Clause was not violated by including churches in a playground resurfacing program). Any Establishment Clause objection to the scholarship program here is particularly unavailing because the government support makes its way to religious schools only as a result of Montanans independently choosing to spend their scholarships at such schools. See Locke, 540 U.S. at 719, 124 S.Ct. 1307; Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649\xd0653, 122 S.Ct. 2460, 153 L.Ed.2d 604 (2002). The Montana Supreme Court, however, held as a matter of state law that even such indirect government support qualified as \xd2aid\xd3 prohibited under the Montana Constitution. "
[475] "3The question for this Court is whether the Free Exercise Clause precluded the Montana Supreme Court from applying Montana's no-aid provision to bar religious schools from the scholarship program. For purposes of answering that question, we accept the Montana Supreme Court's interpretation of state law\xd1including its determination that the scholarship program provided impermissible \xd2aid\xd3 within the meaning of the Montana Constitution\xd1and we assess whether excluding religious schools and affected families from that program was consistent with the Federal Constitution.2 "
[476] "4The Free Exercise Clause, which applies to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, \xd2protects religious observers against unequal treatment\xd3 and against \xd2laws that impose special disabilities on the basis of religious status.\xd3 Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2021 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted); see Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). Those \xd2basic principle[s]\xd3 have long guided this Court. Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0 \xd0 \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct. at 2019\xd02021. See, e.g., *2255 Everson v. Board of Ed. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (a State \xd2cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation\xd3); Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 449, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988) (the Free Exercise Clause protects against laws that \xd2penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens\xd3). "
[477] "5Most recently, Trinity Lutheran distilled these and other decisions to the same effect into the \xd2unremarkable\xd3 conclusion that disqualifying otherwise eligible recipients from a public benefit \xd2solely because of their religious character\xd3 imposes \xd2a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny.\xd3 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0 \xd0 \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2021. In Trinity Lutheran, Missouri provided grants to help nonprofit organizations pay for playground resurfacing, but a state policy disqualified any organization \xd2owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity.\xd3 Id., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2017. Because of that policy, an otherwise eligible church-owned preschool was denied a grant to resurface its playground. Missouri's policy discriminated against the Church \xd2simply because of what it is\xd1a church,\xd3 and so the policy was subject to the \xd2strictest scrutiny,\xd3 which it failed. Id., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0 \xd0 \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2022\xd02025. We acknowledged that the State had not \xd2criminalized\xd3 the way in which the Church worshipped or \xd2told the Church that it cannot subscribe to a certain view of the Gospel.\xd3 Id., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2022. But the State's discriminatory policy was \xd2odious to our Constitution all the same.\xd3 Id., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2025. "
[478] "Here too Montana's no-aid provision bars religious schools from public benefits solely because of the religious character of the schools. The provision also bars parents who wish to send their children to a religious school from those same benefits, again solely because of the religious character of the school. This is apparent from the plain text. The provision bars aid to any school \xd2controlled in whole or in part by any church, sect, or denomination.\xd3 Mont. Const., Art. X, \xa4 6(1). The provision's title\xd1\xd2Aid prohibited to sectarian schools\xd3\xd1confirms that the provision singles out schools based on their religious character. Ibid. And the Montana Supreme Court explained that the provision forbids aid to any school that is \xd2sectarian,\xd3 \xd2religiously affiliated,\xd3 or \xd2controlled in whole or in part by churches.\xd3 393 Mont. at 464\xd0467, 435 P.3d at 612\xd0613. The provision plainly excludes schools from government aid solely because of religious status. See Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0 \xd0 \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2019\xd02021. "
[479] "The Department counters that Trinity Lutheran does not govern here because the no-aid provision applies not because of the religious character of the recipients, but because of how the funds would be used\xd1for \xd2religious education.\xd3 Brief for Respondents 38. In Trinity Lutheran, a majority of the Court concluded that the Missouri policy violated the Free Exercise Clause because it discriminated on the basis of religious status. A plurality declined to address discrimination with respect to \xd2religious uses of funding or other forms of discrimination.\xd3 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, n. 3, 137 S.Ct., at 2024, n. 3. The plurality saw no need to consider such concerns because Missouri had expressly discriminated \xd2based on religious identity,\xd3 ibid., which was enough to invalidate the state policy *2256 without addressing how government funds were used. "
[480] "This case also turns expressly on religious status and not religious use. The Montana Supreme Court applied the no-aid provision solely by reference to religious status. The Court repeatedly explained that the no-aid provision bars aid to \xd2schools controlled in whole or in part by churches,\xd3 \xd2sectarian schools,\xd3 and \xd2religiously-affiliated schools.\xd3 393 Mont. at 463\xd0467, 435 P.3d at 611\xd0613. Applying this provision to the scholarship program, the Montana Supreme Court noted that most of the private schools that would benefit from the program were \xd2religiously affiliated\xd3 and \xd2controlled by churches,\xd3 and the Court ultimately concluded that the scholarship program ran afoul of the Montana Constitution by aiding \xd2schools controlled by churches.\xd3 Id., at 466\xd0467, 435 P.3d at 613\xd0614. The Montana Constitution discriminates based on religious status just like the Missouri policy in Trinity Lutheran, which excluded organizations \xd2owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity.\xd3 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2017. "
[481] "The Department points to some language in the decision below indicating that the no-aid provision has the goal or effect of ensuring that government aid does not end up being used for \xd2sectarian education\xd3 or \xd2religious education.\xd3 393 Mont. at 460, 466\xd0467, 435 P.3d at 609, 613\xd0614. The Department also contrasts what it characterizes as the \xd2completely non-religious\xd3 benefit of playground resurfacing in Trinity Lutheran with the unrestricted tuition aid at issue here. Tr. of Oral Arg. 31. General school aid, the Department stresses, could be used for religious ends by some recipients, particularly schools that believe faith should \xd2permeate[ ]\xd3 everything they do. Brief for Respondents 39 (quoting State ex rel. Chambers v. School Dist. No. 10, 155 Mont. 422, 438, 472 P.2d 1013, 1021 (1970)). See also post, at 2285, 2288 (BREYER, J., dissenting). "
[482] "6Regardless, those considerations were not the Montana Supreme Court's basis for applying the no-aid provision to exclude religious schools; that hinged solely on religious status. Status-based discrimination remains status based even if one of its goals or effects is preventing religious organizations from putting aid to religious uses. "
[483] "7Undeterred by Trinity Lutheran, the Montana Supreme Court applied the no-aid provision to hold that religious schools could not benefit from the scholarship program. 393 Mont. at 464\xd0468, 435 P.3d at 612\xd0614. So applied, the provision \xd2impose[s] special disabilities on the basis of religious status\xd3 and \xd2condition[s] the availability of benefits upon a recipient's willingness to surrender [its] religiously impelled status.\xd3 Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0 \xd0 \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2021\xd02022 (quoting Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993), and McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978) (plurality opinion) (alterations omitted)). To be eligible for government aid under the Montana Constitution, a school must divorce itself from any religious control or affiliation. Placing such a condition on benefits or privileges \xd2inevitably deters or discourages the exercise of First Amendment rights.\xd3 Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2022 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 405, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (alterations omitted)). The Free Exercise Clause protects against even \xd2indirect coercion,\xd3 and a State \xd2punishe[s] the free exercise of religion\xd3 by disqualifying the religious from government aid as Montana did here. * 2257 Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0 \xd0 \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137S.Ct., at 2022 (internal quotation marks omitted). Such status-based discrimination is subject to \xd2the strictest scrutiny.\xd3 Id., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2022. "
[484] "None of this is meant to suggest that we agree with the Department, Brief for Respondents 36\xd040, that some lesser degree of scrutiny applies to discrimination against religious uses of government aid. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (striking down law designed to ban religious practice involving alleged animal cruelty, explaining that a law \xd2target[ing] religious conduct for distinctive treatment or advanc[ing] legitimate governmental interests only against conduct with a religious motivation will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases\xd3). Some Members of the Court, moreover, have questioned whether there is a meaningful distinction between discrimination based on use or conduct and that based on status. See Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0 \xd0 \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct, at 2025 (GORSUCH, J., joined by THOMAS, J., concurring in part) (citing, e.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. 520, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, and Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981)). We acknowledge the point but need not examine it here. It is enough in this case to conclude that strict scrutiny applies under Trinity Lutheran because Montana's no-aid provision discriminates based on religious status. "
[485] "B "
[486] "Seeking to avoid Trinity Lutheran, the Department contends that this case is instead governed by Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004). See also post, at 2283 \xd0 2284 (BREYER, J., dissenting); post, at 2296 \xd0 2297 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting). Locke also involved a scholarship program. The State of Washington provided scholarships paid out of the State's general fund to help students pursuing postsecondary education. The scholarships could be used at accredited religious and nonreligious schools alike, but Washington prohibited students from using the scholarships to pursue devotional theology degrees, which prepared students for a calling as clergy. This prohibition prevented Davey from using his scholarship to obtain a degree that would have enabled him to become a pastor. We held that Washington had not violated the Free Exercise Clause. "
[487] "Locke differs from this case in two critical ways. First, Locke explained that Washington had \xd2merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction\xd3: the \xd2essentially religious endeavor\xd3 of training a minister \xd2to lead a congregation.\xd3 Id., at 721, 124 S.Ct. 1307. Thus, Davey \xd2was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do\xd1use the funds to prepare for the ministry.\xd3 Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2023\xd02024. Apart from that narrow restriction, Washington's program allowed scholarships to be used at \xd2pervasively religious schools\xd3 that incorporated religious instruction throughout their classes. Locke, 540 U.S. at 724\xd0725, 124 S.Ct. 1307. By contrast, Montana's Constitution does not zero in on any particular \xd2essentially religious\xd3 course of instruction at a religious school. Rather, as we have explained, the no-aid provision bars all aid to a religious school \xd2simply because of what it is,\xd3 putting the school to a choice between being religious or receiving government benefits. Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2023. At the same time, the provision puts families to a choice between sending their children to a religious school or receiving such benefits. "
[488] "Second, Locke invoked a \xd2historic and substantial\xd3 state interest in not funding the training of clergy, *2258 540 U.S. at 725, 124 S.Ct. 1307, explaining that \xd2opposition to ... funding \xd4to support church leaders\xd5 lay at the historic core of the Religion Clauses,\xd3 Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2023 (quoting Locke, 540 U.S. at 722, 124 S.Ct. 1307). As evidence of that tradition, the Court in Locke emphasized that the propriety of state-supported clergy was a central subject of founding-era debates, and that most state constitutions from that era prohibited the expenditure of tax dollars to support the clergy. See id., at 722\xd0723, 124 S.Ct. 1307. "
[489] "But no comparable \xd2historic and substantial\xd3 tradition supports Montana's decision to disqualify religious schools from government aid. In the founding era and the early 19th century, governments provided financial support to private schools, including denominational ones. \xd2Far from prohibiting such support, the early state constitutions and statutes actively encouraged this policy.\xd3 L. Jorgenson, The State and the Non-Public School, 1825\xd01925, p. 4 (1987); e.g., R. Gabel, Public Funds for Church and Private Schools 210, 217\xd0218, 221, 241\xd0243 (1937); C. Kaestle, Pillars of the Republic: Common Schools and American Society, 1760\xd01860, pp. 166\xd0167 (1983). Local governments provided grants to private schools, including religious ones, for the education of the poor. M. McConnell, et al., Religion and the Constitution 318\xd0319 (4th ed. 2016). Even States with bans on government-supported clergy, such as New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Georgia, provided various forms of aid to religious schools. See Kaestle, supra, at 166\xd0167; Gabel, supra, at 215\xd0218, 241\xd0245, 372\xd0374; cf. Locke, 540 U.S. at 723, 124 S.Ct. 1307. Early federal aid (often land grants) went to religious schools. McConnell, supra, at 319. Congress provided support to denominational schools in the District of Columbia until 1848, ibid., and Congress paid churches to run schools for American Indians through the end of the 19th century, see Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50, 78, 28 S.Ct. 690, 52 L.Ed. 954 (1908); Gabel, supra, at 521\xd0523. After the Civil War, Congress spent large sums on education for emancipated freedmen, often by supporting denominational schools in the South through the Freedmen's Bureau. McConnell, supra, at 323.3 "
[490] "The Department argues that a tradition against state support for religious schools arose in the second half of the 19th century, as more than 30 States\xd1including Montana\xd1adopted no-aid provisions. See Brief for Respondents 40\xd042 and App. D. *2259 Such a development, of course, cannot by itself establish an early American tradition. Justice SOTOMAYOR questions our reliance on aid provided during the same era by the Freedmen's Bureau, post, at 2297 (dissenting opinion), but we see no inconsistency in recognizing that such evidence may reinforce an early practice but cannot create one. In addition, many of the no-aid provisions belong to a more checkered tradition shared with the Blaine Amendment of the 1870s. That proposal\xd1which Congress nearly passed\xd1would have added to the Federal Constitution a provision similar to the state no-aid provisions, prohibiting States from aiding \xd2sectarian\xd3 schools. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000) (plurality opinion). \xd2[I]t was an open secret that \xd4sectarian\xd5 was code for \xd4Catholic.\xd5 \xd3 Ibid.; see Jorgenson, supra, at 70. The Blaine Amendment was \xd2born of bigotry\xd3 and \xd2arose at a time of pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general\xd3; many of its state counterparts have a similarly \xd2shameful pedigree.\xd3 Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 828\xd0829, 120 S.Ct. 2530 (plurality opinion); see Jorgenson, supra, at 69\xd070, 216; Jeffries & Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 301\xd0305 (2001). The no-aid provisions of the 19th century hardly evince a tradition that should inform our understanding of the Free Exercise Clause. "
[491] "The Department argues that several States have rejected referendums to overturn or limit their no-aid provisions, and that Montana even re-adopted its own in the 1970s, for reasons unrelated to anti-Catholic bigotry. See Brief for Respondents 20, 42. But, on the other side of the ledger, many States today\xd1including those with no-aid provisions\xd1provide support to religious schools through vouchers, scholarships, tax credits, and other measures. See Brief for Oklahoma et al. as Amici Curiae 29\xd031, 33\xd035; Brief for Petitioners 5. According to petitioners, 20 of 37 States with no-aid provisions allow religious options in publicly funded scholarship programs, and almost all allow religious options in tax credit programs. Reply Brief 22, n. 9. "
[492] "All to say, we agree with the Department that the historical record is \xd2complex.\xd3 Brief for Respondents 41. And it is true that governments over time have taken a variety of approaches to religious schools. But it is clear that there is no \xd2historic and substantial\xd3 tradition against aiding such schools comparable to the tradition against state-supported clergy invoked by Locke. "
[493] "C "
[494] "Two dissenters would chart new courses. Justice SOTOMAYOR would grant the government \xd2some room\xd3 to \xd2single ... out\xd3 religious entities \xd2for exclusion,\xd3 based on what she views as \xd2the interests embodied in the Religion Clauses.\xd3 Post, at 2295 \xd0 2296, 2296 (quoting Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2031 (SOTOMAYOR, J., dissenting)). Justice BREYER, building on his solo opinion in Trinity Lutheran, would adopt a \xd2flexible, context-specific approach\xd3 that \xd2may well vary\xd3 from case to case. Post, at 2288, 2290; see Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2026\xd02027 (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment). As best we can tell, courts applying this approach would contemplate the particular benefit and restriction at issue and discern their relationship to religion and society, taking into account \xd2context and consequences measured in light of [the] purposes\xd3 of the Religion Clauses. Post, at 2291 \xd0 2292 (quoting Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 700, 125 S.Ct. 2854, 162 L.Ed.2d 607 (2005) (BREYER, J., concurring in judgment)). What is clear is that *2260 Justice BREYER would afford much freer rein to judges than our current regime, arguing that \xd2there is \xd4no test-related substitute for the exercise of legal judgment.\xd5 \xd3 Post, at 2291 (quoting Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 700, 125 S.Ct. 2854 (opinion of BREYER, J.)). "
[495] "8The simplest response is that these dissents follow from prior separate writings, not from the Court's decision in Trinity Lutheran or the decades of precedent on which it relied. These precedents have \xd2repeatedly confirmed\xd3 the straightforward rule that we apply today: When otherwise eligible recipients are disqualified from a public benefit \xd2solely because of their religious character,\xd3 we must apply strict scrutiny. Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0 \xd0 \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct, at 2021. This rule against express religious discrimination is no \xd2doctrinal innovation.\xd3 Post, at 2288 (opinion of BREYER, J.). Far from it. As Trinity Lutheran explained, the rule is \xd2unremarkable in light of our prior decisions.\xd3 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2021. "
[496] "9For innovation, one must look to the dissents. Their \xd2room[y]\xd3 or \xd2flexible\xd3 approaches to discrimination against religious organizations and observers would mark a significant departure from our free exercise precedents. The protections of the Free Exercise Clause do not depend on a \xd2judgment-by-judgment analysis\xd3 regarding whether discrimination against religious adherents would somehow serve ill-defined interests. Cf. Medell\x92n v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514, 128 S.Ct. 1346, 170 L.Ed.2d 190 (2008). "
[497] "D "
[498] "10Because the Montana Supreme Court applied the no-aid provision to discriminate against schools and parents based on the religious character of the school, the \xd2strictest scrutiny\xd3 is required. Supra, at 2255, 2257 (quoting Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2022). That \xd2stringent standard,\xd3 id., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2024, is not \xd2watered down but really means what it says,\xd3 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). To satisfy it, government action \xd2must advance \xd4interests of the highest order\xd5 and must be narrowly tailored in pursuit of those interests.\xd3 Ibid. (quoting McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 628, 98 S.Ct. 1322). "
[499] "1112The Montana Supreme Court asserted that the no-aid provision serves Montana's interest in separating church and State \xd2more fiercely\xd3 than the Federal Constitution. 393 Mont. at 467, 435 P.3d at 614. But \xd2that interest cannot qualify as compelling\xd3 in the face of the infringement of free exercise here. Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2024. A State's interest \xd2in achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause ... is limited by the Free Exercise Clause.\xd3 Ibid. (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981)). "
[500] "131415The Department, for its part, asserts that the no-aid provision actually promotes religious freedom. In the Department's view, the no-aid provision protects the religious liberty of taxpayers by ensuring that their taxes are not directed to religious organizations, and it safeguards the freedom of religious organizations by keeping the government out of their operations. See Brief for Respondents 17\xd023. An infringement of First Amendment rights, however, cannot be justified by a State's alternative view that the infringement advances religious liberty. Our federal system prizes state experimentation, but not \xd2state experimentation in the suppression of free speech,\xd3 and the same goes for the free exercise of religion. *2261 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 660, 120 S.Ct. 2446, 147 L.Ed.2d 554 (2000). "
[501] "Furthermore, we do not see how the no-aid provision promotes religious freedom. As noted, this Court has repeatedly upheld government programs that spend taxpayer funds on equal aid to religious observers and organizations, particularly when the link between government and religion is attenuated by private choices. A school, concerned about government involvement with its religious activities, might reasonably decide for itself not to participate in a government program. But we doubt that the school's liberty is enhanced by eliminating any option to participate in the first place. "
[502] "The Department's argument is especially unconvincing because the infringement of religious liberty here broadly affects both religious schools and adherents. Montana's no-aid provision imposes a categorical ban\xd1\xd2broadly and strictly\xd3 prohibiting \xd2any type of aid\xd3 to religious schools. 393 Mont. at 462\xd0463, 435 P.3d at 611. This prohibition is far more sweeping than the policy in Trinity Lutheran, which barred churches from one narrow program for playground resurfacing\xd1causing \xd2in all likelihood\xd3 only \xd2a few extra scraped knees.\xd3 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2024\xd02025. "
[503] "16And the prohibition before us today burdens not only religious schools but also the families whose children attend or hope to attend them. Drawing on \xd2enduring American tradition,\xd3 we have long recognized the rights of parents to direct \xd2the religious upbringing\xd3 of their children. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213\xd0214, 232, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Many parents exercise that right by sending their children to religious schools, a choice protected by the Constitution. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534\xd0535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). But the no-aid provision penalizes that decision by cutting families off from otherwise available benefits if they choose a religious private school rather than a secular one, and for no other reason. "
[504] "1718The Department also suggests that the no-aid provision advances Montana's interests in public education. According to the Department, the no-aid provision safeguards the public school system by ensuring that government support is not diverted to private schools. See Brief for Respondents 19, 25. But, under that framing, the no-aid provision is fatally underinclusive because its \xd2proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous nonreligious conduct.\xd3 Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217. On the Department's view, an interest in public education is undermined by diverting government support to any private school, yet the no-aid provision bars aid only to religious ones. A law does not advance \xd2an interest of the highest order when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited.\xd3 Id., at 547, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (internal quotation marks and alterations omitted). Montana's interest in public education cannot justify a no-aid provision that requires only religious private schools to \xd2bear [its] weight.\xd3 Ibid. "
[505] "19A State need not subsidize private education. But once a State decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious. "
[506] "III "
[507] "20The Department argues that, at the end of the day, there is no free exercise violation here because the Montana Supreme Court ultimately eliminated the scholarship program altogether. According to the Department, now that there is no program, religious schools and adherents *2262 cannot complain that they are excluded from any generally available benefit. "
[508] "Two dissenters agree. Justice GINSBURG reports that the State of Montana simply chose to \xd2put all private school parents in the same boat\xd3 by invalidating the scholarship program, post, at 2281, and Justice SOTOMAYOR describes the decision below as resting on state law grounds having nothing to do with the federal Free Exercise Clause, see post, at 2292, 2294 \xd0 2295. "
[509] "The descriptions are not accurate. The Montana Legislature created the scholarship program; the Legislature never chose to end it, for policy or other reasons. The program was eliminated by a court, and not based on some innocuous principle of state law. Rather, the Montana Supreme Court invalidated the program pursuant to a state law provision that expressly discriminates on the basis of religious status. The Court applied that provision to hold that religious schools were barred from participating in the program. Then, seeing no other \xd2mechanism\xd3 to make absolutely sure that religious schools received no aid, the court chose to invalidate the entire program. 393 Mont. at 466\xd0468, 435 P.3d at 613\xd0614. "
[510] "The final step in this line of reasoning eliminated the program, to the detriment of religious and non-religious schools alike. But the Court's error of federal law occurred at the beginning. When the Court was called upon to apply a state law no-aid provision to exclude religious schools from the program, it was obligated by the Federal Constitution to reject the invitation. Had the Court recognized that this was, indeed, \xd2one of those cases\xd3 in which application of the no-aid provision \xd2would violate the Free Exercise Clause,\xd3 id., at 468, 435 P.3d at 614, the Court would not have proceeded to find a violation of that provision. And, in the absence of such a state law violation, the Court would have had no basis for terminating the program. Because the elimination of the program flowed directly from the Montana Supreme Court's failure to follow the dictates of federal law, it cannot be defended as a neutral policy decision, or as resting on adequate and independent state law grounds.4 "
[511] "2122The Supremacy Clause provides that \xd2the Judges in every State shall be bound\xd3 by the Federal Constitution, \xd2any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.\xd3 Art. VI, cl. 2. \xd2[T]his Clause creates a rule of decision\xd3 directing state courts that they \xd2must not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal law[ ].\xd3 Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324, 135 S.Ct. 1378, 191 L.Ed.2d 471 (2015). Given the conflict between the Free Exercise Clause and the application of the no-aid provision here, the Montana Supreme Court should have \xd2disregard[ed]\xd3 the no-aid provision and decided this case \xd2conformably to the [C]onstitution\xd3 of the United States. Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 178, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803). That \xd2supreme law of the land\xd3 condemns discrimination against religious schools and the families whose children attend them. Id., at 180. They are \xd2member[s] of the community too,\xd3 and *2263 their exclusion from the scholarship program here is \xd2odious to our Constitution\xd3 and \xd2cannot stand.\xd3 Trinity Lutheran, 582 U.S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct., at 2023, 2025.5 "
[512] "* * * "
[513] "The judgment of the Montana Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. "
[514] "It is so ordered. "
[515] "Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[516] "The Illinois Unemployment Insurance Act provides that \xd2[a]n individual shall be ineligible for benefits if he has failed, without good cause, either to apply for available, **1516 suitable work when so directed ... or to accept suitable work when offered him....\xd3 Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 48, \xa6 433 (1986). In April 1984, William Frazee refused a temporary retail position offered him by Kelly Services because the job would have required him to work on Sunday. Frazee told Kelly that, as a Christian, he could not work on \xd2the Lord's day.\xd3 Frazee then applied to the Illinois Department of Employment Security for unemployment benefits claiming that there was good cause for his refusal to work on Sunday. His application was denied. Frazee appealed the denial of benefits to the Department of Employment Security's Board of Review, which also denied his claim. The Board of Review stated: \xd2When a refusal of work is based on religious convictions, the refusal must be based upon some tenets or dogma accepted by the individual of some church, sect, or denomination, and such a refusal based solely on an individual's personal belief is personal and noncompelling and does not render the work unsuitable.\xd3 *831 App. 18 19 The Board of Review concluded that Frazee had refused an offer of suitable work without good cause. The Circuit Court of the Tenth Judicial Circuit of Illinois, Peoria County, affirmed, finding that the agency's decision was \xd2not contrary to law nor against the manifest weight of the evidence,\xd3 thereby rejecting Frazee's claim based on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id., at 23. "
[517] "Frazee's free exercise claim was again rejected by the Appellate Court of Illinois, Third District. 159 Ill.App.3d 474, 111 Ill.Dec. 400, 512 N.E.2d 789 (1987). The court characterized Frazee's refusal to work as resting on his \xd2personal professed religious belief,\xd3 and made it clear that it did \xd2not question the sincerity of the plaintiff,\xd3 id., at 475, 477, 111 Ill.Dec., at 401, 402, 512 N.E.2d, at 790, 791. It then engaged in a historical discussion of religious prohibitions against work on the Sabbath and, in particular, on Sunday. Nonetheless, the court distinguished Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); and Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987), from the facts of Frazee's case. Unlike the claimants in Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie, Frazee was not a member of an established religious sect or church, nor did he claim that his refusal to work resulted from a \xd2tenet, belief or teaching of an established religious body.\xd3 159 Ill.App.3d, at 477, 111 Ill.Dec., at 402, 512 N.E.2d, at 791. To the Illinois court, Frazee's position that he was \xd2a Christian\xd3 and as such felt it wrong to work on Sunday was not enough. For a Free Exercise Clause claim to succeed, said the Illinois Appellate Court, \xd2the injunction against Sunday labor must be found in a tenet or dogma of an established religious sect. [Frazee] does not profess to be a member of any such sect.\xd3 Id., at 478\xd0479, 111 Ill.Dec., at 403, 512 N.E.2d, at 792. The Illinois Supreme Court denied Frazee leave to appeal. "
[518] "The mandatory appellate jurisdiction of this Court was invoked under 28 U.S.C. \xa4 1257(2), since the state court *832 rejected a challenge to the constitutionality of Illinois' statutory \xd2good cause\xd3 requirement as applied in this case. We noted probable jurisdiction, 488 U.S. 814, 109 S.Ct. 50, 102 L.Ed.2d 29 (1988), and now reverse. "
[519] "We have had more than one occasion before today to consider denials of unemployment compensation benefits to those who have refused work on the basis of their religious beliefs. In Sherbert v. Verner, supra, 374 U.S., at 410, 83 S.Ct., at 1797, the Court held that a State could not \xd2constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions [of its unemployment-compensation program] so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest.\xd3 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., supra, also held that the State's refusal to award unemployment compensation benefits to one who terminated his job because his religious beliefs forbade participation in the production of armaments violated the First Amendment right to free exercise. Just two years ago, in Hobbie v. **1517 Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, supra, Florida's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to an employee discharged for her refusal to work on her Sabbath because of religious convictions adopted subsequent to employment was also declared to be a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. In each of these cases, the appellant was \xd2forced to choose between fidelity to religious belief and ... employment,\xd3 id., 480 U.S., at 144, 107 S.Ct., at 1051, and we found \xd2the forfeiture of unemployment benefits for choosing the former over the latter brings unlawful coercion to bear on the employee's choice\xd3 ibid. In each of these cases, we concluded that the denial of unemployment compensation benefits violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. "
[520] "It is true, as the Illinois court noted, that each of the claimants in those cases was a member of a particular religious sect, but none of those decisions turned on that consideration or on any tenet of the sect involved that forbade the work the *833 claimant refused to perform. Our judgments in those cases rested on the fact that each of the claimants had a sincere belief that religion required him or her to refrain from the work in question. Never did we suggest that unless a claimant belongs to a sect that forbids what his job requires, his belief, however sincere, must be deemed a purely personal preference rather than a religious belief. Indeed, in Thomas, there was disagreement among sect members as to whether their religion made it sinful to work in an armaments factory; but we considered this to be an irrelevant issue and hence rejected the State's submission that unless the religion involved formally forbade work on armaments, Thomas' belief did not qualify as a religious belief. Because Thomas unquestionably had a sincere belief that his religion prevented him from doing such work, he was entitled to invoke the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. "
[521] "There is no doubt that \xd2[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause,\xd3 Thomas, supra, 450 U.S., at 713, 101 S.Ct., at 1430. Purely secular views do not suffice. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 85 S.Ct. 850, 13 L.Ed.2d 733 (1965); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215\xd0216, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Nor do we underestimate the difficulty of distinguishing between religious and secular convictions and in determining whether a professed belief is sincerely held. States are clearly entitled to assure themselves that there is an ample predicate for invoking the Free Exercise Clause. We do not face problems about sincerity or about the religious nature of Frazee's convictions, however. The courts below did not question his sincerity, and the State concedes it. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35. Furthermore, the Board of Review characterized Frazee's views as \xd2religious convictions,\xd3 App. 18, and the Illinois Appellate Court referred to his refusal to work on Sunday as based on a \xd2personal professed religious belief,\xd3 159 Ill.App.3d, at 475, 111 Ill.Dec., at 401, 512 N.E.2d, at 790.1 "
[522] "*834 Frazee asserted that he was a Christian, but did not claim to be a member of a particular Christian sect. It is also true that there are assorted Christian denominations that do not profess to be compelled by their religion to refuse Sunday work, but this does not diminish Frazee's protection flowing from the Free Exercise Clause. Thomas settled that much. Undoubtedly, membership in an organized religious denomination, especially one with a specific tenet forbidding members to work on Sunday, would simplify the problem of identifying sincerely held religious beliefs, but we reject the notion that to claim the protection of the Free Exercise Clause, one **1518 must be responding to the commands of a particular religious organization. Here, Frazee's refusal was based on a sincerely held religious belief. Under our cases, he was entitled to invoke First Amendment protection.2 "
[523] "The State does not appear to defend this aspect of the decision below. In its brief and at oral argument, the State conceded that the Free Exercise Clause does not demand adherence to a tenet or dogma of an established religious sect. Instead, the State proposes its own test for identifying a \xd2religious\xd3 belief, asserts that Frazee has not met such a test, and asks that we affirm on this basis. We decline to address this submission; for as the case comes to us, Frazee's conviction was recognized as religious but found to be inadequate *835 because it was not claimed to represent a tenet of a religious organization of which he was a member. That ground for decision was clearly erroneous. "
[524] "The State offers no justification for the burden that the denial of benefits places on Frazee's right to exercise his religion. The Illinois Appellate Court ascribed great significance to America's weekend way of life. The Illinois court asked: \xd2What would Sunday be today if professional football, baseball, basketball, and tennis were barred. Today Sunday is not only a day for religion, but for recreation and labor. Today the supermarkets are open, service stations dispense fuel, utilities continue to serve the people and factories continue to belch smoke and tangible products,\xd3 concluding that \xd2[i]f all Americans were to abstain from working on Sunday, chaos would result.\xd3 159 Ill.App.3d, at 478, 111 Ill.Dec., at 403, 512 N.E.2d, at 792. We are unpersuaded, however, that there will be a mass movement away from Sunday employ if William Frazee succeeds in his claim. "
[525] "As was the case in Thomas where there was \xd2no evidence in the record to indicate that the number of people who find themselves in the predicament of choosing between benefits and religious beliefs is large enough to create \xd4widespread unemployment,\xd5 or even to seriously affect unemployment,\xd3 450 U.S., at 719, 101 S.Ct., at 1432, there is nothing before us in this case to suggest that Sunday shopping, or Sunday sporting, for that matter, will grind to a halt as a result of our decision today. And, as we have said in the past, there may exist state interests sufficiently compelling to override a legitimate claim to the free exercise of religion. No such interest has been presented here. "
[526] "The judgment of the Appellate Court of Illinois for the Third District is therefore reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. "
[527] "It is so ordered. "
[528] "Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[529] "*1874 Catholic Social Services is a foster care agency in Philadelphia. The City stopped referring children to CSS upon discovering that the agency would not certify same-sex couples to be foster parents due to its religious beliefs about marriage. The City will renew its foster care contract with CSS only if the agency agrees to certify same-sex couples. The question presented is whether the actions of Philadelphia violate the First Amendment. "
[530] "I "
[531] "The Catholic Church has served the needy children of Philadelphia for over two centuries. In 1798, a priest in the City organized an association to care for orphans whose parents had died in a yellow fever epidemic. H. Folks, The Care of Destitute, Neglected, and Delinquent Children 10 (1902). During the 19th century, nuns ran asylums for orphaned and destitute *1875 youth. T. Hacsi, Second Home: Orphan Asylums and Poor Families in America 24 (1997). When criticism of asylums mounted in the Progressive Era, see id., at 37\xd040, the Church established the Catholic Children's Bureau to place children in foster homes. Petitioner CSS continues that mission today. "
[532] "The Philadelphia foster care system depends on cooperation between the City and private foster agencies like CSS. When children cannot remain in their homes, the City's Department of Human Services assumes custody of them. The Department enters standard annual contracts with private foster agencies to place some of those children with foster families. "
[533] "The placement process begins with review of prospective foster families. Pennsylvania law gives the authority to certify foster families to state-licensed foster agencies like CSS. 55 Pa. Code \xa4 3700.61 (2020). Before certifying a family, an agency must conduct a home study during which it considers statutory criteria including the family's \xd2ability to provide care, nurturing and supervision to children,\xd3 \xd2[e]xisting family relationships,\xd3 and ability \xd2to work in partnership\xd3 with a foster agency. \xa4 3700.64. The agency must decide whether to \xd2approve, disapprove or provisionally approve the foster family.\xd3 \xa4 3700.69. "
[534] "When the Department seeks to place a child with a foster family, it sends its contracted agencies a request, known as a referral. The agencies report whether any of their certified families are available, and the Department places the child with what it regards as the most suitable family. The agency continues to support the family throughout the placement. "
[535] "The religious views of CSS inform its work in this system. CSS believes that \xd2marriage is a sacred bond between a man and a woman.\xd3 App. 171. Because the agency understands the certification of prospective foster families to be an endorsement of their relationships, it will not certify unmarried couples\xd1regardless of their sexual orientation\xd1or same-sex married couples. CSS does not object to certifying gay or lesbian individuals as single foster parents or to placing gay and lesbian children. No same-sex couple has ever sought certification from CSS. If one did, CSS would direct the couple to one of the more than 20 other agencies in the City, all of which currently certify same-sex couples. For over 50 years, CSS successfully contracted with the City to provide foster care services while holding to these beliefs. "
[536] "But things changed in 2018. After receiving a complaint about a different agency, a newspaper ran a story in which a spokesman for the Archdiocese of Philadelphia stated that CSS would not be able to consider prospective foster parents in same-sex marriages. The City Council called for an investigation, saying that the City had \xd2laws in place to protect its people from discrimination that occurs under the guise of religious freedom.\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. 147a. The Philadelphia Commission on Human Relations launched an inquiry. And the Commissioner of the Department of Human Services held a meeting with the leadership of CSS. She remarked that \xd2things have changed since 100 years ago,\xd3 and \xd2it would be great if we followed the teachings of Pope Francis, the voice of the Catholic Church.\xd3 App. 366. Immediately after the meeting, the Department informed CSS that it would no longer refer children to the agency. The City later explained that the refusal of CSS to certify same-sex couples violated a non-discrimination provision in its contract with the City as well as the non-discrimination requirements of the citywide Fair Practices Ordinance. The City stated that it would not enter a full foster care contract *1876 with CSS in the future unless the agency agreed to certify same-sex couples. "
[537] "CSS and three foster parents affiliated with the agency filed suit against the City, the Department, and the Commission. The Support Center for Child Advocates and Philadelphia Family Pride intervened as defendants. As relevant here, CSS alleged that the referral freeze violated the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses of the First Amendment. CSS sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction directing the Department to continue referring children to CSS without requiring the agency to certify same-sex couples. "
[538] "The District Court denied preliminary relief. It concluded that the contractual non-discrimination requirement and the Fair Practices Ordinance were neutral and generally applicable under Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), and that the free exercise claim was therefore unlikely to succeed. 320 F.Supp.3d 661, 680\xd0690 (E.D. Pa. 2018). The court also determined that the free speech claims were unlikely to succeed because CSS performed certifications as part of a government program. Id., at 695\xd0700. "
[539] "The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. Because the contract between the parties had expired, the court focused on whether the City could insist on the inclusion of new language forbidding discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as a condition of contract renewal. 922 F.3d 140, 153 (2019). The court concluded that the proposed contractual terms were a neutral and generally applicable policy under Smith. 922 F.3d at 152\xd0159. The court rejected the agency's free speech claims on the same grounds as the District Court. Id., at 160\xd0162. "
[540] "CSS and the foster parents sought review. They challenged the Third Circuit's determination that the City's actions were permissible under Smith and also asked this Court to reconsider that precedent. "
[541] "We granted certiorari. 589 U. S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 140 S.Ct. 1104, 206 L.Ed.2d 177 (2020). "
[542] "II "
[543] "A "
[544] "12The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that \xd2Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise\xd3 of religion. As an initial matter, it is plain that the City's actions have burdened CSS's religious exercise by putting it to the choice of curtailing its mission or approving relationships inconsistent with its beliefs. The City disagrees. In its view, certification reflects only that foster parents satisfy the statutory criteria, not that the agency endorses their relationships. But CSS believes that certification is tantamount to endorsement. And \xd2religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection.\xd3 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). Our task is to decide whether the burden the City has placed on the religious exercise of CSS is constitutionally permissible. "
[545] "Smith held that laws incidentally burdening religion are ordinarily not subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause so long as they are neutral and generally applicable. 494 U.S. at 878\xd0882, 110 S.Ct. 1595. CSS urges us to overrule Smith, and the concurrences in the judgment argue in favor of doing so, see post, pp. 1883 \xd0 1884 (opinion of ALITO, J.); post, p. 1926 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). *1877 But we need not revisit that decision here. This case falls outside Smith because the City has burdened the religious exercise of CSS through policies that do not meet the requirement of being neutral and generally applicable. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531\xd0532, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). "
[546] "3Government fails to act neutrally when it proceeds in a manner intolerant of religious beliefs or restricts practices because of their religious nature. See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 584 U. S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0 \xd0 \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 138 S.Ct. 1719, 1730\xd01732, 201 L.Ed.2d 35 (2018); Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217. CSS points to evidence in the record that it believes demonstrates that the City has transgressed this neutrality standard, but we find it more straightforward to resolve this case under the rubric of general applicability. "
[547] "4A law is not generally applicable if it \xd2invite[s]\xd3 the government to consider the particular reasons for a person's conduct by providing \xd2 \xd4a mechanism for individualized exemptions.\xd5 \xd3 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986) (opinion of BURGER, C. J., joined by POWELL AND REHNQUIST, JJ.)). For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), a Seventh-day Adventist was fired because she would not work on Saturdays. Unable to find a job that would allow her to keep the Sabbath as her faith required, she applied for unemployment benefits. Id., at 399\xd0400, 83 S.Ct. 1790. The State denied her application under a law prohibiting eligibility to claimants who had \xd2failed, without good cause ... to accept available suitable work.\xd3 Id., at 401, 83 S.Ct. 1790 (internal quotation marks omitted). We held that the denial infringed her free exercise rights and could be justified only by a compelling interest. Id., at 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790. "
[548] "Smith later explained that the unemployment benefits law in Sherbert was not generally applicable because the \xd2good cause\xd3 standard permitted the government to grant exemptions based on the circumstances underlying each application. See 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (citing Roy, 476 U.S. at 708, 106 S.Ct. 2147; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401, n. 4, 83 S.Ct. 1790). Smith went on to hold that \xd2where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of \xd4religious hardship\xd5 without compelling reason.\xd3 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (quoting Roy, 476 U.S. at 708, 106 S.Ct. 2147); see also Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 537, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (same). "
[549] "5A law also lacks general applicability if it prohibits religious conduct while permitting secular conduct that undermines the government's asserted interests in a similar way. See id., at 542\xd0546, 113 S.Ct. 2217. In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, for instance, the City of Hialeah adopted several ordinances prohibiting animal sacrifice, a practice of the Santeria faith. Id., at 524\xd0528, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The City claimed that the ordinances were necessary in part to protect public health, which was \xd2threatened by the disposal of animal carcasses in open public places.\xd3 Id., at 544, 113 S.Ct. 2217. But the ordinances did not regulate hunters\xd5 disposal of their kills or improper garbage disposal by restaurants, both of which posed a similar hazard. Id., at 544\xd0545, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The Court concluded that this and other forms of underinclusiveness meant that the ordinances were not generally applicable. Id., at 545\xd0546, 113 S.Ct. 2217. "
[550] "*1878 B "
[551] "6The City initially argued that CSS's practice violated section 3.21 of its standard foster care contract. We conclude, however, that this provision is not generally applicable as required by Smith. The current version of section 3.21 specifies in pertinent part: "
[552] "\xd2Rejection of Referral. Provider shall not reject a child or family including, but not limited to, ... prospective foster or adoptive parents, for Services based upon ... their ... sexual orientation ... unless an exception is granted by the Commissioner or the Commissioner's designee, in his/her sole discretion.\xd3 Supp. App. to Brief for City Respondents 16\xd017. "
[553] "This provision requires an agency to provide \xd2Services,\xd3 defined as \xd2the work to be performed under this Contract,\xd3 App. 560, to prospective foster parents regardless of their sexual orientation. "
[554] "7Like the good cause provision in Sherbert, section 3.21 incorporates a system of individual exemptions, made available in this case at the \xd2sole discretion\xd3 of the Commissioner. The City has made clear that the Commissioner \xd2has no intention of granting an exception\xd3 to CSS. App. to Pet. for Cert. 168a. But the City \xd2may not refuse to extend that [exemption] system to cases of \xd4religious hardship\xd5 without compelling reason.\xd3 Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (quoting Roy, 476 U.S. at 708, 106 S.Ct. 2147). "
[555] "The City and intervenor-respondents resist this conclusion on several grounds. They first argue that governments should enjoy greater leeway under the Free Exercise Clause when setting rules for contractors than when regulating the general public. The government, they observe, commands heightened powers when managing its internal operations. See NASA v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 150, 131 S.Ct. 746, 178 L.Ed.2d 667 (2011); Engquist v. Oregon Dept. of Agriculture, 553 U.S. 591, 598\xd0600, 128 S.Ct. 2146, 170 L.Ed.2d 975 (2008). And when individuals enter into government employment or contracts, they accept certain restrictions on their freedom as part of the deal. See Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418\xd0420, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006); Board of Comm'rs, Wabaunsee Cty. v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 677\xd0678, 116 S.Ct. 2342, 135 L.Ed.2d 843 (1996). Given this context, the City and intervenor-respondents contend, the government should have a freer hand when dealing with contractors like CSS. "
[556] "8These considerations cannot save the City here. As Philadelphia rightly acknowledges, \xd2principles of neutrality and general applicability still constrain the government in its capacity as manager.\xd3 Brief for City Respondents 11\xd012. We have never suggested that the government may discriminate against religion when acting in its managerial role. And Smith itself drew support for the neutral and generally applicable standard from cases involving internal government affairs. See 494 U.S. at 883\xd0885, and n. 2, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (citing Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn., 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988); Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147). The City and intervenor-respondents accordingly ask only that courts apply a more deferential approach in determining whether a policy is neutral and generally applicable in the contracting context. We find no need to resolve that narrow issue in this case. No matter the level of deference we extend to the City, the inclusion of a formal system of entirely discretionary exceptions in section 3.21 renders the contractual non-discrimination requirement not generally applicable. "
[557] "Perhaps all this explains why the City now contends that section 3.21 does not *1879 apply to CSS's refusal to certify same-sex couples after all. Contrast App. to Pet. for Cert. 167a\xd0168a with Brief for City Respondents 35\xd036. Instead, the City says that section 3.21 addresses only \xd2an agency's right to refuse \xd4referrals\xd5 to place a child with a certified foster family.\xd3 Brief for City Respondents 36. We think the City had it right the first time. Although the section is titled \xd2Rejection of Referral,\xd3 the text sweeps more broadly, forbidding the rejection of \xd2prospective foster ... parents\xd3 for \xd2Services,\xd3 without limitation. Supp. App. to Brief for City Respondents 16. The City maintains that certification is one of the services foster agencies are hired to perform, so its attempt to backtrack on the reach of section 3.21 is unavailing. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 222 (2012) (\xd2[A] title or heading should never be allowed to override the plain words of a text.\xd3). Moreover, the City adopted the current version of section 3.21 shortly after declaring that it would make CSS's obligation to certify same-sex couples \xd2explicit\xd3 in future contracts, App. to Pet. for Cert. 170a, confirming our understanding of the text of the provision. "
[558] "9The City and intervenor-respondents add that, notwithstanding the system of exceptions in section 3.21, a separate provision in the contract independently prohibits discrimination in the certification of foster parents. That provision, section 15.1, bars discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, and it does not on its face allow for exceptions. See Supp. App. to Brief for City Respondents 31. But state law makes clear that \xd2one part of a contract cannot be so interpreted as to annul another part.\xd3 Shehadi v. Northeastern Nat. Bank of Pa., 474 Pa. 232, 236, 378 A.2d 304, 306 (1977); see Commonwealth ex rel. Kane v. UPMC, 634 Pa. 97, 135, 129 A.3d 441, 464 (2015). Applying that \xd2fundamental\xd3 rule here, Shehadi, 474 Pa. at 236, 378 A.2d at 306, an exception from section 3.21 also must govern the prohibition in section 15.1, lest the City's reservation of the authority to grant such an exception be a nullity. As a result, the contract as a whole contains no generally applicable non-discrimination requirement. "
[559] "10Finally, the City and intervenor-respondents contend that the availability of exceptions under section 3.21 is irrelevant because the Commissioner has never granted one. That misapprehends the issue. The creation of a formal mechanism for granting exceptions renders a policy not generally applicable, regardless whether any exceptions have been given, because it \xd2invite[s]\xd3 the government to decide which reasons for not complying with the policy are worthy of solicitude, Smith, 494 U.S. at 884, 110 S.Ct. 1595\xd1here, at the Commissioner's \xd2sole discretion.\xd3 "
[560] "The concurrence objects that no party raised these arguments in this Court. Post, at 1928 \xd0 1929 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). But CSS, supported by the United States, contended that the City's \xd2made-for-CSS Section 3.21 permits discretionary \xd4exception[s]\xd5 from the requirement \xd4not [to] reject a child or family\xd5 based upon \xd4their ... sexual orientation,\xd5 \xd3 which \xd2alone triggers strict scrutiny.\xd3 Reply Brief 5 (quoting Supp. App. to Brief for City Respondents 16; some alterations in original); see also Brief for Petitioners 26\xd027 (section 3.21 triggers strict scrutiny); Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 21\xd022 (same). The concurrence favors the City's reading of section 3.21, see post, at 1928 \xd0 1929, but we find CSS's position more persuasive. "
[561] "C "
[562] "11In addition to relying on the contract, the City argues that CSS's refusal *1880 to certify same-sex couples constitutes an \xd2Unlawful Public Accommodations Practice[ ]\xd3 in violation of the Fair Practices Ordinance. That ordinance forbids \xd2deny[ing] or interfer[ing] with the public accommodations opportunities of an individual or otherwise discriminat[ing] based on his or her race, ethnicity, color, sex, sexual orientation, ... disability, marital status, familial status,\xd3 or several other protected categories. Phila. Code \xa4 9\xd01106(1) (2016). The City contends that foster care agencies are public accommodations and therefore forbidden from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation when certifying foster parents. "
[563] "CSS counters that \xd2foster care has never been treated as a \xd4public accommodation\xd5 in Philadelphia.\xd3 Brief for Petitioners 13. In any event, CSS adds, the ordinance cannot qualify as generally applicable because the City allows exceptions to it for secular reasons despite denying one for CSS's religious exercise. But that constitutional issue arises only if the ordinance applies to CSS in the first place. We conclude that it does not because foster care agencies do not act as public accommodations in performing certifications. "
[564] "12The ordinance defines a public accommodation in relevant part as \xd2[a]ny place, provider or public conveyance, whether licensed or not, which solicits or accepts the patronage or trade of the public or whose goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages or accommodations are extended, offered, sold, or otherwise made available to the public.\xd3 \xa4 9\xd01102(1)(w). Certification is not \xd2made available to the public\xd3 in the usual sense of the words. To make a service \xd2available\xd3 means to make it \xd2accessible, obtainable.\xd3 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 84 (11th ed. 2005); see also 1 Oxford English Dictionary 812 (2d ed. 1989) (\xd2capable of being made use of, at one's disposal, within one's reach\xd3). Related state law illustrates the same point. A Pennsylvania antidiscrimination statute similarly defines a public accommodation as an accommodation that is \xd2open to, accepts or solicits the patronage of the general public.\xd3 Pa. Stat. Ann., Tit. 43, \xa4 954(l) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 2009). It fleshes out that definition with examples like hotels, restaurants, drug stores, swimming pools, barbershops, and public conveyances. Ibid. The \xd2common theme\xd3 is that a public accommodation must \xd2provide a benefit to the general public allowing individual members of the general public to avail themselves of that benefit if they so desire.\xd3 Blizzard v. Floyd, 149 Pa.Commw. 503, 506, 613 A.2d 619, 621 (1992). "
[565] "Certification as a foster parent, by contrast, is not readily accessible to the public. It involves a customized and selective assessment that bears little resemblance to staying in a hotel, eating at a restaurant, or riding a bus. The process takes three to six months. Applicants must pass background checks and a medical exam. Foster agencies are required to conduct an intensive home study during which they evaluate, among other things, applicants\xd5 \xd2mental and emotional adjustment,\xd3 \xd2community ties with family, friends, and neighbors,\xd3 and \xd2[e]xisting family relationships, attitudes and expectations regarding the applicant's own children and parent/child relationships.\xd3 55 Pa. Code \xa4 3700.64. Such inquiries would raise eyebrows at the local bus station. And agencies understandably approach this sensitive process from different angles. As the City itself explains to prospective foster parents, \xd2[e]ach agency has slightly different requirements, specialties, and training programs.\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. 197a. All of this confirms that the one-size-fits-all public accommodations model is a poor match for the foster care system. "
[566] "*1881 13The City asks us to adhere to the District Court's contrary determination that CSS qualifies as a public accommodation under the ordinance. The concurrence adopts the City's argument, seeing no incongruity in deeming a private religious foster agency a public accommodation. See post, at 1927 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). We respectfully disagree with the view of the City and the concurrence. Although \xd2we ordinarily defer to lower court constructions of state statutes, we do not invariably do so.\xd3 Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 483, 108 S.Ct. 2495, 101 L.Ed.2d 420 (1988) (citation omitted). Deference would be inappropriate here. The District Court did not take into account the uniquely selective nature of the certification process, which must inform the applicability of the ordinance. We agree with CSS's position, which it has maintained from the beginning of this dispute, that its \xd2foster services do not constitute a \xd4public accommodation\xd5 under the City's Fair Practices Ordinance, and therefore it is not bound by that ordinance.\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. 159a. We therefore have no need to assess whether the ordinance is generally applicable. "
[567] "III "
[568] "The contractual non-discrimination requirement imposes a burden on CSS's religious exercise and does not qualify as generally applicable. The concurrence protests that the \xd2Court granted certiorari to decide whether to overrule [Smith],\xd3 and chides the Court for seeking to \xd2sidestep the question.\xd3 Post, at 1926 (opinion of GORSUCH, J.). But the Court also granted review to decide whether Philadelphia's actions were permissible under our precedents. See Pet. for Cert. i. CSS has demonstrated that the City's actions are subject to \xd2the most rigorous of scrutiny\xd3 under those precedents. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Because the City's actions are therefore examined under the strictest scrutiny regardless of Smith, we have no occasion to reconsider that decision here. "
[569] "1415A government policy can survive strict scrutiny only if it advances \xd2interests of the highest order\xd3 and is narrowly tailored to achieve those interests. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (internal quotation marks omitted). Put another way, so long as the government can achieve its interests in a manner that does not burden religion, it must do so. "
[570] "1617The City asserts that its non-discrimination policies serve three compelling interests: maximizing the number of foster parents, protecting the City from liability, and ensuring equal treatment of prospective foster parents and foster children. The City states these objectives at a high level of generality, but the First Amendment demands a more precise analysis. See Gonzales v. O Centro Esp\x92rita Beneficente Uni\x8bo do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430\xd0432, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006) (discussing the compelling interest test applied in Sherbert and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972)). Rather than rely on \xd2broadly formulated interests,\xd3 courts must \xd2scrutinize[ ] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants.\xd3 O Centro, 546 U.S. at 431, 126 S.Ct. 1211. The question, then, is not whether the City has a compelling interest in enforcing its non-discrimination policies generally, but whether it has such an interest in denying an exception to CSS. "
[571] "18Once properly narrowed, the City's asserted interests are insufficient. Maximizing the number of foster families and minimizing liability are important goals, but the City fails to show that granting CSS an exception will put those goals *1882 at risk. If anything, including CSS in the program seems likely to increase, not reduce, the number of available foster parents. As for liability, the City offers only speculation that it might be sued over CSS's certification practices. Such speculation is insufficient to satisfy strict scrutiny, see Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assn., 564 U.S. 786, 799\xd0800, 131 S.Ct. 2729, 180 L.Ed.2d 708 (2011), particularly because the authority to certify foster families is delegated to agencies by the State, not the City, see 55 Pa. Code \xa4 3700.61. "
[572] "1920That leaves the interest of the City in the equal treatment of prospective foster parents and foster children. We do not doubt that this interest is a weighty one, for \xd2[o]ur society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth.\xd3 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 584 U. S., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 138 S.Ct., at 1727. On the facts of this case, however, this interest cannot justify denying CSS an exception for its religious exercise. The creation of a system of exceptions under the contract undermines the City's contention that its non-discrimination policies can brook no departures. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 546\xd0547, 113 S.Ct. 2217. The City offers no compelling reason why it has a particular interest in denying an exception to CSS while making them available to others. "
[573] "* * * "
[574] "As Philadelphia acknowledges, CSS has \xd2long been a point of light in the City's foster-care system.\xd3 Brief for City Respondents 1. CSS seeks only an accommodation that will allow it to continue serving the children of Philadelphia in a manner consistent with its religious beliefs; it does not seek to impose those beliefs on anyone else. The refusal of Philadelphia to contract with CSS for the provision of foster care services unless it agrees to certify same-sex couples as foster parents cannot survive strict scrutiny, and violates the First Amendment. "
[575] "In view of our conclusion that the actions of the City violate the Free Exercise Clause, we need not consider whether they also violate the Free Speech Clause. "
[576] "The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. "
[577] "It is so ordered. "
[578] "Justice BARRETT, with whom Justice KAVANAUGH joins, and with whom Justice BREYER joins as to all but the first paragraph, concurring. "
[579] "In Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), this Court held that a neutral and generally applicable law typically does not violate the Free Exercise Clause\xd1no matter how severely that law burdens religious exercise. Petitioners, their amici, scholars, and Justices of this Court have made serious arguments that Smith ought to be overruled. While history looms large in this debate, I find the historical record more silent than supportive on the question whether the founding generation understood the First Amendment to require religious exemptions from generally applicable laws in at least some circumstances. In my view, the textual and structural arguments against Smith are more compelling. As a matter of text and structure, it is difficult to see why the Free Exercise Clause\xd1lone among the First Amendment freedoms\xd1offers nothing more than protection from discrimination. "
[580] "Yet what should replace Smith? The prevailing assumption seems to be that strict scrutiny would apply whenever a *1883 neutral and generally applicable law burdens religious exercise. But I am skeptical about swapping Smith\xd5s categorical antidiscrimination approach for an equally categorical strict scrutiny regime, particularly when this Court's resolution of conflicts between generally applicable laws and other First Amendment rights\xd1like speech and assembly\xd1has been much more nuanced. There would be a number of issues to work through if Smith were overruled. To name a few: Should entities like Catholic Social Services\xd1which is an arm of the Catholic Church\xd1be treated differently than individuals? Cf. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012). Should there be a distinction between indirect and direct burdens on religious exercise? Cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606\xd0607, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961) (plurality opinion). What forms of scrutiny should apply? Compare Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (assessing whether government's interest is \xd2 \xd4compelling\xd5 \xd3), with Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 462, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971) (assessing whether government's interest is \xd2substantial\xd3). And if the answer is strict scrutiny, would pre-Smith cases rejecting free exercise challenges to garden-variety laws come out the same way? See Smith, 494 U.S. at 888\xd0889, 110 S.Ct. 1595. "
[581] "We need not wrestle with these questions in this case, though, because the same standard applies regardless whether Smith stays or goes. A longstanding tenet of our free exercise jurisprudence\xd1one that both pre-dates and survives Smith\xd1is that a law burdening religious exercise must satisfy strict scrutiny if it gives government officials discretion to grant individualized exemptions. See id., at 884, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (law not generally applicable \xd2where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions\xd3 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 401, n. 4, 83 S.Ct. 1790)); see also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303\xd0307, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940) (subjecting statute to heightened scrutiny because exemptions lay in discretion of government official). As the Court's opinion today explains, the government contract at issue provides for individualized exemptions from its nondiscrimination rule, thus triggering strict scrutiny. And all nine Justices agree that the City cannot satisfy strict scrutiny. I therefore see no reason to decide in this case whether Smith should be overruled, much less what should replace it. I join the Court's opinion in full. "
[582] " "
[583] "Mr. Chief Justice WARREN announced the judgment of the Court and an opinion in which Mr. Justice BLACK, Mr. Justice CLARK, and Mr. Justice WHITTAKER concur. "
[584] "The principal issues presented in this case are whether the Massachusetts Sunday Closing Laws1 violate equal protection, are statutes respecting the establishment of religion or prohibit the free exercise thereof. "
[585] "Appellees are Crown Kosher Super Market, a corporation whose four stockholders, officers and directors are members of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which operates in Springfield, Massachusetts, and sells kosher meat and other food products that are almost exclusively kosher and which has many orthodox Jewish customers; three of Crown's customers of the Orthodox Jewish faith, whose religion forbids them to shop on the Sabbath and requires them to eat kosher food, as representatives of that class *619 of patrons; and the chief orthodox rabbi of Springfield, as representative of a class of orthodox rabbis whose duties include the inspecting of kosher food markets to insure compliance with Orthodox Jewish dietary laws. "
[586] "Crown had previously been open for business on Sunday, on which day it had conducted about one-third of its weekly business. No other supermarket in the Springfield area had kept open on Sunday. Since the Orthodox Jewish religion requires its members to refrain from any commercial activity on the Sabbath\xd1from sundown on Friday until sundown on Saturday\xd1Crown was not open during those hours. Although there is a statutory provision which permits Sabbatarians to keep their shops open until 10 a.m. on Sunday for the sale of kosher meat, Crown did not do so because it was economically impractical; for the same reason, Crown did not open after sundown on Saturday. "
[587] "Those provisions of the law immediately under attack are in a chapter entitled \xd4Observance of the Lord's Day.\xd5 They forbid, under penalty of a fine of up to fifty dollars, the keeping open of shops and the doing of any labor, business or work on Sunday. Works of necessity and charity are excepted as is the operation of certain public utilities. There are also exemptions for the retail sale of drugs, the retail sale of tobacco by certain vendors, the retail sale and making of bread at given hours by certain dealers, and the retail sale of frozen desserts, confectioneries and fruits by various listed sellers. The statutes under attack further permit the Sunday sale of live bait for noncommercial fishing; the sale of meals to be consumed off the premises; the operation and letting of motor vehicles and the sale of items and emergency services necessary thereto; the letting of horses, carriages, boats and bicycles; unpaid work on pleasure boats and about private gardens and grounds if it does not cause unreasonable noise; the running of trains and boats; the *620 printing, sale and delivery of newspapers; the operation of bootblacks before 11 a.m., **1124 unless locally prohibited; the wholesale and retail sale of milk, ice and fuel; the wholesale handling and delivery of fish and perishable foodstuffs; the sale at wholesale of dressed poultry; the making of butter and cheese; general interstate truck transportation before 8 a.m. and after 8 p.m. and at all times in cases of emergency; intrastate truck transportation of petroleum products before 6 a.m. and after 10 p.m.; the transportation of livestock and farm items for participation in fairs and sporting events; the sale of fruits and vegetables on the grower's premises; the keeping open of public bathhouses; the digging of claims; the icing and dressing of fish; the sale of works of art at exhibitions; the conducting of private trade expositions between 1 p.m. and 10 p.m. "
[588] "These statutes do not prohibit Sunday business and labor by Sabbatarian observers so long as it disturbs no other person. However, this has been construed to forbid the keeping open of shops for the sale of merchandise. Commonwealth v. Has, 122 Mass. 40. Permission is granted by local option for the Sunday operation after 1 p.m. of amusement parks and beach resorts, including participation in bowling and games of amusement for which prizes are awarded. Special licenses for emergency Sunday work may be obtained from local officials. "
[589] "Other provisions of the Massachusetts Sunday legislation make generally unlawful Sunday attendance or participation in any public entertainments except for those which are duly licensed locally, conducted after 1 p.m., and are in keeping with the character of the day servance. "
[590] "Although there is a general bar of games and sports on Sunday, professional sports may be played between 1:30 p.m. and 6:30 p.m., and indoor hockey and basketball *621 any time after 1:30 p.m.; amateur sports may be played between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m.; this is all subject to local option and no game may be conducted within one thousand feet of any regular place of worship except in a public playground or park. There are specific bans on auto racing, horse racing, boxing and hunting with firearms. And there are a number of additional exemptions from the general proscription. Golf, tennis, dancing at weddings, concerts of sacred music and the celebration of religious customs or rituals are all allowed on Sunday as are the operation of miniature golf courses and golf driving ranges after 1 p.m. Motion pictures may be exhibited after this hour if a local license is obtained. Parades with music for certain commemorative purposes may be held on Sunday by veterans', civic, fraternal, policemen's and firemen's organizations providing that they are suspended while passing within two hundred feet of public worship services. "
[591] "Persons who keep places of public entertainment or refreshment lose their licenses if they entertain, on Sunday, people other than travelers, strangers or lodgers. With limited exceptions, discharging firearms for sport except on one's own land, fishing for commercial purposes, and fishing with nets or spears are prohibited on Sunday. The use of gaming devices is not allowed. Outdoor exercise without the element of contest is generally permitted as is the taking of mammals by means of traps. Heavier penalties are imposed for the willful cutting and destruction of timber, shrubs, fruits or vegetables on Sunday than on other days of the week. "
[592] "Still other statutory sections make it a crime for most employers to require their employees to engage in ordinary occupation on Sunday unless the employee is allowed twenty-four consecutive hours off during the following six days. The sale of alcoholic beverages by certain *622 licensees is permitted on Sunday after 1 p.m. by local option. However, patrons **1125 consuming the beverages on the premises must be seated at tables. "
[593] "Appellees sought permanently to enjoin the enforcement of the statute against them, alleging that appellant, Springfield's chief of police, had previously arrested and prosecuted Crown's manager for keeping open on Sunday; that, unless restrained, appellant would continue to enforce the statute against Crown; that the statute was unconstitutional for the reasons stated above. The three-judge Federal District Court, one judge dissenting, agreed with appellees, 176 F.Supp. 466. On appeal brought under 28 U.S.C. s 1253, 28 U.S.C.A. s 1253, we noted probable jurisdiction, 362 U.S. 960, 80 S.Ct. 876, 4 L.Ed.2d 875. "
[594] "I. "
[595] "The equal protection arguments advanced by appellees are much the same as those made by appellants in McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 6 L.Ed.2d 393. They contend that the exceptions to the statute are so numerous and arbitrary as to be found to have no rational basis;2 that the law permits the sale of certain food items sold by Crown but limits this permission to selected types of stores; that the employees in the exempted activities are just as much in need of a day of rest as are Crown's employees. The three-judge District Court described the present statutory system as an \xd4unbelievable hodgepodge\xd5 and sustained appellees' allegations. "
[596] "The answers to these arguments are likewise similar to those given in McGowan when the contentions are examined under the standards set forth in that opinion. Many of the exceptions in the Massachusetts Sunday Laws are *623 reasonably explainable on their face. Such items as tobaccos, confectioneries, fruits and frozen desserts could have been found by the legislature to be useful in adding to Sunday's enjoyment; such items as newspapers, milk and bread could have been found to be required to be sold fresh daily.3 It is conceivable that the legislature believed that the sale of fish and perishable foodstuffs at wholesale would not detract from the atmosphere of the day, while the retail sale of these items would inject the distinctly commercial element that exists during the other six days of the week. It is fair to believe that the allowance of professional and amateur sports on Dunday would add to the day's special character rather than detract from it. And the legislature could find that the circumstances attendant to the conduct of professional sports are sufficiently different from those of amateur sports to justify different treatment as to the hours during which they may be played. Furthermore, the legislature could determine that, although many retailers, including Crown, sell frozen desserts, to permit only a limited number of innholders, druggists and common victuallers to sell them on Sunday would serve the public purpose of providing these items on Sunday and, at the same time, limit the commercial activities ordinarily attendant to their sale. And, if such determination requires this limited number of stores to be open to serve the public interest, the employees of most of the stores are still protected by the statutory provision giving the employees another day of rest. To permit all stores which sell the exempted products to remain open on Sunday but to limit them to the sale of the exempted items *624 might well be believed to impose near insuperable enforcement problems. "
[597] "The fact is that the irrationality of these and the many other apparently **1126 reasonable distinctions has not been shown. The presumption of validity upon which the other classifications stand has not been dispelled. \xd4A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against (the equal protection) clause merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality.\xd5 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78, 31 S.Ct. 337, 340, 55 L.Ed. 369. Thus, we hold that the Massachusetts Sunday Laws do not violate equal protection of the laws. "
[598] "II. "
[599] "Appellees make several contentions that the statutes violate the constitutional guarantees of religious freedom. First, they allege that the statutes are laws respecting an establishment of religion in that both their original and current purposes are to enforce the observance of Sunday as the Sabbath. "
[600] "We agree with the court below that, like the Sunday laws of other States, the Massachusetts statutes have an unmistakably religious origin. The first enactment of the Plymouth Colony in 1650 stated simply that \xd4whosoever shall prophane the Lords day by doeing any servill worke or any such like abusses' shall either be fined or whipped. The Compact, Charter and Laws of the Colony of New Plymouth, 92. Eight years later, a ban on Sunday traveling was enacted with the following preamble: "
[601] "\xd4Whereas complaint is made of great abuses in sundry places of this Government of prophaning the Lords day by travellers both horse and foot by bearing of burdens carrying of packes &c. upon the Lords day to the great offence of the Godly welafected among us.\xd5 Id., at 113. "
[602] "*625 And, in 1671, the religious purpose was made clear beyond doubt: "
[603] "\xd49. This Court taking notice of great abuse, and many misdemeanours, committed by divers persons in these many wayes, Profaneing the Sabbath or Lord's-day, to the great dishonour of God, Reproach of Religion, and Grief of the Spirits of God's People "
[604] "\xd4Do therefore Order, That whosoever shall Prophane the Lord's-day, by doing unnecessary servile Work, by unnecessary travailing, or by sports and recreations, he or they that so transgress, shall forfeit for every such default forty shillings, or be publickly whipt: But if it clearly appear that the sin was proudly, Presumptuously and with a high hand committed, against the known Command and Authority of the blessed God, such a person therein Despising and Reproaching the Lord, shall be put to death or grievously punished at the Judgment of the Court. "
[605] "\xd410. And whosoever shall frequently neglect the public Worship of God on the Lords day, that is approved by this Government, shall forfeit for every such default convicted of, ten shillings, especially where it appears to arise from negligence, Idleness or Prophaness of Spirit.\xd5 Id., at 247. "
[606] "The Sunday regulations of the Massachusetts Colony were no different. The 1653 version spoke of the abuses of the Dishonor of God and the Reproach of Religion which were Grieving the Souls of God's Servants. Among other things, the statute forbade Drinking and Sporting on Sunday. The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts 132\xd1133. In 1665, Neglect of God's Public Worship was made a crime. Id., at 133. Every person was required to apply himself to Duties of Religion and Piety on Sunday according to the 1692 statute which continued the ban on *626 Sunday sports. Charter of the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay in New-England 13\xd114. The preamble to the new statute in 1761 retained the Religion and Piety **1127 language and added that Profanation of the Lord's Day is highly offensive to Almighty God. This statute retained and strengthened the former prohibitions. Id., at 392\xd1394. "
[607] "A change came about in 1782. The preamble added the following: "
[608] "\xd4Whereas the Observance of the Lord's Day is highly promotive of the Welfare of a Community, by affording necessary Seasons for Relaxation from Labor and the Cares of Business; for moral Reflections and Conversation on the Duties of Life, and the frequent Errors of human Conduct; * * *\xd5 Acts and Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 63. "
[609] "Thus, the statute's announced purpose was no longer solely religious. But this statute proscribed the Sunday attendance at any Concert of Music and Dancing in addition to the previously mentioned activities. Ibid. This law was re-enacted in 1792. 2 Laws of Massachusetts 536 et seq. "
[610] "However, when we examine the statutes now before the Court, we find that, for the most part, they have been divorced from the religious orientation of their predecessors. The preambles' statements, in certain terms, of religious purpose exist no longer. Sports of almost all kinds are now generally allowed on Sunday. The absolute prohibition against alcoholic beverages has disappeared. Concerts and dancing are permitted. Church attendance is no longer required. "
[611] "Admittedly, the statutes still contain references to the Lord's Day and some provisions speak of weekdays as being secular days. Although s 2 of c. 136 excepts concerts of sacred music, the next clause of the section *627 permits free openair concerts. It would seem that the objectionable language is merely a relic. The fact that certain Sunday activities are permitted only if they are \xd4in keeping with the character of the day and not inconsistent with its due observance,\xd5 does not necessarily mean that the day is intended to be religious; the \xd4character\xd5 of the day would appear more likely to be intended to be one of repose and recreation. We are told that those provisions forbidding certain activities to be conducted within a set distance from a place of public worship are especially devoted to maintaining Sunday as the Sabbath. But because the State wishes to protect those who do worship on Sunday does not mean that the State means to impose religious worship on all. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511, 91 L.Ed. 711. Although many of the more recently allowed Sunday activities may not commence prior to 1 p.m., others may be undertaken at any time during the day. And the contention that evening church services are being protected cannot be maintained since most of those activities that begin after 1 p.m. may continue throughout the day. "
[612] "Furthermore, the long list of exemptions that have been recently granted evidences that the present scheme is one to provide an atmosphere of recreation rather than religion. The court below pointed out that, since 1858, the statutes have been amended more than seventy times. It would not seem that the Sunday sales of tobacco, soda water, fruit, et cetera, are in aid of religion. It would seem that the operation of amusement parks and beach resorts is in aid of recreation. "
[613] "An examination of recent Massachusetts legislative history bolsters the State's position that these statutes are not religious. In 1960, a report of the Legislative Research Council stated: "
[614] "\xd4In general, Sunday laws protect the public by guaranteeing one day in seven to provide a period of *628 rest and quiet. Health, peace and good order of society are thereby promoted. Such provision is essentially civil in character and the statutes are not regarded as religious ordinances.\xd5 Report of the Legislative Research Council relative to Legal Holidays and their Observance, Mass.Leg.Docs., **1128 Sen.Doc. No. 525 (1960), 24.4 "
[615] "The earliest pronouncements of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts are further indication of the religious origin of the Sunday Laws. In Pearce v. Atwood, 1816, 13 Mass. 324, 348, it was stated that the statute's sole object was \xd4ensuring reverence and respect for one day of the week, in order that religious exercises should be performed without interruption from common and secular employments.\xd5 In Bennett v. Brooks, 1864, 9 Allen 118, 119, 91 Mass. 118, 119, the day was characterized as one \xd4set apart for religious services and observances.\xd5 "
[616] "In 1877, a case arose in which a charge of violation of religious freedom was made. The Supreme Judicial Court relied on the Pennsylvania case of Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. 312, and stated clearly: "
[617] "\xd4It is essentially a civil regulation, providing for a fixed period of rest in the business, the ordinary avocations and the amusements of the community. If there is to be such a cessation from labor and amusement, some one day must be selected for the purpose; and even if the day thus selected is chosen because a great majority of the people celebrate it as a day *629 of peculiar sanctity, the legislative authority to provide for its observance is derived from its general authority to regulate the business of the community and to provide for its moral and physical welfare. The act imposes upon no one any religious ceremony or attendance upon any form of worship, and any one, who deems another day more suitable for rest or worship, may devote that day to the religious observance which he deems appropriate. That one who conscientiously observes the seventh day of the week may also be compelled to abstain from business of the kind expressly forbidden on the first day, is not occasioned by any subordination of his religion, but because as a member of the community he must submit to the rules which are made by lawful authority to regulate and govern the business of that community.\xd5 Commonwealth v. Has, 1877, 122 Mass. 40, 42. "
[618] "The court below characterized this decision as an ad hoc improvisation by the Massachusetts court. Of course, the court below was correct in deciding that it was not bound by the Massachusetts characterization of the statutes. See Society for Savings in City of Cleveland, Ohio v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 148, 151, 75 S.Ct. 607, 611, 99 L.Ed. 950. But ten years later, in Commonwealth v. Starr, 1887, 144 Mass. 359, 361, 11 N.E. 533, 534, another religious charge against the statute was made; it was rejected on the authority of Has. "
[619] "As the court below pointed out, there have been several cases,5 between 1877 and 1923, which gave a religious characterization to the statute. But in none of these cases was there a contention regarding religious freedom, and *630 none of the cases stated the statute's purpose to be exclusively religious.6 Finally, in the only recent case passing on the Massachusetts Sunday Closing Laws, **1129 Commonwealth v. Chernock, 1957, 336 Mass. 384, 145 N.E.2d 920, the court summarily dismissed the complainant's religious contention, relying on Has. "
[620] "The relevant factors having been most carefully considered, we do not find that the present statutes' purpose or effect is religious. Although the three-judge court found that Massachusetts had no legitimate secular interest in maintaining Sunday closing, we have held differently in McGowan v. Maryland, supra. And, for the reasons stated in that case, we reject appellees' request to hold these statutes invalid on the ground that the State may accomplish its secular purpose by alternative means that would not even remotely or incidentally aid religion. "
[621] "Secondly, appellees contend that the application to them of the Sunday Closing Laws prohibits the free exercise of their religion. Crown alleges that if it is required by law to abstain from business on Sunday, then, because its owners' religion demands closing from sundown Friday to sundown Saturday, Crown will be open only four and one-half days a week, thereby suffering extreme economic disadvantage. Crown's Orthodox Jewish customers allege that because their religious beliefs forbid their shopping on the Jewish Sabbath, the statutes' effect is to deprive them, from Friday afternoon until Monday of each week, of the opportunity to purchase the kosher food sanctioned by their fath. The orthodox rabbis allege that the *631 statutes' effect greatly complicates their task of supervising the condition of kosher meat because the meat delivered on Friday would have to be kept until Monday. Furthermore, appellees contend that, because of all this, the statutes discriminate against their religion. "
[622] "These allegations are similar, although not as grave, as those made by appellants in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563. Since the decision in that case rejects the contentions presented by these appellees on the merits, we need not decide whether appellees have standing to raise these questions.7 "
[623] "Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER and Mr. Justice HARLAN concur in a separate opinion. "
[624] "Accordingly, the decision below is reversed. "
[625] "Reversed. "
[626] "Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[627] "Petitioner S. Simcha Goldman contends that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution permits him to wear a yarmulke while in uniform, notwithstanding an Air Force regulation mandating uniform dress for Air Force personnel. The District Court for the District of Columbia permanently enjoined the Air Force from enforcing its regulation against petitioner and from penalizing him for wearing his yarmulke. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed on the ground that the Air Force's strong interest in discipline justified the strict enforcement of its uniform dress requirements. We granted certiorari because of the importance of the question, 472 U.S. 1016, 105 S.Ct. 3475, 87 L.Ed.2d 612 (1985), and now affirm. "
[628] "Petitioner Goldman is an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi. In 1973, he was accepted into the Armed Forces Health Professions Scholarship Program and placed on inactive reserve status in the Air Force while he studied clinical psychology at Loyola University of Chicago. During his three years in the scholarship program, he received a monthly stipend and an allowance for tuition, books, and fees. After completing his Ph.D. in psychology, petitioner *505 entered active service in the United States Air Force as a commissioned **1312 officer, in accordance with a requirement that participants in the scholarship program serve one year of active duty for each year of subsidized education. Petitioner was stationed at March Air Force Base in Riverside, California, and served as a clinical psychologist at the mental health clinic on the base. "
[629] "Until 1981, petitioner was not prevented from wearing his yarmulke on the base. He avoided controversy by remaining close to his duty station in the health clinic and by wearing his service cap over the yarmulke when out of doors. But in April 1981, after he testified as a defense witness at a court-martial wearing his yarmulke but not his service cap, opposing counsel lodged a complaint with Colonel Joseph Gregory, the Hospital Commander, arguing that petitioner's practice of wearing his yarmulke was a violation of Air Force Regulation (AFR) 35\xd010. This regulation states in pertinent part that \xd2[h]eadgear will not be worn ... [w]hile indoors except by armed security police in the performance of their duties.\xd3 AFR 35\xd010, \xa6 1\xd06.h(2)(f) (1980). "
[630] "Colonel Gregory informed petitioner that wearing a yarmulke while on duty does indeed violate AFR 35\xd010, and ordered him not to violate this regulation outside the hospital. Although virtually all of petitioner's time on the base was spent in the hospital, he refused. Later, after petitioner's attorney protested to the Air Force General Counsel, Colonel Gregory revised his order to prohibit petitioner from wearing the yarmulke even in the hospital. Petitioner's request to report for duty in civilian clothing pending legal resolution of the issue was denied. The next day he received a formal letter of reprimand, and was warned that failure to obey AFR 35\xd010 could subject him to a court-martial. Colonel Gregory also withdrew a recommendation that petitioner's application to extend the term of his active service be approved, and substituted a negative recommendation. "
[631] "*506 Petitioner then sued respondent Secretary of Defense and others, claiming that the application of AFR 35\xd010 to prevent him from wearing his yarmulke infringed upon his First Amendment freedom to exercise his religious beliefs. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia preliminarily enjoined the enforcement of the regulation, Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 530 F.Supp. 12 (1981), and then after a full hearing permanently enjoined the Air Force from prohibiting petitioner from wearing a yarmulke while in uniform. Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 29 EPD \xa6 32,753 (1982). Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, which reversed. Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 236 U.S.App.D.C. 248, 734 F.2d 1531 (1984). As an initial matter, the Court of Appeals determined that the appropriate level of scrutiny of a military regulation that clashes with a constitutional right is neither strict scrutiny nor rational basis. Id., at 252, 734 F.2d, at 1535\xd01536. Instead, it held that a military regulation must be examined to determine whether \xd2legitimate military ends are sought to be achieved,\xd3 id., at 253, 734 F.2d, at 1536, and whether it is \xd2designed to accommodate the individual right to an appropriate degree.\xd3 Ibid. Applying this test, the court concluded that \xd2the Air Force's interest in uniformity renders the strict enforcement of its regulation permissible.\xd3 Id., at 257, 734 F.2d, at 1540. The full Court of Appeals denied a petition for rehearing en banc, with three judges dissenting. 238 U.S.App.D.C. 267, 739 F.2d 657 (1984). "
[632] "Petitioner argues that AFR 35\xd010, as applied to him, prohibits religiously motivated conduct and should therefore be analyzed under the standard enunciated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). See also Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). But we have repeatedly held that \xd2the military is, by **1313 necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian society.\xd3 *507 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743, 94 S.Ct. 2547, 2555, 41 L.Ed.2d 439 (1974). See also Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 300, 103 S.Ct. 2362, 2365, 76 L.Ed.2d 586 (1983); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 757, 95 S.Ct. 1300, 1312\xd013, 43 L.Ed.2d 591 (1975); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 94, 73 S.Ct. 534, 540, 97 L.Ed. 842 (1953). \xd2[T]he military must insist upon a respect for duty and a discipline without counterpart in civilian life,\xd3 Schlesinger v. Councilman, supra, 420 U.S., at 757, 95 S.Ct., at 1312\xd013, in order to prepare for and perform its vital role. See also Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354, 100 S.Ct. 594, 599, 62 L.Ed.2d 540 (1980). "
[633] "12Our review of military regulations challenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for civilian society. The military need not encourage debate or tolerate protest to the extent that such tolerance is required of the civilian state by the First Amendment; to accomplish its mission the military must foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, supra, 462 U.S., at 300, 103 S.Ct., at 2365; Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843\xd0844, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 1220, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976) (POWELL, J., concurring); Parker v. Levy, supra, 417 U.S., at 744, 94 S.Ct., at 2556. The essence of military service \xd2is the subordination of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service.\xd3 Orloff v. Willoughby, supra, 345 U.S., at 92, 73 S.Ct., at 539. "
[634] "3These aspects of military life do not, of course, render entirely nugatory in the military context the guarantees of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, supra, 462 U.S., at 304, 103 S.Ct., at 2367. But \xd2within the military community there is simply not the same [individual] autonomy as there is in the larger civilian community.\xd3 Parker v. Levy, supra, 417 U.S., at 751, 94 S.Ct., at 2559. In the context of the present case, when evaluating whether military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously motivated conduct, courts must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a particular military interest. See Chappell v. Wallace, supra, 462 U.S., at 305, 103 S.Ct., at 2368; Orloff v. Willoughby, supra, 345 U.S., at 93\xd094, 73 S.Ct., at 540. Not only are courts \xd2 \xd4ill-equipped to determine the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military authority might have,\xd5 \xd3 *508 Chappell v. Wallace, supra, 462 U.S., at 305, 103 S.Ct., at 2368, quoting Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L.Rev. 181, 187 (1962), but the military authorities have been charged by the Executive and Legislative Branches with carrying out our Nation's military policy. \xd2[J]udicial deference ... is at its apogee when legislative action under the congressional authority to raise and support armies and make rules and regulations for their governance is challenged.\xd3 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 70, 101 S.Ct. 2646, 2655, 69 L.Ed.2d 478 (1981). "
[635] "The considered professional judgment of the Air Force is that the traditional outfitting of personnel in standardized uniforms encourages the subordination of personal preferences and identities in favor of the overall group mission. Uniforms encourage a sense of hierarchical unity by tending to eliminate outward individual distinctions except for those of rank. The Air Force considers them as vital during peacetime as during war because its personnel must be ready to provide an effective defense on a moment's notice; the necessary habits of discipline and unity must be developed in advance of trouble. We have acknowledged that \xd2[t]he inescapable demands of military discipline and obedience to orders cannot be taught on battlefields; the habit of immediate compliance with military procedures and orders must be virtually reflex with no time for debate or reflection.\xd3 **1314 Chappell v. Wallace, supra, 462 U.S., at 300, 103 S.Ct., at 2365. "
[636] "To this end, the Air Force promulgated AFR 35\xd010, a 190-page document, which states that \xd2Air Force members will wear the Air Force uniform while performing their military duties, except when authorized to wear civilian clothes on duty.\xd3 AFR 35\xd010, \xa6 1\xd06 (1980). The rest of the document describes in minute detail all of the various items of apparel that must be worn as part of the Air Force uniform. It authorizes a few individualized options with respect to certain pieces of jewelry and hairstyle, but even these are subject to severe limitations. See AFR 35\xd010, Table 1\xd01, and \xa6 1\xd012.b(1)(b) (1980). In general, authorized headgear may *509 be worn only out of doors. See AFR 35\xd010, \xa6 1\xd06.h (1980). Indoors, \xd2[h]eadgear [may] not be worn ... except by armed security police in the performance of their duties.\xd3 AFR 35\xd010, \xa6 1\xd06.h(2)(f) (1980). A narrow exception to this rule exists for headgear worn during indoor religious ceremonies. See AFR 35\xd010, \xa6 1\xd06.h(2)(d) (1980). In addition, military commanders may in their discretion permit visible religious headgear and other such apparel in designated living quarters and nonvisible items generally. See Department of Defense Directive 1300.17 (June 18, 1985). "
[637] "Petitioner Goldman contends that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires the Air Force to make an exception to its uniform dress requirements for religious apparel unless the accouterments create a \xd2clear danger\xd3 of undermining discipline and esprit de corps. He asserts that in general, visible but \xd2unobtrusive\xd3 apparel will not create such a danger and must therefore be accommodated. He argues that the Air Force failed to prove that a specific exception for his practice of wearing an unobtrusive yarmulke would threaten discipline. He contends that the Air Force's assertion to the contrary is mere ipse dixit, with no support from actual experience or a scientific study in the record, and is contradicted by expert testimony that religious exceptions to AFR 35\xd010 are in fact desirable and will increase morale by making the Air Force a more humane place. "
[638] "4But whether or not expert witnesses may feel that religious exceptions to AFR 35\xd010 are desirable is quite beside the point. The desirability of dress regulations in the military is decided by the appropriate military officials, and they are under no constitutional mandate to abandon their considered professional judgment. Quite obviously, to the extent the regulations do not permit the wearing of religious apparel such as a yarmulke, a practice described by petitioner as silent devotion akin to prayer, military life may be more objectionable for petitioner and probably others. But the First Amendment does not require the military to accommodate *510 such practices in the face of its view that they would detract from the uniformity sought by the dress regulations. The Air Force has drawn the line essentially between religious apparel that is visible and that which is not, and we hold that those portions of the regulations challenged here reasonably and evenhandedly regulate dress in the interest of the military's perceived need for uniformity. The First Amendment therefore does not prohibit them from being applied to petitioner even though their effect is to restrict the wearing of the headgear required by his religious beliefs. "
[639] "The judgment of the Court of Appeals is "
[640] "Affirmed. "
[641] "Chief Justice\xcaROBERTS\xcadelivered the opinion of the Court. "
[642] "*423\xcaA religious sect with origins in the Amazon Rainforest receives communion by drinking a sacramental tea, brewed from plants unique to the region, that contains a hallucinogen regulated under the Controlled Substances Act by the Federal Government. The Government concedes that this practice is a sincere exercise of religion, but nonetheless sought to prohibit the small American branch of the sect from engaging in the practice, on the ground that the Controlled Substances Act bars all use of the hallucinogen. The sect sued to block enforcement against it of the ban on the sacramental tea, and moved for a preliminary injunction. "
[643] "It relied on the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, which prohibits the Federal Government from substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion, unless the Government\xca\xd2demonstrates that application of the burden to the person\xd3 represents the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest.\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd01(b). The District Court granted the preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. We granted the Government's petition for certiorari. Before this Court, the Government's central submission is that it has a compelling interest in the\xcauniform\xcaapplication of the Controlled Substances Act, such that no exception to the ban on use of the hallucinogen can be made to accommodate the sect's sincere religious practice. We conclude that the Government has not carried the burden expressly placed on it by Congress in the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, and affirm the grant of the preliminary injunction. "
[644] "*424\xcaI "
[645] "In\xcaEmployment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,\xca494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), this Court held that the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment\xcadoes\xcanot prohibit governments from burdening religious practices through generally applicable laws. In\xcaSmith,\xcawe rejected a challenge to an Oregon statute that denied unemployment benefits to drug users, including Native Americans engaged in the sacramental use of peyote.\xcaId.,\xcaat 890, 110 S.Ct. 1595.\xcaIn so\xcadoing, we rejected the interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause announced in\xcaSherbert v. Verner,\xca374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and, in accord with earlier cases, see\xcaSmith,\xca494 U.S., at 879\xd0880, 884\xd0885, 110 S.Ct. 1595,\xcaheld that the Constitution\xcadoes\xcanot require judges to engage in a case-by-case assessment of the religious burdens imposed by facially constitutional laws.\xcaId.,\xcaat 883\xd0890, 110 S.Ct. 1595. "
[646] "Congress responded by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, as amended,\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xcaet seq.,\xcawhich adopts a statutory rule comparable to the constitutional rule rejected in\xcaSmith.\xcaUnder\xca**1217\xcaRFRA, the Federal Government may not, as a statutory matter, substantially burden a person's exercise of religion, \xd2even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability.\xd3ʤ 2000bb\xd01(a). The only exception recognized by the statute requires the Government to satisfy the compelling interest test\xd1to \xd2demonstrat[e] that application of the burden to the person\xd1(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.\xd3ʤ 2000bb\xd01(b). A person whose religious practices are burdened in violation of RFRA \xd2may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief.\xd3ʤ 2000bb\xd01(c).1 "
[647] "*425\xcaThe Controlled Substances Act, 84 Stat. 1242, as amended,\xca21 U.S.C. \xa4 801\xcaet seq.\xca(2000 ed. and Supp. I), regulates the importation, manufacture, distribution, and use of psychotropic substances. The Act classifies substances into five schedules based on their potential for abuse, the extent to which they have an accepted medical use, and their safety. Seeʤ 812(b) (2000 ed.). Substances listed in Schedule I of the Act are subject to the most comprehensive restrictions, including an outright ban on all importation and use, except pursuant to strictly regulated research projects. See \xa4\xa4 823, 960(a)(1). The Act authorizes the imposition of a criminal sentence for simple possession of Schedule I substances, see \xa4 844(a), and mandates the imposition of a criminal sentence for possession \xd2with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense\xd3\xcasuch substances, see \xa4\xa4 841(a), (b). "
[648] "O\xcaCentro\xcaEsp\x92rita\xcaBeneficente\xcaUni\x8b\xcado\xcaVegetal\xca(UDV) is a Christian Spiritist sect based in Brazil, with an American branch of approximately 130 individuals. Central to the UDV's faith is receiving communion through\xcahoasca\xca(pronounced \xd2wass-ca\xd3), a sacramental tea made from two plants unique to the Amazon region. One of the plants,\xcapsychotria viridis,\xcacontains dimethyltryptamine (DMT), a hallucinogen whose effects are enhanced by alkaloids from the other plant,\xcabanisteriopsis caapi. DMT, as well as \xd2any material, compound, mixture, or preparation, which contains any quantity of [DMT],\xd3 is listed in Schedule I of the Controlled Substances Act.ʤ 812(c), Schedule I(c). "
[649] "In 1999, United States Customs inspectors intercepted a shipment to the American UDV containing three drums of\xcahoasca. A subsequent investigation revealed that the UDV had received 14 prior shipments of\xcahoasca. The inspectors seized the intercepted shipment and threatened the UDV with prosecution. "
[650] "The UDV filed suit against the Attorney General and other federal law enforcement officials, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The complaint alleged,\xcainter alia,\xcathat applying the Controlled Substances Act to the UDV's sacramental\xca*426\xcause of\xcahoasca\xcaviolates RFRA. Prior to trial, the UDV moved for a preliminary injunction, so that it could continue to practice its faith pending trial on the merits. "
[651] "At a hearing on the preliminary injunction, the Government conceded that the challenged application of the Controlled Substances Act would substantially burden a sincere exercise of religion by the UDV. See\xcaO\xcaCentro\xcaEspirita\xcaBeneficiente\xcaUniao\xcado\xcaVegetal\xcav. Ashcroft,\xca282 F.Supp.2d 1236, 1252 (D.N.M.2002). The Government argued, however, that this burden\xcadid\xcanot\xca**1218\xcaviolate RFRA, because applying the Controlled Substances Act in this case was the least restrictive means of advancing three compelling governmental interests: protecting the health and safety of UDV members, preventing the diversion of\xcahoasca\xcafrom the church to recreational users, and complying with the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances, a treaty signed by the United States and implemented by the Act.\xcaFeb. 21, 1971, [1979\xd01980] 32 U.S.T. 543, T.I.A.S. No. 9725. See\xca282 F.Supp.2d, at 1252\xd01253. "
[652] "The District Court heard evidence from both parties on the health risks of\xcahoasca\xcaand the potential for diversion from the church. The Government presented evidence to the effect that use of\xcahoasca,\xcaor DMT more generally, can cause psychotic reactions, cardiac irregularities, and adverse drug interactions. The UDV countered by citing studies documenting the safety of its sacramental use of\xcahoasca\xcaand presenting evidence that minimized the likelihood of the health risks raised by the Government. With respect to diversion, the Government pointed to a general rise in the illicit use of hallucinogens, and cited interest in the illegal use of DMT and\xcahoasca\xcain particular; the UDV emphasized the thinness of any market for\xcahoasca,\xcathe relatively small amounts of the substance imported by the church, and the absence of any diversion problem in the past. "
[653] "The District Court concluded that the evidence on health risks was \xd2in equipoise,\xd3 and similarly that the evidence on diversion was \xd2virtually balanced.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 1262, 1266.\xcaIn\xca*427\xcathe face of such an even showing, the court reasoned that the Government had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest justifying what it acknowledged was a substantial burden on the UDV's sincere religious exercise.\xcaId.,\xcaat 1255.\xcaThe court also rejected the asserted interest in complying with the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances, holding that the Convention\xcadoes\xcanot apply to\xcahoasca.\xcaId.,\xcaat 1266\xd01269. "
[654] "The court entered a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Government from enforcing the Controlled Substances Act with respect to the UDV's importation and use of\xcahoasca. The injunction requires the church to import the tea pursuant to federal permits, to restrict control over the tea to persons of church authority, and to warn particularly susceptible UDV members of the dangers of\xcahoasca. See Preliminary Injunction \xa6\xa6 2, 5\xd012, 32\xd033, App. F to App. to Pet. for Cert. 249a, 250a\xd0252a, 258a\xd0259a. The injunction also provides that \xd2if [the Government] believe[s] that evidence exists that\xcahoasca\xcahas negatively affected the health of UDV members,\xd3 or \xd2that a shipment of\xcahoasca\xcacontain[s] particularly dangerous levels of DMT, [the Government] may apply to the Court for an expedite[d] determination of whether the evidence warrants suspension or revocation of [the UDV's authority to use\xcahoasca].\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 257a, \xa6 29. "
[655] "The Government appealed the preliminary injunction and a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed,\xcaO\xcaCentro\xcaEspirita\xcaBeneficiente\xcaUniao\xcado\xcaVegetal\xcav. Ashcroft,\xca342 F.3d 1170 (2003), as\xcadid\xcaa majority of the Circuit sitting en banc,\xca389 F.3d 973 (2004). We granted certiorari.\xca544 U.S. 973, 125 S.Ct. 1846, 161 L.Ed.2d 723 (2005). "
[656] "II "
[657] "1Although its briefs contain some discussion of the potential for harm and diversion from the UDV's use of\xcahoasca,\xcathe Government\xcadoes\xcanot challenge the District Court's factual findings or its conclusion that the evidence submitted on\xca*428\xcathese issues was evenly balanced. Instead, the Government maintains that such\xca**1219\xcaevidentiary equipoise is an insufficient basis for issuing a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the Controlled Substances Act. We review the District Court's legal rulings\xcade novo\xcaand its ultimate decision to issue the preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion. See\xcaMcCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky.,\xca545 U.S. 844, 867, 125 S.Ct. 2722, 2737\xd02738, 162 L.Ed.2d 729 (2005). "
[658] "The Government begins by invoking the well-established principle that the party seeking pretrial relief bears the burden of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits. See,\xcae.g.,\xcaMazurek v. Armstrong,\xca520 U.S. 968, 972, 117 S.Ct. 1865, 138 L.Ed.2d 162 (1997)\xca(per curiam);\xcaDoran v. Salem Inn, Inc.,\xca422 U.S. 922, 931, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). The Government argues that the District Court lost sight of this principle in issuing the injunction based on a mere tie in the evidentiary record. "
[659] "A majority of the en banc Court of Appeals rejected this argument, and so\xcado\xcawe. Before the District Court, the Government conceded the UDV's prima facie case under RFRA. See\xca282 F.Supp.2d, at 1252\xca(application of the Controlled Substances Act would (1) substantially burden (2) a sincere (3) religious exercise). The evidence the District Court found to be in equipoise related to two of the compelling interests asserted by the Government, which formed part of the Government's affirmative defense. See\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd01(b)\xca( \xd2Government may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if\xcait demonstrates\xcathat application of the burden to the person\xd1(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest ...\xd3 (emphasis added)); \xa4 2000bb\xd02(3) (\xd2[T]he term \xd4demonstrates' means meets the burdens of going forward with the evidence and of persuasion\xd3). Accordingly, the UDV effectively demonstrated that its sincere exercise of religion was substantially burdened, and the Government failed to demonstrate that the application of the burden to the UDV would, more likely than not, be justified by the asserted compelling interests.\xca*429\xcaSee\xca389 F.3d, at 1009\xca(Seymour, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (\xd2[T]he balance is between actual irreparable harm to [the] plaintiff and potential harm to the government which\xcadoes\xcanot even rise to the level of a preponderance of the evidence\xd3). "
[660] "2The Government argues that, although it would bear the burden of demonstrating a compelling interest as part of its affirmative defense at trial on the merits, the UDV should have borne the burden of disproving the asserted compelling interests at the hearing on the preliminary injunction. This argument is foreclosed by our recent decision in\xcaAshcroft v. American Civil Liberties Union,\xca542 U.S. 656, 124 S.Ct. 2783, 159 L.Ed.2d 690 (2004). In\xcaAshcroft,\xcawe affirmed the grant of a preliminary injunction in a case where the Government had failed to show a likelihood of success under the compelling interest test. We reasoned that \xd2[a]s the Government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question of [the challenged Act's] constitutionality, respondents [the movants] must be deemed likely to prevail unless the Government has shown that respondents' proposed less restrictive alternatives are less effective than [enforcing the Act].\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 666, 124 S.Ct. 2783.\xcaThat logic extends to this case; here the Government failed on the first prong of the compelling interest test, and\xcadid\xcanot reach the least restrictive means prong, but that can make no difference. The point remains that the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial. "
[661] "The Government attempts to limit the rule announced in\xcaAshcroft\xcato content-\xca**1220\xcabased restrictions on speech, but the distinction is unavailing. The fact that\xcaAshcroft\xcainvolved such a restriction was the reason the Government had the burden of proof at trial under the First Amendment, see\xcaid.,\xcaat 665, 124 S.Ct. 2783,\xcabut in no way affected the Court's assessment of the consequences of having that burden for purposes of the preliminary injunction. Here the burden is placed squarely on the Government by RFRA rather than the First Amendment, see\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4\xa4 2000bb\xd01(b),\xca2000bb\xd02(3), but the consequences\xca*430\xcaare the same. Congress's express decision to legislate the compelling interest test indicates that RFRA challenges should be adjudicated in the same manner as constitutionally mandated applications of the test, including at the preliminary injunction stage. "
[662] "III "
[663] "The Government's second line of argument rests on the Controlled Substances Act itself. The Government contends that the Act's description of Schedule I substances as having \xd2a high potential for abuse,\xd3 \xd2no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,\xd3 and \xd2a lack of accepted safety for use ... under medical supervision,\xd3\xca21 U.S.C. \xa4 812(b)(1), by itself precludes any consideration of individualized exceptions such as that sought by the UDV. The Government goes on to argue that the regulatory regime established by the Act\xd1a \xd2closed\xd3 system that prohibits all use of controlled substances except as authorized by the Act itself, see\xcaGonzales\xcav. Raich,\xca545 U.S. 1, 13, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2203\xd02204, 162 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005)\xd1\xd2cannot function with its necessary rigor and comprehensiveness if subjected to judicial exemptions.\xd3\xcaBrief for Petitioners 18. According to the Government, there would be no way to cabin religious exceptions once recognized, and \xd2the public will misread\xd3 such exceptions as signaling that the substance at issue is not harmful after all.\xcaId.,\xcaat 23.\xcaUnder the Government's view, there is no need to assess the particulars of the UDV's use or weigh the impact of an exemption for that specific use, because the Controlled Substances Act serves a compelling purpose and simply admits of no exceptions. "
[664] "A "
[665] "RFRA, and the strict scrutiny test it adopted, contemplate an inquiry more focused than the Government's categorical approach. RFRA requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law \xd2to the person\xd3\xd1the particular\xca*431\xcaclaimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd01(b). RFRA expressly adopted the compelling interest test \xd2as set forth in\xcaSherbert v. Verner,\xca374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963)\xcaand\xcaWisconsin v. Yoder,\xca406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).\xd3ʤ 2000bb(b)(1). In each of those cases, this Court looked beyond broadly formulated interests justifying the general applicability of government mandates and scrutinized the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants. In\xcaYoder,\xcafor example, we permitted an exemption for Amish children from a compulsory school attendance law. We recognized that the State had a \xd2paramount\xd3 interest in education, but held that \xd2despite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote ... and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing\xcathe claimed Amish exemption.\xd3\xca406 U.S., at 213, 221, 92 S.Ct. 1526\xca(emphasis added). The Court explained that the State needed \xd2to show with more particularity how its\xca**1221\xcaadmittedly strong interest ... would be adversely affected by granting an exemption\xcato the Amish.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 236, 92 S.Ct. 1526\xca(emphasis added). "
[666] "In\xcaSherbert,\xcathe Court upheld a particular claim to a religious exemption from a state law denying unemployment benefits to those who would not work on Saturdays, but explained that it was not announcing a constitutional right to unemployment benefits for \xd2all\xcapersons whose religious convictions are the cause of their unemployment.\xd3\xca374 U.S., at 410, 83 S.Ct. 1790\xca(emphasis added). The Court distinguished the case \xd2in which an employee's religious convictions serve to make him a nonproductive member of society.\xd3\xcaIbid.;\xcasee also\xcaSmith,\xca494 U.S., at 899, 110 S.Ct. 1595\xca(O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment) (strict scrutiny \xd2at least requires a case-by-case determination of the question, sensitive to the facts of each particular claim\xd3). Outside the Free Exercise area as well, the Court has noted that \xd2[c]ontext matters\xd3 in applying the compelling interest test,\xcaGrutter v. Bollinger,\xca539 U.S. 306, 327, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003), and has\xca*432\xcaemphasized that \xd2strict scrutiny\xcadoes\xcatake \xd4relevant differences' into account\xd1indeed, that is its fundamental purpose,\xd3\xcaAdarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pe\x96a,\xca515 U.S. 200, 228, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995). "
[667] "B "
[668] "3Under the more focused inquiry required by RFRA and the compelling interest test, the Government's mere invocation of the general characteristics of Schedule I substances, as set forth in the Controlled Substances Act, cannot carry the day. It is true, of course, that Schedule I substances such as DMT are exceptionally dangerous.\xcaSee,\xcae.g.,\xcaTouby v. United States,\xca500 U.S. 160, 162, 111 S.Ct. 1752, 114 L.Ed.2d 219 (1991). Nevertheless, there is no indication that Congress, in classifying DMT, considered the harms posed by the particular use at issue here\xd1the circumscribed, sacramental use of\xcahoasca\xcaby the UDV. The question of the harms from the sacramental use of\xcahoasca\xcaby the UDV\xcawas\xcalitigated below. Before the District Court found that the Government had not carried its burden of showing a compelling interest in preventing such harms, the court noted that it could not \xd2ignore that the legislative branch of the government elected to place materials containing DMT in Schedule I of the [Act], reflecting findings that substances containing DMT have \xd4a high potential for abuse,\xd5 and \xd4no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United States,\xd5 and that \xd4[t]here is a lack of accepted safety for use of [DMT] under medical supervision.\xd5 \xd3\xca282 F.Supp.2d, at 1254.\xcaBut Congress' determination that DMT should be listed under Schedule I simply\xcadoes\xcanot provide a categorical answer that relieves the Government of the obligation to shoulder its burden under RFRA. "
[669] "This conclusion is reinforced by the Controlled Substances Act itself. The Act contains a provision authorizing the Attorney General to \xd2waive the requirement for registration of certain manufacturers, distributors, or dispensers if he finds it consistent with the public health and safety.\xd3\xca21 U.S.C. \xa4 822(d). The fact that the Act itself contemplates that exempting\xca*433\xcacertain people from its requirements would be \xd2consistent with the public health and safety\xd3 indicates that congressional findings with respect to Schedule I substances should not carry the determinative weight, for RFRA purposes, that the Government would ascribe to them. "
[670] "And in fact an exception has been made to the Schedule I ban for religious use.\xca**1222\xcaFor the past 35 years, there has been a regulatory exemption for use of peyote\xd1a Schedule I substance\xd1by the Native American Church. See\xca21 CFR \xa4 1307.31 (2005). In 1994, Congress extended that exemption to all members of every recognized Indian Tribe. See\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4 1996a(b)(1). Everything the Government says about the DMT in\xcahoasca\xd1that, as a Schedule I substance, Congress has determined that it \xd2has a high potential for abuse,\xd3 \xd2has no currently accepted medical use,\xd3 and has \xd2a lack of accepted safety for use ... under medical supervision,\xd3\xca21 U.S.C. \xa4 812(b)(1)\xd1applies in equal measure to the mescaline in peyote, yet both the Executive and Congress itself have decreed an exception from the Controlled Substances Act for Native American religious use of peyote. If such use is permitted in the face of the congressional findings inʤ 812(b)(1)\xcafor hundreds of thousands of Native Americans practicing their faith, it is difficult to see how those same findings alone can preclude any consideration of a similar exception for the 130 or so American members of the UDV who want to practice theirs. See\xcaChurch of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah,\xca508 U.S. 520, 547, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993)\xca(\xd2It is established in our strict scrutiny jurisprudence that \xd4a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest \xd2of the highest order\xd3 ... when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly vital interest unprohibited\xd5 \xd3 (quoting\xcaFlorida Star v. B.J. F.,\xca491 U.S. 524, 541\xd0542, 109 S.Ct. 2603, 105 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989)\xca(SCALIA, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment))). "
[671] "The Government responds that there is a \xd2unique relationship\xd3 between the United States and the Tribes, Brief for Petitioners 27; see\xcaMorton v. Mancari,\xca417 U.S. 535, 94 S.Ct. 2474, 41 L.Ed.2d 290 (1974),\xca*434\xcabut never explains what about that \xd2unique\xd3 relationship justifies overriding the same congressional findings on which the Government relies in resisting any exception for the UDV's religious use of\xcahoasca.\xcaIn other words, if any Schedule I substance is in fact\xcaalways\xcahighly dangerous in any amount no matter how used, what about the unique relationship with the Tribes justifies allowing their use of peyote? Nothing about the unique political status of the Tribes makes their members immune from the health risks the Government asserts accompany any use of a Schedule I substance, nor insulates the Schedule I substance the Tribes use in religious exercise from the alleged risk of diversion. "
[672] "The Government argues that the existence of a\xcacongressional\xcaexemption for peyote\xcadoes\xcanot indicate that the Controlled Substances Act is amenable to\xcajudicially crafted\xcaexceptions. RFRA, however, plainly contemplates that\xcacourts\xcawould recognize exceptions\xd1that is how the law works. See\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd01(c)\xca(\xd2A person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate relief against a government\xd3). Congress' role in the peyote exemption\xd1and the Executive's, see\xca21 CFR \xa4 1307.31\xca(2005)\xd1confirms that the findings in the Controlled Substances Act\xcado\xcanot preclude exceptions altogether; RFRA makes clear that it is the obligation of the courts to consider whether exceptions are required under the test set forth by Congress. "
[673] "C "
[674] "The well-established peyote exception also fatally undermines the Government's broader contention that the Controlled Substances Act establishes a closed regulatory system that admits of no exceptions under RFRA. The Government argues that the effectiveness of the Controlled\xca**1223\xcaSubstances Act will be \xd2necessarily ... undercut\xd3 if the Act is not uniformly applied, without regard to burdens on religious exercise. Brief for Petitioners 18. The peyote exception,\xca*435\xcahowever, has been in place since the outset of the Controlled Substances Act, and there is no evidence that it has \xd2undercut\xd3 the Government's ability to enforce the ban on peyote use by non-Indians. "
[675] "The Government points to some pre-Smith\xcacases relying on a need for uniformity in rejecting claims for religious exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause, see Brief for Petitioners 16, but those cases strike us as quite different from the present one. Those cases\xcadid\xcanot embrace the notion that a general interest in uniformity justified a substantial burden on religious exercise; they instead scrutinized the asserted need and explained why the denied exemptions could not be accommodated. In\xcaUnited States v. Lee,\xca455 U.S. 252, 102 S.Ct. 1051, 71 L.Ed.2d 127 (1982), for example, the Court rejected a claimed exception to the obligation to pay Social Security taxes, noting that \xd2mandatory participation is indispensable to the fiscal vitality of the social security system\xd3 and that the \xd2tax system could not function if denominations were allowed to challenge the tax system because tax payments were spent in a manner that violates their religious belief.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 258, 260, 102 S.Ct. 1051.\xcaSee also\xcaHernandez v. Commissioner,\xca490 U.S. 680, 700, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989)\xca(same). In\xcaBraunfeld v. Brown,\xca366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961)\xca(plurality opinion), the Court denied a claimed exception to Sunday closing laws, in part because allowing such exceptions\xca\xd2might well provide [the claimants] with an economic advantage over their competitors who must remain closed on that day.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 608\xd0609, 81 S.Ct. 1144.\xcaThe whole point of a \xd2uniform day of rest for all workers\xd3 would have been defeated by exceptions. See\xcaSherbert,\xca374 U.S., at 408, 83 S.Ct. 1790\xca(discussing\xcaBraunfeld).\xcaThese cases show that the Government can demonstrate a compelling interest in uniform application of a particular program by offering evidence that granting the requested religious accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to administer the program. "
[676] "Here the Government's argument for uniformity is different; it rests not so much on the particular statutory program at issue as on slippery-slope concerns that could be invoked\xca*436\xcain response to any RFRA claim for an exception to a generally applicable law. The Government's argument echoes the classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions. But RFRA operates by mandating consideration, under the compelling interest test, of exceptions to \xd2rule[s] of general applicability.\xd3\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb\xd01(a). Congress determined that the legislated test \xd2is a workable test for striking sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.\xd3ʤ 2000bb(a)(5). This determination finds support in our cases; in\xcaSherbert,\xcafor example, we rejected a slippery-slope argument similar to the one offered in this case, dismissing as \xd2no more than a possibility\xd3 the State's speculation \xd2that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work\xd3 would drain the unemployment benefits fund.\xca374 U.S., at 407, 83 S.Ct. 1790. "
[677] "We reaffirmed just last Term the feasibility of case-by-case consideration of religious exemptions to generally applicable rules. In\xcaCutter v. Wilkinson,\xca544 U.S. 709, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005), we held that the Religious Land\xca**1224\xcaUse and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, which allows federal and state prisoners to seek religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA,\xcadoes\xcanot violate the Establishment Clause. We had \xd2no cause to believe\xd3 that the compelling interest test \xd2would not be applied in an appropriately balanced way\xd3 to specific claims for exemptions as they arose.\xcaId.,\xcaat 2122\xd02123.\xcaNothing in our opinion suggested that courts were not up to the task. "
[678] "We\xcado\xcanot doubt that there may be instances in which a need for uniformity precludes the recognition of exceptions to generally applicable laws under RFRA. But it would have been surprising to find that this was such a case, given the longstanding exemption from the Controlled Substances Act for religious use of peyote, and the fact that the very reason Congress enacted RFRA was to respond to a decision\xca*437\xcadenying a claimed right to sacramental use of a controlled substance. See\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb(a)(4). And in fact the Government has not offered evidence demonstrating that granting the UDV an exemption would cause the kind of administrative harm recognized as a compelling interest in\xcaLee,\xcaHernandez,\xcaand\xcaBraunfeld.\xcaThe Government failed to convince the District Court at the preliminary injunction hearing that health or diversion concerns provide a compelling interest in banning the UDV's sacramental use of\xcahoasca. It cannot compensate for that failure now with the bold argument that there can be no RFRA exceptions at all to the Controlled Substances Act.\xcaSee Tr. of Oral Arg. 17 (Deputy Solicitor General statement that exception could not be made even for \xd2rigorously policed\xd3 use of \xd2one drop\xd3 of substance \xd2once a year\xd3). "
[679] "IV "
[680] "Before the District Court, the Government also asserted an interest in compliance with the 1971 United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances,\xcaFeb. 21, 1971, [1979\xd01980] 32 U.S.T. 543, T.I.A.S. No. 9725. The Convention, signed by the United States and implemented by the Controlled Substances Act, calls on signatories to prohibit the use of hallucinogens, including DMT. The Government argues that it has a compelling interest in meeting its international obligations by complying with the Convention. "
[681] "The District Court rejected this interest because it found that the Convention\xcadoes\xcanot cover\xcahoasca. The court relied on the official commentary to the Convention, which notes that \xd2Schedule I [of the Convention]\xcadoes\xcanot list ... natural hallucinogenic materials,\xd3 and that \xd2[p]lants as such are not, and\xd1it is submitted\xd1are also not likely to be, listed in Schedule I, but only some products obtained from plants.\xd3 U.N. Commentary on the Convention on Psychotropic Substances 387, 385 (1976). The court reasoned that\xcahoasca,\xcalike the plants from which the tea is made, is sufficiently distinct from\xcaDMT itself to fall outside the treaty. See 282 F.Supp.2d, at 1266\xd01269. "
[682] "4*438\xcaWe\xcado\xcanot agree. The Convention provides that \xd2a preparation is subject to the same measures of control as the psychotropic substance which it contains,\xd3 and defines \xd2preparation\xd3 as \xd2any solution or mixture, in whatever physical state, containing one or more psychotropic substances.\xd3 See\xca32 U.S. T., at 546, Art. 1(f)(i);\xcaid.,\xcaat 551, Art. 3.\xcaHoasca\xcais a \xd2solution or mixture\xd3 containing DMT; the fact that it is made by the simple process of brewing plants in water, as opposed to some more advanced method,\xcadoes\xcanot change that. To the extent the commentary suggests plants themselves are not covered by the Convention, that is of no moment\xd1the UDV seeks to import and\xca**1225\xcause a tea brewed from plants, not the plants themselves, and the tea plainly qualifies as a \xd2preparation\xd3 under the Convention. "
[683] "5The fact that\xcahoasca\xcais covered by the Convention, however,\xcadoes\xcanot automatically mean that the Government has demonstrated a compelling interest in applying the Controlled Substances Act, which implements the Convention, to the UDV's sacramental use of the tea. At the present stage, it suffices to observe that the Government\xcadid\xcanot even\xcasubmit\xcaevidence addressing the international consequences of granting an exemption for the UDV. The Government simply submitted two affidavits by State Department officials attesting to the general importance of honoring international obligations and of maintaining the leadership position of the United States in the international war on drugs. See Declaration of Gary T. Sheridan (Jan. 24, 2001), App. G to App. to Pet. for Cert. 261a; Declaration of Robert E. Dalton (Jan. 24, 2001), App. H,\xcaid.,\xcaat 265a. We\xcado\xcanot doubt the validity of these interests, any more than we doubt the general interest in promoting public health and safety by enforcing the Controlled Substances Act, but under RFRA invocation of such general interests, standing alone, is not enough.2 "
[684] "*439\xca* * * "
[685] "The Government repeatedly invokes Congress' findings and purposes underlying the Controlled Substances Act, but Congress had a reason for enacting RFRA, too. Congress recognized that \xd2laws \xd4neutral\xd5 toward religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to interfere with religious exercise,\xd3\xcaand legislated \xd2the compelling interest test\xd3 as the means for the courts to \xd2strik[e] sensible balances between religious liberty and competing prior governmental interests.\xd3\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4\xa4 2000bb(a)(2), (5). "
[686] "We have no cause to pretend that the task assigned by Congress to the courts under RFRA is an easy one. Indeed, the very sort of difficulties highlighted by the Government here were cited by this Court in deciding that the approach later mandated by Congress under RFRA was not required as a matter of constitutional law under the Free Exercise Clause. See\xcaSmith,\xca494 U.S., at 885\xd0890, 110 S.Ct. 1595.\xcaBut Congress has determined that courts should strike sensible balances, pursuant to a compelling interest test that requires the Government to address the particular practice at issue. Applying that test, we conclude that the courts below\xcadid\xcanot err in determining that the Government failed to demonstrate, at the preliminary injunction stage, a compelling interest in barring the UDV's sacramental use of\xcahoasca. "
[687] "The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit is affirmed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. "
[688] "It is so ordered. "
[689] "JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[690] "The question presented for review is whether a State, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, may require a religious organization desiring to distribute and sell religious literature and to solicit donations at a state fair to conduct those activities only at an assigned location within the fairgrounds even though application of the rule limits the religious practices of the organization. "
[691] "*643 I "
[692] "Each year, the Minnesota Agricultural Society (Society), a public corporation organized under the laws of Minnesota, see Minn.Stat. \xa4 37.01 (1980), operates a State Fair on a 125\xd0acre state-owned tract located in St. Paul, Minn.1 The Fair is conducted for the purpose of \xd2exhibiting ... the agricultural, stock-breeding, horticultural, mining, mechanical, industrial, and other products and resources of the state, including proper exhibits and expositions of the arts, human skills, and sciences.\xd3 Ibid. The Fair is a major public event and attracts visitors from all over Minnesota as well as from other parts of the country. During the past five years, the average total attendance for the 12\xd0day Fair has been 1,320,000 persons. The average daily attendance on weekdays has been 115,000 persons and on Saturdays and Sundays 160,000. "
[693] "The Society is authorized to make all \xd2bylaws, ordinances, and rules, not inconsistent with law, which it may deem necessary or proper for the government of the fair grounds....\xd3 **2562 Minn.Stat. \xa4 37.16 (1980). Under this authority, the Society promulgated Minnesota State Fair Rule 6.05 which provides in relevant part that "
[694] "\xd2[s]ale or distribution of any merchandise, including printed or written material except under license issued [by] the Society and/or from a duly-licensed location shall be a misdemeanor.\xd3 "
[695] "As Rule 6.05 is construed and applied by the Society, \xd2all persons, groups or firms which desire to sell, exhibit or distribute materials during the annual State Fair must do so only from fixed locations on the fairgrounds.\xd32 Although the Rule does not prevent organizational representatives from walking about the fairgrounds and communicating the organization's *644 views with fair patrons in face-to-face discussions,3 it does require that any exhibitor conduct its sales, distribution, and fund solicitation operations from a booth rented from the Society. Space in the fairgrounds is rented to all comers in a nondiscriminatory fashion on a first-come, first-served basis with the rental charge based on the size and location of the booth.4 The Rule applies alike to nonprofit, charitable, and commercial enterprises.5 "
[696] "One day prior to the opening of the 1977 Minnesota State Fair, respondents International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. (ISKCON), an international religious society espousing the views of the Krishna religion, and Joseph Beca, head of the Minneapolis ISKCON temple, filed suit against numerous state officials seeking a declaration that Rule 6.05, both on its face and as applied, violated respondents' rights under the First Amendment, and seeking injunctive relief *645 prohibiting enforcement of the Rule against ISKCON and its members. Specifically, ISKCON asserted that the Rule would suppress the practice of Sankirtan, one of its religious rituals, which enjoins its members to go into public places to distribute or sell religious literature and to solicit donations for the support of the Krishna religion.6 The trial court entered temporary orders to govern the conduct of the parties during the 1977 Fair.7 When **2563 that event concluded and after a hearing, the trial court granted the state officials' motion for summary judgment, upholding the constitutionality of Rule 6.05. Relying on the reasoning in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Evans, 440 F.Supp. 414 (SD Ohio 1977), the court found that the State's interest \xd2in providing all fair goers and concessionaries with adequate and equal access to each other and in providing a minimum of *646 congestion on the fairgrounds\xd3 was sufficient to sustain Rule 6.05's limitations as applied to respondents.8 The court, however, provided that respondents were free to \xd2[r]oam throughout those areas of the fairgrounds generally open to the public for the purpose of discussing with others their religious beliefs.\xd3 "
[697] "On appeal, the Minnesota Supreme Court reversed, holding that Rule 6.05, as applied to respondents, unconstitutionally restricted the Krishnas' religious practice of Sankirtan. 299 N.W.2d 79 (1980). The court rejected the Society's proffered justifications for the Rule as inadequate to warrant the restriction. Furthermore, the application of Rule 6.05 to ISKCON was not essential to the furtherance of the State's interests in that those interests could be served by means less restrictive of respondents' First Amendment rights. We granted the state officials' petition for writ of certiorari in light of the important constitutional issues presented and the conflicting results reached in similar cases in various lower courts.9 449 U.S. 1109, 101 S.Ct. 917, 66 L.Ed.2d 838. "
[698] "*647 II "
[699] "The State does not dispute that the oral and written dissemination of the Krishnas' religious views and doctrines is protected by the First Amendment. See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160, 162\xd0164, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 151\xd0152, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452, 58 S.Ct. 666, 669, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). Nor does it claim that this protection is lost because the written materials sought to be distributed are sold rather than given away or because contributions or gifts are solicited in the course of propagating the faith. Our cases indicate as much. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 111, 63 S.Ct. 870, 874, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943); **2564 Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 632, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980). See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). "
[700] "1It is also common ground, however, that the First Amendment does not guarantee the right to communicate one's views at all times and places or in any manner that may be desired. Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47\xd048, 87 S.Ct. 242, 247, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405, 73 S.Ct. 760, 766, 97 L.Ed. 1105 (1953); see Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554, 85 S.Ct. 453, 464, 13 L.Ed.2d 471 (1965). As the Minnesota Supreme Court recognized, the activities of ISKCON, like those of others protected by the First Amendment, are subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, supra; Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 69 S.Ct. 448, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 61 S.Ct. 762, 85 L.Ed. 1049 (1941).10 \xd2We have often approved *648 restrictions of that kind provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the information.\xd3 Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771, 96 S.Ct. 1817, 1830, 48 L.Ed.2d 346 (1976); see also Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 535, 100 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 65 L.Ed.2d 319 (1980). The issue here, as it was below, is whether Rule 6.05 is a permissible restriction on the place and manner of communicating the views of the Krishna religion, more specifically, whether the Society may require the members of ISKCON who desire to practice Sankirtan at the State Fair to confine their distribution, sales, and solicitation activities to a fixed location. "
[701] "2A major criterion for a valid time, place and manner restriction is that the restriction \xd2may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.\xd3 Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm'n, supra, at 536, 100 S.Ct., at 2332.11 Rule 6.05 *649 qualifies in this respect, since as the Supreme Court of Minnesota observed, the Rule applies evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written materials or to solicit funds. No person or organization, whether commercial or charitable, is permitted to engage in such activities except from a booth rented for those purposes.12 "
[702] "**2565 Nor does Rule 6.05 suffer from the more covert forms of discrimination that may result when arbitrary discretion is vested in some governmental authority. The method of allocating space is a straightforward first-come, first-served system. The Rule is not open to the kind of arbitrary application that this Court has condemned as inherently inconsistent with a valid time, place, and manner regulation because such discretion has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view. See Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150\xd0153, 89 S.Ct. 935, 938\xd0940, 22 L.Ed.2d 162 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, supra, at 555\xd0558, 85 S.Ct., at 464\xd0466; Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321\xd0325, 78 S.Ct. 277, 281\xd0284, 2 L.Ed.2d 302 (1958); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418, 63 S.Ct. 667, 87 L.Ed. 873 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, at 304, 60 S.Ct., at 903; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S., at 164, 60 S.Ct., at 152; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516, 59 S.Ct. 954, 964, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939). "
[703] "A valid time, place, and manner regulation must also \xd2serve a significant governmental interest.\xd3 Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, supra, at 771, 96 S.Ct., at 1830. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 108, 92 S.Ct., at 2298. Here, the principal justification asserted by the State in support of Rule 6.05 is the need to maintain the orderly movement of *650 the crowd given the large number of exhibitors and persons attending the Fair.13 "
[704] "The fairgrounds comprise a relatively small area of 125 acres, the bulk of which is covered by permanent buildings, temporary structures, parking lots, and connecting thoroughfares. There were some 1,400 exhibitors and concessionaires renting space for the 1977 and 1978 Fairs, chiefly in permanent and temporary buildings. The Fair is designed to exhibit to the public an enormous variety of goods, services, entertainment, and other matters of interest. This is accomplished by confining individual exhibitors to fixed locations, with the public moving to and among the booths or other attractions, using streets and open spaces provided for that purpose. Because the Fair attracts large crowds, see supra, at 2561, it is apparent that the State's interest in the orderly movement and control of such an assembly of persons is a substantial consideration. "
[705] "As a general matter, it is clear that a State's interest in protecting the \xd2safety and convenience\xd3 of persons using a public forum is a valid governmental objective. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S., at 115, 92 S.Ct., at 2302; Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S., at 574, 61 S.Ct., at 765. Furthermore, consideration of a forum's special attributes is relevant to the constitutionality of a regulation since the significance of the governmental *651 interest must be assessed in light of the characteristic nature and function of the particular forum involved. See, e. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, at 116\xd0117, 92 S.Ct., at 2303; Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302\xd0303, 94 S.Ct. 2714, 2716\xd02717, 41 L.Ed.2d 770 (1974). This observation bears particular import in the present case since respondents make a number of analogies between the fairgrounds and city **2566 streets which have \xd2immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and ... have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.\xd3 Hague v. CIO, supra, at 515, 59 S.Ct., at 963. See Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 293, 71 S.Ct. 312, 314, 95 L.Ed. 280 (1951). But it is clear that there are significant differences between a street and the fairgrounds. A street is continually open, often uncongested, and constitutes not only a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of a locality's citizens, but also a place where people may enjoy the open air or the company of friends and neighbors in a relaxed environment. The Minnesota Fair, as described above, is a temporary event attracting great numbers of visitors who come to the event for a short period to see and experience the host of exhibits and attractions at the Fair. The flow of the crowd and demands of safety are more pressing in the context of the Fair. As such, any comparisons to public streets are necessarily inexact. "
[706] "The Minnesota Supreme Court recognized that the State's interest in the orderly movement of a large crowd and in avoiding congestion was substantial and that Rule 6.05 furthered that interest significantly.14 Nevertheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared that the case did not turn on the \xd2importance of the state's undeniable interest in preventing *652 the widespread disorder that would surely exist if no regulation such as Rule 6.05 were in effect\xd3 but upon the significance of the State's interest in avoiding whatever disorder would likely result from granting members of ISKCON an exemption from the Rule. 299 N.W.2d, at 83. Approaching the case in this way, the court concluded that although some disruption would occur from such an exemption, it was not of sufficient concern to warrant confining the Krishnas to a booth. The court also concluded that, in any event, the Rule was not essential to the furtherance of the State's interest in crowd control, which could adequately be served by less intrusive means. "
[707] "As we see it, the Minnesota Supreme Court took too narrow a view of the State's interest in avoiding congestion and maintaining the orderly movement of fair patrons on the fairgrounds. The justification for the Rule should not be measured by the disorder that would result from granting an exemption solely to ISKCON. That organization and its ritual of Sankirtan have no special claim to First Amendment protection as compared to that of other religions who also distribute literature and solicit funds.15 None of our cases suggest that the inclusion of peripatetic solicitation as part of a church ritual entitles church members to solicitation rights in a public forum superior to those of members of other religious groups that raise money but do not purport to ritualize the process. Nor for present purposes do religious organizations enjoy rights to communicate, distribute, and solicit on the fairgrounds superior to those of other organizations having social, political, or other ideological messages to *653 proselytize. These nonreligious organizations seeking support for their activities are entitled to rights equal to those of religious groups to enter a public forum and spread their views, whether by soliciting funds or by distributing literature. "
[708] "If Rule 6.05 is an invalid restriction on the activities of ISKCON, it is no more valid with respect to the other social, political, or charitable organizations that have **2567 rented booths at the Fair and confined their distribution, sale, and fund solicitation to those locations. Nor would it be valid with respect to other organizations that did not rent booths, either because they were unavailable due to a lack of space or because they chose to avoid the expense involved, but that would in all probability appear in the fairgrounds to distribute, sell, and solicit if they could freely do so. The question would also inevitably arise as to what extent the First Amendment also gives commercial organizations a right to move among the crowd to distribute information about or to sell their wares as respondents claim they may do. "
[709] "ISKCON desires to proselytize at the fair because it believes it can successfully communicate and raise funds. In its view, this can be done only by intercepting fair patrons as they move about, and if success is achieved, stopping them momentarily or for longer periods as money is given or exchanged for literature. This consequence would be multiplied many times over if Rule 6.05 could not be applied to confine such transactions by ISKCON and others to fixed locations. Indeed, the court below agreed that without Rule 6.05 there would be widespread disorder at the fairgrounds. The court also recognized that some disorder would inevitably result from exempting the Krishnas from the Rule. Obviously, there would be a much larger threat to the State's interest in crowd control if all other religious, nonreligious, and noncommercial organizations could likewise move freely about the fairgrounds distributing and selling literature and soliciting funds at will. "
[710] "3*654 Given these considerations, we hold that the State's interest in confining distribution, selling, and fund solicitation activities to fixed locations is sufficient to satisfy the requirement that a place or manner restriction must serve a substantial state interest. By focusing on the incidental effect of providing an exemption from Rule 6.05 to ISKCON, the Minnesota Supreme Court did not take into account the fact that any such exemption cannot be meaningfully limited to ISKCON, and as applied to similarly situated groups would prevent the State from furthering its important concern with managing the flow of the crowd. In our view, the Society may apply its Rule and confine the type of transactions at issue to designated locations without violating the First Amendment. "
[711] "For similar reasons, we cannot agree with the Minnesota Supreme Court that Rule 6.05 is an unnecessary regulation because the State could avoid the threat to its interest posed by ISKCON by less restrictive means, such as penalizing disorder or disruption, limiting the number of solicitors, or putting more narrowly drawn restrictions on the location and movement of ISKCON's representatives. As we have indicated, the inquiry must involve not only ISKCON, but also all other organizations that would be entitled to distribute, sell, or solicit if the booth rule may not be enforced with respect to ISKCON. Looked at in this way, it is quite improbable that the alternative means suggested by the Minnesota Supreme Court would deal adequately with the problems posed by the much larger number of distributors and solicitors that would be present on the fairgrounds if the judgment below were affirmed. "
[712] "For Rule 6.05 to be valid as a place and manner restriction, it must also be sufficiently clear that alternative forums for the expression of respondents' protected speech exist despite the effects of the Rule. Rule 6.05 is not vulnerable on this ground. First, the Rule does not prevent ISKCON from *655 practicing Sankirtan anywhere outside the fairgrounds. More importantly, the Rule has not been shown to deny access within the forum in question. Here, the Rule does not exclude ISKCON from the fairgrounds, nor does it deny that organization the right to conduct any desired activity at some point within the forum. Its members may mingle with the crowd and orally propagate their views. The organization may also arrange for a booth and distribute and sell literature and solicit funds from that location on the fairgrounds itself. The Minnesota State Fair is a limited public forum in **2568 that it exists to provide a means for a great number of exhibitors temporarily to present their products or views, be they commercial, religious, or political, to a large number of people in an efficient fashion. Considering the limited functions of the Fair and the combined area within which it operates, we are unwilling to say that Rule 6.05 does not provide ISKCON and other organizations with an adequate means to sell and solicit on the fairgrounds. The First Amendment protects the right of every citizen to \xd2reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be opportunity to win their attention.\xd3 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87, 69 S.Ct. 448, 453, 93 L.Ed. 513 (1949). Rule 6.05 does not unnecessarily limit that right within the fairgrounds.16 "
[713] "*656 The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. "
[714] "So ordered. "
[715] "Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[716] "Appellant's employer discharged her when she refused to work certain scheduled hours because of sincerely held religious convictions adopted after beginning employment. The question to be decided is whether Florida's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to appellant violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment of the Constitution, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.1 "
[717] "*138 I "
[718] "Lawton and Company (Lawton), a Florida jeweler, hired appellant Paula Hobbie in October 1981. She was employed by Lawton for 2 ? years, first as a trainee and then as assistant manager of a retail jewelry store. In April 1984, Hobbie informed her immediate supervisor that she was to be baptized into the Seventh-day Adventist Church and that, for religious reasons, she would no longer be able to work on her Sabbath, from sundown on Friday to sundown on Saturday.2 The supervisor devised an arrangement with Hobbie: she **1048 agreed to work evenings and Sundays, and he agreed to substitute for her whenever she was scheduled to work on a Friday evening or a Saturday. "
[719] "This arrangement continued until the general manager of Lawton learned of it in June 1984. At that time, after a meeting with Hobbie and her minister, the general manager informed appellant that she could either work her scheduled shifts or submit her resignation to the company. When Hobbie refused to do either, Lawton discharged her. "
[720] "On June 4, 1984, appellant filed a claim for unemployment compensation with the Florida Department of Labor and Employment Security. Under Florida law, unemployment compensation benefits are available to persons who become \xd2unemployed through no fault of their own.\xd3 Fla.Stat. \xa4 443.021 (1985). Lawton contested the payment of benefits on the ground that Hobbie was \xd2disqualified for benefits\xd3 because she had been discharged for \xd2misconduct connected with [her] work.\xd3 \xa4 443.101(1)(a).3 "
[721] "*139 A claims examiner for the Bureau of Unemployment Compensation denied Hobbie's claim for benefits, and she appealed that determination. Following a hearing before a referee, the Unemployment Appeals Commission (Appeals Commission) affirmed the denial of benefits, agreeing that Hobbie's refusal to work scheduled shifts constituted \xd2misconduct connected with [her] work.\xd3 App. 3. "
[722] "Hobbie challenged the Appeals Commission's order in the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal. On September 10, 1985, that court summarily affirmed the Appeals Commission.4 We postponed jurisdiction, 475 U.S. 1117, 106 S.Ct. 1633, 90 L.Ed.2d 179 (1985), and we now reverse.5 "
[723] "II "
[724] "1Under our precedents, the Appeals Commission's disqualification of appellant from receipt of benefits violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, applicable to the *140 States through the Fourteenth Amendment.6 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). In Sherbert we considered South Carolina's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a Sabbatarian who, like Hobbie, refused to work on Saturdays. **1049 The Court held that the State's disqualification of Sherbert "
[725] "\xd2force[d] her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against [her] for her Saturday worship.\xd3 374 U.S., at 404, 83 S.Ct. at 1794. "
[726] "We concluded that the State had imposed a burden upon Sherbert's free exercise rights that had not been justified by a compelling state interest. "
[727] "In Thomas, too, the Court held that a State's denial of unemployment benefits unlawfully burdened an employee's right to free exercise of religion. Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness, held religious beliefs that forbade his participation in the production of armaments. He was forced to leave his job when the employer closed his department and transferred him to a division that fabricated turrets for tanks. Indiana then denied Thomas unemployment compensation benefits. The Court found that the employee had been \xd2put to a choice between fidelity to religious belief or cessation of work\xd3 and that the coercive impact of the forfeiture of benefits in this situation was undeniable: "
[728] "\xd2 \xd4Not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of *141 y(3)27 religion, but the pressure upon [the employee] to forego that practice is unmistakable.\xd5 \xd3 Thomas, supra, at 717, 101 S.Ct., at 1431 (quoting Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S., at 404, 83 S.Ct., at 1794). "
[729] "We see no meaningful distinction among the situations of Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie. We again affirm, as stated in Thomas: "
[730] "\xd2Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.\xd3 450 U.S. at 717\xd0718, 101 S.Ct., at 1431\xd01432 (emphasis added). "
[731] "2Both Sherbert and Thomas held that such infringements must be subjected to strict scrutiny and could be justified only by proof by the State of a compelling interest. The Appeals Commission does not seriously contend that its denial of benefits can withstand strict scrutiny; rather it urges that we hold that its justification should be determined under the less rigorous standard articulated in Chief Justice Burger's opinion in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 707\xd0708, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 2156, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986): \xd2[The Government meets its burden when it demonstrates that a challenged requirement for governmental benefits, neutral and uniform in its application, is a reasonable means of promoting a legitimate public interest.\xd3 Five Justices expressly rejected this argument in Roy. See id., at 715\xd0716, 106 S.Ct. at 2160 (BLACKMUN, J., concurring in part); id., at 728, 106 S.Ct., at 2167 (O'CONNOR, J., joined by BRENNAN and MARSHALL, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id., at 733, 106 S.Ct., at 2169 (WHITE, J., dissenting). We reject the argument again today. As Justice O'CONNOR pointed out in Roy, \xd2[s]uch a test has no basis in precedent and relegates a serious First Amendment value to the barest level of minimal scrutiny that the Equal Protection *142 Clause already provides.\xd3 Id., at 727, 106 S.Ct. at 2166. See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (\xd2[O]nly those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion\xd3).7 "
[732] "**1050 3The Appeals Commission also suggests two grounds upon which we might distinguish Sherbert and Thomas from the present case. First, the Appeals Commission points out that in Sherbert the employee was deemed completely ineligible for benefits under South Carolina's unemployment insurance scheme because she would not accept work that conflicted with her Sabbath. The Appeals Commission contends that, *143 under Florida law, Hobbie faces only a limited disqualification from receipt of benefits,8 and that once this fixed term has been served, she will again \xd2be on an equal footing with all other workers, provided she avoids employment that conflicts with her religious beliefs.\xd3 Brief for Appellee Appeals Comm'n 12. The Appeals Commission argues that such a disqualification provision is less coercive than the ineligibility determination in Sherbert, and that the burden it imposes on free exercise is therefore permissible. "
[733] "This distinction is without substance. The immediate effects of ineligibility and disqualification are identical, and the disqualification penalty is substantial. Moreover, Sherbert was given controlling weight in Thomas, which involved a disqualification provision similar in all relevant respects to the statutory section implicated here. See Thomas, 450 U.S., at 709\xd0710, n. 1, 101 S.Ct., at 1427\xd01428, n. 1. "
[734] "4The Appeals Commission also attempts to distinguish this case by arguing that, unlike the employees in Sherbert and Thomas, Hobbie was the \xd2agent of change\xd3 and is therefore responsible for the consequences of the conflict between her job and her religious beliefs. In Sherbert and Thomas, the employees held their respective religious beliefs at the time of hire; subsequent changes in the conditions of employment made by the employer caused the conflict between work and belief. In this case, Hobbie's beliefs changed during the course of her employment, creating a conflict between job and faith that had not previously existed. The Appeals Commission contends that \xd2it is ... unfair for an employee to *144 adopt religious beliefs that conflict with existing employment and expect to continue the employment without compromising those beliefs\xd3 and that this \xd2intentional disregard of the employer's **1051 interests ... constitutes misconduct.\xd3 Brief for Appellee Appeals Commission 20\xd021. "
[735] "In effect, the Appeals Commission asks us to single out the religious convert for different, less favorable treatment than that given an individual whose adherence to his or her faith precedes employment. We decline to do so. The First Amendment protects the free exercise rights of employees who adopt religious beliefs or convert from one faith to another after they are hired.9 The timing of Hobbie's conversion is immaterial to our determination that her free exercise rights have been burdened; the salient inquiry under the Free Exercise Clause is the burden involved. In Sherbert, Thomas, and the present case, the employee was forced to choose between fidelity to religious belief and continued employment; the forfeiture of unemployment benefits for choosing the former over the latter brings unlawful coercion to bear on the employee's choice. "
[736] "5Finally, we reject the Appeals Commission's argument that the awarding of benefits to Hobbie would violate the Establishment Clause. This Court has long recognized that the government may (and sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may do so without violating the *145 Establishment Clause.10 See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (judicial exemption of Amish children from compulsory attendance at high school); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970) (tax exemption for churches). As in Sherbert, the accommodation at issue here does not entangle the State in an unlawful fostering of religion: "
[737] "\xd2In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the \xd4establishment\xd5 of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshipers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent the involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.\xd3 374 U.S., at 409, 83 S.Ct., at 1796.11 "
[738] "*146 **1052 III "
[739] "We conclude that Florida's refusal to award unemployment compensation benefits to appellant violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Here, as in Sherbert and Thomas, the State may not force an employee \xd2to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, ... and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work.\xd3 Sherbert, 374 U.S., at 404, 83 S.Ct., at 1794. The judgment of the Florida Fifth District Court of Appeal is therefore "
[740] "Reversed. "
[741] "Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[742] "*355 Petitioner Gregory Holt, also known as Abdul Maalik Muhammad, is an Arkansas inmate and a devout Muslim who wishes to grow a ?\xd0inch beard in accordance with his religious *356 beliefs. Petitioner's objection to shaving his beard clashes with the Arkansas Department of Correction's grooming policy, which prohibits inmates from growing beards unless they have a particular dermatological condition. We hold that the Department's policy, as applied in this case, violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 114 Stat. 803, 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000cc et seq., which prohibits a state or local government from taking any action that substantially burdens the religious exercise of an institutionalized person unless the government demonstrates that the action constitutes the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. "
[743] "We conclude in this case that the Department's policy substantially burdens petitioner's religious exercise. Although we do not question the importance of the Department's interests in stopping the flow of contraband and facilitating prisoner identification, we do doubt whether the prohibition against petitioner's beard furthers its compelling interest about contraband. And we conclude that the Department has failed to show that its policy is the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interests. We thus reverse the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. "
[744] "I "
[745] "A "
[746] "1Congress enacted RLUIPA and its sister statute, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 107 Stat. 1488, 42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000bb et seq., \xd2in order to provide very broad protection for religious liberty.\xd3 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 693, 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2760, 189 L.Ed.2d 675 (2014). RFRA was enacted three years after our decision in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), which held that neutral, generally applicable laws that incidentally burden the exercise of religion usually do *357 not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Id., at 878\xd0882, 110 S.Ct. 1595. Smith largely repudiated the method of analysis used in prior free exercise cases like Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). In those cases, we employed a balancing test that considered whether a challenged government action that substantially burdened the exercise of religion was necessary to further a compelling state interest. See Yoder, supra, at 214, 219, 92 S.Ct. 1526; Sherbert, supra, at 403, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790. "
[747] "2Following our decision in Smith, Congress enacted RFRA in order to provide **860 greater protection for religious exercise than is available under the First Amendment. See Hobby Lobby, supra, at 694, 695, 134 S.Ct., at 2760\xd02761. RFRA provides that \xd2[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,\xd3 unless the government \xd2demonstrates that application of the burden to the person\xd1(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.\xd3 42 U.S.C. \xa4\xa4 2000bb\xd01(a), (b). In making RFRA applicable to the States and their subdivisions, Congress relied on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 138 L.Ed.2d 624 (1997), this Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress' powers under that provision. Id., at 532\xd0536, 117 S.Ct. 2157. "
[748] "3Congress responded to City of Boerne by enacting RLUIPA, which applies to the States and their subdivisions and invokes congressional authority under the Spending and Commerce Clauses. See \xa4 2000cc\xd01(b). RLUIPA concerns two areas of government activity: Section 2 governs land-use regulation, \xa4 2000cc; and Section 3\xd1the provision at issue in this case\xd1governs religious exercise by institutionalized persons, \xa4 2000cc\xd01. Section 3 mirrors RFRA and provides that \xd2[n]o government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an institution ... even if the burden results from a rule *358 of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on that person\xd1(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.\xd3 \xa4 2000cc\xd01(a). RLUIPA thus allows prisoners \xd2to seek religious accommodations pursuant to the same standard as set forth in RFRA.\xd3 Gonzales v. O Centro Esp\x92rita Beneficente Uni\x9b do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 436, 126 S.Ct. 1211, 163 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2006). "
[749] "Several provisions of RLUIPA underscore its expansive protection for religious liberty. Congress defined \xd2religious exercise\xd3 capaciously to include \xd2any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.\xd3 \xa4 2000cc\xd05(7)(A). Congress mandated that this concept \xd2shall be construed in favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter and the Constitution.\xd3 \xa4 2000cc\xd03(g). And Congress stated that RLUIPA \xd2may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a substantial burden on religious exercise.\xd3 \xa4 2000cc\xd03(c). See Hobby Lobby, supra, at 695, 696-730, 134 S.Ct., at 2761\xd02762, 2781\xd02782. "
[750] "B "
[751] "Petitioner, as noted, is in the custody of the Arkansas Department of Correction, and he objects on religious grounds to the Department's grooming policy, which provides that \xd2[n]o inmates will be permitted to wear facial hair other than a neatly trimmed mustache that does not extend beyond the corner of the mouth or over the lip.\xd3 App. to Brief for Petitioner 11a. The policy makes no exception for inmates who object on religious grounds, but it does contain an exemption for prisoners with medical needs: \xd2Medical staff may prescribe that inmates with a diagnosed dermatological problem may wear facial hair no longer than one quarter of an inch.\xd3 Ibid. The policy provides that \xd2[f]ailure to abide by [the Department's] grooming standards is grounds for disciplinary action.\xd3 Id., at 12a. "
[752] "**861 *359 Petitioner sought permission to grow a beard and, although he believes that his faith requires him not to trim his beard at all, he proposed a \xd2compromise\xd3 under which he would grow only a ?\xd0inch beard. App. 164. Prison officials denied his request, and the warden told him: \xd2 [Y]ou will abide by [Arkansas Department of Correction] policies and if you choose to disobey, you can suffer the consequences.\xd3 No. 5:11\xd0cv\xd000164 (ED Ark., July 21, 2011), Doc. 13, p. 6 (Letter from G. Lay to G. Holt (July 19, 2011)). "
[753] "Petitioner filed a pro se complaint in Federal District Court challenging the grooming policy under RLUIPA. We refer to the respondent prison officials collectively as the Department. In October 2011, the District Court granted petitioner a preliminary injunction and remanded to a Magistrate Judge for an evidentiary hearing. At the hearing, the Department called two witnesses. Both expressed the belief that inmates could hide contraband in even a ?\xd0inch beard, but neither pointed to any instances in which this had been done in Arkansas or elsewhere. Both witnesses also acknowledged that inmates could hide items in many other places, such as in the hair on their heads or their clothing. In addition, one of the witnesses\xd1Gaylon Lay, the warden of petitioner's prison\xd1testified that a prisoner who escaped could change his appearance by shaving his beard, and that a prisoner could shave his beard to disguise himself and enter a restricted area of the prison. Neither witness, however, was able to explain why these problems could not be addressed by taking a photograph of an inmate without a beard, a practice followed in other prison systems. Lay voiced concern that the Department would be unable to monitor the length of a prisoner's beard to ensure that it did not exceed one-half inch, but he acknowledged that the Department kept track of the length of the beards of those inmates who are allowed to wear a ?\xd0inch beard for medical reasons. "
[754] "As a result of the preliminary injunction, petitioner had a short beard at the time of the hearing, and the Magistrate Judge commented: \xd2I look at your particular circumstance *360 and I say, you know, it's almost preposterous to think that you could hide contraband in your beard.\xd3 App. 155. Nevertheless, the Magistrate Judge recommended that the preliminary injunction be vacated and that petitioner's complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. The Magistrate Judge emphasized that \xd2 the prison officials are entitled to deference,\xd3 id., at 168, and that the grooming policy allowed petitioner to exercise his religion in other ways, such as by praying on a prayer rug, maintaining the diet required by his faith, and observing religious holidays. "
[755] "The District Court adopted the Magistrate Judge's recommendation in full, and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed in a brief per curiam opinion, holding that the Department had satisfied its burden of showing that the grooming policy was the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling security interests. 509 Fed.Appx. 561 (2013). The Court of Appeals stated that \xd2courts should ordinarily defer to [prison officials'] expert judgment\xd3 in security matters unless there is substantial evidence that a prison's response is exaggerated. Id., at 562. And while acknowledging that other prisons allow inmates to maintain facial hair, the Eighth Circuit held that this evidence \xd2does not outweigh deference owed to [the] expert judgment of prison officials who are more familiar with their own institutions.\xd3 Ibid. "
[756] "We entered an injunction pending resolution of petitioner's petition for writ of certiorari, **862 571 U.S. 1019, 134 S.Ct. 635, 187 L.Ed.2d 414 (2013), and we then granted certiorari, 571 U.S. 1236, 134 S.Ct. 1490, 188 L.Ed.2d 391 (2014). "
[757] "II "
[758] "4Under RLUIPA, petitioner bore the initial burden of proving that the Department's grooming policy implicates his religious exercise. RLUIPA protects \xd2any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,\xd3 \xa4 2000cc\xd05(7)(A), but, of course, a prisoner's request for an accommodation must be sincerely based on a *361 religious belief and not some other motivation, see Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S., at 717, n. 28, 134 S.Ct., at 2774, n. 28. Here, the religious exercise at issue is the growing of a beard, which petitioner believes is a dictate of his religious faith, and the Department does not dispute the sincerity of petitioner's belief. "
[759] "5In addition to showing that the relevant exercise of religion is grounded in a sincerely held religious belief, petitioner also bore the burden of proving that the Department's grooming policy substantially burdened that exercise of religion. Petitioner easily satisfied that obligation. The Department's grooming policy requires petitioner to shave his beard and thus to \xd2engage in conduct that seriously violates [his] religious beliefs.\xd3 Id., at 720 134 S.Ct., at 2775. If petitioner contravenes that policy and grows his beard, he will face serious disciplinary action. Because the grooming policy puts petitioner to this choice, it substantially burdens his religious exercise. Indeed, the Department does not argue otherwise. "
[760] "6The District Court reached the opposite conclusion, but its reasoning (adopted from the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge) misunderstood the analysis that RLUIPA demands. First, the District Court erred by concluding that the grooming policy did not substantially burden petitioner's religious exercise because \xd2he had been provided a prayer rug and a list of distributors of Islamic material, he was allowed to correspond with a religious advisor, and was allowed to maintain the required diet and observe religious holidays.\xd3 App. 177. In taking this approach, the District Court improperly imported a strand of reasoning from cases involving prisoners' First Amendment rights. See, e.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 351\xd0352, 107 S.Ct. 2400, 96 L.Ed.2d 282 (1987); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 90, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987). Under those cases, the availability of alternative means of practicing religion is a relevant consideration, but RLUIPA provides greater protection. RLUIPA's \xd2substantial burden\xd3 inquiry asks whether the government has substantially burdened *362 religious exercise (here, the growing of a ?\xd0inch beard), not whether the RLUIPA claimant is able to engage in other forms of religious exercise. "
[761] "Second, the District Court committed a similar error in suggesting that the burden on petitioner's religious exercise was slight because, according to petitioner's testimony, his religion would \xd2credit\xd3 him for attempting to follow his religious beliefs, even if that attempt proved to be unsuccessful. RLUIPA, however, applies to an exercise of religion regardless of whether it is \xd2compelled.\xd3 \xa4 2000cc\xd05(7)(A). "
[762] "7Finally, the District Court went astray when it relied on petitioner's testimony that not all Muslims believe that men must grow beards. Petitioner's belief is by no means idiosyncratic. See Brief for Islamic Law Scholars as Amici Curiae 2 (\xd2hadith requiring beards ... are widely followed by observant Muslims across the various schools of Islam\xd3). But even if it were, the protection of RLUIPA, no less **863 than the guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause, is \xd2not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members of a religious sect.\xd3 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715\xd0716, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981). "
[763] "III "
[764] "Since petitioner met his burden of showing that the Department's grooming policy substantially burdened his exercise of religion, the burden shifted to the Department to show that its refusal to allow petitioner to grow a ?\xd0inch beard \xd2(1) [was] in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) [was] the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.\xd3 \xa4 2000cc\xd01(a). "
[765] "89The Department argues that its grooming policy represents the least restrictive means of furthering a \xd2 \xd4broadly formulated interes[t],\xd5 \xd3 Hobby Lobby, supra, at 726, 134 S.Ct., at 2779 (quoting O Centro, 546 U.S., at 431, 126 S.Ct. 1211), namely, the Department's compelling interest in prison safety and security. But RLUIPA, *363 like RFRA, contemplates a \xd2 \xd4more focused\xd5 \xd3 inquiry and \xd2 \xd4requires the Government to demonstrate that the compelling interest test is satisfied through application of the challenged law \xd2to the person\xd3\xd1the particular claimant whose sincere exercise of religion is being substantially burdened.\xd5 \xd3 Hobby Lobby, supra, at 726, 134 S.Ct., at 2779 (quoting O Centro, supra, at 430\xd0431 126 S.Ct. 1211 quoting \xa4 2000bb\xd01(b)). RLUIPA requires us to \xd2 \xd4scrutiniz[e] the asserted harm of granting specific exemptions to particular religious claimants' \xd3 and \xd2to look to the marginal interest in enforcing\xd3 the challenged government action in that particular context. Hobby Lobby, supra, at 726-727, 134 S.Ct., at 2779 (quoting O Centro, supra, at 431, 126 S.Ct. 1211; alteration in original). In this case, that means the enforcement of the Department's policy to prevent petitioner from growing a ?\xd0inch beard. "
[766] "The Department contends that enforcing this prohibition is the least restrictive means of furthering prison safety and security in two specific ways. "
[767] "A "
[768] "10The Department first claims that the no-beard policy prevents prisoners from hiding contraband. The Department worries that prisoners may use their beards to conceal all manner of prohibited items, including razors, needles, drugs, and cellular phone subscriber identity module (SIM) cards. "
[769] "We readily agree that the Department has a compelling interest in staunching the flow of contraband into and within its facilities, but the argument that this interest would be seriously compromised by allowing an inmate to grow a ?\xd0inch beard is hard to take seriously. As noted, the Magistrate Judge observed that it was \xd2almost preposterous to think that [petitioner] could hide contraband\xd3 in the short beard he had grown at the time of the evidentiary hearing. App. 155. An item of contraband would *364 have to be very small indeed to be concealed by a ?\xd0inch beard, and a prisoner seeking to hide an item in such a short beard would have to find a way to prevent the item from falling out. Since the Department does not demand that inmates have shaved heads or short crew cuts, it is hard to see why an inmate would seek to hide contraband in a ?\xd0inch beard rather than in the longer hair on his head. "
[770] "11Although the Magistrate Judge dismissed the possibility that contraband could be hidden in a short beard, the Magistrate Judge, the District Court, and the **864 Court of Appeals all thought that they were bound to defer to the Department's assertion that allowing petitioner to grow such a beard would undermine its interest in suppressing contraband. RLUIPA, however, does not permit such unquestioning deference. RLUIPA, like RFRA, \xd2makes clear that it is the obligation of the courts to consider whether exceptions are required under the test set forth by Congress.\xd3 O Centro, supra, at 434, 126 S.Ct. 1211. That test requires the Department not merely to explain why it denied the exemption but to prove that denying the exemption is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Prison officials are experts in running prisons and evaluating the likely effects of altering prison rules, and courts should respect that expertise. But that respect does not justify the abdication of the responsibility, conferred by Congress, to apply RLUIPA's rigorous standard. And without a degree of deference that is tantamount to unquestioning acceptance, it is hard to swallow the argument that denying petitioner a ?\xd0inch beard actually furthers the Department's interest in rooting out contraband. "
[771] "1213Even if the Department could make that showing, its contraband argument would still fail because the Department cannot show that forbidding very short beards is the least restrictive means of preventing the concealment of contraband. \xd2The least-restrictive-means standard is exceptionally demanding,\xd3 and it requires the government to \xd2sho[w] that it lacks other means of achieving its desired goal without imposing a substantial burden on the exercise of religion *365 by the objecting part[y].\xd3 Hobby Lobby, supra, at 728, 134 S.Ct., at 2780. \xd2[I]f a less restrictive means is available for the Government to achieve its goals, the Government must use it.\xd3 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 815, 120 S.Ct. 1878, 146 L.Ed.2d 865 (2000). "
[772] "The Department failed to establish that it could not satisfy its security concerns by simply searching petitioner's beard. The Department already searches prisoners' hair and clothing, and it presumably examines the ?\xd0inch beards of inmates with dermatological conditions. It has offered no sound reason why hair, clothing, and ?\xd0inch beards can be searched but ?\xd0inch beards cannot. The Department suggests that requiring guards to search a prisoner's beard would pose a risk to the physical safety of a guard if a razor or needle was concealed in the beard. But that is no less true for searches of hair, clothing, and ?\xd0inch beards. And the Department has failed to prove that it could not adopt the less restrictive alternative of having the prisoner run a comb through his beard. For all these reasons, the Department's interest in eliminating contraband cannot sustain its refusal to allow petitioner to grow a ?\xd0inch beard. "
[773] "B "
[774] "14The Department contends that its grooming policy is necessary to further an additional compelling interest, i.e., preventing prisoners from disguising their identities. The Department tells us that the no-beard policy allows security officers to identify prisoners quickly and accurately. It claims that bearded inmates could shave their beards and change their appearance in order to enter restricted areas within the prison, to escape, and to evade apprehension after escaping. "
[775] "We agree that prisons have a compelling interest in the quick and reliable identification of prisoners, and we acknowledge that any alteration in a prisoner's appearance, such as by shaving a beard, might, in the absence of effective *366 countermeasures, have at least some effect on the ability of **865 guards or others to make a quick identification. But even if we assume for present purposes that the Department's grooming policy sufficiently furthers its interest in the identification of prisoners, that policy still violates RLUIPA as applied in the circumstances present here. The Department contends that a prisoner who has a beard when he is photographed for identification purposes might confuse guards by shaving his beard. But as petitioner has argued, the Department could largely solve this problem by requiring that all inmates be photographed without beards when first admitted to the facility and, if necessary, periodically thereafter. Once that is done, an inmate like petitioner could be allowed to grow a short beard and could be photographed again when the beard reached the ?\xd0inch limit. Prison guards would then have a bearded and clean-shaven photo to use in making identifications. In fact, the Department (like many other States, see Brief for Petitioner 39) already has a policy of photographing a prisoner both when he enters an institution and when his \xd2appearance changes at any time during [his] incarceration.\xd3 Arkansas Department of Correction, Inmate Handbook 3\xd04 (rev. Jan. 2013). "
[776] "The Department argues that the dual-photo method is inadequate because, even if it might help authorities apprehend a bearded prisoner who escapes and then shaves his beard once outside the prison, this method is unlikely to assist guards when an inmate quickly shaves his beard in order to alter his appearance within the prison. The Department contends that the identification concern is particularly acute at petitioner's prison, where inmates live in barracks and work in fields. Counsel for the Department suggested at oral argument that a prisoner could gain entry to a restricted area by shaving his beard and swapping identification cards with another inmate while out in the fields. Tr. of Oral Arg. 28\xd030, 39\xd043. "
[777] "*367 We are unpersuaded by these arguments for at least two reasons. First, the Department failed to show, in the face of petitioner's evidence, that its prison system is so different from the many institutions that allow facial hair that the dual-photo method cannot be employed at its institutions. Second, the Department failed to establish why the risk that a prisoner will shave a ?\xd0inch beard to disguise himself is so great that ?\xd0inch beards cannot be allowed, even though prisoners are allowed to grow mustaches, head hair, or ?\xd0inch beards for medical reasons. All of these could also be shaved off at a moment's notice, but the Department apparently does not think that this possibility raises a serious security concern. "
[778] "C "
[779] "15In addition to its failure to prove that petitioner's proposed alternatives would not sufficiently serve its security interests, the Department has not provided an adequate response to two additional arguments that implicate the RLUIPA analysis. "
[780] "First, the Department has not adequately demonstrated why its grooming policy is substantially underinclusive in at least two respects. Although the Department denied petitioner's request to grow a ?\xd0inch beard, it permits prisoners with a dermatological condition to grow ?\xd0inch beards. The Department does this even though both beards pose similar risks. And the Department permits inmates to grow more than a ?\xd0inch of hair on their heads. With respect to hair length, the grooming policy provides only that hair must be worn \xd2above the ear\xd3 and \xd2no longer in the back than the middle of the nape of the neck.\xd3 App. to Brief for Petitioner 11a. Hair on **866 the head is a more plausible place to hide contraband than a ?\xd0inch beard\xd1and the same is true of an inmate's clothing and shoes. Nevertheless, the Department does not require inmates to go about bald, barefoot, or naked. Although the Department's proclaimed objectives are to stop *368 the flow of contraband and to facilitate prisoner identification, \xd2[t]he proffered objectives are not pursued with respect to analogous nonreligious conduct,\xd3 which suggests that \xd2those interests could be achieved by narrower ordinances that burdened religion to a far lesser degree.\xd3 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993). "
[781] "In an attempt to demonstrate why its grooming policy is underinclusive in these respects, the Department emphasizes that petitioner's ?\xd0inch beard is longer than the ?\xd0inch beard allowed for medical reasons. But the Department has failed to establish (and the District Court did not find) that a ?\xd0inch difference in beard length poses a meaningful increase in security risk. The Department also asserts that few inmates require beards for medical reasons while many may request beards for religious reasons. But the Department has not argued that denying petitioner an exemption is necessary to further a compelling interest in cost control or program administration. At bottom, this argument is but another formulation of the \xd2classic rejoinder of bureaucrats throughout history: If I make an exception for you, I'll have to make one for everybody, so no exceptions.\xd3 O Centro, 546 U.S., at 436, 126 S.Ct. 1211. We have rejected a similar argument in analogous contexts, see ibid.; Sherbert, 374 U.S., at 407, 83 S.Ct. 1790, and we reject it again today. "
[782] "Second, the Department failed to show, in the face of petitioner's evidence, why the vast majority of States and the Federal Government permit inmates to grow ?\xd0inch beards, either for any reason or for religious reasons, but it cannot. See Brief for Petitioner 24\xd025; Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 28\xd029. \xd2While not necessarily controlling, the policies followed at other well-run institutions would be relevant to a determination of the need for a particular type of restriction.\xd3 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 414, n. 14, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). That so many other prisons allow inmates to grow beards while ensuring prison safety and security suggests *369 that the Department could satisfy its security concerns through a means less restrictive than denying petitioner the exemption he seeks. "
[783] "16We do not suggest that RLUIPA requires a prison to grant a particular religious exemption as soon as a few other jurisdictions do so. But when so many prisons offer an accommodation, a prison must, at a minimum, offer persuasive reasons why it believes that it must take a different course, and the Department failed to make that showing here. Despite this, the courts below deferred to these prison officials' mere say-so that they could not accommodate petitioner's request. RLUIPA, however, demands much more. Courts must hold prisons to their statutory burden, and they must not \xd2assume a plausible, less restrictive alternative would be ineffective.\xd3 Playboy Entertainment, 529 U.S., at 824, 120 S.Ct. 1878. "
[784] "171819We emphasize that although RLUIPA provides substantial protection for the religious exercise of institutionalized persons, it also affords prison officials ample ability to maintain security. We highlight three ways in which this is so. First, in applying RLUIPA's statutory standard, courts should not blind themselves to the fact that the analysis is conducted in the prison setting. Second, if an institution suspects that an inmate is **867 using religious activity to cloak illicit conduct, \xd2prison officials may appropriately question whether a prisoner's religiosity, asserted as the basis for a requested accommodation, is authentic.\xd3 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 725, n. 13, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005). See also Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S., at 717 n. 28, 134 S.Ct., at 2774, n. 28. Third, even if a claimant's religious belief is sincere, an institution might be entitled to withdraw an accommodation if the claimant abuses the exemption in a manner that undermines the prison's compelling interests. "
[785] "IV "
[786] "In sum, we hold that the Department's grooming policy violates RLUIPA insofar as it prevents petitioner from growing a ?\xd0inch beard in accordance with his religious beliefs. *370 The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. "
[787] "It is so ordered. "
[788] "Chief Justice\xcaROBERTS\xcadelivered the opinion of the Court. "
[789] "*176\xcaCertain employment discrimination laws authorize employees who have been wrongfully terminated to sue their employers for reinstatement and damages. The question presented is whether the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment bar such an action when\xca*177\xcathe employer is a religious group and the employee is one of the group's ministers. "
[790] "I "
[791] "A "
[792] "Petitioner\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaEvangelical\xcaLutheran\xcaChurch\xcaand\xcaSchool\xcais a member congregation of the\xcaLutheran\xcaChurch\xd1Missouri Synod, the second largest\xcaLutheran\xcadenomination in America.\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaoperated a small\xcaschool\xcain Redford, Michigan, offering a \xd2Christ-centered education\xd3 to students in kindergarten through eighth grade.\xca582 F.Supp.2d 881, 884 (E.D.Mich.2008)\xca(internal quotation marks omitted). "
[793] "The Synod classifies teachers into two categories: \xd2called\xd3 and \xd2lay.\xd3 \xd2Called\xd3 teachers are regarded as having been called to their vocation by God through a congregation. To be eligible to receive a call from a congregation, a teacher must satisfy certain academic requirements. One way of doing so is by completing a \xd2colloquy\xd3 program at a\xcaLutheran\xcacollege or university. The program requires candidates to take eight courses of theological study, obtain the endorsement of their local Synod district, and pass an oral examination by a faculty committee. A teacher who meets these requirements may be called by a congregation. Once called, a teacher receives the formal title \xd2Minister of Religion, Commissioned.\xd3 App. 42, 48. A commissioned minister serves for an open-ended term; at\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor, a call could be rescinded only for cause and by a supermajority vote of the congregation. "
[794] "\xd2Lay\xd3 or \xd2contract\xd3 teachers, by contrast, are not required to be trained by the Synod or even to be\xcaLutheran. At\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor, they were appointed by the\xca**700\xcaschool\xcaboard, without a vote of the congregation, to one-year renewable terms.\xcaAlthough teachers at the\xcaschool\xcagenerally performed the same duties regardless of whether they were lay or called, lay teachers were hired only when called teachers were unavailable. "
[795] "*178\xcaRespondent Cheryl Perich was first employed by\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaas a lay teacher in 1999. After Perich completed her colloquy later that\xcaschool\xcayear,\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaasked her to become a called teacher. Perich accepted the call and received a \xd2diploma of vocation\xd3 designating her a commissioned minister.\xcaId.,\xcaat 42. "
[796] "Perich taught kindergarten during her first four years at\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaand fourth grade during the 2003\xd02004\xcaschool\xcayear. She taught math, language arts, social studies, science, gym, art, and music. She also taught a religion class four days a week, led the students in prayer and devotional exercises each day, and attended a weekly\xcaschool-wide chapel service. Perich led the chapel service herself about twice a year. "
[797] "Perich became ill in June 2004 with what was eventually diagnosed as\xcanarcolepsy. Symptoms included sudden and deep sleeps from which she could not be roused. Because of her illness, Perich began the 2004\xd02005\xcaschool\xcayear on disability leave. On January 27, 2005, however, Perich notified the\xcaschool\xcaprincipal, Stacey Hoeft, that she would be able to report to work the following month. Hoeft responded that the\xcaschool\xcahad already contracted with a lay teacher to fill Perich's position for the remainder of the\xcaschool\xcayear. Hoeft also expressed concern that Perich was not yet ready to return to the classroom. "
[798] "On January 30,\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaheld a meeting of its congregation at which\xcaschool\xcaadministrators stated that Perich was unlikely to be physically capable of returning to work that\xcaschool\xcayear or the next. The congregation voted to offer Perich a \xd2peaceful release\xd3 from her call, whereby the congregation would pay a portion of her health insurance premiums in exchange for her resignation as a called teacher.\xcaId.,\xcaat 178, 186. Perich refused to resign and produced a note from her doctor stating that she would be able to return to work on February 22. The\xcaschool\xcaboard urged Perich to\xca*179\xcareconsider, informing her that the\xcaschool\xcano longer had a position for her, but Perich stood by her decision not to resign. "
[799] "On the morning of February 22\xd1the first day she was medically cleared to return to work\xd1Perich presented herself at the\xcaschool. Hoeft asked her to leave but she would not do so until she obtained written documentation that she had reported to work. Later that afternoon, Hoeft called Perich at home and told her that she would likely be fired. Perich responded that she had spoken with an attorney and intended to assert her legal rights. "
[800] "Following a\xcaschool\xcaboard meeting that evening, board chairman Scott Salo sent Perich a letter stating that\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcawas reviewing the process for rescinding her call in light of her \xd2regrettable\xd3 actions.\xcaId.,\xcaat 229. Salo subsequently followed up with a letter advising Perich that the congregation would consider whether to rescind her call at its next meeting. As grounds for termination, the letter cited Perich's \xd2insubordination and disruptive behavior\xd3 on February 22, as well as the damage she had done to her \xd2working relationship\xd3 with the\xcaschool\xcaby \xd2threatening to take legal action.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 55. The congregation voted to rescind Perich's call on April 10, and\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcasent her a letter of termination the next day. "
[801] "**701\xcaB "
[802] "Perich filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, alleging that her employment had been terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 327,\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4 12101\xcaet seq.\xcaThe ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a qualified individual on the basis of disability. \xa4 12112(a). It also prohibits an employer from retaliating \xd2against any individual because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by [the ADA] or because such individual\xca*180\xcamade a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [the ADA].\xd3 \xa4 12203(a).1 "
[803] "The\xcaEEOC\xcabrought suit against\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor, alleging that Perich had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file an ADA lawsuit. Perich intervened in the litigation, claiming unlawful retaliation under both the ADA and the Michigan Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act,\xcaMich. Comp. Laws \xa4 37.1602(a) (1979). The\xcaEEOC\xcaand Perich sought Perich's reinstatement to her former position (or frontpay in lieu thereof), along with backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees, and other injunctive relief. "
[804] "Hosanna\xd0Tabor\xcamoved for summary judgment. Invoking what is known as the \xd2ministerial exception,\xd3 the\xcaChurch\xcaargued that the suit was barred by the First Amendment because the claims at issue concerned the employment relationship between a religious institution and one of its ministers. According to the\xcaChurch, Perich was a minister, and she had been fired for a religious reason\xd1namely, that her threat to sue the\xcaChurch\xcaviolated the Synod's belief that Christians should resolve their disputes internally. "
[805] "The District Court agreed that the suit was barred by the ministerial exception and granted summary judgment in\xca*181\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor's\xcafavor. The court explained that \xd2Hosanna\xd0Tabor\xcatreated Perich like a minister and held her out to the world as such long before this litigation began,\xd3 and that the \xd2facts surrounding Perich's employment in a religious\xcaschool\xcawith a sectarian mission\xd3 supported the\xcaChurch's\xcacharacterization.\xca582 F.Supp.2d, at 891\xd0892. In light of that determination, the court concluded that it could \xd2inquire no further into her claims of retaliation.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 892. "
[806] "The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated and remanded, directing the District Court to proceed to the merits of Perich's retaliation claims. The Court of Appeals recognized the existence of a ministerial exception barring certain employment discrimination claims against religious institutions\xd1an exception \xd2rooted in the First Amendment's guarantees of religious freedom.\xd3\xca597 F.3d 769, 777 (2010). The court concluded, however, that Perich did not qualify as a \xd2minister\xd3 under the exception, noting in particular that her duties as a called teacher were identical to her duties as a lay teacher.\xca**702\xcaId.,\xcaat 778\xd0781. Judge White concurred. She viewed the question whether Perich qualified as a minister to be closer than did the majority, but agreed that the \xd2fact that the duties of the contract teachers are the same as the duties of the called teachers is telling.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 782, 784. "
[807] "We granted certiorari.\xca563 U.S. 903, 131 S.Ct. 1783, 179 L.Ed.2d 653 (2011). "
[808] "II "
[809] "The First Amendment provides, in part, that \xd2Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.\xd3 We have said that these two Clauses \xd2often exert conflicting pressures,\xd3\xcaCutter v. Wilkinson,\xca544 U.S. 709, 719, 125 S.Ct. 2113, 161 L.Ed.2d 1020 (2005), and that there can be \xd2internal tension ... between the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause,\xd3\xcaTilton v. Richardson,\xca403 U.S. 672, 677, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971)\xca(plurality opinion). Not so here. Both Religion Clauses bar the government from interfering with the decision of a religious group to fire one of its ministers. "
[810] "*182\xcaA "
[811] "Controversy between\xcachurch\xcaand state over religious offices is hardly new. In 1215, the issue was addressed in the very first clause of Magna Carta. There, King John agreed that \xd2the English\xcachurch\xcashall be free, and shall have its rights undiminished and its liberties unimpaired.\xd3 The King in particular accepted the \xd2freedom of elections,\xd3 a right \xd2thought to be of the greatest necessity and importance to the English\xcachurch.\xd3 J. Holt, Magna Carta App. IV, p. 317, cl. 1 (1965). "
[812] "That freedom in many cases may have been more theoretical than real. See,\xcae.g.,\xcaW. Warren, Henry II 312 (1973) (recounting the writ sent by Henry II to the electors of a bishopric in Winchester, stating: \xd2I order you to hold a free election, but forbid you to elect anyone but Richard my clerk\xd3). In any event, it did not survive the reign of Henry VIII, even in theory. The Act of Supremacy of 1534, 26 Hen. 8, ch. 1, made the English monarch the supreme head of the\xcaChurch, and the Act in Restraint of Annates, 25 Hen. 8, ch. 20, passed that same year, gave him the authority to appoint the\xcaChurch's\xcahigh officials. See G. Elton, The Tudor Constitution: Documents and Commentary 331\xd0332 (1960). Various Acts of Uniformity, enacted subsequently, tightened further the government's grip on the exercise of religion. See,\xcae.g.,\xcaAct of Uniformity, 1559, 1 Eliz., ch. 2; Act of Uniformity, 1549, 2 & 3 Edw. 6, ch. 1. The Uniformity Act of 1662, for instance, limited service as a minister to those who formally assented to prescribed tenets and pledged to follow the mode of worship set forth in the Book of Common Prayer. Any minister who refused to make that pledge was \xd2deprived of all his Spiritual Promotions.\xd3 Act of Uniformity, 1662, 14 Car. 2, ch. 4. "
[813] "Seeking to escape the control of the national\xcachurch, the Puritans fled to New England, where they hoped to elect their own ministers and establish their own modes of worship. See T. Curry, The First Freedoms:\xcaChurch\xcaand State\xca*183\xcain America to the Passage of the First Amendment 3 (1986); McConnell,\xcaThe Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Religion, 103 Harv. L.Rev. 1409, 1422 (1990). William Penn, the Quaker proprietor of what would eventually become Pennsylvania and Delaware, also sought independence from the\xcaChurch\xcaof England. The charter creating the province of Pennsylvania contained no clause establishing a religion. See S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America 440\xd0441 (1970). "
[814] "**703\xcaColonists in the South, in contrast, brought the\xcaChurch\xcaof England with them. But even they sometimes chafed at the control exercised by the Crown and its representatives over religious offices. In Virginia, for example, the law vested the governor with the power to induct ministers presented to him by parish vestries, 2 Hening's Statutes at Large 46 (1642), but the vestries often refused to make such presentations and instead chose ministers on their own. See H. Eckenrode, Separation of\xcaChurch\xcaand State in Virginia 13\xd019 (1910). Controversies over the selection of ministers also arose in other Colonies with Anglican establishments, including North Carolina. See C. Antieau, A. Downey, & E. Roberts, Freedom From Federal Establishment: Formation and Early History of the First Amendment Religion Clauses 10\xd011 (1964). There, the royal governor insisted that the right of presentation lay with the Bishop of London, but the colonial assembly enacted laws placing that right in the vestries.\xcaAuthorities in England intervened, repealing those laws as inconsistent with the rights of the Crown. See\xcaid.,\xcaat 11; Weeks,\xcaChurch\xcaand State in North Carolina, Johns Hopkins U. Studies in Hist. & Pol. Sci., 11th Ser., Nos. 5\xd06, pp. 29\xd036 (1893). "
[815] "It was against this background that the First Amendment was adopted. Familiar with life under the established\xcaChurch\xcaof England, the founding generation sought to foreclose the possibility of a national\xcachurch. See 1 Annals of Cong. 730\xd0731 (1789) (remarks of J. Madison) (noting that the\xca*184\xcaEstablishment Clause addressed the fear that \xd2one sect might obtain a pre-eminence, or two combine together, and establish a religion to which they would compel others to conform\xd3). By forbidding the \xd2establishment of religion\xd3 and guaranteeing the \xd2free exercise thereof,\xd3 the Religion Clauses ensured that the new Federal Government\xd1unlike the English Crown\xd1would have no role in filling ecclesiastical offices. The Establishment Clause prevents the Government from appointing ministers, and the Free Exercise Clause prevents it from interfering with the freedom of religious groups to select their own. "
[816] "This understanding of the Religion Clauses was reflected in two events involving James Madison, \xd2 \xd4the leading architect of the religion clauses of the First Amendment.\xd5 \xd3\xcaArizona Christian\xcaSchool\xcaTuition Organization v. Winn,\xca563 U.S. 125, 141, 131 S.Ct. 1436, 1446, 179 L.Ed.2d 523 (2011)\xca(quoting\xcaFlast v. Cohen,\xca392 U.S. 83, 103, 88 S.Ct. 1942, 20 L.Ed.2d 947 (1968)). The first occurred in 1806, when John Carroll, the first Catholic bishop in the United States, solicited the Executive's opinion on who should be appointed to direct the affairs of the Catholic\xcaChurch\xcain the territory newly acquired by the Louisiana Purchase. After consulting with President Jefferson, then-Secretary of State Madison responded that the selection of\xcachurch\xca\xd2functionaries\xd3 was an \xd2entirely ecclesiastical\xd3 matter left to the\xcaChurch's\xcaown judgment. Letter from James Madison to Bishop Carroll (Nov. 20, 1806), reprinted in 20 Records of the American Catholic Historical Society 63 (1909). The \xd2scrupulous policy of the Constitution in guarding against a political interference with religious affairs,\xd3 Madison explained, prevented the Government from rendering an opinion on the \xd2selection of ecclesiastical individuals.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 63\xd064. "
[817] "The second episode occurred in 1811, when Madison was President. Congress had passed a bill incorporating the Protestant Episcopal\xcaChurch\xcain the town of Alexandria in what was then the District of Columbia. Madison vetoed the bill, on the ground that it \xd2exceeds the rightful authority\xca*185\xcato which Governments are limited, by the essential distinction between\xca**704\xcacivil and religious functions, and violates, in particular, the article of the Constitution of the United States, which declares, that \xd4Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment.\xd5 \xd3 22 Annals of Cong. 982\xd0983 (1811). Madison explained: "
[818] "\xd2The bill enacts into, and establishes by law, sundry rules and proceedings relative purely to the organization and polity of the\xcachurch\xcaincorporated,\xcaand comprehending even the election and removal of the Minister of the same\xca; so that no change could be made therein by the particular society, or by the general\xcachurch\xcaof which it is a member, and whose authority it recognises.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 983 (emphasis added). "
[819] "B "
[820] "Given this understanding of the Religion Clauses\xd1and the absence of government employment regulation generally\xd1it was some time before questions about government interference with a\xcachurch's\xcaability to select its own ministers came before the courts. This Court touched upon the issue indirectly, however, in the context of disputes over\xcachurch\xcaproperty. Our decisions in that area confirm that it is impermissible for the government to contradict a\xcachurch's\xcadetermination of who can act as its ministers. "
[821] "In\xcaWatson v. Jones,\xca13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872), the Court considered a dispute between antislavery and proslavery factions over who controlled the property of the Walnut Street Presbyterian\xcaChurch\xcain Louisville, Kentucky. The General Assembly of the Presbyterian\xcaChurch\xcahad recognized the antislavery faction, and this Court\xd1applying not the Constitution but a \xd2broad and sound view of the relations of\xcachurch\xcaand state under our system of laws\xd3\xd1declined to question that determination.\xcaId.,\xcaat 727. We explained that \xd2whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of [the]\xca*186\xcachurch\xcajudicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them.\xd3\xcaIbid.\xcaAs we would put it later, our opinion in\xcaWatson\xca\xd2radiates ... a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation\xd1in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of\xcachurch\xcagovernment as well as those of faith and doctrine.\xd3\xcaKedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox\xcaChurch\xcain North America,\xca344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952). "
[822] "Confronting the issue under the Constitution for the first time in\xcaKedroff,\xcathe Court recognized that the \xd2[f]reedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven,\xd3 is \xd2part of the free exercise of religion\xd3 protected by the First Amendment against government interference.\xcaIbid.\xcaAt issue in\xcaKedroff\xcawas the right to use a Russian Orthodox cathedral in New York City. The Russian Orthodox\xcachurches\xcain North America had split from the Supreme\xcaChurch\xcaAuthority in Moscow, out of concern that the Authority had become a tool of the Soviet Government. The North American\xcachurches\xcaclaimed that the right to use the cathedral belonged to an archbishop elected by them; the Supreme\xcaChurch\xcaAuthority claimed that it belonged instead to an archbishop appointed by the patriarch in Moscow. New York's highest court ruled in favor of the North American\xcachurches, based on a state law requiring every Russian Orthodox\xcachurch\xcain New York to recognize the determination of the governing body of the North American\xcachurches\xcaas authoritative.\xcaId.,\xcaat 96\xd097, 99, n. 3, 106, n. 10, 73 S.Ct. 143. "
[823] "**705\xcaThis Court reversed, concluding that the New York law violated the First Amendment.\xcaId.,\xcaat 107, 73 S.Ct. 143. We explained that the controversy over the right to use the cathedral was \xd2strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government, the power of the Supreme\xcaChurch\xcaAuthority of the Russian Orthodox\xcaChurch\xcato appoint the ruling hierarch of the archdiocese of\xca*187\xcaNorth America.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 115, 73 S.Ct. 143. By \xd2pass[ing] the control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one\xcachurch\xcaauthority to another,\xd3 the New York law intruded the \xd2power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 119, 73 S.Ct. 143. Accordingly, we declared the law unconstitutional because it \xd2directly prohibit[ed] the free exercise of an ecclesiastical right, the\xcaChurch's\xcachoice of its hierarchy.\xd3\xcaIbid. "
[824] "This Court reaffirmed these First Amendment principles in\xcaSerbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich,\xca426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), a case involving a dispute over control of the American\xd0Canadian Diocese of the Serbian Orthodox\xcaChurch, including its property and assets. The\xcaChurch\xcahad removed Dionisije Milivojevich as bishop of the American\xd0Canadian Diocese because of his defiance of the\xcachurch\xcahierarchy. Following his removal, Dionisije brought a civil action in state court challenging the\xcaChurch's\xcadecision, and the Illinois Supreme Court \xd2purported in effect to reinstate Dionisije as Diocesan Bishop,\xd3 on the ground that the proceedings resulting in his removal failed to comply with\xcachurch\xcalaws and regulations.\xcaId.,\xcaat 708, 96 S.Ct. 2372. "
[825] "Reversing that judgment, this Court explained that the First Amendment \xd2permit [s] hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 724, 96 S.Ct. 2372. When ecclesiastical tribunals decide such disputes, we further explained, \xd2the Constitution requires that civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 725, 96 S.Ct. 2372. We thus held that by inquiring into whether the\xcaChurch\xcahad followed its own procedures, the State Supreme Court had \xd2unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals\xd3 of the\xcaChurch.\xcaId.,\xcaat 720, 96 S.Ct. 2372. "
[826] "*188\xcaC "
[827] "Until today, we have not had occasion to consider whether this freedom of a religious organization to select its ministers is implicated by a suit alleging discrimination in employment. The Courts of Appeals, in contrast, have had extensive experience with this issue. Since the passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,\xca42 U.S.C. \xa4 2000e\xcaet seq.,\xcaand other employment discrimination laws, the Courts of Appeals have uniformly recognized the existence of a \xd2ministerial exception,\xd3 grounded in the First Amendment, that precludes application of such legislation to claims concerning the employment relationship between a religious institution and its ministers.2 "
[828] "**706\xca1We agree that there is such a ministerial exception. The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a\xcachurch\xcato accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a\xcachurch\xcafor failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the\xcachurch, depriving the\xcachurch\xcaof control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments. According the state\xca*189\xcathe power to determine which individuals will minister to the faithful also violates the Establishment Clause, which prohibits government involvement in such ecclesiastical decisions. "
[829] "The\xcaEEOC\xcaand Perich acknowledge that employment discrimination laws would be unconstitutional as applied to religious groups in certain circumstances. They grant, for example, that it would violate the First Amendment for courts to apply such laws to compel the ordination of women by the Catholic\xcaChurch\xcaor by an Orthodox Jewish seminary.\xcaBrief for Federal Respondent 31; Brief for Respondent Perich 35\xd036. According to the\xcaEEOC\xcaand Perich, religious organizations could successfully defend against employment discrimination claims in those circumstances by invoking the constitutional right to freedom of association\xd1a right \xd2implicit\xd3 in the First Amendment.\xcaRoberts v. United States Jaycees,\xca468 U.S. 609, 622, 104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). The\xcaEEOC\xcaand Perich thus see no need\xd1and no basis\xd1for a special rule for ministers grounded in the Religion Clauses themselves. "
[830] "2We find this position untenable. The right to freedom of association is a right enjoyed by religious and secular groups alike. It follows under the\xcaEEOC's\xcaand Perich's view that the First Amendment analysis should be the same, whether the association in question is the\xcaLutheran\xcaChurch, a labor union, or a social club. See Perich Brief 31; Tr. of Oral Arg. 28. That result is hard to square with the text of the First Amendment itself, which gives special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations. We cannot accept the remarkable view that the Religion Clauses have nothing to say about a religious organization's freedom to select its own ministers. "
[831] "The\xcaEEOC\xcaand Perich also contend that our decision in\xcaEmployment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith,\xca494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), precludes recognition of a ministerial exception. In\xcaSmith,\xcatwo members of the Native American\xcaChurch\xcawere denied state unemployment benefits\xca*190\xcaafter it was determined that they had been fired from their jobs for ingesting peyote, a crime under Oregon law. We held that this did not violate the Free Exercise Clause, even though the peyote had been ingested for sacramental purposes, because the \xd2right of free exercise does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).\xd3\xca**707\xcaId.,\xcaat 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595\xca(internal quotation marks omitted). "
[832] "It is true that the ADA's prohibition on retaliation, like Oregon's prohibition on peyote use, is a valid and neutral law of general applicability. But a\xcachurch's\xcaselection of its ministers is unlike an individual's ingestion of peyote.\xcaSmith\xcainvolved government regulation of only outward physical acts. The present case, in contrast, concerns government interference with an internal\xcachurch\xcadecision that affects the faith and mission of the\xcachurch\xcaitself. See\xcaid.,\xcaat 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595\xca(distinguishing the government's regulation of \xd2physical acts\xd3 from its \xd2lend [ing] its power to one or the other side in controversies over religious authority or dogma\xd3). The contention that\xcaSmith\xcaforecloses recognition of a ministerial exception rooted in the Religion Clauses has no merit. "
[833] "III "
[834] "3Having concluded that there is a ministerial exception grounded in the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, we consider whether the exception applies in this case. We hold that it does. "
[835] "Every Court of Appeals to have considered the question has concluded that the ministerial exception is not limited to the head of a religious congregation, and we agree. We are reluctant, however, to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister. It is enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment. "
[836] "*191\xcaTo begin with,\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaheld Perich out as a minister, with a role distinct from that of most of its members. When\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaextended her a call, it issued her a \xd2diploma of vocation\xd3 according her the title \xd2Minister of Religion, Commissioned.\xd3 App. 42. She was tasked with performing that office \xd2according to the Word of God and the confessional standards of the\xcaEvangelical\xcaLutheran\xcaChurch\xcaas drawn from the Sacred Scriptures.\xd3\xcaIbid.\xcaThe congregation prayed that God \xd2bless [her] ministrations to the glory of His holy name, [and] the building of His\xcachurch.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 43. In a supplement to the diploma, the congregation undertook to periodically review Perich's \xd2skills of ministry\xd3 and \xd2ministerial responsibilities,\xd3 and to provide for her \xd2continuing education as a professional person in the ministry of the Gospel.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 49. "
[837] "Perich's title as a minister reflected a significant degree of religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning. To be eligible to become a commissioned minister, Perich had to complete eight college-level courses in subjects including biblical interpretation,\xcachurch\xcadoctrine, and the ministry of the\xcaLutheran\xcateacher. She also had to obtain the endorsement of her local Synod district by submitting a petition that contained her academic transcripts, letters of recommendation, personal statement, and written answers to various ministry-related questions. Finally, she had to pass an oral examination by a faculty committee at a\xcaLutheran\xcacollege. It took Perich six years to fulfill these requirements. And when she eventually did, she was commissioned as a minister only upon election by the congregation, which recognized God's call to her to teach. At that point, her call could be rescinded only upon a supermajority vote of the congregation\xd1a protection designed to allow her to \xd2preach the Word of God boldly.\xd3 Brief for\xcaLutheran\xcaChurch\xd1Missouri Synod as\xcaAmicus Curiae\xca15. "
[838] "Perich held herself out as a minister of the\xcaChurch\xcaby accepting the formal call to religious service, according to its terms.\xca**708\xcaShe did so in other ways as well. For example, she\xca*192\xcaclaimed a special housing allowance on her taxes that was available only to employees earning their compensation \xd2 \xd4in the exercise of the ministry.\xd5 \xd3 App. 220 (\xd2If you are not conducting activities \xd4in the exercise of the ministry,\xd5 you cannot take advantage of the parsonage or housing allowance exclusion\xd3 (quoting\xcaLutheran\xcaChurch\xd1Missouri Synod Brochure on Whether the IRS Considers Employees as a Minister (2007)). In a form she submitted to the Synod following her termination, Perich again indicated that she regarded herself as a minister at\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor, stating: \xd2I feel that God is leading me to serve in the teaching ministry.... I am anxious to be in the teaching ministry again soon.\xd3 App. 53. "
[839] "Perich's job duties reflected a role in conveying the\xcaChurch's\xcamessage and carrying out its mission.\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaexpressly charged her with \xd2lead[ing] others toward Christian maturity\xd3 and \xd2teach[ing] faithfully the Word of God, the Sacred Scriptures, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the\xcaEvangelical\xcaLutheran\xcaChurch.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 48. In fulfilling these responsibilities, Perich taught her students religion four days a week, and led them in prayer three times a day. Once a week, she took her students to a\xcaschool-wide chapel service, and\xd1about twice a year\xd1she took her turn leading it, choosing the liturgy, selecting the hymns, and delivering a short message based on verses from the Bible.\xcaDuring her last year of teaching, Perich also led her fourth graders in a brief devotional exercise each morning. As a source of religious instruction, Perich performed an important role in transmitting the\xcaLutheran\xcafaith to the next generation. "
[840] "In light of these considerations\xd1the formal title given Perich by the\xcaChurch, the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important religious functions she performed for the\xcaChurch\xd1we conclude that Perich was a minister covered by the ministerial exception. "
[841] "4In reaching a contrary conclusion, the Court of Appeals committed three errors. First, the Sixth Circuit failed to\xca*193\xcasee any relevance in the fact that Perich was a commissioned minister. Although such a title, by itself, does not automatically ensure coverage, the fact that an employee has been ordained or commissioned as a minister is surely relevant, as is the fact that significant religious training and a recognized religious mission underlie the description of the employee's position. It was wrong for the Court of Appeals\xd1and Perich, who has adopted the court's view, see Perich Brief 45\xd1to say that an employee's title does not matter. "
[842] "5Second, the Sixth Circuit gave too much weight to the fact that lay teachers at the\xcaschool\xcaperformed the same religious duties as Perich. We express no view on whether someone with Perich's duties would be covered by the ministerial exception in the absence of the other considerations we have discussed. But though relevant, it cannot be dispositive that others not formally recognized as ministers by the\xcachurch\xcaperform the same functions\xd1particularly when, as here, they did so only because commissioned ministers were unavailable. "
[843] "Third, the Sixth Circuit placed too much emphasis on Perich's performance of secular duties. It is true that her religious duties consumed only 45 minutes of each workday, and that the rest of her day was devoted to teaching secular subjects. The\xcaEEOC\xcaregards that as conclusive, contending that any ministerial exception \xd2should be limited to those employees who perform exclusively religious functions.\xd3 Brief for Federal Respondent 51. We cannot accept\xca**709\xcathat view. Indeed, we are unsure whether any such employees exist. The heads of congregations themselves often have a mix of duties, including secular ones such as helping to manage the congregation's finances, supervising purely secular personnel, and overseeing the upkeep of facilities. "
[844] "6Although the Sixth Circuit did not adopt the extreme position pressed here by the\xcaEEOC, it did regard the relative amount of time Perich spent performing religious functions as largely determinative. The issue before us, however, is\xca*194\xcanot one that can be resolved by a stopwatch. The amount of time an employee spends on particular activities is relevant in assessing that employee's status, but that factor cannot be considered in isolation, without regard to the nature of the religious functions performed and the other considerations discussed above. "
[845] "Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the exception, the First Amendment requires dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her religious employer. The\xcaEEOC\xcaand Perich originally sought an order reinstating Perich to her former position as a called teacher. By requiring the\xcaChurch\xcato accept a minister it did not want, such an order would have plainly violated the\xcaChurch's\xcafreedom under the Religion Clauses to select its own ministers. "
[846] "Perich no longer seeks reinstatement, having abandoned that relief before this Court.\xcaSee Perich Brief 58. But that is immaterial. Perich continues to seek frontpay in lieu of reinstatement, backpay, compensatory and punitive damages, and attorney's fees. An award of such relief would operate as a penalty on the\xcaChurch\xcafor terminating an unwanted minister, and would be no less prohibited by the First Amendment than an order overturning the termination. Such relief would depend on a determination that\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcawas wrong to have relieved Perich of her position, and it is precisely such a ruling that is barred by the ministerial exception.3 "
[847] "78The\xcaEEOC\xcaand Perich suggest that\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor's\xcaasserted religious reason for firing Perich\xd1that she violated the Synod's commitment to internal dispute resolution\xd1was pretextual. That suggestion misses the point of the ministerial exception. The purpose of the exception is not to safeguard a\xcachurch's\xcadecision to fire a minister only when it is made for a religious reason. The exception instead ensures\xca*195\xcathat the authority to select and control who will minister to the faithful\xd1a matter \xd2strictly ecclesiastical,\xd3\xcaKedroff,\xca344 U.S., at 119, 73 S.Ct. 143\xd1is the\xcachurch's\xcaalone.4 "
[848] "**710\xcaIV "
[849] "The\xcaEEOC\xcaand Perich foresee a parade of horribles that will follow our recognition of a ministerial exception to employment discrimination suits. According to the\xcaEEOC\xcaand Perich, such an exception could protect religious organizations from liability for retaliating against employees for reporting criminal misconduct or for testifying before a grand jury or in a criminal trial. What is more, the\xcaEEOC\xcacontends, the logic of the exception would confer on religious employers \xd2unfettered discretion\xd3 to violate employment laws by, for example, hiring children or aliens not authorized to work in the United States. Brief for Federal Respondent 29. "
[850] "Hosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaresponds that the ministerial exception would not in any way bar criminal prosecutions for interfering with law enforcement investigations or other proceedings. Nor, according to the\xcaChurch, would the exception bar government enforcement of general laws restricting eligibility\xca*196\xcafor employment, because the exception applies only to suits by or on behalf of ministers themselves.\xcaHosanna\xd0Tabor\xcaalso notes that the ministerial exception has been around in the lower courts for 40 years, see\xcaMcClure v. Salvation Army,\xca460 F.2d 553, 558 (C.A.5 1972), and has not given rise to the dire consequences predicted by the\xcaEEOC\xcaand Perich. "
[851] "The case before us is an employment discrimination suit brought on behalf of a minister, challenging her\xcachurch's\xcadecision to fire her. Today we hold only that the ministerial exception bars such a suit. We express no view on whether the exception bars other types of suits, including actions by employees alleging breach of contract or tortious conduct by their religious employers. There will be time enough to address the applicability of the exception to other circumstances if and when they arise. "
[852] "* * * "
[853] "The interest of society in the enforcement of employment discrimination statutes is undoubtedly important. But so too is the interest of religious groups in choosing who will preach their beliefs, teach their faith, and carry out their mission. When a minister who has been fired sues her\xcachurch\xcaalleging that her termination was discriminatory, the First Amendment has struck the balance for us. The\xcachurch\xcamust be free to choose those who will guide it on its way. "
[854] "The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed. "
[855] "It is so ordered. "
[856] "Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[857] "This case presents the question whether the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment prohibit a State from imposing a generally applicable sales and use tax on the distribution of religious materials by a religious organization. "
[858] "*381 I "
[859] "California's Sales and Use Tax Law requires retailers to pay a sales tax \xd2[f]or the privilege of selling tangible personal property at retail.\xd3 Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. \xa4 6051 (West 1987). A \xd2sale\xd3 includes any transfer of title or possession of tangible personal property for consideration. Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. \xa4 6006(a) (West Supp.1989). "
[860] "The use tax, as a complement to the sales tax, reaches out-of-state purchases by residents of the State. It is \xd2imposed on the storage, use, or other consumption in this state of tangible personal property purchased from any retailer,\xd3 \xa4 6201, at the same rate as the sales tax (6 percent). Although the use tax is imposed on the purchaser, \xa4 6202, it is generally collected by the retailer at the time the sale is made. \xa4\xa4 6202\xd06206. Neither the State Constitution nor the State Sales and Use Tax Law exempts religious organizations from the sales and use tax, apart from a limited exemption for the serving of meals by religious organizations, \xa4 6363.5. "
[861] "During the tax period in question (1974 to 1981), appellant Jimmy Swaggart Ministries was a religious organization incorporated as a Louisiana nonprofit corporation and recognized as such by the Internal Revenue Service pursuant to \xa4 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, 26 U.S.C. \xa4 501(c)(3) (1982 ed.), and by the California State Controller pursuant to the Inheritance Tax and Gift Tax Laws of the State of California. Appellant's constitution and bylaws provide that it \xd2is called for the purpose of establishing and maintaining an evangelistic outreach for the worship of Almighty God.\xd3 App. 107. This outreach is to be performed \xd2by all available means, both at home and in foreign lands,\xd3 and "
[862] "\xd2shall specifically include evangelistic crusades; missionary endeavors; radio broadcasting (as owner, broadcaster, and placement agency); television broadcasting (both as owner and broadcaster); and audio production and reproduction of music; audio production and reproduction *382 of preaching; audio production and reproduction of teaching; writing, printing and publishing; and, any and all other individual or mass media methods that presently exist or may be devised in the future to proclaim the good news of Jesus Christ.\xd3 Id., at 107\xd0108. "
[863] "From 1974 to 1981, appellant conducted numerous \xd2evangelistic crusades\xd3 in auditoriums and arenas across the country in cooperation with local churches. Id., at 61. During this period, appellant held 23 crusades in California\xd1each lasting 1 to 3 days, with one crusade lasting 6 days\xd1for a total of 52 days. Id., at 19\xd020. At the crusades, appellant conducted religious services that included preaching and singing. Some of these services were recorded for later sale or broadcast. **692 Appellant also sold religious books, tapes, records, and other religious and nonreligious merchandise at the crusades. "
[864] "Appellant also published a monthly magazine, \xd2The Evangelist,\xd3 which was sold nationwide by subscription. The magazine contained articles of a religious nature as well as advertisements for appellant's religious books, tapes, and records. The magazine included an order form listing the various items for sale in the particular issue and their unit price, with spaces for purchasers to fill in the quantity desired and the total price. Appellant also offered its items for sale through radio, television, and cable television broadcasts, including broadcasts through local California stations. "
[865] "In 1980, appellee Board of Equalization of the State of California (Board) informed appellant that religious materials were not exempt from the sales tax and requested appellant to register as a seller to facilitate reporting and payment of the tax. See Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. \xa4\xa4 6066\xd06074 (West 1987 and Supp.1989) (tax registration requirements). Appellant responded that it was exempt from such taxes under the First Amendment. In 1981, the Board audited appellant and advised appellant that it should register as a seller and report and pay sales tax on all sales made at its *383 California crusades. The Board also opined that appellant had a sufficient nexus with the State of California to require appellant to collect and report use tax on its mail-order sales to California purchasers. "
[866] "Based on the Board's review of appellant's records, the parties stipulated \xd2that [appellant] sold for use in California tangible personal property for the period April 1, 1974, through December 31, 1981, measured by payment to [appellant] of $1,702,942.00 for mail order sales from Baton Rouge, Louisiana and $240,560.00 for crusade merchandise sales in California.\xd3 App. 58. These figures represented the sales and use in California of merchandise with specific religious content\xd1Bibles, Bible study manuals, printed sermons and collections of sermons, audiocassette tapes of sermons, religious books and pamphlets, and religious music in the form of songbooks, tapes, and records. See App. to Juris. Statement B\xd01 to B\xd03. Based on the sales figures for appellant's religious materials, the Board notified appellant that it owed sales and use taxes of $118,294.54, plus interest of $36,021.11, and a penalty of $11,829.45, for a total amount due of $166,145.10. App. 8. Appellant did not contest the Board's assessment of tax liability for the sale and use of certain nonreligious merchandise, including such items as \xd2T-shirts with JSM logo, mugs, bowls, plates, replicas of crown of thorns, ark of the covenant, Roman coin, candlesticks, Bible stand, pen and pencil sets, prints of religious scenes, bud vase, and communion cups.\xd3 Id., at 59\xd060. "
[867] "Appellant filed a petition for redetermination with the Board, reiterating its view that the tax on religious materials violated the First Amendment. Following a hearing and an appeal to the Board, the Board deleted the penalty but otherwise redetermined the matter without adjustment in the amount of $118,294.54 in taxes owing, plus $65,043.55 in interest. Pursuant to state procedural law, appellant paid the amount and filed a petition for redetermination and refund with the Board. See Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. \xa4 6902 *384 West 1987). The Board denied appellant's petition, and appellant brought suit in state court, seeking a refund of the tax paid. "
[868] "The trial court entered judgment for the Board, ruling that appellant was not entitled to a refund of any tax. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, 204 Cal.App.3d 1269, 250 Cal.Rptr. 891 (1988), and the California Supreme Court denied discretionary review. We noted probable jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. \xa4 1257(2) (1982 ed.) (amended in 1988), 490 U.S. 1018, 109 S.Ct. 1741, 104 L.Ed.2d 178 (1989), and now affirm. "
[869] "**693 II "
[870] "Appellant's central contention is that the State's imposition of sales and use tax liability on its sale of religious materials contravenes the First Amendment's command, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, to \xd2make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.\xd3 Appellant challenges the Sales and Use Tax Law under both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. "
[871] "A "
[872] "The Free Exercise Clause, we have noted, \xd2withdraws from legislative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions thereof by civil authority.\xd3 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222\xd0223, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 1571\xd01572, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963). Indeed, \xd2[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.\xd3 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1535, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). Our cases have established that \xd2[t]he free exercise inquiry asks whether government has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling governmental interest justifies the *385 burden.\xd3 Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 2148, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989) (citations omitted). "
[873] "Appellant relies almost exclusively on our decisions in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943), and Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 576, 64 S.Ct. 717, 719, 88 L.Ed. 938 (1944), for the proposition that a State may not impose a sales or use tax on the evangelical distribution of religious material by a religious organization. Appellant contends that the State's imposition of use and sales tax liability on it burdens its evangelical distribution of religious materials in a manner identical to the manner in which the evangelists in Murdock and Follett were burdened. "
[874] "We reject appellant's expansive reading of Murdock and Follett as contrary to the decisions themselves. In Murdock, we considered the constitutionality of a city ordinance requiring all persons canvassing or soliciting within the city to procure a license by paying a flat fee. Reversing the convictions of Jehovah's Witnesses convicted under the ordinance of soliciting and distributing religious literature without a license, we explained: "
[875] "\xd2The hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism ... [and] has been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years. This form of evangelism is utilized today on a large scale by various religious sects whose colporteurs carry the Gospel to thousands upon thousands of homes and seek through personal visitations to win adherents to their faith. It is more than preaching; it is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a combination of both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting. This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching in the pulpits.\xd3 319 U.S., at 108\xd0109, 63 S.Ct., at 872\xd0873 (footnotes omitted). "
[876] "Accordingly, we held that \xd2spreading one's religious beliefs or preaching the Gospel through distribution of religious literature *386 and through personal visitations is an age-old type of evangelism with as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types.\xd3 Id., at 110, 63 S.Ct., at 873; see also Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, 63 S.Ct. 890, 87 L.Ed. 1290 (1943); Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943). "
[877] "We extended Murdock the following Term by invalidating, as applied to \xd2one who earns **694 his livelihood as an evangelist or preacher in his home town,\xd3 an ordinance (similar to that involved in Murdock ) that required all booksellers to pay a flat fee to procure a license to sell books. Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S., at 576, 64 S.Ct., at 719. Reaffirming our observation in Murdock that \xd2 \xd4the power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment,\xd5 \xd3 321 U.S., at 577, 64 S.Ct., at 719 (quoting Murdock, supra, 319 U.S., at 112, 63 S.Ct., at 874), we reasoned that \xd2[t]he protection of the First Amendment is not restricted to orthodox religious practices any more than it is to the expression of orthodox economic views. He who makes a profession of evangelism is not in a less preferred position than the casual worker.\xd3 321 U.S., at 577, 64 S.Ct., at 719. "
[878] "Our decisions in these cases, however, resulted from the particular nature of the challenged taxes\xd1flat license taxes that operated as a prior restraint on the exercise of religious liberty. In Murdock, for instance, we emphasized that the tax at issue was \xd2a license tax\xd1a flat tax imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights,\xd3 319 U.S., at 113, 63 S.Ct., at 875, and cautioned that \xd2[w]e do not mean to say that religious groups and the press are free from all financial burdens of government.... We have here something quite different, for example, from a tax on the income of one who engages in religious activities or a tax on property used or employed in connection with those activities.\xd3 Id., at 112, 63 S.Ct., at 874 (citing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250, 56 S.Ct. 444, 449, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936)); see also 319 U.S., at 115, 63 S.Ct., at 876 (\xd2This tax is not a charge for the enjoyment of a privilege or benefit bestowed by the state\xd3). In Follett, we reiterated that a preacher is not \xd2free from all financial burdens of government, including taxes on income *387 or property\xd3 and, \xd2like other citizens, may be subject to general taxation.\xd3 321 U.S., at 578, 64 S.Ct., at 719 (emphasis added). "
[879] "Significantly, we noted in both cases that a primary vice of the ordinances at issue was that they operated as prior restraints of constitutionally protected conduct: "
[880] "\xd2In all of these cases [in which license taxes have been invalidated] the issuance of the permit or license is dependent on the payment of a license tax. And the license tax is fixed in amount and unrelated to the scope of the activities of petitioners or to their realized revenues. It is not a nominal fee imposed as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of policing the activities in question. It is in no way apportioned. It is a flat license tax levied and collected as a condition to the pursuit of activities whose enjoyment is guaranteed by the First Amendment. Accordingly, it restrains in advance those constitutional liberties of press and religion and inevitably tends to suppress their exercise. That is almost uniformly recognized as the inherent vice and evil of this flat license tax.\xd3 Murdock, supra, 319 U.S., at 113\xd0114, 63 S.Ct., at 875\xd0876 (emphasis added). "
[881] "See also Follett, supra, 321 U.S., at 577, 64 S.Ct., at 719 (\xd2The exaction of a tax as a condition to the exercise of the great liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment is as obnoxious as the imposition of a censorship or a previous restraint\xd3) (citations omitted). Thus, although Murdock and Follett establish that appellant's form of religious exercise has \xd2as high a claim to constitutional protection as the more orthodox types,\xd3 Murdock, supra, 319 U.S., at 110, 63 S.Ct., at 873, those cases are of no further help to appellant. Our concern in Murdock and Follett\xd1that a flat license tax would act as a precondition to the free exercise of religious beliefs\xd1is simply not present where a tax applies to all sales and uses of tangible personal property in the State. "
[882] "Our reading of Murdock and Follett is confirmed by our decision in **695 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 103 S.Ct. 1365, 75 L.Ed.2d 295 (1983), where we considered *388 a newspaper's First Amendment challenge to a state use tax on ink and paper products used in the production of periodic publications. In the course of striking down the tax, we rejected the newspaper's suggestion, premised on Murdock and Follett, that a generally applicable sales tax could not be applied to publications. Construing those cases as involving \xd2a flat tax, unrelated to the receipts or income of the speaker or to the expenses of administering a valid regulatory scheme, as a condition of the right to speak,\xd3 460 U.S., at 587, n. 9, 103 S.Ct., at 137, n. 9 (emphasis in original), we noted: "
[883] "\xd2By imposing the tax as a condition of engaging in protected activity, the defendants in those cases imposed a form of prior restraint on speech, rendering the tax highly susceptible to constitutional challenge. In that regard, the cases cited by Star Tribune do not resemble a generally applicable sales tax. Indeed, our cases have consistently recognized that nondiscriminatory taxes on the receipts or income of newspapers would be permissible.\xd3 Ibid. (citations omitted). "
[884] "Accord, Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229, 107 S.Ct. 1722, 1727, 95 L.Ed.2d 209 (1987) (\xd2[A] genuinely nondiscriminatory tax on the receipts of newspapers would be constitutionally permissible\xd3). "
[885] "We also note that just last Term a plurality of the Court rejected the precise argument appellant now makes. In Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 109 S.Ct. 890, 103 L.Ed.2d 1 (1989), Justice BRENNAN, writing for three Justices, held that a state sales tax exemption for religious publications violated the Establishment Clause. Id., at 14\xd021, 109 S.Ct., at 899\xd0903 (plurality opinion). In so concluding, the plurality further held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prevent the State from withdrawing its exemption, noting that \xd2[t]o the extent that our opinions in Murdock and Follett might be read ... to suggest that the States and the Federal Government may never tax the sale of religious or other publications, we reject those dicta.\xd3 Id., at 24, 109 S.Ct., at 904. Justice WHITE, concurring in the judgment, concluded *389 that the exemption violated the Free Press Clause because the content of a publication determined its tax-exempt status. Id., at 24\xd025, 109 S.Ct., at 905. Justice BLACKMUN, joined by Justice O'CONNOR, concurred in the plurality's holding that the tax exemption at issue in that case contravened the Establishment Clause, but reserved the question whether \xd2the Free Exercise Clause requires a tax exemption for the sale of religious literature by a religious organization; in other words, defining the ultimate scope of Follett and Murdock may be left for another day.\xd3 Id., at 28, 109 S.Ct., at 907. In this case, of course, California has not chosen to create a tax exemption for religious materials, and we therefore have no need to revisit the Establishment Clause question presented in Texas Monthly. "
[886] "12We do, however, decide the free exercise question left open by Justice BLACKMUN's concurrence in Texas Monthly by limiting Murdock and Follett to apply only where a flat license tax operates as a prior restraint on the free exercise of religious beliefs. As such, Murdock and Follett plainly do not support appellant's free exercise claim. California's generally applicable sales and use tax is not a flat tax, represents only a small fraction of any retail sale, and applies neutrally to all retail sales of tangible personal property made in California. California imposes its sales and use tax even if the seller or the purchaser is charitable, religious, nonprofit, or state or local governmental in nature. See Union League Club v. Johnson, 18 Cal.2d 275, 278, 115 P.2d 425, 426 (1941); People v. Imperial County, 76 Cal.App.2d 572, 576\xd0577, 173 P.2d 352, 354 (1946); Bank of America National Trust & Savings Assn. v. State Board of Equalization, 209 Cal.App.2d 780, 796\xd0797, 26 Cal.Rptr. 348, 357\xd0358 (1962). Thus, the sales and use tax is not a tax on the right to disseminate religious information, ideas, or **696 beliefs per se; rather, it is a tax on the privilege of making retail sales of tangible personal property and on the storage, use, or other consumption of tangible personal property in California. For example, *390 California treats the sale of a Bible by a religious organization just as it would treat the sale of a Bible by a bookstore; as long as both are in-state retail sales of tangible personal property, they are both subject to the tax regardless of the motivation for the sale or the purchase. There is no danger that appellant's religious activity is being singled out for special and burdensome treatment. "
[887] "3Moreover, our concern in Murdock and Follett that flat license taxes operate as a precondition to the exercise of evangelistic activity is not present in this case, because the registration requirement, see Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. \xa4\xa4 6066\xd06074 (West 1987 and Supp.1989), and the tax itself do not act as prior restraints\xd1no fee is charged for registering, the tax is due regardless of preregistration, and the tax is not imposed as a precondition of disseminating the message. Thus, unlike the license tax in Murdock, which was \xd2in no way apportioned\xd3 to the \xd2realized revenues\xd3 of the itinerant preachers forced to pay the tax, 319 U.S., at 113\xd0114, 63 S.Ct., at 875\xd0876; see also Texas Monthly, supra, 489 U.S., at 22, 109 S.Ct., at 903, the tax at issue in this case is akin to a generally applicable income or property tax, which Murdock and Follett specifically state may constitutionally be imposed on religious activity. "
[888] "4In addition to appellant's misplaced reliance on Murdock and Follett, appellant's free exercise claim is also in significant tension with the Court's decision last Term in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 109 S.Ct. 2136, 104 L.Ed.2d 766 (1989), holding that the Government's disallowance of a tax deduction for religious \xd2auditing\xd3 and \xd2training\xd3 services did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id., at 694\xd0700, 109 S.Ct., at 2146\xd02149. The Court reasoned that "
[889] "\xd2[a]ny burden imposed on auditing or training ... derives solely from the fact that, as a result of the deduction denial, adherents have less money to gain access to such sessions. This burden is no different from that imposed by any public tax or fee; indeed, the burden imposed by the denial of the \xd4contribution or gift\xd5 deduction *391 would seem to pale by comparison to the overall federal income tax burden on an adherent.\xd3 Id., at 699, 109 S.Ct., at 2149. "
[890] "There is no evidence in this case that collection and payment of the tax violates appellant's sincere religious beliefs. California's nondiscriminatory Sales and Use Tax Law requires only that appellant collect the tax from its California purchasers and remit the tax money to the State. The only burden on appellant is the claimed reduction in income resulting from the presumably lower demand for appellant's wares (caused by the marginally higher price) and from the costs associated with administering the tax. As the Court made clear in Hernandez, however, to the extent that imposition of a generally applicable tax merely decreases the amount of money appellant has to spend on its religious activities, any such burden is not constitutionally significant. See ibid.; Texas Monthly, supra, 489 U.S., at 19\xd020, 109 S.Ct., at 902 (plurality opinion); see also Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 603\xd0604, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 1381\xd01382, 76 L.Ed.2d 157 (1983). "
[891] "Appellant contends that the availability of a deduction (at issue in Hernandez ) and the imposition of a tax (at issue here) are distinguishable, but in both cases adherents base their claim for an exemption on the argument that an \xd2incrementally larger tax burden interferes with their religious activities.\xd3 490 U.S., at 700, 109 S.Ct., at 2149. It is precisely this argument\xd1rather than one applicable only to deductions\xd1that the Court rejected in Hernandez. At bottom, though we do not doubt the economic cost to appellant of complying **697 with a generally applicable sales and use tax, such a tax is no different from other generally applicable laws and regulations\xd1such as health and safety regulations\xd1to which appellant must adhere. "
[892] "Finally, because appellant's religious beliefs do not forbid payment of the sales and use tax, appellant's reliance on Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and its progeny is misplaced, because in no sense has the State \xd2 \xd4condition[ed] receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a *392 religious faith, or ... denie[d] such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.\xd5 \xd3 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Florida, 480 U.S. 136, 141, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1049, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717\xd0718, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 1431\xd01432, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981)). Appellant has never alleged that the mere act of paying the tax, by itself, violates its sincere religious beliefs. "
[893] "We therefore conclude that the collection and payment of the generally applicable tax in this case imposes no constitutionally significant burden on appellant's religious practices or beliefs. The Free Exercise Clause accordingly does not require the State to grant appellant an exemption from its generally applicable sales and use tax. Although it is of course possible to imagine that a more onerous tax rate, even if generally applicable, might effectively choke off an adherent's religious practices, cf. Murdock, supra, 319 U.S., at 115, 63 S.Ct., at 876 (the burden of a flat tax could render itinerant evangelism \xd2crushed and closed out by the sheer weight of the toll or tribute which is exacted town by town\xd3), we face no such situation in this case. Accordingly, we intimate no views as to whether such a generally applicable tax might violate the Free Exercise Clause. "
[894] "B "
[895] "5Appellant also contends that application of the sales and use tax to its sale of religious materials violates the Establishment Clause because it fosters \xd2 \xd4an excessive government entanglement with religion,\xd5 \xd3 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York City, 397 U.S. 664, 674, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 1414, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970)). Appellant alleges, for example, that the present controversy has featured on-site inspections of appellant's evangelistic crusades, lengthy on-site audits, examinations of appellant's books and records, threats of criminal prosecution, and layers of administrative and judicial proceedings. "
[896] "*393 The Establishment Clause prohibits \xd2sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.\xd3 Walz, supra, at 668, 90 S.Ct., at 1411. The \xd2excessive entanglement\xd3 prong of the tripartite purpose-effect-entanglement Lemon test, see Lemon, 403 U.S., at 612\xd0613, 91 S.Ct., at 2111\xd02112, requires examination of \xd2the character and purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and the religious authority\xd3 id., at 615, 91 S.Ct., at 2112; see also Walz, 397 U.S., at 695, 90 S.Ct., at 1425 (separate opinion of Harlan, J.) (warning of \xd2programs, whose very nature is apt to entangle the state in details of administration\xd3). Indeed, in Walz we held that a tax exemption for \xd2religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious worship,\xd3 as part of a general exemption for nonprofit institutions, id., at 666\xd0667, 90 S.Ct., at 1410\xd01411, did not violate the Establishment Clause. In upholding the tax exemption, we specifically noted that taxation of religious properties would cause at least as much administrative entanglement between government and religious authorities as did the exemption: "
[897] "**698 \xd2Either course, taxation of churches or exemption, occasions some degree of involvement with religion. Elimination of exemption would tend to expand the involvement of government by giving rise to tax valuation of church property, tax liens, tax foreclosures, and the direct confrontations and conflicts that follow in the train of these legal processes. "
[898] "\xd2Granting tax exemptions to churches necessarily operates to afford an indirect economic benefit and also gives rise to some, but yet a lesser, involvement than taxing them. In analyzing either alternative the questions are whether the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.\xd3 Id., at 674\xd0675, 90 S.Ct., at 1414\xd01415. "
[899] "*394 The issue presented, therefore, is whether the imposition of sales and use tax liability in this case on appellant results in \xd2excessive\xd3 involvement between appellant and the State and \xd2continuing surveillance leading to an impermissible degree of entanglement.\xd3 "
[900] "At the outset, it is undeniable that a generally applicable tax has a secular purpose and neither advances nor inhibits religion, for the very essence of such a tax is that it is neutral and nondiscriminatory on questions of religious belief. Thus, whatever the precise contours of the Establishment Clause, see County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union of Pittsburgh, 492 U.S. 573, 589\xd0594, 109 S.Ct. 3086, 3099\xd03101, 106 L.Ed.2d 472 (1989) (tracing evolution of Establishment Clause doctrine); cf. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 615\xd0618, 108 S.Ct. 2562, \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 101 L.Ed.2d 520 (1988) (applying but noting criticism of the entanglement prong of the Lemon test), its undisputed core values are not even remotely called into question by the generally applicable tax in this case. "
[901] "Even applying the \xd2excessive entanglement\xd3 prong of the Lemon test, however, we hold that California's imposition of sales and use tax liability on appellant threatens no excessive entanglement between church and state. First, we note that the evidence of administrative entanglement in this case is thin. Appellant alleges that collection and payment of the sales and use tax impose severe accounting burdens on it. The Court of Appeal, however, expressly found that the record did not support appellant's factual assertions, noting that appellant \xd2had a sophisticated accounting staff and had recently computerized its accounting and that [appellant] in its own books and for purposes of obtaining a federal income tax exemption segregated \xd4retail sales' and \xd4donations.\xd5 \xd3 204 Cal.App.3d, at 1289, 250 Cal.Rptr., at 905. "
[902] "Second, even assuming that the tax imposes substantial administrative burdens on appellant, such administrative and recordkeeping burdens do not rise to a constitutionally significant level. Collection and payment of the tax will of course require some contact between appellant and the State, *395 but we have held that generally applicable administrative and recordkeeping regulations may be imposed on religious organization without running afoul of the Establishment Clause. See Hernandez, 490 U.S., at 696\xd0697, 109 S.Ct., at 2147\xd02148 (\xd2[R]outine regulatory interaction [such as application of neutral tax laws] which involves no inquiries into religious doctrine, ... no delegation of state power to a religious body, ... and no \xd4detailed monitoring and close administrative contact\xd5 between secular and religious bodies, ... does not of itself violate the nonentanglement command\xd3); Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S. 290, 305\xd0306, 105 S.Ct.1953, 1963\xd01964, 85 L.Ed.2d 278 (1985) (\xd2The Establishment Clause does not exempt religious organizations from such secular governmental activity as fire inspections and building and zoning regulations, Lemon, supra, 403 U.S., at 614, 91 S.Ct., at 2112, and the recordkeeping requirements of the Fair Labor Standards Act, while perhaps more burdensome in terms of paperwork, are not significantly more intrusive into religious affairs\xd3). To be sure, we noted in Tony and Susan Alamo Foundation **699 that the recordkeeping requirements at issue in that case \xd2appl[ied] only to commercial activities undertaken with a \xd4business purpose,\xd5 and would therefore have no impact on petitioners' own evangelical activities,\xd3 471 U.S., at 305, 105 S.Ct., at 1963, but that recognition did not bear on whether the generally applicable regulation was nevertheless \xd2the kind of government surveillance the Court has previously held to pose an intolerable risk of government entanglement with religion,\xd3 ibid. "
[903] "The fact that appellant must bear the cost of collecting and remitting a generally applicable sales and use tax\xd1even if the financial burden of such costs may vary from religion to religion\xd1does not enmesh government in religious affairs. Contrary to appellant's contentions, the statutory scheme requires neither the involvement of state employees in, nor on-site continuing inspection of, appellant's day-to-day operations. There is no \xd2official and continuing surveillance,\xd3 Walz, supra, 397 U.S., at 675, 90 S.Ct., at 1414, by government auditors. The sorts of *396 government entanglement that we have found to violate the Establishment Clause have been far more invasive than the level of contact created by the administration of neutral tax laws. Cf. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 414, 105 S.Ct. 3232, 3238, 87 L.Ed.2d 290 (1985); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116, 126\xd0127, 103 S.Ct. 505, 511\xd0512, 74 L.Ed.2d 297 (1982). "
[904] "Most significantly, the imposition of the sales and use tax without an exemption for appellant does not require the State to inquire into the religious content of the items sold or the religious motivation for selling or purchasing the items, because the materials are subject to the tax regardless of content or motive. From the State's point of view, the critical question is not whether the materials are religious, but whether there is a sale or a use, a question which involves only a secular determination. Thus, this case stands on firmer ground than Hernandez, because appellant offers the items at a stated price, thereby relieving the State of the need to place a monetary value on appellant's religious items. Compare Hernandez, 490 U.S., at 697\xd0698, 109 S.Ct., at 2148 (where no comparable good or service is sold in the marketplace, Internal Revenue Service looks to cost of providing the good or service), with id., at 706, 109 S.Ct., at 2152 (O'CONNOR, J., dissenting) (\xd2It becomes impossible ... to compute the \xd4contribution\xd5 portion of a payment to charity where what is received in return is not merely an intangible, but an intangible (or, for that matter a tangible) that is not bought and sold except in donative contexts\xd3). Although appellant asserts that donations often accompany payments made for the religious items and that items are sometimes given away without payment (or only nominal payment), it is plain that, in the first case, appellant's use of \xd2order forms\xd3 and \xd2price lists\xd3 renders illusory any difficulty in separating the two portions and that, in the second case, the question is only whether any particular transfer constitutes a \xd2sale.\xd3 Ironically, appellant's theory, under which government may not tax \xd2religious core\xd3 activities but may tax \xd2nonreligious\xd3 activities, would require government to do precisely what appellant asserts the Religion *397 Clauses prohibit: \xd2determine which expenditures are religious and which are secular.\xd3 Lemon, 403 U.S., at 621\xd0622, 91 S.Ct., at 2115\xd02116. "
[905] "Accordingly, because we find no excessive entanglement between government and religion in this case, we hold that the imposition of sales and use tax liability on appellant does not violate the Establishment Clause. "
[906] "III "
[907] "6Appellant also contends that the State's imposition of use tax liability on it violates the Commerce and Due Process Clauses because, as an out-of-state distributor, it had an insufficient \xd2nexus\xd3 to the **700 State. See National Geographic Society v. California Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551, 554, 97 S.Ct. 1386, 1389, 51 L.Ed.2d 631 (1977); National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill., 386 U.S. 753, 756\xd0760, 87 S.Ct. 1389, 1391\xd01393, 18 L.Ed.2d 505 (1967). We decline to reach the merits of this claim, however, because the courts below ruled that the claim was procedurally barred. "
[908] "California law provides that an administrative claim for a tax refund \xd2shall state the specific grounds upon which the claim is founded,\xd3 Cal.Rev. & Tax.Code Ann. \xa4 6904(a) (West Supp.1989), and that refund suits will be entertained only if \xd2a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed\xd3 with the Board, \xa4 6932. Suit may thereafter be brought only \xd2on the grounds set forth in the claim.\xd3 \xa4 6933. Thus, under state law, \xd2[t]he claim for refund delineates and restricts the issues to be considered in a taxpayer's refund action. The trial court and [appellate] court are without jurisdiction to consider grounds not set forth in the claim.\xd3 Atari, Inc. v. State Board of Equalization, 170 Cal.App.3d 665, 672, 216 Cal.Rptr. 267, 271 (1985) (citations omitted). This rule serves a legitimate state interest in requiring parties to exhaust administrative remedies before proceeding to court, for \xd2[s]uch a rule prevents having an overworked court consider issues and remedies available through administrative channels.\xd3 Id., at 673, 216 Cal.Rptr., at 272. "
[909] "*398 The record in this case makes clear that appellant, in its refund claim before the Board, failed even to cite the Commerce Clause or the Due Process Clause, much less articulate legal arguments contesting the nexus issue. See App. 34 (incorporating petition for redetermination, which in turn raised only First Amendment arguments, see id., at 11\xd016). The Board's hearing officer specifically noted, in forwarding his decision to the Board, that appellant's \xd2[c]ounsel does not argue nexus,\xd3 id., at 22, and indeed the parties stipulated before the trial court that appellant's request for a refund was based on its First Amendment claim, id., at 59. Accordingly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeal declined to rule on the nexus issue on the ground that appellant had failed to raise it in its refund claim before the Board. 204 Cal.App.3d, at 1290\xd01292, 250 Cal.Rptr., at 905\xd0906; App. 213. This unambiguous application of state procedural law makes it unnecessary for us to review the asserted claim. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041\xd01042, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3476\xd03477, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983); Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 512, n. 7, 98 S.Ct. 1942, 1951, n. 7, 56 L.Ed.2d 486 (1978). "
[910] "7Appellant nevertheless urges that the state procedural ground relied upon by the courts below is inadequate because the procedural rule is not \xd2 \xd4strictly or regularly followed.\xd5 \xd3 Hathorn v. Lovorn, 457 U.S. 255, 263, 102 S.Ct. 2421, 2426, 72 L.Ed.2d 824 (1982) (quoting Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149, 84 S.Ct. 1734, 1736, 12 L.Ed.2d 766 (1964)). Appellant asserts that state courts in California retain the authority to hear claims \xd2involving important questions of public policy\xd3 notwithstanding the parties' failure to raise those claims before an administrative agency. See Lindeleaf v. Agricultural Labor Relations Bd., 41 Cal.3d 861, 870\xd0871, 226 Cal.Rptr. 119, 124\xd0125, 718 P.2d 106, 112 (1986); Hale v. Morgan, 22 Cal.3d 388, 394, 149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 379, 584 P.2d 512, 516 (1978). Appellant observes, for example, that although the Court of Appeal in this case found appellant's nexus claim to be procedurally barred, it ignored the procedural bar and ruled on the merits of appellant's Ninth and Tenth Amendment arguments, see 204 Cal.App.3d, at 1292\xd01293, 250 Cal.Rptr., at 907\xd0908, even though those arguments *399 were likewise not raised in appellant's refund claim, see id., at 1292, n. 19, 250 Cal.Rptr., at 907, n. 19. "
[911] "The Court of Appeal, however, specifically rejected appellant's claim that the nexus issue raised \xd2important questions of public policy,\xd3 noting that the issue instead \xd2raise[d] **701 factual questions, the determination of which is not a matter of \xd4public policy\xd5 but a matter of evidence.\xd3 Id., at 1292, 250 Cal.Rptr., at 907. Even if the Court of Appeal erred as a matter of state law in declining to rule on appellant's nexus claim, appellant has failed to substantiate any claim that the California courts in general apply this exception in an irregular, arbitrary, or inconsistent manner. Accordingly, we conclude that appellant's Commerce Clause and Due Process Clause argument is not properly before us. We thus express no opinion on the merits of the claim. "
[912] "The judgment of the California Court of Appeal is affirmed. "
[913] "It is so ordered. "
[914] "Mr. Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[915] "This case involves a dispute over the ownership of church property following a schism in a local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organization. The question for decision is whether civil courts, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution, may resolve the dispute on the basis of \xd2neutral principles of law,\xd3 or whether they must defer to the resolution of an authoritative tribunal of the hierarchical church. "
[916] "I "
[917] "The Vineville Presbyterian Church of Macon, Ga., was organized in 1904, and first incorporated in 1915. Its corporate charter lapsed in 1935, but was revived and renewed in 1939, and continues in effect at the present time. "
[918] "The property at issue and on which the church is located was acquired in three transactions, and is evidenced by conveyances to the \xd2Trustees of [or \xd4for\xd5] Vineville Presbyterian Church and their successors in office,\xd3 App. 251, 253, or simply to the \xd2Vineville Presbyterian Church.\xd3 Id., at 249. The funds used to acquire the property were contributed entirely by local church members. Pursuant to resolutions adopted by the congregation, the church repeatedly has borrowed money on the property. This indebtedness is evidenced by security deeds variously issued in the name of the \xd2Trustees of the Vineville Presbyterian Church,\xd3 e. g., id., at 278, or, again, simply the \xd2Vineville Presbyterian Church.\xd3 Id., at 299. "
[919] "In the same year it was organized, the Vineville church was established as a member church of the Augusta-Macon Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church in the United States (PCUS). The PCUS has a generally hierarchical or connectional *598 form of government, as contrasted with a congregational form. Under the polity of the PCUS, the government of the local church is committed to its Session in the first instance, but the actions of this assembly or \xd2court\xd3 are subject to the review and control **3023 of the higher church courts, the Presbytery, Synod, and General Assembly, respectively. The powers and duties of each level of the hierarchy are set forth in the constitution of the PCUS, the Book of Church Order, which is part of the record in the present case. "
[920] "On May 27, 1973, at a congregational meeting of the Vineville church attended by a quorum of its duly enrolled members, 164 of them, including the pastor, voted to separate from the PCUS. Ninety-four members opposed the resolution. The majority immediately informed the PCUS of the action, and then united with another denomination, the Presbyterian Church in America. Although the minority remained on the church rolls for three years, they ceased to participate in the affairs of the Vineville church and conducted their religious activities elsewhere. "
[921] "In response to the schism within the Vineville congregation, the Augusta-Macon Presbytery appointed a commission to investigate the dispute and, if possible, to resolve it. The commission eventually issued a written ruling declaring that the minority faction constituted \xd2the true congregation of Vineville Presbyterian Church,\xd3 and withdrawing from the majority faction \xd2all authority to exercise office derived from the [PCUS].\xd3 App. 235. The majority took no part in the commission's inquiry, and did not appeal its ruling to a higher PCUS tribunal. "
[922] "Representatives of the minority faction sought relief in federal court, but their complaint was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. Lucas v. Hope, 515 F.2d 234 (CA5 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967, 96 S.Ct. 1464, 47 L.Ed.2d 734 (1976). They then brought this class action in state court, seeking declaratory and injunctive orders establishing their right to exclusive possession and use of the *599 Vineville church property as a member congregation of the PCUS. The trial court, purporting to apply Georgia's \xd2neutral principles of law\xd3 approach to church property disputes, granted judgment for the majority. The Supreme Court of Georgia, holding that the trial court had correctly stated and applied Georgia law, and rejecting the minority's challenge based on the First and Fourteenth Amendments, affirmed. 241 Ga. 208, 243 S.E.2d 860 (1978). We granted certiorari. 439 U.S. 891, 99 S.Ct. 247, 58 L.Ed. 237 (1978). "
[923] "II "
[924] "Georgia's approach to church property litigation has evolved in response to Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 601, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969) (Presbyterian Church I ), rev'g Presbyterian Church v. Eastern Heights Church, 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968). That case was a property dispute between the PCUS and two local Georgia churches that had withdrawn from the PCUS. The Georgia Supreme Court resolved the controversy by applying a theory of implied trust, whereby the property of a local church affiliated with a hierarchical church organization was deemed to be held in trust for the general church, provided the general church had not \xd2substantially abandoned\xd3 the tenets of faith and practice as they existed at the time of affiliation.1 This Court reversed, holding that Georgia would have to find some other way of resolving church property disputes that did not draw the state courts into religious controversies. The Court did not specify what that method should be, although it noted in passing that \xd2there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without \xd4establishing\xd5 churches to which property is awarded.\xd3 393 U.S., at 449, 89 S.Ct., at 606. "
[925] "*600 On remand, the Georgia Supreme Court concluded that, without the departure-from-doctrine element, the implied trust theory would have to be abandoned in its entirety. Presbyterian Church v. Eastern **3024 Heights Church, 225 Ga. 259, 167 S.E.2d 658 (1969) (Presbyterian Church II ). In its place, the court adopted what is now known as the \xd2neutral principles of law\xd3 method for resolving church property disputes. The court examined the deeds to the properties, the state statutes dealing with implied trusts, Ga.Code \xa4\xa4 108-106, 108-107 (1978), and the Book of Church Order to determine whether there was any basis for a trust in favor of the general church. Finding nothing that would give rise to a trust in any of these documents, the court awarded the property on the basis of legal title, which was in the local church, or in the names of trustees for the local church. 225 Ga., at 261, 167 S.E.2d, at 660. Review was again sought in this Court, but was denied. 396 U.S. 1041, 90 S.Ct. 680, 24 L.Ed.2d 685 (1970). "
[926] "The neutral-principles analysis was further refined by the Georgia Supreme Court in Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga. 30, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 868, 97 S.Ct. 180, 50 L.Ed.2d 148 (1976). That case concerned a property dispute between The United Methodist Church and a local congregation that had withdrawn from that church. As in Presbyterian Church II, the court found no basis for a trust in favor of the general church in the deeds, the corporate charter, or the state statutes dealing with implied trusts. The court observed, however, that the constitution of The United Methodist Church, its Book of Discipline, contained an express trust provision in favor of the general church.2 On this basis, the church property was *601 awarded to the denominational church. 236 Ga., at 39, 222 S.E.2d, at 328. "
[927] "In the present case, the Georgia courts sought to apply the neutral-principles analysis of Presbyterian Church II and Carnes to the facts presented by the Vineville church controversy. Here, as in those two earlier cases, the deeds conveyed the property to the local church. Here, as in the earlier cases, neither the state statutes dealing with implied trusts, nor the corporate charter of the Vineville church, indicated that the general church had any interest in the property. And here, as in Presbyterian Church II, but in contrast to Carnes, the provisions of the constitution of the general church, the Book of Church Order, concerning the ownership and control of property failed to reveal any language of trust in favor of the general church. The courts accordingly held that legal title to the property of the Vineville church was vested in the local congregation. Without further analysis or elaboration, they further decreed that the local congregation was represented by the majority faction, respondents herein. App. to Pet. for Cert. 9a.; 241 Ga., at 212, 243 S.E.2d, at 864. "
[928] "*602 III "
[929] "12The only question presented by this case is which faction of the formerly united Vineville congregation is entitled to possess and enjoy the property located at 2193 Vineville Avenue in Macon, Ga. There can be little doubt about the general authority of civil courts to resolve this question. **3025 The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership of church property can be determined conclusively. Presbyterian Church I, 393 U.S., at 445, 89 S.Ct., at 604. "
[930] "It is also clear, however, that \xd2the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes.\xd3 Id., at 449, 89 S.Ct., at 606. Most importantly, the First Amendment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doctrine and practice. Serbian Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 2381, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976); Maryland & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 368, 90 S.Ct. 499, 500, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970); Presbyterian Church I, 393 U.S., at 449, 89 S.Ct., at 606. As a corollary to this commandment, the Amendment requires that civil courts defer to the resolution of issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical church organization. Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S., at 724-725, 96 S.Ct., at 2387; cf. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 733-734, 13 Wall. 679, 733-734, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872). Subject to these limitations, however, the First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes. Indeed, \xd2a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith.\xd3 Maryland & Va. Churches, 396 U.S., at 368, 90 S.Ct., at 500. (BRENNAN, J., concurring) (emphasis in original). "
[931] "3At least in general outline, we think the \xd2neutral principles of law\xd3 approach is consistent with the foregoing constitutional principles. The neutral-principles approach was approved *603 in Maryland & Va. Churches, supra, an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland settling a local church property dispute on the basis of the language of the deeds, the terms of the local church charters, the state statutes governing the holding of church property, and the provisions in the constitution of the general church concerning the ownership and control of church property. Finding that this analysis entailed \xd2no inquiry into religious doctrine,\xd3 the Court dismissed the appeal for want of a substantial federal question. 396 U.S., at 368, 90 S.Ct., at 500. \xd2Neutral principles of law\xd3 also received approving reference in Presbyterian Church I, 393 U.S., at 449, 89 S.Ct., at 606; in Mr. Justice BRENNAN's concurrence in Maryland & Va. Churches, 396 U.S., at 370, 90 S.Ct., at 501; and in Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S., at 723 n. 15, 96 S.Ct., at 23873. "
[932] "The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. The method relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar to lawyers and judges. It thereby promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice. Furthermore, the neutral-principles analysis shares the peculiar genius of private-law systems in general-flexibility in ordering private rights and obligations to reflect the intentions of the parties. Through appropriate reversionary clauses and trust provisions, religious societies can specify what is to happen to church property in the event of a particular contingency, or what religious body will determine the ownership in the event of a schism or doctrinal controversy. In this manner, a religious organization *604 can **3026 ensure that a dispute over the ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the desires of the members. "
[933] "This is not to say that the application of the neutral-principles approach is wholly free of difficulty. The neutral-principles method, at least as it has evolved in Georgia, requires a civil court to examine certain religious documents, such as a church constitution, for language of trust in favor of the general church. In undertaking such an examination, a civil court must take special care to scrutinize the document in purely secular terms, and not to rely on religious precepts in determining whether the document indicates that the parties have intended to create a trust. In addition, there may be cases where the deed, the corporate charter, or the constitution of the general church incorporates religious concepts in the provisions relating to the ownership of property. If in such a case the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to resolve a religious controversy, then the court must defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the authoritative ecclesiastical body. Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S., at 709, 96 S.Ct., at 2380. "
[934] "On balance, however, the promise of nonentanglement and neutrality inherent in the neutral-principles approach more than compensates for what will be occasional problems in application. These problems, in addition, should be gradually eliminated as recognition is given to the obligation of \xd2States, religious organizations, and individuals [to] structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.\xd3 Presbyterian Church I, 393 U.S., at 449, 89 S.Ct., at 606. We therefore hold that a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating a church property dispute. "
[935] "4The dissent would require the States to abandon the neutral-principles method, and instead would insist as a matter of constitutional law that whenever a dispute arises over the *605 ownership of church property, civil courts must defer to the \xd2authoritative resolution of the dispute within the church itself.\xd3 Post, at 3031. It would require, first, that civil courts review ecclesiastical doctrine and polity to determine where the church has \xd2placed ultimate authority over the use of the church property.\xd3 Post, at 3033. After answering this question, the courts would be required to \xd2determine whether the dispute has been resolved within that structure of government and, if so, what decision has been made.\xd3 Post, at 3033 n. 6. They would then be required to enforce that decision. We cannot agree, however, that the First Amendment requires the States to adopt a rule of compulsory deference to religious authority in resolving church property disputes, even where no issue of doctrinal controversy is involved. "
[936] "The dissent suggests that a rule of compulsory deference would somehow involve less entanglement of civil courts in matters of religious doctrine, practice, and administration. Under its approach, however, civil courts would always be required to examine the polity and administration of a church to determine which unit of government has ultimate control over church property. In some cases, this task would not prove to be difficult. But in others, the locus of control would be ambiguous, and \xd2[a] careful examination of the constitutions of the general and local church, as well as other relevant documents, [would] be necessary to ascertain the form of governance adopted by the members of the religious association.\xd3 Post, at 3034. In such cases, the suggested rule would appear to require \xd2a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity.\xd3 Serbian Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S., at 723, 96 S.Ct., at 2387. The neutral-principles approach, in contrast, obviates entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church property disputes. "
[937] "The dissent also argues that a rule of compulsory deference is necessary in order to protect the free exercise rights \xd2of *606 those who have formed the association and submitted **3027 themselves to its authority.\xd3 Post, at 3033. This argument assumes that the neutral-principles method would somehow frustrate the free-exercise rights of the members of a religious association. Nothing could be further from the truth. The neutral-principles approach cannot be said to \xd2inhibit\xd3 the free exercise of religion, any more than do other neutral provisions of state law governing the manner in which churches own property, hire employees, or purchase goods. Under the neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a church property dispute is not foreordained. At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property. They can modify the deeds or the corporate charter to include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church. Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an express trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden involved in taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil courts will be bound to give effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some legally cognizable form.4 "
[938] "IV "
[939] "It remains to be determined whether the Georgia neutral-principles analysis was constitutionally applied on the facts of this case. Although both the trial court and the Supreme Court of Georgia viewed the case as involving nothing more than an application of the principles developed in Presbyterian Church II and in Carnes, the present case contains a significant complicating factor absent in each of those earlier cases. Presbyterian Church II and Carnes each involved a *607 church property dispute between the general church and the entire local congregation. Here, the local congregation was itself divided between a majority of 164 members who sought to withdraw from the PCUS, and a minority of 94 members who wished to maintain the affiliation. Neither of the state courts alluded to this problem, however; each concluded without discussion or analysis that the title to the property was in the local church and that the local church was represented by the majority rather than the minority. "
[940] "Petitioners earnestly submit that the question of which faction is the true representative of the Vineville church is an ecclesiastical question that cannot be answered by a civil court. At least, it is said, it cannot be answered by a civil court in a case involving a hierarchical church, like the PCUS, where a duly appointed church commission has determined which of the two factions represents the \xd2true congregation.\xd3 Respondents, in opposition, argue in effect that the Georgia courts did no more than apply the ordinary presumption that, absent some indication to the contrary, a voluntary religious association is represented by a majority of its members. "
[941] "5If in fact Georgia has adopted a presumptive rule of majority representation, defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the local church is to be determined by some other means, we think this would be consistent with both the neutral-principles analysis and the First Amendment. Majority rule is generally employed in the governance of religious societies. See Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. 131, 15 Wall. 131, 21 L.Ed. 69 (1872). Furthermore, the majority faction generally can be identified without resolving any question of religious doctrine or polity. Certainly, there was no dispute in the present case about the identity of the duly enrolled members of the Vineville church when the dispute arose, or about the fact that a quorum was present, or about the final vote. Most importantly, any rule of majority representation can always be overcome, under the neutral-principles approach, either by providing, in the corporate *608 charter or the constitution **3028 of the general church, that the identity of the local church is to be established in some other way, or by providing that the church property is held in trust for the general church and those who remain loyal to it. Indeed, the State may adopt any method of overcoming the majoritarian presumption, so long as the use of that method does not impair free-exercise rights or entangle the civil courts in matters of religious controversy.5 "
[942] "6Neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court of Georgia, however, explicitly stated that it was adopting a presumptive rule of majority representation.6 Moreover, there are at least some indications that under Georgia law the process of identifying the faction that represents the Vineville church involves considerations of religious doctrine and polity. Georgia law requires that \xd2church property be held according to the terms of the church government,\xd3 and provides that a local church affiliated with a hierarchical religious association \xd2is part of the whole body of the general church and is subject to the higher authority of the organization and its laws and regulations.\xd3 *609 Carnes v. Smith, 236 Ga., at 33, 38, 222 S.E.2d, at 325, 328; see Ga.Code \xa4\xa4 22-5507, 22-5508 (1978). All this may suggest that the identity of the \xd2Vineville Presbyterian Church\xd3 named in the deeds must be determined according to terms of the Book of Church Order, which sets out the laws and regulations of churches affiliated with the PCUS. Such a determination, however, would appear to require a civil court to pass on questions of religious doctrine,7 and to usurp the function of the commission appointed by the Presbytery, which already has determined that petitioners represent the \xd2true congregation\xd3 of the Vineville church. Therefore, if Georgia law provides that the identity of the Vineville church is to be determined according to the \xd2laws and regulations\xd3 of the PCUS, then the First Amendment requires that the Georgia courts give deference to the presbyterial commission's determination of that church's identity.8 "
[943] "This Court, of course, does not declare what the law of Georgia is. Since the **3029 grounds for the decision that respondents *610 represent the Vineville church remain unarticulated, the judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is vacated, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. "
[944] "It is so ordered. "
[945] "Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[946] "New York Educ. Law \xa4 414 (McKinney 1988 and Supp.1993) authorizes local school boards to adopt reasonable regulations for the use of school property for 10 specified purposes when the property is not in use for school purposes. Among the permitted uses is the holding of \xd2social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community; but such meetings, entertainment and uses shall be non-exclusive and shall be open **2144 to the general public.\xd3 \xa4 414(1)(c).1 The list of permitted uses does not include meetings for religious purposes, and a New York appellate court in Trietley v. Board of Ed. of Buffalo, 65 A.D.2d 1, 409 N.Y.S.2d 912, 915 (1978), ruled that local boards could not allow student bible clubs to meet *387 on school property because \xd2[r]eligious purposes are not included in the enumerated purposes for which a school may be used under section 414.\xd3 In Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, Inc. v. Sobol, 948 F.2d 79, 83\xd084 (1991), the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit accepted Trietley as an authoritative interpretation of state law. Furthermore, the Attorney General of New York supports Trietley as an appropriate approach to deciding this case. "
[947] "Pursuant to \xa4 414's empowerment of local school districts, the Board of Center Moriches Union Free School District (District) has issued rules and regulations with respect to the use of school property when not in use for school purposes. The rules allow only 2 of the 10 purposes authorized by \xa4 414: social, civic, or recreational uses (Rule 10) and use by political organizations if secured in compliance with \xa4 414 (Rule 8). Rule 7, however, consistent with the judicial interpretation of state law, provides that \xd2[t]he school premises shall not be used by any group for religious purposes.\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a. "
[948] "The issue in this case is whether, against this background of state law, it violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, to deny a church access to school premises to exhibit for public viewing and for assertedly religious purposes, a film series dealing with family and child-rearing issues faced by parents today. "
[949] "I "
[950] "Petitioners (Church) are Lamb's Chapel, an evangelical church in the community of Center Moriches, and its pastor John Steigerwald. Twice the Church applied to the District for permission to use school facilities to show a six-part film series containing lectures by Doctor James Dobson.2 A brochureprovided *388 on request of the District identified Dr. Dobson as a licensed psychologist, former associate clinical professor of pediatrics at the University of Southern California, best-selling author, and radio commentator. The brochure stated that the film series would discuss Dr. Dobson's views on the undermining influences of the media that could only be counterbalanced by returning to traditional, Christian family values instilled at an early stage. The brochure went on to describe the contents of each of the six parts of the series.3 The District denied the first application, saying *389 that **2145 \xd2[t]his film does appear to be church related and therefore your request must be refused.\xd3 App. 84. The second application for permission to use school premises for showing the film series, which described it as a \xd2Family oriented movie\xd1from a Christian perspective,\xd3 id., at 91, was denied using identical language. "
[951] "The Church brought suit in the District Court, challenging the denial as a violation of the Freedom of Speech and Assembly Clauses, the Free Exercise Clause, and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, as well as the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As to each cause of action, the Church alleged that the actions were undertaken under color of state law, in violation of 42 U.S.C. \xa4 1983. The District Court granted summary judgment for respondents, rejecting all the Church's claims. With respect to the free-speech claim under the First Amendment, the District Court characterized the District's facilities as a \xd2limited public forum.\xd3 The court noted that the enumerated purposes for which \xa4 414 allowed access to school facilities did not include religious worship or instruction, that Rule 7 explicitly proscribes using school facilities for religious purposes, and that the Church had conceded that its showing of the film series would be for religious purposes. 770 F.Supp. 91, 92, 98\xd099 (E.D.N.Y.1991). The District Court stated that once a limited public forum is opened to a particular type of speech, selectively denying access to other activities of the same genre is forbidden. Id., at 99. Noting that the District had not opened its facilities to organizations *390 similar to Lamb's Chapel for religious purposes, the District Court held that the denial in this case was viewpoint neutral and, hence, not a violation of the Freedom of Speech Clause. Ibid. The District Court also rejected the assertion by the Church that denying its application demonstrated a hostility to religion and advancement of nonreligion not justified under the Establishment of Religion Clause of the First Amendment. 736 F.Supp. 1247, 1253 (1990). "
[952] "The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the District Court \xd2in all respects.\xd3 959 F.2d 381, 389 (CA2 1992). It held that the school property, when not in use for school purposes, was neither a traditional nor a designated public forum; rather, it was a limited public forum open only for designated purposes, a classification that \xd2allows it to remain non-public except as to specified uses.\xd3 Id., at 386. The court observed that exclusions in such a forum need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral, ibid., and ruled that denying access to the Church for the purpose of showing its film did not violate this standard. Because the holding below was questionable under our decisions, we granted the petition for certiorari, 506 U.S. 813, 113 S.Ct. 51, 121 L.Ed.2d 20 (1992), which in principal part challenged the holding **2146 below as contrary to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.4 "
[953] "II "
[954] "12There is no question that the District, like the private owner of property, may legally preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is dedicated. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800, 105 S.Ct. 3439, 3448, 87 L.Ed.2d 567 (1985); Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37, 46, 103 S.Ct. 948, 955, 74 L.Ed.2d 794 (1983); Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh *391 Civic Assns., 453 U.S. 114, 129\xd0130, 101 S.Ct. 2676, 2685, 69 L.Ed.2d 517 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836, 96 S.Ct. 1211, 1216, 47 L.Ed.2d 505 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47, 87 S.Ct. 242, 247, 17 L.Ed.2d 149 (1966). It is also common ground that the District need not have permitted after-hours use of its property for any of the uses permitted by N.Y. Educ. Law \xa4 414. The District, however, did open its property for 2 of the 10 uses permitted by \xa4 414. The Church argued below that because under Rule 10 of the rules issued by the District, school property could be used for \xd2social, civic, and recreational\xd3 purposes, the District had opened its property for such a wide variety of communicative purposes that restrictions on communicative uses of the property were subject to the same constitutional limitations as restrictions in traditional public forums such as parks and sidewalks. Hence, its view was that subject matter or speaker exclusions on District property were required to be justified by a compelling state interest and to be narrowly drawn to achieve that end. See Perry, supra, 460 U.S. at 45, 103 S.Ct., at 955; Cornelius, supra, 473 U.S. at 800, 105 S.Ct., at 3448. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals rejected this submission, which is also presented to this Court. The argument has considerable force, for the District's property is heavily used by a wide variety of private organizations, including some that presented a \xd2close question,\xd3 which the Court of Appeals resolved in the District's favor, as to whether the District had in fact already opened its property for religious uses. 959 F.2d, at 387.5 We need *392 not rule on this issue, however, for even if the courts below were correct in this respect\xd1and we shall assume **2147 for present purposes that they were\xd1the judgment below must be reversed. "
[955] "With respect to public property that is not a designated public forum open for indiscriminate public use for communicative purposes, we have said that \xd2[c]ontrol over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in *393 light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.\xd3 Cornelius, 473 U.S., at 806, 105 S.Ct., at 3451, citing Perry Education Assn., supra, 460 U.S., at 49, 103 S.Ct., at 957. The Court of Appeals appeared to recognize that the total ban on using District property for religious purposes could survive First Amendment challenge only if excluding this category of speech was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The court's conclusion in this case was that Rule 7 met this test. We cannot agree with this holding, for Rule 7 was unconstitutionally applied in this case.6 "
[956] "3The Court of Appeals thought that the application of Rule 7 in this case was viewpoint neutral because it had been, and would be, applied in the same way to all uses of school property for religious purposes. That all religions and all uses for religious purposes are treated alike under Rule 7, however, does not answer the critical question whether it discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the subject matter from a religious standpoint. "
[957] "4There is no suggestion from the courts below or from the District or the State that a lecture or film about child rearing and family values would not be a use for social or civic purposes otherwise permitted by Rule 10. That subject matter is not one that the District has placed off limits to any and all speakers. Nor is there any indication in the record before us that the application to exhibit the particular film series involved here was, or would have been, denied for any reason other than the fact that the presentation would have *394 been from a religious perspective. In our view, denial on that basis was plainly invalid under our holding in Cornelius, supra, 473 U.S., at 806, 105 S.Ct., at 3451, that "
[958] "\xd2[a]lthough a speaker may be excluded from a non-public forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed within the purpose of the forum ... or if he is not a member of the class of speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created ..., the government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise includible subject.\xd3 "
[959] "The film series involved here no doubt dealt with a subject otherwise permissible under Rule 10, and its exhibition was denied solely because the series dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint. The principle that has emerged from our cases \xd2is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some **2148 viewpoints or ideas at the expense of others.\xd3 City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804, 104 S.Ct. 2118, 2128, 80 L.Ed.2d 772 (1984). That principle applies in the circumstances of this case; as Judge Posner said for the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, to discriminate \xd2against a particular point of view ... would ... flunk the test ... [of] Cornelius, provided that the defendants have no defense based on the establishment clause.\xd3 May v. Evansville\xd0Vanderburgh School Corp., 787 F.2d 1105, 1114 (1986). "
[960] "The District, as a respondent, would save its judgment below on the ground that to permit its property to be used for religious purposes would be an establishment of religion forbidden by the First Amendment. This Court suggested in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 271, 102 S.Ct. 269, 275, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981), that the interest of the State in avoiding an Establishment Clause violation \xd2may be [a] compelling\xd3 one justifying an abridgment of free speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment; but the Court went on to hold that permitting use of university *395 property for religious purposes under the open access policy involved there would not be incompatible with the Court's Establishment Clause cases. "
[961] "5We have no more trouble than did the Widmar Court in disposing of the claimed defense on the ground that the posited fears of an Establishment Clause violation are unfounded. The showing of this film series would not have been during school hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, not just to church members. The District property had repeatedly been used by a wide variety of private organizations. Under these circumstances, as in Widmar, there would have been no realistic danger that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church would have been no more than incidental. As in Widmar, supra, 454 U.S., at 271\xd0272, 102 S.Ct., at 275\xd0276, permitting District property to be used to exhibit the film series involved in this case would not have been an establishment of religion under the three-part test articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971): The challenged governmental action has a secular purpose, does not have the principal or primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.7 "
[962] "The District also submits that it justifiably denied use of its property to a \xd2radical\xd3 church for the purpose of proselytizing, since to do so would lead to threats of public unrest and even violence. Brief for Respondent Center Moriches *396 Union Free School District et al. 4\xd05, 11\xd012, 24. There is nothing in the record to support such a justification, which in any event would be difficult to defend as a reason to deny the presentation of a religious point of view about a subject the District otherwise opens to discussion on District property. "
[963] "We note that the New York State Attorney General, a respondent here, does not rely on either the Establishment Clause or possible danger to the public peace in supporting the judgment below. Rather, he submits that the exclusion is justified because the purpose of the access rules is to promote the interests of the public in general rather than sectarian or other private interests. In light of the variety of the uses of District property that have been permitted under Rule 10, this **2149 approach has its difficulties. This is particularly so since Rule 10 states that District property may be used for social, civic, or recreational use \xd2only if it can be non-exclusive and open to all residents of the school district that form a homogeneous group deemed relevant to the event.\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. 57a. At least arguably, the Rule does not require that permitted uses need be open to the public at large. However that may be, this was not the basis of the judgment that we are reviewing. The Court of Appeals, as we understand it, ruled that because the District had the power to permit or exclude certain subject matters, it was entitled to deny use for any religious purpose, including the purpose in this case. The Attorney General also defends this as a permissible subject-matter exclusion rather than a denial based on viewpoint, a submission that we have already rejected. "
[964] "The Attorney General also argues that there is no express finding below that the Church's application would have been granted absent the religious connection. This fact is beside the point for the purposes of this opinion, which is concerned with the validity of the stated reason for denying the *397 Church's application, namely, that the film series sought to be shown \xd2appeared to be church related.\xd3 "
[965] "For the reasons stated in this opinion, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is "
[966] "Reversed. "
[967] "Justice O'CONNOR delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[968] "This case requires us to consider whether the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause prohibits the Government from permitting timber harvesting in, or constructing a road through, a portion of a National Forest that has traditionally *442 been used for religious purposes by members of three American Indian tribes in northwestern California. We conclude that it does not. "
[969] "I "
[970] "As part of a project to create a paved 75\xd0mile road linking two California towns, Gasquet and Orleans, the United States Forest Service has upgraded 49 miles of previously unpaved roads on federal land. In order to complete this project (the G\xd0O road), the Forest Service must build a 6\xd0mile paved segment through the Chimney **1322 Rock section of the Six Rivers National Forest. That section of the forest is situated between two other portions of the road that are already complete. "
[971] "In 1977, the Forest Service issued a draft environmental impact statement that discussed proposals for upgrading an existing unpaved road that runs through the Chimney Rock area. In response to comments on the draft statement, the Forest Service commissioned a study of American Indian cultural and religious sites in the area. The Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation adjoins the Six Rivers National Forest, and the Chimney Rock area has historically been used for religious purposes by Yurok, Karok, and Tolowa Indians. The commissioned study, which was completed in 1979, found that the entire area \xd2is significant as an integral and indispensible part of Indian religious conceptualization and practice.\xd3 App. 181. Specific sites are used for certain rituals, and \xd2successful use of the [area] is dependent upon and facilitated by certain qualities of the physical environment, the most important of which are privacy, silence, and an undisturbed natural setting.\xd3 Ibid. (footnote omitted). The study concluded that constructing a road along any of the available routes \xd2would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an integral and necessary part of the belief systems and lifeway of Northwest California Indian peoples.\xd3 Id., at 182. Accordingly, the report recommended that the G\xd0O road not be completed. "
[972] "*443 In 1982, the Forest Service decided not to adopt this recommendation, and it prepared a final environmental impact statement for construction of the road. The Regional Forester selected a route that avoided archeological sites and was removed as far as possible from the sites used by contemporary Indians for specific spiritual activities. Alternative routes that would have avoided the Chimney Rock area altogether were rejected because they would have required the acquisition of private land, had serious soil stability problems, and would in any event have traversed areas having ritualistic value to American Indians. See id., at 217\xd0218. At about the same time, the Forest Service adopted a management plan allowing for the harvesting of significant amounts of timber in this area of the forest. The management plan provided for one-half mile protective zones around all the religious sites identified in the report that had been commissioned in connection with the G\xd0O road. "
[973] "After exhausting their administrative remedies, respondents\xd1an Indian organization, individual Indians, nature organizations and individual members of those organizations, and the State of California\xd1challenged both the road-building and timber-harvesting decisions in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Respondents claimed that the Forest Service's decisions violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 86 Stat. 896, as amended, 33 U.S.C. \xa4 1251 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 83 Stat. 852, 42 U.S.C. \xa4 4321 et seq., several other federal statutes, and governmental trust responsibilities to Indians living on the Hoopa Valley Reservation. "
[974] "After a trial, the District Court issued a permanent injunction prohibiting the Government from constructing the Chimney Rock section of the G\xd0O road or putting the timber-harvesting management plan into effect. See Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 565 F.Supp. 586 (1983). The court found that both actions would violate *444 the Free Exercise Clause because they \xd2would seriously damage the salient visual, aural, and environmental qualities of the high country.\xd3 Id., at 594\xd0595. The court also found that both proposed actions would violate the FWPCA, and that the environmental impact statements for construction of the road were deficient under the NEPA. Finally, the court concluded that both projects would breach the Government's **1323 trust responsibilities to protect water and fishing rights reserved to the Hoopa Valley Indians. "
[975] "While an appeal was pending before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Congress enacted the California Wilderness Act of 1984, Pub.L. 98\xd0425, 98 Stat. 1619. Under that statute, much of the property covered by the Forest Service's management plan is now designated a wilderness area, which means that commercial activities such as timber harvesting are forbidden. The statute exempts a narrow strip of land, coinciding with the Forest Service's proposed route for the remaining segment of the G\xd0O road, from the wilderness designation. The legislative history indicates that this exemption was adopted \xd2to enable the completion of the Gasquet\xd0Orleans Road project if the responsible authorities so decide.\xd3 S.Rep. No. 98\xd0582, p. 29 (1984). The existing unpaved section of road, however, lies within the wilderness area and is therefore now closed to general traffic. "
[976] "A panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Assn. v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 688 (1986). The panel unanimously rejected the District Court's conclusion that the Government's proposed actions would breach its trust responsibilities to Indians on the Hoopa Valley Reservation. The panel also vacated the injunction to the extent that it had been rendered moot by the California Wilderness Act, which now prevents timber harvesting in certain areas covered by the District Court's order. The District Court's decision, to the extent that it rested on statutory grounds, was otherwise unanimously affirmed. "
[977] "*445 By a divided decision, the District Court's constitutional ruling was also affirmed. Relying primarily on the Forest Service's own commissioned study, the majority found that construction of the Chimney Rock section of the G\xd0O road would have significant, though largely indirect, adverse effects on Indian religious practices. The majority concluded that the Government had failed to demonstrate a compelling interest in the completion of the road, and that it could have abandoned the road without thereby creating \xd2a religious preserve for a single group in violation of the establishment clause.\xd3 Id., at 694. The majority apparently applied the same analysis to logging operations that might be carried out in portions of the Chimney Rock area not covered by the California Wilderness Act. See id., at 692\xd0693 (\xd2Because most of the high country has now been designated by Congress as a wilderness area, the issue of logging becomes less significant, although it does not disappear\xd3). "
[978] "The dissenting judge argued that certain of the adverse effects on the Indian respondents' religious practices could be eliminated by less drastic measures than a ban on building the road, and that other actual or suggested adverse effects did not pose a serious threat to the Indians' religious practices. He also concluded that the injunction against timber harvesting needed to be reconsidered in light of the California Wilderness Act: \xd2It is not clear whether the district court would have issued an injunction based upon the development of the remaining small parcels. Accordingly, I would remand to allow the district court to reevaluate its injunction in light of the Act.\xd3 Id., at 704. "
[979] "II "
[980] "1We begin by noting that the courts below did not articulate the bases of their decisions with perfect clarity. A fundamental and longstanding principle of judicial restraint requires that courts avoid reaching constitutional questions in advance of the necessity of deciding them. See Three *446 Affiliated Tribes of Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold Engineering, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 157\xd0158, 104 S.Ct. 2267, 2279, 81 L.Ed.2d 113 (1984); see also, e.g., Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854, 105 S.Ct. 2992, 2997\xd02998, 86 L.Ed.2d 664 (1985); Gulf Oil Co. v. Bernard, 452 U.S. 89, 99, 101 S.Ct. 2193, 2199, 68 L.Ed.2d 693 (1981); **1324 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346\xd0348, 56 S.Ct. 466, 482\xd0483, 80 L.Ed. 688 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This principle required the courts below to determine, before addressing the constitutional issue, whether a decision on that question could have entitled respondents to relief beyond that to which they were entitled on their statutory claims. If no additional relief would have been warranted, a constitutional decision would have been unnecessary and therefore inappropriate. "
[981] "2Neither the District Court nor the Court of Appeals explained or expressly articulated the necessity for their constitutional holdings. Were we persuaded that those holdings were unnecessary, we could simply vacate the relevant portions of the judgment below without discussing the merits of the constitutional issue. The structure and wording of the District Court's injunctive order, however, suggest that the statutory holdings would not have supported all the relief granted. The order is divided into four sections. Two of those sections deal with a 31,100\xd0acre tract referred to as the Blue Creek Roadless Area. The injunction prohibits the Forest Service from engaging in timber harvesting or road building anywhere on the tract \xd2unless and until\xd3 compliance with the NEPA and the FWPCA have been demonstrated. 565 F.Supp., at 606\xd0607. The sections of the injunction dealing with the smaller Chimney Rock area (i.e., the area affected by the First Amendment challenge) are worded differently. The Forest Service is permanently enjoined, without any qualifying language, from constructing the proposed portion of the G\xd0O road \xd2and/or any alternative route \xd3 through that area; similarly, the injunction forbids timber harvesting or the construction of logging roads in the Chimney Rock area pursuant to the Forest Service's proposed management plan \xd2or any other land management plan.\xd3 *447 Id., at 606 (emphasis added). These differences in wording suggest, without absolutely implying, that an injunction covering the Chimney Rock area would in some way have been conditional, or narrower in scope, if the District Court had not decided the First Amendment issue as it did. Similarly, the silence of the Court of Appeals as to the necessity of reaching the First Amendment issue may have reflected its understanding that the District Court's injunction necessarily rested in part on constitutional grounds. "
[982] "Because it appears reasonably likely that the First Amendment issue was necessary to the decisions below, we believe that it would be inadvisable to vacate and remand without addressing that issue on the merits. This conclusion is strengthened by considerations of judicial economy. The Government, which petitioned for certiorari on the constitutional issue alone, has informed us that it believes it can cure the statutory defects identified below, intends to do so, and will not challenge the adverse statutory rulings. Tr. of Oral Arg. 9\xd010. In this circumstance, it is difficult to see what principle would be vindicated by sending this case on what would almost certainly be a brief round trip to the courts below. "
[983] "III "
[984] "A "
[985] "3The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment provides that \xd2Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].\xd3 It is undisputed that the Indian respondents' beliefs are sincere and that the Government's proposed actions will have severe adverse effects on the practice of their religion. Those respondents contend that the burden on their religious practices is heavy enough to violate the Free Exercise Clause unless the Government can demonstrate a compelling need to complete the G\xd0O road or to engage in timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area. We disagree. "
[986] "*448 In Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 106 S.Ct. 2147, 90 L.Ed.2d 735 (1986), we considered a challenge to a federal statute that required the States to use Social Security numbers in administering certain welfare **1325 programs. Two applicants for benefits under these programs contended that their religious beliefs prevented them from acceding to the use of a Social Security number for their 2-year-old daughter because the use of a numerical identifier would \xd2 \xd4rob the spirit\xd5 of [their] daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power.\xd3 Id., at 696, 106 S.Ct., at 2150. Similarly, in this case, it is said that disruption of the natural environment caused by the G\xd0O road will diminish the sacredness of the area in question and create distractions that will interfere with \xd2training and ongoing religious experience of individuals using [sites within] the area for personal medicine and growth ... and as integrated parts of a system of religious belief and practice which correlates ascending degrees of personal power with a geographic hierarchy of power.\xd3 App. 181. Cf. id., at 178 (\xd2Scarred hills and mountains, and disturbed rocks destroy the purity of the sacred areas, and [Indian] consultants repeatedly stressed the need of a training doctor to be undistracted by such disturbance\xd3). The Court rejected this kind of challenge in Roy: "
[987] "\xd2The Free Exercise Clause simply cannot be understood to require the Government to conduct its own internal affairs in ways that comport with the religious beliefs of particular citizens. Just as the Government may not insist that [the Roys] engage in any set form of religious observance, so [they] may not demand that the Government join in their chosen religious practices by refraining from using a number to identify their daughter.... "
[988] "\xd2... The Free Exercise Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government's internal procedures.\xd3 476 U.S., at 699\xd0700, 106 S.Ct., at 2152. "
[989] "*449 The building of a road or the harvesting of timber on publicly owned land cannot meaningfully be distinguished from the use of a Social Security number in Roy. In both cases, the challenged Government action would interfere significantly with private persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs. In neither case, however, would the affected individuals be coerced by the Government's action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would either governmental action penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens. "
[990] "We are asked to distinguish this case from Roy on the ground that the infringement on religious liberty here is \xd2significantly greater,\xd3 or on the ground that the Government practice in Roy was \xd2purely mechanical\xd3 whereas this case involves \xd2a case-by-case substantive determination as to how a particular unit of land will be managed.\xd3 Brief for Indian Respondents 33\xd034. Similarly, we are told that this case can be distinguished from Roy because \xd2the government action is not at some physically removed location where it places no restriction on what a practitioner may do.\xd3 Brief for Respondent State of California 18. The State suggests that the Social Security number in Roy \xd2could be characterized as interfering with Roy's religious tenets from a subjective point of view, where the government's conduct of \xd4its own internal affairs' was known to him only secondhand and did not interfere with his ability to practice his religion.\xd3 Id., at 19 (footnote omitted; internal citation omitted). In this case, however, it is said that the proposed road will \xd2physically destro[y] the environmental conditions and the privacy without which the [religious] practices cannot be conducted.\xd3 Ibid. "
[991] "These efforts to distinguish Roy are unavailing. This Court cannot determine the truth of the underlying beliefs that led to the religious objections here or in Roy, see Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n of Fla., 480 U.S. 136, 144, n. 9, 107 S.Ct. 1046, 1051, n. 9, 94 L.Ed.2d 190 (1987), and accordingly cannot weigh the **1326 adverse effects on the appellees in Roy and compare them with the adverse effects *450 on the Indian respondents. Without the ability to make such comparisons, we cannot say that the one form of incidental interference with an individual's spiritual activities should be subjected to a different constitutional analysis than the other. "
[992] "Respondents insist, nonetheless, that the courts below properly relied on a factual inquiry into the degree to which the Indians' spiritual practices would become ineffectual if the G\xd0O road were built. They rely on several cases in which this Court has sustained free exercise challenges to government programs that interfered with individuals' ability to practice their religion. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972) (compulsory school-attendance law); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963) (denial of unemployment benefits to applicant who refused to accept work requiring her to violate the Sabbath); Thomas v. Review Board, Indiana Employment Security Div., 450 U.S. 707, 101 S.Ct. 1425, 67 L.Ed.2d 624 (1981) (denial of unemployment benefits to applicant whose religion forbade him to fabricate weapons); Hobbie, supra (denial of unemployment benefits to religious convert who resigned position that required her to work on the Sabbath). "
[993] "Even apart from the inconsistency between Roy and respondents' reading of these cases, their interpretation will not withstand analysis. It is true that this Court has repeatedly held that indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment. Thus, for example, ineligibility for unemployment benefits, based solely on a refusal to violate the Sabbath, has been analogized to a fine imposed on Sabbath worship. Sherbert, supra, 374 U.S., at 404, 83 S.Ct., at 1794. This does not and cannot imply that incidental effects of government programs, which may make it more difficult to practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, require government to bring forward a compelling justification *451 for its otherwise lawful actions. The crucial word in the constitutional text is \xd2prohibit\xd3: \xd2For the Free Exercise Clause is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the individual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the government.\xd3 Sherbert, supra, at 412, 83 S.Ct., at 1798 (Douglas, J., concurring). "
[994] "4Whatever may be the exact line between unconstitutional prohibitions on the free exercise of religion and the legitimate conduct by government of its own affairs, the location of the line cannot depend on measuring the effects of a governmental action on a religious objector's spiritual development. The Government does not dispute, and we have no reason to doubt, that the logging and road-building projects at issue in this case could have devastating effects on traditional Indian religious practices. Those practices are intimately and inextricably bound up with the unique features of the Chimney Rock area, which is known to the Indians as the \xd2high country.\xd3 Individual practitioners use this area for personal spiritual development; some of their activities are believed to be critically important in advancing the welfare of the Tribe, and indeed, of mankind itself. The Indians use this area, as they have used it for a very long time, to conduct a wide variety of specific rituals that aim to accomplish their religious goals. According to their beliefs, the rituals would not be efficacious if conducted at other sites than the ones traditionally used, and too much disturbance of the area's natural state would clearly render any meaningful continuation of traditional practices impossible. To be sure, the Indians themselves were far from unanimous in opposing the G\xd0O road, see App. 180, and it seems less than certain that construction of the road will be so disruptive that it will doom their religion. Nevertheless, we can assume that the threat to the efficacy of at least **1327 some religious practices is extremely grave. "
[995] "Even if we assume that we should accept the Ninth Circuit's prediction, according to which the G\xd0O road will \xd2virtually destroy the ... Indians' ability to practice their religion,\xd3 *452 795 F.2d, at 693 (opinion below), the Constitution simply does not provide a principle that could justify upholding respondents' legal claims. However much we might wish that it were otherwise, government simply could not operate if it were required to satisfy every citizen's religious needs and desires. A broad range of government activities\xd1from social welfare programs to foreign aid to conservation projects\xd1will always be considered essential to the spiritual well-being of some citizens, often on the basis of sincerely held religious beliefs. Others will find the very same activities deeply offensive, and perhaps incompatible with their own search for spiritual fulfillment and with the tenets of their religion. The First Amendment must apply to all citizens alike, and it can give to none of them a veto over public programs that do not prohibit the free exercise of religion. The Constitution does not, and courts cannot, offer to reconcile the various competing demands on government, many of them rooted in sincere religious belief, that inevitably arise in so diverse a society as ours. That task, to the extent that it is feasible, is for the legislatures and other institutions. Cf. The Federalist No. 10 (suggesting that the effects of religious factionalism are best restrained through competition among a multiplicity of religious sects). "
[996] "One need not look far beyond the present case to see why the analysis in Roy, but not respondents' proposed extension of Sherbert and its progeny, offers a sound reading of the Constitution. Respondents attempt to stress the limits of the religious servitude that they are now seeking to impose on the Chimney Rock area of the Six Rivers National Forest. While defending an injunction against logging operations and the construction of a road, they apparently do not at present object to the area's being used by recreational visitors, other Indians, or forest rangers. Nothing in the principle for which they contend, however, would distinguish this case from another lawsuit in which they (or similarly situated religious objectors) might seek to exclude all human activity but *453 their own from sacred areas of the public lands. The Indian respondents insist that \xd2[p]rivacy during the power quests is required for the practitioners to maintain the purity needed for a successful journey.\xd3 Brief for Indian Respondents 8 (emphasis added; citation to record omitted). Similarly: \xd2The practices conducted in the high country entail intense meditation and require the practitioner to achieve a profound awareness of the natural environment. Prayer seats are oriented so there is an unobstructed view, and the practitioner must be surrounded by undisturbed naturalness.\xd3 Id., at 8, n. 4 (emphasis added; citations to record omitted). No disrespect for these practices is implied when one notes that such beliefs could easily require de facto beneficial ownership of some rather spacious tracts of public property. Even without anticipating future cases, the diminution of the Government's property rights, and the concomitant subsidy of the Indian religion, would in this case be far from trivial: the District Court's order permanently forbade commercial timber harvesting, or the construction of a two-lane road, anywhere within an area covering a full 27 sections (i.e. more than 17,000 acres) of public land. "
[997] "The Constitution does not permit government to discriminate against religions that treat particular physical sites as sacred, and a law prohibiting the Indian respondents from visiting the Chimney Rock area would raise a different set of constitutional questions. Whatever rights the Indians may have to the use of the area, however, those rights do not divest the Government of its right to use what is, after all, its land. Cf. Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S., at 724\xd0727, 106 S.Ct., at 2165\xd02166 (O'CONNOR, J., concurring in part and dissenting in **1328 part) (distinguishing between the Government's use of information in its possession and the Government's requiring an individual to provide such information). "
[998] "B "
[999] "Nothing in our opinion should be read to encourage governmental insensitivity to the religious needs of any citizen. *454 The Government's rights to the use of its own land, for example, need not and should not discourage it from accommodating religious practices like those engaged in by the Indian respondents. Cf. Sherbert, 374 U.S., at 422\xd0423, 83 S.Ct., at 1803\xd01804 (Harlan, J., dissenting). It is worth emphasizing, therefore, that the Government has taken numerous steps in this very case to minimize the impact that construction of the G\xd0O road will have on the Indians' religious activities. First, the Forest Service commissioned a comprehensive study of the effects that the project would have on the cultural and religious value of the Chimney Rock area. The resulting 423\xd0page report was so sympathetic to the Indians' interests that it has constituted the principal piece of evidence relied on by respondents throughout this litigation. "
[1000] "Although the Forest Service did not in the end adopt the report's recommendation that the project be abandoned, many other ameliorative measures were planned. No sites where specific rituals take place were to be disturbed. In fact, a major factor in choosing among alternative routes for the road was the relation of the various routes to religious sites: the route selected by the Regional Forester is, he noted, \xd2the farthest removed from contemporary spiritual sites; thus, the adverse audible intrusions associated with the road would be less than all other alternatives.\xd3 App. 102. Nor were the Forest Service's concerns limited to \xd2audible intrusions.\xd3 As the dissenting judge below observed, 10 specific steps were planned to reduce the visual impact of the road on the surrounding country. See 795 F.2d, at 703 (Beezer, J., dissenting in part). "
[1001] "Except for abandoning its project entirely, and thereby leaving the two existing segments of road to dead-end in the middle of a National Forest, it is difficult to see how the Government could have been more solicitous. Such solicitude accords with \xd2the policy of the United States to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express, and exercise the traditional religions *455 of the American Indian ... including but not limited to access to sites, use and possession of sacred objects, and the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites.\xd3 American Indian Religious Freedom Act (AIRFA), Pub.L. 95\xd0341, 92 Stat. 469, 42 U.S.C. \xa4 1996. "
[1002] "5Respondents, however, suggest that AIRFA goes further and in effect enacts their interpretation of the First Amendment into statutory law. Although this contention was rejected by the District Court, they seek to defend the judgment below by arguing that AIRFA authorizes the injunction against completion of the G\xd0O road. This argument is without merit. After reciting several legislative findings, AIRFA \xd2resolves\xd3 upon the policy quoted above. A second section of the statute, 92 Stat. 470, required an evaluation of federal policies and procedures, in consultation with native religious leaders, of changes necessary to protect and preserve the rights and practices in question. The required report dealing with this evaluation was completed and released in 1979. Reply Brief for Petitioners 2, n. 3. Nowhere in the law is there so much as a hint of any intent to create a cause of action or any judicially enforceable individual rights. "
[1003] "What is obvious from the face of the statute is confirmed by numerous indications in the legislative history. The sponsor of the bill that became AIRFA, Representative Udall, called it \xd2a sense of Congress joint resolution,\xd3 aimed at ensuring that \xd2the basic right of the Indian people to exercise their traditional religious practices is not infringed without a clear decision on **1329 the part of the Congress or the administrators that such religious practices must yield to some higher consideration.\xd3 124 Cong.Rec. 21444 (1978). Representative Udall emphasized that the bill would not \xd2confer special religious rights on Indians,\xd3 would \xd2not change any existing State or Federal law,\xd3 and in fact \xd2has no teeth in it.\xd3 Id., at 21444\xd021445. "
[1004] "*456 C "
[1005] "The dissent proposes an approach to the First Amendment that is fundamentally inconsistent with the principles on which our decision rests. Notwithstanding the sympathy that we all must feel for the plight of the Indian respondents, it is plain that the approach taken by the dissent cannot withstand analysis. On the contrary, the path towards which it points us is incompatible with the text of the Constitution, with the precedents of this Court, and with a responsible sense of our own institutional role. "
[1006] "The dissent begins by asserting that the \xd2constitutional guarantee we interpret today ... is directed against any form of government action that frustrates or inhibits religious practice.\xd3 Post, at 1330 (emphasis added). The Constitution, however, says no such thing. Rather, it states: \xd2Congress shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise [of religion].\xd3 U.S. Const., Amdt. 1 (emphasis added). "
[1007] "As we explained above, Bowen v. Roy rejected a First Amendment challenge to Government activities that the religious objectors sincerely believed would \xd2 \xd4 \xd2rob the spirit\xd3 of [their] daughter and prevent her from attaining greater spiritual power.\xd5 \xd3 See supra, at 1324 (quoting Roy, 476 U.S., at 696, 106 S.Ct., at 2150). The dissent now offers to distinguish that case by saying that the Government was acting there \xd2in a purely internal manner,\xd3 whereas land-use decisions \xd2are likely to have substantial external effects.\xd3 Post, at 1336. Whatever the source or meaning of the dissent's distinction, it has no basis in Roy. Robbing the spirit of a child, and preventing her from attaining greater spiritual power, is both a \xd2substantial external effect\xd3 and one that is remarkably similar to the injury claimed by respondents in the case before us today. The dissent's reading of Roy would effectively overrule that decision, without providing any compelling justification for doing so. "
[1008] "The dissent also misreads Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). The statute at issue in that case prohibited the *457 Amish parents, on pain of criminal prosecution, from providing their children with the kind of education required by the Amish religion. Id., at 207\xd0209, 223, 92 S.Ct., at 1529\xd01530, 1537. The statute directly compelled the Amish to send their children to public high schools \xd2contrary to the Amish religion and way of life.\xd3 Id., at 209, 92 S.Ct., at 1530. The Court acknowledged that the statute might be constitutional, despite its coercive nature, if the State could show with sufficient \xd2particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish.\xd3 Id., at 236, 92 S.Ct., at 1543 (citation omitted). The dissent's out-of-context quotations notwithstanding, there is nothing whatsoever in the Yoder opinion to support the proposition that the \xd2impact\xd3 on the Amish religion would have been constitutionally problematic if the statute at issue had not been coercive in nature. Cf. post, at 1333\xd01334. "
[1009] "Perceiving a \xd2stress point in the longstanding conflict between two disparate cultures,\xd3 the dissent attacks us for declining to \xd2balanc[e] these competing and potentially irreconcilable interests, choosing instead to turn this difficult task over to the Federal Legislature.\xd3 Post, at 1337. Seeing the Court as the arbiter, the dissent proposes a legal test under which it would decide which public lands are \xd2central\xd3 or \xd2indispensable\xd3 to which religions, and by implication which are \xd2dispensable\xd3 or \xd2peripheral,\xd3 and would then decide which government programs are \xd2compelling\xd3 **1330 enough to justify \xd2infringement of those practices.\xd3 Post, at 1338. We would accordingly be required to weigh the value of every religious belief and practice that is said to be threatened by any government program. Unless a \xd2showing of \xd4centrality,\xd5 \xd3 post, at 1338, is nothing but an assertion of centrality, see post, at 1339, the dissent thus offers us the prospect of this Courts holding that some sincerely held religious beliefs and practices are not \xd2central\xd3 to certain religions, despite protestations to the contrary from the religious objectors who brought the lawsuit. In other words, the dissent's approach would *458 require us to rule that some religious adherents misunderstand their own religious beliefs. We think such an approach cannot be squared with the Constitution or with our precedents, and that it would cast the Judiciary in a role that we were never intended to play. "
[1010] "IV "
[1011] "The decision of the court below, according to which the First Amendment precludes the Government from completing the G\xd0O road or from permitting timber harvesting in the Chimney Rock area, is reversed. In order that the District Court's injunction may be reconsidered in light of this holding, and in the light of any other relevant events that may have intervened since the injunction issued, the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. "
[1012] "It is so ordered. "
[1013] "In 2012 a same-sex couple visited Masterpiece Cakeshop, a bakery in Colorado, to make inquiries about ordering a cake for their wedding reception. The shop's owner told the couple that he would not create a cake for their wedding because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriages\xd1marriages the State of Colorado itself did not recognize at that time. The couple filed a charge with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission alleging discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in violation of the Colorado Anti\xd0Discrimination Act. "
[1014] "The Commission determined that the shop's actions violated the Act and ruled in the couple's favor. The Colorado state courts affirmed the ruling and its enforcement order, and this Court now must decide whether the Commission's order violated the Constitution. "
[1015] "The case presents difficult questions as to the proper reconciliation of at least two principles. The first is the authority of a State and its governmental entities to protect the rights and dignity of gay persons who are, or wish to be, married but who face discrimination when they seek goods or services. The second is the right of all persons to exercise fundamental freedoms under the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. "
[1016] "The freedoms asserted here are both the freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion. The free speech aspect of this case is difficult, for few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of its creation as an exercise of protected speech. This is an instructive example, however, of the proposition that the application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our understanding of their meaning. "
[1017] "One of the difficulties in this case is that the parties disagree as to the extent of the baker's refusal to provide service. If a baker refused to design a special cake with words or images celebrating the marriage\xd1for instance, a cake showing words with religious meaning\xd1that might be different from a refusal to sell any cake at all. In defining whether a baker's creation can be protected, these details might make a difference. "
[1018] "The same difficulties arise in determining whether a baker has a valid free exercise claim. A baker's refusal to attend the wedding to ensure that the cake is cut the right way, or a refusal to put certain religious words or decorations on the cake, or even a refusal to sell a cake that has been baked for the public generally but includes certain religious words or symbols on it are just three examples of possibilities that seem all but endless. "
[1019] "Whatever the confluence of speech and free exercise principles might be in some cases, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission's consideration of this case was inconsistent with the State's obligation of religious neutrality. The reason and motive for the baker's refusal were based on his sincere religious beliefs and convictions. The Court's precedents make clear that the baker, in his capacity as the owner of a *1724 business serving the public, might have his right to the free exercise of religion limited by generally applicable laws. Still, the delicate question of when the free exercise of his religion must yield to an otherwise valid exercise of state power needed to be determined in an adjudication in which religious hostility on the part of the State itself would not be a factor in the balance the State sought to reach. That requirement, however, was not met here. When the Colorado Civil Rights Commission considered this case, it did not do so with the religious neutrality that the Constitution requires. "
[1020] "Given all these considerations, it is proper to hold that whatever the outcome of some future controversy involving facts similar to these, the Commission's actions here violated the Free Exercise Clause; and its order must be set aside. "
[1021] "I "
[1022] "A "
[1023] "Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd., is a bakery in Lakewood, Colorado, a suburb of Denver. The shop offers a variety of baked goods, ranging from everyday cookies and brownies to elaborate custom-designed cakes for birthday parties, weddings, and other events. "
[1024] "Jack Phillips is an expert baker who has owned and operated the shop for 24 years. Phillips is a devout Christian. He has explained that his \xd2main goal in life is to be obedient to\xd3 Jesus Christ and Christ's \xd2teachings in all aspects of his life.\xd3 App. 148. And he seeks to \xd2honor God through his work at Masterpiece Cakeshop.\xd3 Ibid. One of Phillips' religious beliefs is that \xd2God's intention for marriage from the beginning of history is that it is and should be the union of one man and one woman.\xd3 Id., at 149. To Phillips, creating a wedding cake for a same-sex wedding would be equivalent to participating in a celebration that is contrary to his own most deeply held beliefs. "
[1025] "Phillips met Charlie Craig and Dave Mullins when they entered his shop in the summer of 2012. Craig and Mullins were planning to marry. At that time, Colorado did not recognize same-sex marriages, so the couple planned to wed legally in Massachusetts and afterwards to host a reception for their family and friends in Denver. To prepare for their celebration, Craig and Mullins visited the shop and told Phillips that they were interested in ordering a cake for \xd2our wedding.\xd3 Id., at 152 (emphasis deleted). They did not mention the design of the cake they envisioned. "
[1026] "Phillips informed the couple that he does not \xd2create\xd3 wedding cakes for same-sex weddings. Ibid. He explained, \xd2I'll make your birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell you cookies and brownies, I just don't make cakes for same sex weddings.\xd3 Ibid. The couple left the shop without further discussion. "
[1027] "The following day, Craig's mother, who had accompanied the couple to the cakeshop and been present for their interaction with Phillips, telephoned to ask Phillips why he had declined to serve her son. Phillips explained that he does not create wedding cakes for same-sex weddings because of his religious opposition to same-sex marriage, and also because Colorado (at that time) did not recognize same-sex marriages. Id., at 153. He later explained his belief that \xd2to create a wedding cake for an event that celebrates something that directly goes against the teachings of the Bible, would have been a personal endorsement and participation in the ceremony and relationship that they were entering into.\xd3 Ibid. (emphasis deleted). "
[1028] "B "
[1029] "For most of its history, Colorado has prohibited discrimination in places of public *1725 accommodation. In 1885, less than a decade after Colorado achieved statehood, the General Assembly passed \xd2An Act to Protect All Citizens in Their Civil Rights,\xd3 which guaranteed \xd2full and equal enjoyment\xd3 of certain public facilities to \xd2all citizens,\xd3 \xd2regardless of race, color or previous condition of servitude.\xd3 1885 Colo. Sess. Laws pp. 132\xd0133. A decade later, the General Assembly expanded the requirement to apply to \xd2all other places of public accommodation.\xd3 1895 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 61, p. 139. "
[1030] "Today, the Colorado Anti\xd0Discrimination Act (CADA) carries forward the state's tradition of prohibiting discrimination in places of public accommodation. Amended in 2007 and 2008 to prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation as well as other protected characteristics, CADA in relevant part provides as follows: "
[1031] "\xd2It is a discriminatory practice and unlawful for a person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from, or deny to an individual or a group, because of disability, race, creed, color, sex, sexual orientation, marital status, national origin, or ancestry, the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of a place of public accommodation.\xd3 Colo. Rev. Stat. \xa4 24\xd034\xd0601(2)(a) (2017). "
[1032] "The Act defines \xd2public accommodation\xd3 broadly to include any \xd2place of business engaged in any sales to the public and any place offering services ... to the public,\xd3 but excludes \xd2a church, synagogue, mosque, or other place that is principally used for religious purposes.\xd3 \xa4 24\xd034\xd0601(1). "
[1033] "CADA establishes an administrative system for the resolution of discrimination claims. Complaints of discrimination in violation of CADA are addressed in the first instance by the Colorado Civil Rights Division. The Division investigates each claim; and if it finds probable cause that CADA has been violated, it will refer the matter to the Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The Commission, in turn, decides whether to initiate a formal hearing before a state Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who will hear evidence and argument before issuing a written decision. See \xa4\xa4 24\xd034\xd0306, 24\xd04\xd0105(14). The decision of the ALJ may be appealed to the full Commission, a seven-member appointed body. The Commission holds a public hearing and deliberative session before voting on the case. If the Commission determines that the evidence proves a CADA violation, it may impose remedial measures as provided by statute. See \xa4 24\xd034\xd0306(9). Available remedies include, among other things, orders to cease-and-desist a discriminatory policy, to file regular compliance reports with the Commission, and \xd2to take affirmative action, including the posting of notices setting forth the substantive rights of the public.\xd3 \xa4 24\xd034\xd0605. Colorado law does not permit the Commission to assess money damages or fines. \xa4\xa4 24\xd034\xd0306(9), 24\xd034\xd0605. "
[1034] "C "
[1035] "Craig and Mullins filed a discrimination complaint against Masterpiece Cakeshop and Phillips in September 2012, shortly after the couple's visit to the shop. App. 31. The complaint alleged that Craig and Mullins had been denied \xd2full and equal service\xd3 at the bakery because of their sexual orientation, id., at 35, 48, and that it was Phillips' \xd2standard business practice\xd3 not to provide cakes for same-sex weddings, id., at 43. "
[1036] "The Civil Rights Division opened an investigation. The investigator found that \xd2on multiple occasions,\xd3 Phillips \xd2turned away potential customers on the basis of their sexual orientation, stating that he *1726 could not create a cake for a same-sex wedding ceremony or reception\xd3 because his religious beliefs prohibited it and because the potential customers \xd2were doing something illegal\xd3 at that time. Id., at 76. The investigation found that Phillips had declined to sell custom wedding cakes to about six other same-sex couples on this basis. Id., at 72. The investigator also recounted that, according to affidavits submitted by Craig and Mullins, Phillips' shop had refused to sell cupcakes to a lesbian couple for their commitment celebration because the shop \xd2had a policy of not selling baked goods to same-sex couples for this type of event.\xd3 Id., at 73. Based on these findings, the Division found probable cause that Phillips violated CADA and referred the case to the Civil Rights Commission. Id., at 69. "
[1037] "The Commission found it proper to conduct a formal hearing, and it sent the case to a State ALJ. Finding no dispute as to material facts, the ALJ entertained cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled in the couple's favor. The ALJ first rejected Phillips' argument that declining to make or create a wedding cake for Craig and Mullins did not violate Colorado law. It was undisputed that the shop is subject to state public accommodations laws. And the ALJ determined that Phillips' actions constituted prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, not simply opposition to same-sex marriage as Phillips contended. App. to Pet. for Cert. 68a\xd072a. "
[1038] "Phillips raised two constitutional claims before the ALJ. He first asserted that applying CADA in a way that would require him to create a cake for a same-sex wedding would violate his First Amendment right to free speech by compelling him to exercise his artistic talents to express a message with which he disagreed. The ALJ rejected the contention that preparing a wedding cake is a form of protected speech and did not agree that creating Craig and Mullins' cake would force Phillips to adhere to \xd2an ideological point of view.\xd3 Id., at 75a. Applying CADA to the facts at hand, in the ALJ's view, did not interfere with Phillips' freedom of speech. "
[1039] "Phillips also contended that requiring him to create cakes for same-sex weddings would violate his right to the free exercise of religion, also protected by the First Amendment. Citing this Court's precedent in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), the ALJ determined that CADA is a \xd2valid and neutral law of general applicability\xd3 and therefore that applying it to Phillips in this case did not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Id., at 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595; App. to Pet. for Cert. 82a\xd083a. The ALJ thus ruled against Phillips and the cakeshop and in favor of Craig and Mullins on both constitutional claims. "
[1040] "The Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision in full. Id., at 57a. The Commission ordered Phillips to \xd2cease and desist from discriminating against ... same-sex couples by refusing to sell them wedding cakes or any product [they] would sell to heterosexual couples.\xd3 Ibid. It also ordered additional remedial measures, including \xd2comprehensive staff training on the Public Accommodations section\xd3 of CADA \xd2and changes to any and all company policies to comply with ... this Order.\xd3 Id., at 58a. The Commission additionally required Phillips to prepare \xd2quarterly compliance reports\xd3 for a period of two years documenting \xd2the number of patrons denied service\xd3 and why, along with \xd2a statement describing the remedial actions taken.\xd3 Ibid. "
[1041] "Phillips appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Commission's legal determinations and remedial *1727 order. The court rejected the argument that the \xd2Commission's order unconstitutionally compels\xd3 Phillips and the shop \xd2to convey a celebratory message about same sex marriage.\xd3 Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 283 (2015). The court also rejected the argument that the Commission's order violated the Free Exercise Clause. Relying on this Court's precedent in Smith, supra, at 879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, the court stated that the Free Exercise Clause \xd2does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a valid and neutral law of general applicability\xd3 on the ground that following the law would interfere with religious practice or belief. 370 P.3d, at 289. The court concluded that requiring Phillips to comply with the statute did not violate his free exercise rights. The Colorado Supreme Court declined to hear the case. "
[1042] "Phillips sought review here, and this Court granted certiorari. 582 U.S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct. 2290, 198 L.Ed.2d 723 (2017). He now renews his claims under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. "
[1043] "II "
[1044] "A "
[1045] "1234Our society has come to the recognition that gay persons and gay couples cannot be treated as social outcasts or as inferior in dignity and worth. For that reason the laws and the Constitution can, and in some instances must, protect them in the exercise of their civil rights. The exercise of their freedom on terms equal to others must be given great weight and respect by the courts. At the same time, the religious and philosophical objections to gay marriage are protected views and in some instances protected forms of expression. As this Court observed in Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015), \xd2[t]he First Amendment ensures that religious organizations and persons are given proper protection as they seek to teach the principles that are so fulfilling and so central to their lives and faiths.\xd3 Id., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 135 S.Ct., at 2607. Nevertheless, while those religious and philosophical objections are protected, it is a general rule that such objections do not allow business owners and other actors in the economy and in society to deny protected persons equal access to goods and services under a neutral and generally applicable public accommodations law. See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, n. 5, 88 S.Ct. 964, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263 (1968) (per curiam ); see also Hurley v. Irish\xd0American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557, 572, 115 S.Ct. 2338, 132 L.Ed.2d 487 (1995) (\xd2Provisions like these are well within the State's usual power to enact when a legislature has reason to believe that a given group is the target of discrimination, and they do not, as a general matter, violate the First or Fourteenth Amendments\xd3). "
[1046] "When it comes to weddings, it can be assumed that a member of the clergy who objects to gay marriage on moral and religious grounds could not be compelled to perform the ceremony without denial of his or her right to the free exercise of religion. This refusal would be well understood in our constitutional order as an exercise of religion, an exercise that gay persons could recognize and accept without serious diminishment to their own dignity and worth. Yet if that exception were not confined, then a long list of persons who provide goods and services for marriages and weddings might refuse to do so for gay persons, thus resulting in a community-wide stigma inconsistent with the history and dynamics of civil rights laws that ensure equal access to goods, services, and public accommodations. "
[1047] "*1728 It is unexceptional that Colorado law can protect gay persons, just as it can protect other classes of individuals, in acquiring whatever products and services they choose on the same terms and conditions as are offered to other members of the public. And there are no doubt innumerable goods and services that no one could argue implicate the First Amendment. Petitioners conceded, moreover, that if a baker refused to sell any goods or any cakes for gay weddings, that would be a different matter and the State would have a strong case under this Court's precedents that this would be a denial of goods and services that went beyond any protected rights of a baker who offers goods and services to the general public and is subject to a neutrally applied and generally applicable public accommodations law. See Tr. of Oral Arg. 4\xd07, 10. "
[1048] "Phillips claims, however, that a narrower issue is presented. He argues that he had to use his artistic skills to make an expressive statement, a wedding endorsement in his own voice and of his own creation. As Phillips would see the case, this contention has a significant First Amendment speech component and implicates his deep and sincere religious beliefs. In this context the baker likely found it difficult to find a line where the customers' rights to goods and services became a demand for him to exercise the right of his own personal expression for their message, a message he could not express in a way consistent with his religious beliefs. "
[1049] "Phillips' dilemma was particularly understandable given the background of legal principles and administration of the law in Colorado at that time. His decision and his actions leading to the refusal of service all occurred in the year 2012. At that point, Colorado did not recognize the validity of gay marriages performed in its own State. See Colo. Const., Art. II, \xa4 31 (2012); 370 P.3d, at 277. At the time of the events in question, this Court had not issued its decisions either in United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 186 L.Ed.2d 808 (2013), or Obergefell. Since the State itself did not allow those marriages to be performed in Colorado, there is some force to the argument that the baker was not unreasonable in deeming it lawful to decline to take an action that he understood to be an expression of support for their validity when that expression was contrary to his sincerely held religious beliefs, at least insofar as his refusal was limited to refusing to create and express a message in support of gay marriage, even one planned to take place in another State. "
[1050] "At the time, state law also afforded storekeepers some latitude to decline to create specific messages the storekeeper considered offensive. Indeed, while enforcement proceedings against Phillips were ongoing, the Colorado Civil Rights Division itself endorsed this proposition in cases involving other bakers' creation of cakes, concluding on at least three occasions that a baker acted lawfully in declining to create cakes with decorations that demeaned gay persons or gay marriages. See Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X (Mar. 24, 2015); Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X (Mar. 24, 2015). "
[1051] "There were, to be sure, responses to these arguments that the State could make when it contended for a different result in seeking the enforcement of its generally applicable state regulations of businesses that serve the public. And any decision in favor of the baker would have to be sufficiently constrained, lest all purveyors of goods and services who object to gay marriages for moral and religious reasons in *1729 effect be allowed to put up signs saying \xd2no goods or services will be sold if they will be used for gay marriages,\xd3 something that would impose a serious stigma on gay persons. But, nonetheless, Phillips was entitled to the neutral and respectful consideration of his claims in all the circumstances of the case. "
[1052] "B "
[1053] "5The neutral and respectful consideration to which Phillips was entitled was compromised here, however. The Civil Rights Commission's treatment of his case has some elements of a clear and impermissible hostility toward the sincere religious beliefs that motivated his objection. "
[1054] "That hostility surfaced at the Commission's formal, public hearings, as shown by the record. On May 30, 2014, the seven-member Commission convened publicly to consider Phillips' case. At several points during its meeting, commissioners endorsed the view that religious beliefs cannot legitimately be carried into the public sphere or commercial domain, implying that religious beliefs and persons are less than fully welcome in Colorado's business community. One commissioner suggested that Phillips can believe \xd2what he wants to believe,\xd3 but cannot act on his religious beliefs \xd2if he decides to do business in the state.\xd3 Tr. 23. A few moments later, the commissioner restated the same position: \xd2[I]f a businessman wants to do business in the state and he's got an issue with the\xd1the law's impacting his personal belief system, he needs to look at being able to compromise.\xd3 Id., at 30. Standing alone, these statements are susceptible of different interpretations. On the one hand, they might mean simply that a business cannot refuse to provide services based on sexual orientation, regardless of the proprietor's personal views. On the other hand, they might be seen as inappropriate and dismissive comments showing lack of due consideration for Phillips' free exercise rights and the dilemma he faced. In view of the comments that followed, the latter seems the more likely. "
[1055] "On July 25, 2014, the Commission met again. This meeting, too, was conducted in public and on the record. On this occasion another commissioner made specific reference to the previous meeting's discussion but said far more to disparage Phillips' beliefs. The commissioner stated: "
[1056] "\xd2I would also like to reiterate what we said in the hearing or the last meeting. Freedom of religion and religion has been used to justify all kinds of discrimination throughout history, whether it be slavery, whether it be the holocaust, whether it be\xd1I mean, we\xd1we can list hundreds of situations where freedom of religion has been used to justify discrimination. And to me it is one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use to\xd1to use their religion to hurt others.\xd3 Tr. 11\xd012. "
[1057] "To describe a man's faith as \xd2one of the most despicable pieces of rhetoric that people can use\xd3 is to disparage his religion in at least two distinct ways: by describing it as despicable, and also by characterizing it as merely rhetorical\xd1something insubstantial and even insincere. The commissioner even went so far as to compare Phillips' invocation of his sincerely held religious beliefs to defenses of slavery and the Holocaust. This sentiment is inappropriate for a Commission charged with the solemn responsibility of fair and neutral enforcement of Colorado's antidiscrimination law\xd1a law that protects against discrimination on the basis of religion as well as sexual orientation. "
[1058] "The record shows no objection to these comments from other commissioners. And the later state-court ruling reviewing the Commission's decision did not mention *1730 those comments, much less express concern with their content. Nor were the comments by the commissioners disavowed in the briefs filed in this Court. For these reasons, the Court cannot avoid the conclusion that these statements cast doubt on the fairness and impartiality of the Commission's adjudication of Phillips' case. Members of the Court have disagreed on the question whether statements made by lawmakers may properly be taken into account in determining whether a law intentionally discriminates on the basis of religion. See Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540\xd0542, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993); id., at 558, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment). In this case, however, the remarks were made in a very different context\xd1by an adjudicatory body deciding a particular case. "
[1059] "Another indication of hostility is the difference in treatment between Phillips' case and the cases of other bakers who objected to a requested cake on the basis of conscience and prevailed before the Commission. "
[1060] "As noted above, on at least three other occasions the Civil Rights Division considered the refusal of bakers to create cakes with images that conveyed disapproval of same-sex marriage, along with religious text. Each time, the Division found that the baker acted lawfully in refusing service. It made these determinations because, in the words of the Division, the requested cake included \xd2wording and images [the baker] deemed derogatory,\xd3 Jack v. Gateaux, Ltd., Charge No. P20140071X, at 4; featured \xd2language and images [the baker] deemed hateful,\xd3 Jack v. Le Bakery Sensual, Inc., Charge No. P20140070X, at 4; or displayed a message the baker \xd2deemed as discriminatory, Jack v. Azucar Bakery, Charge No. P20140069X, at 4. "
[1061] "The treatment of the conscience-based objections at issue in these three cases contrasts with the Commission's treatment of Phillips' objection. The Commission ruled against Phillips in part on the theory that any message the requested wedding cake would carry would be attributed to the customer, not to the baker. Yet the Division did not address this point in any of the other cases with respect to the cakes depicting anti-gay marriage symbolism. Additionally, the Division found no violation of CADA in the other cases in part because each bakery was willing to sell other products, including those depicting Christian themes, to the prospective customers. But the Commission dismissed Phillips' willingness to sell \xd2birthday cakes, shower cakes, [and] cookies and brownies,\xd3 App. 152, to gay and lesbian customers as irrelevant. The treatment of the other cases and Phillips' case could reasonably be interpreted as being inconsistent as to the question of whether speech is involved, quite apart from whether the cases should ultimately be distinguished. In short, the Commission's consideration of Phillips' religious objection did not accord with its treatment of these other objections. "
[1062] "Before the Colorado Court of Appeals, Phillips protested that this disparity in treatment reflected hostility on the part of the Commission toward his beliefs. He argued that the Commission had treated the other bakers' conscience-based objections as legitimate, but treated his as illegitimate\xd1thus sitting in judgment of his religious beliefs themselves. The Court of Appeals addressed the disparity only in passing and relegated its complete analysis of the issue to a footnote. There, the court stated that \xd2[t]his case is distinguishable from the Colorado Civil Rights Division's recent findings that [the other bakeries] in Denver did not discriminate against a Christian patron on the basis of his creed\xd3 when they refused to create the *1731 requested cakes. 370 P.3d, at 282, n. 8. In those cases, the court continued, there was no impermissible discrimination because \xd2the Division found that the bakeries ... refuse[d] the patron's request ... because of the offensive nature of the requested message.\xd3 Ibid. "
[1063] "A principled rationale for the difference in treatment of these two instances cannot be based on the government's own assessment of offensiveness. Just as \xd2no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion,\xd3 West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943), it is not, as the Court has repeatedly held, the role of the State or its officials to prescribe what shall be offensive. See Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0 \xd0 \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 137 S.Ct. 1744, 1762\xd01764, 198 L.Ed.2d 366 (2017) (opinion of ALITO, J.). The Colorado court's attempt to account for the difference in treatment elevates one view of what is offensive over another and itself sends a signal of official disapproval of Phillips' religious beliefs. The court's footnote does not, therefore, answer the baker's concern that the State's practice was to disfavor the religious basis of his objection. "
[1064] "C "
[1065] "For the reasons just described, the Commission's treatment of Phillips' case violated the State's duty under the First Amendment not to base laws or regulations on hostility to a religion or religious viewpoint. "
[1066] "678In Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, supra, the Court made clear that the government, if it is to respect the Constitution's guarantee of free exercise, cannot impose regulations that are hostile to the religious beliefs of affected citizens and cannot act in a manner that passes judgment upon or presupposes the illegitimacy of religious beliefs and practices. The Free Exercise Clause bars even \xd2subtle departures from neutrality\xd3 on matters of religion. Id., at 534, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Here, that means the Commission was obliged under the Free Exercise Clause to proceed in a manner neutral toward and tolerant of Phillips' religious beliefs. The Constitution \xd2commits government itself to religious tolerance, and upon even slight suspicion that proposals for state intervention stem from animosity to religion or distrust of its practices, all officials must pause to remember their own high duty to the Constitution and to the rights it secures.\xd3 Id., at 547, 113 S.Ct. 2217. "
[1067] "9Factors relevant to the assessment of governmental neutrality include \xd2the historical background of the decision under challenge, the specific series of events leading to the enactment or official policy in question, and the legislative or administrative history, including contemporaneous statements made by members of the decisionmaking body.\xd3 Id., at 540, 113 S.Ct. 2217. In view of these factors the record here demonstrates that the Commission's consideration of Phillips' case was neither tolerant nor respectful of Phillips' religious beliefs. The Commission gave \xd2every appearance,\xd3 id., at 545, 113 S.Ct. 2217, of adjudicating Phillips' religious objection based on a negative normative \xd2evaluation of the particular justification\xd3 for his objection and the religious grounds for it. Id., at 537, 113 S.Ct. 2217. It hardly requires restating that government has no role in deciding or even suggesting whether the religious ground for Phillips' conscience-based objection is legitimate or illegitimate. On these facts, the Court must draw the inference that Phillips' religious objection was not considered with the neutrality that the Free Exercise Clause requires. "
[1068] "*1732 While the issues here are difficult to resolve, it must be concluded that the State's interest could have been weighed against Phillips' sincere religious objections in a way consistent with the requisite religious neutrality that must be strictly observed. The official expressions of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners' comments\xd1comments that were not disavowed at the Commission or by the State at any point in the proceedings that led to affirmance of the order\xd1were inconsistent with what the Free Exercise Clause requires. The Commission's disparate consideration of Phillips' case compared to the cases of the other bakers suggests the same. For these reasons, the order must be set aside. "
[1069] "III "
[1070] "The Commission's hostility was inconsistent with the First Amendment's guarantee that our laws be applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion. Phillips was entitled to a neutral decisionmaker who would give full and fair consideration to his religious objection as he sought to assert it in all of the circumstances in which this case was presented, considered, and decided. In this case the adjudication concerned a context that may well be different going forward in the respects noted above. However later cases raising these or similar concerns are resolved in the future, for these reasons the rulings of the Commission and of the state court that enforced the Commission's order must be invalidated. "
[1071] "The outcome of cases like this in other circumstances must await further elaboration in the courts, all in the context of recognizing that these disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market. "
[1072] "The judgment of the Colorado Court of Appeals is reversed. "
[1073] "It is so ordered. "
[1074] "Mr. Chief Justice BURGER announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which Mr. Justice POWELL, Mr. Justice REHNQUIST, and Mr. Justice STEVENS joined. "
[1075] "The question presented by this appeal is whether a Tennessee statute barring \xd2Minister[s] of the Gospel, or priest[s] of any denomination whatever\xd3 from serving as delegates to the State's limited constitutional convention deprived appellant McDaniel, an ordained minister, of the right to the free exercise of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment and made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. The First Amendment forbids all laws \xd2prohibiting the free exercise\xd3 of religion. "
[1076] "*621 I "
[1077] "In its first Constitution, in 1796, Tennessee disqualified ministers from serving as legislators.1 That disqualifying provision has continued unchanged since its adoption; it is now Art. 9, \xa4 1, of the State Constitution. The state legislature applied this provision to candidates for delegate to the State's 1977 limited constitutional convention when it enacted ch. 848, \xa4 4, of 1976 Tenn.Pub.Acts: \xd2Any citizen of the state who can qualify for membership in the House of Representatives of the General Assembly may become a candidate for delegate to the convention . . . .\xd3 "
[1078] "McDaniel, an ordained minister of a Baptist Church in Chattanooga, Tenn., filed as a candidate for delegate to the constitutional convention. An opposing candidate, appellee Selma Cash Paty, sued in the Chancery Court for a declaratory judgment that McDaniel was disqualified from serving as a delegate and for a judgment striking his name from the ballot. Chancellor Franks of the Chancery Court held that \xa4 4 of ch. 848 violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution and declared McDaniel eligible for the office of delegate. Accordingly, McDaniel's name remained on the ballot and in the ensuing election he was elected by a vote almost equal to that of three opposing candidates. "
[1079] "After the election, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed the Chancery Court, holding that the disqualification of clergy imposed no burden upon \xd2religious belief\xd3 and restricted \xd2religious action . . . [only] in the lawmaking process of government-where religious action is absolutely prohibited by the establishment clause . . . .\xd3 547 S.W.2d 897, 903 (1977). *622 The state interests in preventing the establishment of religion and in avoiding the divisiveness and tendency to channel political activity along religious lines, resulting from clergy participation in political affairs, were deemed by that court sufficiently weighty to justify the disqualification, notwithstanding the guarantee of the Free Exercise Clause. "
[1080] "We noted probable jurisdiction.2 432 U.S. 905, 97 S.Ct. 2948, 53 L.Ed.2d 1076 (1977). "
[1081] "II "
[1082] "A "
[1083] "The disqualification of ministers from legislative office was a practice carried from England by seven of the original States;3 later six new States similarly excluded clergymen from some political offices. **1326 1 A. Stokes, Church and State in the United States 622 (1950) (hereafter Stokes). In England the practice of excluding clergy from the House of Commons was justified on a variety of grounds: to prevent dual officeholding, that is, membership by a minister in both Parliament and Convocation; to insure that the priest or deacon devoted himself to his \xd2sacred calling\xd3 rather than to \xd2such mundane activities as were appropriate to a member of the House of Commons\xd3; and to prevent ministers, who after 1533 were subject to the Crown's powers over the benefices of the clergy, from using membership in Commons to diminish its independence by increasing the influence of the King and the nobility. In re MacManaway, [1951] A.C. 161, 164, 170-171. "
[1084] "The purpose of the several States in providing for disqualification was primarily to assure the success of a new political experiment, the separation of church and state. 1 Stokes 622. *623 Prior to 1776, most of the 13 Colonies had some form of an established, or government-sponsored, church. Id., at 364-446. Even after ratification of the First Amendment, which prohibited the Federal Government from following such a course, some States continued pro-establishment provisions. See id., at 408, 418-427, 444. Massachusetts, the last State to accept disestablishment, did so in 1833. Id., at 426-427. "
[1085] "In light of this history and a widespread awareness during that period of undue and often dominant clerical influence in public and political affairs here, in England, and on the Continent, it is not surprising that strong views were held by some that one way to assure disestablishment was to keep clergymen out of public office. Indeed, some of the foremost political philosophers and statesmen of that period held such views regarding the clergy. Earlier, John Locke argued for confining the authority of the English clergy \xd2within the bounds of the church, nor can it in any manner be extended to civil affairs; because the church itself is a thing absolutely separate and distinct from the commonwealth.\xd3 5 Works of John Locke 21 (C. Baldwin ed. 1824). Thomas Jefferson initially advocated such a position in his 1783 draft of a constitution for Virginia.4 James Madison, however, disagreed and vigorously *624 urged the position which in our view accurately reflects the spirit and purpose of the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment. Madison's response to Jefferson's position was: "
[1086] "\xd2Does not The exclusion of Ministers of the Gospel as such violate a fundamental principle of liberty by punishing a religious profession with the privation of a civil right? does it [not] violate another article of the plan itself which exempts religion from the cognizance of Civil power? does it not violate justice by at once taking away a right and prohibiting a compensation for it? does it not in fine violate impartiality by shutting the door [against] the Ministers of one Religion and leaving it open for those of every other.\xd3 5 Writings of James Madison 288 (G. Hunt ed. 1904). "
[1087] "Madison was not the only articulate opponent of clergy disqualification. When proposals were made earlier to prevent clergymen from holding public office, John Witherspoon, **1327 a Presbyterian minister, president of Princeton University, and the only clergyman to sign the Declaration of Independence, made a cogent protest and, with tongue in cheek, offered an amendment to a provision much like that challenged here: "
[1088] "\xd2 \xd4No clergyman, of any denomination, shall be capable of being elected a member of the Senate or House of Representatives, because (here insert the grounds of offensive disqualification, which I have not been able to discover) Provided always, and it is the true intent and meaning of this part of the constitution, that if at any time he shall be completely deprived of the clerical character by those by whom he was invested with it, as by deposition for cursing and swearing, drunkenness or uncleanness, he shall then be fully restored to all the privileges of a free *625 citizen; his offense [of being a clergyman] shall no more be remembered against him; but he may be chosen either to the Senate or House of Representatives, and shall be treated with all the respect due to his brethren, the other members of Assembly.\xd5 \xd3 Stokes 624-625. "
[1089] "As the value of the disestablishment experiment was perceived, 11 of the 13 States disqualifying the clergy from some types of public office gradually abandoned that limitation. New York, for example, took that step in 1846 after delegates to the State's constitutional convention argued that the exclusion of clergymen from the legislature was an \xd2odious distinction.\xd3 2 C. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 111-112 (1906). Only Maryland and Tennessee continued their clergy-disqualification provisions into this century and, in 1974, a District Court held Maryland's provision violative of the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantees of the free exercise of religion. Kirkley v. Maryland, 381 F.Supp. 327. Today Tennessee remains the only State excluding ministers from certain public offices. "
[1090] "The essence of this aspect of our national history is that in all but a few States the selection or rejection of clergymen for public office soon came to be viewed as something safely left to the good sense and desires of the people. "
[1091] "B "
[1092] "This brief review of the history of clergy-disqualification provisions also amply demonstrates, however, that, at least during the early segment of our national life, those provisions enjoyed the support of responsible American statesmen and were accepted as having a rational basis. Against this background we do not lightly invalidate a statute enacted pursuant to a provision of a state constitution which has been sustained by its highest court. The challenged provision came to the Tennessee Supreme Court clothed with the presumption of validity to which that court was bound to give deference. "
[1093] "1*626 However, the right to the free exercise of religion unquestionably encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and perform other similar religious functions, or, in other words, to be a minister of the type McDaniel was found to be. Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). Tennessee also acknowledges the right of its adult citizens generally to seek and hold office as legislators or delegates to the state constitutional convention. Tenn.Const., Art. 2, \xa4\xa4 9, 25, 26; Tenn.Code Ann. \xa4\xa4 8-1801, 8-1803 (Supp.1977). Yet under the clergy-disqualification provision, McDaniel cannot exercise both rights simultaneously because the State has conditioned the exercise of one on the surrender of the other. Or, in James Madison's words, the State is \xd2punishing a religious profession with the privation of a civil right.\xd3 5 Writings of James Madison, supra, at 288. In so doing, Tennessee has encroached upon McDaniel's right to the free exercise of religion. \xd2[T]o condition the availability of benefits [including access to the ballot] upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of [his] religious faith [by **1328 surrendering his religiously impelled ministry] effectively penalizes the free exercise of [his] constitutional liberties.\xd3 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 1795, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). "
[1094] "If the Tennessee disqualification provision were viewed as depriving the clergy of a civil right solely because of their religious beliefs, our inquiry would be at an end. The Free Exercise Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs as such. Id., at 402, 83 S.Ct., at 1794; Cantwell v. Connecticut, supra, 310 U.S., at 304, 60 S.Ct., at 903. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982 (1961), the Court reviewed the Maryland constitutional requirement that all holders of \xd2any office of profit or trust in this State\xd3 declare their belief in the existence of God. In striking down the Maryland requirement, the Court did not evaluate the interests assertedly justifying it but rather held that it violated freedom of religious belief. "
[1095] "2In our view, however, Torcaso does not govern. By its *627 terms, the Tennessee disqualification operates against McDaniel because of his status as a \xd2minister\xd3 or \xd2priest.\xd3 The meaning of those words is, of course, a question of state law.5 And although the question has not been examined extensively in state-law sources, such authority as is available indicates that ministerial status is defined in terms of conduct and activity rather than in terms of belief.6 Because the Tennessee disqualification is directed primarily at status, acts, and conduct it is unlike the requirement in Torcaso, which focused on belief. Hence, the Free Exercise Clause's absolute prohibition of infringements on the \xd2freedom to believe\xd3 is inapposite here.7 "
[1096] "3This does not mean, of course, that the disqualification escapes judicial scrutiny or that McDaniel's activity does not enjoy significant First Amendment protection. The Court *628 recently declared in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972): "
[1097] "\xd2The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.\xd38 "
[1098] "**1329 Tennessee asserts that its interest in preventing the establishment of a state religion is consistent with the Establishment Clause and thus of the highest order. The constitutional history of the several States reveals that generally the interest in preventing establishment prompted the adoption of clergy disqualification provisions, see Stokes 622; Tennessee does not appear to be an exception to this pattern. Cf. post, at 1333 n. 9 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment). There is no occasion to inquire whether promoting such an interest is a permissible legislative goal, however, see post, at 1333-1336, for Tennessee has failed to demonstrate that its views of the dangers of clergy participation in the political process have not lost whatever validity they may once have enjoyed. The essence of the rationale underlying the Tennessee restriction on ministers is that if elected to public office they will necessarily exercise *629 their powers and influence to promote the interests of one sect or thwart the interests of another, thus pitting one against the others, contrary to the anti-establishment principle with its command of neutrality. See Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). However widely that view may have been held in the 18th century by many, including enlightened statesmen of that day, the American experience provides no persuasive support for the fear that clergymen in public office will be less careful of anti-establishment interests or less faithful to their oaths of civil office than their unordained counterparts.9 "
[1099] "We hold that \xa4 4 of ch. 848, violates McDaniel's First Amendment right to the free exercise of his religion made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. Accordingly, the judgment of the Tennessee Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is remanded to that court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. "
[1100] "Reversed and remanded. "
[1101] "Chief Justice REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[1102] "This case requires us to consider once again the standard of review for prison regulations claimed to inhibit the exercise of constitutional rights. Respondents, members of the Islamic *345 faith, were prisoners in New Jersey's Leesburg State Prison.1 They challenged policies adopted by prison officials which resulted in their inability to attend Jumu'ah, a weekly Muslim congregational service regularly held in the main prison building and in a separate facility known as \xd2the Farm.\xd3 Jumu'ah is commanded by the Koran and must be held every Friday after the sun reaches its zenith and before the Asr, or afternoon prayer. See Koran 62:9\xd010; Brief for Imam Jamil Abdullah Al-Amin et al. as Amici Curiae 18\xd031. There is no question that respondents' sincerely held religious beliefs compelled attendance at Jumu'ah. We hold that the prison regulations here challenged did not violate respondents' rights under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. "
[1103] "Inmates at Leesburg are placed in one of three custody classifications. Maximum security and \xd2gang minimum\xd3 security inmates are housed in the main prison building, and those with the lowest classification\xd1full minimum\xd1live in \xd2the Farm.\xd3 Both respondents were classified as gang minimum security prisoners when this suit was filed, and respondent Mateen was later classified as full minimum. "
[1104] "Several changes in prison policy prompted this litigation. In April 1983, the New Jersey Department of Corrections issued Standard 853, which provided that inmates could no longer move directly from maximum security to full minimum status, but were instead required to first spend a period of time in the intermediate gang minimum status. App. 147. This change was designed to redress problems that had arisen when inmates were transferred directly from the restrictive maximum security status to full minimum status, with its markedly higher level of freedom. Because **2403 of serious overcrowding in the main building, Standard 853 further mandated that gang minimum inmates ordinarily be assigned jobs outside the main building. Ibid. These inmates work in details of 8 to 15 persons, supervised by one guard. *346 Standard 853 also required that full minimum inmates work outside the main institution, whether on or off prison grounds, or in a satellite building such as the Farm. Ibid. "
[1105] "Corrections officials at Leesburg implemented these policies gradually and, as the District Court noted, with some difficulty. Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F.Supp. 928, 929 (NJ 1984). In the initial stages of outside work details for gang minimum prisoners, officials apparently allowed some Muslim inmates to work inside the main building on Fridays so that they could attend Jumu'ah. This alternative was eventually eliminated in March 1984, in light of the directive of Standard 853 that all gang minimum inmates work outside the main building. "
[1106] "Significant problems arose with those inmates assigned to outside work details. Some avoided reporting for their assignments, while others found reasons for returning to the main building during the course of the workday (including their desire to attend religious services). Evidence showed that the return of prisoners during the day resulted in security risks and administrative burdens that prison officials found unacceptable. Because details of inmates were supervised by only one guard, the whole detail was forced to return to the main gate when one prisoner desired to return to the facility. The gate was the site of all incoming foot and vehicle traffic during the day, and prison officials viewed it as a high security risk area. When an inmate returned, vehicle traffic was delayed while the inmate was logged in and searched. "
[1107] "In response to these burdens, Leesburg officials took steps to ensure that those assigned to outside details remained there for the whole day. Thus, arrangements were made to have lunch and required medications brought out to the prisoners, and appointments with doctors and social workers were scheduled for the late afternoon. These changes proved insufficient, however, and prison officials began to study alternatives. After consulting with the director of social services, the director of professional services, and the *347 prison's imam and chaplain, prison officials in March 1984 issued a policy memorandum which prohibited inmates assigned to outside work details from returning to the prison during the day except in the case of emergency. "
[1108] "The prohibition of returns prevented Muslims assigned to outside work details from attending Jumu'ah. Respondents filed suit under 42 U.S.C. \xa4 1983, alleging that the prison policies unconstitutionally denied them their Free Exercise rights under the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court, applying the standards announced in an earlier decision of the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, concluded that no constitutional violation had occurred. The District Court decided that Standard 853 and the March 1984 prohibition on returns \xd2plausibly advance\xd3 the goals of security, order, and rehabilitation. 595 F.Supp., at 934. It rejected alternative arrangements suggested by respondents, finding that \xd2no less restrictive alternative could be adopted without potentially compromising a legitimate institutional objective.\xd3 Ibid. "
[1109] "The Court of Appeals, sua sponte hearing the case en banc, decided that its earlier decision relied upon by the District Court was not sufficiently protective of prisoners' free exercise rights, and went on to state that prison policies could be sustained only if: "
[1110] "\xd2the state ... show[s] that the challenged regulations were intended to serve, and do serve, the important penological goal of security, and that no reasonable method exists by which [prisoners'] religious rights can be accommodated without creating bona fide security **2404 problems. The expert testimony of prison officials should be given due weight, but such testimony is not dispositive of the issue whether no reasonable adjustment is possible.... Where it is found that reasonable methods of accommodation can be adopted without sacrificing either the state's interest in security or the prisoners' interest *348 in freely exercising their religious rights, the state's refusal to allow the observance of a central religious practice cannot be justified and violates the prisoner's first amendment rights.\xd3 Shabazz v. O'Lone, 782 F.2d 416, 420 (CA3 1986) (footnotes omitted). "
[1111] "In considering whether a potential method of accommodation is reasonable, the court added, relevant factors include cost, the effects of overcrowding, understaffing, and inmates' demonstrated proclivity to unruly conduct. See id., at 420, n. 3. The case was remanded to the District Court for reconsideration under the standards enumerated in the opinion. We granted certiorari to consider the important federal constitutional issues presented by the Court of Appeals' decision, and to resolve apparent confusion among the Courts of Appeals on the proper standards to be applied in considering prisoners' free exercise claims. 479 U.S. 881, 107 S.Ct. 268, 93 L.Ed.2d 245 (1986). "
[1112] "Several general principles guide our consideration of the issues presented here. First, \xd2convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason of their conviction and confinement in prison.\xd3 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 545, 99 S.Ct. 1861, 1877, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1979). See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 2259, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S.Ct. 2532, 2539\xd040, 53 L.Ed.2d 629 (1977). Inmates clearly retain protections afforded by the First Amendment, Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822, 94 S.Ct. 2800, 2804, 41 L.Ed.2d 495 (1974), including its directive that no law shall prohibit the free exercise of religion. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 92 S.Ct. 1079, 31 L.Ed.2d 263 (1972) (per curiam ). Second, \xd2[l]awful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.\xd3 Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S.Ct. 1049, 1060, 92 L.Ed. 1356 (1948). The limitations on the exercise of constitutional rights arise both from the fact of incarceration and from valid penological objectives\xd1including deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of prisoners, and institutional security. Pell v. Procunier, supra, 417 U.S., at 822\xd0823, 94 S.Ct., at 2804; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412, 94 S.Ct. 1800, 1810\xd011, 40 L.Ed.2d 224 (1974). "
[1113] "1*349 In considering the appropriate balance of these factors, we have often said that evaluation of penological objectives is committed to the considered judgment of prison administrators, \xd2who are actually charged with and trained in the running of the particular institution under examination.\xd3 Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S., at 562, 99 S.Ct., at 1886. See Turner v. Safley, supra, 482 U.S., at 86\xd087, 107 S.Ct., at 2260\xd02261. To ensure that courts afford appropriate deference to prison officials, we have determined that prison regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights are judged under a \xd2reasonableness\xd3 test less restrictive than that ordinarily applied to alleged infringements of fundamental constitutional rights. See, e.g., Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., supra, 433 U.S., at 128, 97 S.Ct., at 2539. We recently restated the proper standard: \xd2[W]hen a prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.\xd3 Turner v. Safley, supra, 482 U.S., at 89, 107 S.Ct., at 2261.2 This approach **2405 ensures the ability of corrections officials \xd2to anticipate security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable problems of prison administration,\xd3 ibid., and avoids unnecessary intrusion of the judiciary into problems particularly *350 ill suited to \xd2resolution by decree.\xd3 Procunier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U.S., at 405, 94 S.Ct., at 1807\xd008. See also Turner v. Safley, supra, 482 U.S., at 89, 107 S.Ct., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0; Bell v. Wolfish, supra, 441 U.S., at 548, 99 S.Ct., at 1879. "
[1114] "2We think the Court of Appeals decision in this case was wrong when it established a separate burden on prison officials to prove \xd2that no reasonable method exists by which [prisoners'] religious rights can be accommodated without creating bona fide security problems.\xd3 782 F.2d, at 420. See also id., at 419 (Prison officials should be required \xd2to produce convincing evidence that they are unable to satisfy their institutional goals in any way that does not infringe inmates' free exercise rights\xd3). Though the availability of accommodations is relevant to the reasonableness inquiry, we have rejected the notion that \xd2prison officials ... have to set up and then shoot down every conceivable alternative method of accommodating the claimant's constitutional complaint.\xd3 Turner v. Safley, supra, 482 U.S., at 90\xd091, 107 S.Ct., at 2262. By placing the burden on prison officials to disprove the availability of alternatives, the approach articulated by the Court of Appeals fails to reflect the respect and deference that the United States Constitution allows for the judgment of prison administrators. "
[1115] "3Turning to consideration of the policies challenged in this case, we think the findings of the District Court establish clearly that prison officials have acted in a reasonable manner. Turner v. Safley, drew upon our previous decisions to identify several factors relevant to this reasonableness determination. First, a regulation must have a logical connection to legitimate governmental interests invoked to justify it. Id., at 89\xd090, 107 S.Ct., at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0. The policies at issue here clearly meet that standard. The requirement that full minimum and gang minimum prisoners work outside the main facility was justified by concerns of institutional order and security, for the District Court found that it was \xd2at least in part a response to a critical overcrowding in the state's prisons, and ... at least in part designed to ease tension and drain on the facilities *351 during that part of the day when the inmates were outside the confines of the main buildings.\xd3 595 F.Supp., at 929. We think it beyond doubt that the standard is related to this legitimate concern. "
[1116] "The subsequent policy prohibiting returns to the institution during the day also passes muster under this standard. Prison officials testified that the returns from outside work details generated congestion and delays at the main gate, a high risk area in any event. Return requests also placed pressure on guards supervising outside details, who previously were required to \xd2evaluate each reason possibly justifying a return to the facilities and either accept or reject that reason.\xd3 Id., at 931. Rehabilitative concerns further supported the policy; corrections officials sought a simulation of working conditions and responsibilities **2406 in society. Chief Deputy Ucci testified: \xd2One of the things that society demands or expects is that when you have a job, you show up on time, you put in your eight hours, or whatever hours you are supposed to put in, and you don't get off.... If we can show inmates that they're supposed to show up for work and work a full day, then when they get out at least we've done something.\xd3 Tr. 89. These legitimate goals were advanced by the prohibition on returns; it cannot seriously be maintained that \xd2the logical connection between the regulation and the asserted goal is so remote as to render the policy arbitrary or irrational.\xd3 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S., at 89\xd090, 107 S.Ct., at 2262. "
[1117] "Our decision in Turner also found it relevant that \xd2alternative means of exercising the right ... remain open to prison inmates.\xd3 Ante, at \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0. There are, of course, no alternative means of attending Jumu'ah; respondents' religious beliefs insist that it occur at a particular time. But the very stringent requirements as to the time at which Jumu'ah may be held may make it extraordinarily difficult for prison officials to assure that every Muslim prisoner is able to attend that service. While we in no way minimize the central importance of Jumu'ah to respondents, we are unwilling to hold that prison *352 officials are required by the Constitution to sacrifice legitimate penological objectives to that end. In Turner, we did not look to see whether prisoners had other means of communicating with fellow inmates, but instead examined whether the inmates were deprived of \xd2all means of expression.\xd3 Id., at 92, 107 S.Ct., at 2263. Here, similarly, we think it appropriate to see whether under these regulations respondents retain the ability to participate in other Muslim religious ceremonies. The record establishes that respondents are not deprived of all forms of religious exercise, but instead freely observe a number of their religious obligations. The right to congregate for prayer or discussion is \xd2virtually unlimited except during working hours,\xd3 Tr. 182 (testimony of O'Lone), and the state-provided imam has free access to the prison. Muslim prisoners are given different meals whenever pork is served in the prison cafeteria. Special arrangements are also made during the month-long observance of Ramadan, a period of fasting and prayer. During Ramadan, Muslim prisoners are awakened at 4:00 a.m. for an early breakfast, and receive dinner at 8:30 each evening. We think this ability on the part of respondents to participate in other religious observances of their faith supports the conclusion that the restrictions at issue here were reasonable. "
[1118] "Finally, the case for the validity of these regulations is strengthened by examination of the impact that accommodation of respondents' asserted right would have on other inmates, on prison personnel, and on allocation of prison resources generally. See Turner v. Safley, supra, at 90, 107 S.Ct., at 2262. Respondents suggest several accommodations of their practices, including placing all Muslim inmates in one or two inside work details or providing weekend labor for Muslim inmates. See Brief for Respondents 52\xd053. As noted by the District Court, however, each of respondents' suggested accommodations would, in the judgment of prison officials, have adverse effects on the institution. Inside work details for gang minimum inmates would be inconsistent with the legitimate concerns *353 underlying Standard 853, and the District Court found that the extra supervision necessary to establish weekend details for Muslim prisoners \xd2would be a drain on scarce human resources\xd3 at the prison. 595 F.Supp., at 932. Prison officials determined that the alternatives would also threaten prison security by allowing \xd2affinity groups\xd3 in the prison to flourish. Administrator O'Lone testified that \xd2we have found out and think almost every prison administrator knows that any time you put a group of individuals together with one particular affinity interest ... you wind up with ... a leadership role and **2407 an organizational structure that will almost invariably challenge the institutional authority.\xd3 Tr. 179\xd0180. Finally, the officials determined that special arrangements for one group would create problems as \xd2other inmates [see] that a certain segment is escaping a rigorous work detail\xd3 and perceive favoritism. Id., at 178\xd0179. These concerns of prison administrators provide adequate support for the conclusion that accommodations of respondents' request to attend Jumu'ah would have undesirable results in the institution. These difficulties also make clear that there are no \xd2obvious, easy alternatives to the policy adopted by petitioners.\xd3 Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S., at 93, 107 S.Ct., at 2263. "
[1119] "4We take this opportunity to reaffirm our refusal, even where claims are made under the First Amendment, to \xd2substitute our judgment on ... difficult and sensitive matters of institutional administration,\xd3 Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3233, 82 L.Ed.2d 438 (1984), for the determinations of those charged with the formidable task of running a prison. Here the District Court decided that the regulations alleged to infringe constitutional rights were reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives. We agree with the District Court, and it necessarily follows that the regulations in question do not offend the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is therefore "
[1120] "Reversed. "
[1121] "Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[1122] "*2055 1These cases require us to decide whether the First Amendment permits courts to intervene in employment disputes involving teachers at religious schools who are entrusted with the responsibility of instructing their students in the faith. The First Amendment protects the right of religious institutions \xd2to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.\xd3 Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952). Applying this principle, we held in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 132 S.Ct. 694, 181 L.Ed.2d 650 (2012), that the First Amendment barred a court from entertaining an employment discrimination claim brought by an elementary school teacher, Cheryl Perich, against the religious school where she taught. Our decision built on a line of lower court cases adopting what was dubbed the \xd2ministerial exception\xd3 to laws governing the employment relationship between a religious institution and certain key employees. We did not announce \xd2a rigid formula\xd3 for determining whether an employee falls within this exception, but we identified circumstances that we found relevant in that case, including Perich's title as a \xd2Minister of Religion, Commissioned,\xd3 her educational training, and her responsibility to teach religion and participate with students in religious activities. Id., at 190\xd0191, 132 S.Ct. 694. "
[1123] "In the cases now before us, we consider employment discrimination claims brought by two elementary school teachers at Catholic schools whose teaching responsibilities are similar to Perich's. Although these teachers were not given the title of \xd2minister\xd3 and have less religious training than Perich, we hold that their cases fall within the same rule that dictated our decision in Hosanna-Tabor. The religious education and formation of students is the very reason for the existence of most private religious schools, and therefore the selection and supervision of the teachers upon whom the schools rely to do this work lie at the core of their mission. Judicial review of the way in which religious schools discharge those responsibilities would undermine the independence of religious institutions in a way that the First Amendment does not tolerate. "
[1124] "*2056 I "
[1125] "A "
[1126] "1 "
[1127] "The first of the two cases we now decide involves Agnes Morrissey-Berru, who was employed at Our Lady of Guadalupe School (OLG), a Roman Catholic primary school in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles. Excerpts of Record (ER) 58 in No. 17\xd056624 (CA9) (OLG).1 For many years, Morrissey-Berru was employed at OLG as a lay fifth or sixth grade teacher. Like most elementary school teachers, she taught all subjects, and since OLG is a Catholic school, the curriculum included religion. App. 23, 75. As a result, she was her students\xd5 religion teacher. "
[1128] "Morrissey-Berru earned a B. A. in English Language Arts, with a minor in secondary education, and she holds a California teaching credential. Id., at 21\xd022. While on the faculty at OLG, she took religious education courses at the school's request, ER 41\xd0ER 42, ER 44\xd0ER 45, ER 276, and was expected to attend faculty prayer services, App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19\xd0267, p. 87a.2 "
[1129] "Each year, Morrissey-Berru and OLG entered into an employment agreement, App. 21,3 that set out the school's \xd2mission\xd3 and Morrissey-Berru's duties. See, e.g., id., at 154\xd0164.4 The agreement stated that the school's mission was \xd2to develop and promote a Catholic School Faith Community,\xd3 id., at 154, and it informed Morrissey-Berru that \xd2[a]ll [her] duties and responsibilities as a Teache[r were to] be performed within this overriding commitment.\xd3 Ibid. The agreement explained that the school's hiring and retention decisions would be guided by its Catholic mission, and the agreement made clear that teachers were expected to \xd2model and promote\xd3 Catholic \xd2faith and morals.\xd3 Id., at 155. Under the agreement, Morrissey-Berru was required to participate in \xd2[s]chool liturgical activities, as requested,\xd3 ibid., *2057 and the agreement specified that she could be terminated \xd2for \xd4cause\xd5 \xd3 for failing to carry out these duties or for \xd2conduct that brings discredit upon the School or the Roman Catholic Church.\xd3 Id., at 155\xd0157. The agreement required compliance with the faculty handbook, which sets out similar expectations. Id., at 156; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19\xd0267, at 52a\xd055a. The pastor of the parish, a Catholic priest, had to approve Morrissey-Berru's hiring each year. Id., at 14a; see also App. 164. "
[1130] "Like all teachers in the Archdiocese of Los Angeles, Morrissey-Berru was \xd2considered a catechist,\xd3 i.e., \xd2a teacher of religio[n].\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19\xd0267, at 56a, 60a. Catechists are \xd2responsible for the faith formation of the students in their charge each day.\xd3 Id., at 56a. Morrissey-Berru provided religious instruction every day using a textbook designed for use in teaching religion to young Catholic students. Id., at 45a\xd051a, 90a\xd092a; see App. 79\xd080. Under the prescribed curriculum, she was expected to teach students, among other things, \xd2to learn and express belief that Jesus is the son of God and the Word made flesh\xd3; to \xd2identify the ways\xd3 the church \xd2carries on the mission of Jesus\xd3; to \xd2locate, read and understand stories from the Bible\xd3; to \xd2know the names, meanings, signs and symbols of each of the seven sacraments\xd3; and to be able to \xd2explain the communion of saints.\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19\xd0267, at 91a\xd092a. She tested her students on that curriculum in a yearly exam. Id., at 87a. She also directed and produced an annual passion play. Id., at 26a. "
[1131] "Morrissey-Berru prepared her students for participation in the Mass and for communion and confession. Id., at 68a, 81a, 88a\xd089a. She also occasionally selected and prepared students to read at Mass. Id., at 83a, 89a. And she was expected to take her students to Mass once a week and on certain feast days (such as the Feast Day of St. Juan Diego, All Saints Day, and the Feast of Our Lady), and to take them to confession and to pray the Stations of the Cross. Id., at 68a\xd069a, 83a, 88a. Each year, she brought them to the Catholic Cathedral in Los Angeles, where they participated as altar servers. Id., at 95a\xd096a. This visit, she explained, was \xd2an important experience\xd3 because \xd2[i]t is a big honor\xd3 for children to \xd2serve the altar\xd3 at the cathedral. Id., at 96a. "
[1132] "Morrissey-Berru also prayed with her students. Her class began or ended every day with a Hail Mary. Id., at 87a. She led the students in prayer at other times, such as when a family member was ill. Id., at 21a, 81a, 86a\xd087a. And she taught them to recite the Apostle's Creed and the Nicene Creed, as well as prayers for specific purposes, such as in connection with the sacrament of confession. Id., at 20a\xd021a, 92a. "
[1133] "The school reviewed Morrissey-Berru's performance under religious standards. The \xd2 \xd4Classroom Observation Report\xd5 \xd3 evaluated whether Catholic values were \xd2infused through all subject areas\xd3 and whether there were religious signs and displays in the classroom. Id., at 94a, 95a; App. 59. Morrissey-Berru testified that she tried to instruct her students \xd2in a manner consistent with the teachings of the Church,\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19\xd0267, at 96a, and she said that she was \xd2committed to teaching children Catholic values\xd3 and providing a \xd2faith-based education.\xd3 Id., at 82a. And the school principal confirmed that Morrissey-Berru was expected to do these things.5 "
[1134] "2 "
[1135] "In 2014, OLG asked Morrissey-Berru to move from a full-time to a part-time position, *2058 and the next year, the school declined to renew her contract. She filed a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), received a right-to-sue letter, App. 169, and then filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 81 Stat. 602, as amended, 29 U.S.C. \xa4 621 et seq., claiming that the school had demoted her and had failed to renew her contract so that it could replace her with a younger teacher. App. 168\xd0169. The school maintains that it based its decisions on classroom performance\xd1specifically, Morrissey-Berru's difficulty in administering a new reading and writing program, which had been introduced by the school's new principal as part of an effort to maintain accreditation and improve the school's academic program. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19\xd0267, at 66a\xd067a, 70a, 73a. "
[1136] "Invoking the \xd2ministerial exception\xd3 that we recognized in Hosanna-Tabor, OLG successfully moved for summary judgment, but the Ninth Circuit reversed in a brief opinion. 769 Fed.Appx. 460, 461 (2019). The court acknowledged that Morrissey-Berru had \xd2significant religious responsibilities\xd3 but reasoned that \xd2an employee's duties alone are not dispositive under Hosanna-Tabor\xd5s framework.\xd3 Ibid. Unlike Perich, the court noted, Morrissey-Berru did not have the formal title of \xd2minister,\xd3 had limited formal religious training, and \xd2did not hold herself out to the public as a religious leader or minister.\xd3 Ibid. In the court's view, these \xd2factors\xd3 outweighed the fact that she was invested with significant religious responsibilities. Ibid. The court therefore held that Morrissey-Berru did not fall within the \xd2ministerial exception.\xd3 OLG filed a petition for certiorari, and we granted review. "
[1137] "B "
[1138] "1 "
[1139] "The second case concerns the late Kristen Biel, who worked for about a year and a half as a lay teacher at St. James School, another Catholic primary school in Los Angeles. For part of one academic year, Biel served as a long-term substitute teacher for a first grade class, and for one full year she was a full-time fifth grade teacher. App. 336\xd0337. Like Morrissey-Berru, she taught all subjects, including religion. Id., at 288; ER 588 in No. 17\xd055180 (CA9) (St. James).6 "
[1140] "Biel had a B. A. in liberal studies and a teaching credential. App. 244. During her time at St. James, she attended a religious conference that imparted \xd2[d]ifferent techniques on teaching and incorporating God\xd3 into the classroom. Id., at 260\xd0262. Biel was Catholic.7 "
[1141] "Biel's employment agreement was in pertinent part nearly identical to Morrissey-Berru's. Compare id., at 154\xd0164, with id., at 320\xd0329. The agreement set out the same religious mission; required teachers to serve that mission; imposed commitments regarding religious instruction, worship, and personal modeling of the faith; and explained that teachers\xd5 performance would be reviewed on those bases. "
[1142] "Biel's agreement also required compliance with the St. James faculty handbook, which resembles the OLG handbook. Id., at 322. Compare ER 641\xd0ER 651 (OLG) with ER 565\xd0ER 597 (St. James). The St. James handbook defines \xd2religious development\xd3 *2059 as the school's first goal and provides that teachers must \xd2mode[l] the faith life,\xd3 \xd2exemplif[y] the teachings of Jesus Christ,\xd3 \xd2integrat[e] Catholic thought and principles into secular subjects,\xd3 and \xd2prepar[e] students to receive the sacraments.\xd3 Id., at ER 570\xd0ER 572. The school principal confirmed these expectations.8 "
[1143] "Like Morrissey-Berru, Biel instructed her students in the tenets of Catholicism. She was required to teach religion for 200 minutes each week, App. 257\xd0258, and administered a test on religion every week, id., at 256\xd0257. She used a religion textbook selected by the school's principal, a Catholic nun. Id., at 255; ER 37 (St. James). The religious curriculum covered \xd2the norms and doctrines of the Catholic Faith, including ... the sacraments of the Catholic Church, social teachings according to the Catholic Church, morality, the history of Catholic saints, [and] Catholic prayers.\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19\xd0348, p. 83a. "
[1144] "Biel worshipped with her students. At St. James, teachers are responsible for \xd2prepar[ing] their students to be active participants at Mass, with particular emphasis on Mass responses,\xd3 ER 587, and Biel taught her students about \xd2Catholic practices like the Eucharist and confession,\xd3 id., at ER 226\xd0ER 227. At monthly Masses, she prayed with her students. App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19\xd0348, at 82a, 94a\xd096a. Her students participated in the liturgy on some occasions by presenting the gifts (bringing bread and wine to the priest). Ibid. "
[1145] "Teachers at St. James were \xd2required to pray with their students every day,\xd3 id., at 80a\xd081a, 110a, and Biel observed this requirement by opening and closing each school day with prayer, including the Lord's Prayer or a Hail Mary, id., at 81a\xd082a, 93a, 110a. "
[1146] "As at OLG, teachers at St. James are evaluated on their fulfillment of the school's religious mission. Id., at 83a\xd084a. St. James used the same classroom observation standards as OLG and thus examined whether teachers \xd2infus[ed]\xd3 Catholic values in all their teaching and included religious displays in their classrooms. Id., at 83a\xd084a, 92a. The school's principal, a Catholic nun, evaluated Biel on these measures. Id., at 106a. "
[1147] "2 "
[1148] "St. James declined to renew Biel's contract after one full year at the school. She filed charges with the EEOC, and after receiving a right-to-sue letter, brought this suit, alleging that she was discharged because she had requested a leave of absence to obtain treatment for breast cancer. App. 337\xd0338. The school maintains that the decision was based on poor performance\xd1namely, a failure to observe the planned curriculum and keep an orderly classroom. See id., at 303; App. to Pet. for Cert. in No. 19\xd0348, at 85a\xd089a, 114a\xd0115a, 120a\xd0121a. "
[1149] "Like OLG, St. James obtained summary judgment under the ministerial exception, id., at 74a, but a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, reasoning that Biel lacked Perich's \xd2credentials, training, [and] ministerial background,\xd3 911 F.3d 603, 608 (2018). "
[1150] "Judge D. Michael Fisher, sitting by designation, dissented. Considering the totality of the circumstances, he would have held that the ministerial exception applied \xd2because of the substance reflected in [Biel's] title and the important religious functions she performed\xd3 as a \xd2stewar[d] *2060 of the Catholic faith to the children in her class.\xd3 Id., at 621, 622. "
[1151] "An unsuccessful petition for rehearing en banc ensued. Judge Ryan D. Nelson, joined by eight other judges, dissented. 926 F.3d 1238, 1239 (C.A.9 2019). Judge Nelson faulted the panel majority for \xd2embrac[ing] the narrowest construction\xd3 of the ministerial exception, departing from \xd2the consensus of our sister circuits that the employee's ministerial function should be the key focus,\xd3 and demanding nothing less than a \xd2carbon copy\xd3 of the specific facts in Hosanna-Tabor. Ibid. We granted review and consolidated the case with OLG's. 589 U. S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 140 S.Ct. 679, 205 L.Ed.2d 448 (2019). "
[1152] "II "
[1153] "A "
[1154] "23The First Amendment provides that \xd2Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.\xd3 Among other things, the Religion Clauses protect the right of churches and other religious institutions to decide matters \xd2 \xd4of faith and doctrine\xd5 \xd3 without government intrusion. Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 186, 132 S.Ct. 694 (quoting Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 73 S.Ct. 143). State interference in that sphere would obviously violate the free exercise of religion, and any attempt by government to dictate or even to influence such matters would constitute one of the central attributes of an establishment of religion. The First Amendment outlaws such intrusion. "
[1155] "456The independence of religious institutions in matters of \xd2faith and doctrine\xd3 is closely linked to independence in what we have termed \xd2 \xd4matters of church government.\xd5 \xd3 565 U.S. at 186, 132 S.Ct. 694. This does not mean that religious institutions enjoy a general immunity from secular laws, but it does protect their autonomy with respect to internal management decisions that are essential to the institution's central mission. And a component of this autonomy is the selection of the individuals who play certain key roles. "
[1156] "78The \xd2ministerial exception\xd3 was based on this insight. Under this rule, courts are bound to stay out of employment disputes involving those holding certain important positions with churches and other religious institutions. The rule appears to have acquired the label \xd2ministerial exception\xd3 because the individuals involved in pioneering cases were described as \xd2ministers.\xd3 See McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 558\xd0559 (C.A.5 1972); Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1168 (C.A.4 1985). Not all pre-Hosanna-Tabor decisions applying the exception involved \xd2ministers\xd3 or even members of the clergy. See, e.g., EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277, 283\xd0284 (C.A.5 1981); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N. C., 213 F.3d 795, 800\xd0801 (C.A.4 2000). But it is instructive to consider why a church's independence on matters \xd2of faith and doctrine\xd3 requires the authority to select, supervise, and if necessary, remove a minister without interference by secular authorities. Without that power, a wayward minister's preaching, teaching, and counseling could contradict the church's tenets and lead the congregation away from the faith.9 The ministerial exception was recognized to preserve a *2061 church's independent authority in such matters. "
[1157] "B "
[1158] "When the so-called ministerial exception finally reached this Court in Hosanna-Tabor, we unanimously recognized that the Religion Clauses foreclose certain employment discrimination claims brought against religious organizations. 565 U.S. at 188, 132 S.Ct. 694. The constitutional foundation for our holding was the general principle of church autonomy to which we have already referred: independence in matters of faith and doctrine and in closely linked matters of internal government. The three prior decisions on which we primarily relied drew on this broad principle, and none was exclusively concerned with the selection or supervision of clergy. Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, L.Ed. 666 (1872), involved a dispute about the control of church property, and both Kedroff, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 and Serbian Eastern Ort hodox Diocese for United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 96 S.Ct. 2372, 49 L.Ed.2d 151 (1976), also concerned the control of property, as well as the appointment and authority of bishops. "
[1159] "In addition to these precedents, we looked to the \xd2background\xd3 against which \xd2the First Amendment was adopted.\xd3 Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 183, 132 S.Ct. 694. We noted that 16th-century British statutes had given the Crown the power to fill high \xd2religious offices\xd3 and to control the exercise of religion in other ways, and we explained that the founding generation sought to prevent a repetition of these practices in our country. Ibid. Because Cheryl Perich, the teacher in Hosanna-Tabor, had a title that included the word \xd2minister,\xd3 we naturally concentrated on historical events involving clerical offices, but the abuses we identified were not limited to the control of appointments. "
[1160] "We pointed to the various Acts of Uniformity, id., at 182, 132 S.Ct. 694, which dictated what ministers could preach and imposed penalties for non-compliance. Under the 1549 Act, a minister who \xd2preach[ed,] declare[d,] or [spoke] any thing\xd3 in derogation of any part of the Book of Common Prayer could be sentenced to six months in jail for a first offense and life imprisonment for a third violation. Act of Uniformity, 2 & 3 Edw. 6, ch. 1. In addition, all other English subjects were forbidden to say anything against the Book of Common Prayer in \xd2[i]nterludes[,] play[s,] song[s,] r[h]ymes, or by other open [w]ord[s].\xd3 Ibid. A 1559 law contained similar prohibitions. See Act of Uniformity, 1 Eliz., ch. 2. "
[1161] "After the Restoration, Parliament enacted a new law with a similar aim. Ministers and \xd2Lecturer[s]\xd3 were required to pledge \xd2unfeigned assent and consent\xd3 to the Book of Common Prayer, and all schoolmasters, private tutors, and university professors were required to \xd2conforme to the Liturgy of the Church of England\xd3 and not \xd2to endeavour any change or alteration\xd3 of the church. Act of Uniformity, 1662, 14 Car. 2, ch. 4. "
[1162] "British law continued to impose religious restrictions on education in the 18th century and past the time of the adoption of the First Amendment. The Schism or Established Church Act of 1714, 13 Ann., ch. 7, required that schoolmasters and tutors be licensed by a bishop. Non-conforming Protestants, as well as Catholics and Jews, could not teach at or attend the two universities, and as Blackstone wrote, \xd2[p]ersons professing the popish religion [could] not keep or teach any school under pain of perpetual imprisonment.\xd3 4 W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 55 (8th ed. 1778). The law also imposed penalties *2062 on \xd2any person [who] sen[t] another abroad to be educated in the popish religion ... or [who] contribute[d] to their maintenance when there.\xd3 Id., at 55\xd056. "
[1163] "British colonies in North America similarly controlled both the appointment of clergy, see Hosanna-Tabor, 565 U.S. at 183, 132 S.Ct. 694, and the teaching of students. A Maryland law \xd2prohibited any Catholic priest or lay person from keeping school, or taking upon himself the education of youth.\xd3 2 T. Hughes, History of the Society of Jesus in North America: Colonial and Federal 443\xd0444 (1917). In 1771, the Governor of New York was instructed to require that all schoolmasters arriving from England obtain a license from the Bishop of London. 3 C. Lincoln, The Constitutional History of New York 485, 745 (1906). New York law also required an oath and license for any \xd2 \xd4vagrant Preacher, Moravian, or disguised Papist\xd5 \xd3 to \xd2 \xd4Preach or Teach, Either in Public or Private.\xd5 \xd3 S. Cobb, The Rise of Religious Liberty in America 358 (1902). "
[1164] "C "
[1165] "In Hosanna-Tabor, Cheryl Perich, a kindergarten and fourth grade teacher at an Evangelical Lutheran school, filed suit in federal court, claiming that she had been discharged because of a disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. \xa4 12112(a). The school responded that the real reason for her dismissal was her violation of the Lutheran doctrine that disputes should be resolved internally and not by going to outside authorities. We held that her suit was barred by the \xd2ministerial exception\xd3 and noted that it \xd2concern[ed] government interference with an internal church decision that affects the faith and mission of the church.\xd3 565 U.S. at 190, 132 S.Ct. 694. We declined \xd2to adopt a rigid formula for deciding when an employee qualifies as a minister,\xd3 and we added that it was \xd2enough for us to conclude, in this our first case involving the ministerial exception, that the exception covers Perich, given all the circumstances of her employment.\xd3 Id., at 190\xd0191, 132 S.Ct. 694. We identified four relevant circumstances but did not highlight any as essential. "
[1166] "First, we noted that her church had given Perich the title of \xd2minister, with a role distinct from that of most of its members.\xd3 Id., at 191, 132 S.Ct. 694. Although she was not a minister in the usual sense of the term\xd1she was not a pastor or deacon, did not lead a congregation, and did not regularly conduct religious services\xd1she was classified as a \xd2called\xd3 teacher, as opposed to a lay teacher, and after completing certain academic requirements, was given the formal title \xd2 \xd4Minister of Religion, Commissioned.\xd5 \xd3 Id., at 177\xd0178, 191, 132 S.Ct. 694. "
[1167] "Second, Perich's position \xd2reflected a significant degree of religious training followed by a formal process of commissioning.\xd3 Id., at 191, 132 S.Ct. 694. "
[1168] "Third, \xd2Perich held herself out as a minister of the Church by accepting the formal call to religious service, according to its terms,\xd3 and by claiming certain tax benefits. Id., at 191\xd0192, 132 S.Ct. 694. "
[1169] "Fourth, \xd2Perich's job duties reflected a role in conveying the Church's message and carrying out its mission.\xd3 Id., at 192, 132 S.Ct. 694. The church charged her with \xd2 \xd4lead[ing] others toward Christian maturity\xd5 \xd3 and \xd2 \xd4teach[ing] faithfully the Word of God, the Sacred Scriptures, in its truth and purity and as set forth in all the symbolical books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church.\xd5 \xd3 Ibid. Although Perich also provided instruction in secular subjects, she taught religion four days a week, led her students in prayer three times a day, took her students to a chapel service once a week, and participated in the liturgy *2063 twice a year. \xd2As a source of religious instruction,\xd3 we explained, \xd2Perich performed an important role in transmitting the Lutheran faith to the next generation.\xd3 Ibid. "
[1170] "The case featured two concurrences. In the first, Justice THOMAS stressed that courts should \xd2defer to a religious organization's good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister.\xd3 Id., at 196, 132 S.Ct. 694. That is so, Justice THOMAS explained, because \xd2[a] religious organization's right to choose its ministers would be hollow ... if secular courts could second-guess\xd3 the group's sincere application of its religious tenets. Id., at 197, 132 S.Ct. 694. "
[1171] "The second concurrence argued that application of the \xd2ministerial exception\xd3 should \xd2focus on the function performed by persons who work for religious bodies\xd3 rather than labels or designations that may vary across faiths. Id., at 198, 132 S.Ct. 694 (opinion of ALITO, J., joined by KAGAN, J.). This opinion viewed the title of \xd2minister\xd3 as \xd2relevant\xd3 but \xd2neither necessary nor sufficient.\xd3 Id., at 202, 132 S.Ct. 694. It noted that \xd2most faiths do not employ the term \xd4minister\xd5 \xd3 and that some \xd2consider the ministry to consist of all or a very large percentage of their members.\xd3 Ibid. The opinion concluded that the \xd2 \xd4ministerial\xd5 exception\xd3 \xd2should apply to any \xd4employee\xd5 who leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.\xd3 Id., at 199, 132 S.Ct. 694. "
[1172] "D "
[1173] "1 "
[1174] "910In determining whether a particular position falls within the Hosanna-Tabor exception, a variety of factors may be important.10 The circumstances that informed our decision in Hosanna-Tabor were relevant because of their relationship to Perich's \xd2role in conveying the Church's message and carrying out its mission,\xd3 id., at 192, 132 S.Ct. 694, but the other noted circumstances also shed light on that connection. In a denomination that uses the term \xd2minister,\xd3 conferring that title naturally suggests that the recipient has been given an important position of trust. In Perich's case, the title that she was awarded and used demanded satisfaction of significant academic requirements and was conferred only after a formal approval process, id., at 191, 132 S.Ct. 694, and those circumstances also evidenced the importance attached to her role, ibid. But our recognition of the significance of those factors in Perich's case did not mean that they must be met\xd1or even that they are necessarily important\xd1in all other cases. "
[1175] "1112Take the question of the title \xd2minister.\xd3 Simply giving an employee the title of \xd2minister\xd3 is not enough to justify the exception. And by the same token, *2064 since many religious traditions do not use the title \xd2minister,\xd3 it cannot be a necessary requirement. Requiring the use of the title would constitute impermissible discrimination, and this problem cannot be solved simply by including positions that are thought to be the counterparts of a \xd2minister,\xd3 such as priests, nuns, rabbis, and imams. See Brief for Respondents 21. Nuns are not the same as Protestant ministers. A brief submitted by Jewish organizations makes the point that \xd2Judaism has many \xd4ministers,\xd5 \xd3 that is, \xd2the term \xd4minister\xd5 encompasses an extensive breadth of religious functionaries in Judaism.\xd311 For Muslims, \xd2an inquiry into whether imams or other leaders bear a title equivalent to \xd4minister\xd5 can present a troubling choice between denying a central pillar of Islam\xd1i.e., the equality of all believers\xd1and risking loss of ministerial exception protections.\xd312 "
[1176] "If titles were all-important, courts would have to decide which titles count and which do not, and it is hard to see how that could be done without looking behind the titles to what the positions actually entail. Moreover, attaching too much significance to titles would risk privileging religious traditions with formal organizational structures over those that are less formal. "
[1177] "1314For related reasons, the academic requirements of a position may show that the church in question regards the position as having an important responsibility in elucidating or teaching the tenets of the faith. Presumably the purpose of such requirements is to make sure that the person holding the position understands the faith and can explain it accurately and effectively. But insisting in every case on rigid academic requirements could have a distorting effect. This is certainly true with respect to teachers. Teaching children in an elementary school does not demand the same formal religious education as teaching theology to divinity students. Elementary school teachers often teach secular subjects in which they have little if any special training. In addition, religious traditions may differ in the degree of formal religious training thought to be needed in order to teach. See, e.g., Brief for Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention et al. as Amici Curiae 12 (\xd2many Protestant groups have historically rejected any requirement of formal theological training\xd3). In short, these circumstances, while instructive in Hosanna-Tabor, are not inflexible requirements and may have far less significance in some cases. "
[1178] "15What matters, at bottom, is what an employee does. And implicit in our decision in Hosanna-Tabor was a recognition that educating young people in their faith, inculcating its teachings, and training them to live their faith are responsibilities that lie at the very core of the mission of a private religious school. As we put it, Perich had been entrusted with the responsibility of \xd2transmitting the Lutheran faith to the next generation.\xd3 565 U.S. at 192, 132 S.Ct. 694. One of the concurrences made the same point, concluding that the exception should include \xd2any \xd4employee\xd5 who leads a religious organization, conducts worship services or important religious ceremonies or rituals, or serves as a messenger or teacher of its faith.\xd3 Id., at 199, 132 S.Ct. 694 (opinion of ALITO, J.) (emphasis added). "
[1179] "Religious education is vital to many faiths practiced in the United States. This point is stressed by briefs filed in support of OLG and St. James by groups affiliated *2065 with a wide array of faith traditions. In the Catholic tradition, religious education is \xd2 \xd4intimately bound up with the whole of the Church's life.\xd5 \xd3 Catechism of the Catholic Church 8 (2d ed. 2016). Under canon law, local bishops must satisfy themselves that \xd2those who are designated teachers of religious instruction in schools ... are outstanding in correct doctrine, the witness of a Christian life, and teaching skill.\xd3 Code of Canon Law, Canon 804, \xa4 2 (Eng. transl. 1998). "
[1180] "Similarly, Protestant churches, from the earliest settlements in this country, viewed education as a religious obligation. A core belief of the Puritans was that education was essential to thwart the \xd2chief project of that old deluder, Satan, to keep men from the knowledge of the Scriptures.\xd313 Thus, in 1647, the Massachusetts General Court passed what has been called the Old Deluder Satan Act requiring every sizable town to establish a school.14 Most of the oldest educational institutions in this country were originally established by or affiliated with churches, and in recent years, non-denominational Christian schools have proliferated with the aim of inculcating Biblical values in their students.15 Many such schools expressly set themselves apart from public schools that they believe do not reflect their values.16 "
[1181] "Religious education is a matter of central importance in Judaism. As explained in briefs submitted by Jewish organizations, the Torah is understood to require Jewish parents to ensure that their children are instructed in the faith.17 One brief quotes Maimonides's statement that religious instruction \xd2is an obligation of the highest order, entrusted only to a schoolteacher possessing \xd4fear of Heaven.\xd5 \xd318 \xd2The contemporary American Jewish community continues to place the education of children in its faith and rites at the center of its communal efforts.\xd319 "
[1182] "Religious education is also important in Islam. \xd2[T]he acquisition of at least rudimentary knowledge of religion and its duties [is] mandatory for the Muslim individual.\xd320 This precept is traced to the Prophet Muhammad, who proclaimed that \xd2 \xd4[t]he pursuit of knowledge is incumbent on every Muslim.\xd5 \xd321 \xd2[T]he development of independent private Islamic schools ha[s] become an important part of the picture of Muslim education in America.\xd322 "
[1183] "*2066 The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints has a long tradition of religious education, with roots in revelations given to Joseph Smith. See Doctrine and Covenants of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints \xa4 93:36 (2013). \xd2The Church Board of Education has established elementary, middle, or secondary schools in which both secular and religious instruction is offered.\xd323 "
[1184] "Seventh-day Adventists \xd2trace the importance of education back to the Garden of Eden.\xd324 Seventh-day Adventist formation \xd2restore[s] human beings into the image of God as revealed by the life of Jesus Christ\xd3 and focuses on the development of \xd2knowledge, skills, and understandings to serve God and humanity.\xd325 "
[1185] "This brief survey does not do justice to the rich diversity of religious education in this country, but it shows the close connection that religious institutions draw between their central purpose and educating the young in the faith. "
[1186] "2 "
[1187] "1617When we apply this understanding of the Religion Clauses to the cases now before us, it is apparent that Morrissey-Berru and Biel qualify for the exemption we recognized in Hosanna-Tabor. There is abundant record evidence that they both performed vital religious duties. Educating and forming students in the Catholic faith lay at the core of the mission of the schools where they taught, and their employment agreements and faculty handbooks specified in no uncertain terms that they were expected to help the schools carry out this mission and that their work would be evaluated to ensure that they were fulfilling that responsibility. As elementary school teachers responsible for providing instruction in all subjects, including religion, they were the members of the school staff who were entrusted most directly with the responsibility of educating their students in the faith. And not only were they obligated to provide instruction about the Catholic faith, but they were also expected to guide their students, by word and deed, toward the goal of living their lives in accordance with the faith. They prayed with their students, attended Mass with the students, and prepared the children for their participation in other religious activities. Their positions did not have all the attributes of Perich's. Their titles did not include the term \xd2minister,\xd3 and they had less formal religious training, but their core responsibilities as teachers of religion were essentially the same. And both their schools expressly saw them as playing a vital part in carrying out the mission of the church, and the schools\xd5 definition and explanation of their roles is important. In a country with the religious diversity of the United States, judges cannot be expected to have a complete understanding and appreciation of the role played by every person who performs a particular role in every religious tradition. A religious institution's explanation of the role of such employees in the life of the religion in question is important. "
[1188] "III "
[1189] "1819In holding that Morrissey-Berru and Biel did not fall within the Hosanna-Tabor exception, the Ninth Circuit misunderstood our decision. Both panels *2067 treated the circumstances that we found relevant in that case as checklist items to be assessed and weighed against each other in every case, and the dissent does much the same. That approach is contrary to our admonition that we were not imposing any \xd2rigid formula.\xd3 565 U.S. at 190, 132 S.Ct. 694. Instead, we called on courts to take all relevant circumstances into account and to determine whether each particular position implicated the fundamental purpose of the exception.26 "
[1190] "The Ninth Circuit's rigid test produced a distorted analysis. First, it invested undue significance in the fact that Morrissey-Berru and Biel did not have clerical titles. 769 Fed.Appx. at 460; 911 F.3d at 608\xd0609; Post, at 2079 \xd0 2080. It is true that Perich's title included the term \xd2minister,\xd3 but we never said that her title (or her reference to herself as a \xd2minister\xd3) was necessary to trigger the Hosanna-Tabor exception. Instead, \xd2those considerations ... merely made Perich's case an especially easy one.\xd3 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 19. Moreover, both Morrissey-Berru and Biel had titles. They were Catholic elementary school teachers, which meant that they were their students\xd5 primary teachers of religion. The concept of a teacher of religion is loaded with religious significance. The term \xd2rabbi\xd3 means teacher, and Jesus was frequently called rabbi.27 And if a more esoteric title is needed, they were both regarded as \xd2catechists.\xd328 "
[1191] "2021Second, the Ninth Circuit assigned too much weight to the fact that Morrissey-Berru and Biel had less formal religious schooling than Perich. 769 Fed.Appx. at 460\xd0461; 911 F.3d at 608; post, at 2079 \xd0 2080. The significance of formal training must be evaluated in light of the *2068 age of the students taught and the judgment of a religious institution regarding the need for formal training. The schools in question here thought that Morrissey-Berru and Biel had a sufficient understanding of Catholicism to teach their students,29 and judges have no warrant to second-guess that judgment or to impose their own credentialing requirements. "
[1192] "Third, the St. James panel inappropriately diminished the significance of Biel's duties because they did not evince \xd2close guidance and involvement\xd3 in \xd2students\xd5 spiritual lives.\xd3 911 F.3d at 609; post, at 2077 \xd0 2078, 2080 \xd0 2081. Specifically, the panel majority suggested that Biel merely taught \xd2religion from a book required by the school,\xd3 \xd2joined\xd3 students in prayer, and accompanied students to Mass in order to keep them \xd2 \xd4quiet and in their seats.\xd5 \xd3 911 F.3d at 609. This misrepresents the record and its significance. For better or worse, many primary school teachers tie their instruction closely to textbooks, and many faith traditions prioritize teaching from authoritative texts. See Brief for InterVarsity Christian Fellowship USA et al. as Amici Curiae 26; Brief for Senator Mike Lee et al. as Amici Curiae 24\xd027. As for prayer, Biel prayed with her students, taught them prayers, and supervised the prayers led by students. She prepared them for Mass, accompanied them to Mass, and prayed with them there. See supra, at 2058 \xd0 2059. "
[1193] "In Biel's appeal, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the Hosanna-Tabor exception should be interpreted narrowly because the ADA, 42 U.S.C. \xa4 12101 et seq., and Title VII, \xa4 2000e\xd02, contain provisions allowing religious employers to give preference to members of a particular faith in employing individuals to do work connected with their activities. 911 F.3d at 611, n. 5; post, at 2072 \xd0 2073. But the Hosanna-Tabor exception serves an entirely different purpose. Think of the quintessential case where a church wants to dismiss its minister for poor performance. The church\xd5s objection in that situation is not that the minister has gone over to some other faith but simply that the minister is failing to perform essential functions in a satisfactory manner. "
[1194] "While the Ninth Circuit treated the circumstances that we cited in Hosanna-Tabor as factors to be assessed and weighed in every case, respondents would make the governing test even more rigid. In their view, courts should begin by deciding whether the first three circumstances\xd1a ministerial title, formal religious education, and the employee's self-description as a minister\xd1are met and then, in order to check the conclusion suggested by those factors, ask whether the employee performed a religious function. Brief for Respondents 20\xd024. For reasons already explained, there is no basis for treating the circumstances we found relevant in Hosanna-Tabor in such a rigid manner. "
[1195] "22Respondents go further astray in suggesting that an employee can never come within the Hosanna-Tabor exception unless the employee is a \xd2practicing\xd3 member of the religion with which the employer is associated. Brief for Respondents 12\xd013, 21. In hiring a teacher to provide religious instruction, a religious school is very likely to try to select a person who meets this requirement, but insisting on this as a necessary condition would create a host of problems. As pointed out by petitioners, determining whether a person is a \xd2co-religionist\xd3 will not always be easy. See *2069 Reply Brief 14 (\xd2Are Orthodox Jews and non-Orthodox Jews coreligionists? ... Would Presbyterians and Baptists be similar enough? Southern Baptists and Primitive Baptists?\xd3). Deciding such questions would risk judicial entanglement in religious issues. "
[1196] "Expanding the \xd2co-religionist\xd3 requirement, Brief for Respondents 28\xd029, 44, to exclude those who no longer practice the faith would be even worse, post, at 2078. Would the test depend on whether the person in question no longer considered himself or herself to be a member of a particular faith? Or would the test turn on whether the faith tradition in question still regarded the person as a member in some sense? "
[1197] "Respondents argue that Morrissey-Berru cannot fall within the Hosanna-Tabor exception because she said in connection with her lawsuit that she was not \xd2a practicing Catholic,\xd3 but acceptance of that argument would require courts to delve into the sensitive question of what it means to be a \xd2practicing\xd3 member of a faith, and religious employers would be put in an impossible position. Morrissey-Berru's employment agreements required her to attest to \xd2good standing\xd3 with the church. See App. 91, 144, 154. Beyond insisting on such an attestation, it is not clear how religious groups could monitor whether an employee is abiding by all religious obligations when away from the job. Was OLG supposed to interrogate Morrissey-Berru to confirm that she attended Mass every Sunday? "
[1198] "23Respondents argue that the Hosanna-Tabor exception is not workable unless it is given a rigid structure, but we declined to adopt a \xd2rigid formula\xd3 in Hosanna-Tabor, and the lower courts have been applying the exception for many years without such a formula. Here, as in Hosanna-Tabor, it is sufficient to decide the cases before us. When a school with a religious mission entrusts a teacher with the responsibility of educating and forming students in the faith, judicial intervention into disputes between the school and the teacher threatens the school's independence in a way that the First Amendment does not allow. "
[1199] "* * * "
[1200] "For these reasons, the judgment of the Court of Appeals in each case is reversed, and the cases are remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. "
[1201] "It is so ordered. "
[1202] "Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[1203] "This is a church property dispute which arose when two local churches withdrew from a hierarchical general church organization. Under Georgia law the right to the property previously used by the local churches was made to turn on a civil court jury decision as to whether the general church abandoned or departed from the tenets of faith and practice it held at the time the local churches affiliated with it. The question presented is whether the restraints of the First Amendment, as applied to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment, permit a civil court to award church property on the basis of the interpretation and significance the civil court assigns to aspects of church doctrine. "
[1204] "Petitioner, Presbyterian Church in the United States, is an association of local Presbyterian churches governed *442 by a hierarchical structure of tribunals which consists of, in ascending order, (1) the Church Session, composed of the elders of the local church; (2) the Presbytery, composed of several churches in a geographical area; (3) the Synod, generally composed of all Presbyteries within a State; and (4) the General Assembly, the highest governing body. "
[1205] "A dispute arose between petitioner, the general church, and two local churches in Savannah, Georgia\xd1the respondents, Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church and Eastern Heights Presbyterian Church\xd1over control of the properties used until they by the local churches. In 1966, the membership of the local churches, in the belief that certain actions and pronouncements of the general church were violations of that organization's constitution and departures from the doctrine and practice in force at the time of affiliation,1 voted to withdraw from the general church and to reconstitute the local churches as an autonomous Presbyterian organization. The ministers of the two **603 churches renounced the general church's *443 jurisdiction and authority over them, as did all but two of the ruling elders. In response, the general church, through the Presbytery of Savannah, established an Administrative Commission to seek a conciliation. The dissident local churchmen remained steadfast; consequently, the Commission acknowledged the withdrawal of the local leadership and proceeded to take over the local churches' property on behalf of the general church until new local leadership could be appointed. "
[1206] "1The local churchmen made no effort to appeal the Commission's action to higher church tribunals\xd1the Synod of Georgia or the General Assembly. Instead, the churches filed separate suits in the Superior Court of Chatham County to enjoin the general church from trespassing on the disputed property, title to which was in the local churches. The cases were consolidated for trial. The general church moved to dismiss the actions and cross-claimed for injunctive relief in its own behalf on the ground that civil courts were without power to determine whether the general church had departed from its tenets of faith and practice. The motion to dismiss was denied, and the case was submitted to the jury on the theory that Georgia law implies a trust of local church property for the benefit of the general church on the sole condition that the general church adhere to its tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of affiliation by the local churches.2 Thus, the jury was instructed to determine whether the actions of the general church \xd4amount to a fundamental or substantial abandonment of the original tenets and doctrines of the (general *444 church), so that the new tenets and doctrines are utterly variant from the purposes for which the (general church) was founded.\xd5 The jury returned a verdict for the local churches, and the trial judge thereupon declared that the implied trust had terminated and enjoined the general church from interfering with the use of the property in question. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed, 224 Ga. 61, 159 S.E.2d 690 (1968). We granted certiorari to consider the First Amendment questions raised.3 **604 392 U.S. 903, 88 S.Ct. 2060, 20 L.Ed.2d 1362 (1968). We reverse. "
[1207] "*445 23It is of course true that the State has a legitimate interest in resolving property disputes, and that a civil court is a proper forum for that resolution. Special problems arise, however, when these disputes implicate controversies over church doctrine and practice. The approach of this Court in such cases was originally developed in Watson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872), a pre-Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins diversity decision decided before the application of the First Amendment to the States but nonetheless informed by First Amendment considerations.4 There, as here, civil courts were asked to resolve a property dispute between a national Presbyterian organization and local churches of that organization. There, as here, the disputes arose out of a controversy over church doctrine. There, as here, the Court was asked to decree the termination of an implied trust because of departures from doctrine by the national organization. The Watson Court refused pointing out that it was wholly inconsistent with the American concept of the relationship *446 between church and state to permit civil courts to determine ecclesiastical questions. In language which has a clear constitutional ring, the Court said "
[1208] "\xd4In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. * * * All who unite themselves to such a body (the general church) do so with an implied consent to (its) government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them (sic) reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to **605 such appeals as the organism itself provides for.\xd5 13 Wall., at 728\xd1729.5 "
[1209] "*447 The logic of this language leaves the civil courts no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process of resolving property disputes. "
[1210] "Later cases, however, also decided on nonconstitutional grounds, recognized that there might be some circumstances in which marginal civil court review of ecclesiastical determinations would be appropriate.6 The scope of this review was delineated in Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929). There, Gonzalez claimed the right to be appointed to a chaplaincy in the Roman Catholic Church under a will which provided that a member of his family receive that appointment. The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Philippine Islands, refused to appoint Gonzalez on the ground that he did not satisfy the qualifications established by Canon Law for that office. Gonzalez brought suit in the Court of First Instance of Manila for a judgment directing the Archbishop, among other things, to appoint him chaplain. The trial court entered such an order, but the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands reversed and \xd4absolved the Archbishop from the complaint.\xd5 This Court affirmed. Mr. Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court, defined the civil court role in the following words: \xd4In the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.\xd5 280 U.S., at 16. "
[1211] "In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 73 S.Ct. 143, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952), the Court converted the principle of Watson as qualified by Gonzalez into a constitutional rule. Kedroff grew out of a dispute between the Moscow-based general Russian Orthodox Church and the Russian Orthodox *448 churches located in North America over an appointment to St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City. The North American churches declared their independence from the general church, and the New York Legislature enacted a statute recognizing their administrative autonomy. The New York courts sustained the constitutionality of the statute and held that the North American churches' elected hierarch had the right to use the cathedral. This Court reversed, finding that the Moscow church had not acknowledged the schism, and holding the statute unconstitutional. The Court said, 344 U.S., at 116, 73 S.Ct. at 154: "
[1212] "\xd4The opinion (in Watson v. Jones) radiates * * * a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation\xd1in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice **606 are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference.\xd5 (Italics supplied.) "
[1213] "And, speaking of the New York statute, the Court said further, id., at 119, 73 S.Ct. at 156: "
[1214] "\xd4By fiat it displaces one church administrator with another. It passes the control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church authority to another. It thus intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a church the power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.\xd5 (Italics supplied.) "
[1215] "This holding invalidating legislative action was extended to judicial action in Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190, 80 S.Ct. 1037, 4 L.Ed.2d 1140 (1960), where the Court held that the constitutional guarantees of religious liberty required the *449 reversal of a judgment of the New York courts which transferred control of St. Nicholas Cathedral from the central governing authority of the Russian Orthodox Church to the independent Russian Church of America. "
[1216] "456789Thus, the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes. It is obvious, however, that not every civil court decision as to property claimed by a religious organization jeopardizes values protected by the First Amendment. Civil courts do not inhibit free exercise of religion merely by opening their doors to disputes involving church property. And there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied without \xd4establishing\xd5 churches to which property is awarded. But First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. Because of these hazards, the First Amendment enjoins the employment of organs of government for essentially religious purposes, School District of Township of Abington, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963); the Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Hence, States, religious organizations, and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions. "
[1217] "The Georgia courts have violated the command of the First Amendment. The departure-from-doctrine element of the implied trust theory which they applied *450 requires the civil judiciary to determine whether actions of the general church constitute such a \xd4substantial departure\xd5 from the tenets of faith and practice existing at the time of the local churches' affiliation that the trust in favor of the general church must be declared to have terminated. This determination has two parts. The civil court must first decide whether the challenged actions of the general church depart substantially from prior doctrine. In reaching such a decision, the court must of necessity make its own interpretation of the meaning of church doctrines. If the court should decide that a substantial departure has occurred, it must then go on to determine whether the issue on which the general church has departed holds a place of such importance in the traditional theology as to require that the trust be terminated. A civil court can make this determination **607 only after assessing the relative significance to the religion of the tenets from which departure was found. Thus, the departure-from-doctrine element of the Georgia implied trust theory requires the civil court to determine matters at the very core of a religion\xd1the interpretation of particular church doctrines and the importance of those doctrines to the religion. Plainly, the First Amendment forbids civil courts from playing such a role. "
[1218] "101112Since the Georgia courts on remand may undertake to determine whether petitioner is entitled to relief on its cross-claims, we find it appropriate to remark that the departure-from-doctrine element of Georgia's implied trust theory can play no role in any future judicial proceedings. The departure-from-doctrine approach is not susceptible of the marginal judicial involvement contemplated in Gonzalez.7 Gonzalez' rights under a will *451 turned on a church decision, the Archbishop's, as to church law, the qualifications for the chaplaincy. It was the archbishopric, not the civil courts, which had the task of analyzing and interpreting church law in order to determine the validity of Gonzalez' claim to a chaplaincy. Thus, the civil courts could adjudicate the rights under the will without interpreting or weighing church doctrine but simply by engaging in the narrowest kind of review of a specific church decision\xd1i.e., whether that decision resulted from fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness. Such review does not inject the civil courts into substantive ecclesiastical matters. In contrast, under Georgia's departure-from-doctrine approach, it is not possible for the civil courts to play so limited a role. Under this approach, property rights do not turn on a church decision as to church doctrine. The standard of departure-from-doctrine, though it calls for resolution of ecclesiastical questions, is a creation of state, not church, law. Nothing in the record suggests that this state standard has been interpreted and applied in a decision of the general church. Any decisions which have been made by the general church about the local churches' withdrawal have at most a tangential relationship to the state-fashioned departure-from-doctrine standard. A determination whether such decisions are fraudulent, collusive, or arbitrary would therefore not answer the questions posed by the state standard. To reach those questions would require the civil courts to engage in the forbidden process of interpreting and weighing church doctrine. Even if the general church had attempted to apply the state standard, the civil courts could not review and enforce the church decision without violating the Constitution. The First Amendment prohibits a State from employing religious organizations as an arm of the civil judiciary to perform the function of interpreting and applying state standards. See School District of Township of Abington, Pa. *452 v. Schempp, supra. Thus, a civil court may no more review a church decision applying a state departure-from-doctrine standard than it may apply that standard itself. "
[1219] "The judgment of the Supreme Court of Georgia is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. "
[1220] "It is so or Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[1221] "In 1963, the Holy Assembly of Bishops and the Holy Synod of the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch (Mother Church)\xca*698\xcasuspended and ultimately removed respondent Dionisije\xcaMilivojevich\xca(Dionisije) as Bishop of the American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xcaof that Church, and appointed petitioner Bishop Firmilian Ocokoljich (Firmilian) as Administrator of the\xcaDiocese, which the Mother Church then reorganized into three\xcaDioceses. In 1964 the Holy Assembly and Holy Synod defrocked Dionisije as a Bishop and cleric of the Mother Church. In this civil action brought by Dionisije and the other respondents in Illinois Circuit Court, the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the proceedings of the Mother Church respecting Dionisije were procedurally and substantively defective under the internal regulations of the Mother Church and were therefore arbitrary and invalid. The State Supreme Court also invalidated the Diocesan reorganization into three\xcaDioceses. 60 Ill.2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268 (1975).1\xcaWe granted certiorari to determine whether the actions of the Illinois Supreme Court constituted improper judicial interference with decisions of the highest authorities of a hierarchical church in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.\xca423 U.S. 911,\xca96 S.Ct. 770, 46 L.Ed.2d 634 (1975). We hold that the inquiries made by the Illinois Supreme Court into matters of ecclesiastical cognizance and polity and the court's actions pursuant thereto contravened the First and Fourteenth Amendments. We therefore reverse. "
[1222] "I "
[1223] "The basic dispute is over control of the\xcaSerbian\xcaEastern\xcaOrthodox\xcaDiocese\xcafor the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcaof America and\xcaCanada\xca(American-Canadian\xcaDiocese), its property and assets. Petitioners are Bishops Firmilian, Gregory Udicki, and Sava Vukovich, and the\xcaSerbian\xcaEastern\xca*699\xcaOrthodox\xcaDiocese\xcafor the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcaof America and\xcaCanada\xca(the religious body in this country). Respondents are Bishop Dionisije, the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaMonastery of St. Sava, and the\xcaSerbian\xcaEastern\xcaOrthodox\xcaDiocese\xcafor the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcaof America and\xcaCanada, an\xca**2376\xcaIllinois religious corporation. A proper perspective on the relationship of these parties and the nature of this dispute requires some background discussion. "
[1224] "The\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch, one of the 14 autocephalous, hierarchical churches which came into existence following the schism of the universal Christian church in 1054, is an episcopal church whose seat is the Patriarchate in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Its highest legislative, judicial, ecclesiastical, and administrative authority resides in the Holy Assembly of Bishops, a body composed of all Diocesan Bishops presided over by a Bishop designated by the Assembly to be Patriarch. The Church's highest executive body, the Holy Synod of Bishops, is composed of the Patriarch and four Diocesan Bishops selected by the Holy Assembly. The Holy Synod and the Holy Assembly have the exclusive power to remove, suspend, defrock, or appoint Diocesan Bishops. The Mother Church is governed according to the Holy Scriptures, Holy Tradition, Rules of the Ecumenical Councils, the Holy Apostles, the Holy Faiths of the Church, the Mother Church Constitution adopted in 1931, and a \xd2penal code\xd3 adopted in 1961. These sources of law are sometimes ambiguous and seemingly inconsistent. Pertinent provisions of the Mother Church Constitution provide that the Church's \xd2main administrative division is composed of\xcadioceses, both in regard to church hierarchical and church administrative aspect,\xd3\xcaArt. 12, and that \xd2(d)ecisions of establishing, naming, liquidating, reorganizing, and the seat of the\xcadioceses, and establishing or eliminating of position of vicar bishops,\xca*700\xcais decided upon by the (Holy Assembly), in agreement with the Patriarchal Council,\xd3 Art. 16. "
[1225] "During the late 19th century, migrants to North America of\xcaSerbian\xcadescent formed autonomous religious congregations throughout this country and\xcaCanada. These congregations were then under the jurisdiction of the Russian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch, but that Church was unable to care for their needs and the congregations sought permission to bring themselves under the jurisdiction of the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch. "
[1226] "In 1913 and 1916,\xcaSerbian\xcapriests and laymen organized a\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch in North America. The 32\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcacongregations were divided into 4 presbyteries, each presided over by a Bishop's Aide, and constitutions were adopted. In 1917, the Russian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch commissioned a\xcaSerbian\xcapriest, Father Mardary, to organize an independent\xcaSerbian\xcaDiocese\xcain America. Four years later, as a result of Father Mardary's efforts, the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the Mother Church created the\xcaEastern\xcaOrthodox\xcaDiocese\xcafor the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcaof America and\xcaCanada\xcaand designated a\xcaSerbian\xcaBishop to complete the formal organization of a\xcaDiocese. From that time until 1963, each bishop who governed the American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xcawas a Yugoslav citizen appointed by the Mother Church without consultation with Diocesan officials. "
[1227] "In 1927, Father Mardary called a Church National Assembly embracing all of the known\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcacongregations in the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcaand\xcaCanada. The Assembly drafted and adopted the constitution of the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaDiocese\xcafor the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcaof America and\xcaCanada, and submitted the constitution to the Mother Church for approval. The Holy Assembly made changes to provide for appointment of the Diocesan Bishop by the Holy Assembly and to require Holy Assembly\xca*701\xcaapproval for any amendments to the constitution, and with these changes approved the constitution. The American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xcawas the only\xcadiocese\xcaof the Mother Church with its own constitution. "
[1228] "Article 1 of the constitution provides that the American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xca\xd2is considered ecclesiastically-judicially as an organic part of the\xcaSerbian\xcaPatriarchate in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,\xd3 and Art. 2 provides that all \xd2statutes and rules which regulate the ecclesiastical-canonical authority and position of the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia are also compulsory for\xd3 the American-Canadian\xca**2377\xcaDiocese. Article 3 states that the \xd2jurisdiction of the . . .\xcaDiocese\xca. . . includes the entire political territory of the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcaof America and\xcaCanada, which as such by its geographical location enjoys full administrative freedom and accordingly, it can independently regulate and rule the activities of its church, school and other diocesan institutions and all funds and beneficiencies, through its organs . . . .\xd3 Article 9 provides that the Bishop of the\xcaDiocese\xca\xd2is appointed by the Holy Assembly of Bishops of the\xcaSerbian\xcaPatriarchate\xd3; various provisions of the constitution accord that Bishop extensive powers with respect to both religious matters and control of Diocesan property. The constitution also provides for such Diocesan organs as a Diocesan National Assembly, which exercises considerable legislative and administrative authority within the\xcaDiocese. "
[1229] "In 1927, Father Mardary also organized a not-for-profit corporation, the\xcaSerbian\xcaEastern\xcaOrthodox\xcaCouncil for the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcaand\xcaCanada, under the laws of Illinois. The corporation was to hold title to 30 acres of land in Libertyville, Ill., that Father Mardary had personally purchased in 1924. The charter of that corporation was allowed to lapse, and Father Mardary organized\xca*702\xcaanother Illinois not-for-profit corporation, respondent\xcaSerbian\xcaEastern\xcaOrthodox\xcaDiocese\xcafor the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcaand\xcaCanada, under Illinois laws governing incorporation of hierarchical religious organizations. In 1945, respondent not-for-profit monastery corporation, the Monastery of St. Sava, was organized under these same Illinois laws, and title to the Libertyville property was transrred to it. Similar secular property-holding corporations were subsequently organized in New York, California, and Pennsylvania. "
[1230] "Respondent Bishop Dionisije was elected Bishop of the American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xcaby the Holy Assembly of Bishops in 1939. He became a controversial figure; during the years before 1963, the Holy Assembly received numerous complaints challenging his fitness to serve as Bishop and his administration of the\xcaDiocese. "
[1231] "During his tenure, however, the\xcaDiocese\xcagrew so substantially that Dionisije requested that the Patriarch and Holy Assembly appoint bishops to assist him but to serve under his supervision. Eventually, the\xcaDiocese\xcasought its elevation by the Holy Assembly to the rank of Metropolia, that South America be added to the\xcaDiocese, and that several assistant bishops be appointed under Dionisije. Dionisije specifically recommended that petitioners Firmilian and Gregory Udicki, and one Stefan Lastavica be named assistant bishops. A delegation from the\xcaDiocese\xcawas sent to the May 1962 meeting of the Holy Assembly in Belgrade to urge adoption of these reorganization proposals, and on June 12, 1962, the Holy Synod appointed a delegation to visit the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcaand study the proposals. The delegation was also directed to confer with Dionisije concerning the complaints made against him and his administration over the years. "
[1232] "The delegation remained in the\xcaUnited\xcaStates\xcafor three\xca*703\xcamonths, visiting parishes throughout the\xcaDiocese\xcaand discusng both the reorganization proposals and the complaints against Dionisije. After completion of its survey, the delegation suggested to the Holy Synod the assignment of vicar bishops to the\xcaDiocese\xcaand recommended that a commission be appointed to conduct a thorough investigation into the complaints against Dionisije. However, the Holy Assembly on May 10, 1963, instead recommended that the Holy Synod institute disciplinary proceedings against Dionisije. The Holy Synod thereupon met immediately and suspended Dionisije pending investigation and disposition of the complaints. The Holy Synod appointed petitioner Firmilian, Dionisije's chief episcopal deputy since 1955 and one of Dionisije's candidates for assistant bishop, as Administrator of the\xcaDiocese\xcapending completion of the proceedings. "
[1233] "The Holy Assembly thereafter reconvened and, acting under Art. 16 of the constitution of the Mother Church, reorganized\xca**2378\xcathe American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xcainto three new\xcadioceses\xcathe Middle Western, the Western and the\xcaEastern\xcawhose boundaries were roughly those of the episcopal districts previously created by Dionisije.2\xcaThe final fixing of boundaries for the new\xcadioceses\xcaand all other organizational and administrative matters were left to be determined by the officials of the old American-Canadian\xcaDiocese. Dionisije was appointed Bishop of the Middle Western\xcaDiocese\xcaand, seven days later, petitioners Archimandrites Firmilian, Gregory, and Stefan3\xcawere appointed temporary administrators for the new\xcaDioceses. "
[1234] "*704\xcaDionisije's immediate reaction to these decisions of the Mother Church was to refuse to accept the reorganization on the ground that it contravened the administrative autonomy of the\xcaDiocese\xcaguaranteed by the Diocesan constitution, and to refuse to accept his suspension on the ground that it was not effectuated in compliance with the constitution and laws of the Mother Church. On May 25, 1963, he prepared and mailed a circular to all American-Canadian parishes stating his refusal to recognize these actions, and on May 27 he issued a press release stating his refusal to recognize his suspension and his intent to litigate it in the civil courts. This refusal to recognize the Diocesan reorganization and his suspension as Bishop was again stated by Dionisije in a circular issued on June 3 and addressed to the Patriarch, the Holy Assembly, the Holy Synod, all clergy, congregations, Diocesan committees, and all\xcaSerbians\xcain North America. He also continued to officiate as Bishop, refusing to turn administration of the\xcaDiocese\xcaover to Firmilian; in a May 30 letter to Firmilian, Dionisije repeated this refusal, asserted that he no longer recognized the decisions of the Holy Assembly and Holy Synod, and charged those bodies with being \xd2communistic.\xd3 "
[1235] "The Diocesan Council met on June 6, and Dionisije reaffirmed his refusal to turn over administration of the\xcaDiocese\xcato Firmilian; he also announced that he had discharged two of his vicars general because of their loyalty to the Mother Church. The Council resolved at the meeting to advise the Holy Synod that the proposal to reorganize the\xcaDiocese\xcainto three\xcadioceses\xcawould be submitted to the Diocesan National Assembly in August for acceptance or rejection. The Council also requested that the Holy Assembly promptly send a committee to investigate the complaints against Dionisije. "
[1236] "On June 13, the Holy Synod appointed such a commission,\xca*705\xcacomposed of two Bishops and the Secretary of the ly Synod. On July 5, the commission met with Dionisije, who reiterated his refusal to recognize his suspension or the Diocesan reorganization, and who demanded all accusations in writing. The commission refused to give Dionisije the written accusations on the ground that defiance of decisions of higher church authorities itself established wrongful conduct, and advised him that the Holy Synod would appoint a Bishop as court prosecutor to prepare an indictment against him. "
[1237] "On the basis of the commission's report and recommendations, which recited Dionisije's refusal to accept the decisions of the Holy Synod and Holy Assembly and his refusal to recognize the court of the Holy Synod or its competence to try him, the Holy Assembly met on July 27, 1963, and voted to remove Dionisije as Bishop. The minutes of the Holy Assembly meeting and the Patriarch's letter to Dionisije informing him of the Holy Assembly's actions made clear that the removal was based solely on his acts of defiance subsequent to his May 10, 1963, suspension, and his violation of his oath and loss of certain qualifications for Bishop under Art. 104 of the constitution of the Mother Church. "
[1238] "**2379\xcaThe Diocesan National Assembly, with Dionisije presiding despite his removal, met in August 1963 and issued a resolution repudiating the division of the\xcaDiocese\xcainto three\xcaDioceses\xcaand demanding a revocation by the Mother Church of the decisions concerning that division.\xcaWhen the Holy Assembly refused to reconsider, the Diocesan National Assembly in November 1963 declared the\xcaDiocese\xcacompletely autonomous and reinstated the provisions of the Diocesan constitution that provided for election of the Bishop of the\xcaDiocese\xcaitself and for amendments without the approval of the Holy Assembly. "
[1239] "Meanwhile, the Holy Synod in October 1963 forwarded\xca*706\xcato Dionisije a formal written indictment bad on the charges of canonical misconduct. In November 1963, Dionisije responded with a demand for the verified reports and complaints referred to in the indictment and for a six-month extension to answer the indictment. The Holy Assembly granted a 30-day extension in which to answer, but declined to furnish verified charges on the grounds that they were described in the indictment, that additional details would be evidentiary in nature, and that there was no legal or canonical basis for forwarding such material to an accused Bishop. "
[1240] "Dionisije returned the indictment in January, refusing to answer without the verified charges, denouncing the Holy Assembly and Holy Synod as schismatic and pro-Communist, and asserting that the Mother Church was proceeding in violation of its penal code and constitution. "
[1241] "The Holy Synod, on February 25, 1964, declared that it could not proceed further without Dionisije and referred the matter to the Holy Assembly, which tried Dionisije as a default case on March 5, 1964, because of his refusal to participate. The indictment was also amended at that time to include charges based on Dionisije's acts of rebellion such as those committed at the November meeting of the National Assembly which had declared the\xcaDiocese\xcaseparate from the Mother Church. Considering the original and amended indictments, the Holy Assembly unanimously found Dionisije guilty of all charges and divested him of his episcopal and monastic ranks. "
[1242] "Even before the Holy Assembly had removed Dionisije as Bishop, he had commenced what eventually became this protracted litigation, now carried on for almost 13 years. Acting upon the threat contained in his May 27, 1963, press release, Dionisije filed suit in\xca*707\xcathe Circuit Court of Lake County, Ill., on July 26, 1963, seeking to enjoin petitioners from interfering with the assets of respondent corporations and to have himself declared the true Diocesan Bishop. Petitioners countered with a separate complaint, which was consolidated with the original action, seeking declaratory relief that Dionisije had been removed as Bishop of the\xcaDiocese\xcaand that the\xcaDiocese\xcahad been properly reorganized into three\xcaDioceses, and injunctive relief granting petitioner Bishops control of the reorganized\xcaDioceses\xcaand their property. After the trial court granted summary judgment for respondents and dismissed petitioners' countercomplaint, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed and remanded for a hearing on the merits.\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaDiocese\xcav. Ocokoljich, 72 Ill.App.2d 444, 219 N.E.2d 343,\xcaappeal denied, 34 Ill.2d 631 (1966).4 "
[1243] "Following a lengthy trial, the trial court filed an unreported memorandum opinion and entered a final decree which concluded that \xd2no substantial evidence was produced . . . that fraud, collusion or arbitrariness existed in any of the actions or decisions preliminary to or during the final proceedings of the decision to defrock Bishop Dionisije made by the highest Hierarchical bodies of the Mother Church,\xd3 Pet. for Cert., App. 44; that the property held by\xca**2380\xcarespondent corporations is held in trust for all members of the American-Canadian\xcaDiocese; that it was \xd2improper and beyond the power of the Mother Church to take its action in dividing the whole American\xcaDiocese\xcainto three new\xcaDioceses, changing its boundaries, and in appointing new bishops for\xca*708\xcasaid so-called new\xcaDioceses,\xd3\xcaid.,\xcaat 46; and that \xd2Firmilian was validly appointed by the Holy Episcopal Synod as temporary Administrator of the whole American\xcaDiocese\xcain place of the defrocked Bishop Dionisije,\xd3\xcaibid. "
[1244] "On appeal, the Supreme Court of Illinois affirmed in part and reversed in part, essentially holding that Dionisije's removal and defrockment had to be set aside as \xd2arbitrary\xd3 because the proceedings resulting in those actions were not conducted according to the Illinois Supreme Court's interpretation of the Church's constitution and penal code, and that the Diocesan reorganization was invalid because it was beyond the scope of the Mother Church's authority to effectuate such changes without Diocesan approval.\xca60 Ill.2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268 (1975). Although the court denied rehearing, it amended its original opinion to hold that, although Dionisije had been properly suspended, that suspension terminated by operation of church law when he was not validly tried within one year of his indictment. Thus, the court purported in effect to reinstate Dionisije as Diocesan Bishop. "
[1245] "II "
[1246] "12The fallacy fatal to the judgment of the Illinois Supreme Court is that it rests upon an impermissible rejection of the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church upon the issues in dispute, and impermissibly substitutes its own inquiry into church polity and resolutions based thereon of those disputes. Consistently with the First and Fourteenth Amendments \xd2civil courts do not inquire whether the relevant (hierarchical) church governing body has power under religious law (to decide such disputes). . . . Such a determination . . . frequently necessitates the interpretation of ambiguous religious law and usage.\xca*709\xcaTo permit civil courts to probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within ahierarchical) church so as to decide . . . religious law (governing church polity) . . . would violate the First Amendment in much the same manner as civil determination of religious doctrine.\xd3\xcaMd. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367, 369, 90 S.Ct. 499, 500, 24 L.Ed.2d 582 (1970)\xca(Brennan, J., concurring). For where resolution of the disputes cannot be made without extensive inquiry by civil courts into religious law and polity, the First and Fourteenth Amendments mandate that civil courts shall not disturb the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of hierarchical polity, but must accept such decisions as binding on them, in their application to the religious issues of doctrine or polity before them. Ibid. "
[1247] "34Resolution of the religious disputes at issue here affects the control of church property in addition to the structure and administration of the American-Canadian\xcaDiocese. This is because the Diocesan Bishop controls respondent Monastery of St. Sava and is the principal officer of respondent property-holding corporations. Resolution of the religious dispute over Dionisije's defrockment therefore determines control of the property. Thus, this case essentially involves not a church property dispute, but a religious dispute the resolution of which under our cases is for ecclesiastical and not civil tribunals. Even when rival church factions seek resolution of a church property dispute in the civil courts there is substantial danger that the State will become entangled in essentially religious controversies or intervene on behalf of groups espousing particular doctrinal beliefs.\xcaBecause of this danger, \xd2the First Amendment severely circumscribes the role that civil courts may play in resolving church property disputes.\xd3\xcaPresbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449, 89 S.Ct. 601, 606, 21 L.Ed.2d 658 (1969). \xd2First\xca**2381\xcaAmendment\xca*710\xcavalues are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made turn on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice. If civil courts undertake to resolve such controversies in order to adjudicate the property dispute, the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of religious doctrine and of implicating secular interests in matters of purely ecclesiastical concern. . . . (T)he (First) Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.\xd3 Ibid. This principle applies with equal force to church disputes over church polity and church administration. "
[1248] "The principles limiting the role of civil courts in the resolution of religious controversies that incidentally affect civil rights were initially fashioned in\xcaWatson v. Jones, 13 Wall. 679, 20 L.Ed. 666 (1872), a diversity case decided before the First Amendment had been rendered applicable to the States through the Fourteenth Amendment.5\xcaWith respect to hierarchical churches, Watson held: "
[1249] "\xd2(T)he rule of action which should govern the civil courts . . . is, that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on them, in their application to the case before them.\xd3\xcaId., at 727, 20 L.Ed. 666. "
[1250] "In language having \xd2a clear constitutional ring,\xd3\xcaPresbyterian Church v. Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S. at 446, 89 S.Ct. 601,\xcaWatson reasoned: "
[1251] "\xd2The law knows no heresy, and is committed to the\xca*711\xcasupport of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within the general association, is unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a body do so with an implied consent to this government, and are bound to submit to it. But it would be a vain consent and would lead to the total subversion of such religious bodies, if any one aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of the essence of these religious unions, and of their right to establish tribunals for the decision of questions arising among themselves, that those decisions should be binding in all cases of ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such appeals as the organism itself provides for.\xd3\xca13 Wall., at 728-729, 20 L.Ed. 666\xca(emphasis supplied). "
[1252] "Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 50 S.Ct. 5, 74 L.Ed. 131 (1929), applied this principle in a case involving dispute over entitlement to certain income under a will that turned upon an ecclesiastical determination as to whether an individual would be appointed to a chaplaincy in the Roman Catholic Church. The Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis, observed: "
[1253] "\xd2Because the appointment (to the chaplaincy) is a canonical act, it is the function of the church authorities to determine what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate possesses them.\xcaIn the absence of fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church\xca*712\xcatribunals on matters purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in litigation before the secular courts as conclusive, because the parties in interest made them so by contract or otherwise.\xd3\xcaId.,\xcaat 16, 50 S.Ct. at 7. "
[1254] "**2382\xcaThus, although Watson had left civil courts no role to play in reviewing ecclesiastical decisions during the course of resolving church property disputes, Gonzalez first adverted to the possibility of \xd2marginal civil court review,\xd3\xcaPresbyterian Churgh v. Hull Church, supra, 393 U.S. at 447, 89 S.Ct. at 605,\xcain cases challenging decisions of ecclesiastical tribunals as products of \xd2fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness.\xd3 However, since there was \xd2not even a suggestion that (the Archbishop) exercised his authority (in making the chaplaincy decision) arbitrarily,\xd3\xca280 U.S., at 18, 50 S.Ct., at 8,\xcathe suggested \xd2fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness\xd3 exception to the Watson rule was dictum only. And although references to the suggested exceptions appear in opinions in cases decided since the Watson rule has been held to be mandated by the First Amendment,6\xcano decision of this Court has given concrete content to or applied the \xd2exception.\xd3 However, it was the predicate for the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in this case, and we therefore turn to the question whether reliance upon it in the circumstances of this case was consistent with the prohibition of the First and Fourteenth Amendments against rejection of the decisions of the Mother Church upon the religious disputes in issue. "
[1255] "56The conclusion of the Illinois Supreme Court that the decisions of the Mother Church were \xd2arbitrary\xd3 was grounded upon an inquiry that persuaded the Illinois Supreme\xca*713\xcaCourt that the Mother Church had not followed its own laws and procedures in arriving at those decisions. We have concluded that whether or not there is room for \xd2marginal civil court review \xd2 under the narrow rubrics of \xd3fraud\xd2 or \xd3collusion\xd2 when church tribunals act in bad faith for secular purposes,7\xcano \xd3arbitrariness\xd2 exception in the sense of an inquiry whether the decisions of the highest ecclesiastical tribunal of a hierarchical church complied with church laws and regulations is consistent with the constitutional mandate that civil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law. For civil courts to analyze whether the ecclesiastical actions of a church judicatory are in that sense \xd3arbitrary \xd2 must inherently entail inquiry into the procedures that canon or ecclesiastical law supposedly requires the church judicatory to follow, or else in to the substantive criteria by which they are supposedly to decide the ecclesiastical question. But this is exactly the inquiry that the First Amendment prohibits; recognition of such an exception would undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry, and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them. Watson itself requires our conclusion in its rejection of the analogous argument that ecclesiastical decisions of the highest church judicatories need only be accepted if the subject matter of the dispute is within their \xd3jurisdiction.\xd2 "
[1256] "\xd2But it is a very different thing where a subject-matter of dispute, strictly and purely ecclesiastical in its character, a matter over which the civil courts\xca*714\xcaexercise no jurisdiction, in a matter which concerns theological controversy, church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the church to the standard of morals required of them, becomes the subject of its action. It may be said here, also, that no jurisdiction has been conferred on the tribunal to try the particular case before it, or that, in its judgment, it exceeds the powers conferred upon it, or that the laws of the church do not authorize the particular form of proceeding adopted; and, in a\xca**2383\xcasense often used in the courts, all of those may be said to be questions of jurisdiction. But it is easy to see that If the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters, the whole subject of the doctrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws, and fundamental organization of every religious denomination may, and must, be examined into with minuteness and care, for they would become, in almost every case, the criteria by which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would be determined in the civil court. This principle would deprive these bodies of the right of construing their own church laws, would open the way to all the evils which we have depicted as attendant upon the doctrine of Lord Eldon, And would, in effect, transfer to the civil courts where property rights were concerned the decision of all ecclesiastical questions.\xd3\xca13 Wall., at 733-734, 20 L.Ed. 666.\xca(Emphasis supplied.) "
[1257] "Indeed, it is the essence of religious faith that ecclesiastical decisions are reached and are to be accepted as matters of faith8\xcawhether or not rational or measurable by\xca*715\xcaobjective criteria. Constitutional concepts of due process, involving secular notions of \xd2fundamental fairness\xd3 or impermissible objectives, are therefore hardly relevant to such matters of ecclesiastical cognizance. "
[1258] "The constitutional evils that attend upon any \xd2arbitrariness\xd3 exception in the sense applied by the Illinois Supreme Court to justify civil court review of ecclesiastical decisions of final church tribunals are manifest in the instant case. The Supreme Court of Illinois recognized that all parties agree that the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch is a hierarchical church, and that the sole power to appoint and remove Bishops of the Church resides in its highest ranking organs, the Holy Assembly and the Holy Synod.9\xcaIndeed, final authority with respect to\xca**2384\xcathe\xca*716\xcapromulgation and interpretation of\xcaall\xcamaers of church discipline and internal organization rests with the Holy Assembly, and even the written constitution of the Mother Church expressly provides: "
[1259] "\xd2The Holy Assembly of Bishops, as the highest hierarchical body, is legislative authority in the matters of faith, officiation, church order (discipline) and internal organization of the Church, as well as the highest church juridical authority within its jurisdiction (Article 69 sec. 28).\xd3 Art. 57. "
[1260] "\xd2All the decisions of the Holy Assembly of Bishops\xca*717\xcaand of the Holy Synod of Bishops of canonical d church nature, in regard to faith, officiation, church order and internal organization of the church, are valid and final.\xd3 Art. 64. "
[1261] "\xd2The Holy Assembly of Bishops, whose purpose is noted in Article 57 of this Constitution: "
[1262] "\xd29) interprets canonical-ecclesiastical rules, those which are general and obligatory, and particular ones, and publishes their collections; "
[1263] "\xd212) prescribes the ecclesiastical-judicial procedure for all Ecclesiastical Courts; "
[1264] "\xd226) settles disputes of jurisdiction between hierarchical and church-self governing organs; "
[1265] "\xd227) ADJUDGES: "
[1266] "\xd2A) In first and in final instances: "
[1267] "\xd2a) disagreements between bishops and the Holy Synod, and between the bishops and the Patriarch; "
[1268] "\xd2b) canonical offenses of the Patriarch; "
[1269] "\xd2B) In the second and final instance: "
[1270] "\xd2All matters which the Holy Synod of Bishops judged in the first instance.\xd3 Art. 69. "
[1271] "Nor is there any dispute that questions of church discipline and the composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern; the bishop of a church is clearly one of the central figures in such a hierarchy and the embodiment of the church within his\xcaDiocese, and the Mother Church constitution states that \xd2(h)e is, according to the church canonical regulations, chief representative and guiding leader of all church spiritual life and church order in the\xcadiocese.\xd3 Art. 13. "
[1272] "78Yet having recognized that the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch is hierarchical and that the decisions to suspend and\xca*718\xcadefrock respondent Dionisije were made by the religious bodies in whose sole discretion the authority to make thosecclesiastical decisions was vested, the Supreme Court of Illinois nevertheless invalidated the decision to defrock Dionisije on the ground that it was \xd2arbitrary\xd3 because a \xd2detailed review of the evidence discloses that the proceedings resulting in Bishop Dionisije's removal and defrockment were not in accordance with the prescribed procedure of the constitution and the penal code of the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch.\xd3 60 Ill.2d, at 503, 328 N.E.2d at 281.\xcaNot only was this \xd2detailed review\xd3 impermissible under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, but in reaching this conclusion, the court evaluated conflicting testimony concerning internal church procedures and rejected the interpretations of relevant procedural provisions by the Mother Church's highest tribunals.\xcaId., at 492-500, 328 N.E.2d at 276-280.\xcaThe court also failed to take cognizance of the fact that the church judicatories were also guided by other sources of law, such as canon law, which are admittedly not always consistent, and it rejected the testimony of\xca**2385\xcapetitioners' five expert witnesses10\xcathat church procedures were properly followed, denigrating the testimony of one witness as \xd2contradictory\xd3 and discounting that of another on the ground that it was \xd2premised upon an assumption which did not consider the penal code,\xd3 even though there was some question whether that code even applied to discipline of Bishops.11\xcaThe court\xca*719\xcaaccepted, on the other hand, the testimony of respondents' sole expert witness that the Church's procedures had been contravened in various specifics. We need not, and under the First Amendment cannot, demonstrate the propriety or impropriety of each of Dionisije's procedural claims, but we can note that the state court even rejected petitioners' contention that Dionisije's failure to participate in the proceedings undermined all procedural contentions because Arts. 66 and 70 of the penal code specify that if a person charged with a violation fails to participate or answer the indictment, the allegations are admitted and due process will be concluded without his participation; the court merely asserted that \xd2application of this provision . . . must be viewed from the perspective that Bishop Dionisije refused to participate because he maintained that the proceedings against him were in violation of the constitution and the penal code of the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch.\xd3 60 Ill.2d, at 502, 328 N.E.2d, at 281.\xcaThe court found no support in any church dogma for this judicial rewriting of church law, and compounded further the error of this intrusion into a religious thicket by declaring that although Dionisije had, even under the court's analysis, been properly suspended and replaced by Firmilian as temporary administrator, he had to be reinstated as Bishop because church law mandated a trial on ecclesiastical charges within one year of the indictment.\xcaYet the only reason more time then that had expired was due to Dionisije's decision to resort to the civil courts for redress without attempting to vindicate himself by pursuing available\xca*720\xcaremedies within the church. Indeed, the Illinois Supreme Court overlooked the clear substantive canonical violations for which the Church disciplined Dionisije, violations based on Dionisije's conceded open defiance and rebellion against the church hierarchy immediately after the Holy Assembly's decision to suspend him (a decision which even the Illinois courts deemed to be proper) and Dionisije's decision to litigate the Mother Church's authority in the civil courts rather than participate in the disciplinary proceedings before the Holy Synod and the Holy Assembly. Instead, the Illinois Supreme Court would sanction this circumvention of the tribunals set up to resolve internal church disputes and has ordered the Mother Church to reinstate as Bishop one who espoused views regarded by the church hierarchy to be schismatic and which the proper church tribunals have already determined merit seversanctions. In short, under the guise of \xd2minimal\xd3 review under the umbrella of \xd2arbitrariness,\xd3 the Illinois Supreme Court has unconstitutionally undertaken the resolution of quintessentially religious controversies whose resolution the First Amendment commits exclusively to the highest ecclesiastical tribunals of this hierarchical church. And although the Diocesan Bishop controls respondent Monastery of St. Sava and is the principal officer of respondent property-holding corporations, the civil courts must accept that consequence as the incidental effect of an ecclesiastical determination that is not subject\xca**2386\xcato judicial abrogation, having been reached by the final church judicatory in which authority to make the decision resides. "
[1273] "III "
[1274] "Similar considerations inform our resolution of the second question we must address the constitutionality of the Supreme Court of Illinois' holding that the Mother Church's reorganization of the American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xca*721\xcainto three\xcaDioceses\xcawas invalid because it was \xd2 \xd4in clear and palpable excess of its own jurisdiction.\xd5 \xd3 Essentially, the court premised this determination on its view that the early history of the\xcaDiocese\xca\xd2manested a clear intention to retain independence and autonomy in its administrative affairs while at the same time becoming ecclesiastically and judicially an organic part of the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch,\xd3 and its interpretation of the constitution of the American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xcaas confirming this intention. It also interpreted the constitution of the\xcaSerbian\xcaOrthodox\xcaChurch, which was adopted after the Diocesan constitution, in a manner consistent with this conclusion.\xca60 Ill.2d, at 506-507, 328 N.E.2d, at 283-284. "
[1275] "9This conclusion was not, however, explicitly based on the \xd2fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness\xd3 exception. Rather, the Illinois Supreme Court relied on purported \xd2neutral principles\xd3 for resolving property disputes which would \xd2not in any way entangle this court in the determination of theological or doctrinal matters.\xd3\xcaId., at 505, 328 N.E.2d, at 282.\xcaNevertheless the Supreme Court of Illinois substituted its interpretation of the Diocesan and Mother Church constitutions for that of the highest ecclesiastical tribunals in which church law vests authority to make that interpretation. This the First and Fourteenth Amendments forbid. "
[1276] "10We will not delve into the various church constitutional provisions relevant to this conclusion, for that would repeat the error of the Illinois Supreme Court.\xcaIt suffices to note that the reorganization of the\xcaDiocese\xcainvolves a matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical affairs; Arts. 57 and 64 of the Mother Church constitution commit such questions of church polity to the final province of the Holy Assembly.\xcaKedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154, 97 L.Ed. 120 (1952), stated that religious freedom encompasses the\xca*722\xca\xd2power (of religious bodies) to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine.\xd3 The subordination of the\xcaDiocese\xcato the Mother Church in such matters, which are not only \xd2administrative\xd3 but also \xd2hierarchical,\xd312\xcawas provided, and the power of the Holy Assembly to reorganize the\xcaDiocese\xcais expressed in the Mother Church constitution.13\xcaContrary to the interpretation of the Illinois court, the church judicatories interpreted the provisions of the Diocesan constitution\xca**2387\xcanot to interdict or govern this action, but only to relate to the day-to-day administration of Diocesan property.14\xca*723\xcaThe constitutional provisions of the American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xcawere not so express that the civil courts could enforce them without engaging in a searching and therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity. See\xcaMd. & Va. Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. at 368-370, 90 S.Ct., at 500-501\xca(Brennan, J., concurring).15 "
[1277] "The control of Diocesan property may be little affected by the changes; respondents' allegation that the reorganization was a fraudulent subterfuge to divert Diocesan property from its intended beneficiaries has been rejected by the Illinois courts. Formal title to the property remains in respondent property-holding corporations, to be held in trust for all members of the new\xcaDioceses. The boundaries of the reorganized\xcaDioceses\xcagenerally conform to the episcopal districts which the American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xcahad already employed for its internal government, and the appointed administrators of the new\xcaDioceses\xcawere the same individuals nominated by Dionisije as assistant bishops to govern similar divisions under him. Indeed, even the Illinois courts' rationale that the reorganization would effectuate an abrogation of the Diocesan constitution has no support in the record, which establishes rather that the details of the reorganization and any decisions pertaining to a distribution of\xca*724\xcathe property among the three\xcaDioceses\xcawere expressly left for the Diocesan National Assembly to determine. In response to inquiries from the\xcaDiocese, the Holy Assembly assured Bishop Firmilian: "
[1278] "\xd21. That all the rights of the former American-Canadian\xcaDiocese, as they relate to the autonomy in the administrative sense, remain unchanged. The only exception is the forming of three\xcadioceses\xcaand "
[1279] "\xd22. That the Constitution of the former American-Canadian\xcaDiocese\xcaremains the same and that the\xcaDioceses\xcain America and\xcaCanada\xcawill not, in an administrative sense (the management (Or direction) of the properties) be managed (Or directed) in the same manner as those in Yugoslavia.\xd3 App. 1446. "
[1280] "As a practical matter the effect of the reorganization is a tripling of the Diocesan representational strength in the Holy Assembly and a decentralization of hierarchical authority to permit closer attention to the needs of individual congregations within each of the new\xcaDioceses, a result which Dionisije and Diocesan representatives had already concluded was necessary. Whether corporate bylaws or other documents governing the individual property-holding corporations may affect any desired disposition of the Diocesan property is a question not before us. "
[1281] "IV "
[1282] "11In short, the First and Fourteenth Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and ecclesiastical tribunals are created to decide disputes over\xca*725\xcathe government and direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires\xca**2388\xcathat civil courts accept their decisions as binding upon them. "
[1283] "Reversed. "
[1284] "Mr. Justice BRENNAN delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[1285] "Appellant, a member of the Seventh-day Adventist Church was discharged by her South Carolina employer because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath Day of her faith.1 When she was unable to obtain other employment because from conscientious scruples she would not take Saturday work,2 she filed a claim for *400 unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act.3 That **1792 law provides that, to be eligible for benefits, a claimant must be \xd4able to work and * * * is available for work\xd5; and, further, *401 that a claimant is ineligible for benefits \xd4(i)f * * * he has failed, without good cause * * * to accept available suitable work when offered him by the employment office or the employer * * *.\xd5 The appellee Employment Security Commission, in administrative proceedings under the statute, found that appellant's restriction upon her availability for Saturday work brought her within the provision disqualifying for benefits insured workers who fail, without good cause, to accept \xd4suitable work when offered * * * by the employment office or the employer * * *.\xd5 The Commission's finding was sustained by the Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County. That court's judgment was in turn affirmed by the South Carolina Supreme Court, which rejected appellant's contention that, as applied to her, the disqualifying provisions of the South Carolina statute abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion secured under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth Amendment. The State Supreme Court held specifically that appellant's ineligibility infringed no constitutional liberties because such a construction of the statute \xd4places no restriction upon the appellant's freedom of religion nor does it in any way prevent her in the exercise of her right and freedom to observe her religious beliefs in accordance with the dictates of her conscience.\xd5 240 U.S. 286, 303\xd1304, 125 S.E.2d 737, 746.4 We noted probable *402 jurisdiction of appellant's appeal.371 **1793 U.S. 938, 83 S.Ct. 321, 9 L.Ed.2d 273. We reverse the judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. "
[1286] "I. "
[1287] "123The door of the Free Exercise Clause stands tightly closed against any governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such, Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213. Government may neither compel affirmation of a repugnant belief, Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 81 S.Ct. 1680, 6 L.Ed.2d 982; nor penalize or discriminate against individuals or groups because they hold religious views abhorrent to the authorities, Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 73 S.Ct. 526, 97 L.Ed. 828; nor employ the taxing power to inhibit the dissemination of particular religious views, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292; Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 64 S.Ct. 717, 88 L.Ed. 938; cf. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660. On the other hand, *403 the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for \xd4even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, (it) is not totally free from legislative restrictions.\xd5 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1146, 6 L.Ed.2d 563. The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645; Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14, 67 S.Ct. 13, 91 L.Ed. 12. "
[1288] "4Plainly enough, appellant's conscientious objection to Saturday work constitutes no conduct prompted by religious principles of a kind within the reach of state legislation. If, therefore. the decision of the South Carolina Supreme Court is to withstand appellant's constitutional challenge, it must be either because her disqualification as a beneficiary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion may be justified by a \xd4compelling state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's constitutional power to regulate * * *.\xd5 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438, 83 S.Ct. 328, 341, 9 L.Ed.2d 405. "
[1289] "II. "
[1290] "56We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits **1794 imposes any burden on the free exercise of appellant's religion. We think it is clear that it does. In a sense the consequences of such a disqualification to religious principles and practices may be only an indirect result of welfare legislation within the State's general competence to enact; it is true that no criminal sanctions directly compel appellant to work a six-day week. But this is only the beginning, not the end, of our *404 inquiry.5 For \xd4(i)f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.\xd5 Braunfeld v. Brown, supra, 366 U.S., at 607, 81 S.Ct., at 1148. Here not only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship. "
[1291] "78Nor may the South Carolina court's construction of the statute be saved from constitutional infirmity on the ground that unemployment compensation benefits are not appellant's \xd4right\xd5 but merely a \xd4privilege.\xd5 It is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.6 *405 American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390, 70 S.Ct. 674, 679, 94 L.Ed. 925; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191\xd1192, 73 S.Ct. 215, 218\xd1219, 97 L.Ed. 216; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155\xd1156, 66 S.Ct. 456, 461, 90 L.Ed. 586. For example, in Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611, 80 S.Ct. 1367, 1373, 4 L.Ed.2d 1435, the Court recognized with respect to Federal Social Security benefits that \xd4(t)he interest of a covered employee under the Act is of sufficient substance to fall within the protection from arbitrary governmental **1795 action afforded by the Due Process Clause.\xd5 In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S.Ct. 1332, 2 L.Ed.2d 1460, we emphasized that conditions upon public benefits cannot be sustained if they so operate, whatever their purpose, as to inhibit or deter the exercise of First Amendment freedoms. We there struck down a condition which limited the availability of a tax exemption to those members of the exempted class who affirmed their loyalty to the state government granting the exemption. While the State was surely under no obligation to afford such an exemption, we held that the imposition of such a condition upon even a gratuitous benefit inevitably deterred or discouraged the exercise of First Amendment rights of expression and thereby threatened to \xd4produce a result which the State could not command directly.\xd5 *406 357 U.S., at 526, 78 S.Ct., at 1342. \xd4To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.\xd5 Id., 357 U.S., at 518, 78 S.Ct., at 1338. Likewise, to condition the availability of benefits upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal principle of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of her constitutional liberties. "
[1292] "Significantly South Carolina expressly saves the Sunday worshipper from having to make the kind of choice which we here hold infringes the Sabbatarian's religious liberty. When in times of \xd4national emergency\xd5 the textile plants are authorized by the State Commissioner of Labor to operate on Sunday, \xd4no employee shall be required to work on Sunday * * * who is conscientiously opposed to Sunday work; and if any employee should refuse to work on Sunday on account of conscientious * * * objections he or she shall not jeopardize his or her seniority by such refusal or be discriminated against in any other manner.\xd5 S.C.Code, s 64\xd14. No question of the disqualification of a Sunday worshipper for benefits is likely to arise, since we cannot suppose that an employer will discharge him in violation of this statute. The unconstitutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus compounded by the religious discrimination which South Carolina's general statutory scheme necessarily effects. "
[1293] "III. "
[1294] "910We must next consider whether some compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies the substantial infringement of appellant's First Amendment right. It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, \xd4(o)nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interest, give occasion for permissible limitation,\xd5 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530, 65 S.Ct. 315, 323, 89 L.Ed. 430. *407 No such abuse or danger has been advanced in the present case. The appellees suggest no more than a possibility that the filing of fraudulent claims by unscrupulous claimants feigning religious objections to Saturday work might not only dilute the unemployment compensation fund but also hinder the scheduling by employers of necessary Saturday work. But that possibility is not apposite here because no such objection appears to have been made before the South Carolina Supreme Court, and we are unwilling to assess the importance of an asserted state interest without the views of the state court. Nor, if the contention had been made below, would the record appear to sustain it; there is no proof whatever to warrant such fears of malingering or deceit as those which the respondents now advance. Even if consideration of such evidence is not foreclosed by the prohibition against judicial inquiry into the truth or falsity of religious beliefs, United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 64 S.Ct. 882, 88 L.Ed. 1148\xd1a question as to which we intimate no view since it is not before us\xd1it is highly **1796 doubtful whether such evidence would be sufficient to warrant a substantial infringement of religious liberties. For even if the possibility of spurious claims did threaten to dilute the fund and disrupt the scheduling of work, it would plainly be incumbent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First Amendment rights.7 Cf. *408 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487\xd1490, 81 S.Ct. 247, 251\xd1253, 5 L.Ed.2d 231; Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64, 80 S.Ct. 536, 538, 4 L.Ed.2d 559; Schneider v. State of New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 60 S.Ct. 146, 150, 84 L.Ed. 155; Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144\xd1149, 63 S.Ct. 862, 863\xd1866, 87 L.Ed. 1313. "
[1295] "In these respects, then, the state interest asserted in the present case is wholly dissimilar to the interests which were found to justify the less direct burden upon religious practices in Braunfeld v. Brown, supra. The Court recognized that the Sunday closing law which that decision sustained undoubtedly served \xd4to make the practice of (the Orthodox Jewish merchants') religious beliefs more expensive,\xd5 366 U.S., at 605, 81 S.Ct., at 1147. But the statute was nevertheless saved by a countervailing factor which finds no equivalent in the instant case\xd1a strong state interest in providing one uniform day of rest for all workers. That secular objective could be achieved, the Court found, only by declaring Sunday to be that day of rest. Requiring exemptions for Sabbatarians, while theoretically possible, appeared to present an administrative *409 problem of such magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so great a competitive advantage, that such a requirement would have rendered the entire statutory scheme unworkable.8 In the present case no such justifications underlie the determination of the state court that appellant's religion makes her ineligible to receive benefits.9 "
[1296] "**1797 IV. "
[1297] "1112In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the \xd4establishment\xd5 of the Seventh-day Adventist religion in South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall. See School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560. Nor does the recognition of the appellant's right to unemployment benefits under the state statute serve to abridge any other person's religious liberties. Nor do we, by our decision today, declare the existence of a constitutional right to unemployment benefits on the part *410 of all persons whose religious convictions are the cause of their unemployment. This is not a case in which an employee's religious convictions serve to make him a nonproductive member of society. See note 2, supra. Finally, nothing we say today constrains the States to adopt any particular form or scheme of unemployment compensation. Our holding today is only that South Carolina may not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest. This holding but reaffirms a principle that we announced a decade and a half ago, namely that no State may \xd4exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.\xd5 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 512, 91 L.Ed. 711. "
[1298] "In view of the result we have reached under the First and Fourteenth Amendments' guarantee of free exercise of religion, we have no occasion to consider appellant's claim that the denial of benefits also deprived her of the equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. "
[1299] "The judgment of the South Carolina Supreme Court is reversed and the case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. It is so ordered. "
[1300] "Reversed and remanded. "
[1301] "Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[1302] "We granted certiorari to consider whether the State's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to the petitioner, a Jehovah's Witness who terminated his job because his religious beliefs forbade participation in the production of armaments, constituted a violation of his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion. 444 U.S. 1070, 100 S.Ct. 1012, 62 L.Ed.2d 751 (1980). "
[1303] "I "
[1304] "Thomas terminated his employment in the Blaw-Knox Foundry & Machinery Co. when he was transferred from the roll foundry to a department that produced turrets for military tanks. He claimed his religious beliefs prevented him from participating in the production of war materials. **1428 The respondent Review Board denied him unemployment compensation benefits by applying disqualifying provisions of the Indiana Employment Security Act.1 "
[1305] "*710 Thomas, a Jehovah's Witness, was hired initially to work in the roll foundry at Blaw-Knox. The function of that department was to fabricate sheet steel for a variety of industrial uses. On his application form, he listed his membership in the Jehovah's Witnesses, and noted that his hobbies were Bible study and Bible reading. However, he placed no conditions on his employment; and he did not describe his religious tenets in any detail on the form. "
[1306] "Approximately a year later, the roll foundry closed, and Blaw-Knox transferred Thomas to a department that fabricated turrets for military tanks. On his first day at this new job, Thomas realized that the work he was doing was weapons related. He checked the bulletin board where in-plant openings were listed, and discovered that all of the remaining departments at Blaw-Knox were engaged directly in the production of weapons. Since no transfer to another department would resolve his problem, he asked for a layoff. When that request was denied, he quit, asserting that he could not work on weapons without violating the principles of his religion. The record does not show that he was offered any nonweapons work by his employer, or that any such work was available. "
[1307] "Upon leaving Blaw-Knox, Thomas applied for unemployment compensation benefits under the Indiana Employment Security Act.2 At an administrative hearing where he was *711 not represented by counsel, he testified that he believed that contributing to the production of arms violated his religion. He said that when he realized that his work on the tank turret line involved producing weapons for war, he consulted another Blaw-Knox employee-a friend and fellow Jehovah's Witness. The friend advised him that working on weapons parts at Blaw-Knox was not \xd2unscriptural.\xd3 Thomas was not able to \xd2rest with\xd3 this view, however. He concluded that his friend's view was based upon a less strict reading of Witnesses' principles than his own. "
[1308] "When asked at the hearing to explain what kind of work his religious convictions would permit, Thomas said that he would have no difficulty doing the type of work that he had done at the roll foundry. He testified that he could, in good conscience, engage indirectly in the production of materials that might be used ultimately to fabricate arms-for example, as an employee of a raw material supplier or of a roll foundry.3 "
[1309] "The hearing referee found that Thomas' religious beliefs specifically precluded him from producing or directly aiding in the manufacture of items used in warfare.4 He **1429 also found that Thomas had terminated his employment because of these religious convictions. The referee reported: "
[1310] "\xd2Claimant continually searched for a transfer to another department which would not be so armament related; *712 however, this did not materialize, and prior to the date of his leaving, claimant requested a layoff, which was denied; and on November 6, 1975, claimant did quit due to his religious convictions.\xd35 "
[1311] "The referee concluded nonetheless that Thomas' termination was not based upon a \xd2good cause [arising] in connection with [his] work,\xd3 as required by the Indiana unemployment compensation statute. Accordingly, he was held not entitled to benefits. The Review Board adopted the referee's findings and conclusions, and affirmed the denial of benefits.6 "
[1312] "The Indiana Court of Appeals, accepting the finding that Thomas terminated his employment \xd2due to his religious convictions,\xd3 reversed the decision of the Review Board, and held that \xa4 22-4-15-1, as applied, improperly burdened Thomas' right to the free exercise of his religion. Accordingly, it ordered the Board to extend benefits to Thomas. Thomas v. Review Board, Ind.App., 65 Ind.Dec. 238, 381 N.E.2d 888 (1978). "
[1313] "The Supreme Court of Indiana, dividing 3-2, vacated the decision of the Court of Appeals, and denied Thomas benefits. Ind., 391 N.E.2d 1127 (1979). With reference to the Indiana unemployment compensation statute, the court said: "
[1314] "\xd2It is not intended to facilitate changing employment or to provide relief for those who quit work voluntarily for personal reasons. Voluntary unemployment is not compensable under the purpose of the Act, which is to provide benefits for persons unemployed through no fault of their own. "
[1315] "\xd2Good cause which justifies voluntary termination must *713 be job-related and objective in character.\xd3 Ind., 391 N.E.2d, at 1129 (footnotes omitted). "
[1316] "The court held that Thomas had quit voluntarily for personal reasons, and therefore did not qualify for benefits. Ind., 391 N.E.2d, at 1130. "
[1317] "In discussing the petitioner's free exercise claim, the court stated: \xd2A personal philosophical choice rather than a religious choice, does not rise to the level of a first amendment claim.\xd3 Ind., 391 N.E.2d, at 1131. The court found the basis and the precise nature of Thomas' belief unclear-but it concluded that the belief was more \xd2personal philosophical choice\xd3 than religious belief. Nonetheless, it held that, even assuming that Thomas quit for religious reasons, he would not be entitled to benefits: under Indiana law, a termination motivated by religion is not for \xd2good cause\xd3 objectively related to the work. "
[1318] "The Indiana court concluded that denying Thomas benefits would create only an indirect burden on his free exercise right and that the burden was justified by the legitimate state interest in preserving the integrity of the insurance fund and maintaining a stable work force by encouraging workers not to leave their jobs for personal reasons. "
[1319] "Finally, the court held that awarding unemployment compensation benefits to a person who terminates employment voluntarily for religious reasons, while denying such benefits to persons who terminate for other personal but nonreligious reasons, would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. "
[1320] "**1430 The judgment under review must be examined in light of our prior decisions, particularly Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963). "
[1321] "II "
[1322] "12Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which, by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion. Sherbert v. Verner, supra; Wisconsin *714 v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-216, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1533, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972). The determination of what is a \xd2religious\xd3 belief or practice is more often than not a difficult and delicate task, as the division in the Indiana Supreme Court attests.7 However, the resolution of that question is not to turn upon a judicial perception of the particular belief or practice in question; religious beliefs need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection. "
[1323] "In support of his claim for benefits, Thomas testified: "
[1324] "\xd2Q. And then when it comes to actually producing the tank itself, hammering it out; that you will not do.... "
[1325] "\xd2A. That's right, that's right when ... I'm daily faced with the knowledge that these are tanks.... "
[1326] "? "
[1327] "\xd2A. I really could not, you know, conscientiously continue to work with armaments. It would be against all of the ... religious principles that ... I have come to learn....\xd3 Ind., 391 N.E.2d, at 1132. "
[1328] "Based upon this and other testimony, the referee held that Thomas \xd2quit due to his religious convictions.\xd38 The Review Board adopted that finding,9 and the finding is not challenged in this Court. "
[1329] "The Indiana Supreme Court apparently took a different view of the record. It concluded that \xd2although the claimant's reasons for quitting were described as religious, it was unclear what his belief was, and what the religious basis of his belief was.\xd310 In that court's view, Thomas had made a merely \xd2personal philosophical choice rather than a religious choice.\xd311 "
[1330] "3*715 In reaching its conclusion, the Indiana court seems to have placed considerable reliance on the facts that Thomas was \xd2struggling\xd3 with his beliefs and that he was not able to \xd2articulate\xd3 his belief precisely. It noted, for example, that Thomas admitted before the referee that he would not object to "
[1331] "\xd2working for United States Steel or Inland Steel ... produc[ing] the raw product necessary for the production of any kind of tank ... [because I] would not be a direct party to whoever they shipped it to [and] would not be ... chargeable in ... conscience....\xd3 Ind., 391 N.E.2d, at 1131. "
[1332] "The court found this position inconsistent with Thomas' stated opposition to participation in the production of armaments. But Thomas' statements reveal no more than that he found work in the roll foundry sufficiently insulated from producing weapons of war. We see, therefore, that Thomas drew a line, and it is not for us to say that the line he drew was an unreasonable one. Courts should not undertake to dissect religious beliefs because the believer admits that he is \xd2struggling\xd3 with his position or because his beliefs are not articulated with the clarity and precision that a more sophisticated person might employ. "
[1333] "The Indiana court also appears to have given significant weight to the fact that another Jehovah's Witness had no scruples about working on tank turrets; for that other Witness, at least, such work was \xd2scripturally\xd3 acceptable. Intrafaith differences **1431 of that kind are not uncommon among followers of a particular creed, and the judicial process is singularly ill equipped to resolve such differences in relation to the Religion Clauses. One can, of course, imagine an asserted claim so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection under the Free Exercise Clause; but that is not the case here, and the guarantee of free exercise is not limited to beliefs which are shared by all of the members *716 of a religious sect. Particularly in this sensitive area, it is not within the judicial function and judicial competence to inquire whether the petitioner or his fellow worker more correctly perceived the commands of their common faith. Courts are not arbiters of scriptural interpretation. "
[1334] "The narrow function of a reviewing court in this context is to determine whether there was an appropriate finding that petitioner terminated his work because of an honest conviction that such work was forbidden by his religion. Not surprisingly, the record before the referee and the Review Board was not made with an eye to the microscopic examination often exercised in appellate judicial review. However, judicial review is confined to the facts as found and conclusions drawn. On this record, it is clear that Thomas terminated his employment for religious reasons. "
[1335] "III "
[1336] "A "
[1337] "4More that 30 years ago, the Court held that a person may not be compelled to choose between the exercise of a First Amendment right and participation in an otherwise available public program. A state may not "
[1338] "\xd2exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.\xd3 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16, 67 S.Ct. 504, 511, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947) (emphasis deleted). "
[1339] "Later, in Sherbert, the Court examined South Carolina's attempt to deny unemployment compensation benefits to a Sabbatarian who declined to work on Saturday. In sustaining her right to receive benefits, the Court held: "
[1340] "\xd2The ruling [disqualifying Mrs. Sherbert from benefits because of her refusal to work on Saturday in violation of her faith] forces her to choose between following the *717 precepts of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand. Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against [her] for her Saturday worship.\xd3 374 U.S., at 404, 83 S.Ct., at 1794. "
[1341] "The respondent Review Board argues, and the Indiana Supreme Court held, that the burden upon religion here is only the indirect consequence of public welfare legislation that the State clearly has authority to enact. \xd2Neutral objective standards must be met to qualify for compensation.\xd3 Ind., 391 N.E.2d, at 1130. Indiana requires applicants for unemployment compensation to show that they left work for \xd2good cause in connection with the work.\xd3 Ibid. "
[1342] "A similar argument was made and rejected in Sherbert, however. It is true that, as in Sherbert, the Indiana law does not compel a violation of conscience. But, \xd2this is only the beginning, not the end, of our inquiry.\xd3 374 U.S., at 403-404, 83 S.Ct., at 1794. In a variety of ways we have said that \xd2[a] regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.\xd3 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S., at 220, 92 S.Ct., at 1535. Cf. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). "
[1343] "5Here, as in Sherbert, the employee was put to a choice between fidelity to **1432 religious belief or cessation of work; the coercive impact on Thomas is indistinguishable from Sherbert, where the Court held: "
[1344] "\xd2[N]ot only is it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego, that practice is unmistakable.\xd3 374 U.S., at 404, 83 S.Ct., at 1794. "
[1345] "Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it denies *718 such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial. "
[1346] "The respondents also contend that Sherbert is inapposite because, in that case, the employee was dismissed by the employer's action. But we see that Mrs. Sherbert was dismissed because she refused to work on Saturdays after the plant went to a 6-day workweek. Had Thomas simply presented himself at the Blaw-Knox plant turret line but refused to perform any assigned work, it must be assumed that he, like Sherbert, would have been terminated by the employer's action, if no other work was available. In both cases, the termination flowed from the fact that the employment, once acceptable, became religiously objectionable because of changed conditions. "
[1347] "B "
[1348] "6The mere fact that the petitioner's religious practice is burdened by a governmental program does not mean that an exemption accommodating his practice must be granted. The state may justify an inroad on religious liberty by showing that it is the least restrictive means of achieving some compelling state interest. However, it is still true that \xd2[t]he essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order . . . can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.\xd3 Wisconsin v. Yoder, supra, 406 U.S., at 215, 92 S.Ct., at 1533. "
[1349] "7The purposes urged to sustain the disqualifying provision of the Indiana unemployment compensation scheme are twofold: (1) to avoid the widespread unemployment and the consequent burden on the fund resulting if people were permitted to leave jobs for \xd2personal\xd3 reasons;12 and (2) to *719 avoid a detailed probing by employers into job applicants' religious beliefs. These are by no means unimportant considerations. When the focus of the inquiry is properly narrowed, however, we must conclude that the interests advanced by the State do not justify the burden placed on free exercise of religion. "
[1350] "There is no evidence in the record to indicate that the number of people who find themselves in the predicament of choosing between benefits and religious beliefs is large enough to create \xd2widespread unemployment,\xd3 or even to seriously affect unemployment-and no such claim was advanced by the Review Board. Similarly, although detailed inquiry by employers into applicants' religious beliefs is undesirable, there is no evidence in the record to indicate that such inquiries will occur in Indiana, or that they have occurred in any of the states that extend benefits to people in the petitioner's position. Nor is there any reason to believe that the number of people terminating employment for religious reasons will be so great as to motivate employers to make such inquiries. "
[1351] "Neither of the interests advanced is sufficiently compelling to justify the burden upon Thomas' religious liberty. Accordingly, Thomas is entitled to receive benefits unless, as the respondents contend and the Indiana court held, such payment would violate the Establishment Clause. "
[1352] "**1433 IV "
[1353] "8The respondents contend that to compel benefit payments to Thomas involves the State in fostering a religious faith. There is, in a sense, a \xd2benefit\xd3 to Thomas deriving from his religious beliefs, but this manifests no more than the tension between the two Religious Clauses which the Court resolved in Sherbert: "
[1354] "\xd2In holding as we do, plainly we are not fostering the \xd4establishment\xd5 of the Seventh-day Adventist religion *720 in South Carolina, for the extension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does not represent that involvement of religious with secular institutions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to forestall.\xd3 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S., at 409, 83 S.Ct., at 1796. "
[1355] "See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S., at 220-221, 92 S.Ct., at 1535-1536; Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S., at 668-669, 90 S.Ct., at 1411; O'Hair v. Andrus, 198 U.S.App.D.C. 198, 201-204, 613 F.2d 931, 934-937 (1979) (Leventhal, J.). "
[1356] "9Unless we are prepared to overrule Sherbert, supra, Thomas cannot be denied the benefits due him on the basis of the findings of the referee, the Review Board, and the Indiana Court of Appeals that he terminated his employment because of his religious convictions. "
[1357] "Reversed. Mr. Justice BLACK delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[1358] "Article 37 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution provides: "
[1359] "\xd4(N)o religious test ought ever to be required as a qualification for any office of profit or trust in this State, other than a declaration of belief in the existence of God * * *.\xd5 "
[1360] "The appellant Torcaso was appointed to the office of Notary Public by the Governor of Maryland but was refused a commission to serve because he would not declare his belief in God. He then brought this action in a Maryland Circuit Court to compel issuance of his commission, charging that the State's requirement that he declare this belief violated \xd4the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States * * *.'1 The Circuit Court rejected **1681 these federal constitutional contentions, and the highest court of the State, the Court of Appeals, affirmed,2 holding that the state constitutional provision is self-executing and requires declaration of belief in God as a qualification for office without need for implementing legislation. The case is therefore properly here on appeal under 28 U.S.C. s 1257(2), 28 U.S.C.A. s 1257(2). "
[1361] "There is, and can be, no dispute about the purpose or effect of the Maryland Declaration of Rights requirement before us\xd1it sets up a religious test which was designed to *490 and, if valid, does bar every person who refuses to declare a belief in God from holding a public \xd4office of profit or trust\xd5 in Maryland. The power and authority of the State of Maryland thus is put on the side of one particular sort of believers\xd1those who are willing to say they believe in \xd4the existence of God.\xd5 It is true that there is much historical precedent for such laws. Indeed, it was largely to escape religious test oaths and declarations that a great many of the early colonists left Europe and came here hoping to worship in their own way. It soon developed, however, that many of those who had fled to escape religious test oaths turned out to be perfectly willing, when they had the power to do so, to force dissenters from their faith to take test oaths in conformity with that faith. This brought on a host of laws in the New Colonies imposing burdens and disabilities of various kinds upon varied beliefs depending largely upon what group happened to be politically strong enough to legislate in favor of its own beliefs. The effect of all this was the formal or practical \xd4establishment\xd5 of particular religious faiths in most of the Colonies, with consequent burdens imposed on the free exercise of the faiths of nonfavored believers.3 "
[1362] "There were, however, wise and farseeing men in the Colonies\xd1too many to mention\xd1who spoke out against test oaths and all the philosophy of intolerance behind them. One of these, it so happens, was George Calvert (the first Lord Baltimore), who took a most important part in the original establishment of the Colony of Maryland. He was a Catholic and had, for this reason, felt compelled by his conscience to refuse to take the Oath of Supremacy in England at the cost of resigning from high governmental office. He again refused to take that oath when it was demanded by the Council of the Colony of *491 Virginia, and as a result he was denied settlement in that Colony.4 A recent historian of the early period of Maryland's life has said that it was Calvert's hope and purpose to establish in Maryland a colonial government free from the religious persecutions **1682 he had known\xd1one \xd4securely beyond the reach of oaths * * *.'5 "
[1363] "When our Constitution was adopted, the desire to put the people \xd4securely beyond the reach\xd5 of religious test oaths brought about the inclusion in Article VI of that document of a provision that \xd4no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.\xd5 Article VI supports the accuracy of our observation in Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69, 66 S.Ct. 826, 829, 90 L.Ed. 1084, that \xd4(t)he test oath is abhorrent to our tradition.\xd5 Not satisfied, however, with Article VI and other guarantees in the original Constituion, the First Congress proposed and the States very shortly thereafter *492 adopted our Bill of Rights, including the First Amendment.6 That Amendment broke new constitutional ground in the protection it sought to afford to freedom of religion, speech, press, petition and assembly. Since prior cases in this Court have thoroughly explored and documented the history behind the First Amendment, the reasons for it, and the scope of the religious freedom it protects, we need not cover that ground again.7 What was said in our prior cases we think controls our decision here. "
[1364] "In Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303\xd1304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, we said: "
[1365] "\xd4The First Amendment declares that Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws * * *. Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts,\xd1freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.\xd5 "
[1366] "Later we decided Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, at pages 15 and 16, 67 S.Ct. 504, at page 511, and said this: "
[1367] "\xd4The \xd4establishment of religion\xd5 clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor *493 the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause **1683 against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect \xd4a wall of separation between church and State.\xd4\xd4 "
[1368] "While there were strong dissents in the Everson case, they did not challenge the Court's interpretation of the First Amendment's coverage as being too broad, but thought the Court was applying that interpretation too narrowly to the facts of that case. Not long afterward, in Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 68 S.Ct. 461, 92 L.Ed. 648, we were urged to repudiate as dicta the above-quoted Everson interpretation of the scope of the First Amendment's coverage. We declined to do this, but instead strongly reaffirmed what had been said in Everson, calling attention to the fact that both the majority and the minority in Everson had agreed on the principles declared in this part of the Everson opinion. And a concurring opinion in McCollum, written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter and joined by the other Everson dissenters, said this: "
[1369] "\xd4We are all agreed that the First and Fourteenth Amendments have a secular reach far more penetrating *494 in the conduct of Government than merely to forbid an \xd4established church.\xd5 * * * We renew our conviction that \xd4we have staked the very existence of our country on the faith that complete separation between the state and religion is best for the state and best for religion. \xd28 "
[1370] "The Maryland Court of Appeals thought, and it is argued here, that this Court's later holding and opinion in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 72 S.Ct. 679, 96 L.Ed. 954, had in part repudiated the statement in the Everson opinion quoted above and previously reaffirmed in McCollum. But the Court's opinion in Zorach specifically stated: \xd4We follow the McCollum case.\xd5 343 U.S. at page 315, 72 S.Ct. at page 684. Nothing decided or written in Zorach lends support to the idea that the Court there intended to open up the way for government, state or federal, to restore the historically and constitutionally discredited policy of probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more properly profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious concept.9 "
[1371] "*495 We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person \xd4to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.\xd5 Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers,10 and neither can aid those religions **1684 based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs.11 "
[1372] "1In upholding the State's religious test for public office the highest court of Maryland said (223 Md. 49, 162 A.2d 442): "
[1373] "\xd4The petitioner is not compelled to believe or disbelieve, under threat of punishment or other compulsion. True, unless he makes the declaration of belief he cannot hold public office in Maryland, but he is not compelled to hold office.\xd5 "
[1374] "The fact, however, that a person is not compelled to hold public office cannot possibly be an excuse for barring him *496 from office by state-imposed criteria forbidden by the Constitution. This was settled by our holding in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S.Ct. 215, 219, 97 L.Ed. 216. We there pointed out that whether or not \xd4an abstract right to public employment exists,\xd5 Congress could not pass a law providing \xd2* * * that no federal employee shall attend Mass or take any active part in missionary work.\xd312 "
[1375] "2This Maryland religious test for public office unconstitutionally invades the appellant's freedom of belief and religion and therefore cannot be enforced against him. "
[1376] "The judgment of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is accordingly reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. "
[1377] "Reversed and remanded. "
[1378] "Chief Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court, except as to footnote 3. "
[1379] "The Missouri Department of Natural Resources offers state grants to help public and private schools, nonprofit daycare centers, and other nonprofit entities purchase rubber playground surfaces made from recycled tires. Trinity Lutheran Church applied for such a grant for its preschool and daycare center and would have received one, but for the fact that Trinity Lutheran is a church. The Department had a policy of categorically disqualifying churches and other religious organizations from receiving grants under its playground resurfacing program. The question presented is whether the Department's policy violated the rights of Trinity Lutheran under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. "
[1380] "I "
[1381] "A "
[1382] "The Trinity Lutheran Church Child Learning Center is a preschool and daycare center open throughout the year to serve working families in Boone County, Missouri, and the surrounding area. Established as a nonprofit organization in 1980, the Center merged with Trinity Lutheran Church in 1985 and operates under its auspices on church property. The Center admits students of any religion, and enrollment stands at about 90 children ranging from age two to five. "
[1383] "The Center includes a playground that is equipped with the basic playground essentials: slides, swings, jungle gyms, monkey bars, and sandboxes. Almost the entire surface beneath and surrounding the play equipment is coarse pea gravel. Youngsters, of course, often fall on the playground or tumble from the equipment. And when they do, the gravel can be unforgiving. "
[1384] "In 2012, the Center sought to replace a large portion of the pea gravel with a pour-in-place rubber surface by participating in Missouri's Scrap Tire Program. Run by the State's Department of Natural Resources to reduce the number of used tires destined for landfills and dump sites, the program offers reimbursement grants to qualifying nonprofit organizations that purchase playground surfaces made from recycled tires. It is funded through a fee imposed on the sale of new tires in the State. "
[1385] "Due to limited resources, the Department cannot offer grants to all applicants and so awards them on a competitive basis to those scoring highest based on several criteria, such as the poverty level of the population in the surrounding area and the applicant's plan to promote recycling. When the Center applied, the Department had a strict and express policy of denying grants to any applicant owned or controlled by a church, sect, or other religious entity. That policy, in the Department's view, was compelled by Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution, which provides: "
[1386] "\xd2That no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury, directly or indirectly, in aid of any church, sect or denomination of religion, or in aid of any priest, preacher, minister or teacher thereof, as such; and that no preference shall be given to nor any discrimination made against any church, sect or creed of religion, or any form of religious faith or worship.\xd3 "
[1387] "In its application, the Center disclosed its status as a ministry of Trinity Lutheran Church and specified that the Center's *2018 mission was \xd2to provide a safe, clean, and attractive school facility in conjunction with an educational program structured to allow a child to grow spiritually, physically, socially, and cognitively.\xd3 App. to Pet. for Cert. 131a. After describing the playground and the safety hazards posed by its current surface, the Center detailed the anticipated benefits of the proposed project: increasing access to the playground for all children, including those with disabilities, by providing a surface compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; providing a safe, long-lasting, and resilient surface under the play areas; and improving Missouri's environment by putting recycled tires to positive use. The Center also noted that the benefits of a new surface would extend beyond its students to the local community, whose children often use the playground during non-school hours. "
[1388] "The Center ranked fifth among the 44 applicants in the 2012 Scrap Tire Program. But despite its high score, the Center was deemed categorically ineligible to receive a grant. In a letter rejecting the Center's application, the program director explained that, under Article I, Section 7 of the Missouri Constitution, the Department could not provide financial assistance directly to a church. "
[1389] "The Department ultimately awarded 14 grants as part of the 2012 program. Because the Center was operated by Trinity Lutheran Church, it did not receive a grant. "
[1390] "B "
[1391] "Trinity Lutheran sued the Director of the Department in Federal District Court. The Church alleged that the Department's failure to approve the Center's application, pursuant to its policy of denying grants to religiously affiliated applicants, violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. Trinity Lutheran sought declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the Department from discriminating against the Church on that basis in future grant applications. "
[1392] "The District Court granted the Department's motion to dismiss. The Free Exercise Clause, the District Court stated, prohibits the government from outlawing or restricting the exercise of a religious practice; it generally does not prohibit withholding an affirmative benefit on account of religion. The District Court likened the Department's denial of the scrap tire grant to the situation this Court encountered in Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 124 S.Ct. 1307, 158 L.Ed.2d 1 (2004). In that case, we upheld against a free exercise challenge the State of Washington's decision not to fund degrees in devotional theology as part of a state scholarship program. Finding the present case \xd2nearly indistinguishable from Locke,\xd3 the District Court held that the Free Exercise Clause did not require the State to make funds available under the Scrap Tire Program to religious institutions like Trinity Lutheran. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 976 F.Supp.2d 1137, 1151 (W.D.Mo.2013). "
[1393] "The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court recognized that it was \xd2rather clear\xd3 that Missouri could award a scrap tire grant to Trinity Lutheran without running afoul of the Establishment Clause of the United States Constitution. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 788 F.3d 779, 784 (2015). But, the Court of Appeals explained, that did not mean the Free Exercise Clause compelled the State to disregard the antiestablishment principle reflected in its own Constitution. Viewing a monetary grant to a religious institution as a \xd2 \xd4hallmark[ ] of an established religion,\xd5 \xd3 the court concluded that the State *2019 could rely on an applicant's religious status to deny its application. Id., at 785 (quoting Locke, 540 U.S., at 722, 124 S.Ct. 1307; some internal quotation marks omitted). "
[1394] "Judge Gruender dissented. He distinguished Locke on the ground that it concerned the narrow issue of funding for the religious training of clergy, and \xd2did not leave states with unfettered discretion to exclude the religious from generally available public benefits.\xd3 788 F.3d, at 791 (opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part). "
[1395] "Rehearing en banc was denied by an equally divided court. "
[1396] "12We granted certiorari sub nom. Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Pauley, 577 U.S. \xd0\xd0\xd0\xd0, 136 S.Ct. 891, 193 L.Ed.2d 784 (2016), and now reverse.1 "
[1397] "II "
[1398] "3The First Amendment provides, in part, that \xd2Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.\xd3 The parties agree that the Establishment Clause of that Amendment does not prevent Missouri from including Trinity Lutheran in the Scrap Tire Program. That does not, however, answer the question under the Free Exercise Clause, because we have recognized that there is \xd2play in the joints\xd3 between what the Establishment Clause permits and the Free Exercise Clause compels. Locke, 540 U.S., at 718, 124 S.Ct. 1307 (internal quotation marks omitted). "
[1399] "45The Free Exercise Clause \xd2protect[s] religious observers against unequal treatment\xd3 and subjects to the strictest scrutiny laws that target the religious for \xd2special disabilities\xd3 based on their \xd2religious status.\xd3 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 533, 542, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 124 L.Ed.2d 472 (1993) (internal quotation marks omitted). Applying that basic principle, this Court has repeatedly confirmed that denying a generally available benefit solely on account of religious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that can be justified only by a state interest \xd2of the highest order.\xd3 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593 (1978) (plurality opinion) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972)). "
[1400] "In Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 67 S.Ct. 504, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947), for example, we upheld against an Establishment Clause challenge a New *2020 Jersey law enabling a local school district to reimburse parents for the public transportation costs of sending their children to public and private schools, including parochial schools. In the course of ruling that the Establishment Clause allowed New Jersey to extend that public benefit to all its citizens regardless of their religious belief, we explained that a State \xd2cannot hamper its citizens in the free exercise of their own religion. Consequently, it cannot exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation.\xd3 Id., at 16, 67 S.Ct. 504. "
[1401] "Three decades later, in McDaniel v. Paty, the Court struck down under the Free Exercise Clause a Tennessee statute disqualifying ministers from serving as delegates to the State's constitutional convention. Writing for the plurality, Chief Justice Burger acknowledged that Tennessee had disqualified ministers from serving as legislators since the adoption of its first Constitution in 1796, and that a number of early States had also disqualified ministers from legislative office. This historical tradition, however, did not change the fact that the statute discriminated against McDaniel by denying him a benefit solely because of his \xd2status as a \xd4minister.\xd5 \xd3 435 U.S., at 627, 98 S.Ct. 1322. McDaniel could not seek to participate in the convention while also maintaining his role as a minister; to pursue the one, he would have to give up the other. In this way, said Chief Justice Burger, the Tennessee law \xd2effectively penalizes the free exercise of [McDaniel's] constitutional liberties.\xd3 Id., at 626, 98 S.Ct. 1322 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); internal quotation marks omitted). Joined by Justice Marshall in concurrence, Justice Brennan added that \xd2because the challenged provision requires [McDaniel] to purchase his right to engage in the ministry by sacrificing his candidacy it impairs the free exercise of his religion.\xd3 McDaniel, 435 U.S., at 634, 98 S.Ct. 1322. "
[1402] "In recent years, when this Court has rejected free exercise challenges, the laws in question have been neutral and generally applicable without regard to religion. We have been careful to distinguish such laws from those that single out the religious for disfavored treatment. "
[1403] "For example, in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439, 108 S.Ct. 1319, 99 L.Ed.2d 534 (1988), we held that the Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the Government from timber harvesting or road construction on a particular tract of federal land, even though the Government's action would obstruct the religious practice of several Native American Tribes that held certain sites on the tract to be sacred. Accepting that \xd2[t]he building of a road or the harvesting of timber ... would interfere significantly with private persons' ability to pursue spiritual fulfillment according to their own religious beliefs,\xd3 we nonetheless found no free exercise violation, because the affected individuals were not being \xd2coerced by the Government's action into violating their religious beliefs.\xd3 Id., at 449, 108 S.Ct. 1319. The Court specifically noted, however, that the Government action did not \xd2penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.\xd3 Ibid. "
[1404] "6In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), we rejected a free exercise claim brought by two members of a Native American church denied unemployment *2021 benefits because they had violated Oregon's drug laws by ingesting peyote for sacramental purposes. Along the same lines as our decision in Lyng, we held that the Free Exercise Clause did not entitle the church members to a special dispensation from the general criminal laws on account of their religion. At the same time, we again made clear that the Free Exercise Clause did guard against the government's imposition of \xd2special disabilities on the basis of religious views or religious status.\xd3 494 U.S., at 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595 (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593).2 "
[1405] "Finally, in Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, we struck down three facially neutral city ordinances that outlawed certain forms of animal slaughter. Members of the Santeria religion challenged the ordinances under the Free Exercise Clause, alleging that despite their facial neutrality, the ordinances had a discriminatory purpose easy to ferret out: prohibiting sacrificial rituals integral to Santeria but distasteful to local residents. We agreed. Before explaining why the challenged ordinances were not, in fact, neutral or generally applicable, the Court recounted the fundamentals of our free exercise jurisprudence. A law, we said, may not discriminate against \xd2some or all religious beliefs.\xd3 508 U.S., at 532, 113 S.Ct. 2217. Nor may a law regulate or outlaw conduct because it is religiously motivated. And, citing McDaniel and Smith, we restated the now-familiar refrain: The Free Exercise Clause protects against laws that \xd2 \xd4impose[ ] special disabilities on the basis of ... religious status.\xd5 \xd3 508 U.S., at 533, 113 S.Ct. 2217 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S., at 877, 110 S.Ct. 1595); see also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 828, 120 S.Ct. 2530, 147 L.Ed.2d 660 (2000) (plurality opinion) (noting \xd2our decisions that have prohibited governments from discriminating in the distribution of public benefits based upon religious status or sincerity\xd3 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 132 L.Ed.2d 700 (1995); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 124 L.Ed.2d 352 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 102 S.Ct. 269, 70 L.Ed.2d 440 (1981))). "
[1406] "III "
[1407] "A "
[1408] "78The Department's policy expressly discriminates against otherwise eligible recipients by disqualifying them from a public benefit solely because of their religious character. If the cases just described make one thing clear, it is that such a policy imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that triggers the most exacting scrutiny. Lukumi, 508 U.S., at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217. This conclusion is unremarkable in light of our prior decisions. "
[1409] "9Like the disqualification statute in McDaniel, the Department's policy puts Trinity Lutheran to a choice: It may participate in an otherwise available benefit *2022 program or remain a religious institution. Of course, Trinity Lutheran is free to continue operating as a church, just as McDaniel was free to continue being a minister. But that freedom comes at the cost of automatic and absolute exclusion from the benefits of a public program for which the Center is otherwise fully qualified. And when the State conditions a benefit in this way, McDaniel says plainly that the State has punished the free exercise of religion: \xd2To condition the availability of benefits ... upon [a recipient's] willingness to ... surrender[ ] his religiously impelled [status] effectively penalizes the free exercise of his constitutional liberties.\xd3 435 U.S., at 626, 98 S.Ct. 1322 (plurality opinion) (alterations omitted). "
[1410] "The Department contends that merely declining to extend funds to Trinity Lutheran does not prohibit the Church from engaging in any religious conduct or otherwise exercising its religious rights. In this sense, says the Department, its policy is unlike the ordinances struck down in Lukumi, which outlawed rituals central to Santeria. Here the Department has simply declined to allocate to Trinity Lutheran a subsidy the State had no obligation to provide in the first place. That decision does not meaningfully burden the Church's free exercise rights. And absent any such burden, the argument continues, the Department is free to heed the State's antiestablishment objection to providing funds directly to a church. Brief for Respondent 7\xd012, 14\xd016. "
[1411] "1011It is true the Department has not criminalized the way Trinity Lutheran worships or told the Church that it cannot subscribe to a certain view of the Gospel. But, as the Department itself acknowledges, the Free Exercise Clause protects against \xd2indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions.\xd3 Lyng, 485 U.S., at 450, 108 S.Ct. 1319. As the Court put it more than 50 years ago, \xd2[i]t is too late in the day to doubt that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by the denial of or placing of conditions upon a benefit or privilege.\xd3 Sherbert, 374 U.S., at 404, 83 S.Ct. 1790; see also McDaniel, 435 U.S., at 633, 98 S.Ct. 1322 (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (The \xd2proposition\xd1that the law does not interfere with free exercise because it does not directly prohibit religious activity, but merely conditions eligibility for office on its abandonment\xd1is ... squarely rejected by precedent\xd3). "
[1412] "Trinity Lutheran is not claiming any entitlement to a subsidy. It instead asserts a right to participate in a government benefit program without having to disavow its religious character. The \xd2imposition of such a condition upon even a gratuitous benefit inevitably deter[s] or discourage[s] the exercise of First Amendment rights.\xd3 Sherbert, 374 U.S., at 405, 83 S.Ct. 1790. The express discrimination against religious exercise here is not the denial of a grant, but rather the refusal to allow the Church\xd1solely because it is a church\xd1to compete with secular organizations for a grant. Cf. Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors of America v. Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666, 113 S.Ct. 2297, 124 L.Ed.2d 586 (1993) ( \xd2[T]he \xd4injury in fact\xd5 is the inability to compete on an equal footing in the bidding process, not the loss of a contract\xd3). Trinity Lutheran is a member of the community too, and the State's decision to exclude it for purposes of this public program must withstand the strictest scrutiny. "
[1413] "B "
[1414] "The Department attempts to get out from under the weight of our precedents by arguing that the free exercise question in this case is instead controlled by our *2023 decision in Locke v. Davey. It is not. In Locke, the State of Washington created a scholarship program to assist high-achieving students with the costs of postsecondary education. The scholarships were paid out of the State's general fund, and eligibility was based on criteria such as an applicant's score on college admission tests and family income. While scholarship recipients were free to use the money at accredited religious and non-religious schools alike, they were not permitted to use the funds to pursue a devotional theology degree\xd1one \xd2devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith.\xd3 540 U.S., at 716, 124 S.Ct. 1307 (internal quotation marks omitted). Davey was selected for a scholarship but was denied the funds when he refused to certify that he would not use them toward a devotional degree. He sued, arguing that the State's refusal to allow its scholarship money to go toward such degrees violated his free exercise rights. "
[1415] "This Court disagreed. It began by explaining what was not at issue. Washington's selective funding program was not comparable to the free exercise violations found in the \xd2Lukumi line of cases,\xd3 including those striking down laws requiring individuals to \xd2choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.\xd3 Id., at 720\xd0721, 124 S.Ct. 1307. At the outset, then, the Court made clear that Locke was not like the case now before us. "
[1416] "Washington's restriction on the use of its scholarship funds was different. According to the Court, the State had \xd2merely chosen not to fund a distinct category of instruction.\xd3 Id., at 721, 124 S.Ct. 1307. Davey was not denied a scholarship because of who he was ; he was denied a scholarship because of what he proposed to do\xd1use the funds to prepare for the ministry. Here there is no question that Trinity Lutheran was denied a grant simply because of what it is\xd1a church. "
[1417] "The Court in Locke also stated that Washington's choice was in keeping with the State's antiestablishment interest in not using taxpayer funds to pay for the training of clergy; in fact, the Court could \xd2think of few areas in which a State's antiestablishment interests come more into play.\xd3 Id., at 722, 124 S.Ct. 1307. The claimant in Locke sought funding for an \xd2essentially religious endeavor ... akin to a religious calling as well as an academic pursuit,\xd3 and opposition to such funding \xd2to support church leaders\xd3 lay at the historic core of the Religion Clauses. Id., at 721\xd0722, 124 S.Ct. 1307. Here nothing of the sort can be said about a program to use recycled tires to resurface playgrounds. "
[1418] "Relying on Locke, the Department nonetheless emphasizes Missouri's similar constitutional tradition of not furnishing taxpayer money directly to churches. Brief for Respondent 15\xd016. But Locke took account of Washington's antiestablishment interest only after determining, as noted, that the scholarship program did not \xd2require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit.\xd3 540 U.S., at 720\xd0721, 124 S.Ct. 1307 (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. 618, 98 S.Ct. 1322, 55 L.Ed.2d 593). As the Court put it, Washington's scholarship program went \xd2a long way toward including religion in its benefits.\xd3 Locke, 540 U.S., at 724, 124 S.Ct. 1307. Students in the program were free to use their scholarships at \xd2pervasively religious schools.\xd3 Ibid. Davey could use his scholarship to pursue a secular degree at one institution while studying devotional theology at another. Id., at 721, n. 4, 124 S.Ct. 1307. He could also use his scholarship money to attend a religious college and take devotional theology courses there. *2024 Id., at 725, 124 S.Ct. 1307. The only thing he could not do was use the scholarship to pursue a degree in that subject. "
[1419] "In this case, there is no dispute that Trinity Lutheran is put to the choice between being a church and receiving a government benefit. The rule is simple: No churches need apply.3 "
[1420] "C "
[1421] "12The State in this case expressly requires Trinity Lutheran to renounce its religious character in order to participate in an otherwise generally available public benefit program, for which it is fully qualified. Our cases make clear that such a condition imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that must be subjected to the \xd2most rigorous\xd3 scrutiny. Lukumi, 508 U.S., at 546, 113 S.Ct. 2217.4 "
[1422] "13Under that stringent standard, only a state interest \xd2of the highest order\xd3 can justify the Department's discriminatory policy. McDaniel, 435 U.S., at 628, 98 S.Ct. 1322 (internal quotation marks omitted). Yet the Department offers nothing more than Missouri's policy preference for skating as far as possible from religious establishment concerns. Brief for Respondent 15\xd016. In the face of the clear infringement on free exercise before us, that interest cannot qualify as compelling. As we said when considering Missouri's same policy preference on a prior occasion, \xd2the state interest asserted here\xd1in achieving greater separation of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of the Federal Constitution\xd1is limited by the Free Exercise Clause.\xd3 Widmar, 454 U.S., at 276, 102 S.Ct. 269. "
[1423] "The State has pursued its preferred policy to the point of expressly denying a qualified religious entity a public benefit solely because of its religious character. Under our precedents, that goes too far. The Department's policy violates the Free Exercise Clause.5 "
[1424] "Nearly 200 years ago, a legislator urged the Maryland Assembly to adopt a bill that would end the State's disqualification of Jews from public office: "
[1425] "\xd2If, on account of my religious faith, I am subjected to disqualifications, from which others are free, ... I cannot but consider myself a persecuted man.... An odious exclusion from any of the benefits common to the rest of my fellow-citizens, is a persecution, differing only in degree, but of a nature equally unjustifiable with that, whose instruments are chains and torture.\xd3 Speech by H.M. Brackenridge, Dec. Sess. 1818, in H. Brackenridge, W. Worthington, & J. Tyson, Speeches in the House of Delegates of Maryland, 64 (1829). "
[1426] "The Missouri Department of Natural Resources has not subjected anyone to chains or torture on account of religion. And the result of the State's policy is nothing so dramatic as the denial of political office. The consequence is, in all likelihood, *2025 a few extra scraped knees. But the exclusion of Trinity Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is otherwise qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution all the same, and cannot stand. "
[1427] "The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. "
[1428] "It is so ordered. "
[1429] "Justice STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[1430] "Petitioners contend that a village ordinance making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violates the First Amendment. Through this facial challenge, we consider the door-to-door canvassing regulation not only as it applies to religious proselytizing, but also to anonymous political speech and the distribution of handbills. "
[1431] "I "
[1432] "Petitioner Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., coordinates the preaching activities of Jehovah's Witnesses throughout the United States and publishes Bibles and religious periodicals that are widely distributed. Petitioner Wellsville, Ohio, Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc., supervises the activities of approximately 59 members in a part of Ohio that includes the Village of Stratton (Village). Petitioners offer religious literature without cost to anyone interested in reading it. They allege that they do not solicit contributions or orders for the sale of merchandise or services, but they do accept donations. "
[1433] "Petitioners brought this action against the Village and its mayor in the United States District Court for the Southern *154 District of Ohio, seeking an injunction against the enforcement of several sections of Ordinance No. 1998\xd05 regulating uninvited peddling and solicitation on private property in the Village. Petitioners' complaint alleged that the ordinance violated several constitutional rights, including the free exercise of religion, free speech, and the freedom of the press. App. 10a\xd044a. The District Court conducted a bench trial at which evidence of the administration of the ordinance and its effect on petitioners was introduced. "
[1434] "Section 116.01 prohibits \xd2canvassers\xd3 and others from \xd2going in and upon\xd3 private residential property for the purpose of promoting any \xd2cause\xd3 without first having obtained a permit pursuant to \xa4 116.03.1 That section provides that any canvasser who intends to go on private property to promote a cause must obtain a \xd2Solicitation Permit\xd3 from the office of the mayor; there is no charge for the permit, and apparently one is issued routinely after an applicant *155 fills out a fairly detailed \xd2Solicitor's Registration Form.\xd32 The canvasser is then authorized to go upon premises **2084 that he listed on the registration form, but he must carry the permit upon his person and exhibit it whenever requested to do so by a police officer or by a resident.3 The ordinance *156 sets forth grounds for the denial or revocation of a permit,4 but the record before us does not show that any application has been denied or that any permit has been revoked. Petitioners did not apply for a permit. "
[1435] "A section of the ordinance that petitioners do not challenge establishes a procedure by which a resident may prohibit solicitation even by holders of permits. If the resident files a \xd2No Solicitation Registration Form\xd3 with the mayor, and also posts a \xd2No Solicitation\xd3 sign on his property, no uninvited canvassers may enter his property, unless they are specifically authorized to do so in the \xd2No Solicitation Registration Form\xd3 itself.5 Only 32 of the Village's 278 residents *157 filed such forms. Each of the forms in the record contains a list of 19 suggested exceptions;6 on one form, a resident checked 17 exceptions, **2085 thereby excluding only \xd2Jehovah's Witnesses\xd3 and \xd2Political Candidates\xd3 from the list of invited canvassers. Although Jehovah's Witnesses do not consider themselves to be \xd2solicitors\xd3 because they make no charge for their literature or their teaching, leaders of the church testified at trial that they would honor \xd2no solicitation\xd3 signs in the Village. They also explained at trial that they did not apply for a permit because they derive their authority to *158 preach from Scripture.7 \xd2For us to seek a permit from a municipality to preach we feel would almost be an insult to God.\xd3 App. 321a. "
[1436] "Petitioners introduced some evidence that the ordinance was the product of the mayor's hostility to their ministry, but the District Court credited the mayor's testimony that it had been designed to protect the privacy rights of the Village residents, specifically to protect them \xd2from \xd4flim flam\xd5 con artists who prey on small town populations.\xd3 61 F.Supp.2d 734, 736 (S.D.Ohio 1999). Nevertheless, the court concluded that the terms of the ordinance applied to the activities of petitioners as well as to \xd2business or political canvassers,\xd3 id., at 737, 738. "
[1437] "The District Court upheld most provisions of the ordinance as valid, content-neutral regulations that did not infringe on petitioners' First Amendment rights. The court did, however, require the Village to accept narrowing constructions of three provisions. First, the court viewed the requirement in \xa4 116.03(b)(5) that the applicant must list the specific address of each residence to be visited as potentially invalid, but cured by the Village's agreement to attach to the form a list of willing residents. Id., at 737. Second, it held that petitioners could comply with \xa4 116.03(b)(6) by merely stating their purpose as \xd2the Jehovah's Witness ministry.\xd3 Id., at 738. And third, it held that \xa4 116.05, which limited canvassing to the hours before 5 p.m., was invalid on its face and should be replaced with a provision referring to \xd2reasonable hours of the day.\xd3 Id., at 739. As so modified, the court held the ordinance constitutionally valid as applied to petitioners and dismissed the case. "
[1438] "*159 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 240 F.3d 553 (2001). It held that the ordinance was \xd2content neutral and of general applicability and therefore subject to intermediate scrutiny.\xd3 Id., at 560. It rejected petitioners' reliance on the discussion of laws affecting both the free exercise of religion and free speech in Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990),8 because that \xd2language was dicta **2086 and therefore not binding.\xd3 240 F.3d, at 561. It also rejected petitioners' argument that the ordinance is overbroad because it impairs the right to distribute pamphlets anonymously that we recognized in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 115 S.Ct. 1511, 131 L.Ed.2d 426 (1995), reasoning that \xd2the very act of going door-to-door requires the canvassers to reveal a portion of their identities.\xd3 240 F.3d, at 563. The Court of Appeals concluded that the interests promoted by the Village\xd1\xd2protecting its residents from fraud and undue annoyance\xd3\xd1as well as the harm that it seeks to prevent\xd1\xd2criminals posing as canvassers in order to defraud its residents\xd3\xd1though \xd2by no means overwhelming,\xd3 were sufficient to justify the regulation. Id., at 565\xd0566. The court distinguished earlier cases protecting the Jehovah's Witnesses ministry because those cases either involved *160 a flat prohibition on the dissemination of ideas, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943), or an ordinance that left the issuance of a permit to the discretion of a municipal officer, see, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 302, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). "
[1439] "In dissent, Judge Gilman expressed the opinion that by subjecting noncommercial solicitation to the permit requirements, the ordinance significantly restricted a substantial quantity of speech unrelated to the Village's interest in eliminating fraud and unwanted annoyance. In his view, the Village \xd2failed to demonstrate either the reality of the harm or the efficacy of the restriction.\xd3 240 F.3d, at 572. "
[1440] "We granted certiorari to decide the following question: \xd2Does a municipal ordinance that requires one to obtain a permit prior to engaging in the door-to-door advocacy of a political cause and to display upon demand the permit, which contains one's name, violate the First Amendment protection accorded to anonymous pamphleteering or discourse?\xd3 534 U.S. 971, 122 S.Ct. 392, 151 L.Ed.2d 297 (2001); Pet. for Cert. i.9 "
[1441] "II "
[1442] "For over 50 years, the Court has invalidated restrictions on door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering.10 It is more than historical accident that most of these cases involved First Amendment challenges brought by Jehovah's Witnesses, because door-to-door canvassing is mandated by their religion. As we noted in *161 **2087 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 108, 63 S.Ct. 870 (1943), the Jehovah's Witnesses \xd2claim to follow the example of Paul, teaching \xd4publickly, and from house to house.\xd5 Acts 20:20. They take literally the mandate of the Scriptures, \xd4Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature.\xd5 Mark 16:15. In doing so they believe that they are obeying a commandment of God.\xd3 Moreover, because they lack significant financial resources, the ability of the Witnesses to proselytize is seriously diminished by regulations that burden their efforts to canvass door-to-door. "
[1443] "Although our past cases involving Jehovah's Witnesses, most of which were decided shortly before and during World War II, do not directly control the question we confront today, they provide both a historical and analytical backdrop for consideration of petitioners' First Amendment claim that the breadth of the Village's ordinance offends the First Amendment.11 Those cases involved petty offenses that raised constitutional questions of the most serious magnitude\xd1questions that implicated the free exercise of religion, the freedom of speech, and the freedom of the press. From these decisions, several themes emerge that guide our consideration of the ordinance at issue here. "
[1444] "First, the cases emphasize the value of the speech involved. For example, in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, the Court noted that \xd2hand distribution of religious tracts is an age-old form of missionary evangelism\xd1as old as the history of printing presses. It has been a potent force in various religious movements down through the years .... This form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and preaching from the pulpits. It has the same claim to protection as the more orthodox and conventional exercises of religion. *162 It also has the same claim as the others to the guarantees of freedom of speech and freedom of the press.\xd3 Id., at 108\xd0109, 63 S.Ct. 870. "
[1445] "In addition, the cases discuss extensively the historical importance of door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering as vehicles for the dissemination of ideas. In Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939), the petitioner was a Jehovah's Witness who had been convicted of canvassing without a permit based on evidence that she had gone from house to house offering to leave books or booklets. Writing for the Court, Justice Roberts stated that \xd2pamphlets have proved most effective instruments in the dissemination of opinion. And perhaps the most effective way of bringing them to the notice of individuals is their distribution at the homes of the people. On this method of communication the ordinance imposes censorship, abuse of which engendered the struggle in England which eventuated in the establishment of the doctrine of the freedom of the press embodied in our Constitution. To require a censorship through license which makes impossible the free and unhampered distribution of pamphlets strikes at the very heart of the constitutional guarantees.\xd3 Id., at 164, 60 S.Ct. 146 (emphasis added). "
[1446] "Despite the emphasis on the important role that door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering has played in our constitutional tradition of free and open discussion, these early cases also recognized the interests a town may have in some form of regulation, particularly when the solicitation of money is involved. In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940), the Court held that an ordinance requiring Jehovah's Witnesses to obtain a license before soliciting door to door was invalid because the issuance of the license depended on the exercise of discretion by a city official. Our opinion recognized that \xd2a State may protect its **2088 citizens from fraudulent solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him publicly to solicit funds *163 for any purpose, to establish his identity and his authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent.\xd3 Id., at 306, 60 S.Ct. 900. Similarly, in Martin v. City of Struthers, the Court recognized crime prevention as a legitimate interest served by these ordinances and noted that \xd2burglars frequently pose as canvassers, either in order that they may have a pretense to discover whether a house is empty and hence ripe for burglary, or for the purpose of spying out the premises in order that they may return later.\xd3 319 U.S., at 144, 63 S.Ct. 862. Despite recognition of these interests as legitimate, our precedent is clear that there must be a balance between these interests and the effect of the regulations on First Amendment rights. We \xd2must \xd4be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation\xd5 and must \xd4weigh the circumstances and ... appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced in support of the regulation.\xd5 \xd3 Ibid. (quoting Schneider, 308 U.S., at 161, 60 S.Ct. 146). "
[1447] "Finally, the cases demonstrate that efforts of the Jehovah's Witnesses to resist speech regulation have not been a struggle for their rights alone. In Martin, after cataloging the many groups that rely extensively upon this method of communication, the Court summarized that \xd2[d]oor to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people.\xd3 319 U.S., at 144\xd0146, 63 S.Ct. 862. "
[1448] "That the Jehovah's Witnesses are not the only \xd2little people\xd3 who face the risk of silencing by regulations like the Village's is exemplified by our cases involving nonreligious speech. See, e.g., Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 100 S.Ct. 826, 63 L.Ed.2d 73 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor and Council of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 96 S.Ct. 1755, 48 L.Ed.2d 243 (1976); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 65 S.Ct. 315, 89 L.Ed. 430 (1945). In Thomas, the issue was whether a labor leader could be required to obtain a permit before delivering a speech to prospective union members. After reviewing the Jehovah's Witnesses cases discussed above, the Court observed: "
[1449] "*164 \xd2As a matter of principle a requirement of registration in order to make a public speech would seem generally incompatible with an exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly.... "
[1450] ". . . . . "
[1451] "\xd2If the exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly cannot be made a crime, we do not think this can be accomplished by the device of requiring previous registration as a condition for exercising them and making such a condition the foundation for restraining in advance their exercise and for imposing a penalty for violating such a restraining order. So long as no more is involved than exercise of the rights of free speech and free assembly, it is immune to such a restriction. If one who solicits support for the cause of labor may be required to register as a condition to the exercise of his right to make a public speech, so may he who seeks to rally support for any social, business, religious or political cause. We think a requirement that one must register before he undertakes to make a public speech to enlist support for a lawful movement is quite incompatible with the requirements of the First Amendment.\xd3 Id., at 539\xd0540, 65 S.Ct. 315. "
[1452] "Although these World War II-era cases provide guidance for our consideration of the question presented, they do not answer one preliminary issue that the parties adamantly dispute. That is, what standard of review ought we use in assessing the constitutionality of this ordinance. We find it unnecessary, however, to resolve that dispute because the breadth of speech affected by the ordinance and the nature of the regulation make it clear that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding it. "
[1453] "**2089 III "
[1454] "The Village argues that three interests are served by its ordinance: the prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime, *165 and the protection of residents' privacy. We have no difficulty concluding, in light of our precedent, that these are important interests that the Village may seek to safeguard through some form of regulation of solicitation activity. We must also look, however, to the amount of speech covered by the ordinance and whether there is an appropriate balance between the affected speech and the governmental interests that the ordinance purports to serve. "
[1455] "The text of the Village's ordinance prohibits \xd2canvassers\xd3 from going on private property for the purpose of explaining or promoting any \xd2cause,\xd3 unless they receive a permit and the residents visited have not opted for a \xd2no solicitation\xd3 sign. Had this provision been construed to apply only to commercial activities and the solicitation of funds, arguably the ordinance would have been tailored to the Village's interest in protecting the privacy of its residents and preventing fraud. Yet, even though the Village has explained that the ordinance was adopted to serve those interests, it has never contended that it should be so narrowly interpreted. To the contrary, the Village's administration of its ordinance unquestionably demonstrates that the provisions apply to a significant number of noncommercial \xd2canvassers\xd3 promoting a wide variety of \xd2causes.\xd3 Indeed, on the \xd2No Solicitation Forms\xd3 provided to the residents, the canvassers include \xd2Camp Fire Girls,\xd3 \xd2Jehovah's Witnesses,\xd3 \xd2Political Candidates,\xd3 \xd2Trick or Treaters during Halloween Season,\xd3 and \xd2Persons Affiliated with Stratton Church.\xd3 The ordinance unquestionably applies, not only to religious causes, but to political activity as well. It would seem to extend to \xd2residents casually soliciting the votes of neighbors,\xd312 or ringing doorbells to enlist support for employing a more efficient garbage collector. "
[1456] "The mere fact that the ordinance covers so much speech raises constitutional concerns. It is offensive\xd1not only to *166 the values protected by the First Amendment, but to the very notion of a free society\xd1that in the context of everyday public discourse a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so. Even if the issuance of permits by the mayor's office is a ministerial task that is performed promptly and at no cost to the applicant, a law requiring a permit to engage in such speech constitutes a dramatic departure from our national heritage and constitutional tradition. Three obvious examples illustrate the pernicious effect of such a permit requirement. "
[1457] "First, as our cases involving distribution of unsigned handbills demonstrate,13 there are a significant number of persons who support causes anonymously.14 \xd2The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to preserve as much of one's privacy as possible.\xd3 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S., at 341\xd0342, 115 S.Ct. 1511. The requirement that a canvasser must be identified in a permit application filed in the mayor's office and available for public inspection necessarily results in a surrender of that anonymity. **2090 Although it is true, as the Court of Appeals suggested, see 240 F.3d, at 563, that persons who are known to the resident reveal their allegiance to a group or cause when they present themselves at the front door to advocate an issue or to deliver a handbill, the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that the ordinance does not implicate anonymity interests. The Sixth Circuit's reasoning is undermined by *167 our decision in Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., 525 U.S. 182, 119 S.Ct. 636, 142 L.Ed.2d 599 (1999). The badge requirement that we invalidated in Buckley applied to petition circulators seeking signatures in face-to-face interactions. The fact that circulators revealed their physical identities did not foreclose our consideration of the circulators' interest in maintaining their anonymity. In the Village, strangers to the resident certainly maintain their anonymity, and the ordinance may preclude such persons from canvassing for unpopular causes. Such preclusion may well be justified in some situations\xd1for example, by the special state interest in protecting the integrity of a ballot-initiative process, see ibid., or by the interest in preventing fraudulent commercial transactions. The Village ordinance, however, sweeps more broadly, covering unpopular causes unrelated to commercial transactions or to any special interest in protecting the electoral process. "
[1458] "Second, requiring a permit as a prior condition on the exercise of the right to speak imposes an objective burden on some speech of citizens holding religious or patriotic views. As our World War II-era cases dramatically demonstrate, there are a significant number of persons whose religious scruples will prevent them from applying for such a license. There are no doubt other patriotic citizens, who have such firm convictions about their constitutional right to engage in uninhibited debate in the context of door-to-door advocacy, that they would prefer silence to speech licensed by a petty official. "
[1459] "Third, there is a significant amount of spontaneous speech that is effectively banned by the ordinance. A person who made a decision on a holiday or a weekend to take an active part in a political campaign could not begin to pass out handbills until after he or she obtained the required permit. Even a spontaneous decision to go across the street and urge a neighbor to vote against the mayor could not lawfully be implemented without first obtaining the mayor's permission. *168 In this respect, the regulation is analogous to the circulation licensing tax the Court invalidated in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 56 S.Ct. 444, 80 L.Ed. 660 (1936). In Grosjean, while discussing the history of the Free Press Clause of the First Amendment, the Court stated that \xd2 \xd4[t]he evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely, but any action of the government by means of which it might prevent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exercise of their rights as citizens.\xd5 \xd3 Id., at 249\xd0250, 56 S.Ct. 444 (quoting 2 T. Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 886 (8th ed.1927)); see also Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 58 S.Ct. 666, 82 L.Ed. 949 (1938). "
[1460] "The breadth and unprecedented nature of this regulation does not alone render the ordinance invalid. Also central to our conclusion that the ordinance does not pass First Amendment scrutiny is that it is not tailored to the Village's stated interests. Even if the interest in preventing fraud could adequately support the ordinance insofar as it applies to commercial transactions and the solicitation of funds, that interest provides no support for its application to petitioners, to political campaigns, or to enlisting support for unpopular causes. The Village, however, argues that the ordinance is nonetheless valid because it serves the two additional interests of protecting the privacy of the resident and the prevention of crime. "
[1461] "**2091 With respect to the former, it seems clear that \xa4 107 of the ordinance, which provides for the posting of \xd2No Solicitation\xd3 signs and which is not challenged in this case, coupled with the resident's unquestioned right to refuse to engage in conversation with unwelcome visitors, provides ample protection for the unwilling listener. Schaumburg, 444 U.S., at 639, 100 S.Ct. 826 (\xd2[T]he provision permitting homeowners to bar solicitors from their property by posting [no solicitation] signs ... suggest[s] the availability of less intrusive and more effective measures to protect privacy\xd3). The annoyance caused by an *169 uninvited knock on the front door is the same whether or not the visitor is armed with a permit. "
[1462] "With respect to the latter, it seems unlikely that the absence of a permit would preclude criminals from knocking on doors and engaging in conversations not covered by the ordinance. They might, for example, ask for directions or permission to use the telephone, or pose as surveyers or census takers. See n. 1, supra. Or they might register under a false name with impunity because the ordinance contains no provision for verifying an applicant's identity or organizational credentials. Moreover, the Village did not assert an interest in crime prevention below, and there is an absence of any evidence of a special crime problem related to door-to-door solicitation in the record before us. "
[1463] "The rhetoric used in the World War II-era opinions that repeatedly saved petitioners' coreligionists from petty prosecutions reflected the Court's evaluation of the First Amendment freedoms that are implicated in this case. The value judgment that then motivated a united democratic people fighting to defend those very freedoms from totalitarian attack is unchanged. It motivates our decision today. "
[1464] "The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. "
[1465] "It is so ordered. "
[1466] "Mr. Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[1467] "On petition of the State of Wisconsin, we granted the writ of certiorari in this case to review a decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court holding that respondents' convictions for violating the State's compulsory school-attendance law were invalid under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution made applicable to the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. For the reasons hereafter stated we affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin. "
[1468] "Respondents Jonas Yoder and Wallace Miller are members of the Old Order Amish religion, and respondent Adin Yutzy is a member of the Conservative Amish Mennonite Church. They and their families are residents of Green County, Wisconsin. Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance law required them to cause their children to attend public or private school until reaching age 16 but the respondents declined to send their children, ages 14 and 15, to public school after they complete the eighth grade.1 The children were not enrolled in any private school, or within any recognized exception to the compulsory-attendance law,2 and they are conceded to be subject to the Wisconsin statute. "
[1469] "*208 On complaint of the school district administrator for the public schools, respondents were charged, tried, and convicted of violating the compulsory-attendance law in Green County Court and **1530 were fined the sum of $5 each.3 Respondents defended on the ground that the application *209 of the compulsory-attendance law violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments.4 The trial testimony showed that respondents believed, in accordance with the tenets of Old Order Amish communities generally, that their children's attendance at high school, public or private, was contrary to the Amish religion and way of life. They believed that by sending their children to high school, they would not only expose themselves to the danger of the censure of the church community, but, as found by the county court, also endanger their own salvation and that of their children. The State stipulated that respondents' religious beliefs were sincere. "
[1470] "In support of their position, respondents presented as expert witnesses scholars on religion and education whose testimony is uncontradicted. They expressed their opinions on the relationship of the Amish belief concerning school attendance to the more general tenets of their religion, and described the impact that compulsory high school attendance could have on the continued survival of Amish communities as they exist in the United States today. The history of the Amish *210 sect was given in some detail, beginning with the Swiss Anabaptists of the 16th century who rejected institutionalized churches and sought to return to the early, simple, Christian life de-emphasizing material success, rejecting the competitive spirit, and seeking to insulate themselves from the modern world. As a result of their common heritage, Old Order Amish communities today are characterized by a fundamental belief that salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world and worldly influence. This concept of life aloof from the world and its values is central to their faith. "
[1471] "A related feature of Old Order Amish communities is their devotion to a life in harmony with nature and the soil, as exemplified by the simple life of the early Christian era that continued in America during much of our early national life. Amish beliefs require members of the community to make their living by farming or closely related activities. Broadly speaking, the Old Order Amish religion pervades and determines the entire mode of life of its adherents. Their conduct is regulated in great detail by the Ordnung, or rules, of the church community. Adult baptism, which occurs in late adolescence, is the time at which Amish young people voluntarily undertake heavy obligations, not unlike the Bar Mitzvah of **1531 the Jews, to abide by the rules of the church community.5 "
[1472] "Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly grounded in these central religious concepts. They object to the high school, and higher education generally, because the values they teach *211 are in marked variance with Amish values and the Amish way of life; they view secondary school education as an impermissible exposure of their children to a \xd4wordly\xd5 influence in conflict with their beliefs. The high school tends to emphasize intellectual and scientific accomplishments, self-distinction, competitiveness, worldly success, and social life with other students. Amish society emphasizes informal learning-through-doing; a life of \xd4goodness,\xd5 rather than a life of intellect; wisdom, rather than technical knowledge, community welfare, rather than competition; and separation from, rather than integration with, contemporary worldly society. "
[1473] "Formal high school education beyond the eighth grade is contrary to Amish beliefs, not only because it places Amish children in an environment hostile to Amish beliefs with increasing emphasis on competition in class work and sports and with pressure to conform to the styles, manners, and ways of the peer group, but also because it takes them away from their community, physically and emotionally, during the crucial and formative adolescent period of life. During this period, the children must acquire Amish attitudes favoring manual work and self-reliance and the specific skills needed to perform the adult role of an Amish farmer or housewife. They must learn to enjoy physical labor. Once a child has learned basic reading, writing, and elementary mathematics, these tratis, skills, and attitudes admittedly fall within the category of those best learned through example and \xd4doing\xd5 rather than in a classroom. And, at this time in life, the Amish child must also grow in his faith and his relationship to the Amish community if he is to be prepared to accept the heavy obligations imposed by adult baptism. In short, high school attendance with teachers who are not of the Amish faith\xd1and may even be hostile to it\xd1interposes a serious barrier to the integration of the Amish child into *212 the Amish religious community. Dr. John Hostetler, one of the experts on Amish society, testified that the modern high school is not equipped, in curriculum or social environment, to impart the values promoted by Amish society. "
[1474] "The Amish do not object to elementary education through the first eight grades as a general proposition because they agree that their children must have basic skills in the \xd4three R's' in order to read the Bible, to be good farmers and citizens, and to be able to deal with non-Amish people when necessary in the course of daily affairs. They view such a basic education as acceptable because it does not significantly expose their children to wordly values or interfere with their development in the Amish community during the crucial adolescent period. While Amish accept compulsory elementary education generally, wherever possible they have established their own elementary schools in many respects like the small local schools of the past. In the Amish belief higher learning tends to develop values they reject as influences that alienate man from God. "
[1475] "On the basis of such considerations, Dr. Hostetler testified that compulsory high school attendance could not only result in great psychological harm to Amish children, because of the conflicts it would produce, but would also, in his opinion, ultimately result in the destruction of the Old Order Amish church community as it exists in the United States **1532 today. The testimony of Dr. Donald A. Erickson, an expert witness on education, also showed that the Amish succeed in preparing their high school age children to be productive members of the Amish community. He described their system of learning through doing the skills directly relevant to their adult roles in the Amish community as \xd4ideal\xd5 and perhaps superior to ordinary high school education. The evidence also showed that the Amish have an excellent *213 record as law-abiding and generally self-sufficient members of society. "
[1476] "Although the trial court in its careful findings determined that the Wisconsin compulsory school-attendance law \xd4does interfere with the freedom of the Defendants to act in accordance with their sincere religious belief\xd5 it also concluded that the requirement of high school attendance until age 16 was a \xd4reasonable and constitutional\xd5 exercise of governmental power, and therefore denied the motion to dismiss the charges. The Wisconsin Circuit Court affirmed the convictions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, sustained respondents' claim under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and reversed the convictions. A majority of the court was of the opinion that the State had failed to make an adequate showing that its interest in \xd4establishing and maintaining an educational system overrides the defendants' right to the free exercise of their religion.\xd5 49 Wis.2d 430, 447, 182 N.W.2d 539, 547 (1971). "
[1477] "I "
[1478] "12There is no doubt as to the power of a State, having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534, 45 S.Ct. 571, 573, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). Providing public schools ranks at the very apex of the function of a State. Yet even this paramount responsibility was, in Pierce, made to yield to the right of parents to provide an equivalent education in a privately operated system. There the Court held that Oregon's statute compelling attendance in a public school from age eight to age 16 unreasonably interfered with the interest of parents in directing the rearing of their off-spring, including their education in church-operated schools. As that case suggests, the values of parental direction of the religious upbringing *214 and education of their children in their early and formative years have a high place in our society. See also Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639, 88 S.Ct. 1274, 1280, 20 L.Ed.2d 195 (1968); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042 (1923); cf. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dept., 397 U.S. 728, 90 S.Ct. 1484, 25 L.Ed.2d 736 (1970). Thus, a State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on fundamental rights and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, and the traditional interest of parents with respect to the religious upbringing of their children so long as they, in the words of Pierce, \xd4prepare (them) for additional obligations.\xd5 268 U.S., at 535, 45 S.Ct., at 573. "
[1479] "3It follows that in order for Wisconsin to compel school attendance beyond the eighth grade against a claim that such attendance interferes with the practice of a legitimate religious belief, it must appear either that the State does not deny the free exercise of religious belief by its requirement, or that there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override the interest claiming protection under the Free Exercise Clause. Long before there was general acknowledgment of the need for universal formal education, the Religion Clauses had specifically and firmly fixed the right to free exercise of religious beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental right was an equally firm, even if less explicit, prohibition against the establishment of any religion by government. The values underlying these two provisions relating **1533 to religion have been zealously protected, sometimes even at the expense of other interests of admittedly high social importance. The invalidation of financial aid to parochial schools by government grants for a salary subsidy for teachers is but one example of the extent to which courts have gone in this regard, notwithstanding that such aid programs were legislatively determined to be in the public interest and the service of sound educational policy by States and by Congress. *215 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 91 S.Ct. 2105, 29 L.Ed.2d 745 (1971); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 91 S.Ct. 2091, 29 L.Ed.2d 790 (1971). See also Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18, 67 S.Ct. 504, 513, 91 L.Ed. 711 (1947). "
[1480] "45The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion. We can accept it as settled, therefore, that, however strong the State's interest in universal compulsory education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or subordination of all other interests. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1122, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961) (separate opinion of Frankfurter, J.); Prince v. Marssachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165, 64 S.Ct. 438, 441, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). "
[1481] "II "
[1482] "678We come then to the quality of the claims of the respondents concerning the alleged encroachment of Wisconsin's compulsory school-attendance statute on their rights and the rights of their children to the free exercise of the religious beliefs they and their forbears have adhered to for almost three centuries. In evaluating those claims we must be careful to determine whether the Amish religious faith and their mode of life are, as they claim, inseparable and interdependent. A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. Although a determination of what is a \xd4religious' belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most delicate question,6 the very concept of ordered liberty precludes *216 allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a whole has important interests. Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a religious basis. Thoreau's choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses. "
[1483] "Giving no weight to such secular considerations, however, we see that the record in this case abundantly supports the claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of deep religious conviction, shared by an organized group, and intimately related to daily living. That the Old Order Amish daily life and religious practice stem from their faith is shown by the fact that it is in response to their literal interpretation of the Biblical injunction from the Epistle of Paul to the Romans, \xd4be not conformed to this world . . ..\xd5 This command is fundamental to the Amish faith. Moreover, for the Old Order Amish, religion is not simply a matter of theocratic belief. As the expert witnesses explained, the Old Order Amish religion pervades and **1534 determines virtually their entire way of life, regulating it with the detail of the Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of the church community. "
[1484] "The record shows that the respondents' religious beliefs and attitude toward life, family, and home have remained constant\xd1perhaps some would say static\xd1in a period of unparalleled progress in human knowledge generally and great changes in education.7 The respondents *217 freely concede, and indeed assert as an article of faith, that their religious beliefs and what we would today call \xd4life style\xd5 have not altered in fundamentals for centuries. Their way of life in a church-oriented community, separated from the outside world and \xd4worldly\xd5 influences, their attachment to nature and the soil, is a way inherently simple and uncomplicated, albeit difficult to preserve against the pressure to conform. Their rejection of telephones, automobiles, radios, and television, their mode of dress, of speech, their habits of manual work do indeed set them apart from much of contemporary society; these customs are both symbolic and practical. "
[1485] "As the society around the Amish has become more populous, urban, industrialized, and complex, particularly in this century, government regulation of human affairs has correspondingly become more detailed and pervasive. The Amish mode of life has thus come into conflict increasingly with requirements of contemporary society exerting a hydraulic insistence on conformity to majoritarian standards. So long as compulsory education laws were confined to eight grades of elementary basic education imparted in a nearby rural schoolhouse, with a large proportion of students of the Amish faith, the Old Order Amish had little basis to fear that school attendance would expose their children to the worldly influence they reject. But modern compulsory secondary education in rural areas is now largely carried on in a consolidated school, often remote from the student's home and alien to his daily home life. As the record so strongly shows, the values and programs of the modern secondary school are in sharp conflict with the fundamental mode of life mandated by the Amish religion; modern laws requiring compulsory secondary education have accordingly engendered great concern and conflict.8 *218 The conclusion is inescapable that secondary schooling, by exposing Amish children to worldly influences in terms of attitudes, goals, and values contrary to beliefs, and by substantially interfering with the religious development of the Amish child and his integration into the way of life of the Amish faith community at the crucial adolescent stage of development, contravenes the basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith, both as to the parent and the child. "
[1486] "The impact of the compulsory-attendance law on respondents' practice of the Amish religion is not only severe, but inescapable, for the Wisconsin law affirmatively compels them, under threat of criminal sanction, to perform acts undeniably at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1147, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961). Nor is the impact of the compulsory-attendance law confined to grave interference with important Amish religious tenets from a subjective point of view. It carries with it precisely the kind of objective danger to the free exercise of religion that the First Amendment was designed to prevent. As the record shows, compulsory school attendance to age 16 for Amish children carries with it a very real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist today; they must either abandon belief and be assimilated into **1535 society at large, or be forced to migrate to some other and more tolerant region.9 "
[1487] "*219 9In sum, the unchallenged testimony of acknowledged experts in education and religious history, almost 300 years of consistent practice, and strong evidence of a sustained faith pervading and regulating respondents' entire mode of life support the claim that enforcement of the State's requirement of compulsory formal education after the eighth grade would gravely endanger if not destroy the free exercise of respondents' religious beliefs. "
[1488] "III "
[1489] "Neither the findings of the trial court nor the Amish claims as to the nature of their faith are challenged in this Court by the State of Wisconsin. Its position is that the State's interest in universal compulsory formal secondary education to age 16 is so great that it is paramount to the undisputed claims of respondents that their mode of preparing their youth for Amish life, after the traditional elementary education, is an essential part of their religious belief and practice. Nor does the State undertake to meet the claim that the Amish mode of life and education is inseparable from and a part of the basic tenets of their religion\xd1indeed, as much a part of their religious belief and practices as baptism, the confessional, or a sabbath may be for others. "
[1490] "10Wisconsin concedes that under the Religion Clauses religious beliefs are absolutely free from the State's control, but it argues that \xd4actions,\xd5 even though religiously grounded, are outside the protection of the First Amendment.10 But our decisions have rejected the idea that *220 religiously grounded conduct is always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause. It is true that activities of individuals, even when religiously based, are often subject to regulation by the States in the exercise of their undoubted power to promote the health, safety, and general welfare, or the Federal Government in the exercise of its delegated powers. See, e.g., Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 91 S.Ct. 828, 28 L.Ed.2d 168 (1971); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244 (1879). But to agree that religiously grounded conduct must often be subject to the broad police power of the State is not to deny that there are areas of conduct protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regulations of general applicability. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 63 S.Ct. 870, 87 L.Ed. 1292 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303\xd1304, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940). This case, therefore, does not become easier because respondents were convicted for their \xd4actions' in refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in **1536 logic-tight compartments. Cf. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S., at 612, 91 S.Ct., at 2111, 29 L.Ed.2d 745. "
[1491] "1112Nor can this case be disposed of on the grounds that Wisconsin's requirement for school attendance to age 16 applies uniformly to all citizens of the State and does not, on its face, discriminate against religions or a particular religion, or that it is motivated by legitimate secular concerns. A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion. Sherbert v. Verner, supra; cf. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970). The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception *221 from a general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to prevent any exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection of values promoted by the right of free exercise. By preserving doctrinal flexibility and recognizing the need for a sensible and realistic application of the Religion Clauses "
[1492] "\xd4we have been able to chart a course that preserved the autonomy and freedom of religious bodies while avoiding any semblance of established religion. This is a \xd4tight rope\xd5 and one we have successfully traversed.' Walz v. Tax Commission, supra, at 672, 90 S.Ct., at 1413. "
[1493] "We turn, then, to the State's broader contention that its interest in its system of compulsory education is so compelling that even the established religious practices of the Amish must give way. Where fundamental claims of religious freedom are at stake, however, we cannot accept such a sweeping claim; despite its admitted validity in the generality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education to age 16, and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed Amish exemption. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, supra; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 63 S.Ct. 862, 87 L.Ed. 1313 (1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 60 S.Ct. 146, 84 L.Ed. 155 (1939). "
[1494] "The State advances two primary arguments in support of its system of compulsory education. It notes, as Thomas Jefferson pointed out early in our history, that some degree of education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence. Further, education prepares individuals to be self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society. We accept these propositions. "
[1495] "*222 However, the evidence adduced by the Amish in this case is persuasively to the effect that an additional one or two years of formal high school for Amish children in place of their long-established program of informal vocational education would do little to serve those interests. Respondents' experts testified at trial, without challenge, that the value of all education must be assessed in terms of its capacity to prepare the child for life. It is one thing to say that compulsory education for a year or two beyond the eighth grade may be necessary when its goal is the preparation of the child for life in modern society as the majority live, but it is quite another if the goal of education be viewed as the preparation of the child for life in the separated agrarian community that is the keystone of the Amish faith. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S., at 400, 43 S.Ct., at 627, 67 L.Ed. 1042. "
[1496] "The State attacks respondents' position as one fostering \xd4ignorance\xd5 from which the child must be protected by the State. No one can question the State's duty to protect children from ignorance but this argument does not square with the facts disclosed in the record. Whatever their idiosyncrasies as seen by the majority, this record strongly shows that the Amish community has been a highly successful **1537 social unit within our society, even if apart from the conventional \xd4mainstream.\xd5 Its members are productive and very law-abiding members of society; they reject public welfare in any of its usual modern forms. The Congress itself recognized their self-sufficiency by authorizing exemption of such groups as the Amish from the obligation to pay social security taxes.11 "
[1497] "*223 It is neither fair nor correct to suggests that the Amish are opposed to education beyond the eighth grade level. What this record shows is that they are opposed to conventional formal education of the type provided by a certified high school because it comes at the child's crucial adolescent period of religious development. Dr. Donald Erickson, for example, testified that their system of learning-by-doing was an \xd4ideal system\xd5 of education in terms of preparing Amish children for life as adults in the Amish community, and that \xd4I would be inclined to say they do a better job in this than most of the rest of us do.\xd5 As he put it, \xd4These people aren't purporting to be learned people, and it seems to me the self-sufficiency of the community is the best evidence I can point to\xd1whatever is being done seems to function well.\xd512 "
[1498] "We must not forget that in the Middle Ages important values of the civilization of the Western World were preserved by members of religious orders who isolated themselves from all worldly influences against great obstacles. There can be no assumption that today's majority is *224 \xd4right\xd5 and the Amish and others like them are \xd4wrong.\xd5 A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different. "
[1499] "The State, however, supports its interest in providing an additional one or two years of compulsory high school education to Amish children because of the possibility that some such children will choose to leave the Amish community, and that if this occurs they will be ill-equipped for life. The State argues that if Amish children leave their church they should not be in the position of making their way in the world without the education available in the one or two additional years the State requires. However, on this record, that argument is highly speculative. There is no specific evidence of the loss of Amish adherents by attrition, nor is there any showing that upon leaving the Amish community Amish children, with their practical agricultural training and habits of industry and self-reliance, would become burdens on society because of educational shortcomings. Indeed, this argument of the State appears to rest primarily on the State's mistaken assumption, already noted, that the Amish do not provide any education for their children beyond the eighth grade, but **1538 allow them to grow in \xd4ignorance.\xd5 To the contrary, not only do the Amish accept the necessity for formal schooling through the eighth grade level, but continue to provide what has been characterized by the undisputed testimony of expert educators as an \xd4ideal\xd5 vocational education for their children in the adolescent years. "
[1500] "There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish qualities of reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would fail to find ready markets in today's society. Absent some contrary evidence supporting the *225 State's position, we are unwilling to assume that persons possessing such valuable vocational skills and habits are doomed to become burdens on society should they determine to leave the Amish faith, nor is there any basis in the record to warrant a finding that an additional one or two years of formal school education beyond the eighth grade would serve to eliminate any such problem that might exist. "
[1501] "Insofar as the State's claim rests on the view that a brief additional period of formal education is imperative to enable the Amish to participate effectively and intelligently in our democratic process, it must fall. The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education has enabled them to function effectively in their day-to-day life under self-imposed limitations on relations with the world, and to survive and prosper in contemporary society as a separate, sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient community for more than 200 years in this country. In itself this is strong evidence that they are capable of fulfilling the social and political responsibilities of citizenship without compelled attendance beyond the eighth grade at the price of jeopardizing their free exercise of religious belief.13 When Thomas Jefferson emphasized the need for education as a bulwark of a free people against tyranny, there is nothing to indicate he had in mind compulsory education through any fixed age beyond a basic education. Indeed, the Amish communities singularly parallel and reflect many of the virtues of Jefferson's ideal of the \xd4sturdy yeoman\xd5 who would form the basis of what he considered as the *226 ideal of a democratic society.14 Even their idiosyncratic separateness exemplifies the diversity we profess to admire and encourage. "
[1502] "The requirement for compulsory education beyond the eighth grade is a relatively recent development in our history. Less than 60 years ago, the educational requirements of almost all of the States were satisfied by completion of the elementary grades, at least where the child was regularly and lawfully employed.15 **1539 The independence *227 and successful social functioning of the Amish community for a period approaching almost three centuries and more than 200 years in this country are strong evidence that there is at best a speculative gain, in terms of meeting the duties of citizenship, from an additional one or two years of compulsory formal education. Against this background it would require a more particularized showing from the State on this point to justify the severe interference with religious freedom such additional compulsory attendance would entail. "
[1503] "We should also note that compulsory education and child labor laws find their historical origin in common humanitarian instincts, and that the age limits of both laws have been coordinated to achieve their related objectives.16 In the context of this case, such considerations, *228 if anything, support rather than detract from respondents' position. The origins of the requirement for school attendance to age 16, an age falling after the completion of elementary school but before completion of high school, are not entirely clear. But to some extent such laws reflected the movement to prohibit most child labor under age 16 that culminated in the provisions of the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.17 It is true, then, that the 16-year child labor age limit may to some degree derive from a contemporary impression that children should be in school until that age. But at the same time, it cannot be denied that, conversely, the 16-year education limit reflects, in substantial measure, the concern that children under that age not be employed under conditions hazardous to their health, or in work that should be performed by adults. "
[1504] "The requirement of compulsory schooling to age 16 must therefore be viewed as aimed not merely at providing educational opportunities for children, but as an alternative to the equally undesirable consequence of unhealthful child labor displacing adult workers, or, on the other hand, forced idleness.18 The two kinds of statutes\xd1compulsory school attendance and child labor laws\xd1tend to keep children of certain ages off the labor market and in school; this regimen in **1540 turn provides opportunity to prepare for a livelihood of a higher order than that which children could pursue without education and protects their health in adolescence. "
[1505] "In these terms, Wisconsin's interest in compelling the school attendance of Amish children to age 16 emerges as somewhat less substantial than requiring such attendance *229 for children generally. For, while agricultural employment is not totally outside the legitimate concerns of the child labor laws, employment of children under parental guidance and on the family farm from age 14 to age 16 is an ancient tradition that lies at the periphery of the objectives of such laws.19 There is no intimation that the Amish employment of their children on family farms is in any way deleterious to their health or that Amish parents exploit children at tender years. Any such inference would be contrary to the record before us. Moreover, employment of Amish children on the family farm does not present the undesirable economic aspects of eliminating jobs that might otherwise be held by adults. "
[1506] "IV "
[1507] "13Finally, the State, on authority of Prince v. Massachusetts, argues that a decision exempting Amixh children from the State's requirement fails to recognize the substantive right of the Amish child to a secondary education, and fails to give due regard to the power of the State as parens patriae to extend the benefit of secondary education to children regardless of the wishes of their parents. Taken at its broadest sweep, the Court's language in Prince, might be read to give support to the State's position. However, the Court was not confronted in Prince with a situation comparable to that of the Amish as revealed in this record; this is shown by the *230 Court's severe characterization of the evils that it thought the legislature could legitimately associate with child labor, even when performed in the company of an adult. 321 U.S., at 169\xd1170, 64 S.Ct., at 443\xd1444. The Court later took great care to confine Prince to a narrow scope in Sherbert v. Verner, when it stated: "
[1508] "\xd4On the other hand, the Court has rejected challenges under the Free Exercise Clause to governmental regulation of certain overt acts prompted by religious beliefs or principles, for \xd4even when the action is in accord with one's religious convictions, (it) is not totally free from legislative restrictions.\xd5 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 1146, 6 L.Ed.2d 563. The conduct or actions so regulated have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 25 L.Ed. 244; Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 . . ..' 374 U.S., at 402\xd1403, 83 S.Ct., at 1793. "
[1509] "This case, of course, is not one in which any harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order, or welfare has been demonstrated or may be properly inferred.20 The record is to the contrary, and **1541 any reliance on that theory would find no support in the evidence. "
[1510] "Contrary to the suggestion of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, our holding today in no degree depends on the assertion of the religious interest of the child as contrasted with that of the parents. It is the parents who are subject to prosecution here for failing to cause their children to attend school, and it *231 is their right of free exercise, not that of their children, that must determine Wisconsin's power to impose criminal penalties on the parent. The dissent argues that a child who expresses a desire to attend public high school in conflict with the wishes of his parents should not be prevented from doing so. There is no reason for the Court to consider that point since it is not an issue in the case. The children are not parties to this litigation. The State has at no point tried this case on the theory that respondents were preventing their children from attending school against their expressed desires, and indeed the record is to the contrary.21 The State's position from the outset has been that it is empowered to apply its compulsory-attendance law to Amish parents in the same manner as to other parents\xd1that is, without regard to the wishes of the child. That is the claim we reject today. "
[1511] "Our holding in no way determines the proper resolution of possible competing interests of parents, children, and the State in an appropriate state court proceeding in which the power of the State is asserted on the theory that Amish parents are preventing their minor children from attending high school despite their expressed desires to the contrary. Recognition of the claim of the State in such a proceeding would, of course, call into question traditional concepts of parental control over the religious upbringing and education of their minor children recognized in this Court's past decisions. It is clear that such an intrusion by a State into family decisions in the area of religious training would give rise to grave questions of religious freedom comparable to those raised here *232 and those presented in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 L.Ed. 1070 (1925). On this record we neither reach nor decide those issues. "
[1512] "The State's argument proceeds without reliance on any actual conflict between the wishes of parents and children. It appears to rest on the potential that exemption of Amish parents from the requirements of the compulsory-education law might allow some parents to act contrary to the best interests of their children by foreclosing their opportunity to make an intelligent choice between the Amish way of life and that of the outside world. The same argument could, of course, be made with respect to all church schools short of college. There is nothing in the record or in the ordinary course of human experience to suggest that non-Amish parents generally consult with children of ages 14\xd116 if they are placed in a church school of the parents' faith. "
[1513] "Indeed it seems clear that if the State is empowered, as parens patriae, to \xd4save\xd5 a child from himself or his Amish parents by requiring an additional two years of compulsory formal high school education, the State will in large measure influence, if not determine, the religious future of the child. Even more markedly than in Prince, therefore, this case involves the fundamental interest of parents, as contrasted with that of the State, to guide the religious future and education of their children. The history and culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate **1542 as an enduring American tradition. If not the first, perhaps the most significant statements of the Court in this area are found in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, in which the Court observed: "
[1514] "\xd4Under the doctrine of Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 43 S.Ct. 625, 67 L.Ed. 1042, 29 A.L.R. 1146, we think it entirely plain that the Act *233 of 1922 unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control. As often heretofore pointed out, rights guaranteed by the Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State. The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.\xd5 268 U.S., at 534\xd1535, 45 S.Ct., at 573. "
[1515] "14The duty to prepare the child for \xd4additional obligations,\xd5 referred to by the Court, must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship. Pierce, of course, recognized that where nothing more than the general interest of the parent in the nurture and education of his children is involved, it is beyond dispute that the State acts \xd4reasonably\xd5 and constitutionally in requiring education to age 16 in some public or private school meeting the standards prescribed by the State. "
[1516] "15However read, the Court's holding in Pierce stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the religious upbringing of their children. And, when the interests of parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed by this record, more than merely a \xd4reasonable relation to some purpose within the competency of the State\xd5 is required to sustain the validity of the State's requirement under the First Amendment. To be sure, the power of the parent, even when linked to a free exercise claim, may be subject to limitation under Prince *234 if it appears that parental decisions will jeopardize the health or safety of the child, or have a potential for significant social burdens. But in this case, the Amish have introduced persuasive evidence undermining the arguments the State has advanced to support its claims in terms of the welfare of the child and society as a whole. The record strongly indicates that accommodating the religious objections of the Amish by forgoing one, or at most two, additional years of compulsory education will not impair the physical or mental health of the child, or result in an inability to be self-supporting or to discharge the duties and responsibilities of citizenship, or in any other way materially detract from the welfare of society. "
[1517] "In the fact of our consistent emphasis on the central values underlying the Religion Clauses in our constitutional scheme of government, we cannot accept a parens patriae claim of such all-encompassing scope and with such sweeping potential for broad and unforeseeable application as that urged by the State. "
[1518] "V "
[1519] "1617For the reasons stated we hold, with the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevent the State from compelling respondents to cause their children to attend formal high school to age 16.22 Our disposition of this case, **1543 however, in no way *235 alters our recognition of the obvious fact that courts are not school boards or legislatures, and are ill-equipped to determine the \xd4necessity\xd5 of discrete aspects of a State's program of compulsory education. This should suggest that courts must move with great circumspection in performing the sensitive and delicate task of weighing a State's legitimate social concern when faced with religious claims for exemption from generally applicable education requirements. It cannot be overemphasized that we are not dealing with a way of life and mode of education by a group claiming to have recently discovered some \xd4progressive\xd5 or more enlightened process for rearing children for modern life. "
[1520] "18Aided by a history of three centuries as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of American society, the Amish in this case have convincingly demonstrated the sincerity of their religious beliefs, the interrelationship of belief with their mode of life, the vital role that belief and daily conduct play in the continued survival of Old Order Amish communities and their religious organization, and the hazards presented by the State's enforcement of a statute generally valid as to others. Beyond this, they have carried the even more difficult burden of demonstrating the adequacy of their alternative mode of continuing informal vocational education in terms of precisely those overall interests that the State advances in support of its program of compulsory high school education. In light of this convincing *236 showing, one that probably few other religious groups or sects could make, and weighing the minimal difference between what the State would require and what the Amish already accept, it was incumbent on the State to show with more particularity how its admittedly strong interest in compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exemption to the Amish. Sherbert v. Verner, supra. "
[1521] "Nothing we hold is intended to undermine the general applicability of the State's compulsory school-attendance statutes or to limit the power of the State to promulgate reasonable standards that, while not impairing the free exercise of religion, provide for continuing agricultural vocational education under parental and church guidance by the Old Order Amish or others similarly situated. The States have had a long history of amicable and effective relationships with church-sponsored schools, and there is no basis for assuming that, in this related context, reasonable standards cannot be established concerning the content of the continuing vocational education of Amish children under parental guidance, provided always that state regulations are not inconsistent with what we have said in this opinion.23 "
[1522] "Affirmed "
[1523] "Mr. Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court. "
[1524] "The issue on appeal is whether the State of New Hampshire may constitutionally enforce criminal sanctions against *707 persons who cover the motto \xd2Live Free or Die\xd3 on passenger vehicle license plates because that motto is repugnant to their moral and religious beliefs. "
[1525] "(1) "
[1526] "Since 1969 New Hampshire has required that noncommercial vehicles bear license plates embossed with the state motto, \xd2Live Free or Die.\xd31 N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. s 263:1 (Supp. 1975). Another New Hampshire statute makes it a misdemeanor \xd2knowingly (to obscure) . . . the figures or letters on any number plate.\xd3 N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. s 262:27-c (Supp. 1975). The term \xd2letters\xd3 in this section has been interpreted by the State's highest court to include the state motto. State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 295 A.2d 454 (1972). "
[1527] "Appellees George Maynard and his wife Maxine are followers of the Jehovah's Witnesses faith. The Maynards consider the New Hampshire State motto to be repugnant to their moral, religious, and political beliefs,2 and therefore assert it objectionable to disseminate this message by displaying it on their automobiles.3 Pursuant to **1432 these beliefs, the *708 Maynards began early in 1974 to cover up the motto on their license plates.4 "
[1528] "On November 27, 1974, Mr. Maynard was issued a citation for violating s 262:27-c. On December 6, 1974, he appeared pro se in Lebanon, N. H., District Court to answer the charge. After waiving his right to counsel, he entered a plea of not guilty and proceeded to explain his religious objections to the motto. The state trial judge expressed sympathy for Mr. Maynard's situation, but considered himself bound by the authority of State v. Hoskin, supra, to hold Maynard guilty. A $25 fine was imposed, but execution was suspended during \xd2good behavior.\xd3 "
[1529] "On December 28, 1974, Mr. Maynard was again charged with violating s 262:27-c. He appeared in court on January 31, 1975, and again chose to represent himself; he was found guilty, fined $50, and sentenced to six months in the Grafton County House of Corrections. The court suspended this jail sentence but ordered Mr. Maynard to also pay the $25 fine for the first offense. Maynard informed the court that, as a matter of conscience, he refused to pay the two fines. The court thereupon sentenced him to jail for a period of 15 days. He has served the full sentence. "
[1530] "Prior to trial on the second offense Mr. Maynard was charged with yet a third violation of s 262:27-c on January 3, 1975. He appeared on this complaint on the same day as for the second offense, and was, again, found guilty. This conviction was \xd2continued for sentence\xd3 so that Maynard received no punishment in addition to the 15 days. "
[1531] "*709 (2) "
[1532] "On March 4, 1975, appellees brought the present action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. s 1983 in the United States District Court for the District of New Hampshire. They sought injunctive and declaratory relief against enforcement of N.H.Rev.Stat.Ann. ss 262:27-c, 263:1, insofar as these required displaying the state motto on their vehicle license plates, and made it a criminal offense to obscure the motto.5 On March 11, 1975, the single District Judge issued a temporary restraining order against further arrests and prosecutions of the Maynards. Because the appellees sought an injunction against a state statute on grounds of its unconstitutionality, a three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C. s 2281. Following a hearing on the merits,6 the District Court entered an order enjoining the State \xd2from arresting and prosecuting (the Maynards) at any time in the future for covering over that portion of their license plates that contains the motto \xd4Live Free or Die.\xd5 \xd37 406 F.Supp. 1381 (1976). We noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal. 426 U.S. 946, 96 S.Ct. 3164, 49 L.Ed.2d 1183 (1976). "
[1533] "(3) "
[1534] "123(1-3) Appellants argue that the District Court was precluded from exercising jurisdiction in this case by the principles of *710 equitable **1433 restraint enunciated in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 91 S.Ct. 746, 27 L.Ed.2d 669 (1971). In Younger the Court recognized that principles of judicial economy, as well as proper state-federal relations, preclude federal courts from exercising equitable jurisdiction to enjoin ongoing state prosecutions. Id., at 43, 91 S.Ct., at 750. However, when a genuine threat of prosecution exists, a litigant is entitled to resort to a federal forum to seek redress for an alleged deprivation of federal rights. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 94 S.Ct. 1209, 39 L.Ed.2d 505 (1974); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930-931, 95 S.Ct. 2561, 2567-2568, 45 L.Ed.2d 648 (1975). Younger principles aside, a litigant is entitled to resort to a federal forum in seeking redress under 42 U.S.C. s 1983 for an alleged deprivation of federal rights. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 609-610, n. 21, 95 S.Ct. 1200, 1210-1211, 43 L.Ed.2d 482 (1975). Mr. Maynard now finds himself placed \xd2between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law and the Charybdis of forgoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in (another) criminal proceeding.\xd3 Steffel v. Thompson, supra, 415 U.S., at 462, 94 S.Ct., at 1217. Mrs. Maynard, as joint owner of the family automobiles is no less likely than her husband to be subjected to state prosecution. Under these circumstances he cannot be denied consideration of a federal remedy. "
[1535] "Appellants, however, point out that Maynard failed to seek review of his criminal convictions and cite Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., supra, for the propositions that \xd2a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party in appellee's posture must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court,\xd3 420 U.S., at 608, 95 S.Ct., at 1210, and that \xd2Younger standards must be met to justify federal intervention in a state judicial proceeding as to which a losing litigant has not exhausted his state appellate remedies,\xd3 id., at 609, 95 S.Ct., at 1211. Huffman, however, is inapposite. There the appellee was seeking to prevent, by means of federal intervention enforcement of a state-court *711 judgment declaring its theater a nuisance. We held that appellee's failure to exhaust its state appeals barred federal intervention under the principles of Younger: \xd2Federal post-trial intervention, in a fashion designed to annul the results of a state trial . . . deprives the States of a function which quite legitimately is left to them, that of overseeing trial court dispositions of constitutional issues which arise in civil litigation over which they have jurisdiction.\xd3 Ibid. "
[1536] "4(4) Here, however, the suit is in no way \xd2designed to annul the results of a state trial\xd3 since the relief sought is wholly prospective, to preclude further prosecution under a statute alleged to violate appellees' constitutional rights. Maynard has already sustained convictions and has served a sentence of imprisonment for his prior offenses.8 He does not seek to have his record expunged, or to annul any collateral effects those convictions may have, e. g., upon his driving privileges. The Maynards seek only to be free from prosecutions for future violations of the same statutes. Younger does not bar federal jurisdiction. "
[1537] "5(5) In their complaint, the Maynards sought both declaratory and injunctive relief against the enforcement of the New Hampshire statutes. We have recognized that although \xd2 \xd4(o)rdinarily . . . the practical effect of (injunctive and declaratory) relief will be virtually identical,\xd5 \xd3 Doran v. Salem Inn, supra, 422 U.S., at 931, 95 S.Ct., at 2567, quoting Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 73, 91 S.Ct. 764, 768, 27 L.Ed.2d 688 (1971), a \xd2district court can generally protect the interests of a federal plaintiff by entering a declaratory judgment, and therefore the stronger injunctive medicine **1434 will be unnecessary.\xd3 Doran, supra, 422 U.S., at 931, 95 S.Ct., at 2567. It is correct that generally a *712 court will not enjoin \xd2the enforcement of a criminal statute even though unconstitutional,\xd3 Spielman Motor Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 95, 55 S.Ct. 678, 680, 79 L.Ed. 1322 (1935), since \xd2(s)uch a result seriously impairs the State's interest in enforcing its criminal laws, and implicates the concerns for federalism which lie at the heart of Younger,\xd3 Doran, supra, 422 U.S., at 931, 95 S.Ct., at 2568. But this is not an absolute policy and in some circumstances injunctive relief may be appropriate. \xd2To justify such interference there must be exceptional circumstances and a clear showing that an injunction is necessary in order to afford adequate protection of constitutional rights.\xd3 Spielman Motor Co., supra, 295 U.S., at 95, 55 S.Ct., at 680. "
[1538] "6(6) We have such a situation here for, as we have noted, three successive prosecutions were undertaken against Mr. Maynard in the span of five weeks. This is quite different from a claim for federal equitable relief when a prosecution is threatened for the first time. The threat of repeated prosecutions in the future against both him and his wife, and the effect of such a continuing threat on their ability to perform the ordinary tasks of daily life which require an automobile, is sufficient to justify injunctive relief. Cf. Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 63 S.Ct. 877, 87 L.Ed. 1324 (1943). We are therefore unwilling to say that the District Court was limited to granting declaratory relief. Having determined that the District Court was not required to stay its hand as to either appellee,9 we turn to the merits of the Maynards' claim. "
[1539] "*713 (4) "
[1540] "7(7) The District Court held that by covering up the state motto \xd2Live Free or Die\xd3 on his automobile license plate, Mr. Maynard was engaging in symbolic speech and that \xd2New Hampshire's interest in the enforcement of its defacement statute is not sufficient to justify the restriction on (appellee's) constitutionally protected expression.\xd3 406 F.Supp., at 1389. We find it unnecessary to pass on the \xd2symbolic speech\xd3 issue, since we find more appropriate First Amendment grounds to affirm the judgment of the District Court.10 We turn instead to what in our view is the essence of appellees' objection to the requirement that they display the motto \xd2Live Free or Die\xd3 on their automobile license plates. This is succinctly summarized in the statement made by Mr. Maynard in his affidavit filed with the District Court: "
[1541] "\xd2I refuse to be coerced by the State into advertising a slogan which I find morally, ethically, religiously and politically abhorrent.\xd3 App. 5. "
[1542] "We are thus faced with the question of whether the State may constitutionally require an individual to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property in a **1435 manner and for the express purpose that it be observed and read by the public. We hold that the State may not do so. "
[1543] "*714 A "
[1544] "89(8, 9) We begin with the proposition that the right of freedom of thought protected by the First Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all. See Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 633-634, 63 S.Ct. 1178, 1182-1183, 87 L.Ed. 1628 (1943); id., at 645, 63 S.Ct., at 1188 (Murphy, J., concurring). A system which secures the right to proselytize religious, political, and ideological causes must also guarantee the concomitant right to decline to foster such concepts. The right to speak and the right to refrain from speaking are complementary components of the broader concept of \xd2individual freedom of mind.\xd3 Id., at 637, 63 S.Ct., at 1185. This is illustrated by the recent case of Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S.Ct. 2831, 41 L.Ed.2d 730 (1974), where we held unconstitutional a Florida statute placing an affirmative duty upon newspapers to publish the replies of political candidates whom they had criticized. We concluded that such a requirement deprived a newspaper of the fundamental right to decide what to print or omit: "
[1545] "\xd2Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that published news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute, editors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy. Therefore, under the operation of the Florida statute, political and electoral coverage would be blunted or reduced. Government-enforced right of access inescapably \xd4dampens the vigor and limits the variety of public debate,\xd5 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. (254,) at 279 (84 S.Ct. 710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)).\xd3 Id., at 257, 94 S.Ct., at 2839 (footnote omitted). "
[1546] "10(10) The Court in Barnette, supra, was faced with a state statute which required public school students to participate in daily public ceremonies by honoring the flag both with words and traditional salute gestures. In overruling its prior decision in Minersville District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 60 S.Ct. 1010, 84 L.Ed. 1375 (1940), the Court held that \xd2a ceremony so touching matters of opinion and political attitude may (not) be imposed upon *715 the individual by official authority under powers committed to any political organization under our Constitution.\xd3 319 U.S., at 636, 63 S.Ct., at 1184. Compelling the affirmative act of a flag salute involved a more serious infringement upon personal liberties than the passive act of carrying the state motto on a license plate, but the difference is essentially one of degree. Here, as in Barnette, we are faced with a state measure which forces an individual, as part of his daily life indeed constantly while his automobile is in public view to be an instrument for fostering public adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable. In doing so, the State \xd2invades the sphere of intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official control.\xd3 Id., at 642, 63 S.Ct., at 1187. "
[1547] "11(11) New Hampshire's statute in effect requires that appellees use their private property as a \xd2mobile billboard\xd3 for the State's ideological message or suffer a penalty, as Maynard already has. As a condition to driving an automobile a virtual necessity for most Americans the Maynards must display \xd2Live Free or Die\xd3 to hundreds of people each day.11 The fact that most individuals agree with the thrust of New Hampshire's motto is not the test; most Americans also find the flag salute **1436 acceptable. The First Amendment protects the right of individuals to hold a point of view different from the majority and to refuse to foster, in the way New Hampshire commands, an idea they find morally objectionable. "
[1548] "B "
[1549] "12(12) Identifying the Maynards' interests as implicating First Amendment protections does not end our inquiry however. *716 We must also determine whether the State's countervailing interest is sufficiently compelling to justify requiring appellees to display the state motto on their license plates. See, e. g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-377, 88 S.Ct. 1673, 1678-1679, 20 L.Ed.2d 672 (1968). The two interests advanced by the State are that display of the motto (1) facilitates the identification of passenger vehicles,12 and (2) promotes appreciation of history, individualism, and state pride. "
[1550] "The State first points out that passenger vehicles, but not commercial, trailer, or other vehicles are required to display the state motto. Thus, the argument proceeds, officers of the law are more easily able to determine whether passenger vehicles are carrying the proper plates. However, the record here reveals that New Hampshire passenger license plates normally consist of a specific configuration of letters and numbers, which makes them readily distinguishable from other types of plates, even without reference to the state motto.13 Even were we to credit the State's reasons and \xd2even though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for achieving the *717 same basic purpose.\xd3 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488, 81 S.Ct. 247, 252, 5 L.Ed.2d 231 (1960) (footnotes omitted). "
[1551] "The State's second claimed interest is not ideologically neutral. The State is seeking to communicate to others an official view as to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individualism. Of course, the State may legitimately pursue such interests in any number of ways. However, where the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, no matter how acceptable to some, such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier for such message.14 "
[1552] "13(13) We conclude that the State of New Hampshire may not require appellees to display the state motto15 upon their vehicle license plates; and, accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the District Court. "
[1553] "Affirmed "
[1554] " "
[1555] " "
[1556] " "
[1557] " " [[1]]
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[29] "sites" "use" "possession" "sacred"
[33] "objects" "freedom" "worship" "ceremonials"
[37] "traditional" "rites" "U" "S"
[41] "C" ""
[[20]]
[1] "That" "Resolution" "emphasis"
[4] "protecting" "freedom" "believe"
[7] "express" "exercise" "religion"
[10] "accurately" "identifies" "mission"
[13] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[16] "The" "Federal" "Government"
[19] "s" "use" "Social"
[22] "Security" "number" "Little"
[25] "Bird" "Snow" "degree"
[28] "impair" "Roy" "s"
[31] "freedom" "believe" "express"
[34] "exercist" "religion" "consequently"
[37] "appellees" "objection" "statutory"
[40] "requirement" "state" "agency"
[43] "shall" "utilize" "Social"
[46] "Security" "number" "administration"
[49] "plan" "without" "merit"
[52] "It" "follows" "request"
[55] "injunction" "use" "Social"
[58] "Security" "number" "processing"
[61] "benefit" "applications" "rejected"
[64] "We" "therefore" "hold"
[67] "portion" "District" "Court"
[70] "s" "injunction" "permanently"
[73] "restrained" "Secretary" "making"
[76] "use" "Social" "Security"
[79] "number" "issued" "name"
[82] "Little" "Bird" "Snow"
[85] "Roy" "must" "vacated"
[88] ""
[[21]]
[1] "III" ""
[[22]]
[1] "" "Roy" "also"
[4] "challenges" "Congress" "requirement"
[7] "state" "AFDC" "plan"
[10] "must" "provide" "A"
[13] "condition" "eligibility" "plan"
[16] "applicant" "recipient" "aid"
[19] "shall" "furnish" "State"
[22] "agency" "social" "security"
[25] "account" "number" "U"
[28] "S" "C" "emphasis"
[31] "added" "The" "First"
[34] "Amendment" "s" "guarantee"
[37] "Congress" "shall" "make"
[40] "law" "prohibiting" "free"
[43] "exercise" "religion" "holds"
[46] "important" "place" "scheme"
[49] "ordered" "liberty" "Court"
[52] "steadfastly" "maintained" "claims"
[55] "religious" "conviction" "automatically"
[58] "entitle" "person" "fix"
[61] "unilaterally" "conditions" "terms"
[64] "dealings" "Government" "Not"
[67] "burdens" "religion" "unconstitutional"
[70] "See" "Reynolds" "v"
[73] "United" "States" "U"
[76] "S" "Otto" "L"
[79] "Ed" "This" "treated"
[82] "recently" "United" "States"
[85] "v" "Lee" ""
[[23]]
[1] "" "To" "maintain" "organized"
[5] "society" "guarantees" "religious" "freedom"
[9] "great" "variety" "faiths" "requires"
[13] "religious" "practices" "yield" "common"
[17] "good" "Religious" "beliefs" "can"
[21] "accommodated" "point" "accommodation" "radically"
[25] "restrict" "operating" "latitude" "legislature"
[29] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[33] ""
[[24]]
[1] "" "The" "statutory"
[4] "requirement" "applicants" "provide"
[7] "Social" "Security" "number"
[10] "wholly" "neutral" "religious"
[13] "terms" "uniformly" "applicable"
[16] "There" "claim" "attempt"
[19] "Congress" "discriminate" "invidiously"
[22] "covert" "suppression" "particular"
[25] "religious" "beliefs" "The"
[28] "administrative" "requirement" "create"
[31] "danger" "censorship" "place"
[34] "direct" "condition" "burden"
[37] "dissemination" "religious" "views"
[40] "It" "intrude" "organization"
[43] "religious" "institution" "school"
[46] "It" "may" "indeed"
[49] "confront" "applicants" "benefits"
[52] "choices" "sense" "affirmatively"
[55] "compel" "appellees" "threat"
[58] "sanctions" "refrain" "religiously"
[61] "motivated" "conduct" "engage"
[64] "conduct" "find" "objectionable"
[67] "religious" "reasons" "Rather"
[70] "appellees" "seek" "benefits"
[73] "Government" "assert" "certain"
[76] "religious" "beliefs" "excused"
[79] "compliance" "condition" "binding"
[82] "persons" "seek" "benefits"
[85] "Government" ""
[[25]]
[1] "This" "far" "removed" "historical"
[5] "instances" "religious" "persecution" "intolerance"
[9] "gave" "concern" "drafted" "Free"
[13] "Exercise" "Clause" "First" "Amendment"
[17] "See" "generally" "M" "Malbin"
[21] "Religion" "Politics" "The" "Intentions"
[25] "Authors" "First" "Amendment" "We"
[29] "unmindful" "importance" "many" "government"
[33] "benefits" "today" "value" "sincerely"
[37] "held" "religious" "beliefs" "However"
[41] "believe" "government" "compulsion" "involved"
[45] "ignore" "reality" "denial" "benefits"
[49] "uniformly" "applicable" "statute" "neutral"
[53] "face" "wholly" "different" "less"
[57] "intrusive" "nature" "affirmative" "compulsion"
[61] "prohibition" "threat" "penal" "sanctions"
[65] "conduct" "religious" "implications" ""
[[26]]
[1] "This" "distinction" "clearly" "revealed"
[5] "Court" "s" "opinions" "Decisions"
[9] "rejecting" "religiously" "based" "challenges"
[13] "often" "recited" "fact" "mere"
[17] "denial" "governmental" "benefit" "uniformly"
[21] "applicable" "statute" "constitute" "infringement"
[25] "religious" "liberty" "In" "Hamilton"
[29] "v" "Regents" "University" "California"
[33] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "L" "Ed" "example" "Court"
[41] "rejected" "religious" "challenge" "students"
[45] "military" "courses" "required" "part"
[49] "curriculum" "explaining" ""
[[27]]
[1] "" "The" "fact"
[4] "able" "pay" "way"
[7] "university" "institution" "California"
[10] "without" "significance" "upon"
[13] "constitutional" "question" "involved"
[16] "California" "drafted" "called"
[19] "attend" "university" "They"
[22] "seeking" "education" "offered"
[25] "State" "time" "insisting"
[28] "excluded" "prescribed" "course"
[31] "solely" "upon" "grounds"
[34] "religious" "beliefs" "conscientious"
[37] "objections" "war" "Id"
[40] "S" "Ct" ""
[[28]]
[1] "" "In" "cases" "upholding"
[5] "First" "Amendment" "challenges" "hand"
[9] "Court" "often" "relied" "showing"
[13] "compulsion" "certain" "activity" "religious"
[17] "significance" "involved" "In" "West"
[21] "Virginia" "Bd" "Ed" "v"
[25] "Barnette" "U" "S" "S"
[29] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "example"
[33] "Court" "distinguished" "earlier" "Hamilton"
[37] "holding" "upheld" "challenge" "flag"
[41] "salute" "requirement" ""
[[29]]
[1] "" "Here" "dealing" "compulsion"
[5] "students" "declare" "belief" "This"
[9] "issue" "prejudiced" "Court" "s"
[13] "previous" "holding" "State" "without"
[17] "compelling" "attendance" "extends" "college"
[21] "facilities" "pupils" "voluntarily" "enroll"
[25] "may" "prescribe" "military" "training"
[29] "part" "course" "without" "offense"
[33] "Constitution" "It" "held" "take"
[37] "advantage" "opportunities" "may" "ground"
[41] "conscience" "refuse" "compliance" "conditions"
[45] "Hamilton" "v" "Regents" "U"
[49] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[53] "Ed" "In" "present" "case"
[57] "attendance" "optional" "U" "S"
[61] "S" "Ct" ""
[[30]]
[1] "The" "distinction" "governmental" "compulsion"
[5] "conditions" "relating" "governmental" "benefits"
[9] "contained" "two" "cases" "emphasized"
[13] "Justice" "BRENNAN" "concurring" "opinion"
[17] "Abington" "School" "District" "v"
[21] "Schempp" "U" "S" "S"
[25] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[29] ""
[[31]]
[1] "" "The" "different"
[4] "results" "Hamilton" "Barnette"
[7] "attributable" "part" "difference"
[10] "strength" "particular" "state"
[13] "interests" "respective" "statutes"
[16] "designed" "serve" "Far"
[19] "significant" "fact" "Hamilton"
[22] "dealt" "voluntary" "attendance"
[25] "college" "young" "adults"
[28] "Barnette" "involved" "compelled"
[31] "attendance" "young" "children"
[34] "elementary" "secondary" "schools"
[37] "This" "distinction" "warrants"
[40] "difference" "constitutional" "results"
[43] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[46] "footnote" "omitted" ""
[[32]]
[1] "" "We" "repeatedly" "emphasized"
[5] "distinction" "In" "rejecting" "Free"
[9] "Exercise" "challenge" "Bob" "Jones"
[13] "University" "v" "United" "States"
[17] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[21] "L" "Ed" "d" "example"
[25] "observed" "d" "enial" "tax"
[29] "benefits" "will" "inevitably" "substantial"
[33] "impact" "operation" "private" "religious"
[37] "schools" "will" "prevent" "schools"
[41] "observing" "religious" "tenets" ""
[[33]]
[1] "We" "conclude" "government"
[4] "regulation" "indirectly" "incidentally"
[7] "calls" "choice" "securing"
[10] "governmental" "benefit" "adherence"
[13] "religious" "beliefs" "wholly"
[16] "different" "governmental" "action"
[19] "legislation" "criminalizes" "religiously"
[22] "inspired" "activity" "inescapably"
[25] "compels" "conduct" "find"
[28] "objectionable" "religious" "reasons"
[31] "Although" "denial" "government"
[34] "benefits" "religious" "objection"
[37] "can" "raise" "serious"
[40] "Free" "Exercise" "problems"
[43] "two" "different" "forms"
[46] "government" "action" "governed"
[49] "constitutional" "standard" "A"
[52] "governmental" "burden" "religious"
[55] "liberty" "insulated" "review"
[58] "simply" "indirect" "Thomas"
[61] "v" "Review" "Board"
[64] "Indiana" "Employment" "Security"
[67] "Div" "U" "S"
[70] "S" "Ct" "L"
[73] "Ed" "d" "citing"
[76] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[79] "U" "S" "S"
[82] "Ct" "nature" "burden"
[85] "relevant" "standard" "government"
[88] "must" "meet" "justify"
[91] "burden" ""
[[34]]
[1] "The" "general" "governmental"
[4] "interests" "involved" "buttress"
[7] "conclusion" "Governments" "today"
[10] "grant" "broad" "range"
[13] "benefits" "inescapably" "time"
[16] "administration" "complex" "programs"
[19] "requires" "certain" "conditions"
[22] "restrictions" "Although" "situations"
[25] "mechanism" "individual" "consideration"
[28] "will" "created" "policy"
[31] "decision" "government" "wishes"
[34] "treat" "applicants" "alike"
[37] "wish" "become" "involved"
[40] "case" "case" "inquiries"
[43] "genuineness" "religious" "objection"
[46] "condition" "restrictions" "entitled"
[49] "substantial" "deference" "Moreover"
[52] "legitimate" "interests" "implicated"
[55] "need" "avoid" "appearance"
[58] "favoring" "religious" "nonreligious"
[61] "applicants" ""
[[35]]
[1] "The" "test" "applied"
[4] "cases" "like" "Wisconsin"
[7] "v" "Yoder" "U"
[10] "S" "S" "Ct"
[13] "L" "Ed" "d"
[16] "appropriate" "setting" "In"
[19] "enforcement" "facially" "neutral"
[22] "uniformly" "applicable" "requirement"
[25] "administration" "welfare" "programs"
[28] "reaching" "many" "millions"
[31] "people" "Government" "entitled"
[34] "wide" "latitude" "The"
[37] "Government" "put" "strict"
[40] "test" "applied" "District"
[43] "Court" "standard" "required"
[46] "Government" "justify" "enforcement"
[49] "use" "Social" "Security"
[52] "number" "requirement" "least"
[55] "restrictive" "means" "accomplishing"
[58] "compelling" "state" "interest"
[61] "Absent" "proof" "intent"
[64] "discriminate" "particular" "religious"
[67] "beliefs" "religion" "general"
[70] "Government" "meets" "burden"
[73] "demonstrates" "challenged" "requirement"
[76] "governmental" "benefits" "neutral"
[79] "uniform" "application" "reasonable"
[82] "means" "promoting" "legitimate"
[85] "public" "interest" ""
[[36]]
[1] "We" "reject" "appellees"
[4] "contention" "Sherbert" "Thomas"
[7] "compel" "affirmance" "The"
[10] "statutory" "conditions" "issue"
[13] "cases" "provided" "person"
[16] "eligible" "unemployment" "compensation"
[19] "benefits" "without" "good"
[22] "cause" "quit" "work"
[25] "refused" "available" "work"
[28] "The" "good" "cause"
[31] "standard" "created" "mechanism"
[34] "individualized" "exemptions" "If"
[37] "state" "creates" "mechanism"
[40] "refusal" "extend" "exemption"
[43] "instance" "religious" "hardship"
[46] "suggests" "discriminatory" "intent"
[49] "Thus" "urged" "Thomas"
[52] "consider" "religiously" "motivated"
[55] "resignation" "without" "good"
[58] "cause" "tends" "exhibit"
[61] "hostility" "neutrality" "towards"
[64] "religion" "See" "Brief"
[67] "Petitioner" "Brief" "American"
[70] "Jewish" "Congress" "Amicus"
[73] "Curiae" "Thomas" "v"
[76] "Review" "Board" "Indiana"
[79] "Employment" "Security" "Div"
[82] "O" "T" "No"
[85] "See" "also" "Sherbert"
[88] "supra" "n" "S"
[91] "Ct" "n" "United"
[94] "States" "v" "Lee"
[97] "U" "S" "n"
[100] "S" "Ct" "n"
[103] "STEVENS" "J" "concurring"
[106] "judgment" "Thomas" "Sherbert"
[109] "may" "viewed" "protection"
[112] "unequal" "treatment" "rather"
[115] "grant" "favored" "treatment"
[118] "members" "religious" "sect"
[121] "In" "cases" "therefore"
[124] "appropriate" "require" "State"
[127] "demonstrate" "compelling" "reason"
[130] "denying" "requested" "exemption"
[133] ""
[[37]]
[1] "Here" "nothing" "whatever" "suggesting"
[5] "antagonism" "Congress" "towards" "religion"
[9] "generally" "towards" "particular" "religious"
[13] "beliefs" "The" "requirement" "applicants"
[17] "provide" "Social" "Security" "number"
[21] "facially" "neutral" "applies" "applicants"
[25] "benefits" "involved" "Congress" "made"
[29] "provision" "individual" "exemptions" "requirement"
[33] "two" "statutes" "question" "Indeed"
[37] "contrary" "Congress" "specified" "state"
[41] "AFDC" "plan" "must" "provide"
[45] "A" "condition" "eligibility" "plan"
[49] "applicant" "recipient" "aid" "shall"
[53] "furnish" "State" "agency" "social"
[57] "security" "account" "number" "U"
[61] "S" "C" "emphasis" "added"
[65] "s" "tate" "agencies" "shall"
[69] "require" "condition" "eligibility" "participation"
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[77] "member" "furnish" "State" "agency"
[81] "social" "security" "account" "number"
[85] "U" "S" "C" "e"
[89] "emphasis" "added" "Nor" "requirements"
[93] "relics" "past" "Congress" "made"
[97] "requirement" "mandatory" "Food" "Stamp"
[101] "program" "Compare" "U" "S"
[105] "C" "f" "ed" "Supp"
[109] "IV" "State" "agencies" "may"
[113] "require" "household" "member" "furnish"
[117] "Social" "Security" "number" "U"
[121] "S" "C" "e" "States"
[125] "shall" "require" "numbers" "furnished"
[129] "Congress" "also" "recently" "extended"
[133] "several" "aid" "programs" "mandatory"
[137] "requirement" "States" "use" "Social"
[141] "Security" "numbers" "verifying" "eligibility"
[145] "benefits" "See" "Deficit" "Reduction"
[149] "Act" "Pub" "L" "Stat"
[153] ""
[[38]]
[1] "The" "Social" "Security"
[4] "number" "requirement" "clearly"
[7] "promotes" "legitimate" "important"
[10] "public" "interest" "No"
[13] "one" "can" "doubt"
[16] "preventing" "fraud" "benefits"
[19] "programs" "important" "goal"
[22] "As" "Representative" "Richmond"
[25] "explained" "support" "bill"
[28] "made" "Social" "Security"
[31] "number" "requirement" "mandatory"
[34] "Food" "Stamp" "program"
[37] ""
[[39]]
[1] "" "We" "know"
[4] "however" "generously" "motivated"
[7] "Americans" "may" "furnish"
[10] "resources" "poor" "enable"
[13] "survive" "understandably" "object"
[16] "believe" "resources" "abused"
[19] "wasted" ""
[[40]]
[1] "" "We" "want" "certain"
[5] "food" "stamp" "program" "run"
[9] "efficiently" "error" "free" "possible"
[13] ""
[[41]]
[1] "" "We" "want"
[4] "applicants" "recipients" "alike"
[7] "constantly" "aware" "Congress"
[10] "will" "tolerate" "refusal"
[13] "disclose" "earnings" "accurately"
[16] "underreporting" "welfare" "assistance"
[19] "program" "benefits" "efforts"
[22] "evade" "work" "requirement"
[25] "attempts" "take" "advantage"
[28] "program" "dollars" "intended"
[31] "completely" "satisfy" "stringent"
[34] "eligibility" "requirements" "set"
[37] "forth" "sections" "Food"
[40] "Stamp" "Act" "tightened"
[43] "year" "bill" "Cong"
[46] "Rec" ""
[[42]]
[1] "We" "also" "think"
[4] "plain" "Social" "Security"
[7] "number" "requirement" "reasonable"
[10] "means" "promoting" "goal"
[13] "The" "programs" "issue"
[16] "truly" "staggering" "magnitude"
[19] "Each" "year" "roughly"
[22] "million" "families" "receive"
[25] "billion" "federally" "funded"
[28] "AFDC" "programs" "million"
[31] "persons" "receive" "billion"
[34] "food" "stamps" "The"
[37] "Social" "Security" "program"
[40] "largest" "domestic" "governmental"
[43] "program" "United" "States"
[46] "today" "distributing" "approximately"
[49] "billion" "monthly" "million"
[52] "recipients" "Because" "tremendous"
[55] "administrative" "problems" "associated"
[58] "managing" "programs" "size"
[61] "District" "Court" "found"
[64] ""
[[43]]
[1] "" "Social" "security" "numbers"
[5] "used" "making" "determination" "benefits"
[9] "programs" "properly" "paid" "duplication"
[13] "benefits" "failure" "payment" "Utilization"
[17] "computer" "system" "name" "benefit"
[21] "recipient" "alone" "frequently" "sufficient"
[25] "ensure" "proper" "payment" "benefits"
[29] ""
[[44]]
[1] "Social" "Security" "numbers"
[4] "unique" "numerical" "identifiers"
[7] "used" "pervasively" "programs"
[10] "The" "numbers" "used"
[13] "example" "keep" "track"
[16] "persons" "longer" "entitled"
[19] "receive" "food" "stamps"
[22] "past" "fraud" "abuses"
[25] "program" "Moreover" "existence"
[28] "unique" "numerical" "identifier"
[31] "creates" "opportunities" "ferreting"
[34] "fraudulent" "applications" "computer"
[37] "matching" "techniques" "One"
[40] "investigation" "Project" "Match"
[43] "compared" "federal" "employee"
[46] "files" "AFDC" "Medicaid"
[49] "files" "determine" "instances"
[52] "Government" "employees" "receiving"
[55] "welfare" "benefits" "improperly"
[58] "Data" "States" "examined"
[61] "individuals" "identified" "receiving"
[64] "duplicate" "welfare" "payments"
[67] "While" "undoubtedly" "fraud"
[70] "escapes" "detection" "spite"
[73] "investigations" "President" "s"
[76] "Private" "Sector" "Survey"
[79] "Cost" "Control" "known"
[82] "popularly" "Grace" "Commission"
[85] "recently" "reported" "matching"
[88] "Federal" "Government" "s"
[91] "cost" "effective" "tool"
[94] "verification" "investigation" "prevention"
[97] "detection" "fraud" "waste"
[100] "abuse" "The" "President"
[103] "s" "Private" "Sector"
[106] "Survey" "Cost" "Control"
[109] "Management" "Office" "Selected"
[112] "Issues" "Information" "Gap"
[115] "Federal" "Government" ""
[[45]]
[1] "The" "importance" "Social"
[4] "Security" "number" "matching"
[7] "techniques" "illustrated" "facts"
[10] "case" "The" "District"
[13] "Court" "found" "efficient"
[16] "operation" "matching" "programs"
[19] "requires" "use" "computer"
[22] "systems" "utilize" "unique"
[25] "numerical" "identifiers" "social"
[28] "security" "number" "F"
[31] "Supp" "It" "found"
[34] "exempting" "even" "appellees"
[37] "alone" "requirement" "result"
[40] "one" "perhaps" "individuals"
[43] "fraudulently" "obtain" "ing"
[46] "welfare" "benefits" "id"
[49] "prospect" "court" "termed"
[52] "remote" "Id" "The"
[55] "District" "Court" "s"
[58] "assessment" "probability" "seems"
[61] "quite" "dubious" "But"
[64] "event" "know" "case"
[67] "obligating" "Government" "tolerate"
[70] "slight" "risk" "one"
[73] "perhaps" "individuals" "fraudulently"
[76] "obtaining" "benefits" "order"
[79] "satisfy" "religious" "objection"
[82] "requirement" "designed" "combat"
[85] "risk" "Appellees" "may"
[88] "use" "Free" "Exercise"
[91] "Clause" "demand" "Government"
[94] "benefits" "terms" "particularly"
[97] "insistence" "works" "demonstrable"
[100] "disadvantage" "Government" "administration"
[103] "programs" ""
[[46]]
[1] "As" "Court" "recognized"
[4] "given" "diversity" "beliefs"
[7] "pluralistic" "society" "necessity"
[10] "providing" "governments" "sufficient"
[13] "operating" "latitude" "incidental"
[16] "neutral" "restraints" "free"
[19] "exercise" "religion" "inescapable"
[22] "As" "matter" "legislative"
[25] "policy" "legislature" "might"
[28] "decide" "make" "religious"
[31] "accommodations" "general" "neutral"
[34] "system" "awarding" "benefits"
[37] "b" "ut" "concern"
[40] "wisdom" "legislation" "constitutional"
[43] "limitation" "Braunfeld" "v"
[46] "Brown" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "L"
[52] "Ed" "d" "plurality"
[55] "opinion" "We" "conclude"
[58] "Congress" "refusal" "grant"
[61] "appellees" "special" "exemption"
[64] "violate" "Free" "Exercise"
[67] "Clause" ""
[[47]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "District" "Court" "vacated" "case"
[7] "remanded" ""
[[48]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[49]]
[1] "Mr" "Chief" "Justice" "WARREN" "announced"
[6] "judgment" "Court" "opinion" "Mr" "Justice"
[11] "BLACK" "Mr" "Justice" "CLARK" "Mr"
[16] "Justice" "WHITTAKER" "concur" ""
[[50]]
[1] "This" "case" "concerns"
[4] "constitutional" "validity" "application"
[7] "appellants" "Pennsylvania" "criminal"
[10] "statute" "enacted" "proscribes"
[13] "Sunday" "retail" "sale"
[16] "certain" "enumerated" "commodities"
[19] "Among" "questions" "presented"
[22] "whether" "statute" "law"
[25] "respecting" "establishment" "religion"
[28] "whether" "statute" "violates"
[31] "equal" "protection" "Since"
[34] "questions" "reference" "statute"
[37] "already" "answered" "negative"
[40] "Two" "Guys" "Harrison"
[43] "Allentown" "Inc" "v"
[46] "McGinley" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "L"
[52] "Ed" "d" "since"
[55] "appellants" "present" "nothing"
[58] "new" "regarding" "need"
[61] "considered" "Thus" "question"
[64] "consideration" "whether" "statute"
[67] "interferes" "free" "exercise"
[70] "appellants" "religion" ""
[[51]]
[1] "Appellants" "merchants" "Philadelphia"
[4] "engage" "retail" "sale"
[7] "clothing" "home" "furnishings"
[10] "within" "proscription" "statute"
[13] "issue" "Each" "appellants"
[16] "member" "Orthodox" "Jewish"
[19] "faith" "requires" "closing"
[22] "places" "business" "total"
[25] "abstention" "manner" "work"
[28] "nightfall" "Friday" "nightfall"
[31] "Saturday" "They" "instituted"
[34] "suit" "court" "seeking"
[37] "permanent" "injunction" "enforcement"
[40] "statute" "Their" "complaint"
[43] "amended" "alleged" "appellants"
[46] "previously" "kept" "places"
[49] "business" "open" "Sunday"
[52] "appellants" "done" "substantial"
[55] "amount" "business" "Sunday"
[58] "compensating" "somewhat" "closing"
[61] "Saturday" "Sunday" "closing"
[64] "will" "result" "impairing"
[67] "ability" "appellants" "earn"
[70] "livelihood" "will" "render"
[73] "appellant" "Braunfeld" "unable"
[76] "continue" "business" "thereby"
[79] "losing" "capital" "investment"
[82] "statute" "unconstitutional" "reasons"
[85] "stated" ""
[[52]]
[1] "A" "three" "judge" "court"
[5] "properly" "convened" "dismissed" "complaint"
[9] "authority" "Two" "Guys" "Harrison"
[13] "case" "F" "Supp" "On"
[17] "appeal" "brought" "U" "S"
[21] "C" "s" "U" "S"
[25] "C" "A" "s" "noted"
[29] "probable" "jurisdiction" "U" "S"
[33] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[37] "d" ""
[[53]]
[1] "Appellants" "contend" "enforcement"
[4] "Pennsylvania" "statute" "will"
[7] "prohibit" "free" "exercise"
[10] "religion" "due" "statute"
[13] "s" "compulsion" "close"
[16] "Sunday" "appellants" "will"
[19] "suffer" "substantial" "economic"
[22] "loss" "benefit" "non"
[25] "Sabbatarian" "competitors" "appellants"
[28] "also" "continue" "Sabbath"
[31] "observance" "closing" "businesses"
[34] "Saturday" "result" "will"
[37] "either" "compel" "appellants"
[40] "give" "Sabbath" "observance"
[43] "basic" "tenet" "Orthodox"
[46] "Jewish" "faith" "will"
[49] "put" "appellants" "serious"
[52] "economic" "disadvantage" "continue"
[55] "adhere" "Sabbath" "Appellants"
[58] "also" "assert" "statute"
[61] "will" "operate" "hinder"
[64] "Orthodox" "Jewish" "faith"
[67] "gaining" "new" "adherents"
[70] "And" "corollary" "arguments"
[73] "free" "exercise" "appellants"
[76] "religion" "impeded" "religion"
[79] "subjected" "discriminatory" "treatment"
[82] "State" ""
[[54]]
[1] "In" "McGowan" "v" "Maryland"
[5] "U" "S" "pages" "S"
[9] "Ct" "page" "noted" "significance"
[13] "Court" "attributed" "development" "religious"
[17] "freedom" "Virginia" "determining" "scope"
[21] "First" "Amendment" "s" "protection"
[25] "We" "observed" "Virginia" "passed"
[29] "Declaration" "Rights" "providing" "men"
[33] "equally" "entitled" "free" "exercise"
[37] "religion" "Virginia" "repealed" "laws"
[41] "way" "penalized" "maintaining" "opinions"
[45] "matters" "religion" "forbearing" "repair"
[49] "church" "exercising" "mode" "worship"
[53] "whatsoever" "But" "Virginia" "retained"
[57] "laws" "prohibiting" "Sunday" "labor"
[61] ""
[[55]]
[1] "We" "also" "took" "cognizance"
[5] "McGowan" "evolution" "Sunday" "Closing"
[9] "Laws" "wholly" "religious" "sanctions"
[13] "legislation" "concerned" "establishment" "day"
[17] "community" "tranquillity" "respite" "recreation"
[21] "day" "atmosphere" "one" "calm"
[25] "relaxation" "rather" "one" "commercialism"
[29] "six" "days" "week" "We"
[33] "reviewed" "still" "growing" "state"
[37] "preoccupation" "improving" "health" "safety"
[41] "morals" "general" "well" "citizens"
[45] ""
[[56]]
[1] "Concededly" "appellants" "persons" "wish"
[5] "work" "Sunday" "will" "burdened"
[9] "economically" "State" "s" "day"
[13] "rest" "mandate" "appellants" "point"
[17] "religion" "requires" "refrain" "work"
[21] "Saturday" "well" "Our" "inquiry"
[25] "whether" "circumstances" "First" "Fourteenth"
[29] "Amendments" "forbid" "application" "Sunday"
[33] "Closing" "Law" "appellants" ""
[[57]]
[1] "Certain" "aspects" "religious" "exercise"
[5] "way" "restricted" "burdened" "either"
[9] "federal" "state" "legislation" "Compulsion"
[13] "law" "acceptance" "creed" "practice"
[17] "form" "worship" "strictly" "forbidden"
[21] "The" "freedom" "hold" "religious"
[25] "beliefs" "opinions" "absolute" "Cantwell"
[29] "v" "State" "Connecticut" "U"
[33] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "Reynolds" "v" "United"
[41] "States" "U" "S" "L"
[45] "Ed" "Thus" "West" "Virginia"
[49] "State" "Board" "Education" "v"
[53] "Barnette" "U" "S" "S"
[57] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "Court"
[61] "held" "state" "action" "compelling"
[65] "school" "children" "salute" "flag"
[69] "pain" "expulsion" "public" "shool"
[73] "contrary" "First" "Fourteenth" "Amendments"
[77] "applied" "students" "whose" "religious"
[81] "beliefs" "forbade" "saluting" "flag"
[85] "But" "case" "bar" "statute"
[89] "us" "make" "criminal" "holding"
[93] "religious" "belief" "opinion" "force"
[97] "anyone" "embrace" "religious" "belief"
[101] "say" "believe" "anything" "conflict"
[105] "religious" "tenets" ""
[[58]]
[1] "However" "freedom" "act" "even"
[5] "action" "accord" "one" "s"
[9] "religious" "convictions" "totally" "free"
[13] "legislative" "restrictions" "Cantwell" "v"
[17] "State" "Connecticut" "supra" "U"
[21] "S" "pages" "S" "Ct"
[25] "pages" "As" "pointed" "Reynolds"
[29] "v" "United" "States" "supra"
[33] "U" "S" "page" "legislative"
[37] "power" "mere" "opinion" "forbidden"
[41] "may" "reach" "people" "s"
[45] "actions" "found" "violation" "important"
[49] "social" "duties" "subversive" "good"
[53] "order" "even" "actions" "demanded"
[57] "one" "s" "religion" "This"
[61] "articulated" "Thomas" "Jefferson" "said"
[65] ""
[[59]]
[1] "" "Believing" "religion" "matter"
[5] "lies" "solely" "man" "God"
[9] "owes" "account" "none" "faith"
[13] "worship" "legislative" "powers" "government"
[17] "reach" "actions" "opinions" "I"
[21] "contemplate" "sovereign" "reverence" "act"
[25] "whole" "American" "people" "declared"
[29] "legislature" "make" "law" "respecting"
[33] "establishment" "religion" "prohibiting" "free"
[37] "exercise" "thereof" "thus" "building"
[41] "wall" "separation" "church" "State"
[45] "Adhering" "expression" "supreme" "will"
[49] "nation" "behalf" "rights" "conscience"
[53] "I" "shall" "see" "sincere"
[57] "satisfaction" "progress" "sentiments" "tend"
[61] "restore" "man" "natural" "rights"
[65] "convinced" "natural" "right" "opposition"
[69] "social" "duties" "Emphasis" "added"
[73] "Works" "Thomas" "Jefferson" ""
[[60]]
[1] "And" "Barnette" "case" "Court"
[5] "careful" "point" "The" "freedom"
[9] "asserted" "appellees" "bring" "collision"
[13] "rights" "asserted" "individual" "It"
[17] "conflicts" "frequently" "require" "intervention"
[21] "State" "determine" "rights" "one"
[25] "end" "another" "begin" "It"
[29] "noted" "compulsory" "flag" "salute"
[33] "pledge" "requires" "affirmation" "belief"
[37] "attitude" "mind" "U" "S"
[41] "pages" "S" "Ct" "page"
[45] "Emphasis" "added" ""
[[61]]
[1] "" "Thus" "Reynolds" "v"
[5] "United" "States" "Court" "upheld"
[9] "polygamy" "conviction" "member" "Mormon"
[13] "faith" "despite" "fact" "accepted"
[17] "doctrine" "church" "imposed" "upon"
[21] "male" "members" "duty" "practice"
[25] "polygamy" "And" "Prince" "v"
[29] "Commonwealth" "Massachusetts" "U" "S"
[33] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[37] "Court" "upheld" "statute" "making"
[41] "crime" "girl" "eighteen" "years"
[45] "age" "sell" "newspapers" "periodicals"
[49] "merchandise" "public" "places" "despite"
[53] "fact" "child" "Jehovah" "s"
[57] "Witnesses" "faith" "believed" "religious"
[61] "duty" "perform" "work" ""
[[62]]
[1] "It" "noted" "two" "cases"
[5] "just" "mentioned" "religious" "practices"
[9] "conflicted" "public" "interest" "In"
[13] "cases" "make" "accommodation" "religious"
[17] "action" "exercise" "state" "authority"
[21] "particularly" "delicate" "task" "id"
[25] "U" "S" "page" "S"
[29] "Ct" "page" "resolution" "favor"
[33] "State" "results" "choice" "individual"
[37] "either" "abandoning" "religious" "principle"
[41] "facing" "criminal" "prosecution" ""
[[63]]
[1] "But" "case" "us" "statute"
[5] "bar" "make" "unlawful" "religious"
[9] "practices" "appellants" "Sunday" "law"
[13] "simply" "regulates" "secular" "activity"
[17] "applied" "appellants" "operates" "make"
[21] "practice" "religious" "beliefs" "expensive"
[25] "Furthermore" "law" "s" "effect"
[29] "inconvenience" "members" "Orthodox" "Jewish"
[33] "faith" "believe" "necessary" "work"
[37] "Sunday" "And" "even" "faced"
[41] "serious" "choice" "forsaking" "religious"
[45] "practices" "subjecting" "criminal" "prosecution"
[49] "Fully" "recognizing" "alternatives" "open"
[53] "appellants" "others" "similarly" "situated"
[57] "retaining" "present" "occupations" "incurring"
[61] "economic" "disadvantage" "engaging" "commercial"
[65] "activity" "call" "either" "Saturday"
[69] "Sunday" "labor" "may" "well"
[73] "result" "financial" "sacrifice" "order"
[77] "observe" "religious" "beliefs" "still"
[81] "option" "wholly" "different" "legislation"
[85] "attempts" "make" "religious" "practice"
[89] "unlawful" ""
[[64]]
[1] "To" "strike" "without" "critical"
[5] "scrutiny" "legislation" "imposes" "indirect"
[9] "burden" "exercise" "religion" "e"
[13] "legislation" "make" "unlawful" "religious"
[17] "practice" "radically" "restrict" "operating"
[21] "latitude" "legislature" "Statutes" "tax"
[25] "income" "limit" "amount" "may"
[29] "deducted" "religious" "contributions" "impose"
[33] "indirect" "economic" "burden" "observance"
[37] "religion" "citizen" "whose" "religion"
[41] "requires" "donate" "greater" "amount"
[45] "church" "statutes" "require" "courts"
[49] "closed" "Saturday" "Sunday" "impose"
[53] "similar" "indirect" "burden" "observance"
[57] "religion" "trial" "lawyer" "whose"
[61] "religion" "requires" "rest" "weekday"
[65] "The" "list" "legislation" "nature"
[69] "nearly" "limitless" ""
[[65]]
[1] "Needless" "say" "entering" "area"
[5] "religious" "freedom" "must" "fully"
[9] "cognizant" "particular" "protection" "Constitution"
[13] "accorded" "Abhorrence" "religious" "persecution"
[17] "intolerance" "basic" "part" "heritage"
[21] "But" "cosmopolitan" "nation" "made"
[25] "people" "almost" "every" "conceivable"
[29] "religious" "preference" "These" "denominations"
[33] "number" "almost" "three" "hundred"
[37] "Year" "Book" "American" "Churches"
[41] "et" "seq" "Consequently" "expected"
[45] "much" "less" "required" "legislators"
[49] "enact" "law" "regulating" "conduct"
[53] "may" "way" "result" "economic"
[57] "disadvantage" "religious" "sects" "others"
[61] "special" "practices" "various" "religions"
[65] "We" "believe" "effect" "absolute"
[69] "test" "determining" "whether" "legislation"
[73] "violates" "freedom" "religion" "protected"
[77] "First" "Amendment" ""
[[66]]
[1] "Of" "course" "hold"
[4] "unassailable" "legislation" "regulating"
[7] "conduct" "imposes" "solely"
[10] "indirect" "burden" "observance"
[13] "religion" "gross" "oversimplification"
[16] "If" "purpose" "effect"
[19] "law" "impede" "observance"
[22] "one" "religions" "discriminate"
[25] "invidiously" "religions" "law"
[28] "constitutionally" "invalid" "even"
[31] "though" "burden" "may"
[34] "characterized" "indirect" "But"
[37] "State" "regulates" "conduct"
[40] "enacting" "general" "law"
[43] "within" "power" "purpose"
[46] "effect" "advance" "State"
[49] "s" "secular" "goals"
[52] "statute" "valid" "despite"
[55] "indirect" "burden" "religious"
[58] "observance" "unless" "State"
[61] "may" "accomplish" "purpose"
[64] "means" "impose" "burden"
[67] "See" "Cantwell" "v"
[70] "State" "Connecticut" "supra"
[73] "U" "S" "pages"
[76] "S" "Ct" "pages"
[79] ""
[[67]]
[1] "As" "pointed" "McGowan" "v"
[5] "Maryland" "supra" "U" "S"
[9] "pages" "S" "Ct" "page"
[13] "find" "State" "without" "power"
[17] "provide" "weekly" "respite" "labor"
[21] "time" "set" "one" "day"
[25] "week" "apart" "others" "day"
[29] "rest" "repose" "recreation" "tranquillity"
[33] "day" "hectic" "tempo" "everyday"
[37] "existence" "ceases" "pleasant" "atmosphere"
[41] "created" "day" "members" "family"
[45] "community" "opportunity" "spend" "enjoy"
[49] "together" "day" "people" "may"
[53] "visit" "friends" "relatives" "available"
[57] "working" "days" "day" "weekly"
[61] "laborer" "may" "best" "regenerate"
[65] "This" "particularly" "true" "day"
[69] "age" "increasing" "state" "concern"
[73] "public" "welfare" "legislation" ""
[[68]]
[1] "" "Also" "McGowan" "examined"
[5] "several" "suggested" "alternative" "means"
[9] "argued" "State" "might" "accomplish"
[13] "secular" "goals" "without" "even"
[17] "remotely" "incidentally" "affecting" "religious"
[21] "freedom" "U" "S" "pages"
[25] "S" "Ct" "pages" "We"
[29] "found" "State" "might" "well"
[33] "find" "alternatives" "accomplish" "bringing"
[37] "general" "day" "rest" "We"
[41] "need" "examine" ""
[[69]]
[1] "However" "appellants" "advance"
[4] "yet" "another" "means"
[7] "State" "s" "disposal"
[10] "find" "unobjectionable" "They"
[13] "contend" "State" "cut"
[16] "exception" "Sunday" "labor"
[19] "proscription" "people" "religious"
[22] "conviction" "observe" "day"
[25] "rest" "Sunday" "By"
[28] "regulation" "appellants" "contend"
[31] "economic" "disadvantages" "imposed"
[34] "present" "system" "removed"
[37] "State" "s" "interest"
[40] "people" "rest" "one"
[43] "day" "satisfied" ""
[[70]]
[1] "A" "number" "States"
[4] "provide" "exemption" "may"
[7] "well" "wiser" "solution"
[10] "problem" "But" "concern"
[13] "wisdom" "legislation" "constitutional"
[16] "limitation" "Thus" "reason"
[19] "experience" "teach" "permit"
[22] "exemption" "might" "well"
[25] "undermine" "State" "s"
[28] "goal" "providing" "day"
[31] "best" "possible" "eliminates"
[34] "atmosphere" "commercial" "noise"
[37] "activity" "Although" "dispositive"
[40] "issue" "enforcement" "problems"
[43] "difficult" "since" "two"
[46] "days" "police" "rather"
[49] "one" "difficult" "observe"
[52] "whether" "violations" "occurring"
[55] ""
[[71]]
[1] "Additional" "problems" "might"
[4] "also" "presented" "regulation"
[7] "sort" "To" "allow"
[10] "people" "rest" "day"
[13] "Sunday" "keep" "businesses"
[16] "open" "day" "might"
[19] "well" "provide" "people"
[22] "economic" "advantage" "competitors"
[25] "must" "remain" "closed"
[28] "day" "might" "cause"
[31] "Sunday" "observers" "complain"
[34] "religions" "discriminated" "With"
[37] "competitive" "advantage" "existing"
[40] "well" "temptation" "order"
[43] "keep" "businesses" "open"
[46] "Sunday" "assert" "religious"
[49] "convictions" "compel" "close"
[52] "businesses" "formerly" "least"
[55] "profitable" "day" "This"
[58] "might" "make" "necessary"
[61] "state" "conducted" "inquiry"
[64] "sincerity" "individual" "s"
[67] "religious" "beliefs" "practice"
[70] "State" "might" "believe"
[73] "run" "afoul" "spirit"
[76] "constitutionally" "protected" "religious"
[79] "guarantees" "Finally" "order"
[82] "keep" "disruption" "day"
[85] "minimum" "exempted" "employers"
[88] "probably" "hire" "employees"
[91] "qualified" "exemption" "religious"
[94] "beliefs" "practice" "State"
[97] "might" "feel" "opposed"
[100] "general" "policy" "prohibiting"
[103] "religious" "discrimination" "hiring"
[106] "For" "reasons" "say"
[109] "Pennsylvania" "statute" "us"
[112] "invalid" "either" "face"
[115] "applied" ""
[[72]]
[1] "Mr" "Justice" "HARLAN" "concurs"
[5] "judgment" "Mr" "Justice" "BRENNAN"
[9] "Mr" "Justice" "STEWART" "concur"
[13] "disposition" "appellants" "claims" "Establishment"
[17] "Clause" "Equal" "Protection" "Clause"
[21] "Mr" "Justice" "FRANKFURTER" "Mr"
[25] "Justice" "HARLAN" "rejected" "appellants"
[29] "claim" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[33] "separate" "opinion" ""
[[73]]
[1] "Accordingly" "decision" "affirmed" ""
[[74]]
[1] "Affirmed" ""
[[75]]
[1] "" "For" "opinion" "Mr"
[5] "Justice" "FRANKFURTER" "joined" "Mr"
[9] "Justice" "HARLAN" "see" "U"
[13] "S" "S" "Ct" ""
[[76]]
[1] "" "For" "dissenting" "opinion" "Mr"
[6] "Justice" "DOUGLAS" "see" "U" "S"
[11] "S" "Ct" ""
[[77]]
[1] "Mr" "Justice" "BRENNAN" "concurring" "dissenting"
[6] ""
[[78]]
[1] "ustice" "ALITO" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[79]]
[1] "" "We" "must" "decide"
[5] "cases" "whether" "Religious" "Freedom"
[9] "Restoration" "Act" "RFRA" "Stat"
[13] "U" "S" "C" "bb"
[17] "et" "seq" "permits" "United"
[21] "States" "Department" "Health" "Human"
[25] "Services" "HHS" "demand" "three"
[29] "closely" "held" "corporations" "provide"
[33] "health" "insurance" "coverage" "methods"
[37] "contraception" "violate" "sincerely" "held"
[41] "religious" "beliefs" "companies" "owners"
[45] "We" "hold" "regulations" "impose"
[49] "obligation" "violate" "RFRA" "prohibits"
[53] "Federal" "Government" "taking" "action"
[57] "substantially" "burdens" "exercise" "religion"
[61] "unless" "action" "constitutes" "least"
[65] "restrictive" "means" "serving" "compelling"
[69] "government" "interest" ""
[[80]]
[1] "In" "holding" "HHS"
[4] "mandate" "unlawful" "reject"
[7] "HHS" "s" "argument"
[10] "owners" "companies" "forfeited"
[13] "RFRA" "protection" "decided"
[16] "organize" "businesses" "corporations"
[19] "rather" "sole" "proprietorships"
[22] "general" "partnerships" "The"
[25] "plain" "terms" "RFRA"
[28] "make" "perfectly" "clear"
[31] "Congress" "discriminate" "way"
[34] "men" "women" "wish"
[37] "run" "businesses" "profit"
[40] "corporations" "manner" "required"
[43] "religious" "beliefs" ""
[[81]]
[1] "Since" "RFRA" "applies"
[4] "cases" "must" "decide"
[7] "whether" "challenged" "HHS"
[10] "regulations" "substantially" "burden"
[13] "exercise" "religion" "hold"
[16] "The" "owners" "businesses"
[19] "religious" "objections" "abortion"
[22] "according" "religious" "beliefs"
[25] "four" "contraceptive" "methods"
[28] "issue" "abortifacients" "If"
[31] "owners" "comply" "HHS"
[34] "mandate" "believe" "will"
[37] "facilitating" "abortions" "comply"
[40] "will" "pay" "heavy"
[43] "price" "much" "million"
[46] "per" "day" "million"
[49] "per" "year" "case"
[52] "one" "companies" "If"
[55] "consequences" "amount" "substantial"
[58] "burden" "hard" "see"
[61] ""
[[82]]
[1] "Under" "RFRA" "Government"
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[10] "must" "serve" "compelling"
[13] "government" "interest" "assume"
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[19] "requirement" "But" "order"
[22] "HHS" "mandate" "sustained"
[25] "must" "also" "constitute"
[28] "least" "restrictive" "means"
[31] "serving" "interest" "mandate"
[34] "plainly" "fails" "test"
[37] "There" "ways" "Congress"
[40] "HHS" "equally" "ensure"
[43] "every" "woman" "cost"
[46] "free" "access" "particular"
[49] "contraceptives" "issue" "indeed"
[52] "FDA" "approved" "contraceptives"
[55] ""
[[83]]
[1] "In" "fact" "HHS"
[4] "already" "devised" "implemented"
[7] "system" "seeks" "respect"
[10] "religious" "liberty" "religious"
[13] "nonprofit" "corporations" "ensuring"
[16] "employees" "entities" "precisely"
[19] "access" "FDA" "approved"
[22] "contraceptives" "employees" "companies"
[25] "whose" "owners" "religious"
[28] "objections" "providing" "coverage"
[31] "The" "employees" "religious"
[34] "nonprofit" "corporations" "still"
[37] "access" "insurance" "coverage"
[40] "without" "cost" "sharing"
[43] "FDA" "approved" "contraceptives"
[46] "according" "HHS" "system"
[49] "imposes" "net" "economic"
[52] "burden" "insurance" "companies"
[55] "required" "provide" "secure"
[58] "coverage" ""
[[84]]
[1] "Although" "HHS" "made" "system"
[5] "available" "religious" "nonprofits" "religious"
[9] "objections" "contraceptive" "mandate" "HHS"
[13] "provided" "reason" "system" "made"
[17] "available" "owners" "profit" "corporations"
[21] "similar" "religious" "objections" "We"
[25] "therefore" "conclude" "system" "constitutes"
[29] "alternative" "achieves" "Government" "s"
[33] "aims" "providing" "greater" "respect"
[37] "religious" "liberty" "And" "RFRA"
[41] "conclusion" "means" "enforcement" "HHS"
[45] "contraceptive" "mandate" "objecting" "parties"
[49] "cases" "unlawful" ""
[[85]]
[1] "As" "description" "reasoning"
[4] "shows" "holding" "specific"
[7] "We" "hold" "principal"
[10] "dissent" "alleges" "profit"
[13] "corporations" "commercial" "enterprises"
[16] "can" "opt" "law"
[19] "saving" "tax" "laws"
[22] "judge" "incompatible" "sincerely"
[25] "held" "religious" "beliefs"
[28] "Post" "opinion" "GINSBURG"
[31] "J" "Nor" "hold"
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[40] "steps" "impose" "disadvantages"
[43] "others" "require" "general"
[46] "public" "pick" "tab"
[49] "Post" "And" "certainly"
[52] "hold" "suggest" "RFRA"
[55] "demands" "accommodation" "profit"
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[61] "beliefs" "matter" "impact"
[64] "accommodation" "may" "thousands"
[67] "women" "employed" "Hobby"
[70] "Lobby" "Post" "The"
[73] "effect" "HHS" "created"
[76] "accommodation" "women" "employed"
[79] "Hobby" "Lobby" "companies"
[82] "involved" "cases" "precisely"
[85] "zero" "Under" "accommodation"
[88] "women" "still" "entitled"
[91] "FDA" "approved" "contraceptives"
[94] "without" "cost" "sharing"
[97] ""
[[86]]
[1] "I" ""
[[87]]
[1] "A" ""
[[88]]
[1] "Congress" "enacted" "RFRA" "order"
[5] "provide" "broad" "protection" "religious"
[9] "liberty" "RFRA" "s" "enactment"
[13] "came" "three" "years" "Court"
[17] "s" "decision" "Employment" "Div"
[21] "Dept" "Human" "Resources" "Ore"
[25] "v" "Smith" "U" "S"
[29] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[33] "d" "largely" "repudiated" "method"
[37] "analyzing" "free" "exercise" "claims"
[41] "used" "cases" "like" "Sherbert"
[45] "v" "Verner" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[53] "d" "Wisconsin" "v" "Yoder"
[57] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[61] "L" "Ed" "d" "In"
[65] "determining" "whether" "challenged" "government"
[69] "actions" "violated" "Free" "Exercise"
[73] "Clause" "First" "Amendment" "decisions"
[77] "used" "balancing" "test" "took"
[81] "account" "whether" "challenged" "action"
[85] "imposed" "substantial" "burden" "practice"
[89] "religion" "whether" "needed" "serve"
[93] "compelling" "government" "interest" "Applying"
[97] "test" "Court" "held" "Sherbert"
[101] "employee" "fired" "refusing" "work"
[105] "Sabbath" "denied" "unemployment" "benefits"
[109] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
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[117] "Amish" "children" "required" "comply"
[121] "state" "law" "demanding" "remain"
[125] "school" "age" "even" "though"
[129] "religion" "required" "focus" "uniquely"
[133] "Amish" "values" "beliefs" "formative"
[137] "adolescent" "years" "U" "S"
[141] "S" "Ct" ""
[[89]]
[1] "In" "Smith" "however" "Court"
[5] "rejected" "balancing" "test" "set"
[9] "forth" "Sherbert" "U" "S"
[13] "S" "Ct" "Smith" "concerned"
[17] "two" "members" "Native" "American"
[21] "Church" "fired" "ingesting" "peyote"
[25] "sacramental" "purposes" "When" "sought"
[29] "unemployment" "benefits" "State" "Oregon"
[33] "rejected" "claims" "ground" "consumption"
[37] "peyote" "crime" "Oregon" "Supreme"
[41] "Court" "applying" "Sherbert" "test"
[45] "held" "denial" "benefits" "violated"
[49] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "U"
[53] "S" "S" "Ct" ""
[[90]]
[1] "This" "Court" "reversed"
[4] "observing" "use" "Sherbert"
[7] "test" "whenever" "person"
[10] "objected" "religious" "grounds"
[13] "enforcement" "generally" "applicable"
[16] "law" "open" "prospect"
[19] "constitutionally" "required" "religious"
[22] "exemptions" "civic" "obligations"
[25] "almost" "every" "conceivable"
[28] "kind" "U" "S"
[31] "S" "Ct" "The"
[34] "Court" "therefore" "held"
[37] "First" "Amendment" "neutral"
[40] "generally" "applicable" "laws"
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[46] "practices" "even" "supported"
[49] "compelling" "governmental" "interest"
[52] "City" "Boerne" "v"
[55] "Flores" "U" "S"
[58] "S" "Ct" "L"
[61] "Ed" "d" ""
[[91]]
[1] "" "Congress" "responded" "Smith"
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[13] "found" "may" "burden" "religious"
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[25] "S" "C" "bb" "see"
[29] "also" "bb" "In" "order"
[33] "ensure" "broad" "protection" "religious"
[37] "liberty" "RFRA" "provides" "Government"
[41] "shall" "substantially" "burden" "person"
[45] "s" "exercise" "religion" "even"
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[65] "entitled" "exemption" "rule" "unless"
[69] "Government" "demonstrates" "application" "burden"
[73] "person" "furtherance" "compelling" "governmental"
[77] "interest" "least" "restrictive" "means"
[81] "furthering" "compelling" "governmental" "interest"
[85] "bb" "b" ""
[[92]]
[1] "" "As" "enacted"
[4] "RFRA" "applied" "Federal"
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[10] "authority" "invoked" "regulating"
[13] "federal" "state" "agencies"
[16] "differed" "As" "applied"
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[31] "regulate" "States" "subdivisions"
[34] "Congress" "relied" "power"
[37] "Section" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[40] "enforce" "First" "Amendment"
[43] "U" "S" "S"
[46] "Ct" "In" "City"
[49] "Boerne" "however" "held"
[52] "Congress" "overstepped" "Section"
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[61] "far" "exceed" "ed"
[64] "pattern" "practice" "unconstitutional"
[67] "conduct" "Free" "Exercise"
[70] "Clause" "interpreted" "Smith"
[73] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[76] "See" "also" "id"
[79] "S" "Ct" ""
[[93]]
[1] "" "Following" "decision"
[4] "City" "Boerne" "Congress"
[7] "passed" "Religious" "Land"
[10] "Use" "Institutionalized" "Persons"
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[19] "cc" "et" "seq"
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[25] "Congress" "s" "Commerce"
[28] "Spending" "Clause" "powers"
[31] "imposes" "general" "test"
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[40] "Cutter" "v" "Wilkinson"
[43] "U" "S" "S"
[46] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[49] "d" "And" "relevant"
[52] "present" "purposes" "RLUIPA"
[55] "amended" "RFRA" "s"
[58] "definition" "exercise" "religion"
[61] "See" "bb" "importing"
[64] "RLUIPA" "definition" "Before"
[67] "RLUIPA" "RFRA" "s"
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[73] "First" "Amendment" "See"
[76] "bb" "ed" "defining"
[79] "exercise" "religion" "exercise"
[82] "religion" "First" "Amendment"
[85] "In" "RLUIPA" "obvious"
[88] "effort" "effect" "complete"
[91] "separation" "First" "Amendment"
[94] "case" "law" "Congress"
[97] "deleted" "reference" "First"
[100] "Amendment" "defined" "exercise"
[103] "religion" "include" "exercise"
[106] "religion" "whether" "compelled"
[109] "central" "system" "religious"
[112] "belief" "cc" "A"
[115] "And" "Congress" "mandated"
[118] "concept" "construed" "favor"
[121] "broad" "protection" "religious"
[124] "exercise" "maximum" "extent"
[127] "permitted" "terms" "chapter"
[130] "Constitution" "cc" "g"
[133] ""
[[94]]
[1] "B" ""
[[95]]
[1] "At" "issue" "cases" "HHS"
[5] "regulations" "promulgated" "Patient" "Protection"
[9] "Affordable" "Care" "Act" "ACA"
[13] "Stat" "ACA" "generally" "requires"
[17] "employers" "full" "time" "employees"
[21] "offer" "group" "health" "plan"
[25] "group" "health" "insurance" "coverage"
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[37] "f" "H" "c" "Any"
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[81] "insurance" "altogether" "least" "one"
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[89] "health" "plan" "qualifies" "subsidy"
[93] "one" "government" "run" "ACA"
[97] "exchanges" "employer" "must" "pay"
[101] "per" "year" "full" "time"
[105] "employees" "H" "c" ""
[[96]]
[1] "Unless" "exception" "applies"
[4] "ACA" "requires" "employer"
[7] "s" "group" "health"
[10] "plan" "group" "health"
[13] "insurance" "coverage" "furnish"
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[19] "women" "without" "cost"
[22] "sharing" "requirements" "U"
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[31] "types" "preventive" "care"
[34] "must" "covered" "Instead"
[37] "Congress" "authorized" "Health"
[40] "Resources" "Services" "Administration"
[43] "HRSA" "component" "HHS"
[46] "make" "important" "sensitive"
[49] "decision" "Ibid" "The"
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[55] "Institute" "Medicine" "nonprofit"
[58] "group" "volunteer" "advisers"
[61] "determining" "preventive" "services"
[64] "require" "See" "Fed"
[67] "Reg" ""
[[97]]
[1] "In" "August" "based"
[4] "Institute" "s" "recommendations"
[7] "HRSA" "promulgated" "Women"
[10] "s" "Preventive" "Services"
[13] "Guidelines" "See" "id"
[16] "n" "online" "http"
[19] "hrsa" "gov" "womensguidelines"
[22] "Internet" "materials" "visited"
[25] "June" "available" "Clerk"
[28] "Court" "s" "case"
[31] "file" "The" "Guidelines"
[34] "provide" "nonexempt" "employers"
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[40] "coverage" "without" "cost"
[43] "sharing" "ll" "Food"
[46] "Drug" "Administration" "FDA"
[49] "approved" "contraceptive" "methods"
[52] "sterilization" "procedures" "patient"
[55] "education" "counseling" "Fed"
[58] "Reg" "internal" "quotation"
[61] "marks" "omitted" "Although"
[64] "many" "required" "FDA"
[67] "approved" "methods" "contraception"
[70] "work" "preventing" "fertilization"
[73] "egg" "four" "methods"
[76] "specifically" "issue" "cases"
[79] "may" "effect" "preventing"
[82] "already" "fertilized" "egg"
[85] "developing" "inhibiting" "attachment"
[88] "uterus" "See" "Brief"
[91] "HHS" "No" "pp"
[94] "n" "FDA" "Birth"
[97] "Control" "Medicines" "Help"
[100] "You" ""
[[98]]
[1] "HHS" "also" "authorized" "HRSA"
[5] "establish" "exemptions" "contraceptive" "mandate"
[9] "religious" "employers" "CFR" "That"
[13] "category" "encompasses" "churches" "integrated"
[17] "auxiliaries" "conventions" "associations" "churches"
[21] "well" "exclusively" "religious" "activities"
[25] "religious" "order" "See" "ibid"
[29] "citing" "U" "S" "C"
[33] "A" "iii" "In" "Guidelines"
[37] "HRSA" "exempted" "organizations" "requirement"
[41] "cover" "contraceptive" "services" "See"
[45] "http" "hrsa" "gov" "womens"
[49] "guidelines" ""
[[99]]
[1] "In" "addition" "HHS" "effectively"
[5] "exempted" "certain" "religious" "nonprofit"
[9] "organizations" "described" "HHS" "regulations"
[13] "eligible" "organizations" "contraceptive" "mandate"
[17] "See" "CFR" "b" "Fed"
[21] "Reg" "An" "eligible" "organization"
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[29] "religious" "organization" "opposes" "providing"
[33] "coverage" "contraceptive" "services" "required"
[37] "covered" "account" "religious" "objections"
[41] "CFR" "b" "To" "qualify"
[45] "accommodation" "employer" "must" "certify"
[49] "organization" "b" "When" "group"
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[57] "notice" "one" "clients" "invoked"
[61] "provision" "issuer" "must" "exclude"
[65] "contraceptive" "coverage" "employer" "s"
[69] "plan" "provide" "separate" "payments"
[73] "contraceptive" "services" "plan" "participants"
[77] "without" "imposing" "cost" "sharing"
[81] "requirements" "eligible" "organization" "insurance"
[85] "plan" "employee" "beneficiaries" "c"
[89] "Although" "procedure" "requires" "issuer"
[93] "bear" "cost" "services" "HHS"
[97] "determined" "obligation" "will" "impose"
[101] "net" "expense" "issuers" "cost"
[105] "will" "less" "equal" "cost"
[109] "savings" "resulting" "services" "Fed"
[113] "Reg" ""
[[100]]
[1] "In" "addition" "exemptions" "religious"
[5] "organizations" "ACA" "exempts" "great"
[9] "many" "employers" "coverage" "requirements"
[13] "Employers" "providing" "grandfathered" "health"
[17] "plans" "existed" "prior" "March"
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[25] "need" "comply" "many" "Act"
[29] "s" "requirements" "including" "contraceptive"
[33] "mandate" "U" "S" "C"
[37] "e" "And" "employers" "fewer"
[41] "employees" "required" "provide" "health"
[45] "insurance" "U" "S" "C"
[49] "H" "c" ""
[[101]]
[1] "" "All" "told" "contraceptive"
[5] "mandate" "presently" "apply" "tens"
[9] "millions" "people" "F" "d"
[13] "C" "A" "This" "attributable"
[17] "large" "part" "grandfathered" "health"
[21] "plans" "Over" "one" "third"
[25] "million" "nonelderly" "people" "America"
[29] "employer" "sponsored" "health" "plans"
[33] "enrolled" "grandfathered" "plans" "Brief"
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[61] "million" "workers" "See" "The"
[65] "Whitehouse" "Health" "Reform" "Small"
[69] "Businesses" "The" "Affordable" "Care"
[73] "Act" "Increases" "Choice" "Saving"
[77] "Money" "Small" "Businesses" ""
[[102]]
[1] "II" ""
[[103]]
[1] "A" ""
[[104]]
[1] "Norman" "Elizabeth" "Hahn" "three"
[5] "sons" "devout" "members" "Mennonite"
[9] "Church" "Christian" "denomination" "The"
[13] "Mennonite" "Church" "opposes" "abortion"
[17] "believes" "t" "fetus" "earliest"
[21] "stages" "shares" "humanity" "conceived"
[25] ""
[[105]]
[1] "Fifty" "years" "ago" "Norman"
[5] "Hahn" "started" "wood" "working"
[9] "business" "garage" "since" "company"
[13] "Conestoga" "Wood" "Specialties" "grown"
[17] "now" "employees" "Conestoga" "organized"
[21] "Pennsylvania" "law" "profit" "corporation"
[25] "The" "Hahns" "exercise" "sole"
[29] "ownership" "closely" "held" "business"
[33] "control" "board" "directors" "hold"
[37] "voting" "shares" "One" "Hahn"
[41] "sons" "serves" "president" "CEO"
[45] ""
[[106]]
[1] "The" "Hahns" "believe" "required"
[5] "run" "business" "accordance" "religious"
[9] "beliefs" "moral" "principles" "F"
[13] "Supp" "d" "E" "D"
[17] "Pa" "To" "end" "company"
[21] "s" "mission" "see" "operate"
[25] "professional" "environment" "founded" "upon"
[29] "highest" "ethical" "moral" "Christian"
[33] "principles" "Ibid" "internal" "quotation"
[37] "marks" "omitted" "The" "company"
[41] "s" "Vision" "Values" "Statements"
[45] "affirms" "Conestoga" "endeavors" "ensur"
[49] "e" "reasonable" "profit" "manner"
[53] "reflects" "Hahns" "Christian" "heritage"
[57] "App" "No" "p" "complaint"
[61] ""
[[107]]
[1] "As" "explained" "Conestoga"
[4] "s" "board" "adopted"
[7] "Statement" "Sanctity" "Human"
[10] "Life" "Hahns" "believe"
[13] "human" "life" "begins"
[16] "conception" "F" "d"
[19] "n" "C" "A"
[22] "internal" "quotation" "marks"
[25] "omitted" "It" "therefore"
[28] "moral" "conviction" "involved"
[31] "termination" "human" "life"
[34] "conception" "believe" "sin"
[37] "God" "held" "accountable"
[40] "Ibid" "internal" "quotation"
[43] "marks" "omitted" "The"
[46] "Hahns" "accordingly" "excluded"
[49] "group" "health" "insurance"
[52] "plan" "offer" "employees"
[55] "certain" "contraceptive" "methods"
[58] "consider" "abortifacients" "Id"
[61] ""
[[108]]
[1] "The" "Hahns" "Conestoga"
[4] "sued" "HHS" "federal"
[7] "officials" "agencies" "RFRA"
[10] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[13] "First" "Amendment" "seeking"
[16] "enjoin" "application" "ACA"
[19] "s" "contraceptive" "mandate"
[22] "insofar" "requires" "provide"
[25] "health" "insurance" "coverage"
[28] "four" "FDA" "approved"
[31] "contraceptives" "may" "operate"
[34] "fertilization" "egg" "These"
[37] "include" "two" "forms"
[40] "emergency" "contraception" "commonly"
[43] "called" "morning" "pills"
[46] "two" "types" "intrauterine"
[49] "devices" ""
[[109]]
[1] "In" "opposing" "requirement"
[4] "provide" "coverage" "contraceptives"
[7] "object" "Hahns" "argued"
[10] "immoral" "sinful" "intentionally"
[13] "participate" "pay" "facilitate"
[16] "otherwise" "support" "drugs"
[19] "Ibid" "The" "District"
[22] "Court" "denied" "preliminary"
[25] "injunction" "see" "F"
[28] "Supp" "d" "Third"
[31] "Circuit" "affirmed" "divided"
[34] "opinion" "holding" "profit"
[37] "secular" "corporations" "engage"
[40] "religious" "exercise" "within"
[43] "meaning" "RFRA" "First"
[46] "Amendment" "F" "d"
[49] "The" "Third" "Circuit"
[52] "also" "rejected" "claims"
[55] "brought" "Hahns" "concluded"
[58] "HHS" "m" "andate"
[61] "impose" "requirements" "Hahns"
[64] "personal" "capacity" "Id"
[67] ""
[[110]]
[1] "B" ""
[[111]]
[1] "David" "Barbara" "Green" "three"
[5] "children" "Christians" "operate" "two"
[9] "family" "businesses" "Forty" "five"
[13] "years" "ago" "David" "Green"
[17] "started" "arts" "crafts" "store"
[21] "grown" "nationwide" "chain" "called"
[25] "Hobby" "Lobby" "There" "now"
[29] "Hobby" "Lobby" "stores" "company"
[33] "employees" "F" "d" "Hobby"
[37] "Lobby" "organized" "profit" "corporation"
[41] "Oklahoma" "law" ""
[[112]]
[1] "One" "David" "s" "sons"
[5] "started" "affiliated" "business" "Mardel"
[9] "operates" "Christian" "bookstores" "employs"
[13] "close" "people" "Ibid" "Mardel"
[17] "also" "organized" "profit" "corporation"
[21] "Oklahoma" "law" ""
[[113]]
[1] "Though" "two" "businesses" "expanded"
[5] "years" "remain" "closely" "held"
[9] "David" "Barbara" "children" "retain"
[13] "exclusive" "control" "companies" "Ibid"
[17] "David" "serves" "CEO" "Hobby"
[21] "Lobby" "three" "children" "serve"
[25] "president" "vice" "president" "vice"
[29] "CEO" "See" "Brief" "Respondents"
[33] "No" "p" ""
[[114]]
[1] "" "Hobby" "Lobby" "s"
[5] "statement" "purpose" "commits" "Greens"
[9] "h" "onoring" "Lord" "operating"
[13] "company" "manner" "consistent" "Biblical"
[17] "principles" "App" "No" "pp"
[21] "complaint" "Each" "family" "member"
[25] "signed" "pledge" "run" "businesses"
[29] "accordance" "family" "s" "religious"
[33] "beliefs" "use" "family" "assets"
[37] "support" "Christian" "ministries" "F"
[41] "d" "In" "accordance" "commitments"
[45] "Hobby" "Lobby" "Mardel" "stores"
[49] "close" "Sundays" "even" "though"
[53] "Greens" "calculate" "lose" "millions"
[57] "sales" "annually" "Id" "App"
[61] "No" "The" "businesses" "refuse"
[65] "engage" "profitable" "transactions" "facilitate"
[69] "promote" "alcohol" "use" "contribute"
[73] "profits" "Christian" "missionaries" "ministries"
[77] "buy" "hundreds" "full" "page"
[81] "newspaper" "ads" "inviting" "people"
[85] "know" "Jesus" "Lord" "Savior"
[89] "Ibid" "internal" "quotation" "marks"
[93] "omitted" ""
[[115]]
[1] "Like" "Hahns" "Greens" "believe"
[5] "life" "begins" "conception" "violate"
[9] "religion" "facilitate" "access" "contraceptive"
[13] "drugs" "devices" "operate" "point"
[17] "F" "d" "They" "specifically"
[21] "object" "four" "contraceptive" "methods"
[25] "Hahns" "like" "Hahns" "objection"
[29] "FDA" "approved" "methods" "birth"
[33] "control" "Id" "Although" "group"
[37] "health" "insurance" "plan" "predates"
[41] "enactment" "ACA" "grandfathered" "plan"
[45] "Hobby" "Lobby" "elected" "retain"
[49] "grandfathered" "status" "contraceptive" "mandate"
[53] "proposed" "Id" ""
[[116]]
[1] "The" "Greens" "Hobby" "Lobby"
[5] "Mardel" "sued" "HHS" "federal"
[9] "agencies" "officials" "challenge" "contraceptive"
[13] "mandate" "RFRA" "Free" "Exercise"
[17] "Clause" "The" "District" "Court"
[21] "denied" "preliminary" "injunction" "see"
[25] "F" "Supp" "d" "W"
[29] "D" "Okla" "plaintiffs" "appealed"
[33] "moving" "initial" "en" "banc"
[37] "consideration" "The" "Tenth" "Circuit"
[41] "granted" "motion" "reversed" "divided"
[45] "opinion" "Contrary" "conclusion" "Third"
[49] "Circuit" "Tenth" "Circuit" "held"
[53] "Greens" "two" "profit" "businesses"
[57] "persons" "within" "meaning" "RFRA"
[61] "therefore" "may" "bring" "suit"
[65] "law" ""
[[117]]
[1] "The" "court" "held"
[4] "corporations" "established" "likelihood"
[7] "success" "RFRA" "claim"
[10] "F" "d" "The"
[13] "court" "concluded" "contraceptive"
[16] "mandate" "substantially" "burdened"
[19] "exercise" "religion" "requiring"
[22] "companies" "choose" "compromis"
[25] "ing" "religious" "beliefs"
[28] "paying" "heavy" "fee"
[31] "either" "close" "million"
[34] "taxes" "every" "year"
[37] "simply" "refused" "provide"
[40] "coverage" "contraceptives" "issue"
[43] "roughly" "million" "annually"
[46] "drop" "ped" "health"
[49] "insurance" "benefits" "employees"
[52] "Id" ""
[[118]]
[1] "The" "court" "next" "held"
[5] "HHS" "failed" "demonstrate" "compelling"
[9] "interest" "enforcing" "mandate" "Greens"
[13] "businesses" "alternative" "HHS" "failed"
[17] "prove" "enforcement" "mandate" "least"
[21] "restrictive" "means" "furthering" "Government"
[25] "s" "asserted" "interests" "Id"
[29] "emphasis" "deleted" "internal" "quotation"
[33] "marks" "omitted" "After" "concluding"
[37] "companies" "demonstrated" "irreparable" "harm"
[41] "court" "reversed" "remanded" "District"
[45] "Court" "consider" "remaining" "factors"
[49] "preliminary" "injunction" "test" "Id"
[53] ""
[[119]]
[1] "" "We" "granted" "certiorari" "U"
[6] "S" "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[11] "d" ""
[[120]]
[1] "III" ""
[[121]]
[1] "A" ""
[[122]]
[1] "RFRA" "prohibits" "Government" "substantially"
[5] "burden" "ing" "person" "s"
[9] "exercise" "religion" "even" "burden"
[13] "results" "rule" "general" "applicability"
[17] "unless" "Government" "demonstrates" "application"
[21] "burden" "person" "furtherance" "compelling"
[25] "governmental" "interest" "least" "restrictive"
[29] "means" "furthering" "compelling" "governmental"
[33] "interest" "U" "S" "C"
[37] "bb" "b" "emphasis" "added"
[41] "The" "first" "question" "must"
[45] "address" "whether" "provision" "applies"
[49] "regulations" "govern" "activities" "profit"
[53] "corporations" "like" "Hobby" "Lobby"
[57] "Conestoga" "Mardel" ""
[[123]]
[1] "HHS" "contends" "neither" "companies"
[5] "owners" "can" "even" "heard"
[9] "RFRA" "According" "HHS" "companies"
[13] "sue" "seek" "make" "profit"
[17] "owners" "owners" "heard" "regulations"
[21] "least" "formal" "matter" "apply"
[25] "companies" "owners" "individuals" "HHS"
[29] "s" "argument" "dramatic" "consequences"
[33] ""
[[124]]
[1] "Consider" "Court" "s" "decision"
[5] "Braunfeld" "v" "Brown" "U"
[9] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[13] "Ed" "d" "plurality" "opinion"
[17] "In" "case" "five" "Orthodox"
[21] "Jewish" "merchants" "ran" "small"
[25] "retail" "businesses" "Philadelphia" "challenged"
[29] "Pennsylvania" "Sunday" "closing" "law"
[33] "violation" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[37] "Because" "faith" "merchants" "closed"
[41] "shops" "Saturday" "argued" "requiring"
[45] "remain" "shut" "Sunday" "threatened"
[49] "financial" "ruin" "The" "Court"
[53] "entertained" "claim" "although" "ruled"
[57] "merits" "similar" "claim" "raised"
[61] "today" "RFRA" "jurisdiction" "still"
[65] "subject" "Act" "example" "District"
[69] "Columbia" "see" "U" "S"
[73] "C" "bb" "merchants" "entitled"
[77] "heard" "According" "HHS" "however"
[81] "merchants" "chose" "incorporate" "businesses"
[85] "without" "way" "changing" "size"
[89] "nature" "businesses" "forfeit" "RFRA"
[93] "free" "exercise" "rights" "HHS"
[97] "put" "merchants" "difficult" "choice"
[101] "either" "give" "right" "seek"
[105] "judicial" "protection" "religious" "liberty"
[109] "forgo" "benefits" "available" "competitors"
[113] "operating" "corporations" ""
[[125]]
[1] "As" "seen" "RFRA"
[4] "designed" "provide" "broad"
[7] "protection" "religious" "liberty"
[10] "By" "enacting" "RFRA"
[13] "Congress" "went" "far"
[16] "beyond" "Court" "held"
[19] "constitutionally" "required" "Is"
[22] "reason" "think" "Congress"
[25] "enacted" "sweeping" "protection"
[28] "put" "small" "business"
[31] "owners" "choice" "HHS"
[34] "suggests" "An" "examination"
[37] "RFRA" "s" "text"
[40] "turn" "next" "part"
[43] "opinion" "reveals" "Congress"
[46] "thing" ""
[[126]]
[1] "" "As" "will"
[4] "show" "Congress" "provided"
[7] "protection" "people" "like"
[10] "Hahns" "Greens" "employing"
[13] "familiar" "legal" "fiction"
[16] "It" "included" "corporations"
[19] "within" "RFRA" "s"
[22] "definition" "persons" "But"
[25] "important" "keep" "mind"
[28] "purpose" "fiction" "provide"
[31] "protection" "human" "beings"
[34] "A" "corporation" "simply"
[37] "form" "organization" "used"
[40] "human" "beings" "achieve"
[43] "desired" "ends" "An"
[46] "established" "body" "law"
[49] "specifies" "rights" "obligations"
[52] "people" "including" "shareholders"
[55] "officers" "employees" "associated"
[58] "corporation" "one" "way"
[61] "another" "When" "rights"
[64] "whether" "constitutional" "statutory"
[67] "extended" "corporations" "purpose"
[70] "protect" "rights" "people"
[73] "For" "example" "extending"
[76] "Fourth" "Amendment" "protection"
[79] "corporations" "protects" "privacy"
[82] "interests" "employees" "others"
[85] "associated" "company" "Protecting"
[88] "corporations" "government" "seizure"
[91] "property" "without" "just"
[94] "compensation" "protects" "stake"
[97] "corporations" "financial" "well"
[100] "And" "protecting" "free"
[103] "exercise" "rights" "corporations"
[106] "like" "Hobby" "Lobby"
[109] "Conestoga" "Mardel" "protects"
[112] "religious" "liberty" "humans"
[115] "control" "companies" ""
[[127]]
[1] "In" "holding" "Conestoga" "secular"
[5] "profit" "corporation" "lacks" "RFRA"
[9] "protection" "Third" "Circuit" "wrote"
[13] "follows" ""
[[128]]
[1] "" "General" "business" "corporations"
[5] "separate" "apart" "actions" "belief"
[9] "systems" "individual" "owners" "employees"
[13] "exercise" "religion" "They" "pray"
[17] "worship" "observe" "sacraments" "take"
[21] "religiously" "motivated" "actions" "separate"
[25] "apart" "intention" "direction" "individual"
[29] "actors" "F" "d" "emphasis"
[33] "added" ""
[[129]]
[1] "All" "true" "quite" "beside"
[5] "point" "Corporations" "separate" "apart"
[9] "human" "beings" "run" "employed"
[13] "anything" ""
[[130]]
[1] "B" ""
[[131]]
[1] "" ""
[[132]]
[1] "" "As" "noted" "RFRA"
[5] "applies" "person" "s" "exercise"
[9] "religion" "U" "S" "C"
[13] "bb" "b" "RFRA" "define"
[17] "term" "person" "We" "therefore"
[21] "look" "Dictionary" "Act" "must"
[25] "consult" "n" "determining" "meaning"
[29] "Act" "Congress" "unless" "context"
[33] "indicates" "otherwise" "U" "S"
[37] "C" ""
[[133]]
[1] "Under" "Dictionary" "Act" "wor"
[5] "d" "person" "include" "s"
[9] "corporations" "companies" "associations" "firms"
[13] "partnerships" "societies" "joint" "stock"
[17] "companies" "well" "individuals" "Ibid"
[21] "see" "FCC" "v" "AT"
[25] "T" "Inc" "U" "S"
[29] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[33] "d" "We" "doubt" "person"
[37] "legal" "setting" "often" "refers"
[41] "artificial" "entities" "The" "Dictionary"
[45] "Act" "makes" "clear" "Thus"
[49] "unless" "something" "RFRA" "context"
[53] "indicates" "otherwise" "Dictionary" "Act"
[57] "provides" "quick" "clear" "affirmative"
[61] "answer" "question" "whether" "companies"
[65] "involved" "cases" "may" "heard"
[69] ""
[[134]]
[1] "We" "see" "nothing" "RFRA"
[5] "suggests" "congressional" "intent" "depart"
[9] "Dictionary" "Act" "definition" "HHS"
[13] "makes" "little" "effort" "argue"
[17] "otherwise" "We" "entertained" "RFRA"
[21] "free" "exercise" "claims" "brought"
[25] "nonprofit" "corporations" "see" "Gonzales"
[29] "v" "O" "Centro" "Esp"
[33] "rita" "Beneficente" "Uniao" "Vegetal"
[37] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[41] "L" "Ed" "d" "RFRA"
[45] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "Evangelical" "Lutheran"
[49] "Church" "School" "v" "EEOC"
[53] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[57] "L" "Ed" "d" "Free"
[61] "Exercise" "Church" "Lukumi" "Babalu"
[65] "Aye" "Inc" "v" "Hialeah"
[69] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[73] "L" "Ed" "d" "Free"
[77] "Exercise" "HHS" "concedes" "nonprofit"
[81] "corporation" "can" "person" "within"
[85] "meaning" "RFRA" "See" "Brief"
[89] "HHS" "No" "Reply" "Brief"
[93] "No" ""
[[135]]
[1] "This" "concession" "effectively" "dispatches"
[5] "argument" "term" "person" "used"
[9] "RFRA" "reach" "closely" "held"
[13] "corporations" "involved" "cases" "No"
[17] "known" "understanding" "term" "person"
[21] "includes" "corporations" "The" "term"
[25] "person" "sometimes" "encompasses" "artificial"
[29] "persons" "Dictionary" "Act" "instructs"
[33] "sometimes" "limited" "natural" "persons"
[37] "But" "conceivable" "definition" "term"
[41] "includes" "natural" "persons" "nonprofit"
[45] "corporations" "profit" "corporations" "Cf"
[49] "Clark" "v" "Martinez" "U"
[53] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[57] "Ed" "d" "To" "give"
[61] "th" "e" "words" "different"
[65] "meaning" "category" "invent" "statute"
[69] "rather" "interpret" "one" ""
[[136]]
[1] "" ""
[[137]]
[1] "The" "principal" "argument" "advanced"
[5] "HHS" "principal" "dissent" "regarding"
[9] "RFRA" "protection" "Hobby" "Lobby"
[13] "Conestoga" "Mardel" "focuses" "statutory"
[17] "term" "person" "phrase" "exercise"
[21] "religion" "According" "HHS" "dissent"
[25] "corporations" "protected" "RFRA" "exercise"
[29] "religion" "Neither" "HHS" "dissent"
[33] "however" "provides" "persuasive" "explanation"
[37] "conclusion" ""
[[138]]
[1] "Is" "corporate" "form" "The"
[5] "corporate" "form" "alone" "provide"
[9] "explanation" "pointed" "HHS" "concedes"
[13] "nonprofit" "corporations" "can" "protected"
[17] "RFRA" "The" "dissent" "suggests"
[21] "nonprofit" "corporations" "special" "furthering"
[25] "religious" "autonomy" "often" "furthers"
[29] "individual" "religious" "freedom" "well"
[33] "Post" "quoting" "Corporation" "Presiding"
[37] "Bishop" "Church" "Jesus" "Christ"
[41] "Latter" "day" "Saints" "v"
[45] "Amos" "U" "S" "S"
[49] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[53] "Brennan" "J" "concurring" "judgment"
[57] "But" "principle" "applies" "equally"
[61] "profit" "corporations" "Furthering" "religious"
[65] "freedom" "also" "furthers" "individual"
[69] "religious" "freedom" "In" "cases"
[73] "example" "allowing" "Hobby" "Lobby"
[77] "Conestoga" "Mardel" "assert" "RFRA"
[81] "claims" "protects" "religious" "liberty"
[85] "Greens" "Hahns" ""
[[139]]
[1] "" "If" "corporate" "form"
[5] "enough" "profit" "making" "objective"
[9] "In" "Braunfeld" "U" "S"
[13] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[17] "d" "entertained" "free" "exercise"
[21] "claims" "individuals" "attempting" "make"
[25] "profit" "retail" "merchants" "Court"
[29] "never" "even" "hinted" "objective"
[33] "precluded" "claims" "As" "Court"
[37] "explained" "later" "case" "exercise"
[41] "religion" "involves" "belief" "profession"
[45] "performance" "abstention" "physical" "acts"
[49] "engaged" "religious" "reasons" "Smith"
[53] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[57] "Business" "practices" "compelled" "limited"
[61] "tenets" "religious" "doctrine" "fall"
[65] "comfortably" "within" "definition" "Thus"
[69] "law" "operates" "make" "practice"
[73] "religious" "beliefs" "expensive" "context"
[77] "business" "activities" "imposes" "burden"
[81] "exercise" "religion" "Braunfeld" "supra"
[85] "S" "Ct" "see" "United"
[89] "States" "v" "Lee" "U"
[93] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[97] "Ed" "d" "recognizing" "compulsory"
[101] "participation" "social" "security" "system"
[105] "interferes" "Amish" "employers" "free"
[109] "exercise" "rights" ""
[[140]]
[1] "If" "Braunfeld" "recognized"
[4] "sole" "proprietorship" "seeks"
[7] "make" "profit" "may"
[10] "assert" "free" "exercise"
[13] "claim" "can" "t"
[16] "Hobby" "Lobby" "Conestoga"
[19] "Mardel" ""
[[141]]
[1] "" "Some" "lower" "court"
[5] "judges" "suggested" "RFRA" "protect"
[9] "profit" "corporations" "purpose" "corporations"
[13] "simply" "make" "money" "This"
[17] "argument" "flies" "face" "modern"
[21] "corporate" "law" "Each" "American"
[25] "jurisdiction" "today" "either" "expressly"
[29] "implication" "authorizes" "corporations" "formed"
[33] "general" "corporation" "act" "lawful"
[37] "purpose" "business" "J" "Cox"
[41] "T" "Hazen" "Treatise" "Law"
[45] "Corporations" "p" "d" "ed"
[49] "emphasis" "added" "see" "A"
[53] "W" "Fletcher" "Cyclopedia" "Law"
[57] "Corporations" "rev" "ed" "While"
[61] "certainly" "true" "central" "objective"
[65] "profit" "corporations" "make" "money"
[69] "modern" "corporate" "law" "require"
[73] "profit" "corporations" "pursue" "profit"
[77] "expense" "everything" "else" "many"
[81] "For" "profit" "corporations" "ownership"
[85] "approval" "support" "wide" "variety"
[89] "charitable" "causes" "uncommon" "corporations"
[93] "humanitarian" "altruistic" "objectives" "Many"
[97] "examples" "come" "readily" "mind"
[101] "So" "long" "owners" "agree"
[105] "profit" "corporation" "may" "take"
[109] "costly" "pollution" "control" "energy"
[113] "conservation" "measures" "go" "beyond"
[117] "law" "requires" "A" "profit"
[121] "corporation" "operates" "facilities" "countries"
[125] "may" "exceed" "requirements" "local"
[129] "law" "regarding" "working" "conditions"
[133] "benefits" "If" "profit" "corporations"
[137] "may" "pursue" "worthy" "objectives"
[141] "apparent" "reason" "may" "religious"
[145] "objectives" "well" ""
[[142]]
[1] "HHS" "draw" "sharp" "line"
[5] "nonprofit" "corporations" "HHS" "concedes"
[9] "protected" "RFRA" "profit" "corporations"
[13] "HHS" "leave" "unprotected" "actual"
[17] "picture" "less" "clear" "cut"
[21] "Not" "corporations" "decline" "organize"
[25] "nonprofits" "order" "maximize" "profit"
[29] "For" "example" "organizations" "religious"
[33] "charitable" "aims" "might" "organize"
[37] "profit" "corporations" "potential" "advantages"
[41] "corporate" "form" "freedom" "participate"
[45] "lobbying" "legislation" "campaigning" "political"
[49] "candidates" "promote" "religious" "charitable"
[53] "goals" "In" "fact" "recognizing"
[57] "inherent" "compatibility" "establishing" "profit"
[61] "corporation" "pursuing" "nonprofit" "goals"
[65] "States" "increasingly" "adopted" "laws"
[69] "formally" "recognizing" "hybrid" "corporate"
[73] "forms" "Over" "half" "States"
[77] "instance" "now" "recognize" "benefit"
[81] "corporation" "dual" "purpose" "entity"
[85] "seeks" "achieve" "benefit" "public"
[89] "profit" "owners" ""
[[143]]
[1] "In" "event" "objectives" "may"
[5] "properly" "pursued" "companies" "cases"
[9] "governed" "laws" "States" "incorporated"
[13] "Pennsylvania" "Oklahoma" "laws" "States"
[17] "permit" "profit" "corporations" "pursue"
[21] "lawful" "purpose" "act" "including"
[25] "pursuit" "profit" "conformity" "owners"
[29] "religious" "principles" "Pa" "Cons"
[33] "Stat" "Corporations" "may" "incorporated"
[37] "subpart" "lawful" "purpose" "purposes"
[41] "Okla" "Stat" "Tit" "West"
[45] "E" "corporation" "whether" "profit"
[49] "profit" "may" "incorporated" "organized"
[53] "conduct" "promote" "lawful" "business"
[57] "purposes" "see" "also" "A"
[61] "Brief" "State" "Oklahoma" "Amicus"
[65] "Curiae" "No" ""
[[144]]
[1] "" ""
[[145]]
[1] "HHS" "principal" "dissent" "make"
[5] "one" "additional" "argument" "effort"
[9] "show" "profit" "corporation" "engage"
[13] "exercise" "religion" "within" "meaning"
[17] "RFRA" "HHS" "argues" "RFRA"
[21] "codify" "Court" "s" "pre"
[25] "Smith" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[29] "precedents" "none" "cases" "squarely"
[33] "held" "profit" "corporation" "free"
[37] "exercise" "rights" "RFRA" "confer"
[41] "protection" "This" "argument" "many"
[45] "flaws" ""
[[146]]
[1] "" "First" "nothing"
[4] "text" "RFRA" "originally"
[7] "enacted" "suggested" "statutory"
[10] "phrase" "exercise" "religion"
[13] "First" "Amendment" "meant"
[16] "tied" "Court" "s"
[19] "pre" "Smith" "interpretation"
[22] "Amendment" "When" "first"
[25] "enacted" "RFRA" "defined"
[28] "exercise" "religion" "mean"
[31] "exercise" "religion" "First"
[34] "Amendment" "exercise" "religion"
[37] "recognized" "existing" "Supreme"
[40] "Court" "precedents" "U"
[43] "S" "C" "bb"
[46] "ed" "When" "Congress"
[49] "wants" "link" "meaning"
[52] "statutory" "provision" "body"
[55] "Court" "s" "case"
[58] "law" "knows" "See"
[61] "e" "g" "Antiterrorism"
[64] "Effective" "Death" "Penalty"
[67] "Act" "U" "S"
[70] "C" "d" "authorizing"
[73] "habeas" "relief" "state"
[76] "court" "decision" "contrary"
[79] "involved" "unreasonable" "application"
[82] "clearly" "established" "Federal"
[85] "law" "determined" "Supreme"
[88] "Court" "United" "States"
[91] ""
[[147]]
[1] "Second" "original" "text" "RFRA"
[5] "clear" "enough" "point" "think"
[9] "amendment" "RFRA" "RLUIPA" "surely"
[13] "dispels" "doubt" "That" "amendment"
[17] "deleted" "prior" "reference" "First"
[21] "Amendment" "see" "U" "S"
[25] "C" "bb" "ed" "incorporating"
[29] "cc" "neither" "HHS" "principal"
[33] "dissent" "can" "explain" "Congress"
[37] "wanted" "tie" "RFRA" "coverage"
[41] "tightly" "specific" "holdings" "pre"
[45] "Smith" "free" "exercise" "cases"
[49] "Moreover" "discussed" "amendment" "went"
[53] "providing" "exercise" "religion" "shall"
[57] "construed" "favor" "broad" "protection"
[61] "religious" "exercise" "maximum" "extent"
[65] "permitted" "terms" "chapter" "Constitution"
[69] "cc" "g" "It" "simply"
[73] "possible" "read" "provisions" "restricting"
[77] "concept" "exercise" "religion" "practices"
[81] "specifically" "addressed" "pre" "Smith"
[85] "decisions" ""
[[148]]
[1] "Third" "one" "pre"
[4] "Smith" "case" "involving"
[7] "free" "exercise" "rights"
[10] "profit" "corporation" "suggests"
[13] "anything" "profit" "corporations"
[16] "possess" "rights" "In"
[19] "Gallagher" "v" "Crown"
[22] "Kosher" "Super" "Market"
[25] "Mass" "Inc" "U"
[28] "S" "S" "Ct"
[31] "L" "Ed" "d"
[34] "Massachusetts" "Sunday" "closing"
[37] "law" "challenged" "kosher"
[40] "market" "organized" "profit"
[43] "corporation" "customers" "market"
[46] "rabbi" "The" "Commonwealth"
[49] "argued" "corporation" "lacked"
[52] "standing" "assert" "free"
[55] "exercise" "claim" "one"
[58] "member" "Court" "expressed"
[61] "agreement" "argument" "The"
[64] "plurality" "opinion" "four"
[67] "Justices" "rejected" "First"
[70] "Amendment" "claim" "merits"
[73] "based" "reasoning" "Braunfeld"
[76] "reserved" "decision" "question"
[79] "whether" "corporation" "standing"
[82] "raise" "claim" "See"
[85] "U" "S" "S"
[88] "Ct" "The" "three"
[91] "dissenters" "Justices" "Douglas"
[94] "Brennan" "Stewart" "found"
[97] "law" "unconstitutional" "applied"
[100] "corporation" "challengers" "thus"
[103] "implicitly" "recognized" "right"
[106] "assert" "free" "exercise"
[109] "claim" "See" "id"
[112] "S" "Ct" "Brennan"
[115] "J" "joined" "Stewart"
[118] "J" "dissenting" "McGowan"
[121] "v" "Maryland" "U"
[124] "S" "S" "Ct"
[127] "L" "Ed" "d"
[130] "Douglas" "J" "dissenting"
[133] "related" "cases" "including"
[136] "Gallagher" "Finally" "Justice"
[139] "Frankfurter" "s" "opinion"
[142] "joined" "Justice" "Harlan"
[145] "upheld" "Massachusetts" "law"
[148] "merits" "question" "reserve"
[151] "decision" "issue" "right"
[154] "corporation" "challengers" "heard"
[157] "See" "McGowan" "U"
[160] "S" "S" "Ct"
[163] "It" "quite" "stretch"
[166] "argue" "RFRA" "law"
[169] "enacted" "provide" "broad"
[172] "protection" "religious" "liberty"
[175] "left" "profit" "corporations"
[178] "unprotected" "simply" "Gallagher"
[181] "pre" "Smith" "case"
[184] "issue" "raised" "majority"
[187] "Justices" "find" "necessary"
[190] "decide" "whether" "kosher"
[193] "market" "s" "corporate"
[196] "status" "barred" "raising"
[199] "free" "exercise" "claim"
[202] ""
[[149]]
[1] "Finally" "results" "absurd" "RFRA"
[5] "merely" "restored" "Court" "s"
[9] "pre" "Smith" "decisions" "ossified"
[13] "form" "allow" "plaintiff" "raise"
[17] "RFRA" "claim" "unless" "plaintiff"
[21] "fell" "within" "category" "plaintiffs"
[25] "one" "brought" "free" "exercise"
[29] "claim" "Court" "entertained" "years"
[33] "Smith" "For" "example" "aware"
[37] "pre" "Smith" "case" "Court"
[41] "entertained" "free" "exercise" "claim"
[45] "brought" "resident" "noncitizen" "Are"
[49] "persons" "also" "beyond" "RFRA"
[53] "s" "protective" "reach" "simply"
[57] "Court" "never" "addressed" "rights"
[61] "Smith" ""
[[150]]
[1] "Presumably" "recognition" "weakness" "argument"
[5] "HHS" "principal" "dissent" "fall"
[9] "back" "broader" "contention" "Nation"
[13] "lacks" "tradition" "exempting" "profit"
[17] "corporations" "generally" "applicable" "laws"
[21] "By" "contrast" "HHS" "contends"
[25] "statutes" "like" "Title" "VII"
[29] "U" "S" "C" "e"
[33] "A" "expressly" "exempt" "churches"
[37] "nonprofit" "religious" "institutions" "profit"
[41] "corporations" "See" "Brief" "HHS"
[45] "No" "p" "In" "making"
[49] "argument" "however" "HHS" "call"
[53] "attention" "fact" "federal" "statutes"
[57] "exempt" "categories" "entities" "include"
[61] "profit" "corporations" "laws" "otherwise"
[65] "require" "entities" "engage" "activities"
[69] "object" "grounds" "conscience" "See"
[73] "e" "g" "U" "S"
[77] "C" "b" "n" "If"
[81] "Title" "VII" "similar" "laws"
[85] "show" "anything" "Congress" "speaks"
[89] "specificity" "intends" "religious" "accommodation"
[93] "extend" "profit" "corporations" ""
[[151]]
[1] "" ""
[[152]]
[1] "Finally" "HHS" "contends" "Congress"
[5] "wanted" "RFRA" "apply" "profit"
[9] "corporations" "difficult" "practical" "matter"
[13] "ascertain" "sincere" "beliefs" "corporation"
[17] "HHS" "goes" "far" "raise"
[21] "specter" "divisive" "polarizing" "proxy"
[25] "battles" "religious" "identity" "large"
[29] "publicly" "traded" "corporations" "IBM"
[33] "General" "Electric" "Brief" "HHS"
[37] "No" ""
[[153]]
[1] "" "These" "cases" "however"
[5] "involve" "publicly" "traded" "corporations"
[9] "seems" "unlikely" "sort" "corporate"
[13] "giants" "HHS" "refers" "will"
[17] "often" "assert" "RFRA" "claims"
[21] "HHS" "pointed" "example" "publicly"
[25] "traded" "corporation" "asserting" "RFRA"
[29] "rights" "numerous" "practical" "restraints"
[33] "likely" "prevent" "occurring" "For"
[37] "example" "idea" "unrelated" "shareholders"
[41] "including" "institutional" "investors" "set"
[45] "stakeholders" "agree" "run" "corporation"
[49] "religious" "beliefs" "seems" "improbable"
[53] "In" "event" "occasion" "cases"
[57] "consider" "RFRA" "s" "applicability"
[61] "companies" "The" "companies" "cases"
[65] "us" "closely" "held" "corporations"
[69] "owned" "controlled" "members" "single"
[73] "family" "one" "disputed" "sincerity"
[77] "religious" "beliefs" ""
[[154]]
[1] "HHS" "also" "provided"
[4] "evidence" "purported" "problem"
[7] "determining" "sincerity" "asserted"
[10] "religious" "belief" "moved"
[13] "Congress" "exclude" "profit"
[16] "corporations" "RFRA" "s"
[19] "protection" "On" "contrary"
[22] "scope" "RLUIPA" "shows"
[25] "Congress" "confident" "ability"
[28] "federal" "courts" "weed"
[31] "insincere" "claims" "RLUIPA"
[34] "applies" "institutionalized" "persons"
[37] "category" "consists" "primarily"
[40] "prisoners" "time" "RLUIPA"
[43] "s" "enactment" "propensity"
[46] "prisoners" "assert" "claims"
[49] "dubious" "sincerity" "well"
[52] "documented" "Nevertheless" "decision"
[55] "City" "Boerne" "Congress"
[58] "enacted" "RLUIPA" "preserve"
[61] "right" "prisoners" "raise"
[64] "religious" "liberty" "claims"
[67] "If" "Congress" "thought"
[70] "federal" "courts" "job"
[73] "dealing" "insincere" "prisoner"
[76] "claims" "reason" "believe"
[79] "Congress" "limited" "RFRA"
[82] "s" "reach" "concern"
[85] "seemingly" "less" "difficult"
[88] "task" "corporate" "cases"
[91] "And" "HHS" "seems"
[94] "concede" "Congress" "wanted"
[97] "RFRA" "apply" "nonprofit"
[100] "corporations" "see" "Reply"
[103] "Brief" "No" "reason"
[106] "think" "Congress" "believed"
[109] "spotting" "insincere" "claims"
[112] "tougher" "cases" "involving"
[115] "profits" ""
[[155]]
[1] "HHS" "principal" "dissent" "express"
[5] "concern" "possibility" "disputes" "among"
[9] "owners" "corporations" "problem" "arises"
[13] "RFRA" "unique" "context" "The"
[17] "owners" "closely" "held" "corporations"
[21] "may" "sometimes" "disagree" "conduct"
[25] "business" "Treatise" "Law" "Corporations"
[29] "And" "even" "RFRA" "exist"
[33] "owners" "company" "might" "well"
[37] "dispute" "relating" "religion" "For"
[41] "example" "might" "want" "company"
[45] "s" "stores" "remain" "open"
[49] "Sabbath" "order" "make" "money"
[53] "others" "might" "want" "stores"
[57] "close" "religious" "reasons" "State"
[61] "corporate" "law" "provides" "ready"
[65] "means" "resolving" "conflicts" "example"
[69] "dictating" "corporation" "can" "establish"
[73] "governing" "structure" "See" "e"
[77] "g" "ibid" "id" "Del"
[81] "Code" "Ann" "Tit" "providing"
[85] "certificate" "incorporation" "may" "provide"
[89] "business" "corporation" "shall" "managed"
[93] "Courts" "will" "turn" "structure"
[97] "underlying" "state" "law" "resolving"
[101] "disputes" ""
[[156]]
[1] "For" "reasons" "hold" "federal"
[5] "regulation" "s" "restriction" "activities"
[9] "profit" "closely" "held" "corporation"
[13] "must" "comply" "RFRA" ""
[[157]]
[1] "IV" ""
[[158]]
[1] "Because" "RFRA" "applies" "cases"
[5] "must" "next" "ask" "whether"
[9] "HHS" "contraceptive" "mandate" "substantially"
[13] "burden" "s" "exercise" "religion"
[17] "U" "S" "C" "bb"
[21] "We" "little" "trouble" "concluding"
[25] ""
[[159]]
[1] "" "A" ""
[[160]]
[1] "" "As" "noted" "Hahns"
[5] "Greens" "sincere" "religious" "belief"
[9] "life" "begins" "conception" "They"
[13] "therefore" "object" "religious" "grounds"
[17] "providing" "health" "insurance" "covers"
[21] "methods" "birth" "control" "HHS"
[25] "acknowledges" "see" "Brief" "HHS"
[29] "No" "n" "may" "result"
[33] "destruction" "embryo" "By" "requiring"
[37] "Hahns" "Greens" "companies" "arrange"
[41] "coverage" "HHS" "mandate" "demands"
[45] "engage" "conduct" "seriously" "violates"
[49] "religious" "beliefs" ""
[[161]]
[1] "If" "Hahns" "Greens"
[4] "companies" "yield" "demand"
[7] "economic" "consequences" "will"
[10] "severe" "If" "companies"
[13] "continue" "offer" "group"
[16] "health" "plans" "cover"
[19] "contraceptives" "issue" "will"
[22] "taxed" "per" "day"
[25] "affected" "individual" "U"
[28] "S" "C" "D"
[31] "For" "Hobby" "Lobby"
[34] "bill" "amount" "million"
[37] "per" "day" "million"
[40] "per" "year" "Conestoga"
[43] "assessment" "per" "day"
[46] "million" "per" "year"
[49] "Mardel" "per" "day"
[52] "million" "per" "year"
[55] "These" "sums" "surely"
[58] "substantial" ""
[[162]]
[1] "It" "true" "plaintiffs" "avoid"
[5] "assessments" "dropping" "insurance" "coverage"
[9] "altogether" "thus" "forcing" "employees"
[13] "obtain" "health" "insurance" "one"
[17] "exchanges" "established" "ACA" "But"
[21] "least" "one" "full" "time"
[25] "employees" "qualify" "subsidy" "one"
[29] "government" "run" "exchanges" "course"
[33] "also" "entail" "substantial" "economic"
[37] "consequences" "The" "companies" "face"
[41] "penalties" "per" "employee" "year"
[45] "H" "These" "penalties" "amount"
[49] "roughly" "million" "Hobby" "Lobby"
[53] "million" "Conestoga" "Mardel" ""
[[163]]
[1] "B" ""
[[164]]
[1] "" "Although" "totals" "high"
[5] "amici" "supporting" "HHS" "suggested"
[9] "per" "employee" "penalty" "actually"
[13] "less" "average" "cost" "providing"
[17] "health" "insurance" "see" "Brief"
[21] "Religious" "Organizations" "therefore" "claim"
[25] "companies" "readily" "eliminate" "substantial"
[29] "burden" "forcing" "employees" "obtain"
[33] "insurance" "government" "exchanges" "We"
[37] "generally" "entertain" "arguments" "raised"
[41] "advanced" "Court" "party" "see"
[45] "United" "Parcel" "Service" "Inc"
[49] "v" "Mitchell" "U" "S"
[53] "n" "S" "Ct" "L"
[57] "Ed" "d" "Bell" "v"
[61] "Wolfish" "U" "S" "n"
[65] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[69] "d" "Knetsch" "v" "United"
[73] "States" "U" "S" "S"
[77] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[81] "strong" "reasons" "adhere" "practice"
[85] "cases" "HHS" "presumably" "compiled"
[89] "relevant" "statistics" "never" "made"
[93] "argument" "voluminous" "briefing" "oral"
[97] "argument" "Court" "knowledge" "numerous"
[101] "cases" "issue" "now" "us"
[105] "litigated" "around" "country" "As"
[109] "things" "now" "stand" "even"
[113] "know" "Government" "s" "position"
[117] "might" "respect" "amici" "s"
[121] "intensely" "empirical" "argument" "For"
[125] "reason" "plaintiffs" "never" "opportunity"
[129] "respond" "novel" "claim" "contrary"
[133] "longstanding" "practice" "large" "employers"
[137] "better" "discarding" "employer" "insurance"
[141] "plans" "altogether" ""
[[165]]
[1] "Even" "reach" "argument" "find"
[5] "unpersuasive" "As" "initial" "matter"
[9] "entirely" "ignores" "fact" "Hahns"
[13] "Greens" "companies" "religious" "reasons"
[17] "providing" "health" "insurance" "coverage"
[21] "employees" "Before" "advent" "ACA"
[25] "legally" "compelled" "provide" "insurance"
[29] "nevertheless" "part" "doubt" "conventional"
[33] "business" "reasons" "also" "part"
[37] "religious" "beliefs" "govern" "relations"
[41] "employees" "See" "App" "Pet"
[45] "Cert" "No" "p" "g"
[49] "App" "No" ""
[[166]]
[1] "" "Putting" "aside" "religious"
[5] "dimension" "decision" "provide" "insurance"
[9] "moreover" "far" "clear" "net"
[13] "cost" "companies" "providing" "insurance"
[17] "cost" "dropping" "insurance" "plans"
[21] "paying" "ACA" "penalty" "Health"
[25] "insurance" "benefit" "employees" "value"
[29] "If" "companies" "simply" "eliminated"
[33] "benefit" "forced" "employees" "purchase"
[37] "insurance" "exchanges" "without" "offering"
[41] "additional" "compensation" "predictable" "companies"
[45] "face" "competitive" "disadvantage" "retaining"
[49] "attracting" "skilled" "workers" "See"
[53] "App" "No" ""
[[167]]
[1] "The" "companies" "attempt" "make"
[5] "elimination" "group" "health" "plan"
[9] "increasing" "wages" "costly" "Group"
[13] "health" "insurance" "generally" "less"
[17] "expensive" "comparable" "individual" "coverage"
[21] "amount" "salary" "increase" "needed"
[25] "fully" "compensate" "termination" "insurance"
[29] "coverage" "may" "well" "exceed"
[33] "cost" "companies" "providing" "insurance"
[37] "In" "addition" "salary" "increase"
[41] "take" "account" "fact" "employees"
[45] "must" "pay" "income" "taxes"
[49] "wages" "value" "employer" "provided"
[53] "health" "insurance" "U" "S"
[57] "C" "Likewise" "employers" "can"
[61] "deduct" "cost" "providing" "health"
[65] "insurance" "see" "apparently" "deduct"
[69] "amount" "penalty" "must" "pay"
[73] "insurance" "provided" "difference" "also"
[77] "must" "taken" "account" "Given"
[81] "economic" "incentives" "far" "clear"
[85] "financially" "advantageous" "employer" "drop"
[89] "coverage" "pay" "penalty" ""
[[168]]
[1] "" "In" "sum" "refuse"
[5] "sustain" "challenged" "regulations" "ground"
[9] "never" "maintained" "Government" "dropping"
[13] "insurance" "coverage" "eliminates" "substantial"
[17] "burden" "HHS" "mandate" "imposes"
[21] "We" "doubt" "Congress" "enacted"
[25] "RFRA" "matter" "ACA" "believed"
[29] "tolerable" "result" "put" "family"
[33] "run" "businesses" "choice" "violating"
[37] "sincerely" "held" "religious" "beliefs"
[41] "making" "employees" "lose" "existing"
[45] "healthcare" "plans" ""
[[169]]
[1] "C" ""
[[170]]
[1] "In" "taking" "position" "HHS"
[5] "mandate" "impose" "substantial" "burden"
[9] "exercise" "religion" "HHS" "s"
[13] "main" "argument" "echoed" "principal"
[17] "dissent" "basically" "connection" "objecting"
[21] "parties" "must" "provide" "health"
[25] "insurance" "coverage" "four" "methods"
[29] "contraception" "may" "operate" "fertilization"
[33] "egg" "end" "find" "morally"
[37] "wrong" "destruction" "embryo" "simply"
[41] "attenuated" "Brief" "HHS" "pp"
[45] "post" "HHS" "dissent" "note"
[49] "providing" "coverage" "result" "destruction"
[53] "embryo" "occur" "employee" "chose"
[57] "take" "advantage" "coverage" "use"
[61] "one" "four" "methods" "issue"
[65] "Ibid" ""
[[171]]
[1] "" "This" "argument" "dodges"
[5] "question" "RFRA" "presents" "whether"
[9] "HHS" "mandate" "imposes" "substantial"
[13] "burden" "ability" "objecting" "parties"
[17] "conduct" "business" "accordance" "religious"
[21] "beliefs" "instead" "addresses" "different"
[25] "question" "federal" "courts" "business"
[29] "addressing" "whether" "religious" "belief"
[33] "asserted" "RFRA" "case" "reasonable"
[37] "The" "Hahns" "Greens" "believe"
[41] "providing" "coverage" "demanded" "HHS"
[45] "regulations" "connected" "destruction" "embryo"
[49] "way" "sufficient" "make" "immoral"
[53] "provide" "coverage" "This" "belief"
[57] "implicates" "difficult" "important" "question"
[61] "religion" "moral" "philosophy" "namely"
[65] "circumstances" "wrong" "person" "perform"
[69] "act" "innocent" "effect" "enabling"
[73] "facilitating" "commission" "immoral" "act"
[77] "another" "Arrogating" "authority" "provide"
[81] "binding" "national" "answer" "religious"
[85] "philosophical" "question" "HHS" "principal"
[89] "dissent" "effect" "tell" "plaintiffs"
[93] "beliefs" "flawed" "For" "good"
[97] "reason" "repeatedly" "refused" "take"
[101] "step" "See" "e" "g"
[105] "Smith" "U" "S" "S"
[109] "Ct" "Repeatedly" "many" "different"
[113] "contexts" "warned" "courts" "must"
[117] "presume" "determine" "plausibility" "religious"
[121] "claim" "Hernandez" "v" "Commissioner"
[125] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[129] "L" "Ed" "d" "Presbyterian"
[133] "Church" "U" "S" "v"
[137] "Mary" "Elizabeth" "Blue" "Hull"
[141] "Memorial" "Presbyterian" "Church" "U"
[145] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[149] "Ed" "d" ""
[[172]]
[1] "" "Moreover" "Thomas" "v"
[5] "Review" "Bd" "Indiana" "Employment"
[9] "Security" "Div" "U" "S"
[13] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[17] "d" "considered" "rejected" "argument"
[21] "nearly" "identical" "one" "now"
[25] "urged" "HHS" "dissent" "In"
[29] "Thomas" "Jehovah" "s" "Witness"
[33] "initially" "employed" "making" "sheet"
[37] "steel" "variety" "industrial" "uses"
[41] "later" "transferred" "job" "making"
[45] "turrets" "tanks" "Id" "S"
[49] "Ct" "Because" "objected" "religious"
[53] "grounds" "participating" "manufacture" "weapons"
[57] "lost" "job" "sought" "unemployment"
[61] "compensation" "Ruling" "employee" "state"
[65] "court" "difficulty" "line" "employee"
[69] "drew" "work" "found" "consistent"
[73] "religious" "beliefs" "helping" "manufacture"
[77] "steel" "used" "making" "weapons"
[81] "work" "found" "morally" "objectionable"
[85] "helping" "make" "weapons" "This"
[89] "Court" "however" "held" "us"
[93] "say" "line" "drew" "unreasonable"
[97] "one" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[101] ""
[[173]]
[1] "" "Similarly" "cases" "Hahns"
[5] "Greens" "companies" "sincerely" "believe"
[9] "providing" "insurance" "coverage" "demanded"
[13] "HHS" "regulations" "lies" "forbidden"
[17] "side" "line" "us" "say"
[21] "religious" "beliefs" "mistaken" "insubstantial"
[25] "Instead" "narrow" "function" "context"
[29] "determine" "whether" "line" "drawn"
[33] "reflects" "honest" "conviction" "id"
[37] "S" "Ct" "dispute" ""
[[174]]
[1] "HHS" "nevertheless" "compares" "cases"
[5] "decisions" "rejected" "argument" "use"
[9] "general" "tax" "revenue" "subsidize"
[13] "secular" "activities" "religious" "institutions"
[17] "violated" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[21] "See" "Tilton" "v" "Richardson"
[25] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[29] "L" "Ed" "d" "plurality"
[33] "Board" "Ed" "Central" "School"
[37] "Dist" "No" "v" "Allen"
[41] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[45] "L" "Ed" "d" "But"
[49] "cases" "subsidies" "clearly" "contrary"
[53] "challengers" "views" "secular" "issue"
[57] "namely" "proper" "church" "state"
[61] "relations" "challengers" "never" "articulated"
[65] "religious" "objection" "subsidies" "As"
[69] "put" "Tilton" "unable" "identify"
[73] "coercion" "directed" "practice" "exercise"
[77] "religious" "beliefs" "U" "S"
[81] "S" "Ct" "plurality" "opinion"
[85] "see" "Allen" "supra" "S"
[89] "Ct" "A" "ppellants" "contended"
[93] "New" "York" "law" "way"
[97] "coerces" "individuals" "practice" "religion"
[101] "Here" "contrast" "plaintiffs" "assert"
[105] "funding" "specific" "contraceptive" "methods"
[109] "issue" "violates" "religious" "beliefs"
[113] "HHS" "question" "sincerity" "Because"
[117] "contraceptive" "mandate" "forces" "pay"
[121] "enormous" "sum" "money" "much"
[125] "million" "per" "year" "case"
[129] "Hobby" "Lobby" "insist" "providing"
[133] "insurance" "coverage" "accordance" "religious"
[137] "beliefs" "mandate" "clearly" "imposes"
[141] "substantial" "burden" "beliefs" ""
[[175]]
[1] "V" ""
[[176]]
[1] "Since" "HHS" "contraceptive" "mandate"
[5] "imposes" "substantial" "burden" "exercise"
[9] "religion" "must" "move" "decide"
[13] "whether" "HHS" "shown" "mandate"
[17] "furtherance" "compelling" "governmental" "interest"
[21] "least" "restrictive" "means" "furthering"
[25] "compelling" "governmental" "interest" "U"
[29] "S" "C" "bb" "b"
[33] ""
[[177]]
[1] "A" ""
[[178]]
[1] "" "HHS" "asserts" "contraceptive"
[5] "mandate" "serves" "variety" "important"
[9] "interests" "many" "couched" "broad"
[13] "terms" "promoting" "public" "health"
[17] "gender" "equality" "Brief" "HHS"
[21] "No" "RFRA" "however" "contemplates"
[25] "focused" "inquiry" "It" "requires"
[29] "Government" "demonstrate" "compelling" "interest"
[33] "test" "satisfied" "application" "challenged"
[37] "law" "person" "particular" "claimant"
[41] "whose" "sincere" "exercise" "religion"
[45] "substantially" "burdened" "O" "Centro"
[49] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[53] "quoting" "bb" "b" "This"
[57] "requires" "us" "loo" "k"
[61] "beyond" "broadly" "formulated" "interests"
[65] "scrutiniz" "e" "asserted" "harm"
[69] "granting" "specific" "exemptions" "particular"
[73] "religious" "claimants" "words" "look"
[77] "marginal" "interest" "enforcing" "contraceptive"
[81] "mandate" "cases" "O" "Centro"
[85] "supra" "S" "Ct" ""
[[179]]
[1] "" "In" "addition"
[4] "asserting" "broadly" "framed"
[7] "interests" "HHS" "maintains"
[10] "mandate" "serves" "compelling"
[13] "interest" "ensuring" "women"
[16] "access" "FDA" "approved"
[19] "contraceptives" "without" "cost"
[22] "sharing" "See" "Brief"
[25] "HHS" "No" "see"
[28] "Brief" "HHS" "No"
[31] "Under" "cases" "women"
[34] "men" "constitutional" "right"
[37] "obtain" "contraceptives" "see"
[40] "Griswold" "v" "Connecticut"
[43] "U" "S" "S"
[46] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[49] "d" "HHS" "tells"
[52] "us" "s" "tudies"
[55] "demonstrated" "even" "moderate"
[58] "copayments" "preventive" "services"
[61] "can" "deter" "patients"
[64] "receiving" "services" "Brief"
[67] "HHS" "No" "internal"
[70] "quotation" "marks" "omitted"
[73] ""
[[180]]
[1] "The" "objecting" "parties" "contend"
[5] "HHS" "shown" "mandate" "serves"
[9] "compelling" "government" "interest" "arguable"
[13] "features" "ACA" "support" "view"
[17] "As" "noted" "many" "employees"
[21] "covered" "grandfathered" "plans" "work"
[25] "employers" "fewer" "employees" "may"
[29] "contraceptive" "coverage" "without" "cost"
[33] "sharing" ""
[[181]]
[1] "HHS" "responds" "many" "legal"
[5] "requirements" "exceptions" "existence" "exceptions"
[9] "indicate" "principal" "interest" "served"
[13] "law" "compelling" "Even" "compelling"
[17] "interest" "may" "outweighed" "circumstances"
[21] "another" "even" "weightier" "consideration"
[25] "In" "cases" "however" "interest"
[29] "served" "one" "biggest" "exceptions"
[33] "exception" "grandfathered" "plans" "simply"
[37] "interest" "employers" "avoiding" "inconvenience"
[41] "amending" "existing" "plan" "Grandfathered"
[45] "plans" "required" "comply" "subset"
[49] "Affordable" "Care" "Act" "s"
[53] "health" "reform" "provisions" "provide"
[57] "HHS" "described" "particularly" "significant"
[61] "protections" "Fed" "Reg" "But"
[65] "contraceptive" "mandate" "expressly" "excluded"
[69] "subset" "Ibid" ""
[[182]]
[1] "" "We" "find" "unnecessary"
[5] "adjudicate" "issue" "We" "will"
[9] "assume" "interest" "guaranteeing" "cost"
[13] "free" "access" "four" "challenged"
[17] "contraceptive" "methods" "compelling" "within"
[21] "meaning" "RFRA" "will" "proceed"
[25] "consider" "final" "prong" "RFRA"
[29] "test" "e" "whether" "HHS"
[33] "shown" "contraceptive" "mandate" "least"
[37] "restrictive" "means" "furthering" "compelling"
[41] "governmental" "interest" "bb" "b"
[45] ""
[[183]]
[1] "B" ""
[[184]]
[1] "" "The" "least" "restrictive"
[5] "means" "standard" "exceptionally" "demanding"
[9] "see" "City" "Boerne" "U"
[13] "S" "S" "Ct" "satisfied"
[17] "HHS" "shown" "lacks" "means"
[21] "achieving" "desired" "goal" "without"
[25] "imposing" "substantial" "burden" "exercise"
[29] "religion" "objecting" "parties" "cases"
[33] "See" "bb" "b" "requiring"
[37] "Government" "demonstrat" "e" "application"
[41] "substantial" "burden" "person" "least"
[45] "restrictive" "means" "furthering" "compelling"
[49] "governmental" "interest" "emphasis" "added"
[53] ""
[[185]]
[1] "The" "straightforward" "way"
[4] "Government" "assume" "cost"
[7] "providing" "four" "contraceptives"
[10] "issue" "women" "unable"
[13] "obtain" "health" "insurance"
[16] "policies" "due" "employers"
[19] "religious" "objections" "This"
[22] "certainly" "less" "restrictive"
[25] "plaintiffs" "religious" "liberty"
[28] "HHS" "shown" "see"
[31] "bb" "b" "viable"
[34] "alternative" "HHS" "provided"
[37] "estimate" "average" "cost"
[40] "per" "employee" "providing"
[43] "access" "contraceptives" "two"
[46] "according" "FDA" "designed"
[49] "primarily" "emergency" "use"
[52] "See" "Birth" "Control"
[55] "Medicines" "Help" "You"
[58] "online" "http" "www"
[61] "fda" "gov" "forconsumers"
[64] "byaudience" "forwomen" "freepublications"
[67] "ucm" "htm" "Nor"
[70] "HHS" "provided" "statistics"
[73] "regarding" "number" "employees"
[76] "might" "affected" "work"
[79] "corporations" "like" "Hobby"
[82] "Lobby" "Conestoga" "Mardel"
[85] "Nor" "HHS" "told"
[88] "us" "unable" "provide"
[91] "statistics" "It" "seems"
[94] "likely" "however" "cost"
[97] "providing" "forms" "contraceptives"
[100] "issue" "cases" "FDA"
[103] "approved" "contraceptives" "minor"
[106] "compared" "overall" "cost"
[109] "ACA" "According" "one"
[112] "Congressional" "Budget" "Office"
[115] "s" "recent" "forecasts"
[118] "ACA" "s" "insurance"
[121] "coverage" "provisions" "will"
[124] "cost" "Federal" "Government"
[127] "trillion" "next" "decade"
[130] "See" "CBO" "Updated"
[133] "Estimates" "Effects" "Insurance"
[136] "Coverage" "Provisions" "Affordable"
[139] "Care" "Act" "April"
[142] "p" "If" "HHS"
[145] "tells" "us" "providing"
[148] "women" "cost" "free"
[151] "access" "FDA" "approved"
[154] "methods" "contraception" "Government"
[157] "interest" "highest" "order"
[160] "hard" "understand" "HHS"
[163] "s" "argument" "required"
[166] "RFRA" "pay" "anything"
[169] "order" "achieve" "important"
[172] "goal" ""
[[186]]
[1] "" "HHS" "contends" "RFRA"
[5] "permit" "us" "take" "option"
[9] "account" "RFRA" "used" "require"
[13] "creation" "entirely" "new" "programs"
[17] "Brief" "HHS" "But" "see"
[21] "nothing" "RFRA" "supports" "argument"
[25] "drawing" "line" "creation" "entirely"
[29] "new" "program" "modification" "existing"
[33] "program" "RFRA" "surely" "allows"
[37] "fraught" "problems" "We" "doubt"
[41] "cost" "may" "important" "factor"
[45] "least" "restrictive" "means" "analysis"
[49] "RFRA" "sister" "statute" "RLUIPA"
[53] "may" "circumstances" "require" "Government"
[57] "expend" "additional" "funds" "accommodate"
[61] "citizens" "religious" "beliefs" "Cf"
[65] "cc" "c" "RLUIPA" "T"
[69] "chapter" "may" "require" "government"
[73] "incur" "expenses" "operations" "avoid"
[77] "imposing" "substantial" "burden" "religious"
[81] "exercise" "HHS" "s" "view"
[85] "RFRA" "can" "never" "require"
[89] "Government" "spend" "even" "small"
[93] "amount" "reflects" "judgment" "importance"
[97] "religious" "liberty" "shared" "Congress"
[101] "enacted" "law" ""
[[187]]
[1] "In" "end" "however" "need"
[5] "rely" "option" "new" "government"
[9] "funded" "program" "order" "conclude"
[13] "HHS" "regulations" "fail" "least"
[17] "restrictive" "means" "test" "HHS"
[21] "demonstrated" "disposal" "approach" "less"
[25] "restrictive" "requiring" "employers" "fund"
[29] "contraceptive" "methods" "violate" "religious"
[33] "beliefs" "As" "explained" "HHS"
[37] "already" "established" "accommodation" "nonprofit"
[41] "organizations" "religious" "objections" "See"
[45] "supra" "nn" "Under" "accommodation"
[49] "organization" "can" "self" "certify"
[53] "opposes" "providing" "coverage" "particular"
[57] "contraceptive" "services" "See" "CFR"
[61] "b" "c" "CFR" "A"
[65] "b" "If" "organization" "makes"
[69] "certification" "organization" "s" "insurance"
[73] "issuer" "third" "party" "administrator"
[77] "must" "e" "xpressly" "exclude"
[81] "contraceptive" "coverage" "group" "health"
[85] "insurance" "coverage" "provided" "connection"
[89] "group" "health" "plan" "p"
[93] "rovide" "separate" "payments" "contraceptive"
[97] "services" "required" "covered" "without"
[101] "imposing" "cost" "sharing" "requirements"
[105] "eligible" "organization" "group" "health"
[109] "plan" "plan" "participants" "beneficiaries"
[113] "CFR" "c" "CFR" "A"
[117] "c" ""
[[188]]
[1] "We" "decide" "today"
[4] "whether" "approach" "type"
[7] "complies" "RFRA" "purposes"
[10] "religious" "claims" "At"
[13] "minimum" "however" "impinge"
[16] "plaintiffs" "religious" "belief"
[19] "providing" "insurance" "coverage"
[22] "contraceptives" "issue" "violates"
[25] "religion" "serves" "HHS"
[28] "s" "stated" "interests"
[31] "equally" "well" ""
[[189]]
[1] "" "The" "principal"
[4] "dissent" "identifies" "reason"
[7] "accommodation" "fail" "protect"
[10] "asserted" "needs" "women"
[13] "effectively" "contraceptive" "mandate"
[16] "none" "Under" "accommodation"
[19] "plaintiffs" "female" "employees"
[22] "continue" "receive" "contraceptive"
[25] "coverage" "without" "cost"
[28] "sharing" "FDA" "approved"
[31] "contraceptives" "continue" "face"
[34] "minimal" "logistical" "administrative"
[37] "obstacles" "post" "internal"
[40] "quotation" "marks" "omitted"
[43] "employers" "insurers" "responsible"
[46] "providing" "information" "coverage"
[49] "see" "e" "g"
[52] "CFR" "c" "d"
[55] "cf" "CFR" "A"
[58] "b" "d" "Ironically"
[61] "dissent" "s" "approach"
[64] "mped" "e" "women"
[67] "s" "receipt" "benefits"
[70] "requiring" "take" "steps"
[73] "learn" "sign" "new"
[76] "government" "funded" "administered"
[79] "health" "benefit" "post"
[82] "dissent" "effectively" "compel"
[85] "religious" "employers" "drop"
[88] "health" "insurance" "coverage"
[91] "altogether" "leaving" "employees"
[94] "find" "individual" "plans"
[97] "government" "run" "exchanges"
[100] "elsewhere" "This" "indeed"
[103] "scarcely" "Congress" "contemplated"
[106] "Ibid" ""
[[190]]
[1] "C" ""
[[191]]
[1] "HHS" "principal" "dissent" "argue"
[5] "ruling" "favor" "objecting" "parties"
[9] "cases" "will" "lead" "flood"
[13] "religious" "objections" "regarding" "wide"
[17] "variety" "medical" "procedures" "drugs"
[21] "vaccinations" "blood" "transfusions" "HHS"
[25] "made" "effort" "substantiate" "prediction"
[29] "HHS" "points" "evidence" "insurance"
[33] "plans" "existence" "prior" "enactment"
[37] "ACA" "excluded" "coverage" "items"
[41] "Nor" "HHS" "provided" "evidence"
[45] "significant" "number" "employers" "sought"
[49] "exemption" "religious" "grounds" "ACA"
[53] "s" "coverage" "requirements" "contraceptive"
[57] "mandate" ""
[[192]]
[1] "It" "HHS" "s" "apparent"
[5] "belief" "insurance" "coverage" "mandate"
[9] "violate" "RFRA" "matter" "significantly"
[13] "impinges" "religious" "liberties" "employers"
[17] "lead" "intolerable" "consequences" "Under"
[21] "HHS" "s" "view" "RFRA"
[25] "permit" "Government" "require" "employers"
[29] "provide" "coverage" "medical" "procedure"
[33] "allowed" "law" "jurisdiction" "question"
[37] "instance" "third" "trimester" "abortions"
[41] "assisted" "suicide" "The" "owners"
[45] "many" "closely" "held" "corporations"
[49] "good" "conscience" "provide" "coverage"
[53] "thus" "HHS" "effectively" "exclude"
[57] "people" "full" "participation" "economic"
[61] "life" "Nation" "RFRA" "enacted"
[65] "prevent" "outcome" ""
[[193]]
[1] "In" "event" "decision" "cases"
[5] "concerned" "solely" "contraceptive" "mandate"
[9] "Our" "decision" "understood" "hold"
[13] "insurance" "coverage" "mandate" "must"
[17] "necessarily" "fall" "conflicts" "employer"
[21] "s" "religious" "beliefs" "Other"
[25] "coverage" "requirements" "immunizations" "may"
[29] "supported" "different" "interests" "example"
[33] "need" "combat" "spread" "infectious"
[37] "diseases" "may" "involve" "different"
[41] "arguments" "least" "restrictive" "means"
[45] "providing" ""
[[194]]
[1] "The" "principal" "dissent"
[4] "raises" "possibility" "discrimination"
[7] "hiring" "example" "basis"
[10] "race" "might" "cloaked"
[13] "religious" "practice" "escape"
[16] "legal" "sanction" "See"
[19] "post" "Our" "decision"
[22] "today" "provides" "shield"
[25] "The" "Government" "compelling"
[28] "interest" "providing" "equal"
[31] "opportunity" "participate" "workforce"
[34] "without" "regard" "race"
[37] "prohibitions" "racial" "discrimination"
[40] "precisely" "tailored" "achieve"
[43] "critical" "goal" ""
[[195]]
[1] "HHS" "also" "raises" "first"
[5] "time" "Court" "argument" "applying"
[9] "contraceptive" "mandate" "profit" "employers"
[13] "sincere" "religious" "objections" "essential"
[17] "comprehensive" "health" "insurance" "scheme"
[21] "ACA" "establishes" "HHS" "analogizes"
[25] "contraceptive" "mandate" "requirement" "pay"
[29] "Social" "Security" "taxes" "upheld"
[33] "Lee" "despite" "religious" "objection"
[37] "employer" "cases" "quite" "different"
[41] "Our" "holding" "Lee" "turned"
[45] "primarily" "special" "problems" "associated"
[49] "national" "system" "taxation" "We"
[53] "noted" "t" "obligation" "pay"
[57] "social" "security" "tax" "initially"
[61] "fundamentally" "different" "obligation" "pay"
[65] "income" "taxes" "U" "S"
[69] "S" "Ct" "Based" "premise"
[73] "explained" "untenable" "allow" "individuals"
[77] "seek" "exemptions" "taxes" "based"
[81] "religious" "objections" "particular" "Government"
[85] "expenditures" "If" "example" "religious"
[89] "adherent" "believes" "war" "sin"
[93] "certain" "percentage" "federal" "budget"
[97] "can" "identified" "devoted" "war"
[101] "related" "activities" "individuals" "similarly"
[105] "valid" "claim" "exempt" "paying"
[109] "percentage" "income" "tax" "Ibid"
[113] "We" "observed" "t" "tax"
[117] "system" "function" "denominations" "allowed"
[121] "challenge" "tax" "system" "tax"
[125] "payments" "spent" "manner" "violates"
[129] "religious" "belief" "Ibid" "see"
[133] "O" "Centro" "U" "S"
[137] "S" "Ct" ""
[[196]]
[1] "Lee" "free" "exercise"
[4] "RFRA" "case" "issue"
[7] "Lee" "analyzed" "RFRA"
[10] "framework" "fundamental" "point"
[13] "simply" "less" "restrictive"
[16] "alternative" "categorical" "requirement"
[19] "pay" "taxes" "Because"
[22] "enormous" "variety" "government"
[25] "expenditures" "funded" "tax"
[28] "dollars" "allowing" "taxpayers"
[31] "withhold" "portion" "tax"
[34] "obligations" "religious" "grounds"
[37] "lead" "chaos" "Recognizing"
[40] "exemptions" "contraceptive" "mandate"
[43] "different" "ACA" "create"
[46] "large" "national" "pool"
[49] "tax" "revenue" "use"
[52] "purchasing" "healthcare" "coverage"
[55] "Rather" "individual" "employers"
[58] "like" "plaintiffs" "purchase"
[61] "insurance" "employees" "And"
[64] "contrary" "principal" "dissent"
[67] "s" "characterization" "employers"
[70] "contributions" "necessarily" "funnel"
[73] "undifferentiated" "funds" "Post"
[76] "The" "accommodation" "established"
[79] "HHS" "requires" "issuers"
[82] "mechanism" "segregate" "premium"
[85] "revenue" "collected" "eligible"
[88] "organization" "monies" "used"
[91] "provide" "payments" "contraceptive"
[94] "services" "CFR" "c"
[97] "ii" "Recognizing" "religious"
[100] "accommodation" "RFRA" "particular"
[103] "coverage" "requirements" "therefore"
[106] "threaten" "viability" "ACA"
[109] "s" "comprehensive" "scheme"
[112] "way" "recognizing" "religious"
[115] "objections" "particular" "expenditures"
[118] "general" "tax" "revenues"
[121] ""
[[197]]
[1] "In" "final" "pages"
[4] "principal" "dissent" "reveals"
[7] "fundamental" "objection" "claims"
[10] "plaintiffs" "objection" "RFRA"
[13] "The" "dissent" "worries"
[16] "forcing" "federal" "courts"
[19] "apply" "RFRA" "host"
[22] "claims" "made" "litigants"
[25] "seeking" "religious" "exemption"
[28] "generally" "applicable" "laws"
[31] "dissent" "expresses" "desire"
[34] "keep" "courts" "business"
[37] "See" "post" "In"
[40] "making" "plea" "dissent"
[43] "reiterates" "point" "made"
[46] "forcefully" "Court" "Smith"
[49] "U" "S" "S"
[52] "Ct" "applying" "Sherbert"
[55] "test" "free" "exercise"
[58] "claims" "open" "prospect"
[61] "constitutionally" "required" "religious"
[64] "exemptions" "civic" "obligations"
[67] "almost" "every" "conceivable"
[70] "kind" "But" "Congress"
[73] "enacting" "RFRA" "took"
[76] "position" "compelling" "interest"
[79] "test" "set" "forth"
[82] "prior" "Federal" "court"
[85] "rulings" "workable" "test"
[88] "striking" "sensible" "balances"
[91] "religious" "liberty" "competing"
[94] "prior" "governmental" "interests"
[97] "U" "S" "C"
[100] "bb" "The" "wisdom"
[103] "Congress" "s" "judgment"
[106] "matter" "concern" "Our"
[109] "responsibility" "enforce" "RFRA"
[112] "written" "standard" "RFRA"
[115] "prescribes" "HHS" "contraceptive"
[118] "mandate" "unlawful" ""
[[198]]
[1] "" ""
[[199]]
[1] "The" "contraceptive" "mandate" "applied"
[5] "closely" "held" "corporations" "violates"
[9] "RFRA" "Our" "decision" "statutory"
[13] "question" "makes" "unnecessary" "reach"
[17] "First" "Amendment" "claim" "raised"
[21] "Conestoga" "Hahns" ""
[[200]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "Tenth" "Circuit"
[5] "No" "affirmed" "judgment" "Third"
[9] "Circuit" "No" "reversed" "case"
[13] "remanded" "proceedings" "consistent" "opinion"
[17] ""
[[201]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[202]]
[1] "Justice" "GINSBURG" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[203]]
[1] "" "In" "series" "decisions"
[5] "Court" "emphasized" "First" "Amendment"
[9] "generally" "precludes" "public" "universities"
[13] "denying" "student" "organizations" "access"
[17] "school" "sponsored" "forums" "groups"
[21] "viewpoints" "See" "Rosenberger" "v"
[25] "Rector" "Visitors" "Univ" "Va"
[29] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[33] "L" "Ed" "d" "Widmar"
[37] "v" "Vincent" "U" "S"
[41] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[45] "d" "Healy" "v" "James"
[49] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[53] "L" "Ed" "d" "This"
[57] "case" "concerns" "novel" "question"
[61] "regarding" "student" "activities" "public"
[65] "universities" "May" "public" "law"
[69] "school" "condition" "official" "recognition"
[73] "student" "group" "attendant" "use"
[77] "school" "funds" "facilities" "organization"
[81] "s" "agreement" "open" "eligibility"
[85] "membership" "leadership" "students" ""
[[204]]
[1] "In" "view" "petitioner" "Christian"
[5] "Legal" "Society" "CLS" "accept"
[9] "comers" "policy" "impairs" "First"
[13] "Amendment" "rights" "free" "speech"
[17] "expressive" "association" "free" "exercise"
[21] "religion" "prompting" "pain" "relinquishing"
[25] "advantages" "recognition" "accept" "members"
[29] "share" "organization" "s" "core"
[33] "beliefs" "religion" "sexual" "orientation"
[37] "From" "perspective" "respondent" "Hastings"
[41] "College" "Law" "Hastings" "Law"
[45] "School" "CLS" "seeks" "special"
[49] "dispensation" "across" "board" "open"
[53] "access" "requirement" "designed" "reasonable"
[57] "educational" "purposes" "underpinning" "school"
[61] "s" "student" "organization" "program"
[65] ""
[[205]]
[1] "" "In" "accord"
[4] "District" "Court" "Court"
[7] "Appeals" "reject" "CLS"
[10] "s" "First" "Amendment"
[13] "challenge" "Compliance" "Hastings"
[16] "comers" "policy" "conclude"
[19] "reasonable" "viewpoint" "neutral"
[22] "condition" "access" "student"
[25] "organization" "forum" "In"
[28] "requiring" "CLS" "common"
[31] "student" "organizations" "choose"
[34] "welcoming" "students" "forgoing"
[37] "benefits" "official" "recognition"
[40] "hold" "Hastings" "transgress"
[43] "constitutional" "limitations" "CLS"
[46] "bears" "emphasis" "seeks"
[49] "parity" "organizations" "preferential"
[52] "exemption" "Hastings" "policy"
[55] "The" "First" "Amendment"
[58] "shields" "CLS" "state"
[61] "prohibition" "organization" "s"
[64] "expressive" "activity" "however"
[67] "exclusionary" "activity" "may"
[70] "But" "CLS" "enjoys"
[73] "constitutional" "right" "state"
[76] "subvention" "selectivity" ""
[[206]]
[1] "I" ""
[[207]]
[1] "Founded" "Hastings" "first"
[4] "law" "school" "University"
[7] "California" "public" "school"
[10] "system" "Like" "many"
[13] "institutions" "higher" "education"
[16] "Hastings" "encourages" "students"
[19] "form" "extracurricular" "associations"
[22] "contribute" "Hastings" "community"
[25] "experience" "App" "These"
[28] "groups" "offer" "students"
[31] "opportunities" "pursue" "academic"
[34] "social" "interests" "outside"
[37] "classroom" "education" "help"
[40] "develo" "p" "leadership"
[43] "skills" "Ibid" ""
[[208]]
[1] "Through" "Registered" "Student" "Organization"
[5] "RSO" "program" "Hastings" "extends"
[9] "official" "recognition" "student" "groups"
[13] "Several" "benefits" "attend" "school"
[17] "approved" "status" "RSOs" "eligible"
[21] "seek" "financial" "assistance" "Law"
[25] "School" "subsidizes" "events" "using"
[29] "funds" "mandatory" "student" "activity"
[33] "fee" "imposed" "students" "Id"
[37] "RSOs" "may" "also" "use"
[41] "Law" "School" "channels" "communicate"
[45] "students" "They" "may" "place"
[49] "announcements" "weekly" "Office" "Student"
[53] "Services" "newsletter" "advertise" "events"
[57] "designated" "bulletin" "boards" "send"
[61] "e" "mails" "using" "Hastings"
[65] "organization" "address" "participate" "annual"
[69] "Student" "Organizations" "Fair" "designed"
[73] "advance" "recruitment" "efforts" "Id"
[77] "In" "addition" "RSOs" "may"
[81] "apply" "permission" "use" "Law"
[85] "School" "s" "facilities" "meetings"
[89] "office" "space" "Id" "Finally"
[93] "Hastings" "allows" "officially" "recognized"
[97] "groups" "use" "name" "logo"
[101] "Id" ""
[[209]]
[1] "In" "exchange" "benefits" "RSOs"
[5] "must" "abide" "certain" "conditions"
[9] "Only" "non" "commercial" "organization"
[13] "whose" "membership" "limited" "Hastings"
[17] "students" "may" "become" "RSO"
[21] "App" "Pet" "Cert" "A"
[25] "prospective" "RSO" "must" "submit"
[29] "bylaws" "Hastings" "approval" "id"
[33] "intends" "use" "Law" "School"
[37] "s" "name" "logo" "must"
[41] "sign" "license" "agreement" "App"
[45] "Critical" "RSOs" "must" "undertake"
[49] "comply" "Hastings" "Policies" "Regulations"
[53] "Applying" "College" "Activities" "Organizations"
[57] "Students" "Ibid" ""
[[210]]
[1] "The" "Law" "School"
[4] "s" "Policy" "Nondiscrimination"
[7] "Nondiscrimination" "Policy" "binds"
[10] "RSOs" "states" ""
[[211]]
[1] "" "Hastings" "committed"
[4] "policy" "legally" "impermissible"
[7] "arbitrary" "unreasonable" "discriminatory"
[10] "practices" "All" "groups"
[13] "including" "administration" "faculty"
[16] "student" "governments" "Hastings"
[19] "owned" "student" "residence"
[22] "facilities" "programs" "sponsored"
[25] "Hastings" "governed" "policy"
[28] "nondiscrimination" "Hastings" "policy"
[31] "nondiscrimination" "comply" "fully"
[34] "applicable" "law" ""
[[212]]
[1] "" "Hastings" "shall"
[4] "discriminate" "unlawfully" "basis"
[7] "race" "color" "religion"
[10] "national" "origin" "ancestry"
[13] "disability" "age" "sex"
[16] "sexual" "orientation" "This"
[19] "nondiscrimination" "policy" "covers"
[22] "admission" "access" "treatment"
[25] "Hastings" "sponsored" "programs"
[28] "activities" "Id" ""
[[213]]
[1] "" "Hastings" "interprets"
[4] "Nondiscrimination" "Policy" "relates"
[7] "RSO" "program" "mandate"
[10] "acceptance" "comers" "School"
[13] "approved" "groups" "must"
[16] "allow" "student" "participate"
[19] "become" "member" "seek"
[22] "leadership" "positions" "organization"
[25] "regardless" "status" "beliefs"
[28] "Id" "Other" "law"
[31] "schools" "adopted" "similar"
[34] "comers" "policies" "See"
[37] "e" "g" "Georgetown"
[40] "University" "Law" "Center"
[43] "Office" "Student" "Life"
[46] "Student" "Organizations" "available"
[49] "http" "www" "law"
[52] "georgetown" "edu" "StudentLife"
[55] "StudentOrgs" "NewGroup" "htm"
[58] "All" "Internet" "materials"
[61] "visited" "June" "included"
[64] "Clerk" "Court" "s"
[67] "case" "file" "Membership"
[70] "registered" "groups" "must"
[73] "open" "students" "Hofstra"
[76] "Law" "School" "Student"
[79] "Handbook" "p" "available"
[82] "http" "law" "hofstra"
[85] "edu" "pdf" "StudentLife"
[88] "StudentAffairs" "Handbook" "stuhb_handbook"
[91] "pdf" "Student" "organizations"
[94] "open" "students" "From"
[97] "Hastings" "adoption" "Nondiscrimination"
[100] "Policy" "events" "stirring"
[103] "litigation" "student" "organization"
[106] "Hastings" "ever" "sought"
[109] "exemption" "Policy" "App"
[112] ""
[[214]]
[1] "In" "CLS" "became" "first"
[5] "student" "group" "At" "beginning"
[9] "academic" "year" "leaders" "predecessor"
[13] "Christian" "organization" "RSO" "Hastings"
[17] "decade" "formed" "CLS" "affiliating"
[21] "national" "Christian" "Legal" "Society"
[25] "CLS" "National" "Id" "CLS"
[29] "National" "association" "Christian" "lawyers"
[33] "law" "students" "charters" "student"
[37] "chapters" "law" "schools" "throughout"
[41] "country" "Id" "CLS" "chapters"
[45] "must" "adopt" "bylaws" "inter"
[49] "alia" "require" "members" "officers"
[53] "sign" "Statement" "Faith" "conduct"
[57] "lives" "accord" "prescribed" "principles"
[61] "Id" "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[65] "Among" "tenets" "belief" "sexual"
[69] "activity" "occur" "outside" "marriage"
[73] "man" "woman" "CLS" "thus"
[77] "interprets" "bylaws" "exclude" "affiliation"
[81] "anyone" "engages" "unrepentant" "homosexual"
[85] "conduct" "App" "CLS" "also"
[89] "excludes" "students" "hold" "religious"
[93] "convictions" "different" "Statement" "Faith"
[97] "Id" ""
[[215]]
[1] "On" "September" "CLS"
[4] "submitted" "Hastings" "application"
[7] "RSO" "status" "accompanied"
[10] "required" "documents" "including"
[13] "set" "bylaws" "mandated"
[16] "CLS" "National" "Id"
[19] "Several" "days" "later"
[22] "Law" "School" "rejected"
[25] "application" "CLS" "s"
[28] "bylaws" "Hastings" "explained"
[31] "comply" "Nondiscrimination" "Policy"
[34] "CLS" "barred" "students"
[37] "based" "religion" "sexual"
[40] "orientation" "Id" ""
[[216]]
[1] "CLS" "formally" "requested"
[4] "exemption" "Nondiscrimination" "Policy"
[7] "id" "Hastings" "declined"
[10] "grant" "one" "T"
[13] "o" "one" "student"
[16] "recognized" "organizations" "Hastings"
[19] "reiterated" "CLS" "must"
[22] "open" "membership" "students"
[25] "irrespective" "religious" "beliefs"
[28] "sexual" "orientation" "Id"
[31] "If" "CLS" "instead"
[34] "chose" "operate" "outside"
[37] "RSO" "program" "Hastings"
[40] "stated" "school" "pleased"
[43] "provide" "CLS" "use"
[46] "Hastings" "facilities" "meetings"
[49] "activities" "Ibid" "CLS"
[52] "also" "access" "chalkboards"
[55] "generally" "available" "campus"
[58] "bulletin" "boards" "announce"
[61] "events" "Id" "In"
[64] "words" "Hastings" "nothing"
[67] "suppress" "CLS" "s"
[70] "endeavors" "neither" "lend"
[73] "RSO" "level" "support"
[76] ""
[[217]]
[1] "Refusing" "alter" "bylaws" "CLS"
[5] "obtain" "RSO" "status" "It"
[9] "however" "operate" "independently" "academic"
[13] "year" "CLS" "held" "weekly"
[17] "Bible" "study" "meetings" "invited"
[21] "Hastings" "students" "Good" "Friday"
[25] "Easter" "Sunday" "church" "services"
[29] "Id" "It" "also" "hosted"
[33] "beach" "barbeque" "Thanksgiving" "dinner"
[37] "campus" "lecture" "Christian" "faith"
[41] "legal" "practice" "several" "fellowship"
[45] "dinners" "end" "year" "banquet"
[49] "informal" "social" "activities" "Ibid"
[53] ""
[[218]]
[1] "On" "October" "CLS"
[4] "filed" "suit" "various"
[7] "Hastings" "officers" "administrators"
[10] "U" "S" "C"
[13] "Its" "complaint" "alleged"
[16] "Hastings" "refusal" "grant"
[19] "organization" "RSO" "status"
[22] "violated" "CLS" "s"
[25] "First" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[28] "rights" "free" "speech"
[31] "expressive" "association" "free"
[34] "exercise" "religion" "The"
[37] "suit" "sought" "injunctive"
[40] "declaratory" "relief" ""
[[219]]
[1] "On" "cross" "motions" "summary" "judgment"
[6] "U" "S" "District" "Court" "Northern"
[11] "District" "California" "ruled" "favor" "Hastings"
[16] "The" "Law" "School" "s" "comers"
[21] "condition" "access" "limited" "public" "forum"
[26] "court" "held" "reasonable" "viewpoint" "neutral"
[31] "therefore" "violate" "CLS" "s" "right"
[36] "free" "speech" "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[41] ""
[[220]]
[1] "Nor" "District" "Court" "s"
[5] "view" "Law" "School" "impermissibly"
[9] "impair" "CLS" "s" "right"
[13] "expressive" "association" "Hastings" "directly"
[17] "ordering" "CLS" "admit" "studen"
[21] "t" "court" "observed" "id"
[25] "r" "ather" "Hastings" "merely"
[29] "placed" "conditions" "use" "facilities"
[33] "funds" "ibid" "Hastings" "denial"
[37] "official" "recognition" "court" "added"
[41] "substantial" "impediment" "CLS" "s"
[45] "ability" "meet" "communicate" "group"
[49] "Id" ""
[[221]]
[1] "The" "court" "also"
[4] "rejected" "CLS" "s"
[7] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[10] "argument" "T" "Nondiscrimination"
[13] "Policy" "target" "single"
[16] "religious" "beliefs" "court"
[19] "noted" "rather" "policy"
[22] "neutral" "general" "applicability"
[25] "Id" "CLS" "may"
[28] "motivated" "religious" "beliefs"
[31] "exclude" "students" "based"
[34] "religion" "sexual" "orientation"
[37] "court" "explained" "convert"
[40] "reason" "Hastings" "Nondiscrimination"
[43] "Policy" "one" "religiously"
[46] "based" "Id" ""
[[222]]
[1] "On" "appeal" "Ninth" "Circuit" "affirmed" "opinion"
[7] "stated" "full" ""
[[223]]
[1] "" "The" "parties" "stipulate"
[5] "Hastings" "imposes" "open" "membership"
[9] "rule" "student" "groups" "groups"
[13] "must" "accept" "comers" "voting"
[17] "members" "even" "individuals" "disagree"
[21] "mission" "group" "The" "conditions"
[25] "recognition" "therefore" "viewpoint" "neutral"
[29] "reasonable" "Truth" "v" "Kent"
[33] "Sch" "Dist" "F" "d"
[37] "th" "Cir" "Christian" "Legal"
[41] "Soc" "Chapter" "Univ" "Cal"
[45] "v" "Kane" "Fed" "Appx"
[49] "C" "A" ""
[[224]]
[1] "" "We" "granted" "certiorari" "U"
[6] "S" "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[11] "d" "now" "affirm" "Ninth" "Circuit"
[16] "s" "judgment" ""
[[225]]
[1] "" "II" ""
[[226]]
[1] "Before" "considering" "merits"
[4] "CLS" "s" "constitutional"
[7] "arguments" "must" "resolve"
[10] "preliminary" "issue" "CLS"
[13] "urges" "us" "review"
[16] "Nondiscrimination" "Policy" "written"
[19] "prohibiting" "discrimination" "several"
[22] "enumerated" "bases" "including"
[25] "religion" "sexual" "orientation"
[28] "requirement" "RSOs" "accept"
[31] "comers" "The" "written"
[34] "terms" "Nondiscrimination" "Policy"
[37] "CLS" "contends" "targe"
[40] "t" "solely" "groups"
[43] "whose" "beliefs" "based"
[46] "religion" "disapprove" "particular"
[49] "kind" "sexual" "behavior"
[52] "leave" "associations" "free"
[55] "limit" "membership" "leadership"
[58] "individuals" "committed" "group"
[61] "s" "ideology" "Brief"
[64] "Petitioner" "internal" "quotation"
[67] "marks" "omitted" "For"
[70] "example" "political" "group"
[73] "can" "insist" "leaders"
[76] "support" "purposes" "beliefs"
[79] "CLS" "alleges" "religious"
[82] "group" "Id" ""
[[227]]
[1] "" "CLS" "s" "assertion"
[5] "runs" "headlong" "stipulation" "facts"
[9] "jointly" "submitted" "Hastings" "summary"
[13] "judgment" "stage" "In" "filing"
[17] "parties" "specified" ""
[[228]]
[1] "" "Hastings" "requires" "registered"
[5] "student" "organizations" "allow" "student"
[9] "participate" "become" "member" "seek"
[13] "leadership" "positions" "organization" "regardless"
[17] "status" "beliefs" "Thus" "example"
[21] "Hastings" "Democratic" "Caucus" "bar"
[25] "students" "holding" "Republican" "political"
[29] "beliefs" "becoming" "members" "seeking"
[33] "leadership" "positions" "organization" "App"
[37] "Joint" "Stipulation" "emphasis" "added"
[41] "citations" "omitted" ""
[[229]]
[1] "" "Under" "District" "Court" "s"
[6] "local" "rules" "stipulated" "facts" "deemed"
[11] "undisputed" "Civil" "Local" "Rule" "ND"
[16] "Cal" "See" "also" "Pet" "Cert"
[21] "The" "material" "facts" "case" "undisputed"
[26] ""
[[230]]
[1] "" "Litigants" "long" "recognized"
[5] "re" "entitled" "case" "tried"
[9] "upon" "assumption" "facts" "stipulated"
[13] "record" "established" "H" "Hackfeld"
[17] "Co" "v" "United" "States"
[21] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[25] "L" "Ed" "This" "entitlement"
[29] "bookend" "party" "s" "undertaking"
[33] "bound" "factual" "stipulations" "submits"
[37] "See" "post" "ALITO" "J"
[41] "dissenting" "agreeing" "parties" "must"
[45] "held" "Joint" "Stipulation" "As"
[49] "leading" "legal" "reference" "summarizes"
[53] ""
[[231]]
[1] "" "Factual" "stipulations" "binding"
[5] "conclusive" "facts" "stated" "subject"
[9] "subsequent" "variation" "So" "parties"
[13] "will" "permitted" "deny" "truth"
[17] "facts" "stated" "maintain" "contention"
[21] "contrary" "agreed" "statement" "suggest"
[25] "appeal" "facts" "stipulated" "material"
[29] "fact" "omitted" "The" "burden"
[33] "party" "seeking" "recover" "show"
[37] "right" "facts" "actually" "stated"
[41] "C" "J" "S" "Stipulations"
[45] "footnotes" "omitted" ""
[[232]]
[1] "" "This" "Court" "accordingly"
[5] "refused" "consider" "party" "s"
[9] "argument" "contradicted" "joint" "stipulation"
[13] "entered" "outset" "th" "e"
[17] "litigation" "Board" "Regents" "Univ"
[21] "Wis" "System" "v" "Southworth"
[25] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[29] "L" "Ed" "d" "Time"
[33] "dissent" "races" "away" "facts"
[37] "CLS" "stipulated" "See" "e"
[41] "g" "post" "But" "factual"
[45] "stipulations" "formal" "concessions" "effect"
[49] "withdrawing" "fact" "issue" "dispensing"
[53] "wholly" "need" "proof" "fact"
[57] "Thus" "judicial" "admission" "conclusive"
[61] "case" "K" "Broun" "McCormick"
[65] "Evidence" "p" "th" "ed"
[69] "footnote" "omitted" "See" "also"
[73] "e" "g" "Oscanyan" "v"
[77] "Arms" "Co" "U" "S"
[81] "L" "Ed" "The" "power"
[85] "court" "act" "disposition" "trial"
[89] "upon" "facts" "conceded" "counsel"
[93] "plain" "power" "act" "upon"
[97] "evidence" "produced" ""
[[233]]
[1] "" "In" "light"
[4] "joint" "stipulation" "District"
[7] "Court" "Ninth" "Circuit"
[10] "trained" "attention" "constitutionality"
[13] "comers" "requirement" "described"
[16] "parties" "accord" "See"
[19] "Fed" "Appx" "App"
[22] "Pet" "Cert" "id"
[25] "We" "reject" "CLS"
[28] "s" "unseemly" "attempt"
[31] "escape" "stipulation" "shift"
[34] "target" "Hastings" "policy"
[37] "written" "This" "opinion"
[40] "therefore" "considers" "whether"
[43] "conditioning" "access" "student"
[46] "organization" "forum" "compliance"
[49] "comers" "policy" "violates"
[52] "Constitution" ""
[[234]]
[1] "III" ""
[[235]]
[1] "A" ""
[[236]]
[1] "" "In" "support" "argument"
[5] "Hastings" "comers" "policy" "treads"
[9] "First" "Amendment" "rights" "free"
[13] "speech" "expressive" "association" "CLS"
[17] "draws" "two" "lines" "decisions"
[21] "First" "progression" "cases" "Court"
[25] "employed" "forum" "analysis" "determine"
[29] "governmental" "entity" "regulating" "property"
[33] "charge" "may" "place" "limitations"
[37] "speech" "Recognizing" "State" "s"
[41] "right" "preserve" "property" "control"
[45] "use" "lawfully" "dedicated" "Cornelius"
[49] "v" "NAACP" "Legal" "Defense"
[53] "Ed" "Fund" "Inc" "U"
[57] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[61] "Ed" "d" "internal" "quotation"
[65] "marks" "omitted" "Court" "permitted"
[69] "restrictions" "access" "limited" "public"
[73] "forum" "like" "RSO" "program"
[77] "key" "caveat" "Any" "access"
[81] "barrier" "must" "reasonable" "viewpoint"
[85] "neutral" "e" "g" "Rosenberger"
[89] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[93] "See" "also" "e" "g"
[97] "Good" "News" "Club" "v"
[101] "Milford" "Central" "School" "U"
[105] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[109] "Ed" "d" "Lamb" "s"
[113] "Chapel" "v" "Center" "Moriches"
[117] "Union" "Free" "School" "Dist"
[121] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[125] "L" "Ed" "d" "Perry"
[129] "Ed" "Assn" "v" "Perry"
[133] "Local" "Educators" "Assn" "U"
[137] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[141] "Ed" "d" ""
[[237]]
[1] "" "Second" "evidenced"
[4] "another" "set" "decisions"
[7] "Court" "rigorously" "reviewed"
[10] "laws" "regulations" "constrain"
[13] "associational" "freedom" "In"
[16] "context" "public" "accommodations"
[19] "subjected" "restrictions" "freedom"
[22] "close" "scrutiny" "restrictions"
[25] "permitted" "serve" "compelling"
[28] "state" "interests" "unrelated"
[31] "suppression" "ideas" "interests"
[34] "advanced" "significantly" "less"
[37] "restrictive" "means" "Roberts"
[40] "v" "United" "States"
[43] "Jaycees" "U" "S"
[46] "S" "Ct" "L"
[49] "Ed" "d" "See"
[52] "also" "e" "g"
[55] "Boy" "Scouts" "America"
[58] "v" "Dale" "U"
[61] "S" "S" "Ct"
[64] "L" "Ed" "d"
[67] "Freedom" "association" "recognized"
[70] "plainly" "presupposes" "freedom"
[73] "associate" "Roberts" "U"
[76] "S" "S" "Ct"
[79] "Insisting" "organization" "embrace"
[82] "unwelcome" "members" "therefore"
[85] "concluded" "directly" "immediately"
[88] "affects" "associational" "rights"
[91] "Dale" "U" "S"
[94] "S" "Ct" ""
[[238]]
[1] "CLS" "us" "engage" "line"
[5] "cases" "independently" "expressive" "association"
[9] "free" "speech" "arguments" "merge"
[13] "Who" "speaks" "behalf" "CLS"
[17] "reasons" "colors" "concept" "conveyed"
[21] "See" "Brief" "Petitioner" "expressive"
[25] "association" "case" "functional" "equivalent"
[29] "speech" "It" "therefore" "makes"
[33] "little" "sense" "treat" "CLS"
[37] "s" "speech" "association" "claims"
[41] "discrete" "See" "Citizens" "Against"
[45] "Rent" "Control" "Coalition" "Fair"
[49] "Housing" "v" "Berkeley" "U"
[53] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[57] "Ed" "d" "Instead" "three"
[61] "observations" "lead" "us" "conclude"
[65] "limited" "public" "forum" "precedents"
[69] "supply" "appropriate" "framework" "assessing"
[73] "CLS" "s" "speech" "association"
[77] "rights" ""
[[239]]
[1] "First" "considerations" "led"
[4] "us" "apply" "less"
[7] "restrictive" "level" "scrutiny"
[10] "speech" "limited" "public"
[13] "forums" "compared" "environments"
[16] "see" "supra" "n"
[19] "apply" "equal" "force"
[22] "expressive" "association" "occurring"
[25] "limited" "public" "forums"
[28] "As" "just" "noted"
[31] "speech" "expressive" "association"
[34] "rights" "closely" "linked"
[37] "See" "Roberts" "U"
[40] "S" "S" "Ct"
[43] "Associational" "freedom" "implicit"
[46] "right" "engage" "activities"
[49] "protected" "First" "Amendment"
[52] "When" "intertwined" "rights"
[55] "arise" "exactly" "context"
[58] "anomalous" "restriction" "speech"
[61] "survive" "constitutional" "review"
[64] "limited" "public" "forum"
[67] "test" "invalidated" "impermissible"
[70] "infringement" "expressive" "association"
[73] "Accord" "Brief" "State"
[76] "Universities" "et" "al"
[79] "Amici" "Curiae" "That"
[82] "result" "anomalous" "case"
[85] "CLS" "suggests" "expressive"
[88] "association" "claim" "plays"
[91] "part" "auxiliary" "speech"
[94] "s" "starring" "role"
[97] "See" "Brief" "Petitioner"
[100] ""
[[240]]
[1] "Second" "closely" "related"
[4] "strict" "scrutiny" "applied"
[7] "settings" "laws" "burden"
[10] "expressive" "association" "practical"
[13] "effect" "invalidate" "defining"
[16] "characteristic" "limited" "public"
[19] "forums" "State" "may"
[22] "reserv" "e" "certain"
[25] "groups" "Rosenberger" "U"
[28] "S" "S" "Ct"
[31] "See" "also" "Perry"
[34] "Ed" "Assn" "U"
[37] "S" "S" "Ct"
[40] "Implicit" "concept" "limited"
[43] "public" "forum" "State"
[46] "s" "right" "make"
[49] "distinctions" "access" "basis"
[52] "speaker" "identity" "Cornelius"
[55] "U" "S" "S"
[58] "Ct" "A" "speaker"
[61] "may" "excluded" "limited"
[64] "public" "forum" "member"
[67] "class" "speakers" "whose"
[70] "especial" "benefit" "forum"
[73] "created" ""
[[241]]
[1] "An" "example" "sharpens" "tip"
[5] "point" "Schools" "including" "Hastings"
[9] "see" "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[13] "ordinarily" "without" "controversy" "limit"
[17] "official" "student" "group" "recognition"
[21] "organizations" "comprising" "students" "even"
[25] "groups" "wish" "associate" "nonstudents"
[29] "See" "e" "g" "Volokh"
[33] "Freedom" "Expressive" "Association" "Government"
[37] "Subsidies" "Stan" "L" "Rev"
[41] "The" "ground" "rules" "must"
[45] "govern" "speech" "association" "challenges"
[49] "limited" "public" "forum" "context"
[53] "lest" "strict" "scrutiny" "trump"
[57] "public" "university" "s" "ability"
[61] "confin" "e" "speech" "forum"
[65] "limited" "legitimate" "purposes" "created"
[69] "Rosenberger" "U" "S" "S"
[73] "Ct" "See" "also" "Healy"
[77] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[81] "Associational" "activities" "need" "tolerated"
[85] "infringe" "reasonable" "campus" "rules"
[89] ""
[[242]]
[1] "" "Third" "case" "fits"
[5] "comfortably" "within" "limited" "public"
[9] "forum" "category" "CLS" "seeking"
[13] "effectively" "state" "subsidy" "faces"
[17] "indirect" "pressure" "modify" "membership"
[21] "policies" "CLS" "may" "exclude"
[25] "person" "reason" "forgoes" "benefits"
[29] "official" "recognition" "The" "expressive"
[33] "association" "precedents" "CLS" "relies"
[37] "contrast" "involved" "regulations" "compelled"
[41] "group" "include" "unwanted" "members"
[45] "choice" "opt" "See" "e"
[49] "g" "Dale" "U" "S"
[53] "S" "Ct" "regulation" "forc"
[57] "ed" "Boy" "Scouts" "accept"
[61] "members" "desire" "internal" "quotation"
[65] "marks" "omitted" "Roberts" "U"
[69] "S" "S" "Ct" "There"
[73] "can" "clearer" "example" "intrusion"
[77] "internal" "structure" "affairs" "association"
[81] "forced" "inclusion" "unwelcome" "participants"
[85] ""
[[243]]
[1] "In" "diverse" "contexts"
[4] "decisions" "distinguished" "policies"
[7] "require" "action" "withhold"
[10] "benefits" "See" "e"
[13] "g" "Grove" "City"
[16] "College" "v" "Bell"
[19] "U" "S" "S"
[22] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[25] "d" "Bob" "Jones"
[28] "Univ" "v" "United"
[31] "States" "U" "S"
[34] "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "d" "Application"
[40] "less" "restrictive" "limited"
[43] "public" "forum" "analysis"
[46] "better" "accounts" "fact"
[49] "Hastings" "RSO" "program"
[52] "dangling" "carrot" "subsidy"
[55] "wielding" "stick" "prohibition"
[58] "Cf" "Norwood" "v"
[61] "Harrison" "U" "S"
[64] "S" "Ct" "L"
[67] "Ed" "d" "That"
[70] "Constitution" "may" "compel"
[73] "toleration" "private" "discrimination"
[76] "circumstances" "mean" "requires"
[79] "state" "support" "discrimination"
[82] ""
[[244]]
[1] "" "In" "sum" "persuaded"
[5] "limited" "public" "forum" "precedents"
[9] "adequately" "respect" "CLS" "s"
[13] "speech" "expressive" "association" "rights"
[17] "fairly" "balance" "rights" "Hastings"
[21] "interests" "property" "owner" "educational"
[25] "institution" "We" "turn" "merits"
[29] "instant" "dispute" "therefore" "limited"
[33] "public" "forum" "decisions" "guide"
[37] ""
[[245]]
[1] "" "B" ""
[[246]]
[1] "As" "earlier" "pointed"
[4] "supra" "write" "blank"
[7] "slate" "three" "times"
[10] "considered" "clashes" "public"
[13] "universities" "student" "groups"
[16] "seeking" "official" "recognition"
[19] "attendant" "benefits" "First"
[22] "Healy" "state" "college"
[25] "denied" "school" "affiliation"
[28] "student" "group" "wished"
[31] "form" "local" "chapter"
[34] "Students" "Democratic" "Society"
[37] "SDS" "U" "S"
[40] "S" "Ct" "Characterizing"
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[46] "violent" "disruptive" "finding"
[49] "organization" "s" "philosophy"
[52] "repugnant" "college" "completely"
[55] "banned" "SDS" "chapter"
[58] "campus" "effort" "sever"
[61] "channels" "communication" "students"
[64] "group" "university" "officials"
[67] "went" "far" "disband"
[70] "meeting" "SDS" "members"
[73] "campus" "coffee" "shop"
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[79] "The" "college" "noted"
[82] "require" "group" "seeking"
[85] "official" "recognition" "affirm"
[88] "advance" "willingness" "adhere"
[91] "reasonable" "campus" "law"
[94] "including" "reasonable" "standards"
[97] "respecting" "conduct" "Id"
[100] "S" "Ct" "But"
[103] "public" "educational" "institution"
[106] "exceeds" "constitutional" "bounds"
[109] "held" "restrict" "s"
[112] "speech" "association" "simply"
[115] "finds" "views" "expressed"
[118] "group" "abhorrent" "Id"
[121] "S" "Ct" ""
[[247]]
[1] "We" "later" "relied"
[4] "Healy" "Widmar" "In"
[7] "case" "public" "university"
[10] "effort" "avoid" "state"
[13] "support" "religion" "closed"
[16] "facilities" "registered" "student"
[19] "group" "sought" "use"
[22] "university" "space" "religious"
[25] "worship" "discussion" "U"
[28] "S" "S" "Ct"
[31] "A" "university" "s"
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[37] "decisions" "Court" "never"
[40] "denied" "university" "s"
[43] "authority" "impose" "reasonable"
[46] "regulations" "compatible" "mission"
[49] "upon" "use" "campus"
[52] "facilities" "Id" "n"
[55] "S" "Ct" "But"
[58] "university" "singled" "religious"
[61] "organizations" "disadvantageous" "treatment"
[64] "subjected" "university" "s"
[67] "regulation" "strict" "scrutiny"
[70] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[73] "The" "school" "s"
[76] "interest" "maintaining" "strict"
[79] "separation" "church" "State"
[82] "held" "sufficiently" "compelling"
[85] "justify" "viewpoint" "discrimination"
[88] "religious" "speech" "Id"
[91] "S" "Ct" "internal"
[94] "quotation" "marks" "omitted"
[97] ""
[[248]]
[1] "Most" "recently" "comprehensively"
[4] "Rosenberger" "reiterated" "university"
[7] "generally" "may" "withhold"
[10] "benefits" "student" "groups"
[13] "religious" "outlook" "The"
[16] "officially" "recognized" "student"
[19] "group" "Rosenberger" "denied"
[22] "student" "activity" "fee"
[25] "funding" "distribute" "newspaper"
[28] "publication" "discussed" "issues"
[31] "Christian" "perspective" "U"
[34] "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "By" "select" "ing"
[40] "disfavored" "treatment" "student"
[43] "journalistic" "efforts" "religious"
[46] "editorial" "viewpoints" "held"
[49] "university" "engaged" "viewpoint"
[52] "discrimination" "presumed" "impermissible"
[55] "directed" "speech" "otherwise"
[58] "within" "forum" "s"
[61] "limitations" "Id" "S"
[64] "Ct" ""
[[249]]
[1] "" "In" "three"
[4] "cases" "ruled" "student"
[7] "groups" "unconstitutionally" "singled"
[10] "points" "view" "Once"
[13] "opened" "limited" "public"
[16] "forum" "emphasized" "State"
[19] "must" "respect" "lawful"
[22] "boundaries" "set" "Id"
[25] "S" "Ct" "The"
[28] "constitutional" "constraints" "boundaries"
[31] "State" "may" "set"
[34] "bear" "repetition" "The"
[37] "State" "may" "exclude"
[40] "speech" "distinction" "reasonable"
[43] "light" "purpose" "served"
[46] "forum" "may" "discriminate"
[49] "speech" "basis" "viewpoint"
[52] "Ibid" "internal" "quotation"
[55] "marks" "omitted" ""
[[250]]
[1] "C" ""
[[251]]
[1] "We" "first" "consider" "whether"
[5] "Hastings" "policy" "reasonable" "taking"
[9] "account" "RSO" "forum" "s"
[13] "function" "surrounding" "circumstances" "Cornelius"
[17] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[21] ""
[[252]]
[1] "" ""
[[253]]
[1] "Our" "inquiry" "shaped"
[4] "educational" "context" "arises"
[7] "First" "Amendment" "rights"
[10] "observed" "must" "analyzed"
[13] "light" "special" "characteristics"
[16] "school" "environment" "Widmar"
[19] "U" "S" "n"
[22] "S" "Ct" "internal"
[25] "quotation" "marks" "omitted"
[28] "This" "Court" "final"
[31] "arbiter" "question" "whether"
[34] "public" "university" "exceeded"
[37] "constitutional" "constraints" "owe"
[40] "deference" "universities" "consider"
[43] "question" "Cf" "Pell"
[46] "v" "Procunier" "U"
[49] "S" "S" "Ct"
[52] "L" "Ed" "d"
[55] "Courts" "course" "abdicate"
[58] "constitutional" "responsibility" "delineate"
[61] "protect" "fundamental" "liberties"
[64] "Cognizant" "judges" "lack"
[67] "ground" "expertise" "experience"
[70] "school" "administrators" "however"
[73] "cautioned" "courts" "various"
[76] "contexts" "resist" "substitut"
[79] "ing" "notions" "sound"
[82] "educational" "policy" "school"
[85] "authorities" "review" "Board"
[88] "Ed" "Hendrick" "Hudson"
[91] "Central" "School" "Dist"
[94] "Westchester" "Cty" "v"
[97] "Rowley" "U" "S"
[100] "S" "Ct" "L"
[103] "Ed" "d" "See"
[106] "also" "e" "g"
[109] "Hazelwood" "School" "Dist"
[112] "v" "Kuhlmeier" "U"
[115] "S" "S" "Ct"
[118] "L" "Ed" "d"
[121] "noting" "oft" "expressed"
[124] "view" "education" "Nation"
[127] "s" "youth" "primarily"
[130] "responsibility" "parents" "teachers"
[133] "state" "local" "school"
[136] "officials" "federal" "judges"
[139] "Healy" "U" "S"
[142] "S" "Ct" "T"
[145] "Court" "long" "recognized"
[148] "need" "affirming" "comprehensive"
[151] "authority" "States" "school"
[154] "officials" "consistent" "fundamental"
[157] "constitutional" "safeguards" "prescribe"
[160] "control" "conduct" "schools"
[163] "quoting" "Tinker" "v"
[166] "Des" "Moines" "Independent"
[169] "Community" "School" "Dist"
[172] "U" "S" "S"
[175] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[178] "d" ""
[[254]]
[1] "A" "college" "s"
[4] "commission" "concomitant" "license"
[7] "choose" "among" "pedagogical"
[10] "approaches" "confined" "classroom"
[13] "extracurricular" "programs" "today"
[16] "essential" "parts" "educational"
[19] "process" "See" "Board"
[22] "Ed" "Independent" "School"
[25] "Dist" "No" "Pottawatomie"
[28] "Cty" "v" "Earls"
[31] "U" "S" "n"
[34] "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "d" "involvement"
[40] "student" "groups" "significant"
[43] "contributor" "breadth" "quality"
[46] "educational" "experience" "internal"
[49] "quotation" "marks" "omitted"
[52] "Schools" "emphasized" "enjoy"
[55] "significant" "measure" "authority"
[58] "type" "officially" "recognized"
[61] "activities" "students" "participate"
[64] "Board" "Ed" "Westside"
[67] "Community" "Schools" "Dist"
[70] "v" "Mergens" "U"
[73] "S" "S" "Ct"
[76] "L" "Ed" "d"
[79] "We" "therefore" "approach"
[82] "task" "special" "caution"
[85] "Healy" "U" "S"
[88] "S" "Ct" "mindful"
[91] "Hastings" "decisions" "character"
[94] "student" "group" "program"
[97] "due" "decent" "respect"
[100] ""
[[255]]
[1] "" ""
[[256]]
[1] "" "With" "appropriate"
[4] "regard" "school" "administrators"
[7] "judgment" "review" "justifications"
[10] "Hastings" "offers" "defense"
[13] "comers" "requirement" "First"
[16] "open" "access" "policy"
[19] "ensures" "leadership" "educational"
[22] "social" "opportunities" "afforded"
[25] "RSOs" "available" "students"
[28] "Brief" "Hastings" "see"
[31] "Brief" "American" "Civil"
[34] "Liberties" "Union" "et"
[37] "al" "Amici" "Curiae"
[40] "Just" "Hastings" "allow"
[43] "professors" "host" "classes"
[46] "open" "students" "certain"
[49] "status" "belief" "Law"
[52] "School" "may" "decide"
[55] "reasonably" "view" "educational"
[58] "experience" "best" "promoted"
[61] "participants" "forum" "must"
[64] "provide" "equal" "access"
[67] "students" "Brief" "Hastings"
[70] "RSOs" "count" "significant"
[73] "eligible" "financial" "assistance"
[76] "drawn" "mandatory" "student"
[79] "activity" "fees" "see"
[82] "supra" "comers" "policy"
[85] "ensures" "Hastings" "student"
[88] "forced" "fund" "group"
[91] "reject" "member" ""
[[257]]
[1] "" "Second" "comers"
[4] "requirement" "helps" "Hastings"
[7] "police" "written" "terms"
[10] "Nondiscrimination" "Policy" "without"
[13] "inquiring" "RSO" "s"
[16] "motivation" "membership" "restrictions"
[19] "To" "bring" "RSO"
[22] "program" "within" "CLS"
[25] "s" "view" "Constitution"
[28] "s" "limits" "CLS"
[31] "proposes" "Hastings" "permit"
[34] "exclusion" "belief" "forbid"
[37] "discrimination" "due" "status"
[40] "See" "Tr" "Oral"
[43] "Arg" "But" "proposal"
[46] "impose" "Hastings" "daunting"
[49] "labor" "How" "Law"
[52] "School" "go" "determining"
[55] "whether" "student" "organization"
[58] "cloaked" "prohibited" "status"
[61] "exclusion" "belief" "based"
[64] "garb" "If" "hypothetical"
[67] "Male" "Superiority" "Club"
[70] "barred" "female" "student"
[73] "running" "presidency" "example"
[76] "Law" "School" "tell"
[79] "whether" "group" "rejected"
[82] "bid" "sex" "seeking"
[85] "lead" "club" "manifested"
[88] "lack" "belief" "fundamental"
[91] "philosophy" ""
[[258]]
[1] "" "This" "case"
[4] "instructive" "regard" "CLS"
[7] "contends" "exclude" "individuals"
[10] "sexual" "orientation" "rather"
[13] "basis" "conjunction" "conduct"
[16] "belief" "conduct" "wrong"
[19] "Brief" "Petitioner" "emphasis"
[22] "deleted" "Our" "decisions"
[25] "declined" "distinguish" "status"
[28] "conduct" "context" "See"
[31] "Lawrence" "v" "Texas"
[34] "U" "S" "S"
[37] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[40] "d" "When" "homosexual"
[43] "conduct" "made" "criminal"
[46] "law" "State" "declaration"
[49] "invitation" "subject" "homosexual"
[52] "persons" "discrimination" "emphasis"
[55] "added" "id" "S"
[58] "Ct" "O" "Connor"
[61] "J" "concurring" "judgment"
[64] "While" "true" "law"
[67] "applies" "conduct" "conduct"
[70] "targeted" "law" "conduct"
[73] "closely" "correlated" "homosexual"
[76] "Under" "circumstances" "law"
[79] "targeted" "conduct" "It"
[82] "instead" "directed" "toward"
[85] "gay" "persons" "class"
[88] "cf" "Bray" "v"
[91] "Alexandria" "Women" "s"
[94] "Health" "Clinic" "U"
[97] "S" "S" "Ct"
[100] "L" "Ed" "d"
[103] "A" "tax" "wearing"
[106] "yarmulkes" "tax" "Jews"
[109] "See" "also" "Brief"
[112] "Lambda" "Legal" "Defense"
[115] "Education" "Fund" "Inc"
[118] "et" "al" "Amici"
[121] "Curiae" ""
[[259]]
[1] "Third" "Law" "School" "reasonably"
[5] "adheres" "view" "comers" "policy"
[9] "extent" "brings" "together" "individuals"
[13] "diverse" "backgrounds" "beliefs" "encourages"
[17] "tolerance" "cooperation" "learning" "among"
[21] "students" "App" "And" "policy"
[25] "sometimes" "produces" "discord" "Hastings"
[29] "can" "rationally" "rank" "among"
[33] "RSO" "program" "goals" "development"
[37] "conflict" "resolution" "skills" "toleration"
[41] "readiness" "find" "common" "ground"
[45] ""
[[260]]
[1] "Fourth" "Hastings" "policy"
[4] "incorporates" "fact" "subsumes"
[7] "state" "law" "proscriptions"
[10] "discrimination" "conveys" "Law"
[13] "School" "s" "decision"
[16] "decline" "subsidize" "public"
[19] "monies" "benefits" "conduct"
[22] "people" "California" "disapprove"
[25] "Brief" "Hastings" "id"
[28] "citing" "Cal" "Educ"
[31] "Code" "Ann" "West"
[34] "Supp" "prohibiting" "discrimination"
[37] "various" "bases" "State"
[40] "law" "course" "may"
[43] "command" "public" "universities"
[46] "take" "action" "impermissible"
[49] "First" "Amendment" "But"
[52] "long" "public" "university"
[55] "contravene" "constitutional" "limits"
[58] "choice" "advance" "state"
[61] "law" "goals" "school"
[64] "s" "educational" "endeavors"
[67] "stands" "firm" "footing"
[70] ""
[[261]]
[1] "In" "sum" "several"
[4] "justifications" "Hastings" "asserts"
[7] "support" "comers" "requirement"
[10] "surely" "reasonable" "light"
[13] "RSO" "forum" "s"
[16] "purposes" ""
[[262]]
[1] "" ""
[[263]]
[1] "The" "Law" "School"
[4] "s" "policy" "creditworthy"
[7] "view" "substantial" "alternative"
[10] "channels" "remain" "open"
[13] "CLS" "student" "communication"
[16] "take" "place" "Perry"
[19] "Ed" "Assn" "U"
[22] "S" "S" "Ct"
[25] "If" "restrictions" "access"
[28] "limited" "public" "forum"
[31] "viewpoint" "discriminatory" "ability"
[34] "group" "exist" "outside"
[37] "forum" "cure" "constitutional"
[40] "shortcoming" "But" "access"
[43] "barriers" "viewpoint" "neutral"
[46] "decisions" "counted" "significant"
[49] "available" "avenues" "group"
[52] "exercise" "First" "Amendment"
[55] "rights" "lessen" "burden"
[58] "created" "barriers" "See"
[61] "ibid" "Cornelius" "U"
[64] "S" "S" "Ct"
[67] "Greer" "v" "Spock"
[70] "U" "S" "S"
[73] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[76] "d" "Pell" "U"
[79] "S" "S" "Ct"
[82] ""
[[264]]
[1] "In" "case" "Hastings" "offered"
[5] "CLS" "access" "school" "facilities"
[9] "conduct" "meetings" "use" "chalkboards"
[13] "generally" "available" "bulletin" "boards"
[17] "advertise" "events" "App" "Although"
[21] "CLS" "take" "advantage" "RSO"
[25] "specific" "methods" "communication" "see"
[29] "supra" "advent" "electronic" "media"
[33] "social" "networking" "sites" "reduces"
[37] "importance" "channels" "See" "App"
[41] "CLS" "maintained" "Yahoo" "message"
[45] "group" "disseminate" "information" "students"
[49] "Christian" "Legal" "Society" "v"
[53] "Walker" "F" "d" "C"
[57] "A" "Wood" "J" "dissenting"
[61] "Most" "universities" "colleges" "college"
[65] "aged" "students" "communicate" "email"
[69] "websites" "hosts" "like" "MySpace"
[73] "If" "CLS" "website" "student"
[77] "school" "access" "Google" "easily"
[81] "found" "See" "also" "Brief"
[85] "Associated" "Students" "University" "California"
[89] "Hastings" "College" "Law" "Amicus"
[93] "Curiae" "describing" "host" "ways"
[97] "CLS" "communicate" "Hastings" "students"
[101] "outside" "official" "channels" ""
[[265]]
[1] "Private" "groups" "fraternities"
[4] "sororities" "social" "clubs"
[7] "secret" "societies" "commonly"
[10] "maintain" "presence" "universities"
[13] "without" "official" "school"
[16] "affiliation" "Based" "record"
[19] "us" "CLS" "similarly"
[22] "situated" "It" "hosted"
[25] "variety" "activities" "year"
[28] "Hastings" "denied" "recognition"
[31] "number" "students" "attending"
[34] "meetings" "events" "doubled"
[37] "App" "The" "variety"
[40] "type" "alternative" "modes"
[43] "access" "present" "short"
[46] "compare" "favorably" "limited"
[49] "public" "forum" "cases"
[52] "upheld" "restrictions" "access"
[55] "Perry" "Ed" "Assn"
[58] "U" "S" "S"
[61] "Ct" "It" "beyond"
[64] "dissenter" "s" "license"
[67] "note" "see" "supra"
[70] "n" "constantly" "maintain"
[73] "nonrecognition" "student" "organization"
[76] "equivalent" "prohibiting" "members"
[79] "speaking" ""
[[266]]
[1] "" ""
[[267]]
[1] "CLS" "nevertheless" "deems"
[4] "Hastings" "comers" "policy"
[7] "frankly" "absurd" "Brief"
[10] "Petitioner" "There" "can"
[13] "diversity" "viewpoints" "forum"
[16] "asserts" "groups" "permitted"
[19] "form" "around" "viewpoints"
[22] "Id" "accord" "post"
[25] "ALITO" "J" "dissenting"
[28] "This" "catchphrase" "confuses"
[31] "CLS" "s" "preferred"
[34] "policy" "constitutional" "limitation"
[37] "advisability" "Hastings" "policy"
[40] "control" "permissibility" "See"
[43] "Wood" "v" "Strickland"
[46] "U" "S" "S"
[49] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[52] "d" "Instead" "repeatedly"
[55] "stressed" "State" "s"
[58] "restriction" "access" "limited"
[61] "public" "forum" "need"
[64] "reasonable" "reasonable" "limitation"
[67] "Cornelius" "U" "S"
[70] "S" "Ct" ""
[[268]]
[1] "CLS" "also" "assails"
[4] "reasonableness" "comers" "policy"
[7] "light" "RSO" "forum"
[10] "s" "function" "forecasting"
[13] "policy" "will" "facilitate"
[16] "hostile" "takeovers" "organizations"
[19] "must" "open" "arms"
[22] "CLS" "contends" "saboteurs"
[25] "will" "infiltrate" "groups"
[28] "subvert" "mission" "message"
[31] "This" "supposition" "strikes"
[34] "us" "hypothetical" "real"
[37] "CLS" "points" "history"
[40] "prospect" "RSO" "hijackings"
[43] "Hastings" "Cf" "National"
[46] "Endowment" "Arts" "v"
[49] "Finley" "U" "S"
[52] "S" "Ct" "L"
[55] "Ed" "d" "W"
[58] "e" "reluctant" "invalidate"
[61] "legislation" "basis" "hypothetical"
[64] "application" "situations" "Court"
[67] "internal" "quotation" "marks"
[70] "omitted" "Students" "tend"
[73] "self" "sort" "presumably"
[76] "will" "endeavor" "en"
[79] "masse" "join" "let"
[82] "alone" "seek" "leadership"
[85] "positions" "groups" "pursuing"
[88] "missions" "wholly" "odds"
[91] "personal" "beliefs" "And"
[94] "rogue" "student" "intent"
[97] "sabotaging" "organization" "s"
[100] "objectives" "nevertheless" "attempted"
[103] "takeover" "members" "group"
[106] "likely" "elect" "officer"
[109] ""
[[269]]
[1] "RSOs" "moreover" "harmony" "comers"
[5] "policy" "may" "condition" "eligibility"
[9] "membership" "leadership" "attendance" "payment"
[13] "dues" "neutral" "requirements" "designed"
[17] "ensure" "students" "join" "commitment"
[21] "group" "s" "vitality" "demise"
[25] "See" "supra" "n" "Several"
[29] "RSOs" "Hastings" "limit" "membership"
[33] "rolls" "officer" "slates" "just"
[37] "way" "See" "e" "g"
[41] "App" "members" "must" "p"
[45] "ay" "dues" "timely" "basis"
[49] "attend" "meetings" "regularly" "id"
[53] "members" "must" "complete" "application"
[57] "pay" "dues" "ny" "active"
[61] "member" "misses" "semester" "regularly"
[65] "scheduled" "meetings" "shall" "dropped"
[69] "rolls" "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[73] "Only" "Hastings" "students" "held"
[77] "membership" "organization" "minimum" "one"
[81] "semester" "shall" "eligible" "officer"
[85] ""
[[270]]
[1] "" "Hastings" "furthermore" "reasonably"
[5] "expect" "law" "students" "disruptive"
[9] "behavior" "CLS" "hypothesizes" "build"
[13] "expectation" "educational" "approach" "A"
[17] "reasonable" "policy" "need" "anticipate"
[21] "preemptively" "close" "every" "opportunity"
[25] "avoidance" "manipulation" "If" "students"
[29] "begin" "exploit" "comers" "policy"
[33] "hijacking" "organizations" "distort" "destroy"
[37] "missions" "Hastings" "presumably" "revisit"
[41] "revise" "policy" "See" "Tr"
[45] "Oral" "Arg" "counsel" "Hastings"
[49] "Brief" "Hastings" ""
[[271]]
[1] "Finally" "CLS" "asserts" "dissent"
[5] "repeats" "post" "Law" "School"
[9] "lacks" "legitimate" "interest" "let"
[13] "alone" "one" "reasonably" "related"
[17] "RSO" "forum" "s" "purposes"
[21] "urging" "religious" "groups" "favor"
[25] "co" "religionists" "purposes" "religious"
[29] "activities" "Brief" "Petitioner" "id"
[33] "CLS" "s" "analytical" "error"
[37] "lies" "focusing" "benefits" "must"
[41] "forgo" "ignoring" "interests" "seeks"
[45] "fence" "Exclusion" "two" "sides"
[49] "Hastings" "caught" "crossfire" "group"
[53] "s" "desire" "exclude" "students"
[57] "demand" "equal" "access" "may"
[61] "reasonably" "draw" "line" "sand"
[65] "permitting" "organizations" "express" "wish"
[69] "group" "discriminate" "membership" ""
[[272]]
[1] "D" ""
[[273]]
[1] "We" "next" "consider" "whether" "Hastings"
[6] "comers" "policy" "viewpoint" "neutral" ""
[[274]]
[1] "" ""
[[275]]
[1] "" "Although" "aspect"
[4] "limited" "public" "forum"
[7] "analysis" "constitutional" "sticking"
[10] "point" "prior" "decisions"
[13] "earlier" "recounted" "supra"
[16] "need" "dwell" "It"
[19] "hard" "imagine" "viewpoint"
[22] "neutral" "policy" "one"
[25] "requiring" "student" "groups"
[28] "accept" "comers" "In"
[31] "contrast" "Healy" "Widmar"
[34] "Rosenberger" "universities" "singled"
[37] "organizations" "disfavored" "treatment"
[40] "points" "view" "Hastings"
[43] "comers" "requirement" "draws"
[46] "distinction" "groups" "based"
[49] "message" "perspective" "An"
[52] "comers" "condition" "access"
[55] "RSO" "status" "short"
[58] "textbook" "viewpoint" "neutral"
[61] ""
[[276]]
[1] "" ""
[[277]]
[1] "" "Conceding" "Hastings"
[4] "comers" "policy" "nominally"
[7] "neutral" "CLS" "attacks"
[10] "regulation" "pointing" "effect"
[13] "The" "policy" "vulnerable"
[16] "constitutional" "assault" "CLS"
[19] "contends" "systematically" "predictably"
[22] "burdens" "heavily" "groups"
[25] "whose" "viewpoints" "favor"
[28] "campus" "mainstream" "Brief"
[31] "Petitioner" "cf" "post"
[34] "ALITO" "J" "dissenting"
[37] "charging" "Hastings" "policy"
[40] "favors" "political" "ly"
[43] "correc" "t" "student"
[46] "expression" "This" "argument"
[49] "stumbles" "first" "step"
[52] "regulation" "serves" "purposes"
[55] "unrelated" "content" "expression"
[58] "deemed" "neutral" "even"
[61] "incidental" "effect" "speakers"
[64] "messages" "others" "Ward"
[67] "v" "Rock" "Against"
[70] "Racism" "U" "S"
[73] "S" "Ct" "L"
[76] "Ed" "d" "See"
[79] "also" "Madsen" "v"
[82] "Women" "s" "Health"
[85] "Center" "Inc" "U"
[88] "S" "S" "Ct"
[91] "L" "Ed" "d"
[94] "T" "fact" "injunction"
[97] "covered" "people" "particular"
[100] "viewpoint" "render" "injunction"
[103] "content" "viewpoint" "based"
[106] ""
[[278]]
[1] "" "Even" "regulation"
[4] "differential" "impact" "groups"
[7] "wishing" "enforce" "exclusionary"
[10] "membership" "policies" "w"
[13] "State" "target" "conduct"
[16] "basis" "expressive" "content"
[19] "acts" "shielded" "regulation"
[22] "merely" "express" "discriminatory"
[25] "idea" "philosophy" "R"
[28] "A" "V" "v"
[31] "St" "Paul" "U"
[34] "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "L" "Ed" "d"
[40] "See" "also" "Roberts"
[43] "U" "S" "S"
[46] "Ct" "State" "s"
[49] "nondiscrimination" "law" "distinguish"
[52] "prohibited" "permitted" "activity"
[55] "basis" "viewpoint" "Board"
[58] "Directors" "Rotary" "Int"
[61] "l" "v" "Rotary"
[64] "Club" "Duarte" "U"
[67] "S" "S" "Ct"
[70] "L" "Ed" "d"
[73] ""
[[279]]
[1] "" "Hastings" "requirement"
[4] "student" "groups" "accept"
[7] "comers" "satisfied" "justified"
[10] "without" "reference" "content"
[13] "viewpoint" "regulated" "speech"
[16] "Ward" "U" "S"
[19] "S" "Ct" "internal"
[22] "quotation" "marks" "emphasis"
[25] "omitted" "The" "Law"
[28] "School" "s" "policy"
[31] "aims" "act" "rejecting"
[34] "group" "members" "without"
[37] "reference" "reasons" "motivating"
[40] "behavior" "Hastings" "desire"
[43] "redress" "th" "e"
[46] "perceived" "harms" "exclusionary"
[49] "membership" "policies" "provides"
[52] "adequate" "explanation" "comers"
[55] "condition" "mere" "disagreement"
[58] "student" "group" "s"
[61] "beliefs" "biases" "Wisconsin"
[64] "v" "Mitchell" "U"
[67] "S" "S" "Ct"
[70] "L" "Ed" "d"
[73] "CLS" "s" "conduct"
[76] "Christian" "perspective" "Hastings"
[79] "vantage" "point" "stands"
[82] "group" "RSO" "status"
[85] "In" "end" "Hastings"
[88] "observes" "CLS" "simply"
[91] "confusing" "viewpoint" "based"
[94] "objections" "nondiscrimination" "laws"
[97] "entitled" "voice" "viewpoint"
[100] "discrimination" "Brief" "Hastings"
[103] ""
[[280]]
[1] "" "Finding" "Hastings" "open"
[5] "access" "condition" "RSO" "status"
[9] "reasonable" "viewpoint" "neutral" "reject"
[13] "CLS" "s" "free" "speech"
[17] "expressive" "association" "claims" ""
[[281]]
[1] "IV" ""
[[282]]
[1] "" "In" "reply" "brief"
[5] "CLS" "contends" "t" "peculiarity"
[9] "incoherence" "suspect" "history" "comers"
[13] "policy" "point" "pretext" "Reply"
[17] "Brief" "Neither" "District" "Court"
[21] "Ninth" "Circuit" "addressed" "argument"
[25] "Hastings" "selectively" "enforces" "comers"
[29] "policy" "Court" "proper" "forum"
[33] "air" "issue" "first" "instance"
[37] "On" "remand" "Ninth" "Circuit"
[41] "may" "consider" "CLS" "s"
[45] "pretext" "argument" "extent" "preserved"
[49] ""
[[283]]
[1] "" ""
[[284]]
[1] "For" "foregoing" "reasons"
[4] "affirm" "Court" "Appeals"
[7] "ruling" "comers" "policy"
[10] "constitutional" "remand" "case"
[13] "proceedings" "consistent" "opinion"
[16] ""
[[285]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[286]]
[1] "Justice" "KENNEDY" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] "except" "Part" "II" "A" ""
[[287]]
[1] "The" "principle" "government"
[4] "may" "enact" "laws"
[7] "suppress" "religious" "belief"
[10] "practice" "well" "understood"
[13] "violations" "recorded" "opinions"
[16] "Cf" "McDaniel" "v"
[19] "Paty" "U" "S"
[22] "S" "Ct" "L"
[25] "Ed" "d" "Fowler"
[28] "v" "Rhode" "Island"
[31] "U" "S" "S"
[34] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[37] "Concerned" "fundamental" "nonpersecution"
[40] "principle" "First" "Amendment"
[43] "implicated" "however" "granted"
[46] "certiorari" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "L"
[52] "Ed" "d" ""
[[288]]
[1] "" "Our" "review" "confirms"
[5] "laws" "question" "enacted" "officials"
[9] "understand" "failed" "perceive" "chose"
[13] "ignore" "fact" "official" "actions"
[17] "violated" "Nation" "s" "essential"
[21] "commitment" "religious" "freedom" "The"
[25] "challenged" "laws" "impermissible" "object"
[29] "events" "principle" "general" "applicability"
[33] "violated" "secular" "ends" "asserted"
[37] "defense" "laws" "pursued" "respect"
[41] "conduct" "motivated" "religious" "beliefs"
[45] "We" "invalidate" "challenged" "enactments"
[49] "reverse" "judgment" "Court" "Appeals"
[53] ""
[[289]]
[1] "I" ""
[[290]]
[1] "A" ""
[[291]]
[1] "This" "case" "involves" "practices"
[5] "Santeria" "religion" "originated" "th"
[9] "century" "When" "hundreds" "thousands"
[13] "members" "Yoruba" "people" "brought"
[17] "slaves" "western" "Africa" "Cuba"
[21] "traditional" "African" "religion" "absorbed"
[25] "significant" "elements" "Roman" "Catholicism"
[29] "The" "resulting" "syncretion" "fusion"
[33] "Santeria" "way" "saints" "The"
[37] "Cuban" "Yoruba" "express" "devotion"
[41] "spirits" "called" "orishas" "iconography"
[45] "Catholic" "saints" "Catholic" "symbols"
[49] "often" "present" "Santeria" "rites"
[53] "Santeria" "devotees" "attend" "Catholic"
[57] "sacraments" "F" "Supp" "SD"
[61] "Fla" "Encyclopedia" "Religion" "M"
[65] "Eliade" "ed" "Encyclopedia" "American"
[69] "Religious" "Experience" "C" "Lippy"
[73] "P" "Williams" "eds" ""
[[292]]
[1] "The" "Santeria" "faith" "teaches"
[5] "every" "individual" "destiny" "God"
[9] "destiny" "fulfilled" "aid" "energy"
[13] "orishas" "The" "basis" "Santeria"
[17] "religion" "nurture" "personal" "relation"
[21] "orishas" "one" "principal" "forms"
[25] "devotion" "animal" "sacrifice" "Encyclopedia"
[29] "Religion" "supra" "The" "sacrifice"
[33] "animals" "part" "religious" "rituals"
[37] "ancient" "roots" "See" "generally"
[41] "id" "Animal" "sacrifice" "mentioned"
[45] "throughout" "Old" "Testament" "see"
[49] "Encyclopaedia" "Judaica" "played" "important"
[53] "role" "practice" "Judaism" "destruction"
[57] "second" "Temple" "Jerusalem" "see"
[61] "id" "In" "modern" "Islam"
[65] "annual" "sacrifice" "commemorating" "Abraham"
[69] "s" "sacrifice" "ram" "stead"
[73] "son" "See" "C" "Glass"
[77] "Concise" "Encyclopedia" "Islam" "Encyclopedia"
[81] "Religion" "supra" ""
[[293]]
[1] "According" "Santeria" "teaching" "orishas"
[5] "powerful" "immortal" "They" "depend"
[9] "survival" "sacrifice" "Sacrifices" "performed"
[13] "birth" "marriage" "death" "rites"
[17] "cure" "sick" "initiation" "new"
[21] "members" "priests" "annual" "celebration"
[25] "Animals" "sacrificed" "Santeria" "rituals"
[29] "include" "chickens" "pigeons" "doves"
[33] "ducks" "guinea" "pigs" "goats"
[37] "sheep" "turtles" "The" "animals"
[41] "killed" "cutting" "carotid" "arteries"
[45] "neck" "The" "sacrificed" "animal"
[49] "cooked" "eaten" "except" "healing"
[53] "death" "rituals" "See" "F"
[57] "Supp" "Encyclopedia" "Religion" "supra"
[61] "M" "Gonz" "lex" "Wippler"
[65] "The" "Santeria" "Experience" ""
[[294]]
[1] "Santeria" "adherents" "faced" "widespread"
[5] "persecution" "Cuba" "religion" "rituals"
[9] "practiced" "secret" "The" "open"
[13] "practice" "Santeria" "rites" "remains"
[17] "infrequent" "See" "F" "Supp"
[21] "Encyclopedia" "Religion" "supra" "M"
[25] "Gonz" "lez" "Wippler" "Santer"
[29] "The" "Religion" "The" "religion"
[33] "brought" "Nation" "often" "exiles"
[37] "Cuban" "revolution" "The" "District"
[41] "Court" "estimated" "least" "practitioners"
[45] "South" "Florida" "today" "See"
[49] "F" "Supp" ""
[[295]]
[1] "B" ""
[[296]]
[1] "Petitioner" "Church" "Lukumi" "Babalu"
[5] "Aye" "Inc" "Church" "profit"
[9] "corporation" "organized" "Florida" "law"
[13] "The" "Church" "congregants" "practice"
[17] "Santeria" "religion" "The" "president"
[21] "Church" "petitioner" "Ernesto" "Pichardo"
[25] "also" "Church" "s" "priest"
[29] "holds" "religious" "title" "Italero"
[33] "second" "highest" "Santeria" "faith"
[37] "In" "April" "Church" "leased"
[41] "land" "City" "Hialeah" "Florida"
[45] "announced" "plans" "establish" "house"
[49] "worship" "well" "school" "cultural"
[53] "center" "museum" "Pichardo" "indicated"
[57] "Church" "s" "goal" "bring"
[61] "practice" "Santeria" "faith" "including"
[65] "ritual" "animal" "sacrifice" "open"
[69] "The" "Church" "began" "process"
[73] "obtaining" "utility" "service" "receiving"
[77] "necessary" "licensing" "inspection" "zoning"
[81] "approvals" "Although" "Church" "s"
[85] "efforts" "obtaining" "necessary" "licenses"
[89] "permits" "far" "smooth" "see"
[93] "F" "Supp" "appears" "received"
[97] "needed" "approvals" "early" "August"
[101] ""
[[297]]
[1] "The" "prospect" "Santeria" "church"
[5] "midst" "distressing" "many" "members"
[9] "Hialeah" "community" "announcement" "plans"
[13] "open" "Santeria" "church" "Hialeah"
[17] "prompted" "city" "council" "hold"
[21] "emergency" "public" "session" "June"
[25] "The" "resolutions" "ordinances" "passed"
[29] "later" "meetings" "set" "forth"
[33] "Appendix" "following" "opinion" ""
[[298]]
[1] "A" "summary" "suffices" "beginning"
[5] "enactments" "passed" "June" "meeting"
[9] "First" "city" "council" "adopted"
[13] "Resolution" "noted" "concern" "expressed"
[17] "residents" "city" "certain" "religions"
[21] "may" "propose" "engage" "practices"
[25] "inconsistent" "public" "morals" "peace"
[29] "safety" "declared" "t" "City"
[33] "reiterates" "commitment" "prohibition" "acts"
[37] "religious" "groups" "inconsistent" "public"
[41] "morals" "peace" "safety" "Next"
[45] "council" "approved" "emergency" "ordinance"
[49] "Ordinance" "incorporated" "full" "except"
[53] "penalty" "Florida" "s" "animal"
[57] "cruelty" "laws" "Fla" "Stat"
[61] "ch" "Among" "things" "incorporated"
[65] "state" "law" "subjected" "criminal"
[69] "punishment" "w" "hoever" "unnecessarily"
[73] "cruelly" "kills" "animal" ""
[[299]]
[1] "The" "city" "council" "desired"
[5] "undertake" "legislative" "action" "Florida"
[9] "law" "prohibited" "municipality" "enacting"
[13] "legislation" "relating" "animal" "cruelty"
[17] "conflicted" "state" "law" "To"
[21] "obtain" "clarification" "Hialeah" "s"
[25] "city" "attorney" "requested" "opinion"
[29] "attorney" "general" "Florida" "whether"
[33] "prohibited" "religious" "group" "sacrificing"
[37] "animal" "religious" "ritual" "practice"
[41] "whether" "city" "enact" "ordinances"
[45] "making" "religious" "animal" "sacrifice"
[49] "unlawful" "The" "attorney" "general"
[53] "responded" "mid" "July" "He"
[57] "concluded" "ritual" "sacrifice" "animals"
[61] "purposes" "food" "consumption" "necessary"
[65] "killing" "prohibited" "Fla" "Op"
[69] "Atty" "Gen" "Annual" "Report"
[73] "Atty" "Gen" "The" "attorney"
[77] "general" "appeared" "define" "unnecessary"
[81] "done" "without" "useful" "motive"
[85] "spirit" "wanton" "cruelty" "mere"
[89] "pleasure" "destruction" "without" "sense"
[93] "beneficial" "useful" "person" "killing"
[97] "animal" "Id" "n" "He"
[101] "advised" "religious" "animal" "sacrifice"
[105] "state" "law" "city" "ordinance"
[109] "prohibiting" "conflict" "Id" ""
[[300]]
[1] "The" "city" "council" "responded"
[5] "first" "hortatory" "enactment" "Resolution"
[9] "noted" "residents" "great" "concern"
[13] "regarding" "possibility" "public" "ritualistic"
[17] "animal" "sacrifices" "state" "law"
[21] "prohibition" "The" "resolution" "declared"
[25] "city" "policy" "oppose" "ritual"
[29] "sacrifices" "animals" "within" "Hialeah"
[33] "announced" "person" "organization" "practicing"
[37] "animal" "sacrifice" "will" "prosecuted"
[41] ""
[[301]]
[1] "In" "September" "city"
[4] "council" "adopted" "three"
[7] "substantive" "ordinances" "addressing"
[10] "issue" "religious" "animal"
[13] "sacrifice" "Ordinance" "defined"
[16] "sacrifice" "unnecessarily" "kill"
[19] "torment" "torture" "mutilate"
[22] "animal" "public" "private"
[25] "ritual" "ceremony" "primary"
[28] "purpose" "food" "consumption"
[31] "prohibited" "owning" "possessing"
[34] "animal" "intending" "use"
[37] "animal" "food" "purposes"
[40] "It" "restricted" "application"
[43] "prohibition" "however" "individual"
[46] "group" "kills" "slaughters"
[49] "sacrifices" "animals" "type"
[52] "ritual" "regardless" "whether"
[55] "flesh" "blood" "animal"
[58] "consumed" "The" "ordinance"
[61] "contained" "exemption" "slaughtering"
[64] "licensed" "establishment" "s"
[67] "animals" "specifically" "raised"
[70] "food" "purposes" "Declaring"
[73] "moreover" "city" "council"
[76] "determined" "sacrificing" "animals"
[79] "within" "city" "limits"
[82] "contrary" "public" "health"
[85] "safety" "welfare" "morals"
[88] "community" "city" "council"
[91] "adopted" "Ordinance" "That"
[94] "ordinance" "defined" "sacrifice"
[97] "Ordinance" "provided" "t"
[100] "shall" "unlawful" "person"
[103] "persons" "corporations" "associations"
[106] "sacrifice" "animal" "within"
[109] "corporate" "limits" "City"
[112] "Hialeah" "Florida" "The"
[115] "final" "Ordinance" "defined"
[118] "slaughter" "killing" "animals"
[121] "food" "prohibited" "slaughter"
[124] "outside" "areas" "zoned"
[127] "slaughterhouse" "use" "The"
[130] "ordinance" "provided" "exemption"
[133] "however" "slaughter" "processing"
[136] "sale" "small" "numbers"
[139] "hogs" "cattle" "per"
[142] "week" "accordance" "exemption"
[145] "provided" "state" "law"
[148] "All" "ordinances" "resolutions"
[151] "passed" "city" "council"
[154] "unanimous" "vote" "Violations"
[157] "four" "ordinances" "punishable"
[160] "fines" "exceeding" "imprisonment"
[163] "exceeding" "days" ""
[[302]]
[1] "Following" "enactment" "ordinances" "Church"
[5] "Pichardo" "filed" "action" "pursuant"
[9] "U" "S" "C" "United"
[13] "States" "District" "Court" "Southern"
[17] "District" "Florida" "Named" "defendants"
[21] "city" "Hialeah" "mayor" "members"
[25] "city" "council" "individual" "capacities"
[29] "Alleging" "violations" "petitioners" "rights"
[33] "inter" "alia" "Free" "Exercise"
[37] "Clause" "complaint" "sought" "declaratory"
[41] "judgment" "injunctive" "monetary" "relief"
[45] "The" "District" "Court" "granted"
[49] "summary" "judgment" "individual" "defendants"
[53] "finding" "absolute" "immunity" "legislative"
[57] "acts" "ordinances" "resolutions" "adopted"
[61] "council" "constitute" "official" "policy"
[65] "harassment" "alleged" "petitioners" "F"
[69] "Supp" "SD" "Fla" ""
[[303]]
[1] "After" "day" "bench" "trial"
[5] "remaining" "claims" "District" "Court"
[9] "ruled" "city" "finding" "violation"
[13] "petitioners" "rights" "Free" "Exercise"
[17] "Clause" "F" "Supp" "SD"
[21] "Fla" "The" "court" "rejected"
[25] "well" "petitioners" "claims" "issue"
[29] "Although" "acknowledging" "ordinances" "religiously"
[33] "neutral" "id" "city" "s"
[37] "concern" "animal" "sacrifice" "prompted"
[41] "establishment" "Church" "city" "id"
[45] "District" "Court" "concluded" "purpose"
[49] "ordinances" "exclude" "Church" "city"
[53] "end" "practice" "animal" "sacrifice"
[57] "whatever" "reason" "practiced" "id"
[61] "The" "court" "also" "found"
[65] "ordinances" "target" "religious" "conduct"
[69] "face" "though" "noted" "event"
[73] "specifically" "regulating" "religious" "conduct"
[77] "violate" "First" "Amendment" "conduct"
[81] "deemed" "inconsistent" "public" "health"
[85] "welfare" "Id" "Thus" "court"
[89] "concluded" "ordinances" "effect" "petitioners"
[93] "religious" "conduct" "incidental" "secular"
[97] "purpose" "effect" "Id" ""
[[304]]
[1] "The" "District" "Court"
[4] "proceeded" "determine" "whether"
[7] "governmental" "interests" "underlying"
[10] "ordinances" "compelling" "balance"
[13] "governmental" "religious" "interests"
[16] "The" "court" "noted"
[19] "t" "balance" "depends"
[22] "upon" "cost" "government"
[25] "altering" "activity" "allow"
[28] "religious" "practice" "continue"
[31] "unimpeded" "versus" "cost"
[34] "religious" "interest" "imposed"
[37] "government" "activity" "Ibid"
[40] "quoting" "Grosz" "v"
[43] "City" "Miami" "Beach"
[46] "F" "d" "CA"
[49] "cert" "denied" "U"
[52] "S" "S" "Ct"
[55] "L" "Ed" "d"
[58] "The" "court" "found"
[61] "four" "compelling" "interests"
[64] "First" "court" "found"
[67] "animal" "sacrifices" "present"
[70] "substantial" "health" "risk"
[73] "participants" "general" "public"
[76] "According" "court" "animals"
[79] "sacrificed" "often" "kept"
[82] "unsanitary" "conditions" "uninspected"
[85] "animal" "remains" "found"
[88] "public" "places" "F"
[91] "Supp" "Second" "court"
[94] "found" "emotional" "injury"
[97] "children" "witness" "sacrifice"
[100] "animals" "Id" "Third"
[103] "court" "found" "compelling"
[106] "city" "s" "interest"
[109] "protecting" "animals" "cruel"
[112] "unnecessary" "killing" "The"
[115] "court" "determined" "method"
[118] "killing" "used" "Santeria"
[121] "sacrifice" "unreliable" "humane"
[124] "animals" "sacrificed" "often"
[127] "kept" "conditions" "produce"
[130] "great" "deal" "fear"
[133] "stress" "animal" "Id"
[136] "Fourth" "District" "Court"
[139] "found" "compelling" "city"
[142] "s" "interest" "restricting"
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[148] "areas" "zoned" "slaughterhouse"
[151] "use" "Id" "This"
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[157] "factual" "findings" ""
[[305]]
[1] "Balancing" "competing" "governmental" "religious"
[5] "interests" "District" "Court" "concluded"
[9] "compelling" "governmental" "interests" "fully"
[13] "justify" "absolute" "prohibition" "ritual"
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[29] "conduct" "unduly" "interfere" "fulfillment"
[33] "governmental" "interest" "narrow" "restrictions"
[37] "e" "g" "regulation" "disposal"
[41] "animal" "carcasses" "unenforceable" "result"
[45] "secret" "nature" "Santeria" "religion"
[49] "Id" "nn" "A" "religious"
[53] "exemption" "city" "s" "ordinances"
[57] "concluded" "court" "defeat" "city"
[61] "s" "compelling" "interests" "enforcing"
[65] "prohibition" "Id" ""
[[306]]
[1] "The" "Court" "Appeals" "Eleventh"
[5] "Circuit" "affirmed" "one" "paragraph"
[9] "per" "curiam" "opinion" "Judgt"
[13] "order" "reported" "F" "d"
[17] "Choosing" "rely" "District" "Court"
[21] "s" "recitation" "compelling" "interest"
[25] "promoting" "welfare" "children" "Court"
[29] "Appeals" "stated" "simply" "concluded"
[33] "ordinances" "consistent" "Constitution" "App"
[37] "Pet" "Cert" "A" "It"
[41] "declined" "address" "effect" "Employment"
[45] "Div" "Dept" "Human" "Resources"
[49] "Ore" "v" "Smith" "U"
[53] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[57] "Ed" "d" "decided" "District"
[61] "Court" "s" "opinion" "District"
[65] "Court" "employed" "arguably" "stricter"
[69] "standard" "applied" "Smith" "App"
[73] "Pet" "Cert" "A" "n"
[77] ""
[[307]]
[1] "" "II" ""
[[308]]
[1] "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[4] "Clause" "First" "Amendment"
[7] "applied" "States" "Fourteenth"
[10] "Amendment" "see" "Cantwell"
[13] "v" "Connecticut" "U"
[16] "S" "S" "Ct"
[19] "L" "Ed" "provides"
[22] "Congress" "shall" "make"
[25] "law" "respecting" "establishment"
[28] "religion" "prohibiting" "free"
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[43] "Amendment" "Nor" "Although"
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[58] "comprehensible" "others" "order"
[61] "merit" "First" "Amendment"
[64] "protection" "Thomas" "v"
[67] "Review" "Bd" "Indiana"
[70] "Employment" "Security" "Div"
[73] "U" "S" "S"
[76] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[79] "d" "Given" "historical"
[82] "association" "animal" "sacrifice"
[85] "religious" "worship" "see"
[88] "supra" "petitioners" "assertion"
[91] "animal" "sacrifice" "integral"
[94] "part" "religion" "deemed"
[97] "bizarre" "incredible" "Frazee"
[100] "v" "Illinois" "Dept"
[103] "Employment" "Security" "U"
[106] "S" "n" "S"
[109] "Ct" "n" "L"
[112] "Ed" "d" "Neither"
[115] "city" "courts" "moreover"
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[121] "professed" "desire" "conduct"
[124] "animal" "sacrifices" "religious"
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[133] "Amendment" "claim" ""
[[309]]
[1] "" "In" "addressing"
[4] "constitutional" "protection" "free"
[7] "exercise" "religion" "cases"
[10] "establish" "general" "proposition"
[13] "law" "neutral" "general"
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[19] "compelling" "governmental" "interest"
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[28] "religious" "practice" "Employment"
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[37] "Smith" "supra" "Neutrality"
[40] "general" "applicability" "interrelated"
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[46] "failure" "satisfy" "one"
[49] "requirement" "likely" "indication"
[52] "satisfied" "A" "law"
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[61] "governmental" "interest" "must"
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[67] "interest" "These" "ordinances"
[70] "fail" "satisfy" "Smith"
[73] "requirements" "We" "begin"
[76] "discussing" "neutrality" ""
[[310]]
[1] "A" ""
[[311]]
[1] "In" "Establishment" "Clause" "cases"
[5] "often" "stated" "principle" "First"
[9] "Amendment" "forbids" "official" "purpose"
[13] "disapprove" "particular" "religion" "religion"
[17] "general" "See" "e" "g"
[21] "Board" "Ed" "Westside" "Community"
[25] "Schools" "Dist" "v" "Mergens"
[29] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[33] "L" "Ed" "d" "plurality"
[37] "opinion" "School" "Dist" "Grand"
[41] "Rapids" "v" "Ball" "U"
[45] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[49] "Ed" "d" "Wallace" "v"
[53] "Jaffree" "U" "S" "S"
[57] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[61] "Epperson" "v" "Arkansas" "U"
[65] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[69] "Ed" "d" "School" "Dist"
[73] "Abington" "v" "Schempp" "U"
[77] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[81] "Ed" "d" "Everson" "v"
[85] "Board" "Ed" "Ewing" "U"
[89] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[93] "Ed" "These" "cases" "however"
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[101] "benefit" "religion" "particular" "religions"
[105] "dealt" "question" "different" "least"
[109] "formulation" "emphasis" "issue" "Petitioners"
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[117] "religious" "ceremonies" "commands" "Free"
[121] "Exercise" "Clause" "dispositive" "analysis"
[125] ""
[[312]]
[1] "" "At" "minimum"
[4] "protections" "Free" "Exercise"
[7] "Clause" "pertain" "law"
[10] "issue" "discriminates" "religious"
[13] "beliefs" "regulates" "prohibits"
[16] "conduct" "undertaken" "religious"
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[22] "g" "Braunfeld" "v"
[25] "Brown" "U" "S"
[28] "S" "Ct" "L"
[31] "Ed" "d" "plurality"
[34] "opinion" "Fowler" "v"
[37] "Rhode" "Island" "U"
[40] "S" "S" "Ct"
[43] "L" "Ed" "Indeed"
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[49] "persecution" "intolerance" "gave"
[52] "concern" "drafted" "Free"
[55] "Exercise" "Clause" "Bowen"
[58] "v" "Roy" "U"
[61] "S" "S" "Ct"
[64] "L" "Ed" "d"
[67] "opinion" "Burger" "C"
[70] "J" "See" "J"
[73] "Story" "Commentaries" "Constitution"
[76] "United" "States" "abridged"
[79] "ed" "reprint" "T"
[82] "Cooley" "Constitutional" "Limitations"
[85] "reprint" "McGowan" "v"
[88] "Maryland" "U" "S"
[91] "n" "S" "Ct"
[94] "n" "L" "Ed"
[97] "d" "opinion" "Frankfurter"
[100] "J" "Douglas" "v"
[103] "Jeannette" "U" "S"
[106] "S" "Ct" "L"
[109] "Ed" "Jackson" "J"
[112] "concurring" "result" "Davis"
[115] "v" "Beason" "U"
[118] "S" "S" "Ct"
[121] "L" "Ed" "These"
[124] "principles" "though" "often"
[127] "issue" "Free" "Exercise"
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[133] "role" "In" "McDaniel"
[136] "v" "Paty" "U"
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[142] "L" "Ed" "d"
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[166] "Human" "Resources" "Ore"
[169] "v" "Smith" "U"
[172] "S" "S" "Ct"
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[178] "v" "Rhode" "Island"
[181] "supra" "found" "municipal"
[184] "ordinance" "applied" "unconstitutional"
[187] "manner" "interpreted" "prohibit"
[190] "preaching" "public" "park"
[193] "Jehovah" "s" "Witness"
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[199] "Catholic" "mass" "Protestant"
[202] "church" "service" "See"
[205] "also" "Niemotko" "v"
[208] "Maryland" "U" "S"
[211] "S" "Ct" "L"
[214] "Ed" "Cf" "Larson"
[217] "v" "Valente" "U"
[220] "S" "S" "Ct"
[223] "L" "Ed" "d"
[226] "state" "statute" "treated"
[229] "religious" "denominations" "favorably"
[232] "others" "violated" "Establishment"
[235] "Clause" ""
[[313]]
[1] "" ""
[[314]]
[1] "" "Although" "law"
[4] "targeting" "religious" "beliefs"
[7] "never" "permissible" "McDaniel"
[10] "v" "Paty" "supra"
[13] "U" "S" "S"
[16] "Ct" "plurality" "opinion"
[19] "Cantwell" "v" "Connecticut"
[22] "supra" "U" "S"
[25] "S" "Ct" "object"
[28] "law" "infringe" "upon"
[31] "restrict" "practices" "religious"
[34] "motivation" "law" "neutral"
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[40] "Dept" "Human" "Resources"
[43] "Oregon" "v" "Smith"
[46] "supra" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "invalid"
[52] "unless" "justified" "compelling"
[55] "interest" "narrowly" "tailored"
[58] "advance" "interest" "There"
[61] "course" "many" "ways"
[64] "demonstrating" "object" "purpose"
[67] "law" "suppression" "religion"
[70] "religious" "conduct" "To"
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[76] "must" "begin" "text"
[79] "minimum" "requirement" "neutrality"
[82] "law" "discriminate" "face"
[85] "A" "law" "lacks"
[88] "facial" "neutrality" "refers"
[91] "religious" "practice" "without"
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[97] "language" "context" "Petitioners"
[100] "contend" "three" "ordinances"
[103] "fail" "test" "facial"
[106] "neutrality" "use" "words"
[109] "sacrifice" "ritual" "words"
[112] "strong" "religious" "connotations"
[115] "Brief" "Petitioners" "We"
[118] "agree" "words" "consistent"
[121] "claim" "facial" "discrimination"
[124] "argument" "conclusive" "The"
[127] "words" "sacrifice" "ritual"
[130] "religious" "origin" "current"
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[142] "New" "International" "Dictionary"
[145] "See" "also" "Encyclopedia"
[148] "Religion" "T" "word"
[151] "sacrifice" "ultimately" "became"
[154] "much" "secular" "term"
[157] "common" "usage" "The"
[160] "ordinances" "furthermore" "define"
[163] "sacrifice" "secular" "terms"
[166] "without" "referring" "religious"
[169] "practices" ""
[[315]]
[1] "" "We" "reject"
[4] "contention" "advanced" "city"
[7] "see" "Brief" "Respondent"
[10] "inquiry" "must" "end"
[13] "text" "laws" "issue"
[16] "Facial" "neutrality" "determinative"
[19] "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[22] "Clause" "like" "Establishment"
[25] "Clause" "extends" "beyond"
[28] "facial" "discrimination" "The"
[31] "Clause" "forbids" "subtle"
[34] "departures" "neutrality" "Gillette"
[37] "v" "United" "States"
[40] "U" "S" "S"
[43] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[46] "d" "covert" "suppression"
[49] "particular" "religious" "beliefs"
[52] "Bowen" "v" "Roy"
[55] "supra" "U" "S"
[58] "S" "Ct" "opinion"
[61] "Burger" "C" "J"
[64] "Official" "action" "targets"
[67] "religious" "conduct" "distinctive"
[70] "treatment" "shielded" "mere"
[73] "compliance" "requirement" "facial"
[76] "neutrality" "The" "Free"
[79] "Exercise" "Clause" "protects"
[82] "governmental" "hostility" "masked"
[85] "well" "overt" "The"
[88] "Court" "must" "survey"
[91] "meticulously" "circumstances" "governmental"
[94] "categories" "eliminate" "religious"
[97] "gerrymanders" "Walz" "v"
[100] "Tax" "Comm" "n"
[103] "New" "York" "City"
[106] "U" "S" "S"
[109] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[112] "d" "Harlan" "J"
[115] "concurring" ""
[[316]]
[1] "" "The" "record" "case"
[5] "compels" "conclusion" "suppression" "central"
[9] "element" "Santeria" "worship" "service"
[13] "object" "ordinances" "First" "though"
[17] "use" "words" "sacrifice" "ritual"
[21] "compel" "finding" "improper" "targeting"
[25] "Santeria" "religion" "choice" "words"
[29] "support" "conclusion" "There" "respects"
[33] "text" "city" "council" "s"
[37] "enactments" "discloses" "improper" "attempt"
[41] "target" "Santeria" "Resolution" "adopted"
[45] "June" "recited" "residents" "citizens"
[49] "City" "Hialeah" "expressed" "concern"
[53] "certain" "religions" "may" "propose"
[57] "engage" "practices" "inconsistent" "public"
[61] "morals" "peace" "safety" "reiterate"
[65] "d" "city" "s" "commitment"
[69] "prohibit" "acts" "religious" "groups"
[73] "No" "one" "suggests" "record"
[77] "maintained" "city" "officials" "mind"
[81] "religion" "Santeria" ""
[[317]]
[1] "" "It" "becomes"
[4] "evident" "ordinances" "target"
[7] "Santeria" "sacrifice" "ordinances"
[10] "operation" "considered" "Apart"
[13] "text" "effect" "law"
[16] "real" "operation" "strong"
[19] "evidence" "object" "To"
[22] "sure" "adverse" "impact"
[25] "will" "always" "lead"
[28] "finding" "impermissible" "targeting"
[31] "For" "example" "social"
[34] "harm" "may" "legitimate"
[37] "concern" "government" "reasons"
[40] "quite" "apart" "discrimination"
[43] "McGowan" "v" "Maryland"
[46] "U" "S" "S"
[49] "Ct" "See" "e"
[52] "g" "Reynolds" "v"
[55] "United" "States" "U"
[58] "S" "L" "Ed"
[61] "Davis" "v" "Beason"
[64] "U" "S" "S"
[67] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[70] "See" "also" "Ely"
[73] "Legislative" "Administrative" "Motivation"
[76] "Constitutional" "Law" "Yale"
[79] "L" "J" "The"
[82] "subject" "hand" "implicate"
[85] "course" "multiple" "concerns"
[88] "unrelated" "religious" "animosity"
[91] "example" "suffering" "mistreatment"
[94] "visited" "upon" "sacrificed"
[97] "animals" "health" "hazards"
[100] "improper" "disposal" "But"
[103] "ordinances" "considered" "together"
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[112] "design" "laws" "accomplishes"
[115] "instead" "religious" "gerrymander"
[118] "Walz" "v" "Tax"
[121] "Comm" "n" "New"
[124] "York" "City" "supra"
[127] "U" "S" "S"
[130] "Ct" "Harlan" "J"
[133] "concurring" "impermissible" "attempt"
[136] "target" "petitioners" "religious"
[139] "practices" ""
[[318]]
[1] "It" "necessary" "conclusion"
[4] "almost" "conduct" "subject"
[7] "Ordinances" "religious" "exercise"
[10] "Santeria" "church" "members"
[13] "The" "texts" "show"
[16] "drafted" "tandem" "achieve"
[19] "result" "We" "begin"
[22] "Ordinance" "It" "prohibits"
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[28] "sacrifice" "unnecessarily" "kill"
[31] "animal" "public" "private"
[34] "ritual" "ceremony" "primary"
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[40] "The" "definition" "excludes"
[43] "almost" "killings" "animals"
[46] "except" "religious" "sacrifice"
[49] "primary" "purpose" "requirement"
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[55] "even" "particular" "exempting"
[58] "kosher" "slaughter" "see"
[61] "F" "Supp" "We"
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[67] "differential" "treatment" "two"
[70] "religions" "independent" "constitutional"
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[76] "v" "Valente" "U"
[79] "S" "S" "Ct"
[82] "It" "suffices" "recite"
[85] "feature" "law" "support"
[88] "conclusion" "Santeria" "alone"
[91] "exclusive" "legislative" "concern"
[94] "The" "net" "result"
[97] "gerrymander" "killings" "animals"
[100] "prohibited" "Santeria" "sacrifice"
[103] "proscribed" "occurs" "ritual"
[106] "ceremony" "primary" "purpose"
[109] "make" "offering" "orishas"
[112] "food" "consumption" "Indeed"
[115] "careful" "drafting" "ensured"
[118] "although" "Santeria" "sacrifice"
[121] "prohibited" "killings" "necessary"
[124] "humane" "almost" "circumstances"
[127] "unpunished" ""
[[319]]
[1] "Operating" "similar" "fashion" "Ordinance"
[5] "prohibits" "possess" "ion" "sacrifice"
[9] "slaughter" "animal" "inten" "t"
[13] "use" "animal" "food" "purposes"
[17] "This" "prohibition" "extending" "keeping"
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[25] "animal" "killed" "type" "ritual"
[29] "intent" "use" "animal" "food"
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[41] "licensed" "food" "establishment" "regard"
[45] "animals" "specifically" "raised" "food"
[49] "purposes" "activity" "permitted" "zoning"
[53] "laws" "This" "exception" "seems"
[57] "intended" "cover" "kosher" "slaughter"
[61] "Again" "burden" "ordinance" "practical"
[65] "terms" "falls" "Santeria" "adherents"
[69] "almost" "others" "If" "killing"
[73] "unlike" "Santeria" "sacrifices" "unaccompanied"
[77] "intent" "use" "animal" "food"
[81] "prohibited" "Ordinance" "killing" "specifically"
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[89] "ritual" "falls" "outside" "prohibition"
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[101] "properly" "zoned" "licensed" "establishment"
[105] "involves" "animals" "specifically" "raised"
[109] "food" "purposes" "A" "pattern"
[113] "exemptions" "parallels" "pattern" "narrow"
[117] "prohibitions" "Each" "contributes" "gerrymander"
[121] ""
[[320]]
[1] "Ordinance" "incorporates"
[3] "Florida" "animal"
[5] "cruelty" "statute"
[7] "Fla" "Stat"
[9] "Its" "prohibition"
[11] "broad" "face"
[13] "punishing" "w"
[15] "hoever" "unnecessarily"
[17] "kills" "animal"
[19] "The" "city"
[21] "claims" "ordinance"
[23] "epitome" "neutral"
[25] "prohibition" "Brief"
[27] "Respondent" "The"
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[31] "interpretation" "given"
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[35] "Florida" "attorney"
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[45] "fall" "outside"
[47] "prohibition" "The"
[49] "city" "seems"
[51] "per" "se"
[53] "basis" "deems"
[55] "hunting" "slaughter"
[57] "animals" "food"
[59] "eradication" "insects"
[61] "pests" "euthanasia"
[63] "necessary" "See"
[65] "id" "There"
[67] "indication" "record"
[69] "respondent" "concluded"
[71] "hunting" "fishing"
[73] "sport" "unnecessary"
[75] "Indeed" "one"
[77] "reported" "Florida"
[79] "cases" "decided"
[81] "concludes" "use"
[83] "live" "rabbits"
[85] "train" "greyhounds"
[87] "unnecessary" "See"
[89] "Kiper" "v"
[91] "State" "So"
[93] "d" "Fla"
[95] "App" "cert"
[97] "denied" "So"
[99] "d" "Fla"
[101] "Further" "requires"
[103] "evaluation" "particular"
[105] "justification" "killing"
[107] "ordinance" "represents"
[109] "system" "individualized"
[111] "governmental" "assessment"
[113] "reasons" "relevant"
[115] "conduct" "Employment"
[117] "Div" "Dept"
[119] "Human" "Resources"
[121] "Ore" "v"
[123] "Smith" "U"
[125] "S" "S"
[127] "Ct" "As"
[129] "noted" "Smith"
[131] "circumstances" "individualized"
[133] "exemptions" "general"
[135] "requirement" "available"
[137] "government" "may"
[139] "refuse" "extend"
[141] "system" "cases"
[143] "religious" "hardship"
[145] "without" "compelling"
[147] "reason" "Ibid"
[149] "quoting" "Bowen"
[151] "v" "Roy"
[153] "U" "S"
[155] "S" "Ct"
[157] "opinion" "Burger"
[159] "C" "J"
[161] "Respondent" "s"
[163] "application" "ordinance"
[165] "s" "test"
[167] "necessity" "devalues"
[169] "religious" "reasons"
[171] "killing" "judging"
[173] "lesser" "import"
[175] "nonreligiousreasons" "Thus"
[177] "religious" "practice"
[179] "singled" "discriminatory"
[181] "treatment" "Bowen"
[183] "v" "Roy"
[185] "U" "S"
[187] "n" "S"
[189] "Ct" "n"
[191] "STEVENS" "J"
[193] "concurring" "part"
[195] "concurring" "result"
[197] "id" "S"
[199] "Ct" "opinion"
[201] "Burger" "C"
[203] "J" "United"
[205] "States" "v"
[207] "Lee" "U"
[209] "S" "n"
[211] "S" "Ct"
[213] "n" "L"
[215] "Ed" "d"
[217] "STEVENS" "J"
[219] "concurring" "judgment"
[221] ""
[[321]]
[1] "We" "also" "find" "significant"
[5] "evidence" "ordinances" "improper" "targeting"
[9] "Santeria" "sacrifice" "fact" "proscribe"
[13] "religious" "conduct" "necessary" "achieve"
[17] "stated" "ends" "It" "unreasonable"
[21] "infer" "least" "persuasive" "indications"
[25] "contrary" "law" "visits" "gratuitous"
[29] "restrictions" "religious" "conduct" "McGowan"
[33] "v" "Maryland" "U" "S"
[37] "S" "Ct" "opinion" "Frankfurter"
[41] "J" "seeks" "effectuate" "stated"
[45] "governmental" "interests" "suppress" "conduct"
[49] "religious" "motivation" ""
[[322]]
[1] "" "The" "legitimate"
[4] "governmental" "interests" "protecting"
[7] "public" "health" "preventing"
[10] "cruelty" "animals" "addressed"
[13] "restrictions" "stopping" "far"
[16] "short" "flat" "prohibition"
[19] "Santeria" "sacrificial" "practice"
[22] "If" "improper" "disposal"
[25] "sacrifice" "harm" "prevented"
[28] "city" "imposed" "general"
[31] "regulation" "disposal" "organic"
[34] "garbage" "It" "Indeed"
[37] "counsel" "city" "conceded"
[40] "oral" "argument" "ordinances"
[43] "Santeria" "sacrifices" "illegal"
[46] "even" "occurred" "licensed"
[49] "inspected" "zoned" "slaughterhouses"
[52] "Tr" "Oral" "Arg"
[55] "See" "also" "id"
[58] "Thus" "broad" "ordinances"
[61] "prohibit" "Santeria" "sacrifice"
[64] "even" "threaten" "city"
[67] "sinterest" "public" "health"
[70] "The" "District" "Court"
[73] "accepted" "argument" "narrower"
[76] "regulation" "unenforceable" "secrecy"
[79] "Santeria" "rituals" "lack"
[82] "central" "religious" "authority"
[85] "require" "compliance" "secular"
[88] "disposal" "regulations" "See"
[91] "F" "Supp" "nn"
[94] "It" "difficult" "understand"
[97] "however" "prohibition" "sacrifices"
[100] "occur" "private" "enforceable"
[103] "ban" "improper" "disposal"
[106] "occurs" "public" "The"
[109] "neutrality" "law" "suspect"
[112] "First" "Amendment" "freedoms"
[115] "curtailed" "prevent" "isolated"
[118] "collateral" "harms" "prohibited"
[121] "direct" "regulation" "See"
[124] "e" "g" "Schneider"
[127] "v" "State" "U"
[130] "S" "S" "Ct"
[133] "L" "Ed" ""
[[323]]
[1] "Under" "similar" "analysis"
[4] "narrower" "regulation" "achieve"
[7] "city" "s" "interest"
[10] "preventing" "cruelty" "animals"
[13] "With" "regard" "city"
[16] "s" "interest" "ensuring"
[19] "adequate" "care" "animals"
[22] "regulation" "conditions" "treatment"
[25] "regardless" "animal" "kept"
[28] "logical" "response" "city"
[31] "s" "concern" "prohibition"
[34] "possession" "purpose" "sacrifice"
[37] "The" "true" "city"
[40] "s" "interest" "prohibiting"
[43] "cruel" "methods" "killing"
[46] "Under" "federal" "Florida"
[49] "law" "Ordinance" "incorporates"
[52] "Florida" "law" "regard"
[55] "killing" "animal" "simultaneous"
[58] "instantaneous" "severance" "carotid"
[61] "arteries" "sharp" "instrument"
[64] "method" "used" "kosher"
[67] "slaughter" "approved" "humane"
[70] "See" "U" "S"
[73] "C" "b" "Fla"
[76] "Stat" "b" "Ordinance"
[79] "The" "District" "Court"
[82] "found" "though" "Santeria"
[85] "sacrifice" "also" "results"
[88] "severance" "carotid" "arteries"
[91] "method" "used" "sacrifice"
[94] "less" "reliable" "therefore"
[97] "humane" "See" "F"
[100] "Supp" "If" "city"
[103] "real" "concern" "methods"
[106] "less" "humane" "however"
[109] "subject" "regulation" "method"
[112] "slaughter" "religious" "classification"
[115] "said" "bear" "general"
[118] "relation" ""
[[324]]
[1] "" "Ordinance" "unlike"
[4] "three" "ordinances" "appear"
[7] "apply" "substantial" "nonreligious"
[10] "conduct" "overbroad" "For"
[13] "purposes" "however" "four"
[16] "substantive" "ordinances" "may"
[19] "treated" "group" "neutrality"
[22] "purposes" "Ordinance" "passed"
[25] "day" "Ordinance" "enacted"
[28] "three" "others" "direct"
[31] "response" "opening" "Church"
[34] "It" "implausible" "suggest"
[37] "three" "ordinances" "Ordinance"
[40] "object" "suppression" "religion"
[43] "We" "need" "decide"
[46] "whether" "Ordinance" "survive"
[49] "constitutional" "scrutiny" "existed"
[52] "separately" "must" "invalidated"
[55] "functions" "rest" "enactments"
[58] "question" "suppress" "Santeria"
[61] "religious" "worship" ""
[[325]]
[1] "" ""
[[326]]
[1] "In" "determining" "object"
[4] "law" "neutral" "one"
[7] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[10] "can" "also" "find"
[13] "guidance" "equal" "protection"
[16] "cases" "As" "Justice"
[19] "Harlan" "noted" "related"
[22] "context" "Establishment" "Clause"
[25] "n" "eutrality" "application"
[28] "requires" "equal" "protection"
[31] "mode" "analysis" "Walz"
[34] "v" "Tax" "Comm"
[37] "n" "New" "York"
[40] "City" "U" "S"
[43] "S" "Ct" "concurring"
[46] "opinion" "Here" "equal"
[49] "protection" "cases" "may"
[52] "determine" "city" "council"
[55] "s" "object" "direct"
[58] "circumstantial" "evidence" "Arlington"
[61] "Heights" "v" "Metropolitan"
[64] "Housing" "Development" "Corp"
[67] "U" "S" "S"
[70] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[73] "d" "Relevant" "evidence"
[76] "includes" "among" "things"
[79] "historical" "background" "decision"
[82] "challenge" "specific" "series"
[85] "events" "leading" "enactment"
[88] "official" "policy" "question"
[91] "legislative" "administrative" "history"
[94] "including" "contemporaneous" "statements"
[97] "made" "members" "decisionmaking"
[100] "body" "Id" "S"
[103] "Ct" "These" "objective"
[106] "factors" "bear" "question"
[109] "discriminatory" "object" "Personnel"
[112] "Administrator" "Mass" "v"
[115] "Feeney" "U" "S"
[118] "n" "S" "Ct"
[121] "n" "L" "Ed"
[124] "d" ""
[[327]]
[1] "That" "ordinances" "enacted" "merely"
[5] "spite" "suppression" "Santeria" "religious"
[9] "practice" "id" "S" "Ct"
[13] "revealed" "events" "preceding" "enactment"
[17] "Although" "respondent" "claimed" "oral"
[21] "argument" "experienced" "significant" "problems"
[25] "resulting" "sacrifice" "animals" "within"
[29] "city" "announced" "opening" "Church"
[33] "Tr" "Oral" "Arg" "city"
[37] "council" "made" "attempt" "address"
[41] "supposed" "problem" "meeting" "June"
[45] "just" "weeks" "Church" "announced"
[49] "plans" "open" "The" "minutes"
[53] "taped" "excerpts" "June" "session"
[57] "record" "evidence" "significant" "hostility"
[61] "exhibited" "residents" "members" "city"
[65] "council" "city" "officials" "toward"
[69] "Santeria" "religion" "practice" "animal"
[73] "sacrifice" "The" "public" "crowd"
[77] "attended" "June" "meetings" "interrupted"
[81] "statements" "council" "members" "critical"
[85] "Santeria" "cheers" "brief" "comments"
[89] "Pichardo" "taunts" "When" "Councilman"
[93] "Martinez" "supporter" "ordinances" "stated"
[97] "prerevolution" "Cuba" "people" "put"
[101] "jail" "practicing" "religion" "audience"
[105] "applauded" "Taped" "excerpts" "Hialeah"
[109] "City" "Council" "Meeting" "June"
[113] ""
[[328]]
[1] "Other" "statements" "members" "city"
[5] "council" "similar" "vein" "For"
[9] "example" "Councilman" "Martinez" "noting"
[13] "belief" "Santeria" "outlawed" "Cuba"
[17] "questioned" "I" "f" "practice"
[21] "religion" "homeland" "Cuba" "bring"
[25] "country" "Councilman" "Cardoso" "said"
[29] "Santeria" "devotees" "Church" "violation"
[33] "everything" "country" "stands" "Councilman"
[37] "Mejides" "indicated" "totally" "sacrificing"
[41] "animals" "distinguished" "kosher" "slaughter"
[45] "real" "purpose" "The" "Bible"
[49] "says" "allowed" "sacrifice" "animal"
[53] "consumption" "continued" "purposes" "I"
[57] "don" "t" "believe" "Bible"
[61] "allows" "The" "president" "city"
[65] "council" "Councilman" "Echevarria" "asked"
[69] "What" "can" "prevent" "Church"
[73] "opening" ""
[[329]]
[1] "Various" "Hialeah" "city" "officials"
[5] "made" "comparable" "comments" "The"
[9] "chaplain" "Hialeah" "Police" "Department"
[13] "told" "city" "council" "Santeria"
[17] "sin" "foolishness" "abomination" "Lord"
[21] "worship" "demons" "He" "advised"
[25] "city" "council" "We" "need"
[29] "helping" "people" "sharing" "truth"
[33] "found" "Jesus" "Christ" "He"
[37] "concluded" "I" "exhort" "permit"
[41] "Church" "exist" "The" "city"
[45] "attorney" "commented" "Resolution" "indicated"
[49] "This" "community" "will" "tolerate"
[53] "religious" "practices" "abhorrent" "citizens"
[57] "Ibid" "Similar" "comments" "made"
[61] "deputy" "city" "attorney" "This"
[65] "history" "discloses" "object" "ordinances"
[69] "target" "animal" "sacrifice" "Santeria"
[73] "worshippers" "religious" "motivation" ""
[[330]]
[1] "" ""
[[331]]
[1] "In" "sum" "neutrality" "inquiry"
[5] "leads" "one" "conclusion" "The"
[9] "ordinances" "object" "suppression" "religion"
[13] "The" "pattern" "recited" "discloses"
[17] "animosity" "Santeria" "adherents" "religious"
[21] "practices" "ordinances" "terms" "target"
[25] "religious" "exercise" "texts" "ordinances"
[29] "gerrymandered" "care" "proscribe" "religious"
[33] "killings" "animals" "exclude" "almost"
[37] "secular" "killings" "ordinances" "suppress"
[41] "much" "religious" "conduct" "necessary"
[45] "order" "achieve" "legitimate" "ends"
[49] "asserted" "defense" "These" "ordinances"
[53] "neutral" "court" "committed" "clear"
[57] "error" "failing" "reach" "conclusion"
[61] ""
[[332]]
[1] "B" ""
[[333]]
[1] "" "We" "turn" "next"
[5] "second" "requirement" "Free" "Exercise"
[9] "Clause" "rule" "laws" "burdening"
[13] "religious" "practice" "must" "general"
[17] "applicability" "Employment" "Div" "Dept"
[21] "Human" "Resources" "Ore" "v"
[25] "Smith" "U" "S" "S"
[29] "Ct" "All" "laws" "selective"
[33] "extent" "categories" "selection" "paramount"
[37] "concern" "law" "incidental" "effect"
[41] "burdening" "religious" "practice" "The"
[45] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "protect"
[49] "s" "religious" "observers" "unequal"
[53] "treatment" "Hobbie" "v" "Unemployment"
[57] "Appeals" "Comm" "n" "Fla"
[61] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[65] "L" "Ed" "d" "STEVENS"
[69] "J" "concurring" "judgment" "inequality"
[73] "results" "legislature" "decides" "governmental"
[77] "interests" "seeks" "advance" "worthy"
[81] "pursued" "conduct" "religious" "motivation"
[85] ""
[[334]]
[1] "" "The" "principle" "government"
[5] "pursuit" "legitimate" "interests" "selective"
[9] "manner" "impose" "burdens" "conduct"
[13] "motivated" "religious" "belief" "essential"
[17] "protection" "rights" "guaranteed" "Free"
[21] "Exercise" "Clause" "The" "principle"
[25] "underlying" "general" "applicability" "requirement"
[29] "parallels" "First" "Amendment" "jurisprudence"
[33] "See" "e" "g" "Cohen"
[37] "v" "Cowles" "Media" "Co"
[41] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[45] "L" "Ed" "d" "University"
[49] "Pennsylvania" "v" "EEOC" "U"
[53] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[57] "Ed" "d" "Minneapolis" "Star"
[61] "Tribune" "Co" "v" "Minnesota"
[65] "Comm" "r" "Revenue" "U"
[69] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[73] "Ed" "d" "Larson" "v"
[77] "Valente" "U" "S" "S"
[81] "Ct" "Presbyterian" "Church" "U"
[85] "S" "v" "Mary" "Elizabeth"
[89] "Blue" "Hull" "Memorial" "Presbyterian"
[93] "Church" "U" "S" "S"
[97] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[101] "In" "case" "need" "define"
[105] "precision" "standard" "used" "evaluate"
[109] "whether" "prohibition" "general" "application"
[113] "ordinances" "fall" "well" "minimum"
[117] "standard" "necessary" "protect" "First"
[121] "Amendment" "rights" ""
[[335]]
[1] "" "Respondent" "claims"
[4] "Ordinances" "advance" "two"
[7] "interests" "protecting" "public"
[10] "health" "preventing" "cruelty"
[13] "animals" "The" "ordinances"
[16] "underinclusive" "ends" "They"
[19] "fail" "prohibit" "nonreligious"
[22] "conduct" "endangers" "interests"
[25] "similar" "greater" "degree"
[28] "Santeria" "sacrifice" "The"
[31] "underinclusion" "substantial" "inconsequential"
[34] "Despite" "city" "s"
[37] "proffered" "interest" "preventing"
[40] "cruelty" "animals" "ordinances"
[43] "drafted" "care" "forbid"
[46] "killings" "occasioned" "religious"
[49] "sacrifice" "Many" "types"
[52] "animal" "deaths" "kills"
[55] "nonreligious" "reasons" "either"
[58] "prohibited" "approved" "express"
[61] "provision" "For" "example"
[64] "fishing" "occurs" "Hialeah"
[67] "see" "A" "Khedouri"
[70] "F" "Khedouri" "South"
[73] "Florida" "Inside" "Out"
[76] "legal" "Extermination" "mice"
[79] "rats" "within" "home"
[82] "also" "permitted" "Florida"
[85] "law" "incorporated" "Ordinance"
[88] "sanctions" "euthanasia" "stray"
[91] "neglected" "abandoned" "unwanted"
[94] "animals" "Fla" "Stat"
[97] "destruction" "animals" "judicially"
[100] "removed" "owners" "humanitarian"
[103] "reasons" "animal" "commercial"
[106] "value" "c" "infliction"
[109] "pain" "suffering" "interest"
[112] "medical" "science" "placing"
[115] "poison" "one" "s"
[118] "yard" "enclosure" "use"
[121] "live" "animal" "pursue"
[124] "take" "wildlife" "participate"
[127] "hunting" "b" "hunt"
[130] "wild" "hogs" "e"
[133] ""
[[336]]
[1] "The" "city" "concedes" "neither"
[5] "State" "Florida" "City" "enacted"
[9] "generally" "applicable" "ban" "killing"
[13] "animals" "Brief" "Respondent" "It"
[17] "asserts" "however" "animal" "sacrifice"
[21] "different" "animal" "killings" "permitted"
[25] "law" "Ibid" "According" "city"
[29] "self" "evident" "killing" "animals"
[33] "food" "important" "eradication" "insects"
[37] "pests" "obviously" "justified" "euthanasia"
[41] "excess" "animals" "makes" "sense"
[45] "Id" "These" "ipse" "dixits"
[49] "explain" "religion" "alone" "must"
[53] "bear" "burden" "ordinances" "many"
[57] "secular" "killings" "fall" "within"
[61] "city" "s" "interest" "preventing"
[65] "cruel" "treatment" "animals" ""
[[337]]
[1] "" "The" "ordinances"
[4] "also" "underinclusive" "regard"
[7] "city" "s" "interest"
[10] "public" "health" "threatened"
[13] "disposal" "animal" "carcasses"
[16] "open" "public" "places"
[19] "consumption" "uninspected" "meat"
[22] "see" "Brief" "Respondent"
[25] "citing" "F" "Supp"
[28] "Neither" "interest" "pursued"
[31] "respondent" "regard" "conduct"
[34] "motivated" "religious" "conviction"
[37] "The" "health" "risks"
[40] "posed" "improper" "disposal"
[43] "animal" "carcasses" "whether"
[46] "Santeria" "sacrifice" "nonreligious"
[49] "killing" "preceded" "The"
[52] "city" "however" "prohibit"
[55] "hunters" "bringing" "kill"
[58] "houses" "regulate" "disposal"
[61] "activity" "Despite" "substantial"
[64] "testimony" "trial" "public"
[67] "health" "hazards" "result"
[70] "improper" "disposal" "garbage"
[73] "restaurants" "see" "Record"
[76] "restaurants" "outside" "scope"
[79] "ordinances" "Improper" "disposal"
[82] "general" "problem" "causes"
[85] "substantial" "health" "risks"
[88] "F" "Supp" "respondent"
[91] "addresses" "results" "religious"
[94] "exercise" ""
[[338]]
[1] "The" "ordinances" "underinclusive"
[4] "well" "regard" "health"
[7] "risk" "posed" "consumption"
[10] "uninspected" "meat" "Under"
[13] "city" "s" "ordinances"
[16] "hunters" "may" "eat"
[19] "kill" "fishermen" "may"
[22] "eat" "catch" "without"
[25] "undergoing" "governmental" "inspection"
[28] "Likewise" "state" "law"
[31] "requires" "inspection" "meat"
[34] "sold" "exempts" "meat"
[37] "animals" "raised" "use"
[40] "owner" "members" "household"
[43] "nonpaying" "guests" "employees"
[46] "Fla" "Stat" "The"
[49] "asserted" "interest" "inspected"
[52] "meat" "pursued" "contexts"
[55] "similar" "religious" "animal"
[58] "sacrifice" ""
[[339]]
[1] "Ordinance" "prohibits" "slaughter"
[4] "animals" "outside" "areas"
[7] "zoned" "slaughterhouses" "underinclusive"
[10] "face" "The" "ordinance"
[13] "includes" "exemption" "person"
[16] "group" "organization" "slaughters"
[19] "processes" "sale" "small"
[22] "numbers" "hogs" "cattle"
[25] "per" "week" "accordance"
[28] "exemption" "provided" "state"
[31] "law" "See" "Fla"
[34] "Stat" "Respondent" "explained"
[37] "commercial" "operations" "slaughter"
[40] "small" "numbers" "hogs"
[43] "cattle" "implicate" "professed"
[46] "desire" "prevent" "cruelty"
[49] "animals" "preserve" "public"
[52] "health" "Although" "city"
[55] "classified" "Santeria" "sacrifice"
[58] "slaughter" "subjecting" "ordinance"
[61] "regulate" "killings" "food"
[64] "like" "manner" ""
[[340]]
[1] "We" "conclude" "sum" "Hialeah"
[5] "s" "ordinances" "pursues" "city"
[9] "s" "governmental" "interests" "conduct"
[13] "motivated" "religious" "belief" "The"
[17] "ordinances" "ha" "ve" "every"
[21] "appearance" "prohibition" "society" "prepared"
[25] "impose" "upon" "Santeria" "worshippers"
[29] "upon" "Florida" "Star" "v"
[33] "B" "J" "F" "U"
[37] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[41] "Ed" "d" "SCALIA" "J"
[45] "concurring" "part" "concurring" "judgment"
[49] "This" "precise" "evil" "requirement"
[53] "general" "applicability" "designed" "prevent"
[57] ""
[[341]]
[1] "III" ""
[[342]]
[1] "" "A" "law" "burdening"
[5] "religious" "practice" "neutral" "general"
[9] "application" "must" "undergo" "rigorous"
[13] "scrutiny" "To" "satisfy" "commands"
[17] "First" "Amendment" "law" "restrictive"
[21] "religious" "practice" "must" "advance"
[25] "interests" "highest" "order" "must"
[29] "narrowly" "tailored" "pursuit" "interests"
[33] "McDaniel" "v" "Paty" "U"
[37] "S" "S" "Ct" "quoting"
[41] "Wisconsin" "v" "Yoder" "U"
[45] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[49] "Ed" "d" "The" "compelling"
[53] "interest" "standard" "apply" "law"
[57] "fails" "meet" "Smith" "requirements"
[61] "water" "ed" "really" "means"
[65] "says" "Employment" "Div" "Dept"
[69] "Human" "Resources" "Ore" "v"
[73] "Smith" "U" "S" "S"
[77] "Ct" "A" "law" "targets"
[81] "religious" "conduct" "distinctive" "treatment"
[85] "advances" "legitimate" "governmental" "interests"
[89] "conduct" "religious" "motivation" "will"
[93] "survive" "strict" "scrutiny" "rare"
[97] "cases" "It" "follows" "already"
[101] "said" "ordinances" "withstand" "scrutiny"
[105] ""
[[343]]
[1] "" "First" "even"
[4] "governmental" "interests" "compelling"
[7] "ordinances" "drawn" "narrow"
[10] "terms" "accomplish" "interests"
[13] "As" "discussed" "see"
[16] "supra" "four" "ordinances"
[19] "overbroad" "underinclusive" "substantial"
[22] "respects" "The" "proffered"
[25] "objectives" "pursued" "respect"
[28] "analogous" "non" "religious"
[31] "conduct" "interests" "achieved"
[34] "narrower" "ordinances" "burdened"
[37] "religion" "far" "lesser"
[40] "degree" "The" "absence"
[43] "narrow" "tailoring" "suffices"
[46] "establish" "invalidity" "ordinances"
[49] "See" "Arkansas" "Writers"
[52] "Project" "Inc" "v"
[55] "Ragland" "U" "S"
[58] "S" "Ct" "L"
[61] "Ed" "d" ""
[[344]]
[1] "Respondent" "demonstrated" "moreover"
[4] "context" "ordinances" "governmental"
[7] "interests" "compelling" "Where"
[10] "government" "restricts" "conduct"
[13] "protected" "First" "Amendment"
[16] "fails" "enact" "feasible"
[19] "measures" "restrict" "conduct"
[22] "producing" "substantial" "harm"
[25] "alleged" "harm" "sort"
[28] "interest" "given" "justification"
[31] "restriction" "compelling" "It"
[34] "established" "strict" "scrutiny"
[37] "jurisprudence" "law" "regarded"
[40] "protecting" "interest" "highest"
[43] "order" "leaves" "appreciable"
[46] "damage" "supposedly" "vital"
[49] "interest" "unprohibited" "Florida"
[52] "Star" "v" "B"
[55] "J" "F" "supra"
[58] "U" "S" "S"
[61] "Ct" "SCALIA" "J"
[64] "concurring" "part" "concurring"
[67] "judgment" "citation" "omitted"
[70] "See" "Simon" "Schuster"
[73] "Inc" "v" "Members"
[76] "N" "Y" "State"
[79] "Crime" "Victims" "Bd"
[82] "U" "S" "S"
[85] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[88] "d" "Cf" "Florida"
[91] "Star" "v" "B"
[94] "J" "F" "supra"
[97] "S" "Ct" "Smith"
[100] "v" "Daily" "Mail"
[103] "Publishing" "Co" "U"
[106] "S" "S" "Ct"
[109] "L" "Ed" "d"
[112] "id" "S" "Ct"
[115] "REHNQUIST" "J" "concurring"
[118] "judgment" "As" "show"
[121] "see" "supra" "ordinances"
[124] "underinclusive" "substantial" "extent"
[127] "respect" "interests" "respondent"
[130] "asserted" "conduct" "motivated"
[133] "religious" "conviction" "bears"
[136] "weight" "governmental" "restrictions"
[139] "There" "can" "serious"
[142] "claim" "interests" "justify"
[145] "ordinances" ""
[[345]]
[1] "IV" ""
[[346]]
[1] "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[4] "Clause" "commits" "government"
[7] "religious" "tolerance" "upon"
[10] "even" "slight" "suspicion"
[13] "proposals" "state" "intervention"
[16] "stem" "animosity" "religion"
[19] "distrust" "practices" "officials"
[22] "must" "pause" "remember"
[25] "high" "duty" "Constitution"
[28] "rights" "secures" "Those"
[31] "office" "must" "resolute"
[34] "resisting" "importunate" "demands"
[37] "must" "ensure" "sole"
[40] "reasons" "imposing" "burdens"
[43] "law" "regulation" "secular"
[46] "Legislators" "may" "devise"
[49] "mechanisms" "overt" "disguised"
[52] "designed" "persecute" "oppress"
[55] "religion" "practices" "The"
[58] "laws" "question" "enacted"
[61] "contrary" "constitutional" "principles"
[64] "void" ""
[[347]]
[1] "Reversed" ""
[[348]]
[1] "Justice" "KENNEDY" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[349]]
[1] "A" "decision" "local" "zoning"
[5] "authorities" "deny" "church" "building"
[9] "permit" "challenged" "Religious" "Freedom"
[13] "Restoration" "Act" "RFRA" "Act"
[17] "Stat" "U" "S" "C"
[21] "bb" "et" "seq" "The"
[25] "case" "calls" "question" "authority"
[29] "Congress" "enact" "RFRA" "We"
[33] "conclude" "statute" "exceeds" "Congress"
[37] "power" ""
[[350]]
[1] "I" ""
[[351]]
[1] "Situated" "hill" "city" "Boerne"
[5] "Texas" "miles" "northwest" "San"
[9] "Antonio" "St" "Peter" "Catholic"
[13] "Church" "Built" "church" "s"
[17] "structure" "replicates" "mission" "style"
[21] "region" "s" "earlier" "history"
[25] "The" "church" "seats" "worshippers"
[29] "number" "small" "growing" "parish"
[33] "Some" "parishioners" "accommodated" "Sunday"
[37] "masses" "In" "order" "meet"
[41] "needs" "congregation" "Archbishop" "San"
[45] "Antonio" "gave" "permission" "parish"
[49] "plan" "alterations" "enlarge" "building"
[53] ""
[[352]]
[1] "A" "months" "later" "Boerne"
[5] "City" "Council" "passed" "ordinance"
[9] "authorizing" "city" "s" "Historic"
[13] "Landmark" "Commission" "prepare" "preservation"
[17] "plan" "proposed" "historic" "landmarks"
[21] "districts" "Under" "ordinance" "commission"
[25] "must" "preapprove" "construction" "affecting"
[29] "historic" "landmarks" "buildings" "historic"
[33] "district" ""
[[353]]
[1] "Soon" "afterwards" "Archbishop" "applied"
[5] "building" "permit" "construction" "enlarge"
[9] "church" "proceed" "City" "authorities"
[13] "relying" "ordinance" "designation" "historic"
[17] "district" "argued" "included" "church"
[21] "denied" "application" "The" "Archbishop"
[25] "brought" "suit" "challenging" "permit"
[29] "denial" "United" "States" "District"
[33] "Court" "Western" "District" "Texas"
[37] "F" "Supp" ""
[[354]]
[1] "The" "complaint" "contained"
[4] "various" "claims" "point"
[7] "litigation" "centered" "RFRA"
[10] "question" "constitutionality" "The"
[13] "Archbishop" "relied" "upon"
[16] "RFRA" "one" "basis"
[19] "relief" "refusal" "issue"
[22] "permit" "The" "District"
[25] "Court" "concluded" "enacting"
[28] "RFRA" "Congress" "exceeded"
[31] "scope" "enforcement" "power"
[34] "Fourteenth" "Amendment" "The"
[37] "court" "certified" "order"
[40] "interlocutory" "appeal" "Fifth"
[43] "Circuit" "reversed" "finding"
[46] "RFRA" "constitutional" "F"
[49] "d" "We" "granted"
[52] "certiorari" "U" "S"
[55] "S" "Ct" "L"
[58] "Ed" "d" "now"
[61] "reverse" ""
[[355]]
[1] "II" ""
[[356]]
[1] "Congress" "enacted" "RFRA" "direct"
[5] "response" "Court" "s" "decision"
[9] "Employment" "Div" "Dept" "Human"
[13] "Resources" "Oregon" "v" "Smith"
[17] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[21] "L" "Ed" "d" "There"
[25] "considered" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[29] "claim" "brought" "members" "Native"
[33] "American" "Church" "denied" "unemployment"
[37] "benefits" "lost" "jobs" "used"
[41] "peyote" "Their" "practice" "ingest"
[45] "peyote" "sacramental" "purposes" "challenged"
[49] "Oregon" "statute" "general" "applicability"
[53] "made" "use" "drug" "criminal"
[57] "In" "evaluating" "claim" "declined"
[61] "apply" "balancing" "test" "set"
[65] "forth" "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[69] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[73] "L" "Ed" "d" "asked"
[77] "whether" "Oregon" "s" "prohibition"
[81] "substantially" "burdened" "religious" "practice"
[85] "whether" "burden" "justified" "compelling"
[89] "government" "interest" "We" "stated"
[93] ""
[[357]]
[1] "" "G" "overnment"
[4] "s" "ability" "enforce"
[7] "generally" "applicable" "prohibitions"
[10] "socially" "harmful" "conduct"
[13] "depend" "measuring" "effects"
[16] "governmental" "action" "religious"
[19] "objector" "s" "spiritual"
[22] "development" "To" "make"
[25] "individual" "s" "obligation"
[28] "obey" "law" "contingent"
[31] "upon" "law" "s"
[34] "coincidence" "religious" "beliefs"
[37] "except" "State" "s"
[40] "interest" "compelling" "contradicts"
[43] "constitutional" "tradition" "common"
[46] "sense" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "internal"
[52] "quotation" "marks" "citations"
[55] "omitted" ""
[[358]]
[1] "The" "application" "Sherbert"
[4] "test" "Smith" "decision"
[7] "explained" "produced" "anomaly"
[10] "law" "constitutional" "right"
[13] "ignore" "neutral" "laws"
[16] "general" "applicability" "The"
[19] "anomaly" "accentuated" "Court"
[22] "reasoned" "difficulty" "determining"
[25] "whether" "particular" "practice"
[28] "central" "individual" "s"
[31] "religion" "We" "explained"
[34] "moreover" "within" "judicial"
[37] "ken" "question" "centrality"
[40] "particular" "beliefs" "practices"
[43] "faith" "validity" "particular"
[46] "litigants" "interpretations" "creeds"
[49] "U" "S" "S"
[52] "Ct" "internal" "quotation"
[55] "marks" "citation" "omitted"
[58] ""
[[359]]
[1] "The" "instances" "neutral"
[4] "generally" "applicable" "law"
[7] "failed" "pass" "constitutional"
[10] "muster" "Smith" "Court"
[13] "noted" "cases" "constitutional"
[16] "protections" "stake" "Id"
[19] "S" "Ct" "In"
[22] "Wisconsin" "v" "Yoder"
[25] "U" "S" "S"
[28] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[31] "d" "example" "invalidated"
[34] "Wisconsin" "s" "mandatory"
[37] "school" "attendance" "law"
[40] "applied" "Amish" "parents"
[43] "refused" "religious" "grounds"
[46] "send" "children" "school"
[49] "That" "case" "implicated"
[52] "right" "free" "exercise"
[55] "religion" "also" "right"
[58] "parents" "control" "children"
[61] "s" "education" ""
[[360]]
[1] "The" "Smith" "decision" "acknowledged"
[5] "Court" "employed" "Sherbert" "test"
[9] "considering" "free" "exercise" "challenges"
[13] "state" "unemployment" "compensation" "rules"
[17] "three" "occasions" "balance" "tipped"
[21] "favor" "individual" "See" "Sherbert"
[25] "supra" "Thomas" "v" "Review"
[29] "Bd" "Indiana" "Employment" "Security"
[33] "Div" "U" "S" "S"
[37] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[41] "Hobbie" "v" "Unemployment" "Appeals"
[45] "Comm" "n" "Fla" "U"
[49] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[53] "Ed" "d" "Those" "cases"
[57] "Court" "explained" "stand" "proposition"
[61] "State" "place" "system" "individual"
[65] "exemptions" "may" "refuse" "extend"
[69] "system" "cases" "religious" "hardship"
[73] "without" "compelling" "reason" "U"
[77] "S" "S" "Ct" "internal"
[81] "quotation" "marks" "omitted" "By"
[85] "contrast" "general" "prohibition" "Oregon"
[89] "s" "issue" "sounder" "approach"
[93] "approach" "accord" "vast" "majority"
[97] "precedents" "hold" "test" "inapplicable"
[101] "free" "exercise" "challenges" "Id"
[105] "S" "Ct" "Smith" "held"
[109] "neutral" "generally" "applicable" "laws"
[113] "may" "applied" "religious" "practices"
[117] "even" "supported" "compelling" "governmental"
[121] "interest" ""
[[361]]
[1] "Four" "Members" "Court" "disagreed"
[5] "They" "argued" "law" "placed"
[9] "substantial" "burden" "Native" "American"
[13] "Church" "members" "upheld" "law"
[17] "served" "compelling" "state" "interest"
[21] "narrowly" "tailored" "achieve" "end"
[25] "Id" "S" "Ct" "Justice"
[29] "O" "CONNOR" "concluded" "Oregon"
[33] "satisfied" "test" "Justice" "Blackmun"
[37] "joined" "Justice" "Brennan" "Justice"
[41] "Marshall" "see" "compelling" "interest"
[45] "justifying" "law" "s" "application"
[49] "members" ""
[[362]]
[1] "" "These" "points"
[4] "constitutional" "interpretation" "debated"
[7] "Members" "Congress" "hearings"
[10] "floor" "debates" "Many"
[13] "criticized" "Court" "s"
[16] "reasoning" "disagreement" "resulted"
[19] "passage" "RFRA" "Congress"
[22] "announced" ""
[[363]]
[1] "" "T" "framers" "Constitution"
[5] "recognizing" "free" "exercise" "religion"
[9] "unalienable" "right" "secured" "protection"
[13] "First" "Amendment" "Constitution" ""
[[364]]
[1] "" "laws" "neutral" "toward" "religion"
[6] "may" "burden" "religious" "exercise" "surely"
[11] "laws" "intended" "interfere" "religious" "exercise"
[16] ""
[[365]]
[1] "" "governments" "substantially" "burden"
[5] "religious" "exercise" "without" "compelling"
[9] "justification" ""
[[366]]
[1] "" "Employment" "Division" "v"
[5] "Smith" "U" "S" "S"
[9] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[13] "Supreme" "Court" "virtually" "eliminated"
[17] "requirement" "government" "justify" "burdens"
[21] "religious" "exercise" "imposed" "laws"
[25] "neutral" "toward" "religion" ""
[[367]]
[1] "" "compelling" "interest" "test"
[5] "set" "forth" "prior" "Federal"
[9] "court" "rulings" "workable" "test"
[13] "striking" "sensible" "balances" "religious"
[17] "liberty" "competing" "prior" "governmental"
[21] "interests" "U" "S" "C"
[25] "bb" ""
[[368]]
[1] "The" "Act" "s" "stated" "purposes" ""
[[369]]
[1] "" "restore" "compelling" "interest"
[5] "test" "set" "forth" "Sherbert"
[9] "v" "Verner" "U" "S"
[13] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[17] "d" "Wisconsin" "v" "Yoder"
[21] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[25] "L" "Ed" "d" "guarantee"
[29] "application" "cases" "free" "exercise"
[33] "religion" "substantially" "burdened" ""
[[370]]
[1] "" "provide" "claim" "defense"
[5] "persons" "whose" "religious" "exercise"
[9] "substantially" "burdened" "government" "bb"
[13] "b" ""
[[371]]
[1] "RFRA" "prohibits" "g"
[4] "overnment" "substantially" "burden"
[7] "ing" "person" "s"
[10] "exercise" "religion" "even"
[13] "burden" "results" "rule"
[16] "general" "applicability" "unless"
[19] "government" "can" "demonstrate"
[22] "burden" "furtherance" "compelling"
[25] "governmental" "interest" "least"
[28] "restrictive" "means" "furthering"
[31] "compelling" "governmental" "interest"
[34] "bb" "The" "Act"
[37] "s" "mandate" "applies"
[40] "branch" "department" "agency"
[43] "instrumentality" "official" "person"
[46] "acting" "color" "law"
[49] "United" "States" "well"
[52] "State" "subdivision" "State"
[55] "bb" "The" "Act"
[58] "s" "universal" "coverage"
[61] "confirmed" "bb" "RFRA"
[64] "applies" "Federal" "State"
[67] "law" "implementation" "law"
[70] "whether" "statutory" "otherwise"
[73] "whether" "adopted" "RFRA"
[76] "s" "enactment" "In"
[79] "accordance" "RFRA" "s"
[82] "usage" "term" "shall"
[85] "use" "state" "law"
[88] "include" "local" "municipal"
[91] "ordinances" ""
[[372]]
[1] "III" ""
[[373]]
[1] "A" ""
[[374]]
[1] "" "Under" "Constitution"
[4] "Federal" "Government" "one"
[7] "enumerated" "powers" "M"
[10] "Culloch" "v" "Maryland"
[13] "Wheat" "L" "Ed"
[16] "see" "also" "The"
[19] "Federalist" "No" "p"
[22] "C" "Rossiter" "ed"
[25] "J" "Madison" "The"
[28] "judicial" "authority" "determine"
[31] "constitutionality" "laws" "cases"
[34] "controversies" "based" "premise"
[37] "powers" "legislature" "defined"
[40] "limited" "limits" "may"
[43] "mistaken" "forgotten" "constitution"
[46] "written" "Marbury" "v"
[49] "Madison" "Cranch" "L"
[52] "Ed" ""
[[375]]
[1] "Congress" "relied" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[5] "enforcement" "power" "enacting" "far"
[9] "reaching" "substantial" "RFRA" "s"
[13] "provisions" "impose" "requirements" "States"
[17] "See" "Religious" "Freedom" "Restoration"
[21] "Act" "S" "Rep" "No"
[25] "pp" "Senate" "Report" "H"
[29] "R" "Rep" "No" "p"
[33] "House" "Report" "The" "Fourteenth"
[37] "Amendment" "provides" "relevant" "part"
[41] ""
[[376]]
[1] "" "Section" "No" "State"
[5] "shall" "make" "enforce" "law"
[9] "shall" "abridge" "privileges" "immunities"
[13] "citizens" "United" "States" "shall"
[17] "State" "deprive" "person" "life"
[21] "liberty" "property" "without" "due"
[25] "process" "law" "deny" "person"
[29] "within" "jurisdiction" "equal" "protection"
[33] "laws" ""
[[377]]
[1] "" ""
[[378]]
[1] "" "Section" "The" "Congress"
[5] "shall" "power" "enforce" "appropriate"
[9] "legislation" "provisions" "article" ""
[[379]]
[1] "The" "parties" "disagree"
[4] "whether" "RFRA" "proper"
[7] "exercise" "Congress" "power"
[10] "enforce" "appropriate" "legislation"
[13] "constitutional" "guarantee" "State"
[16] "shall" "deprive" "person"
[19] "life" "liberty" "property"
[22] "without" "due" "process"
[25] "law" "deny" "person"
[28] "equal" "protection" "laws"
[31] ""
[[380]]
[1] "In" "defense" "Act"
[4] "respondent" "Archbishop" "contends"
[7] "support" "United" "States"
[10] "RFRA" "permissible" "enforcement"
[13] "legislation" "Congress" "said"
[16] "protecting" "legislation" "one"
[19] "liberties" "guaranteed" "Fourteenth"
[22] "Amendment" "s" "Due"
[25] "Process" "Clause" "free"
[28] "exercise" "religion" "beyond"
[31] "necessary" "Smith" "It"
[34] "said" "congressional" "decision"
[37] "dispense" "proof" "deliberate"
[40] "overt" "discrimination" "instead"
[43] "concentrate" "law" "s"
[46] "effects" "accords" "settled"
[49] "understanding" "includes" "power"
[52] "enact" "legislation" "designed"
[55] "prevent" "well" "remedy"
[58] "constitutional" "violations" "It"
[61] "contended" "Congress" "power"
[64] "limited" "remedial" "preventive"
[67] "legislation" ""
[[381]]
[1] "" "All" "must" "acknowledge"
[5] "positive" "grant" "legislative" "power"
[9] "Congress" "Katzenbach" "v" "Morgan"
[13] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[17] "L" "Ed" "d" "In"
[21] "Ex" "parte" "Virginia" "U"
[25] "S" "L" "Ed" "explained"
[29] "scope" "Congress" "power" "following"
[33] "broad" "terms" ""
[[382]]
[1] "" "Whatever" "legislation" "appropriate"
[5] "adapted" "carry" "objects" "amendments"
[9] "view" "whatever" "tends" "enforce"
[13] "submission" "prohibitions" "contain" "secure"
[17] "persons" "enjoyment" "perfect" "equality"
[21] "civil" "rights" "equal" "protection"
[25] "laws" "State" "denial" "invasion"
[29] "prohibited" "brought" "within" "domain"
[33] "congressional" "power" ""
[[383]]
[1] "Legislation" "deters" "remedies"
[4] "constitutional" "violations" "can"
[7] "fall" "within" "sweep"
[10] "Congress" "enforcement" "power"
[13] "even" "process" "prohibits"
[16] "conduct" "unconstitutional" "intrudes"
[19] "legislative" "spheres" "autonomy"
[22] "previously" "reserved" "States"
[25] "Fitzpatrick" "v" "Bitzer"
[28] "U" "S" "S"
[31] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[34] "d" "For" "example"
[37] "Court" "upheld" "suspension"
[40] "literacy" "tests" "similar"
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[46] "parallel" "power" "enforce"
[49] "provisions" "Fifteenth" "Amendment"
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[61] "voting" "South" "Carolina"
[64] "v" "Katzenbach" "U"
[67] "S" "S" "Ct"
[70] "L" "Ed" "d"
[73] "despite" "facial" "constitutionality"
[76] "tests" "Lassiter" "v"
[79] "Northampton" "County" "Bd"
[82] "Elections" "U" "S"
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[97] "within" "Congress" "power"
[100] "enforce" "Fourteenth" "Fifteenth"
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[121] "v" "Morgan" "supra"
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[130] "people" "schooled" "Puerto"
[133] "Rico" "voting" "Oregon"
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[139] "S" "S" "Ct"
[142] "L" "Ed" "d"
[145] "upholding" "year" "nationwide"
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[154] "registering" "vote" "City"
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[160] "States" "U" "S"
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[166] "Ed" "d" "upholding"
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[211] "manufacture" "sale" "transportation"
[214] "intoxicating" "liquors" "beverage"
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[[384]]
[1] "" "It" "also"
[4] "true" "however" "s"
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[100] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
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[118] "Amendment" "internal" "quotation"
[121] "marks" "citation" "omitted"
[124] ""
[[385]]
[1] "" "Congress" "power"
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[10] "Amendment" "The" "Court"
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[[386]]
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[49] "distinction" "one" "apparent"
[52] "text" "Amendment" ""
[[387]]
[1] "" ""
[[388]]
[1] "The" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
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[52] "Amendment" "House" "Representatives"
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[58] ""
[[389]]
[1] "" "The" "Congress" "shall" "power"
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[11] "secure" "citizens" "State" "privileges" "immunities"
[16] "citizens" "several" "States" "persons" "several"
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[26] "liberty" "property" "Cong" "Globe" "th"
[31] "Cong" "st" "Sess" ""
[[390]]
[1] "The" "proposal" "encountered"
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[43] "statement" "Rep" "Hotchkiss"
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[202] "Stan" "L" "Rev"
[205] ""
[[391]]
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[7] "quarters" "House" "voted"
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[136] ""
[[392]]
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[208] ""
[[393]]
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[64] "Cases" "S" "Ct"
[67] "Rev" ""
[[394]]
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[149] "Judiciary" ""
[[395]]
[1] "" ""
[[396]]
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[172] "definitional" "questioned" ""
[[397]]
[1] "Recent" "cases" "continued"
[4] "revolve" "around" "question"
[7] "whether" "legislation" "can"
[10] "considered" "remedial" "In"
[13] "South" "Carolina" "v"
[16] "Katzenbach" "supra" "emphasized"
[19] "t" "constitutional" "propriety"
[22] "legislation" "adopted" "Enforcement"
[25] "Clause" "must" "judged"
[28] "reference" "historical" "experience"
[31] "reflects" "U" "S"
[34] "S" "Ct" "There"
[37] "upheld" "various" "provisions"
[40] "Voting" "Rights" "Act"
[43] "finding" "remedies" "aimed"
[46] "areas" "voting" "discrimination"
[49] "flagrant" "id" "S"
[52] "Ct" "necessary" "banish"
[55] "blight" "racial" "discrimination"
[58] "voting" "infected" "electoral"
[61] "process" "parts" "country"
[64] "nearly" "century" "id"
[67] "S" "Ct" "We"
[70] "noted" "evidence" "record"
[73] "reflecting" "subsisting" "pervasive"
[76] "discriminatory" "therefore" "unconstitutional"
[79] "use" "literacy" "tests"
[82] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[85] "The" "Act" "s"
[88] "new" "remedies" "used"
[91] "administrative" "resources" "Federal"
[94] "Government" "included" "suspension"
[97] "literacy" "tests" "pending"
[100] "federal" "review" "new"
[103] "voting" "regulations" "covered"
[106] "jurisdictions" "well" "assignment"
[109] "federal" "examiners" "list"
[112] "qualified" "applicants" "enabling"
[115] "listed" "vote" "The"
[118] "new" "unprecedented" "remedies"
[121] "deemed" "necessary" "given"
[124] "ineffectiveness" "existing" "voting"
[127] "rights" "laws" "see"
[130] "id" "S" "Ct"
[133] "slow" "costly" "character"
[136] "case" "case" "litigation"
[139] "id" "S" "Ct"
[142] ""
[[398]]
[1] "After" "South" "Carolina"
[4] "v" "Katzenbach" "Court"
[7] "continued" "acknowledge" "necessity"
[10] "using" "strong" "remedial"
[13] "preventive" "measures" "respond"
[16] "widespread" "persisting" "deprivation"
[19] "constitutional" "rights" "resulting"
[22] "country" "s" "history"
[25] "racial" "discrimination" "See"
[28] "Oregon" "v" "Mitchell"
[31] "U" "S" "S"
[34] "Ct" "In" "enacting"
[37] "literacy" "test" "ban"
[40] "Congress" "long" "history"
[43] "discriminatory" "use" "literacy"
[46] "tests" "disfranchise" "voters"
[49] "account" "race" "opinion"
[52] "Black" "J" "id"
[55] "S" "Ct" "Literacy"
[58] "tests" "used" "times"
[61] "discriminatory" "weapon" "minorities"
[64] "Negroes" "Americans" "Mexican"
[67] "ancestry" "American" "Indians"
[70] "opinion" "Douglas" "J"
[73] "id" "S" "Ct"
[76] "Congress" "determined" "racial"
[79] "prejudice" "prevalent" "throughout"
[82] "Nation" "literacy" "tests"
[85] "unduly" "lend" "discriminatory"
[88] "application" "either" "conscious"
[91] "unconscious" "opinion" "Harlan"
[94] "J" "id" "S"
[97] "Ct" "T" "question"
[100] "Congress" "legitimately" "concluded"
[103] "use" "literacy" "tests"
[106] "anywhere" "within" "United"
[109] "States" "inevitable" "effect"
[112] "denying" "vote" "members"
[115] "racial" "minorities" "whose"
[118] "inability" "pass" "tests"
[121] "direct" "consequence" "previous"
[124] "governmental" "discrimination" "education"
[127] "opinion" "Brennan" "J"
[130] "id" "S" "Ct"
[133] "N" "ationwide" "suspension"
[136] "literacy" "tests" "may"
[139] "reasonably" "thought" "appropriate"
[142] "Congress" "acts" "evil"
[145] "racial" "discrimination" "varying"
[148] "degrees" "manifests" "every"
[151] "part" "country" "opinion"
[154] "Stewart" "J" "City"
[157] "Rome" "U" "S"
[160] "S" "Ct" "Congress"
[163] "considered" "determination" "least"
[166] "another" "years" "statutory"
[169] "remedies" "necessary" "counter"
[172] "perpetuation" "years" "pervasive"
[175] "voting" "discrimination" "unsurprising"
[178] "unassailable" "Morgan" "U"
[181] "S" "S" "Ct"
[184] "Congress" "factual" "basis"
[187] "conclude" "New" "York"
[190] "s" "literacy" "requirement"
[193] "constituted" "invidious" "discrimination"
[196] "violation" "Equal" "Protection"
[199] "Clause" ""
[[399]]
[1] "" ""
[[400]]
[1] "Any" "suggestion" "Congress"
[4] "substantive" "non" "remedial"
[7] "power" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[10] "supported" "case" "law"
[13] "In" "Oregon" "v"
[16] "Mitchell" "supra" "S"
[19] "Ct" "majority" "Court"
[22] "concluded" "Congress" "exceeded"
[25] "enforcement" "powers" "enacting"
[28] "legislation" "lowering" "minimum"
[31] "age" "voters" "state"
[34] "local" "elections" "The"
[37] "five" "Members" "Court"
[40] "reached" "conclusion" "explained"
[43] "legislation" "intruded" "area"
[46] "reserved" "Constitution" "States"
[49] "See" "U" "S"
[52] "S" "Ct" "concluding"
[55] "legislation" "unconstitutional" "Constitution"
[58] "reserves" "States" "power"
[61] "set" "voter" "qualifications"
[64] "state" "local" "elections"
[67] "opinion" "Black" "J"
[70] "id" "S" "Ct"
[73] "explaining" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[76] "never" "intended" "restrict"
[79] "authority" "States" "allocate"
[82] "political" "power" "see"
[85] "fit" "opinion" "Harlan"
[88] "J" "id" "S"
[91] "Ct" "concluding" "States"
[94] "Congress" "power" "establish"
[97] "qualification" "voting" "based"
[100] "age" "opinion" "Stewart"
[103] "J" "joined" "Burger"
[106] "C" "J" "Blackmun"
[109] "J" "Four" "five"
[112] "explicit" "rejecting" "position"
[115] "endowed" "Congress" "power"
[118] "establish" "meaning" "constitutional"
[121] "provisions" "See" "id"
[124] "S" "Ct" "opinion"
[127] "Harlan" "J" "id"
[130] "S" "Ct" "opinion"
[133] "Stewart" "J" "Justice"
[136] "Black" "s" "rejection"
[139] "position" "might" "inferred"
[142] "disagreement" "Congress" "interpretation"
[145] "Equal" "Protection" "Clause"
[148] "See" "id" "S"
[151] "Ct" ""
[[401]]
[1] "There" "language" "opinion"
[4] "Katzenbach" "v" "Morgan"
[7] "U" "S" "S"
[10] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[13] "d" "interpreted" "acknowledging"
[16] "power" "Congress" "enact"
[19] "legislation" "expands" "rights"
[22] "contained" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[25] "This" "necessary" "interpretation"
[28] "however" "even" "best"
[31] "one" "In" "Morgan"
[34] "Court" "considered" "constitutionality"
[37] "e" "Voting" "Rights"
[40] "Act" "provided" "person"
[43] "successfully" "completed" "sixth"
[46] "primary" "grade" "public"
[49] "school" "private" "school"
[52] "accredited" "Commonwealth" "Puerto"
[55] "Rico" "language" "instruction"
[58] "English" "denied" "right"
[61] "vote" "inability" "read"
[64] "write" "English" "New"
[67] "York" "s" "Constitution"
[70] "hand" "required" "voters"
[73] "able" "read" "write"
[76] "English" "The" "Court"
[79] "provided" "two" "related"
[82] "rationales" "conclusion" "e"
[85] "viewed" "measure" "secure"
[88] "Puerto" "Rican" "community"
[91] "residing" "New" "York"
[94] "nondiscriminatory" "treatment" "government"
[97] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[100] "Under" "first" "rationale"
[103] "Congress" "prohibit" "New"
[106] "York" "denying" "right"
[109] "vote" "large" "segments"
[112] "Puerto" "Rican" "community"
[115] "order" "give" "Puerto"
[118] "Ricans" "enhanced" "political"
[121] "power" "helpful" "gaining"
[124] "nondiscriminatory" "treatment" "public"
[127] "services" "entire" "Puerto"
[130] "Rican" "community" "Ibid"
[133] "Section" "e" "thus"
[136] "justified" "remedial" "measure"
[139] "deal" "discrimination" "governmental"
[142] "services" "Id" "S"
[145] "Ct" "The" "second"
[148] "rationale" "alternative" "holding"
[151] "address" "discrimination" "provision"
[154] "public" "services" "discrimination"
[157] "establishing" "voter" "qualifications"
[160] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[163] "The" "Court" "perceived"
[166] "factual" "basis" "Congress"
[169] "concluded" "New" "York"
[172] "s" "literacy" "requirement"
[175] "constituted" "invidious" "discrimination"
[178] "violation" "Equal" "Protection"
[181] "Clause" "Id" "S"
[184] "Ct" "Both" "rationales"
[187] "upholding" "e" "rested"
[190] "unconstitutional" "discrimination" "New"
[193] "York" "Congress" "reasonable"
[196] "attempt" "combat" "As"
[199] "Justice" "Stewart" "explained"
[202] "Oregon" "v" "Mitchell"
[205] "supra" "S" "Ct"
[208] "interpreting" "Morgan" "give"
[211] "Congress" "power" "interpret"
[214] "Constitution" "require" "enormous"
[217] "extension" "decision" "s"
[220] "rationale" ""
[[402]]
[1] "" "If" "Congress" "define"
[5] "powers" "altering" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[9] "s" "meaning" "longer" "Constitution"
[13] "superior" "paramount" "law" "unchangeable"
[17] "ordinary" "means" "It" "level"
[21] "ordinary" "legislative" "acts" "like"
[25] "acts" "alterable" "legislature" "shall"
[29] "please" "alter" "Marbury" "v"
[33] "Madison" "Cranch" "L" "Ed"
[37] "Under" "approach" "difficult" "conceive"
[41] "principle" "limit" "congressional" "power"
[45] "See" "Van" "Alstyne" "The"
[49] "Failure" "Religious" "Freedom" "Restoration"
[53] "Act" "Section" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[57] "Duke" "L" "J" "Shifting"
[61] "legislative" "majorities" "change" "Constitution"
[65] "effectively" "circumvent" "difficult" "detailed"
[69] "amendment" "process" "contained" "Article"
[73] "V" ""
[[403]]
[1] "We" "now" "turn" "consider"
[5] "whether" "RFRA" "can" "considered"
[9] "enforcement" "legislation" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[13] ""
[[404]]
[1] "B" ""
[[405]]
[1] "Respondent" "contends" "RFRA"
[4] "proper" "exercise" "Congress"
[7] "remedial" "preventive" "power"
[10] "The" "Act" "said"
[13] "reasonable" "means" "protecting"
[16] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[19] "defined" "Smith" "It"
[22] "prevents" "remedies" "laws"
[25] "enacted" "unconstitutional" "object"
[28] "targeting" "religious" "beliefs"
[31] "practices" "See" "Church"
[34] "Lukumi" "Babalu" "Aye"
[37] "Inc" "v" "Hialeah"
[40] "U" "S" "S"
[43] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[46] "d" "A" "law"
[49] "targeting" "religious" "beliefs"
[52] "never" "permissible" "To"
[55] "avoid" "difficulty" "proving"
[58] "violations" "said" "Congress"
[61] "can" "simply" "invalidate"
[64] "law" "imposes" "substantial"
[67] "burden" "religious" "practice"
[70] "unless" "justified" "compelling"
[73] "interest" "least" "restrictive"
[76] "means" "accomplishing" "interest"
[79] "If" "Congress" "can"
[82] "prohibit" "laws" "discriminatory"
[85] "effects" "order" "prevent"
[88] "racial" "discrimination" "violation"
[91] "Equal" "Protection" "Clause"
[94] "see" "Fullilove" "v"
[97] "Klutznick" "U" "S"
[100] "S" "Ct" "L"
[103] "Ed" "d" "plurality"
[106] "opinion" "City" "Rome"
[109] "U" "S" "S"
[112] "Ct" "can" "respondent"
[115] "argues" "promote" "religious"
[118] "liberty" ""
[[406]]
[1] "" "While" "preventive"
[4] "rules" "sometimes" "appropriate"
[7] "remedial" "measures" "must"
[10] "congruence" "means" "used"
[13] "ends" "achieved" "The"
[16] "appropriateness" "remedial" "measures"
[19] "must" "considered" "light"
[22] "evil" "presented" "See"
[25] "South" "Carolina" "v"
[28] "Katzenbach" "U" "S"
[31] "S" "Ct" "Strong"
[34] "measures" "appropriate" "address"
[37] "one" "harm" "may"
[40] "unwarranted" "response" "another"
[43] "lesser" "one" "Id"
[46] "S" "Ct" ""
[[407]]
[1] "A" "comparison" "RFRA"
[4] "Voting" "Rights" "Act"
[7] "instructive" "In" "contrast"
[10] "record" "confronted" "Congress"
[13] "Judiciary" "voting" "rights"
[16] "cases" "RFRA" "s"
[19] "legislative" "record" "lacks"
[22] "examples" "modern" "instances"
[25] "generally" "applicable" "laws"
[28] "passed" "religious" "bigotry"
[31] "The" "history" "persecution"
[34] "country" "detailed" "hearings"
[37] "mentions" "episodes" "occurring"
[40] "past" "years" "See"
[43] "e" "g" "Religious"
[46] "Freedom" "Restoration" "Act"
[49] "Hearings" "H" "R"
[52] "Subcommittee" "Civil" "Constitutional"
[55] "Rights" "House" "Committee"
[58] "Judiciary" "d" "Cong"
[61] "d" "Sess" "statement"
[64] "Douglas" "Laycock" "House"
[67] "Hearings" "The" "Religious"
[70] "Freedom" "Restoration" "Act"
[73] "Hearing" "S" "Senate"
[76] "Committee" "Judiciary" "d"
[79] "Cong" "d" "Sess"
[82] "statement" "Dallin" "H"
[85] "Oaks" "Senate" "Hearing"
[88] "id" "statement" "Douglas"
[91] "Laycock" "Religious" "Freedom"
[94] "Restoration" "Act" "Hearing"
[97] "H" "R" "Subcommittee"
[100] "Civil" "Constitutional" "Rights"
[103] "House" "Committee" "Judiciary"
[106] "st" "Cong" "d"
[109] "Sess" "statement" "John"
[112] "H" "Buchanan" "Jr"
[115] "House" "Hearing" "The"
[118] "absence" "recent" "episodes"
[121] "stems" "fact" "one"
[124] "witness" "testified" "deliberate"
[127] "persecution" "usual" "problem"
[130] "country" "House" "Hearings"
[133] "statement" "Douglas" "Laycock"
[136] "See" "also" "House"
[139] "Report" "L" "aws"
[142] "directly" "targeting" "religious"
[145] "practices" "become" "increasingly"
[148] "rare" "Rather" "emphasis"
[151] "hearings" "laws" "general"
[154] "applicability" "place" "incidental"
[157] "burdens" "religion" "Much"
[160] "discussion" "centered" "upon"
[163] "anecdotal" "evidence" "autopsies"
[166] "performed" "Jewish" "individuals"
[169] "Hmong" "immigrants" "violation"
[172] "religious" "beliefs" "see"
[175] "e" "g" "House"
[178] "Hearings" "statement" "Nadine"
[181] "Strossen" "id" "statement"
[184] "William" "Yang" "id"
[187] "statement" "Rep" "Stephen"
[190] "J" "Solarz" "id"
[193] "statement" "Douglas" "Laycock"
[196] "Senate" "Hearing" "statement"
[199] "William" "Yang" "id"
[202] "statement" "Hmong" "Lao"
[205] "Unity" "Assn" "Inc"
[208] "id" "statement" "Baptist"
[211] "Joint" "Committee" "see"
[214] "also" "Senate" "Report"
[217] "House" "Report" "n"
[220] "zoning" "regulations" "historic"
[223] "preservation" "laws" "like"
[226] "one" "issue" "incident"
[229] "normal" "operation" "adverse"
[232] "effects" "churches" "synagogues"
[235] "See" "e" "g"
[238] "House" "Hearings" "statement"
[241] "Robert" "P" "Dugan"
[244] "Jr" "id" "statement"
[247] "Nadine" "Strossen" "id"
[250] "statement" "Rep" "Stephen"
[253] "J" "Solarz" "id"
[256] "statement" "Edward" "M"
[259] "Gaffney" "Jr" "id"
[262] "statement" "Douglas" "Laycock"
[265] "Senate" "Hearing" "statement"
[268] "Forest" "D" "Montgomery"
[271] "House" "Hearing" "statement"
[274] "Robert" "P" "Dugan"
[277] "Jr" "see" "also"
[280] "Senate" "Report" "House"
[283] "Report" "n" "It"
[286] "difficult" "maintain" "examples"
[289] "legislation" "enacted" "enforced"
[292] "due" "animus" "hostility"
[295] "burdened" "religious" "practices"
[298] "indicate" "widespread" "pattern"
[301] "religious" "discrimination" "country"
[304] "Congress" "concern" "incidental"
[307] "burdens" "imposed" "object"
[310] "purpose" "legislation" "See"
[313] "House" "Report" "Senate"
[316] "Report" "House" "Hearings"
[319] "statement" "Nadine" "Strossen"
[322] "id" "statement" "Rep"
[325] "Stephen" "J" "Solarz"
[328] "House" "Hearing" "statement"
[331] "Rep" "Stephen" "J"
[334] "Solarz" "This" "lack"
[337] "support" "legislative" "record"
[340] "however" "RFRA" "s"
[343] "serious" "shortcoming" "Judicial"
[346] "deference" "cases" "based"
[349] "state" "legislative" "record"
[352] "Congress" "compiles" "due"
[355] "regard" "decision" "body"
[358] "constitutionally" "appointed" "decide"
[361] "Oregon" "v" "Mitchell"
[364] "U" "S" "S"
[367] "Ct" "opinion" "Harlan"
[370] "J" "As" "general"
[373] "matter" "Congress" "determine"
[376] "method" "will" "reach"
[379] "decision" ""
[[408]]
[1] "" "Regardless" "state"
[4] "legislative" "record" "RFRA"
[7] "considered" "remedial" "preventive"
[10] "legislation" "terms" "meaning"
[13] "RFRA" "proportion" "supposed"
[16] "remedial" "preventive" "object"
[19] "understood" "responsive" "designed"
[22] "prevent" "unconstitutional" "behavior"
[25] "It" "appears" "instead"
[28] "attempt" "substantive" "change"
[31] "constitutional" "protections" "Preventive"
[34] "measures" "prohibiting" "certain"
[37] "types" "laws" "may"
[40] "appropriate" "reason" "believe"
[43] "many" "laws" "affected"
[46] "congressional" "enactment" "significant"
[49] "likelihood" "unconstitutional" "See"
[52] "City" "Rome" "U"
[55] "S" "S" "Ct"
[58] "since" "jurisdictions" "demonstrable"
[61] "history" "intentional" "racial"
[64] "discrimination" "create" "risk"
[67] "purposeful" "discrimination" "Congress"
[70] "prohibit" "changes" "discriminatory"
[73] "impact" "jurisdictions" "Remedial"
[76] "legislation" "adapted" "mischief"
[79] "wrong" "Fourteenth" "A"
[82] "mendment" "intended" "provide"
[85] "Civil" "Rights" "Cases"
[88] "U" "S" "S"
[91] "Ct" ""
[[409]]
[1] "" "RFRA" "confined" "Sweeping"
[5] "coverage" "ensures" "intrusion" "every"
[9] "level" "government" "displacing" "laws"
[13] "prohibiting" "official" "actions" "almost"
[17] "every" "description" "regardless" "subject"
[21] "matter" "RFRA" "s" "restrictions"
[25] "apply" "every" "agency" "official"
[29] "Federal" "State" "local" "Governments"
[33] "U" "S" "C" "bb"
[37] "RFRA" "applies" "federal" "state"
[41] "law" "statutory" "otherwise" "whether"
[45] "adopted" "enactment" "bb" "RFRA"
[49] "termination" "date" "termination" "mechanism"
[53] "Any" "law" "subject" "challenge"
[57] "time" "individual" "alleges" "substantial"
[61] "burden" "free" "exercise" "religion"
[65] ""
[[410]]
[1] "The" "reach" "scope"
[4] "RFRA" "distinguish" "measures"
[7] "passed" "Congress" "enforcement"
[10] "power" "even" "area"
[13] "voting" "rights" "In"
[16] "South" "Carolina" "v"
[19] "Katzenbach" "challenged" "provisions"
[22] "confined" "regions" "country"
[25] "voting" "discrimination" "flagrant"
[28] "see" "U" "S"
[31] "S" "Ct" "affected"
[34] "discrete" "class" "state"
[37] "laws" "e" "state"
[40] "voting" "laws" "Furthermore"
[43] "ensure" "reach" "Voting"
[46] "Rights" "Act" "limited"
[49] "cases" "constitutional" "violations"
[52] "likely" "order" "reduce"
[55] "possibility" "overbreadth" "coverage"
[58] "Act" "terminate" "behest"
[61] "States" "political" "subdivisions"
[64] "danger" "substantial" "voting"
[67] "discrimination" "materialized" "preceding"
[70] "five" "years" "Id"
[73] "S" "Ct" "The"
[76] "provisions" "restricting" "banning"
[79] "literacy" "tests" "upheld"
[82] "Katzenbach" "v" "Morgan"
[85] "U" "S" "S"
[88] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[91] "d" "Oregon" "v"
[94] "Mitchell" "supra" "attacked"
[97] "particular" "type" "voting"
[100] "qualification" "one" "long"
[103] "history" "notorious" "means"
[106] "deny" "abridge" "voting"
[109] "rights" "racial" "grounds"
[112] "South" "Carolina" "v"
[115] "Katzenbach" "U" "S"
[118] "S" "Ct" "Black"
[121] "J" "concurring" "dissenting"
[124] "In" "City" "Rome"
[127] "supra" "Court" "rejected"
[130] "challenge" "constitutionality" "Voting"
[133] "Rights" "Act" "provision"
[136] "required" "certain" "jurisdictions"
[139] "submit" "changes" "electoral"
[142] "practices" "Department" "Justice"
[145] "preimplementation" "review" "The"
[148] "requirement" "placed" "jurisdictions"
[151] "history" "intentional" "racial"
[154] "discrimination" "voting" "Id"
[157] "S" "Ct" "Like"
[160] "provisions" "issue" "South"
[163] "Carolina" "v" "Katzenbach"
[166] "provision" "permitted" "covered"
[169] "jurisdiction" "avoid" "preclearance"
[172] "requirements" "certain" "conditions"
[175] "moreover" "lapsed" "seven"
[178] "years" "This" "say"
[181] "course" "legislation" "requires"
[184] "termination" "dates" "geographic"
[187] "restrictions" "egregious" "predicates"
[190] "Where" "however" "congressional"
[193] "enactment" "pervasively" "prohibits"
[196] "constitutional" "state" "action"
[199] "effort" "remedy" "prevent"
[202] "unconstitutional" "state" "action"
[205] "limitations" "kind" "tend"
[208] "ensure" "Congress" "means"
[211] "proportionate" "ends" "legitimate"
[214] ""
[[411]]
[1] "The" "stringent" "test"
[4] "RFRA" "demands" "state"
[7] "laws" "reflects" "lack"
[10] "proportionality" "congruence" "means"
[13] "adopted" "legitimate" "end"
[16] "achieved" "If" "objector"
[19] "can" "show" "substantial"
[22] "burden" "free" "exercise"
[25] "State" "must" "demonstrate"
[28] "compelling" "governmental" "interest"
[31] "show" "law" "least"
[34] "restrictive" "means" "furthering"
[37] "interest" "Claims" "law"
[40] "substantially" "burdens" "someone"
[43] "s" "exercise" "religion"
[46] "will" "often" "difficult"
[49] "contest" "See" "Smith"
[52] "U" "S" "S"
[55] "Ct" "What" "principle"
[58] "law" "logic" "can"
[61] "brought" "bear" "contradict"
[64] "believer" "s" "assertion"
[67] "particular" "act" "central"
[70] "personal" "faith" "id"
[73] "S" "Ct" "The"
[76] "distinction" "questions" "centrality"
[79] "questions" "sincerity" "burden"
[82] "admittedly" "fine" "O"
[85] "CONNOR" "J" "concurring"
[88] "judgment" "Requiring" "State"
[91] "demonstrate" "compelling" "interest"
[94] "show" "adopted" "least"
[97] "restrictive" "means" "achieving"
[100] "interest" "demanding" "test"
[103] "known" "constitutional" "law"
[106] "If" "compelling" "interest"
[109] "really" "means" "says"
[112] "many" "laws" "will"
[115] "meet" "test" "The"
[118] "test" "open" "prospect"
[121] "constitutionally" "required" "religious"
[124] "exemptions" "civic" "obligations"
[127] "almost" "every" "conceivable"
[130] "kind" "Id" "S"
[133] "Ct" "Laws" "valid"
[136] "Smith" "fall" "RFRA"
[139] "without" "regard" "whether"
[142] "object" "stifling" "punishing"
[145] "free" "exercise" "We"
[148] "make" "observations" "reargue"
[151] "position" "majority" "Smith"
[154] "illustrate" "substantive" "alteration"
[157] "holding" "attempted" "RFRA"
[160] "Even" "assuming" "RFRA"
[163] "interpreted" "effect" "mandate"
[166] "lesser" "test" "say"
[169] "one" "equivalent" "intermediate"
[172] "scrutiny" "statute" "nevertheless"
[175] "require" "searching" "judicial"
[178] "scrutiny" "state" "law"
[181] "attendant" "likelihood" "invalidation"
[184] "This" "considerable" "congressional"
[187] "intrusion" "States" "traditional"
[190] "prerogatives" "general" "authority"
[193] "regulate" "health" "welfare"
[196] "citizens" ""
[[412]]
[1] "The" "substantial" "costs"
[4] "RFRA" "exacts" "practical"
[7] "terms" "imposing" "heavy"
[10] "litigation" "burden" "States"
[13] "terms" "curtailing" "traditional"
[16] "general" "regulatory" "power"
[19] "far" "exceed" "pattern"
[22] "practice" "unconstitutional" "conduct"
[25] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[28] "interpreted" "Smith" "Simply"
[31] "put" "RFRA" "designed"
[34] "identify" "counteract" "state"
[37] "laws" "likely" "unconstitutional"
[40] "treatment" "religion" "In"
[43] "cases" "state" "laws"
[46] "RFRA" "applies" "ones"
[49] "will" "motivated" "religious"
[52] "bigotry" "If" "state"
[55] "law" "disproportionately" "burdened"
[58] "particular" "class" "religious"
[61] "observers" "circumstance" "might"
[64] "evidence" "impermissible" "legislative"
[67] "motive" "Cf" "Washington"
[70] "v" "Davis" "U"
[73] "S" "S" "Ct"
[76] "L" "Ed" "d"
[79] "RFRA" "s" "substantial"
[82] "burden" "test" "however"
[85] "even" "discriminatory" "effects"
[88] "disparate" "impact" "test"
[91] "It" "reality" "modern"
[94] "regulatory" "state" "numerous"
[97] "state" "laws" "zoning"
[100] "regulations" "issue" "impose"
[103] "substantial" "burden" "large"
[106] "class" "individuals" "When"
[109] "exercise" "religion" "burdened"
[112] "incidental" "way" "law"
[115] "general" "application" "follow"
[118] "persons" "affected" "burdened"
[121] "citizens" "let" "alone"
[124] "burdened" "religious" "beliefs"
[127] "In" "addition" "Act"
[130] "imposes" "every" "case"
[133] "least" "restrictive" "means"
[136] "requirement" "requirement" "used"
[139] "pre" "Smith" "jurisprudence"
[142] "RFRA" "purported" "codify"
[145] "also" "indicates" "legislation"
[148] "broader" "appropriate" "goal"
[151] "prevent" "remedy" "constitutional"
[154] "violations" ""
[[413]]
[1] "When" "Congress" "acts"
[4] "within" "sphere" "power"
[7] "responsibilities" "just" "right"
[10] "duty" "make" "informed"
[13] "judgment" "meaning" "force"
[16] "Constitution" "This" "clear"
[19] "early" "days" "Republic"
[22] "In" "Member" "House"
[25] "Representatives" "objected" "debate"
[28] "constitutionality" "legislation" "based"
[31] "theory" "officious" "consider"
[34] "constitutionality" "measure" "affect"
[37] "House" "James" "Madison"
[40] "explained" "incontrovertibly" "much"
[43] "importance" "branch" "Government"
[46] "constitution" "preserved" "entire"
[49] "It" "duty" "Annals"
[52] "Congress" "Were" "otherwise"
[55] "afford" "Congress" "presumption"
[58] "validity" "enactments" "now"
[61] "enjoy" ""
[[414]]
[1] "Our" "national" "experience"
[4] "teaches" "Constitution" "preserved"
[7] "best" "part" "Government"
[10] "respects" "Constitution" "proper"
[13] "actions" "determinations" "branches"
[16] "When" "Court" "interpreted"
[19] "Constitution" "acted" "within"
[22] "province" "Judicial" "Branch"
[25] "embraces" "duty" "say"
[28] "law" "Marbury" "v"
[31] "Madison" "Cranch" "L"
[34] "Ed" "When" "political"
[37] "branches" "Government" "act"
[40] "background" "judicial" "interpretation"
[43] "Constitution" "already" "issued"
[46] "must" "understood" "later"
[49] "cases" "controversies" "Court"
[52] "will" "treat" "precedents"
[55] "respect" "due" "settled"
[58] "principles" "including" "stare"
[61] "decisis" "contrary" "expectations"
[64] "must" "disappointed" "RFRA"
[67] "designed" "control" "cases"
[70] "controversies" "one" "us"
[73] "provisions" "federal" "statute"
[76] "invoked" "beyond" "congressional"
[79] "authority" "Court" "s"
[82] "precedent" "RFRA" "must"
[85] "control" ""
[[415]]
[1] "" ""
[[416]]
[1] "It" "Congress" "first"
[4] "instance" "determin" "e"
[7] "whether" "legislation" "needed"
[10] "secure" "guarantees" "Fourteenth"
[13] "Amendment" "conclusions" "entitled"
[16] "much" "deference" "Katzenbach"
[19] "v" "Morgan" "U"
[22] "S" "S" "Ct"
[25] "Congress" "discretion" "unlimited"
[28] "however" "courts" "retain"
[31] "power" "since" "Marbury"
[34] "v" "Madison" "determine"
[37] "Congress" "exceeded" "authority"
[40] "Constitution" "Broad" "power"
[43] "Congress" "Enforcement" "Clause"
[46] "Fourteenth" "Amendment" "RFRA"
[49] "contradicts" "vital" "principles"
[52] "necessary" "maintain" "separation"
[55] "powers" "federal" "balance"
[58] "The" "judgment" "Court"
[61] "Appeals" "sustaining" "Act"
[64] "s" "constitutionality" "reversed"
[67] ""
[[417]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[418]]
[1] "Justice" "SCALIA" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[419]]
[1] "This" "case" "requires" "us"
[5] "decide" "whether" "Free" "Exercise"
[9] "Clause" "First" "Amendment" "permits"
[13] "State" "Oregon" "include" "religiously"
[17] "inspired" "peyote" "use" "within"
[21] "reach" "general" "criminal" "prohibition"
[25] "use" "drug" "thus" "permits"
[29] "State" "deny" "unemployment" "benefits"
[33] "persons" "dismissed" "jobs" "religiously"
[37] "inspired" "use" ""
[[420]]
[1] "I" ""
[[421]]
[1] "Oregon" "law" "prohibits" "knowing"
[5] "intentional" "possession" "controlled" "substance"
[9] "unless" "substance" "prescribed" "medical"
[13] "practitioner" "Ore" "Rev" "Stat"
[17] "The" "law" "defines" "controlled"
[21] "substance" "drug" "classified" "Schedules"
[25] "I" "V" "Federal" "Controlled"
[29] "Substances" "Act" "U" "S"
[33] "C" "modified" "State" "Board"
[37] "Pharmacy" "Ore" "Rev" "Stat"
[41] "Persons" "violate" "provision" "possessing"
[45] "controlled" "substance" "listed" "Schedule"
[49] "I" "guilty" "Class" "B"
[53] "felony" "As" "compiled" "State"
[57] "Board" "Pharmacy" "statutory" "authority"
[61] "see" "Schedule" "I" "contains"
[65] "drug" "peyote" "hallucinogen" "derived"
[69] "plant" "Lophophora" "williamsii" "Lemaire"
[73] "Ore" "Admin" "Rule" "s"
[77] ""
[[422]]
[1] "Respondents" "Alfred" "Smith"
[4] "Galen" "Black" "hereinafter"
[7] "respondents" "fired" "jobs"
[10] "private" "drug" "rehabilitation"
[13] "organization" "ingested" "peyote"
[16] "sacramental" "purposes" "ceremony"
[19] "Native" "American" "Church"
[22] "members" "When" "respondents"
[25] "applied" "petitioner" "Employment"
[28] "Division" "hereinafter" "petitioner"
[31] "unemployment" "compensation" "determined"
[34] "ineligible" "benefits" "discharged"
[37] "work" "related" "misconduct"
[40] "The" "Oregon" "Court"
[43] "Appeals" "reversed" "determination"
[46] "holding" "denial" "benefits"
[49] "violated" "respondents" "free"
[52] "exercise" "rights" "First"
[55] "Amendment" ""
[[423]]
[1] "" "On" "appeal"
[4] "Oregon" "Supreme" "Court"
[7] "petitioner" "argued" "denial"
[10] "benefits" "permissible" "respondents"
[13] "consumption" "peyote" "crime"
[16] "Oregon" "law" "The"
[19] "Oregon" "Supreme" "Court"
[22] "reasoned" "however" "criminality"
[25] "respondents" "peyote" "use"
[28] "irrelevant" "resolution" "constitutional"
[31] "claim" "since" "purpose"
[34] "misconduct" "provision" "respondents"
[37] "disqualified" "enforce" "State"
[40] "s" "criminal" "laws"
[43] "preserve" "financial" "integrity"
[46] "compensation" "fund" "since"
[49] "purpose" "inadequate" "justify"
[52] "burden" "disqualification" "imposed"
[55] "respondents" "religious" "practice"
[58] "Citing" "decisions" "Sherbert"
[61] "v" "Verner" "U"
[64] "S" "S" "Ct"
[67] "L" "Ed" "d"
[70] "Thomas" "v" "Review"
[73] "Bd" "Indiana" "Employment"
[76] "Security" "Div" "U"
[79] "S" "S" "Ct"
[82] "L" "Ed" "d"
[85] "court" "concluded" "respondents"
[88] "entitled" "payment" "unemployment"
[91] "benefits" "Smith" "v"
[94] "Employment" "Div" "Dept"
[97] "Human" "Resources" "Or"
[100] "P" "d" "We"
[103] "granted" "certiorari" "U"
[106] "S" "S" "Ct"
[109] "L" "Ed" "d"
[112] ""
[[424]]
[1] "Before" "Court" "petitioner"
[4] "continued" "maintain" "illegality"
[7] "respondents" "peyote" "consumption"
[10] "relevant" "constitutional" "claim"
[13] "We" "agreed" "concluding"
[16] "State" "prohibited" "criminal"
[19] "laws" "certain" "kinds"
[22] "religiously" "motivated" "conduct"
[25] "without" "violating" "First"
[28] "Amendment" "certainly" "follows"
[31] "may" "impose" "lesser"
[34] "burden" "denying" "unemployment"
[37] "compensation" "benefits" "persons"
[40] "engage" "conduct" "Employment"
[43] "Div" "Dept" "Human"
[46] "Resources" "Oregon" "v"
[49] "Smith" "U" "S"
[52] "S" "Ct" "L"
[55] "Ed" "d" "Smith"
[58] "I" "We" "noted"
[61] "however" "Oregon" "Supreme"
[64] "Court" "decided" "whether"
[67] "respondents" "sacramental" "use"
[70] "peyote" "fact" "proscribed"
[73] "Oregon" "s" "controlled"
[76] "substance" "law" "issue"
[79] "matter" "dispute" "parties"
[82] "Being" "uncertain" "legality"
[85] "religious" "use" "peyote"
[88] "Oregon" "determined" "appropriate"
[91] "us" "decide" "whether"
[94] "practice" "protected" "Federal"
[97] "Constitution" "Id" "S"
[100] "Ct" "Accordingly" "vacated"
[103] "judgment" "Oregon" "Supreme"
[106] "Court" "remanded" "proceedings"
[109] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[112] ""
[[425]]
[1] "On" "remand" "Oregon" "Supreme"
[5] "Court" "held" "respondents" "religiously"
[9] "inspired" "use" "peyote" "fell"
[13] "within" "prohibition" "Oregon" "statute"
[17] "makes" "exception" "sacramental" "use"
[21] "drug" "Or" "P" "d"
[25] "It" "considered" "whether" "prohibition"
[29] "valid" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[33] "concluded" "The" "court" "therefore"
[37] "reaffirmed" "previous" "ruling" "State"
[41] "deny" "unemployment" "benefits" "respondents"
[45] "engaged" "practice" ""
[[426]]
[1] "We" "granted" "certiorari" "U" "S"
[6] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[11] ""
[[427]]
[1] "II" ""
[[428]]
[1] "Respondents" "claim" "relief" "rests"
[5] "decisions" "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[9] "supra" "Thomas" "v" "Review"
[13] "Bd" "Indiana" "Employment" "Security"
[17] "Div" "supra" "Hobbie" "v"
[21] "Unemployment" "Appeals" "Comm" "n"
[25] "Florida" "U" "S" "S"
[29] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[33] "held" "State" "condition" "availability"
[37] "unemployment" "insurance" "individual" "s"
[41] "willingness" "forgo" "conduct" "required"
[45] "religion" "As" "observed" "Smith"
[49] "I" "however" "conduct" "issue"
[53] "cases" "prohibited" "law" "We"
[57] "held" "distinction" "critical" "Oregon"
[61] "prohibit" "religious" "use" "peyote"
[65] "prohibition" "consistent" "Federal" "Constitution"
[69] "federal" "right" "engage" "conduct"
[73] "Oregon" "State" "free" "withhold"
[77] "unemployment" "compensation" "respondents" "engaging"
[81] "work" "related" "misconduct" "despite"
[85] "religious" "motivation" "U" "S"
[89] "S" "Ct" "Now" "Oregon"
[93] "Supreme" "Court" "confirmed" "Oregon"
[97] "prohibit" "religious" "use" "peyote"
[101] "proceed" "consider" "whether" "prohibition"
[105] "permissible" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[109] ""
[[429]]
[1] "A" ""
[[430]]
[1] "" "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[5] "Clause" "First" "Amendment" "made"
[9] "applicable" "States" "incorporation" "Fourteenth"
[13] "Amendment" "see" "Cantwell" "v"
[17] "Connecticut" "U" "S" "S"
[21] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "provides"
[25] "Congress" "shall" "make" "law"
[29] "respecting" "establishment" "religion" "prohibiting"
[33] "free" "exercise" "thereof" "U"
[37] "S" "Const" "Amdt" "emphasis"
[41] "added" "The" "free" "exercise"
[45] "religion" "means" "first" "foremost"
[49] "right" "believe" "profess" "whatever"
[53] "religious" "doctrine" "one" "desires"
[57] "Thus" "First" "Amendment" "obviously"
[61] "excludes" "governmental" "regulation" "religious"
[65] "beliefs" "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[69] "supra" "U" "S" "S"
[73] "Ct" "The" "government" "may"
[77] "compel" "affirmation" "religious" "belief"
[81] "see" "Torcaso" "v" "Watkins"
[85] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[89] "L" "Ed" "d" "punish"
[93] "expression" "religious" "doctrines" "believes"
[97] "false" "United" "States" "v"
[101] "Ballard" "U" "S" "S"
[105] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "impose"
[109] "special" "disabilities" "basis" "religious"
[113] "views" "religious" "status" "see"
[117] "McDaniel" "v" "Paty" "U"
[121] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[125] "Ed" "d" "Fowler" "v"
[129] "Rhode" "Island" "U" "S"
[133] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[137] "cf" "Larson" "v" "Valente"
[141] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[145] "L" "Ed" "d" "lend"
[149] "power" "one" "side" "controversies"
[153] "religious" "authority" "dogma" "see"
[157] "Presbyterian" "Church" "U" "S"
[161] "v" "Mary" "Elizabeth" "Blue"
[165] "Hull" "Memorial" "Presbyterian" "Church"
[169] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[173] "L" "Ed" "d" "Kedroff"
[177] "v" "St" "Nicholas" "Cathedral"
[181] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[185] "L" "Ed" "Serbian" "Eastern"
[189] "Orthodox" "Diocese" "v" "Milivojevich"
[193] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[197] "L" "Ed" "d" ""
[[431]]
[1] "" "But" "exercise"
[4] "religion" "often" "involves"
[7] "belief" "profession" "performance"
[10] "abstention" "physical" "acts"
[13] "assembling" "others" "worship"
[16] "service" "participating" "sacramental"
[19] "use" "bread" "wine"
[22] "proselytizing" "abstaining" "certain"
[25] "foods" "certain" "modes"
[28] "transportation" "It" "true"
[31] "think" "though" "case"
[34] "involved" "point" "State"
[37] "prohibiting" "free" "exercise"
[40] "religion" "sought" "ban"
[43] "acts" "abstentions" "engaged"
[46] "religious" "reasons" "religious"
[49] "belief" "display" "It"
[52] "doubtless" "unconstitutional" "example"
[55] "ban" "casting" "statues"
[58] "used" "worship" "purposes"
[61] "prohibit" "bowing" "golden"
[64] "calf" ""
[[432]]
[1] "Respondents" "present" "case"
[4] "however" "seek" "carry"
[7] "meaning" "prohibiting" "free"
[10] "exercise" "religion" "one"
[13] "large" "step" "They"
[16] "contend" "religious" "motivation"
[19] "using" "peyote" "places"
[22] "beyond" "reach" "criminal"
[25] "law" "specifically" "directed"
[28] "religious" "practice" "concededly"
[31] "constitutional" "applied" "use"
[34] "drug" "reasons" "They"
[37] "assert" "words" "prohibiting"
[40] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[43] "includes" "requiring" "individual"
[46] "observe" "generally" "applicable"
[49] "law" "requires" "forbids"
[52] "performance" "act" "religious"
[55] "belief" "forbids" "requires"
[58] "As" "textual" "matter"
[61] "think" "words" "must"
[64] "given" "meaning" "It"
[67] "necessary" "regard" "collection"
[70] "general" "tax" "example"
[73] "prohibiting" "free" "exercise"
[76] "religion" "citizens" "believe"
[79] "support" "organized" "government"
[82] "sinful" "regard" "tax"
[85] "abridging" "freedom" "press"
[88] "publishing" "companies" "must"
[91] "pay" "tax" "condition"
[94] "staying" "business" "It"
[97] "permissible" "reading" "text"
[100] "one" "case" "say"
[103] "prohibiting" "exercise" "religion"
[106] "burdening" "activity" "printing"
[109] "object" "tax" "merely"
[112] "incidental" "effect" "generally"
[115] "applicable" "otherwise" "valid"
[118] "provision" "First" "Amendment"
[121] "offended" "Compare" "Citizen"
[124] "Publishing" "Co" "v"
[127] "United" "States" "U"
[130] "S" "S" "Ct"
[133] "L" "Ed" "d"
[136] "upholding" "application" "antitrust"
[139] "laws" "press" "Grosjean"
[142] "v" "American" "Press"
[145] "Co" "U" "S"
[148] "S" "Ct" "L"
[151] "Ed" "striking" "license"
[154] "tax" "applied" "newspapers"
[157] "weekly" "circulation" "specified"
[160] "level" "see" "generally"
[163] "Minneapolis" "Star" "Tribune"
[166] "Co" "v" "Minnesota"
[169] "Comm" "r" "Revenue"
[172] "U" "S" "S"
[175] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[178] "d" ""
[[433]]
[1] "Our" "decisions" "reveal"
[4] "latter" "reading" "correct"
[7] "one" "We" "never"
[10] "held" "individual" "s"
[13] "religious" "beliefs" "excuse"
[16] "compliance" "otherwise" "valid"
[19] "law" "prohibiting" "conduct"
[22] "State" "free" "regulate"
[25] "On" "contrary" "record"
[28] "century" "free" "exercise"
[31] "jurisprudence" "contradicts" "proposition"
[34] "As" "described" "succinctly"
[37] "Justice" "Frankfurter" "Minersville"
[40] "School" "Dist" "Bd"
[43] "Ed" "v" "Gobitis"
[46] "U" "S" "S"
[49] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[52] "Conscientious" "scruples" "course"
[55] "long" "struggle" "religious"
[58] "toleration" "relieved" "individual"
[61] "obedience" "general" "law"
[64] "aimed" "promotion" "restriction"
[67] "religious" "beliefs" "The"
[70] "mere" "possession" "religious"
[73] "convictions" "contradict" "relevant"
[76] "concerns" "political" "society"
[79] "relieve" "citizen" "discharge"
[82] "political" "responsibilities" "footnote"
[85] "omitted" "We" "first"
[88] "occasion" "assert" "principle"
[91] "Reynolds" "v" "United"
[94] "States" "U" "S"
[97] "L" "Ed" "rejected"
[100] "claim" "criminal" "laws"
[103] "polygamy" "constitutionally" "applied"
[106] "whose" "religion" "commanded"
[109] "practice" "Laws" "said"
[112] "made" "government" "actions"
[115] "interfere" "mere" "religious"
[118] "belief" "opinions" "may"
[121] "practices" "Can" "man"
[124] "excuse" "practices" "contrary"
[127] "religious" "belief" "To"
[130] "permit" "make" "professed"
[133] "doctrines" "religious" "belief"
[136] "superior" "law" "land"
[139] "effect" "permit" "every"
[142] "citizen" "become" "law"
[145] "unto" "Id" ""
[[434]]
[1] "Subsequent" "decisions" "consistently"
[4] "held" "right" "free"
[7] "exercise" "relieve" "individual"
[10] "obligation" "comply" "valid"
[13] "neutral" "law" "general"
[16] "applicability" "ground" "law"
[19] "proscribes" "prescribes" "conduct"
[22] "religion" "prescribes" "proscribes"
[25] "United" "States" "v"
[28] "Lee" "U" "S"
[31] "n" "S" "Ct"
[34] "n" "L" "Ed"
[37] "d" "STEVENS" "J"
[40] "concurring" "judgment" "see"
[43] "Minersville" "School" "Dist"
[46] "Bd" "Ed" "v"
[49] "Gobitis" "supra" "U"
[52] "S" "S" "Ct"
[55] "collecting" "cases" "In"
[58] "Prince" "v" "Massachusetts"
[61] "U" "S" "S"
[64] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[67] "held" "mother" "prosecuted"
[70] "child" "labor" "laws"
[73] "using" "children" "dispense"
[76] "literature" "streets" "religious"
[79] "motivation" "notwithstanding" "We"
[82] "found" "constitutional" "infirmity"
[85] "excluding" "children" "children"
[88] "may" "Id" "S"
[91] "Ct" "In" "Braunfeld"
[94] "v" "Brown" "U"
[97] "S" "S" "Ct"
[100] "L" "Ed" "d"
[103] "plurality" "opinion" "upheld"
[106] "Sunday" "closing" "laws"
[109] "claim" "burdened" "religious"
[112] "practices" "persons" "whose"
[115] "religions" "compelled" "refrain"
[118] "work" "days" "In"
[121] "Gillette" "v" "United"
[124] "States" "U" "S"
[127] "S" "Ct" "L"
[130] "Ed" "d" "sustained"
[133] "military" "Selective" "Service"
[136] "System" "claim" "violated"
[139] "free" "exercise" "conscripting"
[142] "persons" "opposed" "particular"
[145] "war" "religious" "grounds"
[148] ""
[[435]]
[1] "" "Our" "recent"
[4] "decision" "involving" "neutral"
[7] "generally" "applicable" "regulatory"
[10] "law" "compelled" "activity"
[13] "forbidden" "individual" "s"
[16] "religion" "United" "States"
[19] "v" "Lee" "U"
[22] "S" "S" "Ct"
[25] "There" "Amish" "employer"
[28] "behalf" "employees" "sought"
[31] "exemption" "collection" "payment"
[34] "Social" "Security" "taxes"
[37] "ground" "Amish" "faith"
[40] "prohibited" "participation" "governmental"
[43] "support" "programs" "We"
[46] "rejected" "claim" "exemption"
[49] "constitutionally" "required" "There"
[52] "way" "observed" "distinguish"
[55] "Amish" "believer" "s"
[58] "objection" "Social" "Security"
[61] "taxes" "religious" "objections"
[64] "others" "might" "collection"
[67] "use" "taxes" "If"
[70] "example" "religious" "adherent"
[73] "believes" "war" "sin"
[76] "certain" "percentage" "federal"
[79] "budget" "can" "identified"
[82] "devoted" "war" "related"
[85] "activities" "individuals" "similarly"
[88] "valid" "claim" "exempt"
[91] "paying" "percentage" "income"
[94] "tax" "The" "tax"
[97] "system" "function" "denominations"
[100] "allowed" "challenge" "tax"
[103] "system" "tax" "payments"
[106] "spent" "manner" "violates"
[109] "religious" "belief" "Id"
[112] "S" "Ct" "Cf"
[115] "Hernandez" "v" "Commissioner"
[118] "U" "S" "S"
[121] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[124] "d" "rejecting" "free"
[127] "exercise" "challenge" "payment"
[130] "income" "taxes" "alleged"
[133] "make" "religious" "activities"
[136] "difficult" ""
[[436]]
[1] "" "The" "decisions"
[4] "held" "First" "Amendment"
[7] "bars" "application" "neutral"
[10] "generally" "applicable" "law"
[13] "religiously" "motivated" "action"
[16] "involved" "Free" "Exercise"
[19] "Clause" "alone" "Free"
[22] "Exercise" "Clause" "conjunction"
[25] "constitutional" "protections" "freedom"
[28] "speech" "press" "see"
[31] "Cantwell" "v" "Connecticut"
[34] "U" "S" "S"
[37] "Ct" "invalidating" "licensing"
[40] "system" "religious" "charitable"
[43] "solicitations" "administrator" "discretion"
[46] "deny" "license" "cause"
[49] "deemed" "nonreligious" "Murdock"
[52] "v" "Pennsylvania" "U"
[55] "S" "S" "Ct"
[58] "L" "Ed" "invalidating"
[61] "flat" "tax" "solicitation"
[64] "applied" "dissemination" "religious"
[67] "ideas" "Follett" "v"
[70] "McCormick" "U" "S"
[73] "S" "Ct" "L"
[76] "Ed" "right" "parents"
[79] "acknowledged" "Pierce" "v"
[82] "Society" "Sisters" "U"
[85] "S" "S" "Ct"
[88] "L" "Ed" "direct"
[91] "education" "children" "see"
[94] "Wisconsin" "v" "Yoder"
[97] "U" "S" "S"
[100] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[103] "d" "invalidating" "compulsory"
[106] "school" "attendance" "laws"
[109] "applied" "Amish" "parents"
[112] "refused" "religious" "grounds"
[115] "send" "children" "school"
[118] "Some" "cases" "prohibiting"
[121] "compelled" "expression" "decided"
[124] "exclusively" "upon" "free"
[127] "speech" "grounds" "also"
[130] "involved" "freedom" "religion"
[133] "cf" "Wooley" "v"
[136] "Maynard" "U" "S"
[139] "S" "Ct" "L"
[142] "Ed" "d" "invalidating"
[145] "compelled" "display" "license"
[148] "plate" "slogan" "offended"
[151] "individual" "religious" "beliefs"
[154] "West" "Virginia" "Bd"
[157] "Education" "v" "Barnette"
[160] "U" "S" "S"
[163] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[166] "invalidating" "compulsory" "flag"
[169] "salute" "statute" "challenged"
[172] "religious" "objectors" "And"
[175] "easy" "envision" "case"
[178] "challenge" "freedom" "association"
[181] "grounds" "likewise" "reinforced"
[184] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[187] "concerns" "Cf" "Roberts"
[190] "v" "United" "States"
[193] "Jaycees" "U" "S"
[196] "S" "Ct" "L"
[199] "Ed" "d" "An"
[202] "individual" "s" "freedom"
[205] "speak" "worship" "petition"
[208] "government" "redress" "grievances"
[211] "vigorously" "protected" "interference"
[214] "State" "correlative" "freedom"
[217] "engage" "group" "effort"
[220] "toward" "ends" "also"
[223] "guaranteed" ""
[[437]]
[1] "The" "present" "case" "present"
[5] "hybrid" "situation" "free" "exercise"
[9] "claim" "unconnected" "communicative" "activity"
[13] "parental" "right" "Respondents" "urge"
[17] "us" "hold" "quite" "simply"
[21] "otherwise" "prohibitable" "conduct" "accompanied"
[25] "religious" "convictions" "convictions" "conduct"
[29] "must" "free" "governmental" "regulation"
[33] "We" "never" "held" "decline"
[37] "now" "There" "contention" "Oregon"
[41] "s" "drug" "law" "represents"
[45] "attempt" "regulate" "religious" "beliefs"
[49] "communication" "religious" "beliefs" "raising"
[53] "one" "s" "children" "beliefs"
[57] "rule" "adhered" "ever" "since"
[61] "Reynolds" "plainly" "controls" "Our"
[65] "cases" "farthest" "reach" "support"
[69] "proposition" "stance" "conscientious" "opposition"
[73] "relieves" "objector" "colliding" "duty"
[77] "fixed" "democratic" "government" "Gillette"
[81] "v" "United" "States" "supra"
[85] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[89] ""
[[438]]
[1] "B" ""
[[439]]
[1] "" "Respondents" "argue" "even"
[5] "though" "exemption" "generally" "applicable"
[9] "criminal" "laws" "need" "automatically"
[13] "extended" "religiously" "motivated" "actors"
[17] "least" "claim" "religious" "exemption"
[21] "must" "evaluated" "balancing" "test"
[25] "set" "forth" "Sherbert" "v"
[29] "Verner" "U" "S" "S"
[33] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[37] "Under" "Sherbert" "test" "governmental"
[41] "actions" "substantially" "burden" "religious"
[45] "practice" "must" "justified" "compelling"
[49] "governmental" "interest" "See" "id"
[53] "S" "Ct" "see" "also"
[57] "Hernandez" "v" "Commissioner" "U"
[61] "S" "S" "Ct" "Applying"
[65] "test" "three" "occasions" "invalidated"
[69] "state" "unemployment" "compensation" "rules"
[73] "conditioned" "availability" "benefits" "upon"
[77] "applicant" "s" "willingness" "work"
[81] "conditions" "forbidden" "religion" "See"
[85] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner" "supra"
[89] "Thomas" "v" "Review" "Bd"
[93] "Indiana" "Employment" "Security" "Div"
[97] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[101] "L" "Ed" "d" "Hobbie"
[105] "v" "Unemployment" "Appeals" "Comm"
[109] "n" "Florida" "U" "S"
[113] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[117] "d" "We" "never" "invalidated"
[121] "governmental" "action" "basis" "Sherbert"
[125] "test" "except" "denial" "unemployment"
[129] "compensation" "Although" "sometimes" "purported"
[133] "apply" "Sherbert" "test" "contexts"
[137] "always" "found" "test" "satisfied"
[141] "see" "United" "States" "v"
[145] "Lee" "U" "S" "S"
[149] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[153] "Gillette" "v" "United" "States"
[157] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[161] "L" "Ed" "d" "In"
[165] "recent" "years" "abstained" "applying"
[169] "Sherbert" "test" "outside" "unemployment"
[173] "compensation" "field" "In" "Bowen"
[177] "v" "Roy" "U" "S"
[181] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[185] "d" "declined" "apply" "Sherbert"
[189] "analysis" "federal" "statutory" "scheme"
[193] "required" "benefit" "applicants" "recipients"
[197] "provide" "Social" "Security" "numbers"
[201] "The" "plaintiffs" "case" "asserted"
[205] "violate" "religious" "beliefs" "obtain"
[209] "provide" "Social" "Security" "number"
[213] "daughter" "We" "held" "statute"
[217] "s" "application" "plaintiffs" "valid"
[221] "regardless" "whether" "necessary" "effectuate"
[225] "compelling" "interest" "See" "U"
[229] "S" "S" "Ct" "In"
[233] "Lyng" "v" "Northwest" "Indian"
[237] "Cemetery" "Protective" "Assn" "U"
[241] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[245] "Ed" "d" "declined" "apply"
[249] "Sherbert" "analysis" "Government" "s"
[253] "logging" "road" "construction" "activities"
[257] "lands" "used" "religious" "purposes"
[261] "several" "Native" "American" "Tribes"
[265] "even" "though" "undisputed" "activities"
[269] "devastating" "effects" "traditional" "Indian"
[273] "religious" "practices" "U" "S"
[277] "S" "Ct" "In" "Goldman"
[281] "v" "Weinberger" "U" "S"
[285] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[289] "d" "rejected" "application" "Sherbert"
[293] "test" "military" "dress" "regulations"
[297] "forbade" "wearing" "yarmulkes" "In"
[301] "O" "Lone" "v" "Estate"
[305] "Shabazz" "U" "S" "S"
[309] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[313] "sustained" "without" "mentioning" "Sherbert"
[317] "test" "prison" "s" "refusal"
[321] "excuse" "inmates" "work" "requirements"
[325] "attend" "worship" "services" ""
[[440]]
[1] "Even" "inclined" "breathe"
[4] "Sherbert" "life" "beyond"
[7] "unemployment" "compensation" "field"
[10] "apply" "require" "exemptions"
[13] "generally" "applicable" "criminal"
[16] "law" "The" "Sherbert"
[19] "test" "must" "recalled"
[22] "developed" "context" "lent"
[25] "individualized" "governmental" "assessment"
[28] "reasons" "relevant" "conduct"
[31] "As" "plurality" "Court"
[34] "noted" "Roy" "distinctive"
[37] "feature" "unemployment" "compensation"
[40] "programs" "eligibility" "criteria"
[43] "invite" "consideration" "particular"
[46] "circumstances" "behind" "applicant"
[49] "s" "unemployment" "The"
[52] "statutory" "conditions" "Sherbert"
[55] "Thomas" "provided" "person"
[58] "eligible" "unemployment" "compensation"
[61] "benefits" "without" "good"
[64] "cause" "quit" "work"
[67] "refused" "available" "work"
[70] "The" "good" "cause"
[73] "standard" "created" "mechanism"
[76] "individualized" "exemptions" "Bowen"
[79] "v" "Roy" "supra"
[82] "U" "S" "S"
[85] "Ct" "opinion" "Burger"
[88] "C" "J" "joined"
[91] "Powell" "REHNQUIST" "JJ"
[94] "See" "also" "Sherbert"
[97] "supra" "U" "S"
[100] "n" "S" "Ct"
[103] "n" "reading" "state"
[106] "unemployment" "compensation" "law"
[109] "allowing" "benefits" "unemployment"
[112] "caused" "least" "personal"
[115] "reasons" "As" "plurality"
[118] "pointed" "Roy" "decisions"
[121] "unemployment" "cases" "stand"
[124] "proposition" "State" "place"
[127] "system" "individual" "exemptions"
[130] "may" "refuse" "extend"
[133] "system" "cases" "religious"
[136] "hardship" "without" "compelling"
[139] "reason" "Bowen" "v"
[142] "Roy" "supra" "U"
[145] "S" "S" "Ct"
[148] ""
[[441]]
[1] "Whether" "decisions" "limited"
[4] "least" "nothing" "across"
[7] "board" "criminal" "prohibition"
[10] "particular" "form" "conduct"
[13] "Although" "noted" "earlier"
[16] "sometimes" "used" "Sherbert"
[19] "test" "analyze" "free"
[22] "exercise" "challenges" "laws"
[25] "see" "United" "States"
[28] "v" "Lee" "supra"
[31] "U" "S" "S"
[34] "Ct" "Gillette" "v"
[37] "United" "States" "supra"
[40] "U" "S" "S"
[43] "Ct" "never" "applied"
[46] "test" "invalidate" "one"
[49] "We" "conclude" "today"
[52] "sounder" "approach" "approach"
[55] "accord" "vast" "majority"
[58] "precedents" "hold" "test"
[61] "inapplicable" "challenges" "The"
[64] "government" "s" "ability"
[67] "enforce" "generally" "applicable"
[70] "prohibitions" "socially" "harmful"
[73] "conduct" "like" "ability"
[76] "carry" "aspects" "public"
[79] "policy" "depend" "measuring"
[82] "effects" "governmental" "action"
[85] "religious" "objector" "s"
[88] "spiritual" "development" "Lyng"
[91] "supra" "U" "S"
[94] "S" "Ct" "To"
[97] "make" "individual" "s"
[100] "obligation" "obey" "law"
[103] "contingent" "upon" "law"
[106] "s" "coincidence" "religious"
[109] "beliefs" "except" "State"
[112] "s" "interest" "compelling"
[115] "permitting" "virtue" "beliefs"
[118] "become" "law" "unto"
[121] "Reynolds" "v" "United"
[124] "States" "U" "S"
[127] "contradicts" "constitutional" "tradition"
[130] "common" "sense" ""
[[442]]
[1] "" "The" "compelling"
[4] "government" "interest" "requirement"
[7] "seems" "benign" "familiar"
[10] "fields" "But" "using"
[13] "standard" "must" "met"
[16] "government" "may" "accord"
[19] "different" "treatment" "basis"
[22] "race" "see" "e"
[25] "g" "Palmore" "v"
[28] "Sidoti" "U" "S"
[31] "S" "Ct" "L"
[34] "Ed" "d" "government"
[37] "may" "regulate" "content"
[40] "speech" "see" "e"
[43] "g" "Sable" "Communications"
[46] "California" "v" "FCC"
[49] "U" "S" "S"
[52] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[55] "d" "remotely" "comparable"
[58] "using" "purpose" "asserted"
[61] "What" "produces" "fields"
[64] "equality" "treatment" "unrestricted"
[67] "flow" "contending" "speech"
[70] "constitutional" "norms" "produce"
[73] "private" "right" "ignore"
[76] "generally" "applicable" "laws"
[79] "constitutional" "anomaly" ""
[[443]]
[1] "Nor" "possible" "limit"
[4] "impact" "respondents" "proposal"
[7] "requiring" "compelling" "state"
[10] "interest" "conduct" "prohibited"
[13] "central" "individual" "s"
[16] "religion" "Cf" "Lyng"
[19] "v" "Northwest" "Indian"
[22] "Cemetery" "Protective" "Assn"
[25] "U" "S" "S"
[28] "Ct" "BRENNAN" "J"
[31] "dissenting" "It" "appropriate"
[34] "judges" "determine" "centrality"
[37] "religious" "beliefs" "applying"
[40] "compelling" "interest" "test"
[43] "free" "exercise" "field"
[46] "determine" "importance" "ideas"
[49] "applying" "compelling" "interest"
[52] "test" "free" "speech"
[55] "field" "What" "principle"
[58] "law" "logic" "can"
[61] "brought" "bear" "contradict"
[64] "believer" "s" "assertion"
[67] "particular" "act" "central"
[70] "personal" "faith" "Judging"
[73] "centrality" "different" "religious"
[76] "practices" "akin" "unacceptable"
[79] "business" "evaluating" "relative"
[82] "merits" "differing" "religious"
[85] "claims" "United" "States"
[88] "v" "Lee" "U"
[91] "S" "n" "S"
[94] "Ct" "n" "STEVENS"
[97] "J" "concurring" "As"
[100] "reaffirmed" "last" "Term"
[103] "t" "within" "judicial"
[106] "ken" "question" "centrality"
[109] "particular" "beliefs" "practices"
[112] "faith" "validity" "particular"
[115] "litigants" "interpretations" "creeds"
[118] "Hernandez" "v" "Commissioner"
[121] "U" "S" "S"
[124] "Ct" "Repeatedly" "many"
[127] "different" "contexts" "warned"
[130] "courts" "must" "presume"
[133] "determine" "place" "particular"
[136] "belief" "religion" "plausibility"
[139] "religious" "claim" "See"
[142] "e" "g" "Thomas"
[145] "v" "Review" "Bd"
[148] "Indiana" "Employment" "Security"
[151] "Div" "U" "S"
[154] "S" "Ct" "Presbyterian"
[157] "Church" "U" "S"
[160] "v" "Mary" "Elizabeth"
[163] "Blue" "Hull" "Memorial"
[166] "Presbyterian" "Church" "U"
[169] "S" "S" "Ct"
[172] "Jones" "v" "Wolf"
[175] "U" "S" "S"
[178] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[181] "d" "United" "States"
[184] "v" "Ballard" "U"
[187] "S" "S" "Ct"
[190] "L" "Ed" ""
[[444]]
[1] "" "If" "compelling"
[4] "interest" "test" "applied"
[7] "must" "applied" "across"
[10] "board" "actions" "thought"
[13] "religiously" "commanded" "Moreover"
[16] "compelling" "interest" "really"
[19] "means" "says" "watering"
[22] "subvert" "rigor" "fields"
[25] "applied" "many" "laws"
[28] "will" "meet" "test"
[31] "Any" "society" "adopting"
[34] "system" "courting" "anarchy"
[37] "danger" "increases" "direct"
[40] "proportion" "society" "s"
[43] "diversity" "religious" "beliefs"
[46] "determination" "coerce" "suppress"
[49] "none" "Precisely" "cosmopolitan"
[52] "nation" "made" "people"
[55] "almost" "every" "conceivable"
[58] "religious" "preference" "Braunfeld"
[61] "v" "Brown" "U"
[64] "S" "S" "Ct"
[67] "precisely" "value" "protect"
[70] "religious" "divergence" "afford"
[73] "luxury" "deeming" "presumptively"
[76] "invalid" "applied" "religious"
[79] "objector" "every" "regulation"
[82] "conduct" "protect" "interest"
[85] "highest" "order" "The"
[88] "rule" "respondents" "favor"
[91] "open" "prospect" "constitutionally"
[94] "required" "religious" "exemptions"
[97] "civic" "obligations" "almost"
[100] "every" "conceivable" "kind"
[103] "ranging" "compulsory" "military"
[106] "service" "see" "e"
[109] "g" "Gillette" "v"
[112] "United" "States" "U"
[115] "S" "S" "Ct"
[118] "L" "Ed" "d"
[121] "payment" "taxes" "see"
[124] "e" "g" "United"
[127] "States" "v" "Lee"
[130] "supra" "health" "safety"
[133] "regulation" "manslaughter" "child"
[136] "neglect" "laws" "see"
[139] "e" "g" "Funkhouser"
[142] "v" "State" "P"
[145] "d" "Okla" "Crim"
[148] "App" "compulsory" "vaccination"
[151] "laws" "see" "e"
[154] "g" "Cude" "v"
[157] "State" "Ark" "S"
[160] "W" "d" "drug"
[163] "laws" "see" "e"
[166] "g" "Olsen" "v"
[169] "Drug" "Enforcement" "Administration"
[172] "U" "S" "App"
[175] "D" "C" "F"
[178] "d" "traffic" "laws"
[181] "see" "Cox" "v"
[184] "New" "Hampshire" "U"
[187] "S" "S" "Ct"
[190] "L" "Ed" "social"
[193] "welfare" "legislation" "minimum"
[196] "wage" "laws" "see"
[199] "Tony" "Susan" "Alamo"
[202] "Foundation" "v" "Secretary"
[205] "Labor" "U" "S"
[208] "S" "Ct" "L"
[211] "Ed" "d" "child"
[214] "labor" "laws" "see"
[217] "Prince" "v" "Massachusetts"
[220] "U" "S" "S"
[223] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[226] "animal" "cruelty" "laws"
[229] "see" "e" "g"
[232] "Church" "Lukumi" "Babalu"
[235] "Aye" "Inc" "v"
[238] "City" "Hialeah" "F"
[241] "Supp" "SD" "Fla"
[244] "cf" "State" "v"
[247] "Massey" "N" "C"
[250] "S" "E" "d"
[253] "appeal" "dism" "d"
[256] "U" "S" "S"
[259] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[262] "environmental" "protection" "laws"
[265] "see" "United" "States"
[268] "v" "Little" "F"
[271] "Supp" "Mont" "laws"
[274] "providing" "equality" "opportunity"
[277] "races" "see" "e"
[280] "g" "Bob" "Jones"
[283] "University" "v" "United"
[286] "States" "U" "S"
[289] "S" "Ct" "L"
[292] "Ed" "d" "The"
[295] "First" "Amendment" "s"
[298] "protection" "religious" "liberty"
[301] "require" ""
[[445]]
[1] "" "Values" "protected"
[4] "government" "interference" "enshrinement"
[7] "Bill" "Rights" "thereby"
[10] "banished" "political" "process"
[13] "Just" "society" "believes"
[16] "negative" "protection" "accorded"
[19] "press" "First" "Amendment"
[22] "likely" "enact" "laws"
[25] "affirmatively" "foster" "dissemination"
[28] "printed" "word" "also"
[31] "society" "believes" "negative"
[34] "protection" "accorded" "religious"
[37] "belief" "can" "expected"
[40] "solicitous" "value" "legislation"
[43] "well" "It" "therefore"
[46] "surprising" "number" "States"
[49] "made" "exception" "drug"
[52] "laws" "sacramental" "peyote"
[55] "use" "See" "e"
[58] "g" "Ariz" "Rev"
[61] "Stat" "Ann" "B"
[64] "Colo" "Rev" "Stat"
[67] "N" "M" "Stat"
[70] "Ann" "D" "Supp"
[73] "But" "say" "nondiscriminatory"
[76] "religious" "practice" "exemption"
[79] "permitted" "even" "desirable"
[82] "say" "constitutionally" "required"
[85] "appropriate" "occasions" "creation"
[88] "can" "discerned" "courts"
[91] "It" "may" "fairly"
[94] "said" "leaving" "accommodation"
[97] "political" "process" "will"
[100] "place" "relative" "disadvantage"
[103] "religious" "practices" "widely"
[106] "engaged" "unavoidable" "consequence"
[109] "democratic" "government" "must"
[112] "preferred" "system" "conscience"
[115] "law" "unto" "judges"
[118] "weigh" "social" "importance"
[121] "laws" "centrality" "religious"
[124] "beliefs" ""
[[446]]
[1] "" ""
[[447]]
[1] "" "Because" "respondents"
[4] "ingestion" "peyote" "prohibited"
[7] "Oregon" "law" "prohibition"
[10] "constitutional" "Oregon" "may"
[13] "consistent" "Free" "Exercise"
[16] "Clause" "deny" "respondents"
[19] "unemployment" "compensation" "dismissal"
[22] "results" "use" "drug"
[25] "The" "decision" "Oregon"
[28] "Supreme" "Court" "accordingly"
[31] "reversed" ""
[[448]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[449]]
[1] "Chief" "Justice" "ROBERTS" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[450]]
[1] "" "The" "Montana" "Legislature"
[5] "established" "program" "provide" "tuition"
[9] "assistance" "parents" "send" "children"
[13] "private" "schools" "The" "program"
[17] "grants" "tax" "credit" "anyone"
[21] "donates" "certain" "organizations" "turn"
[25] "award" "scholarships" "selected" "students"
[29] "attending" "schools" "When" "petitioners"
[33] "sought" "use" "scholarships" "religious"
[37] "school" "Montana" "Supreme" "Court"
[41] "struck" "program" "The" "Court"
[45] "relied" "aid" "provision" "State"
[49] "Constitution" "prohibits" "aid" "school"
[53] "controlled" "church" "sect" "denomination"
[57] "The" "question" "presented" "whether"
[61] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "United"
[65] "States" "Constitution" "barred" "application"
[69] "aid" "provision" ""
[[451]]
[1] "I" ""
[[452]]
[1] "A" ""
[[453]]
[1] "In" "Montana" "Legislature" "sought"
[5] "provide" "parental" "student" "choice"
[9] "education" "enacting" "scholarship" "program"
[13] "students" "attending" "private" "schools"
[17] "Mont" "Laws" "p" "The"
[21] "program" "grants" "tax" "credit"
[25] "taxpayer" "donates" "participating" "student"
[29] "scholarship" "organization" "Mont" "Code"
[33] "Ann" "The" "scholarship" "organizations"
[37] "use" "donations" "award" "scholarships"
[41] "children" "tuition" "private" "school"
[45] "c" ""
[[454]]
[1] "So" "far" "one" "scholarship"
[5] "organization" "Big" "Sky" "Scholarships"
[9] "participated" "program" "Big" "Sky"
[13] "focuses" "providing" "scholarships" "families"
[17] "face" "financial" "hardship" "children"
[21] "disabilities" "Scholarship" "organizations" "like"
[25] "Big" "Sky" "must" "among"
[29] "requirements" "maintain" "application" "process"
[33] "awarding" "scholarships" "use" "least"
[37] "donations" "scholarship" "awards" "comply"
[41] "state" "reporting" "monitoring" "requirements"
[45] ""
[[455]]
[1] "A" "family" "whose" "child"
[5] "awarded" "scholarship" "program" "may"
[9] "use" "qualified" "education" "provider"
[13] "private" "school" "meets" "certain"
[17] "accreditation" "testing" "safety" "requirements"
[21] "See" "Virtually" "every" "private"
[25] "school" "Montana" "qualifies" "Upon"
[29] "receiving" "scholarship" "family" "designates"
[33] "school" "choice" "scholarship" "organization"
[37] "sends" "scholarship" "funds" "directly"
[41] "school" "Neither" "scholarship" "organization"
[45] "donors" "can" "restrict" "awards"
[49] "particular" "types" "schools" "See"
[53] "b" ""
[[456]]
[1] "The" "Montana" "Legislature" "allotted"
[5] "million" "annually" "fund" "tax"
[9] "credits" "beginning" "If" "annual"
[13] "allotment" "exhausted" "increases" "following"
[17] "year" "Ibid" "The" "program"
[21] "slated" "expire" "Mont" "Laws"
[25] "p" ""
[[457]]
[1] "The" "Montana" "Legislature" "also"
[5] "directed" "program" "administered" "accordance"
[9] "Article" "X" "section" "Montana"
[13] "Constitution" "contains" "aid" "provision"
[17] "barring" "government" "aid" "sectarian"
[21] "schools" "See" "Mont" "Code"
[25] "Ann" "In" "full" "provision"
[29] "states" ""
[[458]]
[1] "" "Aid" "prohibited" "sectarian"
[5] "schools" "The" "legislature" "counties"
[9] "cities" "towns" "school" "districts"
[13] "public" "corporations" "shall" "make"
[17] "direct" "indirect" "appropriation" "payment"
[21] "public" "fund" "monies" "grant"
[25] "lands" "property" "sectarian" "purpose"
[29] "aid" "church" "school" "academy"
[33] "seminary" "college" "university" "literary"
[37] "scientific" "institution" "controlled" "whole"
[41] "part" "church" "sect" "denomination"
[45] "Mont" "Const" "Art" "X"
[49] ""
[[459]]
[1] "Shortly" "scholarship" "program"
[4] "created" "Montana" "Department"
[7] "Revenue" "promulgated" "Rule"
[10] "objection" "Montana" "Attorney"
[13] "General" "That" "administrative"
[16] "rule" "prohibited" "families"
[19] "using" "scholarships" "religious"
[22] "schools" "Mont" "Admin"
[25] "Rule" "It" "changing"
[28] "definition" "qualified" "education"
[31] "provider" "exclude" "school"
[34] "owned" "controlled" "whole"
[37] "part" "church" "religious"
[40] "sect" "denomination" "Ibid"
[43] "The" "Department" "explained"
[46] "Rule" "needed" "reconcile"
[49] "scholarship" "program" "aid"
[52] "provision" "Montana" "Constitution"
[55] ""
[[460]]
[1] "The" "Montana" "Attorney"
[4] "General" "disagreed" "In"
[7] "letter" "Department" "advised"
[10] "Montana" "Constitution" "require"
[13] "excluding" "religious" "schools"
[16] "program" "likely" "violate"
[19] "United" "States" "Constitution"
[22] "discriminating" "schools" "students"
[25] "See" "Complaint" "No"
[28] "DV" "A" "Dist"
[31] "Ct" "Flathead" "Cty"
[34] "Exh" "pp" "The"
[37] "Attorney" "General" "representing"
[40] "Department" "case" ""
[[461]]
[1] "B" ""
[[462]]
[1] "This" "suit" "brought"
[4] "three" "mothers" "whose"
[7] "children" "attend" "Stillwater"
[10] "Christian" "School" "northwestern"
[13] "Montana" "Stillwater" "private"
[16] "Christian" "school" "meets"
[19] "statutory" "criteria" "qualified"
[22] "education" "providers" "It"
[25] "serves" "students" "prekindergarten"
[28] "th" "grade" "petitioners"
[31] "chose" "school" "large"
[34] "part" "teaches" "Christian"
[37] "values" "teach" "home"
[40] "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[43] "see" "id" "The"
[46] "child" "one" "petitioner"
[49] "already" "received" "scholarships"
[52] "Big" "Sky" "petitioners"
[55] "children" "eligible" "scholarships"
[58] "planned" "apply" "While"
[61] "effect" "however" "Rule"
[64] "blocked" "petitioners" "using"
[67] "scholarship" "funds" "tuition"
[70] "Stillwater" "To" "overcome"
[73] "obstacle" "petitioners" "sued"
[76] "Department" "Revenue" "Montana"
[79] "state" "court" "Petitioners"
[82] "claimed" "Rule" "conflicted"
[85] "statute" "created" "scholarship"
[88] "program" "justified" "ground"
[91] "compelled" "Montana" "Constitution"
[94] "s" "aid" "provision"
[97] "Petitioners" "alleged" "Rule"
[100] "discriminated" "basis" "religious"
[103] "views" "religious" "nature"
[106] "school" "chosen" "children"
[109] ""
[[463]]
[1] "The" "trial" "court"
[4] "enjoined" "Rule" "holding"
[7] "based" "mistake" "law"
[10] "The" "court" "explained"
[13] "Rule" "required" "aid"
[16] "provision" "provision" "prohibits"
[19] "appropriations" "aid" "religious"
[22] "schools" "tax" "credits"
[25] "Id" ""
[[464]]
[1] "The" "injunctive" "relief" "freed"
[5] "Big" "Sky" "award" "scholarships"
[9] "students" "regardless" "whether" "attended"
[13] "religious" "secular" "school" "For"
[17] "school" "year" "beginning" "fall"
[21] "Big" "Sky" "received" "applications"
[25] "ultimately" "awarded" "scholarships" "The"
[29] "next" "year" "Big" "Sky"
[33] "received" "applications" "awarded" "scholarships"
[37] "Several" "families" "incomes" "less"
[41] "used" "scholarships" "send" "children"
[45] "Stillwater" "Christian" ""
[[465]]
[1] "In" "December" "Montana" "Supreme"
[5] "Court" "reversed" "trial" "court"
[9] "Mont" "P" "d" "The"
[13] "Court" "first" "addressed" "scholarship"
[17] "program" "unmodified" "Rule" "holding"
[21] "program" "aided" "religious" "schools"
[25] "violation" "aid" "provision" "Montana"
[29] "Constitution" "In" "Court" "s"
[33] "view" "aid" "provision" "broadly"
[37] "strictly" "prohibits" "aid" "sectarian"
[41] "schools" "Id" "P" "d"
[45] "The" "scholarship" "program" "provided"
[49] "aid" "using" "tax" "credits"
[53] "subsidize" "tuition" "payments" "private"
[57] "schools" "religiously" "affiliated" "controlled"
[61] "whole" "part" "churches" "Id"
[65] "P" "d" "In" "way"
[69] "scholarship" "program" "flouted" "State"
[73] "Constitution" "s" "guarantee" "Montanans"
[77] "government" "will" "use" "state"
[81] "funds" "aid" "religious" "schools"
[85] "Id" "P" "d" ""
[[466]]
[1] "The" "Montana" "Supreme" "Court"
[5] "went" "hold" "violation" "aid"
[9] "provision" "required" "invalidating" "entire"
[13] "scholarship" "program" "The" "Court"
[17] "explained" "program" "provided" "mechanism"
[21] "preventing" "aid" "flowing" "religious"
[25] "schools" "therefore" "scholarship" "program"
[29] "circumstance" "construed" "consistent" "aid"
[33] "provision" "Id" "P" "d"
[37] "As" "result" "tax" "credit"
[41] "longer" "available" "support" "scholarships"
[45] "either" "religious" "secular" "private"
[49] "schools" ""
[[467]]
[1] "The" "Montana" "Supreme" "Court"
[5] "acknowledged" "overly" "broad" "application"
[9] "aid" "provision" "implicate" "free"
[13] "exercise" "concerns" "may" "case"
[17] "prohibiting" "aid" "violate" "Free"
[21] "Exercise" "Clause" "Id" "P"
[25] "d" "But" "Court" "concluded"
[29] "one" "cases" "Ibid" ""
[[468]]
[1] "Finally" "Court" "agreed"
[4] "petitioners" "Department" "exceeded"
[7] "authority" "promulgating" "Rule"
[10] "The" "Court" "explained"
[13] "statute" "creating" "scholarship"
[16] "program" "broadly" "defined"
[19] "qualifying" "schools" "include"
[22] "private" "schools" "including"
[25] "religious" "ones" "Department"
[28] "lacked" "authority" "transform"
[31] "definition" "administrative" "rule"
[34] "Id" "P" "d"
[37] ""
[[469]]
[1] "Several" "Justices" "wrote"
[4] "separately" "All" "agreed"
[7] "Rule" "invalid" "expressed"
[10] "differing" "views" "whether"
[13] "scholarship" "program" "consistent"
[16] "Montana" "United" "States"
[19] "Constitutions" "Justice" "Gustafson"
[22] "s" "concurrence" "argued"
[25] "program" "violated" "Montana"
[28] "s" "aid" "provision"
[31] "also" "Federal" "Establishment"
[34] "Free" "Exercise" "Clauses"
[37] "Id" "P" "d"
[40] "Justice" "Sandefur" "echoed"
[43] "majority" "s" "conclusion"
[46] "applying" "aid" "provision"
[49] "consistent" "Free" "Exercise"
[52] "Clause" "dismissed" "modern"
[55] "jurisprudence" "Clause" "unnecessarily"
[58] "complicate" "d" "due"
[61] "increasingly" "value" "driven"
[64] "hairsplitting" "overstretching" "Id"
[67] "P" "d" ""
[[470]]
[1] "Two" "Justices" "dissented" "Justice"
[5] "Rice" "held" "scholarship" "program"
[9] "permissible" "aid" "provision" "He"
[13] "criticized" "majority" "invalidating" "program"
[17] "sua" "sponte" "contending" "party"
[21] "challenged" "State" "Constitution" "Id"
[25] "P" "d" "Justice" "Baker"
[29] "also" "upheld" "program" "In"
[33] "view" "aid" "provision" "bar"
[37] "use" "scholarships" "religious" "schools"
[41] "free" "exercise" "concerns" "arise"
[45] "Federal" "Constitution" "Id" "P"
[49] "d" ""
[[471]]
[1] "We" "granted" "certiorari" "U" "S"
[6] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[11] ""
[[472]]
[1] "II" ""
[[473]]
[1] "A" ""
[[474]]
[1] "" "The" "Religion" "Clauses"
[5] "First" "Amendment" "provide" "Congress"
[9] "shall" "make" "law" "respecting"
[13] "establishment" "religion" "prohibiting" "free"
[17] "exercise" "thereof" "We" "recognized"
[21] "play" "joints" "Establishment" "Clause"
[25] "permits" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[29] "compels" "Trinity" "Lutheran" "Church"
[33] "Columbia" "Inc" "v" "Comer"
[37] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[41] "L" "Ed" "d" "quoting"
[45] "Locke" "v" "Davey" "U"
[49] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[53] "Ed" "d" "Here" "parties"
[57] "dispute" "scholarship" "program" "permissible"
[61] "Establishment" "Clause" "Nor" "We"
[65] "repeatedly" "held" "Establishment" "Clause"
[69] "offended" "religious" "observers" "organizations"
[73] "benefit" "neutral" "government" "programs"
[77] "See" "e" "g" "Locke"
[81] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[85] "Rosenberger" "v" "Rector" "Visitors"
[89] "Univ" "Va" "U" "S"
[93] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[97] "d" "See" "also" "Trinity"
[101] "Lutheran" "U" "S" "S"
[105] "Ct" "noting" "parties" "agreement"
[109] "Establishment" "Clause" "violated" "including"
[113] "churches" "playground" "resurfacing" "program"
[117] "Any" "Establishment" "Clause" "objection"
[121] "scholarship" "program" "particularly" "unavailing"
[125] "government" "support" "makes" "way"
[129] "religious" "schools" "result" "Montanans"
[133] "independently" "choosing" "spend" "scholarships"
[137] "schools" "See" "Locke" "U"
[141] "S" "S" "Ct" "Zelman"
[145] "v" "Simmons" "Harris" "U"
[149] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[153] "Ed" "d" "The" "Montana"
[157] "Supreme" "Court" "however" "held"
[161] "matter" "state" "law" "even"
[165] "indirect" "government" "support" "qualified"
[169] "aid" "prohibited" "Montana" "Constitution"
[173] ""
[[475]]
[1] "" "The" "question"
[4] "Court" "whether" "Free"
[7] "Exercise" "Clause" "precluded"
[10] "Montana" "Supreme" "Court"
[13] "applying" "Montana" "s"
[16] "aid" "provision" "bar"
[19] "religious" "schools" "scholarship"
[22] "program" "For" "purposes"
[25] "answering" "question" "accept"
[28] "Montana" "Supreme" "Court"
[31] "s" "interpretation" "state"
[34] "law" "including" "determination"
[37] "scholarship" "program" "provided"
[40] "impermissible" "aid" "within"
[43] "meaning" "Montana" "Constitution"
[46] "assess" "whether" "excluding"
[49] "religious" "schools" "affected"
[52] "families" "program" "consistent"
[55] "Federal" "Constitution" ""
[[476]]
[1] "" "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[5] "Clause" "applies" "States" "Fourteenth"
[9] "Amendment" "protects" "religious" "observers"
[13] "unequal" "treatment" "laws" "impose"
[17] "special" "disabilities" "basis" "religious"
[21] "status" "Trinity" "Lutheran" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct" "internal"
[29] "quotation" "marks" "alterations" "omitted"
[33] "see" "Cantwell" "v" "Connecticut"
[37] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[41] "L" "Ed" "Those" "basic"
[45] "principle" "s" "long" "guided"
[49] "Court" "Trinity" "Lutheran" "U"
[53] "S" "S" "Ct" "See"
[57] "e" "g" "Everson" "v"
[61] "Board" "Ed" "Ewing" "U"
[65] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[69] "Ed" "State" "exclude" "individual"
[73] "Catholics" "Lutherans" "Mohammedans" "Baptists"
[77] "Jews" "Methodists" "Non" "believers"
[81] "Presbyterians" "members" "faith" "faith"
[85] "lack" "receiving" "benefits" "public"
[89] "welfare" "legislation" "Lyng" "v"
[93] "Northwest" "Indian" "Cemetery" "Protective"
[97] "Assn" "U" "S" "S"
[101] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[105] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "protects"
[109] "laws" "penalize" "religious" "activity"
[113] "denying" "person" "equal" "share"
[117] "rights" "benefits" "privileges" "enjoyed"
[121] "citizens" ""
[[477]]
[1] "" "Most" "recently"
[4] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "distilled"
[7] "decisions" "effect" "unremarkable"
[10] "conclusion" "disqualifying" "otherwise"
[13] "eligible" "recipients" "public"
[16] "benefit" "solely" "religious"
[19] "character" "imposes" "penalty"
[22] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[25] "triggers" "exacting" "scrutiny"
[28] "U" "S" "S"
[31] "Ct" "In" "Trinity"
[34] "Lutheran" "Missouri" "provided"
[37] "grants" "help" "nonprofit"
[40] "organizations" "pay" "playground"
[43] "resurfacing" "state" "policy"
[46] "disqualified" "organization" "owned"
[49] "controlled" "church" "sect"
[52] "religious" "entity" "Id"
[55] "S" "Ct" "Because"
[58] "policy" "otherwise" "eligible"
[61] "church" "owned" "preschool"
[64] "denied" "grant" "resurface"
[67] "playground" "Missouri" "s"
[70] "policy" "discriminated" "Church"
[73] "simply" "church" "policy"
[76] "subject" "strictest" "scrutiny"
[79] "failed" "Id" "S"
[82] "Ct" "We" "acknowledged"
[85] "State" "criminalized" "way"
[88] "Church" "worshipped" "told"
[91] "Church" "subscribe" "certain"
[94] "view" "Gospel" "Id"
[97] "S" "Ct" "But"
[100] "State" "s" "discriminatory"
[103] "policy" "odious" "Constitution"
[106] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[109] ""
[[478]]
[1] "Here" "Montana" "s" "aid"
[5] "provision" "bars" "religious" "schools"
[9] "public" "benefits" "solely" "religious"
[13] "character" "schools" "The" "provision"
[17] "also" "bars" "parents" "wish"
[21] "send" "children" "religious" "school"
[25] "benefits" "solely" "religious" "character"
[29] "school" "This" "apparent" "plain"
[33] "text" "The" "provision" "bars"
[37] "aid" "school" "controlled" "whole"
[41] "part" "church" "sect" "denomination"
[45] "Mont" "Const" "Art" "X"
[49] "The" "provision" "s" "title"
[53] "Aid" "prohibited" "sectarian" "schools"
[57] "confirms" "provision" "singles" "schools"
[61] "based" "religious" "character" "Ibid"
[65] "And" "Montana" "Supreme" "Court"
[69] "explained" "provision" "forbids" "aid"
[73] "school" "sectarian" "religiously" "affiliated"
[77] "controlled" "whole" "part" "churches"
[81] "Mont" "P" "d" "The"
[85] "provision" "plainly" "excludes" "schools"
[89] "government" "aid" "solely" "religious"
[93] "status" "See" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[97] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[101] ""
[[479]]
[1] "The" "Department" "counters"
[4] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "govern"
[7] "aid" "provision" "applies"
[10] "religious" "character" "recipients"
[13] "funds" "used" "religious"
[16] "education" "Brief" "Respondents"
[19] "In" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[22] "majority" "Court" "concluded"
[25] "Missouri" "policy" "violated"
[28] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[31] "discriminated" "basis" "religious"
[34] "status" "A" "plurality"
[37] "declined" "address" "discrimination"
[40] "respect" "religious" "uses"
[43] "funding" "forms" "discrimination"
[46] "U" "S" "n"
[49] "S" "Ct" "n"
[52] "The" "plurality" "saw"
[55] "need" "consider" "concerns"
[58] "Missouri" "expressly" "discriminated"
[61] "based" "religious" "identity"
[64] "ibid" "enough" "invalidate"
[67] "state" "policy" "without"
[70] "addressing" "government" "funds"
[73] "used" ""
[[480]]
[1] "This" "case" "also" "turns"
[5] "expressly" "religious" "status" "religious"
[9] "use" "The" "Montana" "Supreme"
[13] "Court" "applied" "aid" "provision"
[17] "solely" "reference" "religious" "status"
[21] "The" "Court" "repeatedly" "explained"
[25] "aid" "provision" "bars" "aid"
[29] "schools" "controlled" "whole" "part"
[33] "churches" "sectarian" "schools" "religiously"
[37] "affiliated" "schools" "Mont" "P"
[41] "d" "Applying" "provision" "scholarship"
[45] "program" "Montana" "Supreme" "Court"
[49] "noted" "private" "schools" "benefit"
[53] "program" "religiously" "affiliated" "controlled"
[57] "churches" "Court" "ultimately" "concluded"
[61] "scholarship" "program" "ran" "afoul"
[65] "Montana" "Constitution" "aiding" "schools"
[69] "controlled" "churches" "Id" "P"
[73] "d" "The" "Montana" "Constitution"
[77] "discriminates" "based" "religious" "status"
[81] "just" "like" "Missouri" "policy"
[85] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "excluded" "organizations"
[89] "owned" "controlled" "church" "sect"
[93] "religious" "entity" "U" "S"
[97] "S" "Ct" ""
[[481]]
[1] "The" "Department" "points" "language"
[5] "decision" "indicating" "aid" "provision"
[9] "goal" "effect" "ensuring" "government"
[13] "aid" "end" "used" "sectarian"
[17] "education" "religious" "education" "Mont"
[21] "P" "d" "The" "Department"
[25] "also" "contrasts" "characterizes" "completely"
[29] "non" "religious" "benefit" "playground"
[33] "resurfacing" "Trinity" "Lutheran" "unrestricted"
[37] "tuition" "aid" "issue" "Tr"
[41] "Oral" "Arg" "General" "school"
[45] "aid" "Department" "stresses" "used"
[49] "religious" "ends" "recipients" "particularly"
[53] "schools" "believe" "faith" "permeate"
[57] "everything" "Brief" "Respondents" "quoting"
[61] "State" "ex" "rel" "Chambers"
[65] "v" "School" "Dist" "No"
[69] "Mont" "P" "d" "See"
[73] "also" "post" "BREYER" "J"
[77] "dissenting" ""
[[482]]
[1] "" "Regardless" "considerations"
[4] "Montana" "Supreme" "Court"
[7] "s" "basis" "applying"
[10] "aid" "provision" "exclude"
[13] "religious" "schools" "hinged"
[16] "solely" "religious" "status"
[19] "Status" "based" "discrimination"
[22] "remains" "status" "based"
[25] "even" "one" "goals"
[28] "effects" "preventing" "religious"
[31] "organizations" "putting" "aid"
[34] "religious" "uses" ""
[[483]]
[1] "" "Undeterred" "Trinity"
[4] "Lutheran" "Montana" "Supreme"
[7] "Court" "applied" "aid"
[10] "provision" "hold" "religious"
[13] "schools" "benefit" "scholarship"
[16] "program" "Mont" "P"
[19] "d" "So" "applied"
[22] "provision" "impose" "s"
[25] "special" "disabilities" "basis"
[28] "religious" "status" "condition"
[31] "s" "availability" "benefits"
[34] "upon" "recipient" "s"
[37] "willingness" "surrender" "religiously"
[40] "impelled" "status" "Trinity"
[43] "Lutheran" "U" "S"
[46] "S" "Ct" "quoting"
[49] "Church" "Lukumi" "Babalu"
[52] "Aye" "Inc" "v"
[55] "Hialeah" "U" "S"
[58] "S" "Ct" "L"
[61] "Ed" "d" "McDaniel"
[64] "v" "Paty" "U"
[67] "S" "S" "Ct"
[70] "L" "Ed" "d"
[73] "plurality" "opinion" "alterations"
[76] "omitted" "To" "eligible"
[79] "government" "aid" "Montana"
[82] "Constitution" "school" "must"
[85] "divorce" "religious" "control"
[88] "affiliation" "Placing" "condition"
[91] "benefits" "privileges" "inevitably"
[94] "deters" "discourages" "exercise"
[97] "First" "Amendment" "rights"
[100] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "U"
[103] "S" "S" "Ct"
[106] "quoting" "Sherbert" "v"
[109] "Verner" "U" "S"
[112] "S" "Ct" "L"
[115] "Ed" "d" "alterations"
[118] "omitted" "The" "Free"
[121] "Exercise" "Clause" "protects"
[124] "even" "indirect" "coercion"
[127] "State" "punishe" "s"
[130] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[133] "disqualifying" "religious" "government"
[136] "aid" "Montana" "Trinity"
[139] "Lutheran" "U" "S"
[142] "S" "Ct" "internal"
[145] "quotation" "marks" "omitted"
[148] "Such" "status" "based"
[151] "discrimination" "subject" "strictest"
[154] "scrutiny" "Id" "S"
[157] "Ct" ""
[[484]]
[1] "None" "meant" "suggest"
[4] "agree" "Department" "Brief"
[7] "Respondents" "lesser" "degree"
[10] "scrutiny" "applies" "discrimination"
[13] "religious" "uses" "government"
[16] "aid" "See" "Lukumi"
[19] "U" "S" "S"
[22] "Ct" "striking" "law"
[25] "designed" "ban" "religious"
[28] "practice" "involving" "alleged"
[31] "animal" "cruelty" "explaining"
[34] "law" "target" "ing"
[37] "religious" "conduct" "distinctive"
[40] "treatment" "advanc" "ing"
[43] "legitimate" "governmental" "interests"
[46] "conduct" "religious" "motivation"
[49] "will" "survive" "strict"
[52] "scrutiny" "rare" "cases"
[55] "Some" "Members" "Court"
[58] "moreover" "questioned" "whether"
[61] "meaningful" "distinction" "discrimination"
[64] "based" "use" "conduct"
[67] "based" "status" "See"
[70] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "U"
[73] "S" "S" "Ct"
[76] "GORSUCH" "J" "joined"
[79] "THOMAS" "J" "concurring"
[82] "part" "citing" "e"
[85] "g" "Lukumi" "U"
[88] "S" "S" "Ct"
[91] "L" "Ed" "d"
[94] "Thomas" "v" "Review"
[97] "Bd" "Ind" "Employment"
[100] "Security" "Div" "U"
[103] "S" "S" "Ct"
[106] "L" "Ed" "d"
[109] "We" "acknowledge" "point"
[112] "need" "examine" "It"
[115] "enough" "case" "conclude"
[118] "strict" "scrutiny" "applies"
[121] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "Montana"
[124] "s" "aid" "provision"
[127] "discriminates" "based" "religious"
[130] "status" ""
[[485]]
[1] "B" ""
[[486]]
[1] "Seeking" "avoid" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[5] "Department" "contends" "case" "instead"
[9] "governed" "Locke" "v" "Davey"
[13] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[17] "L" "Ed" "d" "See"
[21] "also" "post" "BREYER" "J"
[25] "dissenting" "post" "SOTOMAYOR" "J"
[29] "dissenting" "Locke" "also" "involved"
[33] "scholarship" "program" "The" "State"
[37] "Washington" "provided" "scholarships" "paid"
[41] "State" "s" "general" "fund"
[45] "help" "students" "pursuing" "postsecondary"
[49] "education" "The" "scholarships" "used"
[53] "accredited" "religious" "nonreligious" "schools"
[57] "alike" "Washington" "prohibited" "students"
[61] "using" "scholarships" "pursue" "devotional"
[65] "theology" "degrees" "prepared" "students"
[69] "calling" "clergy" "This" "prohibition"
[73] "prevented" "Davey" "using" "scholarship"
[77] "obtain" "degree" "enabled" "become"
[81] "pastor" "We" "held" "Washington"
[85] "violated" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[89] ""
[[487]]
[1] "Locke" "differs" "case" "two"
[5] "critical" "ways" "First" "Locke"
[9] "explained" "Washington" "merely" "chosen"
[13] "fund" "distinct" "category" "instruction"
[17] "essentially" "religious" "endeavor" "training"
[21] "minister" "lead" "congregation" "Id"
[25] "S" "Ct" "Thus" "Davey"
[29] "denied" "scholarship" "proposed" "use"
[33] "funds" "prepare" "ministry" "Trinity"
[37] "Lutheran" "U" "S" "S"
[41] "Ct" "Apart" "narrow" "restriction"
[45] "Washington" "s" "program" "allowed"
[49] "scholarships" "used" "pervasively" "religious"
[53] "schools" "incorporated" "religious" "instruction"
[57] "throughout" "classes" "Locke" "U"
[61] "S" "S" "Ct" "By"
[65] "contrast" "Montana" "s" "Constitution"
[69] "zero" "particular" "essentially" "religious"
[73] "course" "instruction" "religious" "school"
[77] "Rather" "explained" "aid" "provision"
[81] "bars" "aid" "religious" "school"
[85] "simply" "putting" "school" "choice"
[89] "religious" "receiving" "government" "benefits"
[93] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "U" "S"
[97] "S" "Ct" "At" "time"
[101] "provision" "puts" "families" "choice"
[105] "sending" "children" "religious" "school"
[109] "receiving" "benefits" ""
[[488]]
[1] "Second" "Locke" "invoked" "historic"
[5] "substantial" "state" "interest" "funding"
[9] "training" "clergy" "U" "S"
[13] "S" "Ct" "explaining" "opposition"
[17] "funding" "support" "church" "leaders"
[21] "lay" "historic" "core" "Religion"
[25] "Clauses" "Trinity" "Lutheran" "U"
[29] "S" "S" "Ct" "quoting"
[33] "Locke" "U" "S" "S"
[37] "Ct" "As" "evidence" "tradition"
[41] "Court" "Locke" "emphasized" "propriety"
[45] "state" "supported" "clergy" "central"
[49] "subject" "founding" "era" "debates"
[53] "state" "constitutions" "era" "prohibited"
[57] "expenditure" "tax" "dollars" "support"
[61] "clergy" "See" "id" "S"
[65] "Ct" ""
[[489]]
[1] "But" "comparable" "historic"
[4] "substantial" "tradition" "supports"
[7] "Montana" "s" "decision"
[10] "disqualify" "religious" "schools"
[13] "government" "aid" "In"
[16] "founding" "era" "early"
[19] "th" "century" "governments"
[22] "provided" "financial" "support"
[25] "private" "schools" "including"
[28] "denominational" "ones" "Far"
[31] "prohibiting" "support" "early"
[34] "state" "constitutions" "statutes"
[37] "actively" "encouraged" "policy"
[40] "L" "Jorgenson" "The"
[43] "State" "Non" "Public"
[46] "School" "p" "e"
[49] "g" "R" "Gabel"
[52] "Public" "Funds" "Church"
[55] "Private" "Schools" "C"
[58] "Kaestle" "Pillars" "Republic"
[61] "Common" "Schools" "American"
[64] "Society" "pp" "Local"
[67] "governments" "provided" "grants"
[70] "private" "schools" "including"
[73] "religious" "ones" "education"
[76] "poor" "M" "McConnell"
[79] "et" "al" "Religion"
[82] "Constitution" "th" "ed"
[85] "Even" "States" "bans"
[88] "government" "supported" "clergy"
[91] "New" "Jersey" "Pennsylvania"
[94] "Georgia" "provided" "various"
[97] "forms" "aid" "religious"
[100] "schools" "See" "Kaestle"
[103] "supra" "Gabel" "supra"
[106] "cf" "Locke" "U"
[109] "S" "S" "Ct"
[112] "Early" "federal" "aid"
[115] "often" "land" "grants"
[118] "went" "religious" "schools"
[121] "McConnell" "supra" "Congress"
[124] "provided" "support" "denominational"
[127] "schools" "District" "Columbia"
[130] "ibid" "Congress" "paid"
[133] "churches" "run" "schools"
[136] "American" "Indians" "end"
[139] "th" "century" "see"
[142] "Quick" "Bear" "v"
[145] "Leupp" "U" "S"
[148] "S" "Ct" "L"
[151] "Ed" "Gabel" "supra"
[154] "After" "Civil" "War"
[157] "Congress" "spent" "large"
[160] "sums" "education" "emancipated"
[163] "freedmen" "often" "supporting"
[166] "denominational" "schools" "South"
[169] "Freedmen" "s" "Bureau"
[172] "McConnell" "supra" ""
[[490]]
[1] "The" "Department" "argues" "tradition"
[5] "state" "support" "religious" "schools"
[9] "arose" "second" "half" "th"
[13] "century" "States" "including" "Montana"
[17] "adopted" "aid" "provisions" "See"
[21] "Brief" "Respondents" "App" "D"
[25] "Such" "development" "course" "establish"
[29] "early" "American" "tradition" "Justice"
[33] "SOTOMAYOR" "questions" "reliance" "aid"
[37] "provided" "era" "Freedmen" "s"
[41] "Bureau" "post" "dissenting" "opinion"
[45] "see" "inconsistency" "recognizing" "evidence"
[49] "may" "reinforce" "early" "practice"
[53] "create" "one" "In" "addition"
[57] "many" "aid" "provisions" "belong"
[61] "checkered" "tradition" "shared" "Blaine"
[65] "Amendment" "s" "That" "proposal"
[69] "Congress" "nearly" "passed" "added"
[73] "Federal" "Constitution" "provision" "similar"
[77] "state" "aid" "provisions" "prohibiting"
[81] "States" "aiding" "sectarian" "schools"
[85] "See" "Mitchell" "v" "Helms"
[89] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[93] "L" "Ed" "d" "plurality"
[97] "opinion" "I" "t" "open"
[101] "secret" "sectarian" "code" "Catholic"
[105] "Ibid" "see" "Jorgenson" "supra"
[109] "The" "Blaine" "Amendment" "born"
[113] "bigotry" "arose" "time" "pervasive"
[117] "hostility" "Catholic" "Church" "Catholics"
[121] "general" "many" "state" "counterparts"
[125] "similarly" "shameful" "pedigree" "Mitchell"
[129] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[133] "plurality" "opinion" "see" "Jorgenson"
[137] "supra" "Jeffries" "Ryan" "A"
[141] "Political" "History" "Establishment" "Clause"
[145] "Mich" "L" "Rev" "The"
[149] "aid" "provisions" "th" "century"
[153] "hardly" "evince" "tradition" "inform"
[157] "understanding" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[161] ""
[[491]]
[1] "The" "Department" "argues" "several"
[5] "States" "rejected" "referendums" "overturn"
[9] "limit" "aid" "provisions" "Montana"
[13] "even" "re" "adopted" "s"
[17] "reasons" "unrelated" "anti" "Catholic"
[21] "bigotry" "See" "Brief" "Respondents"
[25] "But" "side" "ledger" "many"
[29] "States" "today" "including" "aid"
[33] "provisions" "provide" "support" "religious"
[37] "schools" "vouchers" "scholarships" "tax"
[41] "credits" "measures" "See" "Brief"
[45] "Oklahoma" "et" "al" "Amici"
[49] "Curiae" "Brief" "Petitioners" "According"
[53] "petitioners" "States" "aid" "provisions"
[57] "allow" "religious" "options" "publicly"
[61] "funded" "scholarship" "programs" "almost"
[65] "allow" "religious" "options" "tax"
[69] "credit" "programs" "Reply" "Brief"
[73] "n" ""
[[492]]
[1] "All" "say" "agree" "Department"
[5] "historical" "record" "complex" "Brief"
[9] "Respondents" "And" "true" "governments"
[13] "time" "taken" "variety" "approaches"
[17] "religious" "schools" "But" "clear"
[21] "historic" "substantial" "tradition" "aiding"
[25] "schools" "comparable" "tradition" "state"
[29] "supported" "clergy" "invoked" "Locke"
[33] ""
[[493]]
[1] "C" ""
[[494]]
[1] "Two" "dissenters" "chart" "new"
[5] "courses" "Justice" "SOTOMAYOR" "grant"
[9] "government" "room" "single" "religious"
[13] "entities" "exclusion" "based" "views"
[17] "interests" "embodied" "Religion" "Clauses"
[21] "Post" "quoting" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[25] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[29] "SOTOMAYOR" "J" "dissenting" "Justice"
[33] "BREYER" "building" "solo" "opinion"
[37] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "adopt" "flexible"
[41] "context" "specific" "approach" "may"
[45] "well" "vary" "case" "case"
[49] "Post" "see" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[53] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[57] "BREYER" "J" "concurring" "judgment"
[61] "As" "best" "can" "tell"
[65] "courts" "applying" "approach" "contemplate"
[69] "particular" "benefit" "restriction" "issue"
[73] "discern" "relationship" "religion" "society"
[77] "taking" "account" "context" "consequences"
[81] "measured" "light" "purposes" "Religion"
[85] "Clauses" "Post" "quoting" "Van"
[89] "Orden" "v" "Perry" "U"
[93] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[97] "Ed" "d" "BREYER" "J"
[101] "concurring" "judgment" "What" "clear"
[105] "Justice" "BREYER" "afford" "much"
[109] "freer" "rein" "judges" "current"
[113] "regime" "arguing" "test" "related"
[117] "substitute" "exercise" "legal" "judgment"
[121] "Post" "quoting" "Van" "Orden"
[125] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[129] "opinion" "BREYER" "J" ""
[[495]]
[1] "" "The" "simplest"
[4] "response" "dissents" "follow"
[7] "prior" "separate" "writings"
[10] "Court" "s" "decision"
[13] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "decades"
[16] "precedent" "relied" "These"
[19] "precedents" "repeatedly" "confirmed"
[22] "straightforward" "rule" "apply"
[25] "today" "When" "otherwise"
[28] "eligible" "recipients" "disqualified"
[31] "public" "benefit" "solely"
[34] "religious" "character" "must"
[37] "apply" "strict" "scrutiny"
[40] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "U"
[43] "S" "S" "Ct"
[46] "This" "rule" "express"
[49] "religious" "discrimination" "doctrinal"
[52] "innovation" "Post" "opinion"
[55] "BREYER" "J" "Far"
[58] "As" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[61] "explained" "rule" "unremarkable"
[64] "light" "prior" "decisions"
[67] "U" "S" "S"
[70] "Ct" ""
[[496]]
[1] "" "For" "innovation"
[4] "one" "must" "look"
[7] "dissents" "Their" "room"
[10] "y" "flexible" "approaches"
[13] "discrimination" "religious" "organizations"
[16] "observers" "mark" "significant"
[19] "departure" "free" "exercise"
[22] "precedents" "The" "protections"
[25] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[28] "depend" "judgment" "judgment"
[31] "analysis" "regarding" "whether"
[34] "discrimination" "religious" "adherents"
[37] "somehow" "serve" "ill"
[40] "defined" "interests" "Cf"
[43] "Medell" "n" "v"
[46] "Texas" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "L"
[52] "Ed" "d" ""
[[497]]
[1] "D" ""
[[498]]
[1] "" "Because" "Montana" "Supreme"
[5] "Court" "applied" "aid" "provision"
[9] "discriminate" "schools" "parents" "based"
[13] "religious" "character" "school" "strictest"
[17] "scrutiny" "required" "Supra" "quoting"
[21] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "U" "S"
[25] "S" "Ct" "That" "stringent"
[29] "standard" "id" "S" "Ct"
[33] "watered" "really" "means" "says"
[37] "Lukumi" "U" "S" "S"
[41] "Ct" "internal" "quotation" "marks"
[45] "alterations" "omitted" "To" "satisfy"
[49] "government" "action" "must" "advance"
[53] "interests" "highest" "order" "must"
[57] "narrowly" "tailored" "pursuit" "interests"
[61] "Ibid" "quoting" "McDaniel" "U"
[65] "S" "S" "Ct" ""
[[499]]
[1] "" "The" "Montana" "Supreme"
[5] "Court" "asserted" "aid" "provision"
[9] "serves" "Montana" "s" "interest"
[13] "separating" "church" "State" "fiercely"
[17] "Federal" "Constitution" "Mont" "P"
[21] "d" "But" "interest" "qualify"
[25] "compelling" "face" "infringement" "free"
[29] "exercise" "Trinity" "Lutheran" "U"
[33] "S" "S" "Ct" "A"
[37] "State" "s" "interest" "achieving"
[41] "greater" "separation" "church" "State"
[45] "already" "ensured" "Establishment" "Clause"
[49] "limited" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[53] "Ibid" "quoting" "Widmar" "v"
[57] "Vincent" "U" "S" "S"
[61] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[65] ""
[[500]]
[1] "" "The" "Department"
[4] "part" "asserts" "aid"
[7] "provision" "actually" "promotes"
[10] "religious" "freedom" "In"
[13] "Department" "s" "view"
[16] "aid" "provision" "protects"
[19] "religious" "liberty" "taxpayers"
[22] "ensuring" "taxes" "directed"
[25] "religious" "organizations" "safeguards"
[28] "freedom" "religious" "organizations"
[31] "keeping" "government" "operations"
[34] "See" "Brief" "Respondents"
[37] "An" "infringement" "First"
[40] "Amendment" "rights" "however"
[43] "justified" "State" "s"
[46] "alternative" "view" "infringement"
[49] "advances" "religious" "liberty"
[52] "Our" "federal" "system"
[55] "prizes" "state" "experimentation"
[58] "state" "experimentation" "suppression"
[61] "free" "speech" "goes"
[64] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[67] "Boy" "Scouts" "America"
[70] "v" "Dale" "U"
[73] "S" "S" "Ct"
[76] "L" "Ed" "d"
[79] ""
[[501]]
[1] "Furthermore" "see" "aid" "provision"
[5] "promotes" "religious" "freedom" "As"
[9] "noted" "Court" "repeatedly" "upheld"
[13] "government" "programs" "spend" "taxpayer"
[17] "funds" "equal" "aid" "religious"
[21] "observers" "organizations" "particularly" "link"
[25] "government" "religion" "attenuated" "private"
[29] "choices" "A" "school" "concerned"
[33] "government" "involvement" "religious" "activities"
[37] "might" "reasonably" "decide" "participate"
[41] "government" "program" "But" "doubt"
[45] "school" "s" "liberty" "enhanced"
[49] "eliminating" "option" "participate" "first"
[53] "place" ""
[[502]]
[1] "The" "Department" "s" "argument"
[5] "especially" "unconvincing" "infringement" "religious"
[9] "liberty" "broadly" "affects" "religious"
[13] "schools" "adherents" "Montana" "s"
[17] "aid" "provision" "imposes" "categorical"
[21] "ban" "broadly" "strictly" "prohibiting"
[25] "type" "aid" "religious" "schools"
[29] "Mont" "P" "d" "This"
[33] "prohibition" "far" "sweeping" "policy"
[37] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "barred" "churches"
[41] "one" "narrow" "program" "playground"
[45] "resurfacing" "causing" "likelihood" "extra"
[49] "scraped" "knees" "U" "S"
[53] "S" "Ct" ""
[[503]]
[1] "" "And" "prohibition" "us"
[5] "today" "burdens" "religious" "schools"
[9] "also" "families" "whose" "children"
[13] "attend" "hope" "attend" "Drawing"
[17] "enduring" "American" "tradition" "long"
[21] "recognized" "rights" "parents" "direct"
[25] "religious" "upbringing" "children" "Wisconsin"
[29] "v" "Yoder" "U" "S"
[33] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[37] "d" "Many" "parents" "exercise"
[41] "right" "sending" "children" "religious"
[45] "schools" "choice" "protected" "Constitution"
[49] "See" "Pierce" "v" "Society"
[53] "Sisters" "U" "S" "S"
[57] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "But"
[61] "aid" "provision" "penalizes" "decision"
[65] "cutting" "families" "otherwise" "available"
[69] "benefits" "choose" "religious" "private"
[73] "school" "rather" "secular" "one"
[77] "reason" ""
[[504]]
[1] "" "The" "Department"
[4] "also" "suggests" "aid"
[7] "provision" "advances" "Montana"
[10] "s" "interests" "public"
[13] "education" "According" "Department"
[16] "aid" "provision" "safeguards"
[19] "public" "school" "system"
[22] "ensuring" "government" "support"
[25] "diverted" "private" "schools"
[28] "See" "Brief" "Respondents"
[31] "But" "framing" "aid"
[34] "provision" "fatally" "underinclusive"
[37] "proffered" "objectives" "pursued"
[40] "respect" "analogous" "nonreligious"
[43] "conduct" "Lukumi" "U"
[46] "S" "S" "Ct"
[49] "On" "Department" "s"
[52] "view" "interest" "public"
[55] "education" "undermined" "diverting"
[58] "government" "support" "private"
[61] "school" "yet" "aid"
[64] "provision" "bars" "aid"
[67] "religious" "ones" "A"
[70] "law" "advance" "interest"
[73] "highest" "order" "leaves"
[76] "appreciable" "damage" "supposedly"
[79] "vital" "interest" "unprohibited"
[82] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[85] "internal" "quotation" "marks"
[88] "alterations" "omitted" "Montana"
[91] "s" "interest" "public"
[94] "education" "justify" "aid"
[97] "provision" "requires" "religious"
[100] "private" "schools" "bear"
[103] "weight" "Ibid" ""
[[505]]
[1] "" "A" "State" "need" "subsidize"
[6] "private" "education" "But" "State" "decides"
[11] "disqualify" "private" "schools" "solely" "religious"
[16] ""
[[506]]
[1] "III" ""
[[507]]
[1] "" "The" "Department" "argues"
[5] "end" "day" "free" "exercise"
[9] "violation" "Montana" "Supreme" "Court"
[13] "ultimately" "eliminated" "scholarship" "program"
[17] "altogether" "According" "Department" "now"
[21] "program" "religious" "schools" "adherents"
[25] "complain" "excluded" "generally" "available"
[29] "benefit" ""
[[508]]
[1] "Two" "dissenters" "agree" "Justice"
[5] "GINSBURG" "reports" "State" "Montana"
[9] "simply" "chose" "put" "private"
[13] "school" "parents" "boat" "invalidating"
[17] "scholarship" "program" "post" "Justice"
[21] "SOTOMAYOR" "describes" "decision" "resting"
[25] "state" "law" "grounds" "nothing"
[29] "federal" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[33] "see" "post" ""
[[509]]
[1] "The" "descriptions" "accurate" "The"
[5] "Montana" "Legislature" "created" "scholarship"
[9] "program" "Legislature" "never" "chose"
[13] "end" "policy" "reasons" "The"
[17] "program" "eliminated" "court" "based"
[21] "innocuous" "principle" "state" "law"
[25] "Rather" "Montana" "Supreme" "Court"
[29] "invalidated" "program" "pursuant" "state"
[33] "law" "provision" "expressly" "discriminates"
[37] "basis" "religious" "status" "The"
[41] "Court" "applied" "provision" "hold"
[45] "religious" "schools" "barred" "participating"
[49] "program" "Then" "seeing" "mechanism"
[53] "make" "absolutely" "sure" "religious"
[57] "schools" "received" "aid" "court"
[61] "chose" "invalidate" "entire" "program"
[65] "Mont" "P" "d" ""
[[510]]
[1] "The" "final" "step" "line"
[5] "reasoning" "eliminated" "program" "detriment"
[9] "religious" "non" "religious" "schools"
[13] "alike" "But" "Court" "s"
[17] "error" "federal" "law" "occurred"
[21] "beginning" "When" "Court" "called"
[25] "upon" "apply" "state" "law"
[29] "aid" "provision" "exclude" "religious"
[33] "schools" "program" "obligated" "Federal"
[37] "Constitution" "reject" "invitation" "Had"
[41] "Court" "recognized" "indeed" "one"
[45] "cases" "application" "aid" "provision"
[49] "violate" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[53] "id" "P" "d" "Court"
[57] "proceeded" "find" "violation" "provision"
[61] "And" "absence" "state" "law"
[65] "violation" "Court" "basis" "terminating"
[69] "program" "Because" "elimination" "program"
[73] "flowed" "directly" "Montana" "Supreme"
[77] "Court" "s" "failure" "follow"
[81] "dictates" "federal" "law" "defended"
[85] "neutral" "policy" "decision" "resting"
[89] "adequate" "independent" "state" "law"
[93] "grounds" ""
[[511]]
[1] "" "The" "Supremacy"
[4] "Clause" "provides" "Judges"
[7] "every" "State" "shall"
[10] "bound" "Federal" "Constitution"
[13] "Thing" "Constitution" "Laws"
[16] "State" "Contrary" "notwithstanding"
[19] "Art" "VI" "cl"
[22] "T" "Clause" "creates"
[25] "rule" "decision" "directing"
[28] "state" "courts" "must"
[31] "give" "effect" "state"
[34] "laws" "conflict" "federal"
[37] "law" "Armstrong" "v"
[40] "Exceptional" "Child" "Center"
[43] "Inc" "U" "S"
[46] "S" "Ct" "L"
[49] "Ed" "d" "Given"
[52] "conflict" "Free" "Exercise"
[55] "Clause" "application" "aid"
[58] "provision" "Montana" "Supreme"
[61] "Court" "disregard" "ed"
[64] "aid" "provision" "decided"
[67] "case" "conformably" "C"
[70] "onstitution" "United" "States"
[73] "Marbury" "v" "Madison"
[76] "Cranch" "U" "S"
[79] "L" "Ed" "That"
[82] "supreme" "law" "land"
[85] "condemns" "discrimination" "religious"
[88] "schools" "families" "whose"
[91] "children" "attend" "Id"
[94] "They" "member" "s"
[97] "community" "exclusion" "scholarship"
[100] "program" "odious" "Constitution"
[103] "stand" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[106] "U" "S" "S"
[109] "Ct" ""
[[512]]
[1] "" ""
[[513]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "Montana" "Supreme"
[5] "Court" "reversed" "case" "remanded"
[9] "proceedings" "inconsistent" "opinion" ""
[[514]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[515]]
[1] "Justice" "WHITE" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[516]]
[1] "The" "Illinois" "Unemployment" "Insurance"
[5] "Act" "provides" "n" "individual"
[9] "shall" "ineligible" "benefits" "failed"
[13] "without" "good" "cause" "either"
[17] "apply" "available" "suitable" "work"
[21] "directed" "accept" "suitable" "work"
[25] "offered" "Ill" "Rev" "Stat"
[29] "ch" "In" "April" "William"
[33] "Frazee" "refused" "temporary" "retail"
[37] "position" "offered" "Kelly" "Services"
[41] "job" "required" "work" "Sunday"
[45] "Frazee" "told" "Kelly" "Christian"
[49] "work" "Lord" "s" "day"
[53] "Frazee" "applied" "Illinois" "Department"
[57] "Employment" "Security" "unemployment" "benefits"
[61] "claiming" "good" "cause" "refusal"
[65] "work" "Sunday" "His" "application"
[69] "denied" "Frazee" "appealed" "denial"
[73] "benefits" "Department" "Employment" "Security"
[77] "s" "Board" "Review" "also"
[81] "denied" "claim" "The" "Board"
[85] "Review" "stated" "When" "refusal"
[89] "work" "based" "religious" "convictions"
[93] "refusal" "must" "based" "upon"
[97] "tenets" "dogma" "accepted" "individual"
[101] "church" "sect" "denomination" "refusal"
[105] "based" "solely" "individual" "s"
[109] "personal" "belief" "personal" "noncompelling"
[113] "render" "work" "unsuitable" "App"
[117] "The" "Board" "Review" "concluded"
[121] "Frazee" "refused" "offer" "suitable"
[125] "work" "without" "good" "cause"
[129] "The" "Circuit" "Court" "Tenth"
[133] "Judicial" "Circuit" "Illinois" "Peoria"
[137] "County" "affirmed" "finding" "agency"
[141] "s" "decision" "contrary" "law"
[145] "manifest" "weight" "evidence" "thereby"
[149] "rejecting" "Frazee" "s" "claim"
[153] "based" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[157] "First" "Amendment" "Id" ""
[[517]]
[1] "Frazee" "s" "free" "exercise"
[5] "claim" "rejected" "Appellate" "Court"
[9] "Illinois" "Third" "District" "Ill"
[13] "App" "d" "Ill" "Dec"
[17] "N" "E" "d" "The"
[21] "court" "characterized" "Frazee" "s"
[25] "refusal" "work" "resting" "personal"
[29] "professed" "religious" "belief" "made"
[33] "clear" "question" "sincerity" "plaintiff"
[37] "id" "Ill" "Dec" "N"
[41] "E" "d" "It" "engaged"
[45] "historical" "discussion" "religious" "prohibitions"
[49] "work" "Sabbath" "particular" "Sunday"
[53] "Nonetheless" "court" "distinguished" "Sherbert"
[57] "v" "Verner" "U" "S"
[61] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[65] "d" "Thomas" "v" "Review"
[69] "Bd" "Indiana" "Employment" "Security"
[73] "Div" "U" "S" "S"
[77] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[81] "Hobbie" "v" "Unemployment" "Appeals"
[85] "Comm" "n" "Florida" "U"
[89] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[93] "Ed" "d" "facts" "Frazee"
[97] "s" "case" "Unlike" "claimants"
[101] "Sherbert" "Thomas" "Hobbie" "Frazee"
[105] "member" "established" "religious" "sect"
[109] "church" "claim" "refusal" "work"
[113] "resulted" "tenet" "belief" "teaching"
[117] "established" "religious" "body" "Ill"
[121] "App" "d" "Ill" "Dec"
[125] "N" "E" "d" "To"
[129] "Illinois" "court" "Frazee" "s"
[133] "position" "Christian" "felt" "wrong"
[137] "work" "Sunday" "enough" "For"
[141] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "claim"
[145] "succeed" "said" "Illinois" "Appellate"
[149] "Court" "injunction" "Sunday" "labor"
[153] "must" "found" "tenet" "dogma"
[157] "established" "religious" "sect" "Frazee"
[161] "profess" "member" "sect" "Id"
[165] "Ill" "Dec" "N" "E"
[169] "d" "The" "Illinois" "Supreme"
[173] "Court" "denied" "Frazee" "leave"
[177] "appeal" ""
[[518]]
[1] "The" "mandatory" "appellate"
[4] "jurisdiction" "Court" "invoked"
[7] "U" "S" "C"
[10] "since" "state" "court"
[13] "rejected" "challenge" "constitutionality"
[16] "Illinois" "statutory" "good"
[19] "cause" "requirement" "applied"
[22] "case" "We" "noted"
[25] "probable" "jurisdiction" "U"
[28] "S" "S" "Ct"
[31] "L" "Ed" "d"
[34] "now" "reverse" ""
[[519]]
[1] "We" "one" "occasion"
[4] "today" "consider" "denials"
[7] "unemployment" "compensation" "benefits"
[10] "refused" "work" "basis"
[13] "religious" "beliefs" "In"
[16] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[19] "supra" "U" "S"
[22] "S" "Ct" "Court"
[25] "held" "State" "constitutionally"
[28] "apply" "eligibility" "provisions"
[31] "unemployment" "compensation" "program"
[34] "constrain" "worker" "abandon"
[37] "religious" "convictions" "respecting"
[40] "day" "rest" "Thomas"
[43] "v" "Review" "Bd"
[46] "Indiana" "Employment" "Security"
[49] "Div" "supra" "also"
[52] "held" "State" "s"
[55] "refusal" "award" "unemployment"
[58] "compensation" "benefits" "one"
[61] "terminated" "job" "religious"
[64] "beliefs" "forbade" "participation"
[67] "production" "armaments" "violated"
[70] "First" "Amendment" "right"
[73] "free" "exercise" "Just"
[76] "two" "years" "ago"
[79] "Hobbie" "v" "Unemployment"
[82] "Appeals" "Comm" "n"
[85] "Florida" "supra" "Florida"
[88] "s" "denial" "unemployment"
[91] "compensation" "benefits" "employee"
[94] "discharged" "refusal" "work"
[97] "Sabbath" "religious" "convictions"
[100] "adopted" "subsequent" "employment"
[103] "also" "declared" "violation"
[106] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[109] "In" "cases" "appellant"
[112] "forced" "choose" "fidelity"
[115] "religious" "belief" "employment"
[118] "id" "U" "S"
[121] "S" "Ct" "found"
[124] "forfeiture" "unemployment" "benefits"
[127] "choosing" "former" "latter"
[130] "brings" "unlawful" "coercion"
[133] "bear" "employee" "s"
[136] "choice" "ibid" "In"
[139] "cases" "concluded" "denial"
[142] "unemployment" "compensation" "benefits"
[145] "violated" "Free" "Exercise"
[148] "Clause" "First" "Amendment"
[151] "Constitution" "applied" "States"
[154] "Fourteenth" "Amendment" ""
[[520]]
[1] "It" "true" "Illinois"
[4] "court" "noted" "claimants"
[7] "cases" "member" "particular"
[10] "religious" "sect" "none"
[13] "decisions" "turned" "consideration"
[16] "tenet" "sect" "involved"
[19] "forbade" "work" "claimant"
[22] "refused" "perform" "Our"
[25] "judgments" "cases" "rested"
[28] "fact" "claimants" "sincere"
[31] "belief" "religion" "required"
[34] "refrain" "work" "question"
[37] "Never" "suggest" "unless"
[40] "claimant" "belongs" "sect"
[43] "forbids" "job" "requires"
[46] "belief" "however" "sincere"
[49] "must" "deemed" "purely"
[52] "personal" "preference" "rather"
[55] "religious" "belief" "Indeed"
[58] "Thomas" "disagreement" "among"
[61] "sect" "members" "whether"
[64] "religion" "made" "sinful"
[67] "work" "armaments" "factory"
[70] "considered" "irrelevant" "issue"
[73] "hence" "rejected" "State"
[76] "s" "submission" "unless"
[79] "religion" "involved" "formally"
[82] "forbade" "work" "armaments"
[85] "Thomas" "belief" "qualify"
[88] "religious" "belief" "Because"
[91] "Thomas" "unquestionably" "sincere"
[94] "belief" "religion" "prevented"
[97] "work" "entitled" "invoke"
[100] "protection" "Free" "Exercise"
[103] "Clause" ""
[[521]]
[1] "There" "doubt" "o"
[4] "nly" "beliefs" "rooted"
[7] "religion" "protected" "Free"
[10] "Exercise" "Clause" "Thomas"
[13] "supra" "U" "S"
[16] "S" "Ct" "Purely"
[19] "secular" "views" "suffice"
[22] "United" "States" "v"
[25] "Seeger" "U" "S"
[28] "S" "Ct" "L"
[31] "Ed" "d" "Wisconsin"
[34] "v" "Yoder" "U"
[37] "S" "S" "Ct"
[40] "L" "Ed" "d"
[43] "Nor" "underestimate" "difficulty"
[46] "distinguishing" "religious" "secular"
[49] "convictions" "determining" "whether"
[52] "professed" "belief" "sincerely"
[55] "held" "States" "clearly"
[58] "entitled" "assure" "ample"
[61] "predicate" "invoking" "Free"
[64] "Exercise" "Clause" "We"
[67] "face" "problems" "sincerity"
[70] "religious" "nature" "Frazee"
[73] "s" "convictions" "however"
[76] "The" "courts" "question"
[79] "sincerity" "State" "concedes"
[82] "Tr" "Oral" "Arg"
[85] "Furthermore" "Board" "Review"
[88] "characterized" "Frazee" "s"
[91] "views" "religious" "convictions"
[94] "App" "Illinois" "Appellate"
[97] "Court" "referred" "refusal"
[100] "work" "Sunday" "based"
[103] "personal" "professed" "religious"
[106] "belief" "Ill" "App"
[109] "d" "Ill" "Dec"
[112] "N" "E" "d"
[115] ""
[[522]]
[1] "" "Frazee" "asserted" "Christian"
[5] "claim" "member" "particular" "Christian"
[9] "sect" "It" "also" "true"
[13] "assorted" "Christian" "denominations" "profess"
[17] "compelled" "religion" "refuse" "Sunday"
[21] "work" "diminish" "Frazee" "s"
[25] "protection" "flowing" "Free" "Exercise"
[29] "Clause" "Thomas" "settled" "much"
[33] "Undoubtedly" "membership" "organized" "religious"
[37] "denomination" "especially" "one" "specific"
[41] "tenet" "forbidding" "members" "work"
[45] "Sunday" "simplify" "problem" "identifying"
[49] "sincerely" "held" "religious" "beliefs"
[53] "reject" "notion" "claim" "protection"
[57] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "one"
[61] "must" "responding" "commands" "particular"
[65] "religious" "organization" "Here" "Frazee"
[69] "s" "refusal" "based" "sincerely"
[73] "held" "religious" "belief" "Under"
[77] "cases" "entitled" "invoke" "First"
[81] "Amendment" "protection" ""
[[523]]
[1] "The" "State" "appear" "defend"
[5] "aspect" "decision" "In" "brief"
[9] "oral" "argument" "State" "conceded"
[13] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "demand"
[17] "adherence" "tenet" "dogma" "established"
[21] "religious" "sect" "Instead" "State"
[25] "proposes" "test" "identifying" "religious"
[29] "belief" "asserts" "Frazee" "met"
[33] "test" "asks" "affirm" "basis"
[37] "We" "decline" "address" "submission"
[41] "case" "comes" "us" "Frazee"
[45] "s" "conviction" "recognized" "religious"
[49] "found" "inadequate" "claimed" "represent"
[53] "tenet" "religious" "organization" "member"
[57] "That" "ground" "decision" "clearly"
[61] "erroneous" ""
[[524]]
[1] "The" "State" "offers" "justification"
[5] "burden" "denial" "benefits" "places"
[9] "Frazee" "s" "right" "exercise"
[13] "religion" "The" "Illinois" "Appellate"
[17] "Court" "ascribed" "great" "significance"
[21] "America" "s" "weekend" "way"
[25] "life" "The" "Illinois" "court"
[29] "asked" "What" "Sunday" "today"
[33] "professional" "football" "baseball" "basketball"
[37] "tennis" "barred" "Today" "Sunday"
[41] "day" "religion" "recreation" "labor"
[45] "Today" "supermarkets" "open" "service"
[49] "stations" "dispense" "fuel" "utilities"
[53] "continue" "serve" "people" "factories"
[57] "continue" "belch" "smoke" "tangible"
[61] "products" "concluding" "f" "Americans"
[65] "abstain" "working" "Sunday" "chaos"
[69] "result" "Ill" "App" "d"
[73] "Ill" "Dec" "N" "E"
[77] "d" "We" "unpersuaded" "however"
[81] "will" "mass" "movement" "away"
[85] "Sunday" "employ" "William" "Frazee"
[89] "succeeds" "claim" ""
[[525]]
[1] "As" "case" "Thomas" "evidence"
[5] "record" "indicate" "number" "people"
[9] "find" "predicament" "choosing" "benefits"
[13] "religious" "beliefs" "large" "enough"
[17] "create" "widespread" "unemployment" "even"
[21] "seriously" "affect" "unemployment" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct" "nothing"
[29] "us" "case" "suggest" "Sunday"
[33] "shopping" "Sunday" "sporting" "matter"
[37] "will" "grind" "halt" "result"
[41] "decision" "today" "And" "said"
[45] "past" "may" "exist" "state"
[49] "interests" "sufficiently" "compelling" "override"
[53] "legitimate" "claim" "free" "exercise"
[57] "religion" "No" "interest" "presented"
[61] ""
[[526]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "Appellate" "Court"
[5] "Illinois" "Third" "District" "therefore"
[9] "reversed" "case" "remanded" "proceedings"
[13] "inconsistent" "opinion" ""
[[527]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[528]]
[1] "Chief" "Justice" "ROBERTS" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[529]]
[1] "" "Catholic" "Social" "Services"
[5] "foster" "care" "agency" "Philadelphia"
[9] "The" "City" "stopped" "referring"
[13] "children" "CSS" "upon" "discovering"
[17] "agency" "certify" "sex" "couples"
[21] "foster" "parents" "due" "religious"
[25] "beliefs" "marriage" "The" "City"
[29] "will" "renew" "foster" "care"
[33] "contract" "CSS" "agency" "agrees"
[37] "certify" "sex" "couples" "The"
[41] "question" "presented" "whether" "actions"
[45] "Philadelphia" "violate" "First" "Amendment"
[49] ""
[[530]]
[1] "I" ""
[[531]]
[1] "The" "Catholic" "Church" "served"
[5] "needy" "children" "Philadelphia" "two"
[9] "centuries" "In" "priest" "City"
[13] "organized" "association" "care" "orphans"
[17] "whose" "parents" "died" "yellow"
[21] "fever" "epidemic" "H" "Folks"
[25] "The" "Care" "Destitute" "Neglected"
[29] "Delinquent" "Children" "During" "th"
[33] "century" "nuns" "ran" "asylums"
[37] "orphaned" "destitute" "youth" "T"
[41] "Hacsi" "Second" "Home" "Orphan"
[45] "Asylums" "Poor" "Families" "America"
[49] "When" "criticism" "asylums" "mounted"
[53] "Progressive" "Era" "see" "id"
[57] "Church" "established" "Catholic" "Children"
[61] "s" "Bureau" "place" "children"
[65] "foster" "homes" "Petitioner" "CSS"
[69] "continues" "mission" "today" ""
[[532]]
[1] "The" "Philadelphia" "foster" "care"
[5] "system" "depends" "cooperation" "City"
[9] "private" "foster" "agencies" "like"
[13] "CSS" "When" "children" "remain"
[17] "homes" "City" "s" "Department"
[21] "Human" "Services" "assumes" "custody"
[25] "The" "Department" "enters" "standard"
[29] "annual" "contracts" "private" "foster"
[33] "agencies" "place" "children" "foster"
[37] "families" ""
[[533]]
[1] "The" "placement" "process" "begins"
[5] "review" "prospective" "foster" "families"
[9] "Pennsylvania" "law" "gives" "authority"
[13] "certify" "foster" "families" "state"
[17] "licensed" "foster" "agencies" "like"
[21] "CSS" "Pa" "Code" "Before"
[25] "certifying" "family" "agency" "must"
[29] "conduct" "home" "study" "considers"
[33] "statutory" "criteria" "including" "family"
[37] "s" "ability" "provide" "care"
[41] "nurturing" "supervision" "children" "e"
[45] "xisting" "family" "relationships" "ability"
[49] "work" "partnership" "foster" "agency"
[53] "The" "agency" "must" "decide"
[57] "whether" "approve" "disapprove" "provisionally"
[61] "approve" "foster" "family" ""
[[534]]
[1] "When" "Department" "seeks" "place" "child"
[6] "foster" "family" "sends" "contracted" "agencies"
[11] "request" "known" "referral" "The" "agencies"
[16] "report" "whether" "certified" "families" "available"
[21] "Department" "places" "child" "regards" "suitable"
[26] "family" "The" "agency" "continues" "support"
[31] "family" "throughout" "placement" ""
[[535]]
[1] "The" "religious" "views" "CSS"
[5] "inform" "work" "system" "CSS"
[9] "believes" "marriage" "sacred" "bond"
[13] "man" "woman" "App" "Because"
[17] "agency" "understands" "certification" "prospective"
[21] "foster" "families" "endorsement" "relationships"
[25] "will" "certify" "unmarried" "couples"
[29] "regardless" "sexual" "orientation" "sex"
[33] "married" "couples" "CSS" "object"
[37] "certifying" "gay" "lesbian" "individuals"
[41] "single" "foster" "parents" "placing"
[45] "gay" "lesbian" "children" "No"
[49] "sex" "couple" "ever" "sought"
[53] "certification" "CSS" "If" "one"
[57] "CSS" "direct" "couple" "one"
[61] "agencies" "City" "currently" "certify"
[65] "sex" "couples" "For" "years"
[69] "CSS" "successfully" "contracted" "City"
[73] "provide" "foster" "care" "services"
[77] "holding" "beliefs" ""
[[536]]
[1] "But" "things" "changed"
[4] "After" "receiving" "complaint"
[7] "different" "agency" "newspaper"
[10] "ran" "story" "spokesman"
[13] "Archdiocese" "Philadelphia" "stated"
[16] "CSS" "able" "consider"
[19] "prospective" "foster" "parents"
[22] "sex" "marriages" "The"
[25] "City" "Council" "called"
[28] "investigation" "saying" "City"
[31] "laws" "place" "protect"
[34] "people" "discrimination" "occurs"
[37] "guise" "religious" "freedom"
[40] "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[43] "The" "Philadelphia" "Commission"
[46] "Human" "Relations" "launched"
[49] "inquiry" "And" "Commissioner"
[52] "Department" "Human" "Services"
[55] "held" "meeting" "leadership"
[58] "CSS" "She" "remarked"
[61] "things" "changed" "since"
[64] "years" "ago" "great"
[67] "followed" "teachings" "Pope"
[70] "Francis" "voice" "Catholic"
[73] "Church" "App" "Immediately"
[76] "meeting" "Department" "informed"
[79] "CSS" "longer" "refer"
[82] "children" "agency" "The"
[85] "City" "later" "explained"
[88] "refusal" "CSS" "certify"
[91] "sex" "couples" "violated"
[94] "non" "discrimination" "provision"
[97] "contract" "City" "well"
[100] "non" "discrimination" "requirements"
[103] "citywide" "Fair" "Practices"
[106] "Ordinance" "The" "City"
[109] "stated" "enter" "full"
[112] "foster" "care" "contract"
[115] "CSS" "future" "unless"
[118] "agency" "agreed" "certify"
[121] "sex" "couples" ""
[[537]]
[1] "CSS" "three" "foster" "parents"
[5] "affiliated" "agency" "filed" "suit"
[9] "City" "Department" "Commission" "The"
[13] "Support" "Center" "Child" "Advocates"
[17] "Philadelphia" "Family" "Pride" "intervened"
[21] "defendants" "As" "relevant" "CSS"
[25] "alleged" "referral" "freeze" "violated"
[29] "Free" "Exercise" "Free" "Speech"
[33] "Clauses" "First" "Amendment" "CSS"
[37] "sought" "temporary" "restraining" "order"
[41] "preliminary" "injunction" "directing" "Department"
[45] "continue" "referring" "children" "CSS"
[49] "without" "requiring" "agency" "certify"
[53] "sex" "couples" ""
[[538]]
[1] "The" "District" "Court"
[4] "denied" "preliminary" "relief"
[7] "It" "concluded" "contractual"
[10] "non" "discrimination" "requirement"
[13] "Fair" "Practices" "Ordinance"
[16] "neutral" "generally" "applicable"
[19] "Employment" "Division" "Department"
[22] "Human" "Resources" "Oregon"
[25] "v" "Smith" "U"
[28] "S" "S" "Ct"
[31] "L" "Ed" "d"
[34] "free" "exercise" "claim"
[37] "therefore" "unlikely" "succeed"
[40] "F" "Supp" "d"
[43] "E" "D" "Pa"
[46] "The" "court" "also"
[49] "determined" "free" "speech"
[52] "claims" "unlikely" "succeed"
[55] "CSS" "performed" "certifications"
[58] "part" "government" "program"
[61] "Id" ""
[[539]]
[1] "The" "Court" "Appeals"
[4] "Third" "Circuit" "affirmed"
[7] "Because" "contract" "parties"
[10] "expired" "court" "focused"
[13] "whether" "City" "insist"
[16] "inclusion" "new" "language"
[19] "forbidding" "discrimination" "basis"
[22] "sexual" "orientation" "condition"
[25] "contract" "renewal" "F"
[28] "d" "The" "court"
[31] "concluded" "proposed" "contractual"
[34] "terms" "neutral" "generally"
[37] "applicable" "policy" "Smith"
[40] "F" "d" "The"
[43] "court" "rejected" "agency"
[46] "s" "free" "speech"
[49] "claims" "grounds" "District"
[52] "Court" "Id" ""
[[540]]
[1] "CSS" "foster" "parents" "sought"
[5] "review" "They" "challenged" "Third"
[9] "Circuit" "s" "determination" "City"
[13] "s" "actions" "permissible" "Smith"
[17] "also" "asked" "Court" "reconsider"
[21] "precedent" ""
[[541]]
[1] "We" "granted" "certiorari" "U" "S"
[6] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[11] ""
[[542]]
[1] "II" ""
[[543]]
[1] "A" ""
[[544]]
[1] "" "The" "Free"
[4] "Exercise" "Clause" "First"
[7] "Amendment" "applicable" "States"
[10] "Fourteenth" "Amendment" "provides"
[13] "Congress" "shall" "make"
[16] "law" "prohibiting" "free"
[19] "exercise" "religion" "As"
[22] "initial" "matter" "plain"
[25] "City" "s" "actions"
[28] "burdened" "CSS" "s"
[31] "religious" "exercise" "putting"
[34] "choice" "curtailing" "mission"
[37] "approving" "relationships" "inconsistent"
[40] "beliefs" "The" "City"
[43] "disagrees" "In" "view"
[46] "certification" "reflects" "foster"
[49] "parents" "satisfy" "statutory"
[52] "criteria" "agency" "endorses"
[55] "relationships" "But" "CSS"
[58] "believes" "certification" "tantamount"
[61] "endorsement" "And" "religious"
[64] "beliefs" "need" "acceptable"
[67] "logical" "consistent" "comprehensible"
[70] "others" "order" "merit"
[73] "First" "Amendment" "protection"
[76] "Thomas" "v" "Review"
[79] "Bd" "Ind" "Employment"
[82] "Security" "Div" "U"
[85] "S" "S" "Ct"
[88] "L" "Ed" "d"
[91] "Our" "task" "decide"
[94] "whether" "burden" "City"
[97] "placed" "religious" "exercise"
[100] "CSS" "constitutionally" "permissible"
[103] ""
[[545]]
[1] "Smith" "held" "laws" "incidentally"
[5] "burdening" "religion" "ordinarily" "subject"
[9] "strict" "scrutiny" "Free" "Exercise"
[13] "Clause" "long" "neutral" "generally"
[17] "applicable" "U" "S" "S"
[21] "Ct" "CSS" "urges" "us"
[25] "overrule" "Smith" "concurrences" "judgment"
[29] "argue" "favor" "see" "post"
[33] "pp" "opinion" "ALITO" "J"
[37] "post" "p" "opinion" "GORSUCH"
[41] "J" "But" "need" "revisit"
[45] "decision" "This" "case" "falls"
[49] "outside" "Smith" "City" "burdened"
[53] "religious" "exercise" "CSS" "policies"
[57] "meet" "requirement" "neutral" "generally"
[61] "applicable" "See" "Church" "Lukumi"
[65] "Babalu" "Aye" "Inc" "v"
[69] "Hialeah" "U" "S" "S"
[73] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[77] ""
[[546]]
[1] "" "Government" "fails"
[4] "act" "neutrally" "proceeds"
[7] "manner" "intolerant" "religious"
[10] "beliefs" "restricts" "practices"
[13] "religious" "nature" "See"
[16] "Masterpiece" "Cakeshop" "Ltd"
[19] "v" "Colorado" "Civil"
[22] "Rights" "Comm" "n"
[25] "U" "S" "S"
[28] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[31] "d" "Lukumi" "U"
[34] "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "CSS" "points" "evidence"
[40] "record" "believes" "demonstrates"
[43] "City" "transgressed" "neutrality"
[46] "standard" "find" "straightforward"
[49] "resolve" "case" "rubric"
[52] "general" "applicability" ""
[[547]]
[1] "" "A" "law"
[4] "generally" "applicable" "invite"
[7] "s" "government" "consider"
[10] "particular" "reasons" "person"
[13] "s" "conduct" "providing"
[16] "mechanism" "individualized" "exemptions"
[19] "Smith" "U" "S"
[22] "S" "Ct" "quoting"
[25] "Bowen" "v" "Roy"
[28] "U" "S" "S"
[31] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[34] "d" "opinion" "BURGER"
[37] "C" "J" "joined"
[40] "POWELL" "AND" "REHNQUIST"
[43] "JJ" "For" "example"
[46] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[49] "U" "S" "S"
[52] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[55] "d" "Seventh" "day"
[58] "Adventist" "fired" "work"
[61] "Saturdays" "Unable" "find"
[64] "job" "allow" "keep"
[67] "Sabbath" "faith" "required"
[70] "applied" "unemployment" "benefits"
[73] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[76] "The" "State" "denied"
[79] "application" "law" "prohibiting"
[82] "eligibility" "claimants" "failed"
[85] "without" "good" "cause"
[88] "accept" "available" "suitable"
[91] "work" "Id" "S"
[94] "Ct" "internal" "quotation"
[97] "marks" "omitted" "We"
[100] "held" "denial" "infringed"
[103] "free" "exercise" "rights"
[106] "justified" "compelling" "interest"
[109] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[112] ""
[[548]]
[1] "Smith" "later" "explained" "unemployment"
[5] "benefits" "law" "Sherbert" "generally"
[9] "applicable" "good" "cause" "standard"
[13] "permitted" "government" "grant" "exemptions"
[17] "based" "circumstances" "underlying" "application"
[21] "See" "U" "S" "S"
[25] "Ct" "citing" "Roy" "U"
[29] "S" "S" "Ct" "Sherbert"
[33] "U" "S" "n" "S"
[37] "Ct" "Smith" "went" "hold"
[41] "State" "place" "system" "individual"
[45] "exemptions" "may" "refuse" "extend"
[49] "system" "cases" "religious" "hardship"
[53] "without" "compelling" "reason" "U"
[57] "S" "S" "Ct" "quoting"
[61] "Roy" "U" "S" "S"
[65] "Ct" "see" "also" "Lukumi"
[69] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[73] ""
[[549]]
[1] "" "A" "law"
[4] "also" "lacks" "general"
[7] "applicability" "prohibits" "religious"
[10] "conduct" "permitting" "secular"
[13] "conduct" "undermines" "government"
[16] "s" "asserted" "interests"
[19] "similar" "way" "See"
[22] "id" "S" "Ct"
[25] "In" "Church" "Lukumi"
[28] "Babalu" "Aye" "Inc"
[31] "v" "Hialeah" "instance"
[34] "City" "Hialeah" "adopted"
[37] "several" "ordinances" "prohibiting"
[40] "animal" "sacrifice" "practice"
[43] "Santeria" "faith" "Id"
[46] "S" "Ct" "The"
[49] "City" "claimed" "ordinances"
[52] "necessary" "part" "protect"
[55] "public" "health" "threatened"
[58] "disposal" "animal" "carcasses"
[61] "open" "public" "places"
[64] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[67] "But" "ordinances" "regulate"
[70] "hunters" "disposal" "kills"
[73] "improper" "garbage" "disposal"
[76] "restaurants" "posed" "similar"
[79] "hazard" "Id" "S"
[82] "Ct" "The" "Court"
[85] "concluded" "forms" "underinclusiveness"
[88] "meant" "ordinances" "generally"
[91] "applicable" "Id" "S"
[94] "Ct" ""
[[550]]
[1] "" "B" ""
[[551]]
[1] "" "The" "City" "initially" "argued"
[6] "CSS" "s" "practice" "violated" "section"
[11] "standard" "foster" "care" "contract" "We"
[16] "conclude" "however" "provision" "generally" "applicable"
[21] "required" "Smith" "The" "current" "version"
[26] "section" "specifies" "pertinent" "part" ""
[[552]]
[1] "" "Rejection" "Referral" "Provider"
[5] "shall" "reject" "child" "family"
[9] "including" "limited" "prospective" "foster"
[13] "adoptive" "parents" "Services" "based"
[17] "upon" "sexual" "orientation" "unless"
[21] "exception" "granted" "Commissioner" "Commissioner"
[25] "s" "designee" "sole" "discretion"
[29] "Supp" "App" "Brief" "City"
[33] "Respondents" ""
[[553]]
[1] "This" "provision" "requires" "agency"
[5] "provide" "Services" "defined" "work"
[9] "performed" "Contract" "App" "prospective"
[13] "foster" "parents" "regardless" "sexual"
[17] "orientation" ""
[[554]]
[1] "" "Like" "good" "cause"
[5] "provision" "Sherbert" "section" "incorporates"
[9] "system" "individual" "exemptions" "made"
[13] "available" "case" "sole" "discretion"
[17] "Commissioner" "The" "City" "made"
[21] "clear" "Commissioner" "intention" "granting"
[25] "exception" "CSS" "App" "Pet"
[29] "Cert" "But" "City" "may"
[33] "refuse" "extend" "exemption" "system"
[37] "cases" "religious" "hardship" "without"
[41] "compelling" "reason" "Smith" "U"
[45] "S" "S" "Ct" "quoting"
[49] "Roy" "U" "S" "S"
[53] "Ct" ""
[[555]]
[1] "The" "City" "intervenor" "respondents"
[5] "resist" "conclusion" "several" "grounds"
[9] "They" "first" "argue" "governments"
[13] "enjoy" "greater" "leeway" "Free"
[17] "Exercise" "Clause" "setting" "rules"
[21] "contractors" "regulating" "general" "public"
[25] "The" "government" "observe" "commands"
[29] "heightened" "powers" "managing" "internal"
[33] "operations" "See" "NASA" "v"
[37] "Nelson" "U" "S" "S"
[41] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[45] "Engquist" "v" "Oregon" "Dept"
[49] "Agriculture" "U" "S" "S"
[53] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[57] "And" "individuals" "enter" "government"
[61] "employment" "contracts" "accept" "certain"
[65] "restrictions" "freedom" "part" "deal"
[69] "See" "Garcetti" "v" "Ceballos"
[73] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[77] "L" "Ed" "d" "Board"
[81] "Comm" "rs" "Wabaunsee" "Cty"
[85] "v" "Umbehr" "U" "S"
[89] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[93] "d" "Given" "context" "City"
[97] "intervenor" "respondents" "contend" "government"
[101] "freer" "hand" "dealing" "contractors"
[105] "like" "CSS" ""
[[556]]
[1] "" "These" "considerations"
[4] "save" "City" "As"
[7] "Philadelphia" "rightly" "acknowledges"
[10] "principles" "neutrality" "general"
[13] "applicability" "still" "constrain"
[16] "government" "capacity" "manager"
[19] "Brief" "City" "Respondents"
[22] "We" "never" "suggested"
[25] "government" "may" "discriminate"
[28] "religion" "acting" "managerial"
[31] "role" "And" "Smith"
[34] "drew" "support" "neutral"
[37] "generally" "applicable" "standard"
[40] "cases" "involving" "internal"
[43] "government" "affairs" "See"
[46] "U" "S" "n"
[49] "S" "Ct" "citing"
[52] "Lyng" "v" "Northwest"
[55] "Indian" "Cemetery" "Protective"
[58] "Assn" "U" "S"
[61] "S" "Ct" "L"
[64] "Ed" "d" "Roy"
[67] "U" "S" "S"
[70] "Ct" "The" "City"
[73] "intervenor" "respondents" "accordingly"
[76] "ask" "courts" "apply"
[79] "deferential" "approach" "determining"
[82] "whether" "policy" "neutral"
[85] "generally" "applicable" "contracting"
[88] "context" "We" "find"
[91] "need" "resolve" "narrow"
[94] "issue" "case" "No"
[97] "matter" "level" "deference"
[100] "extend" "City" "inclusion"
[103] "formal" "system" "entirely"
[106] "discretionary" "exceptions" "section"
[109] "renders" "contractual" "non"
[112] "discrimination" "requirement" "generally"
[115] "applicable" ""
[[557]]
[1] "Perhaps" "explains" "City"
[4] "now" "contends" "section"
[7] "apply" "CSS" "s"
[10] "refusal" "certify" "sex"
[13] "couples" "Contrast" "App"
[16] "Pet" "Cert" "Brief"
[19] "City" "Respondents" "Instead"
[22] "City" "says" "section"
[25] "addresses" "agency" "s"
[28] "right" "refuse" "referrals"
[31] "place" "child" "certified"
[34] "foster" "family" "Brief"
[37] "City" "Respondents" "We"
[40] "think" "City" "right"
[43] "first" "time" "Although"
[46] "section" "titled" "Rejection"
[49] "Referral" "text" "sweeps"
[52] "broadly" "forbidding" "rejection"
[55] "prospective" "foster" "parents"
[58] "Services" "without" "limitation"
[61] "Supp" "App" "Brief"
[64] "City" "Respondents" "The"
[67] "City" "maintains" "certification"
[70] "one" "services" "foster"
[73] "agencies" "hired" "perform"
[76] "attempt" "backtrack" "reach"
[79] "section" "unavailing" "See"
[82] "A" "Scalia" "B"
[85] "Garner" "Reading" "Law"
[88] "The" "Interpretation" "Legal"
[91] "Texts" "A" "title"
[94] "heading" "never" "allowed"
[97] "override" "plain" "words"
[100] "text" "Moreover" "City"
[103] "adopted" "current" "version"
[106] "section" "shortly" "declaring"
[109] "make" "CSS" "s"
[112] "obligation" "certify" "sex"
[115] "couples" "explicit" "future"
[118] "contracts" "App" "Pet"
[121] "Cert" "confirming" "understanding"
[124] "text" "provision" ""
[[558]]
[1] "" "The" "City"
[4] "intervenor" "respondents" "add"
[7] "notwithstanding" "system" "exceptions"
[10] "section" "separate" "provision"
[13] "contract" "independently" "prohibits"
[16] "discrimination" "certification" "foster"
[19] "parents" "That" "provision"
[22] "section" "bars" "discrimination"
[25] "basis" "sexual" "orientation"
[28] "face" "allow" "exceptions"
[31] "See" "Supp" "App"
[34] "Brief" "City" "Respondents"
[37] "But" "state" "law"
[40] "makes" "clear" "one"
[43] "part" "contract" "interpreted"
[46] "annul" "another" "part"
[49] "Shehadi" "v" "Northeastern"
[52] "Nat" "Bank" "Pa"
[55] "Pa" "A" "d"
[58] "see" "Commonwealth" "ex"
[61] "rel" "Kane" "v"
[64] "UPMC" "Pa" "A"
[67] "d" "Applying" "fundamental"
[70] "rule" "Shehadi" "Pa"
[73] "A" "d" "exception"
[76] "section" "also" "must"
[79] "govern" "prohibition" "section"
[82] "lest" "City" "s"
[85] "reservation" "authority" "grant"
[88] "exception" "nullity" "As"
[91] "result" "contract" "whole"
[94] "contains" "generally" "applicable"
[97] "non" "discrimination" "requirement"
[100] ""
[[559]]
[1] "" "Finally" "City" "intervenor"
[5] "respondents" "contend" "availability" "exceptions"
[9] "section" "irrelevant" "Commissioner" "never"
[13] "granted" "one" "That" "misapprehends"
[17] "issue" "The" "creation" "formal"
[21] "mechanism" "granting" "exceptions" "renders"
[25] "policy" "generally" "applicable" "regardless"
[29] "whether" "exceptions" "given" "invite"
[33] "s" "government" "decide" "reasons"
[37] "complying" "policy" "worthy" "solicitude"
[41] "Smith" "U" "S" "S"
[45] "Ct" "Commissioner" "s" "sole"
[49] "discretion" ""
[[560]]
[1] "The" "concurrence" "objects" "party"
[5] "raised" "arguments" "Court" "Post"
[9] "opinion" "GORSUCH" "J" "But"
[13] "CSS" "supported" "United" "States"
[17] "contended" "City" "s" "made"
[21] "CSS" "Section" "permits" "discretionary"
[25] "exception" "s" "requirement" "reject"
[29] "child" "family" "based" "upon"
[33] "sexual" "orientation" "alone" "triggers"
[37] "strict" "scrutiny" "Reply" "Brief"
[41] "quoting" "Supp" "App" "Brief"
[45] "City" "Respondents" "alterations" "original"
[49] "see" "also" "Brief" "Petitioners"
[53] "section" "triggers" "strict" "scrutiny"
[57] "Brief" "United" "States" "Amicus"
[61] "Curiae" "The" "concurrence" "favors"
[65] "City" "s" "reading" "section"
[69] "see" "post" "find" "CSS"
[73] "s" "position" "persuasive" ""
[[561]]
[1] "C" ""
[[562]]
[1] "" "In" "addition"
[4] "relying" "contract" "City"
[7] "argues" "CSS" "s"
[10] "refusal" "certify" "sex"
[13] "couples" "constitutes" "Unlawful"
[16] "Public" "Accommodations" "Practice"
[19] "violation" "Fair" "Practices"
[22] "Ordinance" "That" "ordinance"
[25] "forbids" "deny" "ing"
[28] "interfer" "ing" "public"
[31] "accommodations" "opportunities" "individual"
[34] "otherwise" "discriminat" "ing"
[37] "based" "race" "ethnicity"
[40] "color" "sex" "sexual"
[43] "orientation" "disability" "marital"
[46] "status" "familial" "status"
[49] "several" "protected" "categories"
[52] "Phila" "Code" "The"
[55] "City" "contends" "foster"
[58] "care" "agencies" "public"
[61] "accommodations" "therefore" "forbidden"
[64] "discriminating" "basis" "sexual"
[67] "orientation" "certifying" "foster"
[70] "parents" ""
[[563]]
[1] "CSS" "counters" "foster"
[4] "care" "never" "treated"
[7] "public" "accommodation" "Philadelphia"
[10] "Brief" "Petitioners" "In"
[13] "event" "CSS" "adds"
[16] "ordinance" "qualify" "generally"
[19] "applicable" "City" "allows"
[22] "exceptions" "secular" "reasons"
[25] "despite" "denying" "one"
[28] "CSS" "s" "religious"
[31] "exercise" "But" "constitutional"
[34] "issue" "arises" "ordinance"
[37] "applies" "CSS" "first"
[40] "place" "We" "conclude"
[43] "foster" "care" "agencies"
[46] "act" "public" "accommodations"
[49] "performing" "certifications" ""
[[564]]
[1] "" "The" "ordinance"
[4] "defines" "public" "accommodation"
[7] "relevant" "part" "ny"
[10] "place" "provider" "public"
[13] "conveyance" "whether" "licensed"
[16] "solicits" "accepts" "patronage"
[19] "trade" "public" "whose"
[22] "goods" "services" "facilities"
[25] "privileges" "advantages" "accommodations"
[28] "extended" "offered" "sold"
[31] "otherwise" "made" "available"
[34] "public" "w" "Certification"
[37] "made" "available" "public"
[40] "usual" "sense" "words"
[43] "To" "make" "service"
[46] "available" "means" "make"
[49] "accessible" "obtainable" "Merriam"
[52] "Webster" "s" "Collegiate"
[55] "Dictionary" "th" "ed"
[58] "see" "also" "Oxford"
[61] "English" "Dictionary" "d"
[64] "ed" "capable" "made"
[67] "use" "one" "s"
[70] "disposal" "within" "one"
[73] "s" "reach" "Related"
[76] "state" "law" "illustrates"
[79] "point" "A" "Pennsylvania"
[82] "antidiscrimination" "statute" "similarly"
[85] "defines" "public" "accommodation"
[88] "accommodation" "open" "accepts"
[91] "solicits" "patronage" "general"
[94] "public" "Pa" "Stat"
[97] "Ann" "Tit" "l"
[100] "Purdon" "Cum" "Supp"
[103] "It" "fleshes" "definition"
[106] "examples" "like" "hotels"
[109] "restaurants" "drug" "stores"
[112] "swimming" "pools" "barbershops"
[115] "public" "conveyances" "Ibid"
[118] "The" "common" "theme"
[121] "public" "accommodation" "must"
[124] "provide" "benefit" "general"
[127] "public" "allowing" "individual"
[130] "members" "general" "public"
[133] "avail" "benefit" "desire"
[136] "Blizzard" "v" "Floyd"
[139] "Pa" "Commw" "A"
[142] "d" ""
[[565]]
[1] "Certification" "foster" "parent"
[4] "contrast" "readily" "accessible"
[7] "public" "It" "involves"
[10] "customized" "selective" "assessment"
[13] "bears" "little" "resemblance"
[16] "staying" "hotel" "eating"
[19] "restaurant" "riding" "bus"
[22] "The" "process" "takes"
[25] "three" "six" "months"
[28] "Applicants" "must" "pass"
[31] "background" "checks" "medical"
[34] "exam" "Foster" "agencies"
[37] "required" "conduct" "intensive"
[40] "home" "study" "evaluate"
[43] "among" "things" "applicants"
[46] "mental" "emotional" "adjustment"
[49] "community" "ties" "family"
[52] "friends" "neighbors" "e"
[55] "xisting" "family" "relationships"
[58] "attitudes" "expectations" "regarding"
[61] "applicant" "s" "children"
[64] "parent" "child" "relationships"
[67] "Pa" "Code" "Such"
[70] "inquiries" "raise" "eyebrows"
[73] "local" "bus" "station"
[76] "And" "agencies" "understandably"
[79] "approach" "sensitive" "process"
[82] "different" "angles" "As"
[85] "City" "explains" "prospective"
[88] "foster" "parents" "e"
[91] "ach" "agency" "slightly"
[94] "different" "requirements" "specialties"
[97] "training" "programs" "App"
[100] "Pet" "Cert" "All"
[103] "confirms" "one" "size"
[106] "fits" "public" "accommodations"
[109] "model" "poor" "match"
[112] "foster" "care" "system"
[115] ""
[[566]]
[1] "" "The" "City" "asks"
[5] "us" "adhere" "District" "Court"
[9] "s" "contrary" "determination" "CSS"
[13] "qualifies" "public" "accommodation" "ordinance"
[17] "The" "concurrence" "adopts" "City"
[21] "s" "argument" "seeing" "incongruity"
[25] "deeming" "private" "religious" "foster"
[29] "agency" "public" "accommodation" "See"
[33] "post" "opinion" "GORSUCH" "J"
[37] "We" "respectfully" "disagree" "view"
[41] "City" "concurrence" "Although" "ordinarily"
[45] "defer" "lower" "court" "constructions"
[49] "state" "statutes" "invariably" "Frisby"
[53] "v" "Schultz" "U" "S"
[57] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[61] "d" "citation" "omitted" "Deference"
[65] "inappropriate" "The" "District" "Court"
[69] "take" "account" "uniquely" "selective"
[73] "nature" "certification" "process" "must"
[77] "inform" "applicability" "ordinance" "We"
[81] "agree" "CSS" "s" "position"
[85] "maintained" "beginning" "dispute" "foster"
[89] "services" "constitute" "public" "accommodation"
[93] "City" "s" "Fair" "Practices"
[97] "Ordinance" "therefore" "bound" "ordinance"
[101] "App" "Pet" "Cert" "We"
[105] "therefore" "need" "assess" "whether"
[109] "ordinance" "generally" "applicable" ""
[[567]]
[1] "III" ""
[[568]]
[1] "The" "contractual" "non"
[4] "discrimination" "requirement" "imposes"
[7] "burden" "CSS" "s"
[10] "religious" "exercise" "qualify"
[13] "generally" "applicable" "The"
[16] "concurrence" "protests" "Court"
[19] "granted" "certiorari" "decide"
[22] "whether" "overrule" "Smith"
[25] "chides" "Court" "seeking"
[28] "sidestep" "question" "Post"
[31] "opinion" "GORSUCH" "J"
[34] "But" "Court" "also"
[37] "granted" "review" "decide"
[40] "whether" "Philadelphia" "s"
[43] "actions" "permissible" "precedents"
[46] "See" "Pet" "Cert"
[49] "CSS" "demonstrated" "City"
[52] "s" "actions" "subject"
[55] "rigorous" "scrutiny" "precedents"
[58] "Lukumi" "U" "S"
[61] "S" "Ct" "Because"
[64] "City" "s" "actions"
[67] "therefore" "examined" "strictest"
[70] "scrutiny" "regardless" "Smith"
[73] "occasion" "reconsider" "decision"
[76] ""
[[569]]
[1] "" "A" "government" "policy" "can"
[6] "survive" "strict" "scrutiny" "advances" "interests"
[11] "highest" "order" "narrowly" "tailored" "achieve"
[16] "interests" "Lukumi" "U" "S" "S"
[21] "Ct" "internal" "quotation" "marks" "omitted"
[26] "Put" "another" "way" "long" "government"
[31] "can" "achieve" "interests" "manner" "burden"
[36] "religion" "must" ""
[[570]]
[1] "" "The" "City"
[4] "asserts" "non" "discrimination"
[7] "policies" "serve" "three"
[10] "compelling" "interests" "maximizing"
[13] "number" "foster" "parents"
[16] "protecting" "City" "liability"
[19] "ensuring" "equal" "treatment"
[22] "prospective" "foster" "parents"
[25] "foster" "children" "The"
[28] "City" "states" "objectives"
[31] "high" "level" "generality"
[34] "First" "Amendment" "demands"
[37] "precise" "analysis" "See"
[40] "Gonzales" "v" "O"
[43] "Centro" "Esp" "rita"
[46] "Beneficente" "Uni" "o"
[49] "Vegetal" "U" "S"
[52] "S" "Ct" "L"
[55] "Ed" "d" "discussing"
[58] "compelling" "interest" "test"
[61] "applied" "Sherbert" "Wisconsin"
[64] "v" "Yoder" "U"
[67] "S" "S" "Ct"
[70] "L" "Ed" "d"
[73] "Rather" "rely" "broadly"
[76] "formulated" "interests" "courts"
[79] "must" "scrutinize" "asserted"
[82] "harm" "granting" "specific"
[85] "exemptions" "particular" "religious"
[88] "claimants" "O" "Centro"
[91] "U" "S" "S"
[94] "Ct" "The" "question"
[97] "whether" "City" "compelling"
[100] "interest" "enforcing" "non"
[103] "discrimination" "policies" "generally"
[106] "whether" "interest" "denying"
[109] "exception" "CSS" ""
[[571]]
[1] "" "Once" "properly" "narrowed"
[5] "City" "s" "asserted" "interests"
[9] "insufficient" "Maximizing" "number" "foster"
[13] "families" "minimizing" "liability" "important"
[17] "goals" "City" "fails" "show"
[21] "granting" "CSS" "exception" "will"
[25] "put" "goals" "risk" "If"
[29] "anything" "including" "CSS" "program"
[33] "seems" "likely" "increase" "reduce"
[37] "number" "available" "foster" "parents"
[41] "As" "liability" "City" "offers"
[45] "speculation" "might" "sued" "CSS"
[49] "s" "certification" "practices" "Such"
[53] "speculation" "insufficient" "satisfy" "strict"
[57] "scrutiny" "see" "Brown" "v"
[61] "Entertainment" "Merchants" "Assn" "U"
[65] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[69] "Ed" "d" "particularly" "authority"
[73] "certify" "foster" "families" "delegated"
[77] "agencies" "State" "City" "see"
[81] "Pa" "Code" ""
[[572]]
[1] "" "That" "leaves"
[4] "interest" "City" "equal"
[7] "treatment" "prospective" "foster"
[10] "parents" "foster" "children"
[13] "We" "doubt" "interest"
[16] "weighty" "one" "o"
[19] "ur" "society" "come"
[22] "recognition" "gay" "persons"
[25] "gay" "couples" "treated"
[28] "social" "outcasts" "inferior"
[31] "dignity" "worth" "Masterpiece"
[34] "Cakeshop" "U" "S"
[37] "S" "Ct" "On"
[40] "facts" "case" "however"
[43] "interest" "justify" "denying"
[46] "CSS" "exception" "religious"
[49] "exercise" "The" "creation"
[52] "system" "exceptions" "contract"
[55] "undermines" "City" "s"
[58] "contention" "non" "discrimination"
[61] "policies" "can" "brook"
[64] "departures" "See" "Lukumi"
[67] "U" "S" "S"
[70] "Ct" "The" "City"
[73] "offers" "compelling" "reason"
[76] "particular" "interest" "denying"
[79] "exception" "CSS" "making"
[82] "available" "others" ""
[[573]]
[1] "" ""
[[574]]
[1] "As" "Philadelphia" "acknowledges" "CSS"
[5] "long" "point" "light" "City"
[9] "s" "foster" "care" "system"
[13] "Brief" "City" "Respondents" "CSS"
[17] "seeks" "accommodation" "will" "allow"
[21] "continue" "serving" "children" "Philadelphia"
[25] "manner" "consistent" "religious" "beliefs"
[29] "seek" "impose" "beliefs" "anyone"
[33] "else" "The" "refusal" "Philadelphia"
[37] "contract" "CSS" "provision" "foster"
[41] "care" "services" "unless" "agrees"
[45] "certify" "sex" "couples" "foster"
[49] "parents" "survive" "strict" "scrutiny"
[53] "violates" "First" "Amendment" ""
[[575]]
[1] "In" "view" "conclusion" "actions" "City"
[6] "violate" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "need"
[11] "consider" "whether" "also" "violate" "Free"
[16] "Speech" "Clause" ""
[[576]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "United" "States"
[5] "Court" "Appeals" "Third" "Circuit"
[9] "reversed" "case" "remanded" "proceedings"
[13] "consistent" "opinion" ""
[[577]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[578]]
[1] "Justice" "BARRETT" "Justice" "KAVANAUGH" "joins"
[6] "Justice" "BREYER" "joins" "first" "paragraph"
[11] "concurring" ""
[[579]]
[1] "In" "Employment" "Div"
[4] "Dept" "Human" "Resources"
[7] "Ore" "v" "Smith"
[10] "U" "S" "S"
[13] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[16] "d" "Court" "held"
[19] "neutral" "generally" "applicable"
[22] "law" "typically" "violate"
[25] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[28] "matter" "severely" "law"
[31] "burdens" "religious" "exercise"
[34] "Petitioners" "amici" "scholars"
[37] "Justices" "Court" "made"
[40] "serious" "arguments" "Smith"
[43] "overruled" "While" "history"
[46] "looms" "large" "debate"
[49] "I" "find" "historical"
[52] "record" "silent" "supportive"
[55] "question" "whether" "founding"
[58] "generation" "understood" "First"
[61] "Amendment" "require" "religious"
[64] "exemptions" "generally" "applicable"
[67] "laws" "least" "circumstances"
[70] "In" "view" "textual"
[73] "structural" "arguments" "Smith"
[76] "compelling" "As" "matter"
[79] "text" "structure" "difficult"
[82] "see" "Free" "Exercise"
[85] "Clause" "lone" "among"
[88] "First" "Amendment" "freedoms"
[91] "offers" "nothing" "protection"
[94] "discrimination" ""
[[580]]
[1] "Yet" "replace" "Smith"
[4] "The" "prevailing" "assumption"
[7] "seems" "strict" "scrutiny"
[10] "apply" "whenever" "neutral"
[13] "generally" "applicable" "law"
[16] "burdens" "religious" "exercise"
[19] "But" "I" "skeptical"
[22] "swapping" "Smith" "s"
[25] "categorical" "antidiscrimination" "approach"
[28] "equally" "categorical" "strict"
[31] "scrutiny" "regime" "particularly"
[34] "Court" "s" "resolution"
[37] "conflicts" "generally" "applicable"
[40] "laws" "First" "Amendment"
[43] "rights" "like" "speech"
[46] "assembly" "much" "nuanced"
[49] "There" "number" "issues"
[52] "work" "Smith" "overruled"
[55] "To" "name" "Should"
[58] "entities" "like" "Catholic"
[61] "Social" "Services" "arm"
[64] "Catholic" "Church" "treated"
[67] "differently" "individuals" "Cf"
[70] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "Evangelical"
[73] "Lutheran" "Church" "School"
[76] "v" "EEOC" "U"
[79] "S" "S" "Ct"
[82] "L" "Ed" "d"
[85] "Should" "distinction" "indirect"
[88] "direct" "burdens" "religious"
[91] "exercise" "Cf" "Braunfeld"
[94] "v" "Brown" "U"
[97] "S" "S" "Ct"
[100] "L" "Ed" "d"
[103] "plurality" "opinion" "What"
[106] "forms" "scrutiny" "apply"
[109] "Compare" "Sherbert" "v"
[112] "Verner" "U" "S"
[115] "S" "Ct" "L"
[118] "Ed" "d" "assessing"
[121] "whether" "government" "s"
[124] "interest" "compelling" "Gillette"
[127] "v" "United" "States"
[130] "U" "S" "S"
[133] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[136] "d" "assessing" "whether"
[139] "government" "s" "interest"
[142] "substantial" "And" "answer"
[145] "strict" "scrutiny" "pre"
[148] "Smith" "cases" "rejecting"
[151] "free" "exercise" "challenges"
[154] "garden" "variety" "laws"
[157] "come" "way" "See"
[160] "Smith" "U" "S"
[163] "S" "Ct" ""
[[581]]
[1] "We" "need" "wrestle"
[4] "questions" "case" "though"
[7] "standard" "applies" "regardless"
[10] "whether" "Smith" "stays"
[13] "goes" "A" "longstanding"
[16] "tenet" "free" "exercise"
[19] "jurisprudence" "one" "pre"
[22] "dates" "survives" "Smith"
[25] "law" "burdening" "religious"
[28] "exercise" "must" "satisfy"
[31] "strict" "scrutiny" "gives"
[34] "government" "officials" "discretion"
[37] "grant" "individualized" "exemptions"
[40] "See" "id" "S"
[43] "Ct" "law" "generally"
[46] "applicable" "State" "place"
[49] "system" "individual" "exemptions"
[52] "citing" "Sherbert" "U"
[55] "S" "n" "S"
[58] "Ct" "see" "also"
[61] "Cantwell" "v" "Connecticut"
[64] "U" "S" "S"
[67] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[70] "subjecting" "statute" "heightened"
[73] "scrutiny" "exemptions" "lay"
[76] "discretion" "government" "official"
[79] "As" "Court" "s"
[82] "opinion" "today" "explains"
[85] "government" "contract" "issue"
[88] "provides" "individualized" "exemptions"
[91] "nondiscrimination" "rule" "thus"
[94] "triggering" "strict" "scrutiny"
[97] "And" "nine" "Justices"
[100] "agree" "City" "satisfy"
[103] "strict" "scrutiny" "I"
[106] "therefore" "see" "reason"
[109] "decide" "case" "whether"
[112] "Smith" "overruled" "much"
[115] "less" "replace" "I"
[118] "join" "Court" "s"
[121] "opinion" "full" ""
[[582]]
[1] "" ""
[[583]]
[1] "Mr" "Chief" "Justice" "WARREN" "announced"
[6] "judgment" "Court" "opinion" "Mr" "Justice"
[11] "BLACK" "Mr" "Justice" "CLARK" "Mr"
[16] "Justice" "WHITTAKER" "concur" ""
[[584]]
[1] "The" "principal" "issues" "presented"
[5] "case" "whether" "Massachusetts" "Sunday"
[9] "Closing" "Laws" "violate" "equal"
[13] "protection" "statutes" "respecting" "establishment"
[17] "religion" "prohibit" "free" "exercise"
[21] "thereof" ""
[[585]]
[1] "Appellees" "Crown" "Kosher"
[4] "Super" "Market" "corporation"
[7] "whose" "four" "stockholders"
[10] "officers" "directors" "members"
[13] "Orthodox" "Jewish" "faith"
[16] "operates" "Springfield" "Massachusetts"
[19] "sells" "kosher" "meat"
[22] "food" "products" "almost"
[25] "exclusively" "kosher" "many"
[28] "orthodox" "Jewish" "customers"
[31] "three" "Crown" "s"
[34] "customers" "Orthodox" "Jewish"
[37] "faith" "whose" "religion"
[40] "forbids" "shop" "Sabbath"
[43] "requires" "eat" "kosher"
[46] "food" "representatives" "class"
[49] "patrons" "chief" "orthodox"
[52] "rabbi" "Springfield" "representative"
[55] "class" "orthodox" "rabbis"
[58] "whose" "duties" "include"
[61] "inspecting" "kosher" "food"
[64] "markets" "insure" "compliance"
[67] "Orthodox" "Jewish" "dietary"
[70] "laws" ""
[[586]]
[1] "Crown" "previously" "open" "business"
[5] "Sunday" "day" "conducted" "one"
[9] "third" "weekly" "business" "No"
[13] "supermarket" "Springfield" "area" "kept"
[17] "open" "Sunday" "Since" "Orthodox"
[21] "Jewish" "religion" "requires" "members"
[25] "refrain" "commercial" "activity" "Sabbath"
[29] "sundown" "Friday" "sundown" "Saturday"
[33] "Crown" "open" "hours" "Although"
[37] "statutory" "provision" "permits" "Sabbatarians"
[41] "keep" "shops" "open" "m"
[45] "Sunday" "sale" "kosher" "meat"
[49] "Crown" "economically" "impractical" "reason"
[53] "Crown" "open" "sundown" "Saturday"
[57] ""
[[587]]
[1] "Those" "provisions" "law"
[4] "immediately" "attack" "chapter"
[7] "entitled" "Observance" "Lord"
[10] "s" "Day" "They"
[13] "forbid" "penalty" "fine"
[16] "fifty" "dollars" "keeping"
[19] "open" "shops" "labor"
[22] "business" "work" "Sunday"
[25] "Works" "necessity" "charity"
[28] "excepted" "operation" "certain"
[31] "public" "utilities" "There"
[34] "also" "exemptions" "retail"
[37] "sale" "drugs" "retail"
[40] "sale" "tobacco" "certain"
[43] "vendors" "retail" "sale"
[46] "making" "bread" "given"
[49] "hours" "certain" "dealers"
[52] "retail" "sale" "frozen"
[55] "desserts" "confectioneries" "fruits"
[58] "various" "listed" "sellers"
[61] "The" "statutes" "attack"
[64] "permit" "Sunday" "sale"
[67] "live" "bait" "noncommercial"
[70] "fishing" "sale" "meals"
[73] "consumed" "premises" "operation"
[76] "letting" "motor" "vehicles"
[79] "sale" "items" "emergency"
[82] "services" "necessary" "thereto"
[85] "letting" "horses" "carriages"
[88] "boats" "bicycles" "unpaid"
[91] "work" "pleasure" "boats"
[94] "private" "gardens" "grounds"
[97] "cause" "unreasonable" "noise"
[100] "running" "trains" "boats"
[103] "printing" "sale" "delivery"
[106] "newspapers" "operation" "bootblacks"
[109] "m" "unless" "locally"
[112] "prohibited" "wholesale" "retail"
[115] "sale" "milk" "ice"
[118] "fuel" "wholesale" "handling"
[121] "delivery" "fish" "perishable"
[124] "foodstuffs" "sale" "wholesale"
[127] "dressed" "poultry" "making"
[130] "butter" "cheese" "general"
[133] "interstate" "truck" "transportation"
[136] "m" "p" "m"
[139] "times" "cases" "emergency"
[142] "intrastate" "truck" "transportation"
[145] "petroleum" "products" "m"
[148] "p" "m" "transportation"
[151] "livestock" "farm" "items"
[154] "participation" "fairs" "sporting"
[157] "events" "sale" "fruits"
[160] "vegetables" "grower" "s"
[163] "premises" "keeping" "open"
[166] "public" "bathhouses" "digging"
[169] "claims" "icing" "dressing"
[172] "fish" "sale" "works"
[175] "art" "exhibitions" "conducting"
[178] "private" "trade" "expositions"
[181] "p" "m" "p"
[184] "m" ""
[[588]]
[1] "These" "statutes" "prohibit" "Sunday"
[5] "business" "labor" "Sabbatarian" "observers"
[9] "long" "disturbs" "person" "However"
[13] "construed" "forbid" "keeping" "open"
[17] "shops" "sale" "merchandise" "Commonwealth"
[21] "v" "Has" "Mass" "Permission"
[25] "granted" "local" "option" "Sunday"
[29] "operation" "p" "m" "amusement"
[33] "parks" "beach" "resorts" "including"
[37] "participation" "bowling" "games" "amusement"
[41] "prizes" "awarded" "Special" "licenses"
[45] "emergency" "Sunday" "work" "may"
[49] "obtained" "local" "officials" ""
[[589]]
[1] "Other" "provisions" "Massachusetts"
[4] "Sunday" "legislation" "make"
[7] "generally" "unlawful" "Sunday"
[10] "attendance" "participation" "public"
[13] "entertainments" "except" "duly"
[16] "licensed" "locally" "conducted"
[19] "p" "m" "keeping"
[22] "character" "day" "servance"
[25] ""
[[590]]
[1] "Although" "general" "bar" "games"
[5] "sports" "Sunday" "professional" "sports"
[9] "may" "played" "p" "m"
[13] "p" "m" "indoor" "hockey"
[17] "basketball" "time" "p" "m"
[21] "amateur" "sports" "may" "played"
[25] "p" "m" "p" "m"
[29] "subject" "local" "option" "game"
[33] "may" "conducted" "within" "one"
[37] "thousand" "feet" "regular" "place"
[41] "worship" "except" "public" "playground"
[45] "park" "There" "specific" "bans"
[49] "auto" "racing" "horse" "racing"
[53] "boxing" "hunting" "firearms" "And"
[57] "number" "additional" "exemptions" "general"
[61] "proscription" "Golf" "tennis" "dancing"
[65] "weddings" "concerts" "sacred" "music"
[69] "celebration" "religious" "customs" "rituals"
[73] "allowed" "Sunday" "operation" "miniature"
[77] "golf" "courses" "golf" "driving"
[81] "ranges" "p" "m" "Motion"
[85] "pictures" "may" "exhibited" "hour"
[89] "local" "license" "obtained" "Parades"
[93] "music" "certain" "commemorative" "purposes"
[97] "may" "held" "Sunday" "veterans"
[101] "civic" "fraternal" "policemen" "s"
[105] "firemen" "s" "organizations" "providing"
[109] "suspended" "passing" "within" "two"
[113] "hundred" "feet" "public" "worship"
[117] "services" ""
[[591]]
[1] "Persons" "keep" "places" "public"
[5] "entertainment" "refreshment" "lose" "licenses"
[9] "entertain" "Sunday" "people" "travelers"
[13] "strangers" "lodgers" "With" "limited"
[17] "exceptions" "discharging" "firearms" "sport"
[21] "except" "one" "s" "land"
[25] "fishing" "commercial" "purposes" "fishing"
[29] "nets" "spears" "prohibited" "Sunday"
[33] "The" "use" "gaming" "devices"
[37] "allowed" "Outdoor" "exercise" "without"
[41] "element" "contest" "generally" "permitted"
[45] "taking" "mammals" "means" "traps"
[49] "Heavier" "penalties" "imposed" "willful"
[53] "cutting" "destruction" "timber" "shrubs"
[57] "fruits" "vegetables" "Sunday" "days"
[61] "week" ""
[[592]]
[1] "Still" "statutory" "sections" "make"
[5] "crime" "employers" "require" "employees"
[9] "engage" "ordinary" "occupation" "Sunday"
[13] "unless" "employee" "allowed" "twenty"
[17] "four" "consecutive" "hours" "following"
[21] "six" "days" "The" "sale"
[25] "alcoholic" "beverages" "certain" "licensees"
[29] "permitted" "Sunday" "p" "m"
[33] "local" "option" "However" "patrons"
[37] "consuming" "beverages" "premises" "must"
[41] "seated" "tables" ""
[[593]]
[1] "Appellees" "sought" "permanently"
[4] "enjoin" "enforcement" "statute"
[7] "alleging" "appellant" "Springfield"
[10] "s" "chief" "police"
[13] "previously" "arrested" "prosecuted"
[16] "Crown" "s" "manager"
[19] "keeping" "open" "Sunday"
[22] "unless" "restrained" "appellant"
[25] "continue" "enforce" "statute"
[28] "Crown" "statute" "unconstitutional"
[31] "reasons" "stated" "The"
[34] "three" "judge" "Federal"
[37] "District" "Court" "one"
[40] "judge" "dissenting" "agreed"
[43] "appellees" "F" "Supp"
[46] "On" "appeal" "brought"
[49] "U" "S" "C"
[52] "s" "U" "S"
[55] "C" "A" "s"
[58] "noted" "probable" "jurisdiction"
[61] "U" "S" "S"
[64] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[67] "d" ""
[[594]]
[1] "I" ""
[[595]]
[1] "The" "equal" "protection" "arguments"
[5] "advanced" "appellees" "much" "made"
[9] "appellants" "McGowan" "v" "Maryland"
[13] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[17] "L" "Ed" "d" "They"
[21] "contend" "exceptions" "statute" "numerous"
[25] "arbitrary" "found" "rational" "basis"
[29] "law" "permits" "sale" "certain"
[33] "food" "items" "sold" "Crown"
[37] "limits" "permission" "selected" "types"
[41] "stores" "employees" "exempted" "activities"
[45] "just" "much" "need" "day"
[49] "rest" "Crown" "s" "employees"
[53] "The" "three" "judge" "District"
[57] "Court" "described" "present" "statutory"
[61] "system" "unbelievable" "hodgepodge" "sustained"
[65] "appellees" "allegations" ""
[[596]]
[1] "The" "answers" "arguments"
[4] "likewise" "similar" "given"
[7] "McGowan" "contentions" "examined"
[10] "standards" "set" "forth"
[13] "opinion" "Many" "exceptions"
[16] "Massachusetts" "Sunday" "Laws"
[19] "reasonably" "explainable" "face"
[22] "Such" "items" "tobaccos"
[25] "confectioneries" "fruits" "frozen"
[28] "desserts" "found" "legislature"
[31] "useful" "adding" "Sunday"
[34] "s" "enjoyment" "items"
[37] "newspapers" "milk" "bread"
[40] "found" "required" "sold"
[43] "fresh" "daily" "It"
[46] "conceivable" "legislature" "believed"
[49] "sale" "fish" "perishable"
[52] "foodstuffs" "wholesale" "detract"
[55] "atmosphere" "day" "retail"
[58] "sale" "items" "inject"
[61] "distinctly" "commercial" "element"
[64] "exists" "six" "days"
[67] "week" "It" "fair"
[70] "believe" "allowance" "professional"
[73] "amateur" "sports" "Dunday"
[76] "add" "day" "s"
[79] "special" "character" "rather"
[82] "detract" "And" "legislature"
[85] "find" "circumstances" "attendant"
[88] "conduct" "professional" "sports"
[91] "sufficiently" "different" "amateur"
[94] "sports" "justify" "different"
[97] "treatment" "hours" "may"
[100] "played" "Furthermore" "legislature"
[103] "determine" "although" "many"
[106] "retailers" "including" "Crown"
[109] "sell" "frozen" "desserts"
[112] "permit" "limited" "number"
[115] "innholders" "druggists" "common"
[118] "victuallers" "sell" "Sunday"
[121] "serve" "public" "purpose"
[124] "providing" "items" "Sunday"
[127] "time" "limit" "commercial"
[130] "activities" "ordinarily" "attendant"
[133] "sale" "And" "determination"
[136] "requires" "limited" "number"
[139] "stores" "open" "serve"
[142] "public" "interest" "employees"
[145] "stores" "still" "protected"
[148] "statutory" "provision" "giving"
[151] "employees" "another" "day"
[154] "rest" "To" "permit"
[157] "stores" "sell" "exempted"
[160] "products" "remain" "open"
[163] "Sunday" "limit" "sale"
[166] "exempted" "items" "might"
[169] "well" "believed" "impose"
[172] "near" "insuperable" "enforcement"
[175] "problems" ""
[[597]]
[1] "The" "fact" "irrationality"
[4] "many" "apparently" "reasonable"
[7] "distinctions" "shown" "The"
[10] "presumption" "validity" "upon"
[13] "classifications" "stand" "dispelled"
[16] "A" "classification" "reasonable"
[19] "basis" "offend" "equal"
[22] "protection" "clause" "merely"
[25] "made" "mathematical" "nicety"
[28] "practice" "results" "inequality"
[31] "Lindsley" "v" "Natural"
[34] "Carbonic" "Gas" "Co"
[37] "U" "S" "S"
[40] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[43] "Thus" "hold" "Massachusetts"
[46] "Sunday" "Laws" "violate"
[49] "equal" "protection" "laws"
[52] ""
[[598]]
[1] "II" ""
[[599]]
[1] "Appellees" "make" "several"
[4] "contentions" "statutes" "violate"
[7] "constitutional" "guarantees" "religious"
[10] "freedom" "First" "allege"
[13] "statutes" "laws" "respecting"
[16] "establishment" "religion" "original"
[19] "current" "purposes" "enforce"
[22] "observance" "Sunday" "Sabbath"
[25] ""
[[600]]
[1] "We" "agree" "court" "like"
[5] "Sunday" "laws" "States" "Massachusetts"
[9] "statutes" "unmistakably" "religious" "origin"
[13] "The" "first" "enactment" "Plymouth"
[17] "Colony" "stated" "simply" "whosoever"
[21] "shall" "prophane" "Lords" "day"
[25] "doeing" "servill" "worke" "like"
[29] "abusses" "shall" "either" "fined"
[33] "whipped" "The" "Compact" "Charter"
[37] "Laws" "Colony" "New" "Plymouth"
[41] "Eight" "years" "later" "ban"
[45] "Sunday" "traveling" "enacted" "following"
[49] "preamble" ""
[[601]]
[1] "" "Whereas" "complaint" "made" "great"
[6] "abuses" "sundry" "places" "Government" "prophaning"
[11] "Lords" "day" "travellers" "horse" "foot"
[16] "bearing" "burdens" "carrying" "packes" "c"
[21] "upon" "Lords" "day" "great" "offence"
[26] "Godly" "welafected" "among" "us" "Id"
[31] ""
[[602]]
[1] "" "And" "religious" "purpose" "made"
[6] "clear" "beyond" "doubt" ""
[[603]]
[1] "" "This" "Court" "taking"
[5] "notice" "great" "abuse" "many"
[9] "misdemeanours" "committed" "divers" "persons"
[13] "many" "wayes" "Profaneing" "Sabbath"
[17] "Lord" "s" "day" "great"
[21] "dishonour" "God" "Reproach" "Religion"
[25] "Grief" "Spirits" "God" "s"
[29] "People" ""
[[604]]
[1] "" "Do" "therefore"
[4] "Order" "That" "whosoever"
[7] "shall" "Prophane" "Lord"
[10] "s" "day" "unnecessary"
[13] "servile" "Work" "unnecessary"
[16] "travailing" "sports" "recreations"
[19] "transgress" "shall" "forfeit"
[22] "every" "default" "forty"
[25] "shillings" "publickly" "whipt"
[28] "But" "clearly" "appear"
[31] "sin" "proudly" "Presumptuously"
[34] "high" "hand" "committed"
[37] "known" "Command" "Authority"
[40] "blessed" "God" "person"
[43] "therein" "Despising" "Reproaching"
[46] "Lord" "shall" "put"
[49] "death" "grievously" "punished"
[52] "Judgment" "Court" ""
[[605]]
[1] "" "And" "whosoever" "shall" "frequently"
[6] "neglect" "public" "Worship" "God" "Lords"
[11] "day" "approved" "Government" "shall" "forfeit"
[16] "every" "default" "convicted" "ten" "shillings"
[21] "especially" "appears" "arise" "negligence" "Idleness"
[26] "Prophaness" "Spirit" "Id" ""
[[606]]
[1] "The" "Sunday" "regulations" "Massachusetts"
[5] "Colony" "different" "The" "version"
[9] "spoke" "abuses" "Dishonor" "God"
[13] "Reproach" "Religion" "Grieving" "Souls"
[17] "God" "s" "Servants" "Among"
[21] "things" "statute" "forbade" "Drinking"
[25] "Sporting" "Sunday" "The" "Colonial"
[29] "Laws" "Massachusetts" "In" "Neglect"
[33] "God" "s" "Public" "Worship"
[37] "made" "crime" "Id" "Every"
[41] "person" "required" "apply" "Duties"
[45] "Religion" "Piety" "Sunday" "according"
[49] "statute" "continued" "ban" "Sunday"
[53] "sports" "Charter" "Province" "Massachusetts"
[57] "Bay" "New" "England" "The"
[61] "preamble" "new" "statute" "retained"
[65] "Religion" "Piety" "language" "added"
[69] "Profanation" "Lord" "s" "Day"
[73] "highly" "offensive" "Almighty" "God"
[77] "This" "statute" "retained" "strengthened"
[81] "former" "prohibitions" "Id" ""
[[607]]
[1] "A" "change" "came" "The" "preamble"
[6] "added" "following" ""
[[608]]
[1] "" "Whereas" "Observance" "Lord"
[5] "s" "Day" "highly" "promotive"
[9] "Welfare" "Community" "affording" "necessary"
[13] "Seasons" "Relaxation" "Labor" "Cares"
[17] "Business" "moral" "Reflections" "Conversation"
[21] "Duties" "Life" "frequent" "Errors"
[25] "human" "Conduct" "Acts" "Laws"
[29] "Commonwealth" "Massachusetts" ""
[[609]]
[1] "Thus" "statute" "s" "announced"
[5] "purpose" "longer" "solely" "religious"
[9] "But" "statute" "proscribed" "Sunday"
[13] "attendance" "Concert" "Music" "Dancing"
[17] "addition" "previously" "mentioned" "activities"
[21] "Ibid" "This" "law" "re"
[25] "enacted" "Laws" "Massachusetts" "et"
[29] "seq" ""
[[610]]
[1] "However" "examine" "statutes" "now"
[5] "Court" "find" "part" "divorced"
[9] "religious" "orientation" "predecessors" "The"
[13] "preambles" "statements" "certain" "terms"
[17] "religious" "purpose" "exist" "longer"
[21] "Sports" "almost" "kinds" "now"
[25] "generally" "allowed" "Sunday" "The"
[29] "absolute" "prohibition" "alcoholic" "beverages"
[33] "disappeared" "Concerts" "dancing" "permitted"
[37] "Church" "attendance" "longer" "required"
[41] ""
[[611]]
[1] "Admittedly" "statutes" "still" "contain"
[5] "references" "Lord" "s" "Day"
[9] "provisions" "speak" "weekdays" "secular"
[13] "days" "Although" "s" "c"
[17] "excepts" "concerts" "sacred" "music"
[21] "next" "clause" "section" "permits"
[25] "free" "openair" "concerts" "It"
[29] "seem" "objectionable" "language" "merely"
[33] "relic" "The" "fact" "certain"
[37] "Sunday" "activities" "permitted" "keeping"
[41] "character" "day" "inconsistent" "due"
[45] "observance" "necessarily" "mean" "day"
[49] "intended" "religious" "character" "day"
[53] "appear" "likely" "intended" "one"
[57] "repose" "recreation" "We" "told"
[61] "provisions" "forbidding" "certain" "activities"
[65] "conducted" "within" "set" "distance"
[69] "place" "public" "worship" "especially"
[73] "devoted" "maintaining" "Sunday" "Sabbath"
[77] "But" "State" "wishes" "protect"
[81] "worship" "Sunday" "mean" "State"
[85] "means" "impose" "religious" "worship"
[89] "See" "Everson" "v" "Board"
[93] "Education" "U" "S" "S"
[97] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "Although"
[101] "many" "recently" "allowed" "Sunday"
[105] "activities" "may" "commence" "prior"
[109] "p" "m" "others" "may"
[113] "undertaken" "time" "day" "And"
[117] "contention" "evening" "church" "services"
[121] "protected" "maintained" "since" "activities"
[125] "begin" "p" "m" "may"
[129] "continue" "throughout" "day" ""
[[612]]
[1] "Furthermore" "long" "list" "exemptions"
[5] "recently" "granted" "evidences" "present"
[9] "scheme" "one" "provide" "atmosphere"
[13] "recreation" "rather" "religion" "The"
[17] "court" "pointed" "since" "statutes"
[21] "amended" "seventy" "times" "It"
[25] "seem" "Sunday" "sales" "tobacco"
[29] "soda" "water" "fruit" "et"
[33] "cetera" "aid" "religion" "It"
[37] "seem" "operation" "amusement" "parks"
[41] "beach" "resorts" "aid" "recreation"
[45] ""
[[613]]
[1] "An" "examination" "recent" "Massachusetts"
[5] "legislative" "history" "bolsters" "State"
[9] "s" "position" "statutes" "religious"
[13] "In" "report" "Legislative" "Research"
[17] "Council" "stated" ""
[[614]]
[1] "" "In" "general" "Sunday"
[5] "laws" "protect" "public" "guaranteeing"
[9] "one" "day" "seven" "provide"
[13] "period" "rest" "quiet" "Health"
[17] "peace" "good" "order" "society"
[21] "thereby" "promoted" "Such" "provision"
[25] "essentially" "civil" "character" "statutes"
[29] "regarded" "religious" "ordinances" "Report"
[33] "Legislative" "Research" "Council" "relative"
[37] "Legal" "Holidays" "Observance" "Mass"
[41] "Leg" "Docs" "Sen" "Doc"
[45] "No" ""
[[615]]
[1] "The" "earliest" "pronouncements"
[4] "Supreme" "Judicial" "Court"
[7] "Massachusetts" "indication" "religious"
[10] "origin" "Sunday" "Laws"
[13] "In" "Pearce" "v"
[16] "Atwood" "Mass" "stated"
[19] "statute" "s" "sole"
[22] "object" "ensuring" "reverence"
[25] "respect" "one" "day"
[28] "week" "order" "religious"
[31] "exercises" "performed" "without"
[34] "interruption" "common" "secular"
[37] "employments" "In" "Bennett"
[40] "v" "Brooks" "Allen"
[43] "Mass" "day" "characterized"
[46] "one" "set" "apart"
[49] "religious" "services" "observances"
[52] ""
[[616]]
[1] "In" "case" "arose" "charge"
[5] "violation" "religious" "freedom" "made"
[9] "The" "Supreme" "Judicial" "Court"
[13] "relied" "Pennsylvania" "case" "Specht"
[17] "v" "Commonwealth" "Pa" "stated"
[21] "clearly" ""
[[617]]
[1] "" "It" "essentially"
[4] "civil" "regulation" "providing"
[7] "fixed" "period" "rest"
[10] "business" "ordinary" "avocations"
[13] "amusements" "community" "If"
[16] "cessation" "labor" "amusement"
[19] "one" "day" "must"
[22] "selected" "purpose" "even"
[25] "day" "thus" "selected"
[28] "chosen" "great" "majority"
[31] "people" "celebrate" "day"
[34] "peculiar" "sanctity" "legislative"
[37] "authority" "provide" "observance"
[40] "derived" "general" "authority"
[43] "regulate" "business" "community"
[46] "provide" "moral" "physical"
[49] "welfare" "The" "act"
[52] "imposes" "upon" "one"
[55] "religious" "ceremony" "attendance"
[58] "upon" "form" "worship"
[61] "one" "deems" "another"
[64] "day" "suitable" "rest"
[67] "worship" "may" "devote"
[70] "day" "religious" "observance"
[73] "deems" "appropriate" "That"
[76] "one" "conscientiously" "observes"
[79] "seventh" "day" "week"
[82] "may" "also" "compelled"
[85] "abstain" "business" "kind"
[88] "expressly" "forbidden" "first"
[91] "day" "occasioned" "subordination"
[94] "religion" "member" "community"
[97] "must" "submit" "rules"
[100] "made" "lawful" "authority"
[103] "regulate" "govern" "business"
[106] "community" "Commonwealth" "v"
[109] "Has" "Mass" ""
[[618]]
[1] "The" "court" "characterized"
[4] "decision" "ad" "hoc"
[7] "improvisation" "Massachusetts" "court"
[10] "Of" "course" "court"
[13] "correct" "deciding" "bound"
[16] "Massachusetts" "characterization" "statutes"
[19] "See" "Society" "Savings"
[22] "City" "Cleveland" "Ohio"
[25] "v" "Bowers" "U"
[28] "S" "S" "Ct"
[31] "L" "Ed" "But"
[34] "ten" "years" "later"
[37] "Commonwealth" "v" "Starr"
[40] "Mass" "N" "E"
[43] "another" "religious" "charge"
[46] "statute" "made" "rejected"
[49] "authority" "Has" ""
[[619]]
[1] "As" "court" "pointed"
[4] "several" "cases" "gave"
[7] "religious" "characterization" "statute"
[10] "But" "none" "cases"
[13] "contention" "regarding" "religious"
[16] "freedom" "none" "cases"
[19] "stated" "statute" "s"
[22] "purpose" "exclusively" "religious"
[25] "Finally" "recent" "case"
[28] "passing" "Massachusetts" "Sunday"
[31] "Closing" "Laws" "Commonwealth"
[34] "v" "Chernock" "Mass"
[37] "N" "E" "d"
[40] "court" "summarily" "dismissed"
[43] "complainant" "s" "religious"
[46] "contention" "relying" "Has"
[49] ""
[[620]]
[1] "The" "relevant" "factors" "carefully"
[5] "considered" "find" "present" "statutes"
[9] "purpose" "effect" "religious" "Although"
[13] "three" "judge" "court" "found"
[17] "Massachusetts" "legitimate" "secular" "interest"
[21] "maintaining" "Sunday" "closing" "held"
[25] "differently" "McGowan" "v" "Maryland"
[29] "supra" "And" "reasons" "stated"
[33] "case" "reject" "appellees" "request"
[37] "hold" "statutes" "invalid" "ground"
[41] "State" "may" "accomplish" "secular"
[45] "purpose" "alternative" "means" "even"
[49] "remotely" "incidentally" "aid" "religion"
[53] ""
[[621]]
[1] "Secondly" "appellees" "contend" "application"
[5] "Sunday" "Closing" "Laws" "prohibits"
[9] "free" "exercise" "religion" "Crown"
[13] "alleges" "required" "law" "abstain"
[17] "business" "Sunday" "owners" "religion"
[21] "demands" "closing" "sundown" "Friday"
[25] "sundown" "Saturday" "Crown" "will"
[29] "open" "four" "one" "half"
[33] "days" "week" "thereby" "suffering"
[37] "extreme" "economic" "disadvantage" "Crown"
[41] "s" "Orthodox" "Jewish" "customers"
[45] "allege" "religious" "beliefs" "forbid"
[49] "shopping" "Jewish" "Sabbath" "statutes"
[53] "effect" "deprive" "Friday" "afternoon"
[57] "Monday" "week" "opportunity" "purchase"
[61] "kosher" "food" "sanctioned" "fath"
[65] "The" "orthodox" "rabbis" "allege"
[69] "statutes" "effect" "greatly" "complicates"
[73] "task" "supervising" "condition" "kosher"
[77] "meat" "meat" "delivered" "Friday"
[81] "kept" "Monday" "Furthermore" "appellees"
[85] "contend" "statutes" "discriminate" "religion"
[89] ""
[[622]]
[1] "These" "allegations" "similar" "although"
[5] "grave" "made" "appellants" "Braunfeld"
[9] "v" "Brown" "U" "S"
[13] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[17] "d" "Since" "decision" "case"
[21] "rejects" "contentions" "presented" "appellees"
[25] "merits" "need" "decide" "whether"
[29] "appellees" "standing" "raise" "questions"
[33] ""
[[623]]
[1] "Mr" "Justice" "FRANKFURTER" "Mr"
[5] "Justice" "HARLAN" "concur" "separate"
[9] "opinion" ""
[[624]]
[1] "Accordingly" "decision" "reversed" ""
[[625]]
[1] "Reversed" ""
[[626]]
[1] "Justice" "REHNQUIST" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[627]]
[1] "Petitioner" "S" "Simcha"
[4] "Goldman" "contends" "Free"
[7] "Exercise" "Clause" "First"
[10] "Amendment" "United" "States"
[13] "Constitution" "permits" "wear"
[16] "yarmulke" "uniform" "notwithstanding"
[19] "Air" "Force" "regulation"
[22] "mandating" "uniform" "dress"
[25] "Air" "Force" "personnel"
[28] "The" "District" "Court"
[31] "District" "Columbia" "permanently"
[34] "enjoined" "Air" "Force"
[37] "enforcing" "regulation" "petitioner"
[40] "penalizing" "wearing" "yarmulke"
[43] "The" "Court" "Appeals"
[46] "District" "Columbia" "Circuit"
[49] "reversed" "ground" "Air"
[52] "Force" "s" "strong"
[55] "interest" "discipline" "justified"
[58] "strict" "enforcement" "uniform"
[61] "dress" "requirements" "We"
[64] "granted" "certiorari" "importance"
[67] "question" "U" "S"
[70] "S" "Ct" "L"
[73] "Ed" "d" "now"
[76] "affirm" ""
[[628]]
[1] "Petitioner" "Goldman" "Orthodox" "Jew"
[5] "ordained" "rabbi" "In" "accepted"
[9] "Armed" "Forces" "Health" "Professions"
[13] "Scholarship" "Program" "placed" "inactive"
[17] "reserve" "status" "Air" "Force"
[21] "studied" "clinical" "psychology" "Loyola"
[25] "University" "Chicago" "During" "three"
[29] "years" "scholarship" "program" "received"
[33] "monthly" "stipend" "allowance" "tuition"
[37] "books" "fees" "After" "completing"
[41] "Ph" "D" "psychology" "petitioner"
[45] "entered" "active" "service" "United"
[49] "States" "Air" "Force" "commissioned"
[53] "officer" "accordance" "requirement" "participants"
[57] "scholarship" "program" "serve" "one"
[61] "year" "active" "duty" "year"
[65] "subsidized" "education" "Petitioner" "stationed"
[69] "March" "Air" "Force" "Base"
[73] "Riverside" "California" "served" "clinical"
[77] "psychologist" "mental" "health" "clinic"
[81] "base" ""
[[629]]
[1] "Until" "petitioner" "prevented" "wearing"
[5] "yarmulke" "base" "He" "avoided"
[9] "controversy" "remaining" "close" "duty"
[13] "station" "health" "clinic" "wearing"
[17] "service" "cap" "yarmulke" "doors"
[21] "But" "April" "testified" "defense"
[25] "witness" "court" "martial" "wearing"
[29] "yarmulke" "service" "cap" "opposing"
[33] "counsel" "lodged" "complaint" "Colonel"
[37] "Joseph" "Gregory" "Hospital" "Commander"
[41] "arguing" "petitioner" "s" "practice"
[45] "wearing" "yarmulke" "violation" "Air"
[49] "Force" "Regulation" "AFR" "This"
[53] "regulation" "states" "pertinent" "part"
[57] "h" "eadgear" "will" "worn"
[61] "w" "hile" "indoors" "except"
[65] "armed" "security" "police" "performance"
[69] "duties" "AFR" "h" "f"
[73] ""
[[630]]
[1] "Colonel" "Gregory" "informed"
[4] "petitioner" "wearing" "yarmulke"
[7] "duty" "indeed" "violate"
[10] "AFR" "ordered" "violate"
[13] "regulation" "outside" "hospital"
[16] "Although" "virtually" "petitioner"
[19] "s" "time" "base"
[22] "spent" "hospital" "refused"
[25] "Later" "petitioner" "s"
[28] "attorney" "protested" "Air"
[31] "Force" "General" "Counsel"
[34] "Colonel" "Gregory" "revised"
[37] "order" "prohibit" "petitioner"
[40] "wearing" "yarmulke" "even"
[43] "hospital" "Petitioner" "s"
[46] "request" "report" "duty"
[49] "civilian" "clothing" "pending"
[52] "legal" "resolution" "issue"
[55] "denied" "The" "next"
[58] "day" "received" "formal"
[61] "letter" "reprimand" "warned"
[64] "failure" "obey" "AFR"
[67] "subject" "court" "martial"
[70] "Colonel" "Gregory" "also"
[73] "withdrew" "recommendation" "petitioner"
[76] "s" "application" "extend"
[79] "term" "active" "service"
[82] "approved" "substituted" "negative"
[85] "recommendation" ""
[[631]]
[1] "" "Petitioner" "sued"
[4] "respondent" "Secretary" "Defense"
[7] "others" "claiming" "application"
[10] "AFR" "prevent" "wearing"
[13] "yarmulke" "infringed" "upon"
[16] "First" "Amendment" "freedom"
[19] "exercise" "religious" "beliefs"
[22] "The" "United" "States"
[25] "District" "Court" "District"
[28] "Columbia" "preliminarily" "enjoined"
[31] "enforcement" "regulation" "Goldman"
[34] "v" "Secretary" "Defense"
[37] "F" "Supp" "full"
[40] "hearing" "permanently" "enjoined"
[43] "Air" "Force" "prohibiting"
[46] "petitioner" "wearing" "yarmulke"
[49] "uniform" "Goldman" "v"
[52] "Secretary" "Defense" "EPD"
[55] "Respondents" "appealed" "Court"
[58] "Appeals" "District" "Columbia"
[61] "Circuit" "reversed" "Goldman"
[64] "v" "Secretary" "Defense"
[67] "U" "S" "App"
[70] "D" "C" "F"
[73] "d" "As" "initial"
[76] "matter" "Court" "Appeals"
[79] "determined" "appropriate" "level"
[82] "scrutiny" "military" "regulation"
[85] "clashes" "constitutional" "right"
[88] "neither" "strict" "scrutiny"
[91] "rational" "basis" "Id"
[94] "F" "d" "Instead"
[97] "held" "military" "regulation"
[100] "must" "examined" "determine"
[103] "whether" "legitimate" "military"
[106] "ends" "sought" "achieved"
[109] "id" "F" "d"
[112] "whether" "designed" "accommodate"
[115] "individual" "right" "appropriate"
[118] "degree" "Ibid" "Applying"
[121] "test" "court" "concluded"
[124] "Air" "Force" "s"
[127] "interest" "uniformity" "renders"
[130] "strict" "enforcement" "regulation"
[133] "permissible" "Id" "F"
[136] "d" "The" "full"
[139] "Court" "Appeals" "denied"
[142] "petition" "rehearing" "en"
[145] "banc" "three" "judges"
[148] "dissenting" "U" "S"
[151] "App" "D" "C"
[154] "F" "d" ""
[[632]]
[1] "Petitioner" "argues" "AFR" "applied"
[5] "prohibits" "religiously" "motivated" "conduct"
[9] "therefore" "analyzed" "standard" "enunciated"
[13] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner" "U"
[17] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[21] "Ed" "d" "See" "also"
[25] "Thomas" "v" "Review" "Bd"
[29] "Indiana" "Employment" "Security" "Div"
[33] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "L" "Ed" "d" "Wisconsin"
[41] "v" "Yoder" "U" "S"
[45] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[49] "d" "But" "repeatedly" "held"
[53] "military" "necessity" "specialized" "society"
[57] "separate" "civilian" "society" "Parker"
[61] "v" "Levy" "U" "S"
[65] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[69] "d" "See" "also" "Chappell"
[73] "v" "Wallace" "U" "S"
[77] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[81] "d" "Schlesinger" "v" "Councilman"
[85] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[89] "L" "Ed" "d" "Orloff"
[93] "v" "Willoughby" "U" "S"
[97] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[101] "T" "military" "must" "insist"
[105] "upon" "respect" "duty" "discipline"
[109] "without" "counterpart" "civilian" "life"
[113] "Schlesinger" "v" "Councilman" "supra"
[117] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[121] "order" "prepare" "perform" "vital"
[125] "role" "See" "also" "Brown"
[129] "v" "Glines" "U" "S"
[133] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[137] "d" ""
[[633]]
[1] "" "Our" "review"
[4] "military" "regulations" "challenged"
[7] "First" "Amendment" "grounds"
[10] "far" "deferential" "constitutional"
[13] "review" "similar" "laws"
[16] "regulations" "designed" "civilian"
[19] "society" "The" "military"
[22] "need" "encourage" "debate"
[25] "tolerate" "protest" "extent"
[28] "tolerance" "required" "civilian"
[31] "state" "First" "Amendment"
[34] "accomplish" "mission" "military"
[37] "must" "foster" "instinctive"
[40] "obedience" "unity" "commitment"
[43] "esprit" "de" "corps"
[46] "See" "e" "g"
[49] "Chappell" "v" "Wallace"
[52] "supra" "U" "S"
[55] "S" "Ct" "Greer"
[58] "v" "Spock" "U"
[61] "S" "S" "Ct"
[64] "L" "Ed" "d"
[67] "POWELL" "J" "concurring"
[70] "Parker" "v" "Levy"
[73] "supra" "U" "S"
[76] "S" "Ct" "The"
[79] "essence" "military" "service"
[82] "subordination" "desires" "interests"
[85] "individual" "needs" "service"
[88] "Orloff" "v" "Willoughby"
[91] "supra" "U" "S"
[94] "S" "Ct" ""
[[634]]
[1] "" "These" "aspects" "military"
[5] "life" "course" "render" "entirely"
[9] "nugatory" "military" "context" "guarantees"
[13] "First" "Amendment" "See" "e"
[17] "g" "Chappell" "v" "Wallace"
[21] "supra" "U" "S" "S"
[25] "Ct" "But" "within" "military"
[29] "community" "simply" "individual" "autonomy"
[33] "larger" "civilian" "community" "Parker"
[37] "v" "Levy" "supra" "U"
[41] "S" "S" "Ct" "In"
[45] "context" "present" "case" "evaluating"
[49] "whether" "military" "needs" "justify"
[53] "particular" "restriction" "religiously" "motivated"
[57] "conduct" "courts" "must" "give"
[61] "great" "deference" "professional" "judgment"
[65] "military" "authorities" "concerning" "relative"
[69] "importance" "particular" "military" "interest"
[73] "See" "Chappell" "v" "Wallace"
[77] "supra" "U" "S" "S"
[81] "Ct" "Orloff" "v" "Willoughby"
[85] "supra" "U" "S" "S"
[89] "Ct" "Not" "courts" "ill"
[93] "equipped" "determine" "impact" "upon"
[97] "discipline" "particular" "intrusion" "upon"
[101] "military" "authority" "might" "Chappell"
[105] "v" "Wallace" "supra" "U"
[109] "S" "S" "Ct" "quoting"
[113] "Warren" "The" "Bill" "Rights"
[117] "Military" "N" "Y" "U"
[121] "L" "Rev" "military" "authorities"
[125] "charged" "Executive" "Legislative" "Branches"
[129] "carrying" "Nation" "s" "military"
[133] "policy" "J" "udicial" "deference"
[137] "apogee" "legislative" "action" "congressional"
[141] "authority" "raise" "support" "armies"
[145] "make" "rules" "regulations" "governance"
[149] "challenged" "Rostker" "v" "Goldberg"
[153] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[157] "L" "Ed" "d" ""
[[635]]
[1] "The" "considered" "professional" "judgment"
[5] "Air" "Force" "traditional" "outfitting"
[9] "personnel" "standardized" "uniforms" "encourages"
[13] "subordination" "personal" "preferences" "identities"
[17] "favor" "overall" "group" "mission"
[21] "Uniforms" "encourage" "sense" "hierarchical"
[25] "unity" "tending" "eliminate" "outward"
[29] "individual" "distinctions" "except" "rank"
[33] "The" "Air" "Force" "considers"
[37] "vital" "peacetime" "war" "personnel"
[41] "must" "ready" "provide" "effective"
[45] "defense" "moment" "s" "notice"
[49] "necessary" "habits" "discipline" "unity"
[53] "must" "developed" "advance" "trouble"
[57] "We" "acknowledged" "t" "inescapable"
[61] "demands" "military" "discipline" "obedience"
[65] "orders" "taught" "battlefields" "habit"
[69] "immediate" "compliance" "military" "procedures"
[73] "orders" "must" "virtually" "reflex"
[77] "time" "debate" "reflection" "Chappell"
[81] "v" "Wallace" "supra" "U"
[85] "S" "S" "Ct" ""
[[636]]
[1] "To" "end" "Air"
[4] "Force" "promulgated" "AFR"
[7] "page" "document" "states"
[10] "Air" "Force" "members"
[13] "will" "wear" "Air"
[16] "Force" "uniform" "performing"
[19] "military" "duties" "except"
[22] "authorized" "wear" "civilian"
[25] "clothes" "duty" "AFR"
[28] "The" "rest" "document"
[31] "describes" "minute" "detail"
[34] "various" "items" "apparel"
[37] "must" "worn" "part"
[40] "Air" "Force" "uniform"
[43] "It" "authorizes" "individualized"
[46] "options" "respect" "certain"
[49] "pieces" "jewelry" "hairstyle"
[52] "even" "subject" "severe"
[55] "limitations" "See" "AFR"
[58] "Table" "b" "b"
[61] "In" "general" "authorized"
[64] "headgear" "may" "worn"
[67] "doors" "See" "AFR"
[70] "h" "Indoors" "h"
[73] "eadgear" "may" "worn"
[76] "except" "armed" "security"
[79] "police" "performance" "duties"
[82] "AFR" "h" "f"
[85] "A" "narrow" "exception"
[88] "rule" "exists" "headgear"
[91] "worn" "indoor" "religious"
[94] "ceremonies" "See" "AFR"
[97] "h" "d" "In"
[100] "addition" "military" "commanders"
[103] "may" "discretion" "permit"
[106] "visible" "religious" "headgear"
[109] "apparel" "designated" "living"
[112] "quarters" "nonvisible" "items"
[115] "generally" "See" "Department"
[118] "Defense" "Directive" "June"
[121] ""
[[637]]
[1] "Petitioner" "Goldman" "contends" "Free"
[5] "Exercise" "Clause" "First" "Amendment"
[9] "requires" "Air" "Force" "make"
[13] "exception" "uniform" "dress" "requirements"
[17] "religious" "apparel" "unless" "accouterments"
[21] "create" "clear" "danger" "undermining"
[25] "discipline" "esprit" "de" "corps"
[29] "He" "asserts" "general" "visible"
[33] "unobtrusive" "apparel" "will" "create"
[37] "danger" "must" "therefore" "accommodated"
[41] "He" "argues" "Air" "Force"
[45] "failed" "prove" "specific" "exception"
[49] "practice" "wearing" "unobtrusive" "yarmulke"
[53] "threaten" "discipline" "He" "contends"
[57] "Air" "Force" "s" "assertion"
[61] "contrary" "mere" "ipse" "dixit"
[65] "support" "actual" "experience" "scientific"
[69] "study" "record" "contradicted" "expert"
[73] "testimony" "religious" "exceptions" "AFR"
[77] "fact" "desirable" "will" "increase"
[81] "morale" "making" "Air" "Force"
[85] "humane" "place" ""
[[638]]
[1] "" "But" "whether"
[4] "expert" "witnesses" "may"
[7] "feel" "religious" "exceptions"
[10] "AFR" "desirable" "quite"
[13] "beside" "point" "The"
[16] "desirability" "dress" "regulations"
[19] "military" "decided" "appropriate"
[22] "military" "officials" "constitutional"
[25] "mandate" "abandon" "considered"
[28] "professional" "judgment" "Quite"
[31] "obviously" "extent" "regulations"
[34] "permit" "wearing" "religious"
[37] "apparel" "yarmulke" "practice"
[40] "described" "petitioner" "silent"
[43] "devotion" "akin" "prayer"
[46] "military" "life" "may"
[49] "objectionable" "petitioner" "probably"
[52] "others" "But" "First"
[55] "Amendment" "require" "military"
[58] "accommodate" "practices" "face"
[61] "view" "detract" "uniformity"
[64] "sought" "dress" "regulations"
[67] "The" "Air" "Force"
[70] "drawn" "line" "essentially"
[73] "religious" "apparel" "visible"
[76] "hold" "portions" "regulations"
[79] "challenged" "reasonably" "evenhandedly"
[82] "regulate" "dress" "interest"
[85] "military" "s" "perceived"
[88] "need" "uniformity" "The"
[91] "First" "Amendment" "therefore"
[94] "prohibit" "applied" "petitioner"
[97] "even" "though" "effect"
[100] "restrict" "wearing" "headgear"
[103] "required" "religious" "beliefs"
[106] ""
[[639]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "Court" "Appeals" ""
[[640]]
[1] "Affirmed" ""
[[641]]
[1] "Chief" "Justice" "ROBERTS" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[642]]
[1] "" "A" "religious" "sect"
[5] "origins" "Amazon" "Rainforest" "receives"
[9] "communion" "drinking" "sacramental" "tea"
[13] "brewed" "plants" "unique" "region"
[17] "contains" "hallucinogen" "regulated" "Controlled"
[21] "Substances" "Act" "Federal" "Government"
[25] "The" "Government" "concedes" "practice"
[29] "sincere" "exercise" "religion" "nonetheless"
[33] "sought" "prohibit" "small" "American"
[37] "branch" "sect" "engaging" "practice"
[41] "ground" "Controlled" "Substances" "Act"
[45] "bars" "use" "hallucinogen" "The"
[49] "sect" "sued" "block" "enforcement"
[53] "ban" "sacramental" "tea" "moved"
[57] "preliminary" "injunction" ""
[[643]]
[1] "It" "relied" "Religious" "Freedom"
[5] "Restoration" "Act" "prohibits" "Federal"
[9] "Government" "substantially" "burdening" "person"
[13] "s" "exercise" "religion" "unless"
[17] "Government" "demonstrates" "application" "burden"
[21] "person" "represents" "least" "restrictive"
[25] "means" "advancing" "compelling" "interest"
[29] "U" "S" "C" "bb"
[33] "b" "The" "District" "Court"
[37] "granted" "preliminary" "injunction" "Court"
[41] "Appeals" "affirmed" "We" "granted"
[45] "Government" "s" "petition" "certiorari"
[49] "Before" "Court" "Government" "s"
[53] "central" "submission" "compelling" "interest"
[57] "uniform" "application" "Controlled" "Substances"
[61] "Act" "exception" "ban" "use"
[65] "hallucinogen" "can" "made" "accommodate"
[69] "sect" "s" "sincere" "religious"
[73] "practice" "We" "conclude" "Government"
[77] "carried" "burden" "expressly" "placed"
[81] "Congress" "Religious" "Freedom" "Restoration"
[85] "Act" "affirm" "grant" "preliminary"
[89] "injunction" ""
[[644]]
[1] "" "I" ""
[[645]]
[1] "In" "Employment" "Div"
[4] "Dept" "Human" "Resources"
[7] "Ore" "v" "Smith"
[10] "U" "S" "S"
[13] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[16] "d" "Court" "held"
[19] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[22] "First" "Amendment" "prohibit"
[25] "governments" "burdening" "religious"
[28] "practices" "generally" "applicable"
[31] "laws" "In" "Smith"
[34] "rejected" "challenge" "Oregon"
[37] "statute" "denied" "unemployment"
[40] "benefits" "drug" "users"
[43] "including" "Native" "Americans"
[46] "engaged" "sacramental" "use"
[49] "peyote" "Id" "S"
[52] "Ct" "In" "rejected"
[55] "interpretation" "Free" "Exercise"
[58] "Clause" "announced" "Sherbert"
[61] "v" "Verner" "U"
[64] "S" "S" "Ct"
[67] "L" "Ed" "d"
[70] "accord" "earlier" "cases"
[73] "see" "Smith" "U"
[76] "S" "S" "Ct"
[79] "held" "Constitution" "require"
[82] "judges" "engage" "case"
[85] "case" "assessment" "religious"
[88] "burdens" "imposed" "facially"
[91] "constitutional" "laws" "Id"
[94] "S" "Ct" ""
[[646]]
[1] "Congress" "responded" "enacting"
[4] "Religious" "Freedom" "Restoration"
[7] "Act" "RFRA" "Stat"
[10] "amended" "U" "S"
[13] "C" "bb" "et"
[16] "seq" "adopts" "statutory"
[19] "rule" "comparable" "constitutional"
[22] "rule" "rejected" "Smith"
[25] "Under" "RFRA" "Federal"
[28] "Government" "may" "statutory"
[31] "matter" "substantially" "burden"
[34] "person" "s" "exercise"
[37] "religion" "even" "burden"
[40] "results" "rule" "general"
[43] "applicability" "ʤ" "bb"
[46] "The" "exception" "recognized"
[49] "statute" "requires" "Government"
[52] "satisfy" "compelling" "interest"
[55] "test" "demonstrat" "e"
[58] "application" "burden" "person"
[61] "furtherance" "compelling" "governmental"
[64] "interest" "least" "restrictive"
[67] "means" "furthering" "compelling"
[70] "governmental" "interest" "ʤ"
[73] "bb" "b" "A"
[76] "person" "whose" "religious"
[79] "practices" "burdened" "violation"
[82] "RFRA" "may" "assert"
[85] "violation" "claim" "defense"
[88] "judicial" "proceeding" "obtain"
[91] "appropriate" "relief" "ʤ"
[94] "bb" "c" ""
[[647]]
[1] "" "The" "Controlled" "Substances"
[5] "Act" "Stat" "amended" "U"
[9] "S" "C" "et" "seq"
[13] "ed" "Supp" "I" "regulates"
[17] "importation" "manufacture" "distribution" "use"
[21] "psychotropic" "substances" "The" "Act"
[25] "classifies" "substances" "five" "schedules"
[29] "based" "potential" "abuse" "extent"
[33] "accepted" "medical" "use" "safety"
[37] "Seeʤ" "b" "ed" "Substances"
[41] "listed" "Schedule" "I" "Act"
[45] "subject" "comprehensive" "restrictions" "including"
[49] "outright" "ban" "importation" "use"
[53] "except" "pursuant" "strictly" "regulated"
[57] "research" "projects" "See" "The"
[61] "Act" "authorizes" "imposition" "criminal"
[65] "sentence" "simple" "possession" "Schedule"
[69] "I" "substances" "see" "mandates"
[73] "imposition" "criminal" "sentence" "possession"
[77] "intent" "manufacture" "distribute" "dispense"
[81] "substances" "see" "b" ""
[[648]]
[1] "O" "Centro" "Esp"
[4] "rita" "Beneficente" "Uni"
[7] "Vegetal" "UDV" "Christian"
[10] "Spiritist" "sect" "based"
[13] "Brazil" "American" "branch"
[16] "approximately" "individuals" "Central"
[19] "UDV" "s" "faith"
[22] "receiving" "communion" "hoasca"
[25] "pronounced" "wass" "ca"
[28] "sacramental" "tea" "made"
[31] "two" "plants" "unique"
[34] "Amazon" "region" "One"
[37] "plants" "psychotria" "viridis"
[40] "contains" "dimethyltryptamine" "DMT"
[43] "hallucinogen" "whose" "effects"
[46] "enhanced" "alkaloids" "plant"
[49] "banisteriopsis" "caapi" "DMT"
[52] "well" "material" "compound"
[55] "mixture" "preparation" "contains"
[58] "quantity" "DMT" "listed"
[61] "Schedule" "I" "Controlled"
[64] "Substances" "Act" "ʤ"
[67] "c" "Schedule" "I"
[70] "c" ""
[[649]]
[1] "In" "United" "States" "Customs"
[5] "inspectors" "intercepted" "shipment" "American"
[9] "UDV" "containing" "three" "drums"
[13] "hoasca" "A" "subsequent" "investigation"
[17] "revealed" "UDV" "received" "prior"
[21] "shipments" "hoasca" "The" "inspectors"
[25] "seized" "intercepted" "shipment" "threatened"
[29] "UDV" "prosecution" ""
[[650]]
[1] "The" "UDV" "filed" "suit"
[5] "Attorney" "General" "federal" "law"
[9] "enforcement" "officials" "seeking" "declaratory"
[13] "injunctive" "relief" "The" "complaint"
[17] "alleged" "inter" "alia" "applying"
[21] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "UDV"
[25] "s" "sacramental" "use" "hoasca"
[29] "violates" "RFRA" "Prior" "trial"
[33] "UDV" "moved" "preliminary" "injunction"
[37] "continue" "practice" "faith" "pending"
[41] "trial" "merits" ""
[[651]]
[1] "At" "hearing" "preliminary" "injunction"
[5] "Government" "conceded" "challenged" "application"
[9] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "substantially"
[13] "burden" "sincere" "exercise" "religion"
[17] "UDV" "See" "O" "Centro"
[21] "Espirita" "Beneficiente" "Uniao" "Vegetal"
[25] "v" "Ashcroft" "F" "Supp"
[29] "d" "D" "N" "M"
[33] "The" "Government" "argued" "however"
[37] "burden" "violate" "RFRA" "applying"
[41] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "case"
[45] "least" "restrictive" "means" "advancing"
[49] "three" "compelling" "governmental" "interests"
[53] "protecting" "health" "safety" "UDV"
[57] "members" "preventing" "diversion" "hoasca"
[61] "church" "recreational" "users" "complying"
[65] "United" "Nations" "Convention" "Psychotropic"
[69] "Substances" "treaty" "signed" "United"
[73] "States" "implemented" "Act" "Feb"
[77] "U" "S" "T" "T"
[81] "I" "A" "S" "No"
[85] "See" "F" "Supp" "d"
[89] ""
[[652]]
[1] "The" "District" "Court"
[4] "heard" "evidence" "parties"
[7] "health" "risks" "hoasca"
[10] "potential" "diversion" "church"
[13] "The" "Government" "presented"
[16] "evidence" "effect" "use"
[19] "hoasca" "DMT" "generally"
[22] "can" "cause" "psychotic"
[25] "reactions" "cardiac" "irregularities"
[28] "adverse" "drug" "interactions"
[31] "The" "UDV" "countered"
[34] "citing" "studies" "documenting"
[37] "safety" "sacramental" "use"
[40] "hoasca" "presenting" "evidence"
[43] "minimized" "likelihood" "health"
[46] "risks" "raised" "Government"
[49] "With" "respect" "diversion"
[52] "Government" "pointed" "general"
[55] "rise" "illicit" "use"
[58] "hallucinogens" "cited" "interest"
[61] "illegal" "use" "DMT"
[64] "hoasca" "particular" "UDV"
[67] "emphasized" "thinness" "market"
[70] "hoasca" "relatively" "small"
[73] "amounts" "substance" "imported"
[76] "church" "absence" "diversion"
[79] "problem" "past" ""
[[653]]
[1] "The" "District" "Court" "concluded"
[5] "evidence" "health" "risks" "equipoise"
[9] "similarly" "evidence" "diversion" "virtually"
[13] "balanced" "Id" "In" "face"
[17] "even" "showing" "court" "reasoned"
[21] "Government" "failed" "demonstrate" "compelling"
[25] "interest" "justifying" "acknowledged" "substantial"
[29] "burden" "UDV" "s" "sincere"
[33] "religious" "exercise" "Id" "The"
[37] "court" "also" "rejected" "asserted"
[41] "interest" "complying" "Convention" "Psychotropic"
[45] "Substances" "holding" "Convention" "apply"
[49] "hoasca" "Id" ""
[[654]]
[1] "The" "court" "entered" "preliminary"
[5] "injunction" "prohibiting" "Government" "enforcing"
[9] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "respect"
[13] "UDV" "s" "importation" "use"
[17] "hoasca" "The" "injunction" "requires"
[21] "church" "import" "tea" "pursuant"
[25] "federal" "permits" "restrict" "control"
[29] "tea" "persons" "church" "authority"
[33] "warn" "particularly" "susceptible" "UDV"
[37] "members" "dangers" "hoasca" "See"
[41] "Preliminary" "Injunction" "App" "F"
[45] "App" "Pet" "Cert" "The"
[49] "injunction" "also" "provides" "Government"
[53] "believe" "s" "evidence" "exists"
[57] "hoasca" "negatively" "affected" "health"
[61] "UDV" "members" "shipment" "hoasca"
[65] "contain" "s" "particularly" "dangerous"
[69] "levels" "DMT" "Government" "may"
[73] "apply" "Court" "expedite" "d"
[77] "determination" "whether" "evidence" "warrants"
[81] "suspension" "revocation" "UDV" "s"
[85] "authority" "use" "hoasca" "Id"
[89] ""
[[655]]
[1] "The" "Government" "appealed" "preliminary"
[5] "injunction" "panel" "Court" "Appeals"
[9] "Tenth" "Circuit" "affirmed" "O"
[13] "Centro" "Espirita" "Beneficiente" "Uniao"
[17] "Vegetal" "v" "Ashcroft" "F"
[21] "d" "majority" "Circuit" "sitting"
[25] "en" "banc" "F" "d"
[29] "We" "granted" "certiorari" "U"
[33] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "d" ""
[[656]]
[1] "II" ""
[[657]]
[1] "" "Although" "briefs" "contain"
[5] "discussion" "potential" "harm" "diversion"
[9] "UDV" "s" "use" "hoasca"
[13] "Government" "challenge" "District" "Court"
[17] "s" "factual" "findings" "conclusion"
[21] "evidence" "submitted" "issues" "evenly"
[25] "balanced" "Instead" "Government" "maintains"
[29] "evidentiary" "equipoise" "insufficient" "basis"
[33] "issuing" "preliminary" "injunction" "enforcement"
[37] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "We"
[41] "review" "District" "Court" "s"
[45] "legal" "rulings" "de" "novo"
[49] "ultimate" "decision" "issue" "preliminary"
[53] "injunction" "abuse" "discretion" "See"
[57] "McCreary" "County" "v" "American"
[61] "Civil" "Liberties" "Union" "Ky"
[65] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[69] "L" "Ed" "d" ""
[[658]]
[1] "The" "Government" "begins" "invoking"
[5] "well" "established" "principle" "party"
[9] "seeking" "pretrial" "relief" "bears"
[13] "burden" "demonstrating" "likelihood" "success"
[17] "merits" "See" "e" "g"
[21] "Mazurek" "v" "Armstrong" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[29] "Ed" "d" "per" "curiam"
[33] "Doran" "v" "Salem" "Inn"
[37] "Inc" "U" "S" "S"
[41] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[45] "The" "Government" "argues" "District"
[49] "Court" "lost" "sight" "principle"
[53] "issuing" "injunction" "based" "mere"
[57] "tie" "evidentiary" "record" ""
[[659]]
[1] "A" "majority" "en" "banc"
[5] "Court" "Appeals" "rejected" "argument"
[9] "Before" "District" "Court" "Government"
[13] "conceded" "UDV" "s" "prima"
[17] "facie" "case" "RFRA" "See"
[21] "F" "Supp" "d" "application"
[25] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "substantially"
[29] "burden" "sincere" "religious" "exercise"
[33] "The" "evidence" "District" "Court"
[37] "found" "equipoise" "related" "two"
[41] "compelling" "interests" "asserted" "Government"
[45] "formed" "part" "Government" "s"
[49] "affirmative" "defense" "See" "U"
[53] "S" "C" "bb" "b"
[57] "Government" "may" "substantially" "burden"
[61] "person" "s" "exercise" "religion"
[65] "demonstrates" "application" "burden" "person"
[69] "furtherance" "compelling" "governmental" "interest"
[73] "emphasis" "added" "bb" "T"
[77] "term" "demonstrates" "means" "meets"
[81] "burdens" "going" "forward" "evidence"
[85] "persuasion" "Accordingly" "UDV" "effectively"
[89] "demonstrated" "sincere" "exercise" "religion"
[93] "substantially" "burdened" "Government" "failed"
[97] "demonstrate" "application" "burden" "UDV"
[101] "likely" "justified" "asserted" "compelling"
[105] "interests" "See" "F" "d"
[109] "Seymour" "J" "concurring" "part"
[113] "dissenting" "part" "T" "balance"
[117] "actual" "irreparable" "harm" "plaintiff"
[121] "potential" "harm" "government" "even"
[125] "rise" "level" "preponderance" "evidence"
[129] ""
[[660]]
[1] "" "The" "Government"
[4] "argues" "although" "bear"
[7] "burden" "demonstrating" "compelling"
[10] "interest" "part" "affirmative"
[13] "defense" "trial" "merits"
[16] "UDV" "borne" "burden"
[19] "disproving" "asserted" "compelling"
[22] "interests" "hearing" "preliminary"
[25] "injunction" "This" "argument"
[28] "foreclosed" "recent" "decision"
[31] "Ashcroft" "v" "American"
[34] "Civil" "Liberties" "Union"
[37] "U" "S" "S"
[40] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[43] "d" "In" "Ashcroft"
[46] "affirmed" "grant" "preliminary"
[49] "injunction" "case" "Government"
[52] "failed" "show" "likelihood"
[55] "success" "compelling" "interest"
[58] "test" "We" "reasoned"
[61] "s" "Government" "bears"
[64] "burden" "proof" "ultimate"
[67] "question" "challenged" "Act"
[70] "s" "constitutionality" "respondents"
[73] "movants" "must" "deemed"
[76] "likely" "prevail" "unless"
[79] "Government" "shown" "respondents"
[82] "proposed" "less" "restrictive"
[85] "alternatives" "less" "effective"
[88] "enforcing" "Act" "Id"
[91] "S" "Ct" "That"
[94] "logic" "extends" "case"
[97] "Government" "failed" "first"
[100] "prong" "compelling" "interest"
[103] "test" "reach" "least"
[106] "restrictive" "means" "prong"
[109] "can" "make" "difference"
[112] "The" "point" "remains"
[115] "burdens" "preliminary" "injunction"
[118] "stage" "track" "burdens"
[121] "trial" ""
[[661]]
[1] "The" "Government" "attempts"
[4] "limit" "rule" "announced"
[7] "Ashcroft" "content" "based"
[10] "restrictions" "speech" "distinction"
[13] "unavailing" "The" "fact"
[16] "Ashcroft" "involved" "restriction"
[19] "reason" "Government" "burden"
[22] "proof" "trial" "First"
[25] "Amendment" "see" "id"
[28] "S" "Ct" "way"
[31] "affected" "Court" "s"
[34] "assessment" "consequences" "burden"
[37] "purposes" "preliminary" "injunction"
[40] "Here" "burden" "placed"
[43] "squarely" "Government" "RFRA"
[46] "rather" "First" "Amendment"
[49] "see" "U" "S"
[52] "C" "bb" "b"
[55] "bb" "consequences" "Congress"
[58] "s" "express" "decision"
[61] "legislate" "compelling" "interest"
[64] "test" "indicates" "RFRA"
[67] "challenges" "adjudicated" "manner"
[70] "constitutionally" "mandated" "applications"
[73] "test" "including" "preliminary"
[76] "injunction" "stage" ""
[[662]]
[1] "III" ""
[[663]]
[1] "The" "Government" "s"
[4] "second" "line" "argument"
[7] "rests" "Controlled" "Substances"
[10] "Act" "The" "Government"
[13] "contends" "Act" "s"
[16] "description" "Schedule" "I"
[19] "substances" "high" "potential"
[22] "abuse" "currently" "accepted"
[25] "medical" "use" "treatment"
[28] "United" "States" "lack"
[31] "accepted" "safety" "use"
[34] "medical" "supervision" "U"
[37] "S" "C" "b"
[40] "precludes" "consideration" "individualized"
[43] "exceptions" "sought" "UDV"
[46] "The" "Government" "goes"
[49] "argue" "regulatory" "regime"
[52] "established" "Act" "closed"
[55] "system" "prohibits" "use"
[58] "controlled" "substances" "except"
[61] "authorized" "Act" "see"
[64] "Gonzales" "v" "Raich"
[67] "U" "S" "S"
[70] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[73] "d" "function" "necessary"
[76] "rigor" "comprehensiveness" "subjected"
[79] "judicial" "exemptions" "Brief"
[82] "Petitioners" "According" "Government"
[85] "way" "cabin" "religious"
[88] "exceptions" "recognized" "public"
[91] "will" "misread" "exceptions"
[94] "signaling" "substance" "issue"
[97] "harmful" "Id" "Under"
[100] "Government" "s" "view"
[103] "need" "assess" "particulars"
[106] "UDV" "s" "use"
[109] "weigh" "impact" "exemption"
[112] "specific" "use" "Controlled"
[115] "Substances" "Act" "serves"
[118] "compelling" "purpose" "simply"
[121] "admits" "exceptions" ""
[[664]]
[1] "A" ""
[[665]]
[1] "RFRA" "strict" "scrutiny" "test"
[5] "adopted" "contemplate" "inquiry" "focused"
[9] "Government" "s" "categorical" "approach"
[13] "RFRA" "requires" "Government" "demonstrate"
[17] "compelling" "interest" "test" "satisfied"
[21] "application" "challenged" "law" "person"
[25] "particular" "claimant" "whose" "sincere"
[29] "exercise" "religion" "substantially" "burdened"
[33] "U" "S" "C" "bb"
[37] "b" "RFRA" "expressly" "adopted"
[41] "compelling" "interest" "test" "set"
[45] "forth" "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[49] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[53] "L" "Ed" "d" "Wisconsin"
[57] "v" "Yoder" "U" "S"
[61] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[65] "d" "ʤ" "bb" "b"
[69] "In" "cases" "Court" "looked"
[73] "beyond" "broadly" "formulated" "interests"
[77] "justifying" "general" "applicability" "government"
[81] "mandates" "scrutinized" "asserted" "harm"
[85] "granting" "specific" "exemptions" "particular"
[89] "religious" "claimants" "In" "Yoder"
[93] "example" "permitted" "exemption" "Amish"
[97] "children" "compulsory" "school" "attendance"
[101] "law" "We" "recognized" "State"
[105] "paramount" "interest" "education" "held"
[109] "despite" "admitted" "validity" "generality"
[113] "cases" "must" "searchingly" "examine"
[117] "interests" "State" "seeks" "promote"
[121] "impediment" "objectives" "flow" "recognizing"
[125] "claimed" "Amish" "exemption" "U"
[129] "S" "S" "Ct" "emphasis"
[133] "added" "The" "Court" "explained"
[137] "State" "needed" "show" "particularity"
[141] "admittedly" "strong" "interest" "adversely"
[145] "affected" "granting" "exemption" "Amish"
[149] "Id" "S" "Ct" "emphasis"
[153] "added" ""
[[666]]
[1] "In" "Sherbert" "Court"
[4] "upheld" "particular" "claim"
[7] "religious" "exemption" "state"
[10] "law" "denying" "unemployment"
[13] "benefits" "work" "Saturdays"
[16] "explained" "announcing" "constitutional"
[19] "right" "unemployment" "benefits"
[22] "persons" "whose" "religious"
[25] "convictions" "cause" "unemployment"
[28] "U" "S" "S"
[31] "Ct" "emphasis" "added"
[34] "The" "Court" "distinguished"
[37] "case" "employee" "s"
[40] "religious" "convictions" "serve"
[43] "make" "nonproductive" "member"
[46] "society" "Ibid" "see"
[49] "also" "Smith" "U"
[52] "S" "S" "Ct"
[55] "O" "Connor" "J"
[58] "concurring" "judgment" "strict"
[61] "scrutiny" "least" "requires"
[64] "case" "case" "determination"
[67] "question" "sensitive" "facts"
[70] "particular" "claim" "Outside"
[73] "Free" "Exercise" "area"
[76] "well" "Court" "noted"
[79] "c" "ontext" "matters"
[82] "applying" "compelling" "interest"
[85] "test" "Grutter" "v"
[88] "Bollinger" "U" "S"
[91] "S" "Ct" "L"
[94] "Ed" "d" "emphasized"
[97] "strict" "scrutiny" "take"
[100] "relevant" "differences" "account"
[103] "indeed" "fundamental" "purpose"
[106] "Adarand" "Constructors" "Inc"
[109] "v" "Pe" "U"
[112] "S" "S" "Ct"
[115] "L" "Ed" "d"
[118] ""
[[667]]
[1] "B" ""
[[668]]
[1] "" "Under" "focused"
[4] "inquiry" "required" "RFRA"
[7] "compelling" "interest" "test"
[10] "Government" "s" "mere"
[13] "invocation" "general" "characteristics"
[16] "Schedule" "I" "substances"
[19] "set" "forth" "Controlled"
[22] "Substances" "Act" "carry"
[25] "day" "It" "true"
[28] "course" "Schedule" "I"
[31] "substances" "DMT" "exceptionally"
[34] "dangerous" "See" "e"
[37] "g" "Touby" "v"
[40] "United" "States" "U"
[43] "S" "S" "Ct"
[46] "L" "Ed" "d"
[49] "Nevertheless" "indication" "Congress"
[52] "classifying" "DMT" "considered"
[55] "harms" "posed" "particular"
[58] "use" "issue" "circumscribed"
[61] "sacramental" "use" "hoasca"
[64] "UDV" "The" "question"
[67] "harms" "sacramental" "use"
[70] "hoasca" "UDV" "litigated"
[73] "Before" "District" "Court"
[76] "found" "Government" "carried"
[79] "burden" "showing" "compelling"
[82] "interest" "preventing" "harms"
[85] "court" "noted" "ignore"
[88] "legislative" "branch" "government"
[91] "elected" "place" "materials"
[94] "containing" "DMT" "Schedule"
[97] "I" "Act" "reflecting"
[100] "findings" "substances" "containing"
[103] "DMT" "high" "potential"
[106] "abuse" "currently" "accepted"
[109] "medical" "use" "treatment"
[112] "United" "States" "t"
[115] "lack" "accepted" "safety"
[118] "use" "DMT" "medical"
[121] "supervision" "F" "Supp"
[124] "d" "But" "Congress"
[127] "determination" "DMT" "listed"
[130] "Schedule" "I" "simply"
[133] "provide" "categorical" "answer"
[136] "relieves" "Government" "obligation"
[139] "shoulder" "burden" "RFRA"
[142] ""
[[669]]
[1] "This" "conclusion" "reinforced" "Controlled"
[5] "Substances" "Act" "The" "Act"
[9] "contains" "provision" "authorizing" "Attorney"
[13] "General" "waive" "requirement" "registration"
[17] "certain" "manufacturers" "distributors" "dispensers"
[21] "finds" "consistent" "public" "health"
[25] "safety" "U" "S" "C"
[29] "d" "The" "fact" "Act"
[33] "contemplates" "exempting" "certain" "people"
[37] "requirements" "consistent" "public" "health"
[41] "safety" "indicates" "congressional" "findings"
[45] "respect" "Schedule" "I" "substances"
[49] "carry" "determinative" "weight" "RFRA"
[53] "purposes" "Government" "ascribe" ""
[[670]]
[1] "And" "fact" "exception" "made"
[5] "Schedule" "I" "ban" "religious"
[9] "use" "For" "past" "years"
[13] "regulatory" "exemption" "use" "peyote"
[17] "Schedule" "I" "substance" "Native"
[21] "American" "Church" "See" "CFR"
[25] "In" "Congress" "extended" "exemption"
[29] "members" "every" "recognized" "Indian"
[33] "Tribe" "See" "U" "S"
[37] "C" "b" "Everything" "Government"
[41] "says" "DMT" "hoasca" "Schedule"
[45] "I" "substance" "Congress" "determined"
[49] "high" "potential" "abuse" "currently"
[53] "accepted" "medical" "use" "lack"
[57] "accepted" "safety" "use" "medical"
[61] "supervision" "U" "S" "C"
[65] "b" "applies" "equal" "measure"
[69] "mescaline" "peyote" "yet" "Executive"
[73] "Congress" "decreed" "exception" "Controlled"
[77] "Substances" "Act" "Native" "American"
[81] "religious" "use" "peyote" "If"
[85] "use" "permitted" "face" "congressional"
[89] "findings" "inʤ" "b" "hundreds"
[93] "thousands" "Native" "Americans" "practicing"
[97] "faith" "difficult" "see" "findings"
[101] "alone" "can" "preclude" "consideration"
[105] "similar" "exception" "American" "members"
[109] "UDV" "want" "practice" "See"
[113] "Church" "Lukumi" "Babalu" "Aye"
[117] "Inc" "v" "Hialeah" "U"
[121] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[125] "Ed" "d" "It" "established"
[129] "strict" "scrutiny" "jurisprudence" "law"
[133] "regarded" "protecting" "interest" "highest"
[137] "order" "leaves" "appreciable" "damage"
[141] "supposedly" "vital" "interest" "unprohibited"
[145] "quoting" "Florida" "Star" "v"
[149] "B" "J" "F" "U"
[153] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[157] "Ed" "d" "SCALIA" "J"
[161] "concurring" "part" "concurring" "judgment"
[165] ""
[[671]]
[1] "The" "Government" "responds" "unique"
[5] "relationship" "United" "States" "Tribes"
[9] "Brief" "Petitioners" "see" "Morton"
[13] "v" "Mancari" "U" "S"
[17] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[21] "d" "never" "explains" "unique"
[25] "relationship" "justifies" "overriding" "congressional"
[29] "findings" "Government" "relies" "resisting"
[33] "exception" "UDV" "s" "religious"
[37] "use" "hoasca" "In" "words"
[41] "Schedule" "I" "substance" "fact"
[45] "always" "highly" "dangerous" "amount"
[49] "matter" "used" "unique" "relationship"
[53] "Tribes" "justifies" "allowing" "use"
[57] "peyote" "Nothing" "unique" "political"
[61] "status" "Tribes" "makes" "members"
[65] "immune" "health" "risks" "Government"
[69] "asserts" "accompany" "use" "Schedule"
[73] "I" "substance" "insulates" "Schedule"
[77] "I" "substance" "Tribes" "use"
[81] "religious" "exercise" "alleged" "risk"
[85] "diversion" ""
[[672]]
[1] "The" "Government" "argues" "existence"
[5] "congressional" "exemption" "peyote" "indicate"
[9] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "amenable"
[13] "judicially" "crafted" "exceptions" "RFRA"
[17] "however" "plainly" "contemplates" "courts"
[21] "recognize" "exceptions" "law" "works"
[25] "See" "U" "S" "C"
[29] "bb" "c" "A" "person"
[33] "whose" "religious" "exercise" "burdened"
[37] "violation" "section" "may" "assert"
[41] "violation" "claim" "defense" "judicial"
[45] "proceeding" "obtain" "appropriate" "relief"
[49] "government" "Congress" "role" "peyote"
[53] "exemption" "Executive" "s" "see"
[57] "CFR" "confirms" "findings" "Controlled"
[61] "Substances" "Act" "preclude" "exceptions"
[65] "altogether" "RFRA" "makes" "clear"
[69] "obligation" "courts" "consider" "whether"
[73] "exceptions" "required" "test" "set"
[77] "forth" "Congress" ""
[[673]]
[1] "C" ""
[[674]]
[1] "The" "well" "established" "peyote"
[5] "exception" "also" "fatally" "undermines"
[9] "Government" "s" "broader" "contention"
[13] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "establishes"
[17] "closed" "regulatory" "system" "admits"
[21] "exceptions" "RFRA" "The" "Government"
[25] "argues" "effectiveness" "Controlled" "Substances"
[29] "Act" "will" "necessarily" "undercut"
[33] "Act" "uniformly" "applied" "without"
[37] "regard" "burdens" "religious" "exercise"
[41] "Brief" "Petitioners" "The" "peyote"
[45] "exception" "however" "place" "since"
[49] "outset" "Controlled" "Substances" "Act"
[53] "evidence" "undercut" "Government" "s"
[57] "ability" "enforce" "ban" "peyote"
[61] "use" "non" "Indians" ""
[[675]]
[1] "The" "Government" "points"
[4] "pre" "Smith" "cases"
[7] "relying" "need" "uniformity"
[10] "rejecting" "claims" "religious"
[13] "exemptions" "Free" "Exercise"
[16] "Clause" "see" "Brief"
[19] "Petitioners" "cases" "strike"
[22] "us" "quite" "different"
[25] "present" "one" "Those"
[28] "cases" "embrace" "notion"
[31] "general" "interest" "uniformity"
[34] "justified" "substantial" "burden"
[37] "religious" "exercise" "instead"
[40] "scrutinized" "asserted" "need"
[43] "explained" "denied" "exemptions"
[46] "accommodated" "In" "United"
[49] "States" "v" "Lee"
[52] "U" "S" "S"
[55] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[58] "d" "example" "Court"
[61] "rejected" "claimed" "exception"
[64] "obligation" "pay" "Social"
[67] "Security" "taxes" "noting"
[70] "mandatory" "participation" "indispensable"
[73] "fiscal" "vitality" "social"
[76] "security" "system" "tax"
[79] "system" "function" "denominations"
[82] "allowed" "challenge" "tax"
[85] "system" "tax" "payments"
[88] "spent" "manner" "violates"
[91] "religious" "belief" "Id"
[94] "S" "Ct" "See"
[97] "also" "Hernandez" "v"
[100] "Commissioner" "U" "S"
[103] "S" "Ct" "L"
[106] "Ed" "d" "In"
[109] "Braunfeld" "v" "Brown"
[112] "U" "S" "S"
[115] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[118] "d" "plurality" "opinion"
[121] "Court" "denied" "claimed"
[124] "exception" "Sunday" "closing"
[127] "laws" "part" "allowing"
[130] "exceptions" "might" "well"
[133] "provide" "claimants" "economic"
[136] "advantage" "competitors" "must"
[139] "remain" "closed" "day"
[142] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[145] "The" "whole" "point"
[148] "uniform" "day" "rest"
[151] "workers" "defeated" "exceptions"
[154] "See" "Sherbert" "U"
[157] "S" "S" "Ct"
[160] "discussing" "Braunfeld" "These"
[163] "cases" "show" "Government"
[166] "can" "demonstrate" "compelling"
[169] "interest" "uniform" "application"
[172] "particular" "program" "offering"
[175] "evidence" "granting" "requested"
[178] "religious" "accommodations" "seriously"
[181] "compromise" "ability" "administer"
[184] "program" ""
[[676]]
[1] "Here" "Government" "s" "argument"
[5] "uniformity" "different" "rests" "much"
[9] "particular" "statutory" "program" "issue"
[13] "slippery" "slope" "concerns" "invoked"
[17] "response" "RFRA" "claim" "exception"
[21] "generally" "applicable" "law" "The"
[25] "Government" "s" "argument" "echoes"
[29] "classic" "rejoinder" "bureaucrats" "throughout"
[33] "history" "If" "I" "make"
[37] "exception" "I" "ll" "make"
[41] "one" "everybody" "exceptions" "But"
[45] "RFRA" "operates" "mandating" "consideration"
[49] "compelling" "interest" "test" "exceptions"
[53] "rule" "s" "general" "applicability"
[57] "U" "S" "C" "bb"
[61] "Congress" "determined" "legislated" "test"
[65] "workable" "test" "striking" "sensible"
[69] "balances" "religious" "liberty" "competing"
[73] "prior" "governmental" "interests" "ʤ"
[77] "bb" "This" "determination" "finds"
[81] "support" "cases" "Sherbert" "example"
[85] "rejected" "slippery" "slope" "argument"
[89] "similar" "one" "offered" "case"
[93] "dismissing" "possibility" "State" "s"
[97] "speculation" "filing" "fraudulent" "claims"
[101] "unscrupulous" "claimants" "feigning" "religious"
[105] "objections" "Saturday" "work" "drain"
[109] "unemployment" "benefits" "fund" "U"
[113] "S" "S" "Ct" ""
[[677]]
[1] "We" "reaffirmed" "just"
[4] "last" "Term" "feasibility"
[7] "case" "case" "consideration"
[10] "religious" "exemptions" "generally"
[13] "applicable" "rules" "In"
[16] "Cutter" "v" "Wilkinson"
[19] "U" "S" "S"
[22] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[25] "d" "held" "Religious"
[28] "Land" "Use" "Institutionalized"
[31] "Persons" "Act" "allows"
[34] "federal" "state" "prisoners"
[37] "seek" "religious" "accommodations"
[40] "pursuant" "standard" "set"
[43] "forth" "RFRA" "violate"
[46] "Establishment" "Clause" "We"
[49] "cause" "believe" "compelling"
[52] "interest" "test" "applied"
[55] "appropriately" "balanced" "way"
[58] "specific" "claims" "exemptions"
[61] "arose" "Id" "Nothing"
[64] "opinion" "suggested" "courts"
[67] "task" ""
[[678]]
[1] "We" "doubt" "may"
[4] "instances" "need" "uniformity"
[7] "precludes" "recognition" "exceptions"
[10] "generally" "applicable" "laws"
[13] "RFRA" "But" "surprising"
[16] "find" "case" "given"
[19] "longstanding" "exemption" "Controlled"
[22] "Substances" "Act" "religious"
[25] "use" "peyote" "fact"
[28] "reason" "Congress" "enacted"
[31] "RFRA" "respond" "decision"
[34] "denying" "claimed" "right"
[37] "sacramental" "use" "controlled"
[40] "substance" "See" "U"
[43] "S" "C" "bb"
[46] "And" "fact" "Government"
[49] "offered" "evidence" "demonstrating"
[52] "granting" "UDV" "exemption"
[55] "cause" "kind" "administrative"
[58] "harm" "recognized" "compelling"
[61] "interest" "Lee" "Hernandez"
[64] "Braunfeld" "The" "Government"
[67] "failed" "convince" "District"
[70] "Court" "preliminary" "injunction"
[73] "hearing" "health" "diversion"
[76] "concerns" "provide" "compelling"
[79] "interest" "banning" "UDV"
[82] "s" "sacramental" "use"
[85] "hoasca" "It" "compensate"
[88] "failure" "now" "bold"
[91] "argument" "can" "RFRA"
[94] "exceptions" "Controlled" "Substances"
[97] "Act" "See" "Tr"
[100] "Oral" "Arg" "Deputy"
[103] "Solicitor" "General" "statement"
[106] "exception" "made" "even"
[109] "rigorously" "policed" "use"
[112] "one" "drop" "substance"
[115] "year" ""
[[679]]
[1] "IV" ""
[[680]]
[1] "Before" "District" "Court" "Government"
[5] "also" "asserted" "interest" "compliance"
[9] "United" "Nations" "Convention" "Psychotropic"
[13] "Substances" "Feb" "U" "S"
[17] "T" "T" "I" "A"
[21] "S" "No" "The" "Convention"
[25] "signed" "United" "States" "implemented"
[29] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "calls"
[33] "signatories" "prohibit" "use" "hallucinogens"
[37] "including" "DMT" "The" "Government"
[41] "argues" "compelling" "interest" "meeting"
[45] "international" "obligations" "complying" "Convention"
[49] ""
[[681]]
[1] "The" "District" "Court"
[4] "rejected" "interest" "found"
[7] "Convention" "cover" "hoasca"
[10] "The" "court" "relied"
[13] "official" "commentary" "Convention"
[16] "notes" "Schedule" "I"
[19] "Convention" "list" "natural"
[22] "hallucinogenic" "materials" "p"
[25] "lants" "submitted" "also"
[28] "likely" "listed" "Schedule"
[31] "I" "products" "obtained"
[34] "plants" "U" "N"
[37] "Commentary" "Convention" "Psychotropic"
[40] "Substances" "The" "court"
[43] "reasoned" "hoasca" "like"
[46] "plants" "tea" "made"
[49] "sufficiently" "distinct" "DMT"
[52] "fall" "outside" "treaty"
[55] "See" "F" "Supp"
[58] "d" ""
[[682]]
[1] "" "We" "agree" "The"
[5] "Convention" "provides" "preparation" "subject"
[9] "measures" "control" "psychotropic" "substance"
[13] "contains" "defines" "preparation" "solution"
[17] "mixture" "whatever" "physical" "state"
[21] "containing" "one" "psychotropic" "substances"
[25] "See" "U" "S" "T"
[29] "Art" "f" "id" "Art"
[33] "Hoasca" "solution" "mixture" "containing"
[37] "DMT" "fact" "made" "simple"
[41] "process" "brewing" "plants" "water"
[45] "opposed" "advanced" "method" "change"
[49] "To" "extent" "commentary" "suggests"
[53] "plants" "covered" "Convention" "moment"
[57] "UDV" "seeks" "import" "use"
[61] "tea" "brewed" "plants" "plants"
[65] "tea" "plainly" "qualifies" "preparation"
[69] "Convention" ""
[[683]]
[1] "" "The" "fact" "hoasca"
[5] "covered" "Convention" "however" "automatically"
[9] "mean" "Government" "demonstrated" "compelling"
[13] "interest" "applying" "Controlled" "Substances"
[17] "Act" "implements" "Convention" "UDV"
[21] "s" "sacramental" "use" "tea"
[25] "At" "present" "stage" "suffices"
[29] "observe" "Government" "even" "submit"
[33] "evidence" "addressing" "international" "consequences"
[37] "granting" "exemption" "UDV" "The"
[41] "Government" "simply" "submitted" "two"
[45] "affidavits" "State" "Department" "officials"
[49] "attesting" "general" "importance" "honoring"
[53] "international" "obligations" "maintaining" "leadership"
[57] "position" "United" "States" "international"
[61] "war" "drugs" "See" "Declaration"
[65] "Gary" "T" "Sheridan" "Jan"
[69] "App" "G" "App" "Pet"
[73] "Cert" "Declaration" "Robert" "E"
[77] "Dalton" "Jan" "App" "H"
[81] "id" "We" "doubt" "validity"
[85] "interests" "doubt" "general" "interest"
[89] "promoting" "public" "health" "safety"
[93] "enforcing" "Controlled" "Substances" "Act"
[97] "RFRA" "invocation" "general" "interests"
[101] "standing" "alone" "enough" ""
[[684]]
[1] "" ""
[[685]]
[1] "The" "Government" "repeatedly" "invokes"
[5] "Congress" "findings" "purposes" "underlying"
[9] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "Congress"
[13] "reason" "enacting" "RFRA" "Congress"
[17] "recognized" "laws" "neutral" "toward"
[21] "religion" "may" "burden" "religious"
[25] "exercise" "surely" "laws" "intended"
[29] "interfere" "religious" "exercise" "legislated"
[33] "compelling" "interest" "test" "means"
[37] "courts" "strik" "e" "sensible"
[41] "balances" "religious" "liberty" "competing"
[45] "prior" "governmental" "interests" "U"
[49] "S" "C" "bb" ""
[[686]]
[1] "We" "cause" "pretend"
[4] "task" "assigned" "Congress"
[7] "courts" "RFRA" "easy"
[10] "one" "Indeed" "sort"
[13] "difficulties" "highlighted" "Government"
[16] "cited" "Court" "deciding"
[19] "approach" "later" "mandated"
[22] "Congress" "RFRA" "required"
[25] "matter" "constitutional" "law"
[28] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[31] "See" "Smith" "U"
[34] "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "But" "Congress" "determined"
[40] "courts" "strike" "sensible"
[43] "balances" "pursuant" "compelling"
[46] "interest" "test" "requires"
[49] "Government" "address" "particular"
[52] "practice" "issue" "Applying"
[55] "test" "conclude" "courts"
[58] "err" "determining" "Government"
[61] "failed" "demonstrate" "preliminary"
[64] "injunction" "stage" "compelling"
[67] "interest" "barring" "UDV"
[70] "s" "sacramental" "use"
[73] "hoasca" ""
[[687]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "United" "States"
[5] "Court" "Appeals" "Tenth" "Circuit"
[9] "affirmed" "case" "remanded" "proceedings"
[13] "consistent" "opinion" ""
[[688]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[689]]
[1] "JUSTICE" "WHITE" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[690]]
[1] "The" "question" "presented" "review"
[5] "whether" "State" "consistent" "First"
[9] "Fourteenth" "Amendments" "may" "require"
[13] "religious" "organization" "desiring" "distribute"
[17] "sell" "religious" "literature" "solicit"
[21] "donations" "state" "fair" "conduct"
[25] "activities" "assigned" "location" "within"
[29] "fairgrounds" "even" "though" "application"
[33] "rule" "limits" "religious" "practices"
[37] "organization" ""
[[691]]
[1] "" "I" ""
[[692]]
[1] "Each" "year" "Minnesota" "Agricultural"
[5] "Society" "Society" "public" "corporation"
[9] "organized" "laws" "Minnesota" "see"
[13] "Minn" "Stat" "operates" "State"
[17] "Fair" "acre" "state" "owned"
[21] "tract" "located" "St" "Paul"
[25] "Minn" "The" "Fair" "conducted"
[29] "purpose" "exhibiting" "agricultural" "stock"
[33] "breeding" "horticultural" "mining" "mechanical"
[37] "industrial" "products" "resources" "state"
[41] "including" "proper" "exhibits" "expositions"
[45] "arts" "human" "skills" "sciences"
[49] "Ibid" "The" "Fair" "major"
[53] "public" "event" "attracts" "visitors"
[57] "Minnesota" "well" "parts" "country"
[61] "During" "past" "five" "years"
[65] "average" "total" "attendance" "day"
[69] "Fair" "persons" "The" "average"
[73] "daily" "attendance" "weekdays" "persons"
[77] "Saturdays" "Sundays" ""
[[693]]
[1] "The" "Society" "authorized" "make"
[5] "bylaws" "ordinances" "rules" "inconsistent"
[9] "law" "may" "deem" "necessary"
[13] "proper" "government" "fair" "grounds"
[17] "Minn" "Stat" "Under" "authority"
[21] "Society" "promulgated" "Minnesota" "State"
[25] "Fair" "Rule" "provides" "relevant"
[29] "part" ""
[[694]]
[1] "" "s" "ale" "distribution"
[5] "merchandise" "including" "printed" "written"
[9] "material" "except" "license" "issued"
[13] "Society" "duly" "licensed" "location"
[17] "shall" "misdemeanor" ""
[[695]]
[1] "As" "Rule" "construed"
[4] "applied" "Society" "persons"
[7] "groups" "firms" "desire"
[10] "sell" "exhibit" "distribute"
[13] "materials" "annual" "State"
[16] "Fair" "must" "fixed"
[19] "locations" "fairgrounds" "Although"
[22] "Rule" "prevent" "organizational"
[25] "representatives" "walking" "fairgrounds"
[28] "communicating" "organization" "s"
[31] "views" "fair" "patrons"
[34] "face" "face" "discussions"
[37] "require" "exhibitor" "conduct"
[40] "sales" "distribution" "fund"
[43] "solicitation" "operations" "booth"
[46] "rented" "Society" "Space"
[49] "fairgrounds" "rented" "comers"
[52] "nondiscriminatory" "fashion" "first"
[55] "come" "first" "served"
[58] "basis" "rental" "charge"
[61] "based" "size" "location"
[64] "booth" "The" "Rule"
[67] "applies" "alike" "nonprofit"
[70] "charitable" "commercial" "enterprises"
[73] ""
[[696]]
[1] "One" "day" "prior"
[4] "opening" "Minnesota" "State"
[7] "Fair" "respondents" "International"
[10] "Society" "Krishna" "Consciousness"
[13] "Inc" "ISKCON" "international"
[16] "religious" "society" "espousing"
[19] "views" "Krishna" "religion"
[22] "Joseph" "Beca" "head"
[25] "Minneapolis" "ISKCON" "temple"
[28] "filed" "suit" "numerous"
[31] "state" "officials" "seeking"
[34] "declaration" "Rule" "face"
[37] "applied" "violated" "respondents"
[40] "rights" "First" "Amendment"
[43] "seeking" "injunctive" "relief"
[46] "prohibiting" "enforcement" "Rule"
[49] "ISKCON" "members" "Specifically"
[52] "ISKCON" "asserted" "Rule"
[55] "suppress" "practice" "Sankirtan"
[58] "one" "religious" "rituals"
[61] "enjoins" "members" "go"
[64] "public" "places" "distribute"
[67] "sell" "religious" "literature"
[70] "solicit" "donations" "support"
[73] "Krishna" "religion" "The"
[76] "trial" "court" "entered"
[79] "temporary" "orders" "govern"
[82] "conduct" "parties" "Fair"
[85] "When" "event" "concluded"
[88] "hearing" "trial" "court"
[91] "granted" "state" "officials"
[94] "motion" "summary" "judgment"
[97] "upholding" "constitutionality" "Rule"
[100] "Relying" "reasoning" "International"
[103] "Society" "Krishna" "Consciousness"
[106] "Inc" "v" "Evans"
[109] "F" "Supp" "SD"
[112] "Ohio" "court" "found"
[115] "State" "s" "interest"
[118] "providing" "fair" "goers"
[121] "concessionaries" "adequate" "equal"
[124] "access" "providing" "minimum"
[127] "congestion" "fairgrounds" "sufficient"
[130] "sustain" "Rule" "s"
[133] "limitations" "applied" "respondents"
[136] "The" "court" "however"
[139] "provided" "respondents" "free"
[142] "r" "oam" "throughout"
[145] "areas" "fairgrounds" "generally"
[148] "open" "public" "purpose"
[151] "discussing" "others" "religious"
[154] "beliefs" ""
[[697]]
[1] "On" "appeal" "Minnesota"
[4] "Supreme" "Court" "reversed"
[7] "holding" "Rule" "applied"
[10] "respondents" "unconstitutionally" "restricted"
[13] "Krishnas" "religious" "practice"
[16] "Sankirtan" "N" "W"
[19] "d" "The" "court"
[22] "rejected" "Society" "s"
[25] "proffered" "justifications" "Rule"
[28] "inadequate" "warrant" "restriction"
[31] "Furthermore" "application" "Rule"
[34] "ISKCON" "essential" "furtherance"
[37] "State" "s" "interests"
[40] "interests" "served" "means"
[43] "less" "restrictive" "respondents"
[46] "First" "Amendment" "rights"
[49] "We" "granted" "state"
[52] "officials" "petition" "writ"
[55] "certiorari" "light" "important"
[58] "constitutional" "issues" "presented"
[61] "conflicting" "results" "reached"
[64] "similar" "cases" "various"
[67] "lower" "courts" "U"
[70] "S" "S" "Ct"
[73] "L" "Ed" "d"
[76] ""
[[698]]
[1] "" "II" ""
[[699]]
[1] "The" "State" "dispute" "oral"
[5] "written" "dissemination" "Krishnas" "religious"
[9] "views" "doctrines" "protected" "First"
[13] "Amendment" "See" "Schneider" "v"
[17] "State" "U" "S" "S"
[21] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "Lovell"
[25] "v" "City" "Griffin" "U"
[29] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[33] "Ed" "Nor" "claim" "protection"
[37] "lost" "written" "materials" "sought"
[41] "distributed" "sold" "rather" "given"
[45] "away" "contributions" "gifts" "solicited"
[49] "course" "propagating" "faith" "Our"
[53] "cases" "indicate" "much" "Murdock"
[57] "v" "Pennsylvania" "U" "S"
[61] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[65] "Schaumburg" "v" "Citizens" "Better"
[69] "Environment" "U" "S" "S"
[73] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[77] "See" "Cantwell" "v" "Connecticut"
[81] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[85] "L" "Ed" ""
[[700]]
[1] "" "It" "also" "common"
[5] "ground" "however" "First" "Amendment"
[9] "guarantee" "right" "communicate" "one"
[13] "s" "views" "times" "places"
[17] "manner" "may" "desired" "Adderley"
[21] "v" "Florida" "U" "S"
[25] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[29] "d" "Poulos" "v" "New"
[33] "Hampshire" "U" "S" "S"
[37] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "see"
[41] "Cox" "v" "Louisiana" "U"
[45] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[49] "Ed" "d" "As" "Minnesota"
[53] "Supreme" "Court" "recognized" "activities"
[57] "ISKCON" "like" "others" "protected"
[61] "First" "Amendment" "subject" "reasonable"
[65] "time" "place" "manner" "restrictions"
[69] "Grayned" "v" "City" "Rockford"
[73] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[77] "L" "Ed" "d" "Adderley"
[81] "v" "Florida" "supra" "Kovacs"
[85] "v" "Cooper" "U" "S"
[89] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[93] "Cox" "v" "New" "Hampshire"
[97] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[101] "L" "Ed" "We" "often"
[105] "approved" "restrictions" "kind" "provided"
[109] "justified" "without" "reference" "content"
[113] "regulated" "speech" "serve" "significant"
[117] "governmental" "interest" "leave" "open"
[121] "ample" "alternative" "channels" "communication"
[125] "information" "Virginia" "Pharmacy" "Board"
[129] "v" "Virginia" "Citizens" "Consumer"
[133] "Council" "U" "S" "S"
[137] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[141] "see" "also" "Consolidated" "Edison"
[145] "Co" "v" "Public" "Service"
[149] "Comm" "n" "U" "S"
[153] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[157] "d" "The" "issue" "whether"
[161] "Rule" "permissible" "restriction" "place"
[165] "manner" "communicating" "views" "Krishna"
[169] "religion" "specifically" "whether" "Society"
[173] "may" "require" "members" "ISKCON"
[177] "desire" "practice" "Sankirtan" "State"
[181] "Fair" "confine" "distribution" "sales"
[185] "solicitation" "activities" "fixed" "location"
[189] ""
[[701]]
[1] "" "A" "major" "criterion"
[5] "valid" "time" "place" "manner"
[9] "restriction" "restriction" "may" "based"
[13] "upon" "either" "content" "subject"
[17] "matter" "speech" "Consolidated" "Edison"
[21] "Co" "v" "Public" "Service"
[25] "Comm" "n" "supra" "S"
[29] "Ct" "Rule" "qualifies" "respect"
[33] "since" "Supreme" "Court" "Minnesota"
[37] "observed" "Rule" "applies" "evenhandedly"
[41] "wish" "distribute" "sell" "written"
[45] "materials" "solicit" "funds" "No"
[49] "person" "organization" "whether" "commercial"
[53] "charitable" "permitted" "engage" "activities"
[57] "except" "booth" "rented" "purposes"
[61] ""
[[702]]
[1] "" "Nor" "Rule"
[4] "suffer" "covert" "forms"
[7] "discrimination" "may" "result"
[10] "arbitrary" "discretion" "vested"
[13] "governmental" "authority" "The"
[16] "method" "allocating" "space"
[19] "straightforward" "first" "come"
[22] "first" "served" "system"
[25] "The" "Rule" "open"
[28] "kind" "arbitrary" "application"
[31] "Court" "condemned" "inherently"
[34] "inconsistent" "valid" "time"
[37] "place" "manner" "regulation"
[40] "discretion" "potential" "becoming"
[43] "means" "suppressing" "particular"
[46] "point" "view" "See"
[49] "Shuttlesworth" "v" "Birmingham"
[52] "U" "S" "S"
[55] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[58] "d" "Cox" "v"
[61] "Louisiana" "supra" "S"
[64] "Ct" "Staub" "v"
[67] "City" "Baxley" "U"
[70] "S" "S" "Ct"
[73] "L" "Ed" "d"
[76] "Largent" "v" "Texas"
[79] "U" "S" "S"
[82] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[85] "Cantwell" "v" "Connecticut"
[88] "supra" "S" "Ct"
[91] "Schneider" "v" "State"
[94] "U" "S" "S"
[97] "Ct" "Hague" "v"
[100] "CIO" "U" "S"
[103] "S" "Ct" "L"
[106] "Ed" ""
[[703]]
[1] "A" "valid" "time" "place"
[5] "manner" "regulation" "must" "also"
[9] "serve" "significant" "governmental" "interest"
[13] "Virginia" "Pharmacy" "Board" "v"
[17] "Virginia" "Citizens" "Consumer" "Council"
[21] "supra" "S" "Ct" "See"
[25] "Grayned" "v" "City" "Rockford"
[29] "supra" "S" "Ct" "Here"
[33] "principal" "justification" "asserted" "State"
[37] "support" "Rule" "need" "maintain"
[41] "orderly" "movement" "crowd" "given"
[45] "large" "number" "exhibitors" "persons"
[49] "attending" "Fair" ""
[[704]]
[1] "The" "fairgrounds" "comprise"
[4] "relatively" "small" "area"
[7] "acres" "bulk" "covered"
[10] "permanent" "buildings" "temporary"
[13] "structures" "parking" "lots"
[16] "connecting" "thoroughfares" "There"
[19] "exhibitors" "concessionaires" "renting"
[22] "space" "Fairs" "chiefly"
[25] "permanent" "temporary" "buildings"
[28] "The" "Fair" "designed"
[31] "exhibit" "public" "enormous"
[34] "variety" "goods" "services"
[37] "entertainment" "matters" "interest"
[40] "This" "accomplished" "confining"
[43] "individual" "exhibitors" "fixed"
[46] "locations" "public" "moving"
[49] "among" "booths" "attractions"
[52] "using" "streets" "open"
[55] "spaces" "provided" "purpose"
[58] "Because" "Fair" "attracts"
[61] "large" "crowds" "see"
[64] "supra" "apparent" "State"
[67] "s" "interest" "orderly"
[70] "movement" "control" "assembly"
[73] "persons" "substantial" "consideration"
[76] ""
[[705]]
[1] "As" "general" "matter"
[4] "clear" "State" "s"
[7] "interest" "protecting" "safety"
[10] "convenience" "persons" "using"
[13] "public" "forum" "valid"
[16] "governmental" "objective" "See"
[19] "Grayned" "v" "City"
[22] "Rockford" "U" "S"
[25] "S" "Ct" "Cox"
[28] "v" "New" "Hampshire"
[31] "U" "S" "S"
[34] "Ct" "Furthermore" "consideration"
[37] "forum" "s" "special"
[40] "attributes" "relevant" "constitutionality"
[43] "regulation" "since" "significance"
[46] "governmental" "interest" "must"
[49] "assessed" "light" "characteristic"
[52] "nature" "function" "particular"
[55] "forum" "involved" "See"
[58] "e" "g" "Grayned"
[61] "v" "City" "Rockford"
[64] "supra" "S" "Ct"
[67] "Lehman" "v" "City"
[70] "Shaker" "Heights" "U"
[73] "S" "S" "Ct"
[76] "L" "Ed" "d"
[79] "This" "observation" "bears"
[82] "particular" "import" "present"
[85] "case" "since" "respondents"
[88] "make" "number" "analogies"
[91] "fairgrounds" "city" "streets"
[94] "immemorially" "held" "trust"
[97] "use" "public" "used"
[100] "purposes" "assembly" "communicating"
[103] "thoughts" "citizens" "discussing"
[106] "public" "questions" "Hague"
[109] "v" "CIO" "supra"
[112] "S" "Ct" "See"
[115] "Kunz" "v" "New"
[118] "York" "U" "S"
[121] "S" "Ct" "L"
[124] "Ed" "But" "clear"
[127] "significant" "differences" "street"
[130] "fairgrounds" "A" "street"
[133] "continually" "open" "often"
[136] "uncongested" "constitutes" "necessary"
[139] "conduit" "daily" "affairs"
[142] "locality" "s" "citizens"
[145] "also" "place" "people"
[148] "may" "enjoy" "open"
[151] "air" "company" "friends"
[154] "neighbors" "relaxed" "environment"
[157] "The" "Minnesota" "Fair"
[160] "described" "temporary" "event"
[163] "attracting" "great" "numbers"
[166] "visitors" "come" "event"
[169] "short" "period" "see"
[172] "experience" "host" "exhibits"
[175] "attractions" "Fair" "The"
[178] "flow" "crowd" "demands"
[181] "safety" "pressing" "context"
[184] "Fair" "As" "comparisons"
[187] "public" "streets" "necessarily"
[190] "inexact" ""
[[706]]
[1] "The" "Minnesota" "Supreme" "Court"
[5] "recognized" "State" "s" "interest"
[9] "orderly" "movement" "large" "crowd"
[13] "avoiding" "congestion" "substantial" "Rule"
[17] "furthered" "interest" "significantly" "Nevertheless"
[21] "Minnesota" "Supreme" "Court" "declared"
[25] "case" "turn" "importance" "state"
[29] "s" "undeniable" "interest" "preventing"
[33] "widespread" "disorder" "surely" "exist"
[37] "regulation" "Rule" "effect" "upon"
[41] "significance" "State" "s" "interest"
[45] "avoiding" "whatever" "disorder" "likely"
[49] "result" "granting" "members" "ISKCON"
[53] "exemption" "Rule" "N" "W"
[57] "d" "Approaching" "case" "way"
[61] "court" "concluded" "although" "disruption"
[65] "occur" "exemption" "sufficient" "concern"
[69] "warrant" "confining" "Krishnas" "booth"
[73] "The" "court" "also" "concluded"
[77] "event" "Rule" "essential" "furtherance"
[81] "State" "s" "interest" "crowd"
[85] "control" "adequately" "served" "less"
[89] "intrusive" "means" ""
[[707]]
[1] "As" "see" "Minnesota" "Supreme"
[5] "Court" "took" "narrow" "view"
[9] "State" "s" "interest" "avoiding"
[13] "congestion" "maintaining" "orderly" "movement"
[17] "fair" "patrons" "fairgrounds" "The"
[21] "justification" "Rule" "measured" "disorder"
[25] "result" "granting" "exemption" "solely"
[29] "ISKCON" "That" "organization" "ritual"
[33] "Sankirtan" "special" "claim" "First"
[37] "Amendment" "protection" "compared" "religions"
[41] "also" "distribute" "literature" "solicit"
[45] "funds" "None" "cases" "suggest"
[49] "inclusion" "peripatetic" "solicitation" "part"
[53] "church" "ritual" "entitles" "church"
[57] "members" "solicitation" "rights" "public"
[61] "forum" "superior" "members" "religious"
[65] "groups" "raise" "money" "purport"
[69] "ritualize" "process" "Nor" "present"
[73] "purposes" "religious" "organizations" "enjoy"
[77] "rights" "communicate" "distribute" "solicit"
[81] "fairgrounds" "superior" "organizations" "social"
[85] "political" "ideological" "messages" "proselytize"
[89] "These" "nonreligious" "organizations" "seeking"
[93] "support" "activities" "entitled" "rights"
[97] "equal" "religious" "groups" "enter"
[101] "public" "forum" "spread" "views"
[105] "whether" "soliciting" "funds" "distributing"
[109] "literature" ""
[[708]]
[1] "If" "Rule" "invalid" "restriction"
[5] "activities" "ISKCON" "valid" "respect"
[9] "social" "political" "charitable" "organizations"
[13] "rented" "booths" "Fair" "confined"
[17] "distribution" "sale" "fund" "solicitation"
[21] "locations" "Nor" "valid" "respect"
[25] "organizations" "rent" "booths" "either"
[29] "unavailable" "due" "lack" "space"
[33] "chose" "avoid" "expense" "involved"
[37] "probability" "appear" "fairgrounds" "distribute"
[41] "sell" "solicit" "freely" "The"
[45] "question" "also" "inevitably" "arise"
[49] "extent" "First" "Amendment" "also"
[53] "gives" "commercial" "organizations" "right"
[57] "move" "among" "crowd" "distribute"
[61] "information" "sell" "wares" "respondents"
[65] "claim" "may" ""
[[709]]
[1] "ISKCON" "desires" "proselytize" "fair"
[5] "believes" "can" "successfully" "communicate"
[9] "raise" "funds" "In" "view"
[13] "can" "done" "intercepting" "fair"
[17] "patrons" "move" "success" "achieved"
[21] "stopping" "momentarily" "longer" "periods"
[25] "money" "given" "exchanged" "literature"
[29] "This" "consequence" "multiplied" "many"
[33] "times" "Rule" "applied" "confine"
[37] "transactions" "ISKCON" "others" "fixed"
[41] "locations" "Indeed" "court" "agreed"
[45] "without" "Rule" "widespread" "disorder"
[49] "fairgrounds" "The" "court" "also"
[53] "recognized" "disorder" "inevitably" "result"
[57] "exempting" "Krishnas" "Rule" "Obviously"
[61] "much" "larger" "threat" "State"
[65] "s" "interest" "crowd" "control"
[69] "religious" "nonreligious" "noncommercial" "organizations"
[73] "likewise" "move" "freely" "fairgrounds"
[77] "distributing" "selling" "literature" "soliciting"
[81] "funds" "will" ""
[[710]]
[1] "" "Given" "considerations"
[4] "hold" "State" "s"
[7] "interest" "confining" "distribution"
[10] "selling" "fund" "solicitation"
[13] "activities" "fixed" "locations"
[16] "sufficient" "satisfy" "requirement"
[19] "place" "manner" "restriction"
[22] "must" "serve" "substantial"
[25] "state" "interest" "By"
[28] "focusing" "incidental" "effect"
[31] "providing" "exemption" "Rule"
[34] "ISKCON" "Minnesota" "Supreme"
[37] "Court" "take" "account"
[40] "fact" "exemption" "meaningfully"
[43] "limited" "ISKCON" "applied"
[46] "similarly" "situated" "groups"
[49] "prevent" "State" "furthering"
[52] "important" "concern" "managing"
[55] "flow" "crowd" "In"
[58] "view" "Society" "may"
[61] "apply" "Rule" "confine"
[64] "type" "transactions" "issue"
[67] "designated" "locations" "without"
[70] "violating" "First" "Amendment"
[73] ""
[[711]]
[1] "For" "similar" "reasons"
[4] "agree" "Minnesota" "Supreme"
[7] "Court" "Rule" "unnecessary"
[10] "regulation" "State" "avoid"
[13] "threat" "interest" "posed"
[16] "ISKCON" "less" "restrictive"
[19] "means" "penalizing" "disorder"
[22] "disruption" "limiting" "number"
[25] "solicitors" "putting" "narrowly"
[28] "drawn" "restrictions" "location"
[31] "movement" "ISKCON" "s"
[34] "representatives" "As" "indicated"
[37] "inquiry" "must" "involve"
[40] "ISKCON" "also" "organizations"
[43] "entitled" "distribute" "sell"
[46] "solicit" "booth" "rule"
[49] "may" "enforced" "respect"
[52] "ISKCON" "Looked" "way"
[55] "quite" "improbable" "alternative"
[58] "means" "suggested" "Minnesota"
[61] "Supreme" "Court" "deal"
[64] "adequately" "problems" "posed"
[67] "much" "larger" "number"
[70] "distributors" "solicitors" "present"
[73] "fairgrounds" "judgment" "affirmed"
[76] ""
[[712]]
[1] "For" "Rule" "valid" "place"
[5] "manner" "restriction" "must" "also"
[9] "sufficiently" "clear" "alternative" "forums"
[13] "expression" "respondents" "protected" "speech"
[17] "exist" "despite" "effects" "Rule"
[21] "Rule" "vulnerable" "ground" "First"
[25] "Rule" "prevent" "ISKCON" "practicing"
[29] "Sankirtan" "anywhere" "outside" "fairgrounds"
[33] "More" "importantly" "Rule" "shown"
[37] "deny" "access" "within" "forum"
[41] "question" "Here" "Rule" "exclude"
[45] "ISKCON" "fairgrounds" "deny" "organization"
[49] "right" "conduct" "desired" "activity"
[53] "point" "within" "forum" "Its"
[57] "members" "may" "mingle" "crowd"
[61] "orally" "propagate" "views" "The"
[65] "organization" "may" "also" "arrange"
[69] "booth" "distribute" "sell" "literature"
[73] "solicit" "funds" "location" "fairgrounds"
[77] "The" "Minnesota" "State" "Fair"
[81] "limited" "public" "forum" "exists"
[85] "provide" "means" "great" "number"
[89] "exhibitors" "temporarily" "present" "products"
[93] "views" "commercial" "religious" "political"
[97] "large" "number" "people" "efficient"
[101] "fashion" "Considering" "limited" "functions"
[105] "Fair" "combined" "area" "within"
[109] "operates" "unwilling" "say" "Rule"
[113] "provide" "ISKCON" "organizations" "adequate"
[117] "means" "sell" "solicit" "fairgrounds"
[121] "The" "First" "Amendment" "protects"
[125] "right" "every" "citizen" "reach"
[129] "minds" "willing" "listeners" "must"
[133] "opportunity" "win" "attention" "Kovacs"
[137] "v" "Cooper" "U" "S"
[141] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[145] "Rule" "unnecessarily" "limit" "right"
[149] "within" "fairgrounds" ""
[[713]]
[1] "" "The" "judgment" "Supreme"
[5] "Court" "Minnesota" "reversed" "case"
[9] "remanded" "proceedings" "inconsistent" "opinion"
[13] ""
[[714]]
[1] "So" "ordered" ""
[[715]]
[1] "Justice" "BRENNAN" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[716]]
[1] "Appellant" "s" "employer" "discharged"
[5] "refused" "work" "certain" "scheduled"
[9] "hours" "sincerely" "held" "religious"
[13] "convictions" "adopted" "beginning" "employment"
[17] "The" "question" "decided" "whether"
[21] "Florida" "s" "denial" "unemployment"
[25] "compensation" "benefits" "appellant" "violates"
[29] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "First"
[33] "Amendment" "Constitution" "applied" "States"
[37] "Fourteenth" "Amendment" ""
[[717]]
[1] "" "I" ""
[[718]]
[1] "Lawton" "Company" "Lawton" "Florida"
[5] "jeweler" "hired" "appellant" "Paula"
[9] "Hobbie" "October" "She" "employed"
[13] "Lawton" "years" "first" "trainee"
[17] "assistant" "manager" "retail" "jewelry"
[21] "store" "In" "April" "Hobbie"
[25] "informed" "immediate" "supervisor" "baptized"
[29] "Seventh" "day" "Adventist" "Church"
[33] "religious" "reasons" "longer" "able"
[37] "work" "Sabbath" "sundown" "Friday"
[41] "sundown" "Saturday" "The" "supervisor"
[45] "devised" "arrangement" "Hobbie" "agreed"
[49] "work" "evenings" "Sundays" "agreed"
[53] "substitute" "whenever" "scheduled" "work"
[57] "Friday" "evening" "Saturday" ""
[[719]]
[1] "This" "arrangement" "continued" "general"
[5] "manager" "Lawton" "learned" "June"
[9] "At" "time" "meeting" "Hobbie"
[13] "minister" "general" "manager" "informed"
[17] "appellant" "either" "work" "scheduled"
[21] "shifts" "submit" "resignation" "company"
[25] "When" "Hobbie" "refused" "either"
[29] "Lawton" "discharged" ""
[[720]]
[1] "On" "June" "appellant" "filed"
[5] "claim" "unemployment" "compensation" "Florida"
[9] "Department" "Labor" "Employment" "Security"
[13] "Under" "Florida" "law" "unemployment"
[17] "compensation" "benefits" "available" "persons"
[21] "become" "unemployed" "fault" "Fla"
[25] "Stat" "Lawton" "contested" "payment"
[29] "benefits" "ground" "Hobbie" "disqualified"
[33] "benefits" "discharged" "misconduct" "connected"
[37] "work" ""
[[721]]
[1] "" "A" "claims" "examiner"
[5] "Bureau" "Unemployment" "Compensation" "denied"
[9] "Hobbie" "s" "claim" "benefits"
[13] "appealed" "determination" "Following" "hearing"
[17] "referee" "Unemployment" "Appeals" "Commission"
[21] "Appeals" "Commission" "affirmed" "denial"
[25] "benefits" "agreeing" "Hobbie" "s"
[29] "refusal" "work" "scheduled" "shifts"
[33] "constituted" "misconduct" "connected" "work"
[37] "App" ""
[[722]]
[1] "Hobbie" "challenged" "Appeals" "Commission"
[5] "s" "order" "Florida" "Fifth"
[9] "District" "Court" "Appeal" "On"
[13] "September" "court" "summarily" "affirmed"
[17] "Appeals" "Commission" "We" "postponed"
[21] "jurisdiction" "U" "S" "S"
[25] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[29] "now" "reverse" ""
[[723]]
[1] "II" ""
[[724]]
[1] "" "Under" "precedents"
[4] "Appeals" "Commission" "s"
[7] "disqualification" "appellant" "receipt"
[10] "benefits" "violates" "Free"
[13] "Exercise" "Clause" "First"
[16] "Amendment" "applicable" "States"
[19] "Fourteenth" "Amendment" "Sherbert"
[22] "v" "Verner" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct"
[28] "L" "Ed" "d"
[31] "Thomas" "v" "Review"
[34] "Bd" "Indiana" "Employment"
[37] "Security" "Div" "U"
[40] "S" "S" "Ct"
[43] "L" "Ed" "d"
[46] "In" "Sherbert" "considered"
[49] "South" "Carolina" "s"
[52] "denial" "unemployment" "compensation"
[55] "benefits" "Sabbatarian" "like"
[58] "Hobbie" "refused" "work"
[61] "Saturdays" "The" "Court"
[64] "held" "State" "s"
[67] "disqualification" "Sherbert" ""
[[725]]
[1] "" "force" "d" "choose"
[5] "following" "precepts" "religion" "forfeiting"
[9] "benefits" "one" "hand" "abandoning"
[13] "one" "precepts" "religion" "order"
[17] "accept" "work" "hand" "Governmental"
[21] "imposition" "choice" "puts" "kind"
[25] "burden" "upon" "free" "exercise"
[29] "religion" "fine" "imposed" "Saturday"
[33] "worship" "U" "S" "S"
[37] "Ct" ""
[[726]]
[1] "We" "concluded" "State" "imposed" "burden"
[6] "upon" "Sherbert" "s" "free" "exercise"
[11] "rights" "justified" "compelling" "state" "interest"
[16] ""
[[727]]
[1] "In" "Thomas" "Court" "held"
[5] "State" "s" "denial" "unemployment"
[9] "benefits" "unlawfully" "burdened" "employee"
[13] "s" "right" "free" "exercise"
[17] "religion" "Thomas" "Jehovah" "s"
[21] "Witness" "held" "religious" "beliefs"
[25] "forbade" "participation" "production" "armaments"
[29] "He" "forced" "leave" "job"
[33] "employer" "closed" "department" "transferred"
[37] "division" "fabricated" "turrets" "tanks"
[41] "Indiana" "denied" "Thomas" "unemployment"
[45] "compensation" "benefits" "The" "Court"
[49] "found" "employee" "put" "choice"
[53] "fidelity" "religious" "belief" "cessation"
[57] "work" "coercive" "impact" "forfeiture"
[61] "benefits" "situation" "undeniable" ""
[[728]]
[1] "" "Not" "apparent" "appellant"
[5] "s" "declared" "ineligibility" "benefits"
[9] "derives" "solely" "practice" "y"
[13] "religion" "pressure" "upon" "employee"
[17] "forego" "practice" "unmistakable" "Thomas"
[21] "supra" "S" "Ct" "quoting"
[25] "Sherbert" "supra" "U" "S"
[29] "S" "Ct" ""
[[729]]
[1] "We" "see" "meaningful" "distinction"
[5] "among" "situations" "Sherbert" "Thomas"
[9] "Hobbie" "We" "affirm" "stated"
[13] "Thomas" ""
[[730]]
[1] "" "Where" "state" "conditions"
[5] "receipt" "important" "benefit" "upon"
[9] "conduct" "proscribed" "religious" "faith"
[13] "denies" "benefit" "conduct" "mandated"
[17] "religious" "belief" "thereby" "putting"
[21] "substantial" "pressure" "adherent" "modify"
[25] "behavior" "violate" "beliefs" "burden"
[29] "upon" "religion" "exists" "While"
[33] "compulsion" "may" "indirect" "infringement"
[37] "upon" "free" "exercise" "nonetheless"
[41] "substantial" "U" "S" "S"
[45] "Ct" "emphasis" "added" ""
[[731]]
[1] "" "Both" "Sherbert" "Thomas"
[5] "held" "infringements" "must" "subjected"
[9] "strict" "scrutiny" "justified" "proof"
[13] "State" "compelling" "interest" "The"
[17] "Appeals" "Commission" "seriously" "contend"
[21] "denial" "benefits" "can" "withstand"
[25] "strict" "scrutiny" "rather" "urges"
[29] "hold" "justification" "determined" "less"
[33] "rigorous" "standard" "articulated" "Chief"
[37] "Justice" "Burger" "s" "opinion"
[41] "Bowen" "v" "Roy" "U"
[45] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[49] "Ed" "d" "The" "Government"
[53] "meets" "burden" "demonstrates" "challenged"
[57] "requirement" "governmental" "benefits" "neutral"
[61] "uniform" "application" "reasonable" "means"
[65] "promoting" "legitimate" "public" "interest"
[69] "Five" "Justices" "expressly" "rejected"
[73] "argument" "Roy" "See" "id"
[77] "S" "Ct" "BLACKMUN" "J"
[81] "concurring" "part" "id" "S"
[85] "Ct" "O" "CONNOR" "J"
[89] "joined" "BRENNAN" "MARSHALL" "JJ"
[93] "concurring" "part" "dissenting" "part"
[97] "id" "S" "Ct" "WHITE"
[101] "J" "dissenting" "We" "reject"
[105] "argument" "today" "As" "Justice"
[109] "O" "CONNOR" "pointed" "Roy"
[113] "s" "uch" "test" "basis"
[117] "precedent" "relegates" "serious" "First"
[121] "Amendment" "value" "barest" "level"
[125] "minimal" "scrutiny" "Equal" "Protection"
[129] "Clause" "already" "provides" "Id"
[133] "S" "Ct" "See" "also"
[137] "Wisconsin" "v" "Yoder" "U"
[141] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[145] "Ed" "d" "O" "nly"
[149] "interests" "highest" "order" "otherwise"
[153] "served" "can" "overbalance" "legitimate"
[157] "claims" "free" "exercise" "religion"
[161] ""
[[732]]
[1] "" "The" "Appeals"
[4] "Commission" "also" "suggests"
[7] "two" "grounds" "upon"
[10] "might" "distinguish" "Sherbert"
[13] "Thomas" "present" "case"
[16] "First" "Appeals" "Commission"
[19] "points" "Sherbert" "employee"
[22] "deemed" "completely" "ineligible"
[25] "benefits" "South" "Carolina"
[28] "s" "unemployment" "insurance"
[31] "scheme" "accept" "work"
[34] "conflicted" "Sabbath" "The"
[37] "Appeals" "Commission" "contends"
[40] "Florida" "law" "Hobbie"
[43] "faces" "limited" "disqualification"
[46] "receipt" "benefits" "fixed"
[49] "term" "served" "will"
[52] "equal" "footing" "workers"
[55] "provided" "avoids" "employment"
[58] "conflicts" "religious" "beliefs"
[61] "Brief" "Appellee" "Appeals"
[64] "Comm" "n" "The"
[67] "Appeals" "Commission" "argues"
[70] "disqualification" "provision" "less"
[73] "coercive" "ineligibility" "determination"
[76] "Sherbert" "burden" "imposes"
[79] "free" "exercise" "therefore"
[82] "permissible" ""
[[733]]
[1] "This" "distinction" "without"
[4] "substance" "The" "immediate"
[7] "effects" "ineligibility" "disqualification"
[10] "identical" "disqualification" "penalty"
[13] "substantial" "Moreover" "Sherbert"
[16] "given" "controlling" "weight"
[19] "Thomas" "involved" "disqualification"
[22] "provision" "similar" "relevant"
[25] "respects" "statutory" "section"
[28] "implicated" "See" "Thomas"
[31] "U" "S" "n"
[34] "S" "Ct" "n"
[37] ""
[[734]]
[1] "" "The" "Appeals" "Commission"
[5] "also" "attempts" "distinguish" "case"
[9] "arguing" "unlike" "employees" "Sherbert"
[13] "Thomas" "Hobbie" "agent" "change"
[17] "therefore" "responsible" "consequences" "conflict"
[21] "job" "religious" "beliefs" "In"
[25] "Sherbert" "Thomas" "employees" "held"
[29] "respective" "religious" "beliefs" "time"
[33] "hire" "subsequent" "changes" "conditions"
[37] "employment" "made" "employer" "caused"
[41] "conflict" "work" "belief" "In"
[45] "case" "Hobbie" "s" "beliefs"
[49] "changed" "course" "employment" "creating"
[53] "conflict" "job" "faith" "previously"
[57] "existed" "The" "Appeals" "Commission"
[61] "contends" "unfair" "employee" "adopt"
[65] "religious" "beliefs" "conflict" "existing"
[69] "employment" "expect" "continue" "employment"
[73] "without" "compromising" "beliefs" "intentional"
[77] "disregard" "employer" "s" "interests"
[81] "constitutes" "misconduct" "Brief" "Appellee"
[85] "Appeals" "Commission" ""
[[735]]
[1] "In" "effect" "Appeals" "Commission"
[5] "asks" "us" "single" "religious"
[9] "convert" "different" "less" "favorable"
[13] "treatment" "given" "individual" "whose"
[17] "adherence" "faith" "precedes" "employment"
[21] "We" "decline" "The" "First"
[25] "Amendment" "protects" "free" "exercise"
[29] "rights" "employees" "adopt" "religious"
[33] "beliefs" "convert" "one" "faith"
[37] "another" "hired" "The" "timing"
[41] "Hobbie" "s" "conversion" "immaterial"
[45] "determination" "free" "exercise" "rights"
[49] "burdened" "salient" "inquiry" "Free"
[53] "Exercise" "Clause" "burden" "involved"
[57] "In" "Sherbert" "Thomas" "present"
[61] "case" "employee" "forced" "choose"
[65] "fidelity" "religious" "belief" "continued"
[69] "employment" "forfeiture" "unemployment" "benefits"
[73] "choosing" "former" "latter" "brings"
[77] "unlawful" "coercion" "bear" "employee"
[81] "s" "choice" ""
[[736]]
[1] "" "Finally" "reject" "Appeals"
[5] "Commission" "s" "argument" "awarding"
[9] "benefits" "Hobbie" "violate" "Establishment"
[13] "Clause" "This" "Court" "long"
[17] "recognized" "government" "may" "sometimes"
[21] "must" "accommodate" "religious" "practices"
[25] "may" "without" "violating" "Establishment"
[29] "Clause" "See" "e" "g"
[33] "Wisconsin" "v" "Yoder" "U"
[37] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[41] "Ed" "d" "judicial" "exemption"
[45] "Amish" "children" "compulsory" "attendance"
[49] "high" "school" "Walz" "v"
[53] "Tax" "Comm" "n" "U"
[57] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[61] "Ed" "d" "tax" "exemption"
[65] "churches" "As" "Sherbert" "accommodation"
[69] "issue" "entangle" "State" "unlawful"
[73] "fostering" "religion" ""
[[737]]
[1] "" "In" "holding" "plainly"
[5] "fostering" "establishment" "Seventh" "day"
[9] "Adventist" "religion" "South" "Carolina"
[13] "extension" "unemployment" "benefits" "Sabbatarians"
[17] "common" "Sunday" "worshipers" "reflects"
[21] "nothing" "governmental" "obligation" "neutrality"
[25] "face" "religious" "differences" "represent"
[29] "involvement" "religious" "secular" "institutions"
[33] "object" "Establishment" "Clause" "forestall"
[37] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[41] ""
[[738]]
[1] "" "III" ""
[[739]]
[1] "We" "conclude" "Florida" "s"
[5] "refusal" "award" "unemployment" "compensation"
[9] "benefits" "appellant" "violated" "Free"
[13] "Exercise" "Clause" "First" "Amendment"
[17] "Here" "Sherbert" "Thomas" "State"
[21] "may" "force" "employee" "choose"
[25] "following" "precepts" "religion" "forfeiting"
[29] "benefits" "abandoning" "one" "precepts"
[33] "religion" "order" "accept" "work"
[37] "Sherbert" "U" "S" "S"
[41] "Ct" "The" "judgment" "Florida"
[45] "Fifth" "District" "Court" "Appeal"
[49] "therefore" ""
[[740]]
[1] "Reversed" ""
[[741]]
[1] "Justice" "ALITO" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[742]]
[1] "" "Petitioner" "Gregory"
[4] "Holt" "also" "known"
[7] "Abdul" "Maalik" "Muhammad"
[10] "Arkansas" "inmate" "devout"
[13] "Muslim" "wishes" "grow"
[16] "inch" "beard" "accordance"
[19] "religious" "beliefs" "Petitioner"
[22] "s" "objection" "shaving"
[25] "beard" "clashes" "Arkansas"
[28] "Department" "Correction" "s"
[31] "grooming" "policy" "prohibits"
[34] "inmates" "growing" "beards"
[37] "unless" "particular" "dermatological"
[40] "condition" "We" "hold"
[43] "Department" "s" "policy"
[46] "applied" "case" "violates"
[49] "Religious" "Land" "Use"
[52] "Institutionalized" "Persons" "Act"
[55] "RLUIPA" "Stat" "U"
[58] "S" "C" "cc"
[61] "et" "seq" "prohibits"
[64] "state" "local" "government"
[67] "taking" "action" "substantially"
[70] "burdens" "religious" "exercise"
[73] "institutionalized" "person" "unless"
[76] "government" "demonstrates" "action"
[79] "constitutes" "least" "restrictive"
[82] "means" "furthering" "compelling"
[85] "governmental" "interest" ""
[[743]]
[1] "We" "conclude" "case"
[4] "Department" "s" "policy"
[7] "substantially" "burdens" "petitioner"
[10] "s" "religious" "exercise"
[13] "Although" "question" "importance"
[16] "Department" "s" "interests"
[19] "stopping" "flow" "contraband"
[22] "facilitating" "prisoner" "identification"
[25] "doubt" "whether" "prohibition"
[28] "petitioner" "s" "beard"
[31] "furthers" "compelling" "interest"
[34] "contraband" "And" "conclude"
[37] "Department" "failed" "show"
[40] "policy" "least" "restrictive"
[43] "means" "furthering" "compelling"
[46] "interests" "We" "thus"
[49] "reverse" "judgment" "United"
[52] "States" "Court" "Appeals"
[55] "Eighth" "Circuit" ""
[[744]]
[1] "I" ""
[[745]]
[1] "A" ""
[[746]]
[1] "" "Congress" "enacted" "RLUIPA"
[5] "sister" "statute" "Religious" "Freedom"
[9] "Restoration" "Act" "RFRA" "Stat"
[13] "U" "S" "C" "bb"
[17] "et" "seq" "order" "provide"
[21] "broad" "protection" "religious" "liberty"
[25] "Burwell" "v" "Hobby" "Lobby"
[29] "Stores" "Inc" "U" "S"
[33] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[37] "d" "RFRA" "enacted" "three"
[41] "years" "decision" "Employment" "Div"
[45] "Dept" "Human" "Resources" "Ore"
[49] "v" "Smith" "U" "S"
[53] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[57] "d" "held" "neutral" "generally"
[61] "applicable" "laws" "incidentally" "burden"
[65] "exercise" "religion" "usually" "violate"
[69] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "First"
[73] "Amendment" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[77] "Smith" "largely" "repudiated" "method"
[81] "analysis" "used" "prior" "free"
[85] "exercise" "cases" "like" "Wisconsin"
[89] "v" "Yoder" "U" "S"
[93] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[97] "d" "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[101] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[105] "L" "Ed" "d" "In"
[109] "cases" "employed" "balancing" "test"
[113] "considered" "whether" "challenged" "government"
[117] "action" "substantially" "burdened" "exercise"
[121] "religion" "necessary" "compelling" "state"
[125] "interest" "See" "Yoder" "supra"
[129] "S" "Ct" "Sherbert" "supra"
[133] "S" "Ct" ""
[[747]]
[1] "" "Following" "decision" "Smith"
[5] "Congress" "enacted" "RFRA" "order"
[9] "provide" "greater" "protection" "religious"
[13] "exercise" "available" "First" "Amendment"
[17] "See" "Hobby" "Lobby" "supra"
[21] "S" "Ct" "RFRA" "provides"
[25] "g" "overnment" "shall" "substantially"
[29] "burden" "person" "s" "exercise"
[33] "religion" "even" "burden" "results"
[37] "rule" "general" "applicability" "unless"
[41] "government" "demonstrates" "application" "burden"
[45] "person" "furtherance" "compelling" "governmental"
[49] "interest" "least" "restrictive" "means"
[53] "furthering" "compelling" "governmental" "interest"
[57] "U" "S" "C" "bb"
[61] "b" "In" "making" "RFRA"
[65] "applicable" "States" "subdivisions" "Congress"
[69] "relied" "Section" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[73] "City" "Boerne" "v" "Flores"
[77] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[81] "L" "Ed" "d" "Court"
[85] "held" "RFRA" "exceeded" "Congress"
[89] "powers" "provision" "Id" "S"
[93] "Ct" ""
[[748]]
[1] "" "Congress" "responded"
[4] "City" "Boerne" "enacting"
[7] "RLUIPA" "applies" "States"
[10] "subdivisions" "invokes" "congressional"
[13] "authority" "Spending" "Commerce"
[16] "Clauses" "See" "cc"
[19] "b" "RLUIPA" "concerns"
[22] "two" "areas" "government"
[25] "activity" "Section" "governs"
[28] "land" "use" "regulation"
[31] "cc" "Section" "provision"
[34] "issue" "case" "governs"
[37] "religious" "exercise" "institutionalized"
[40] "persons" "cc" "Section"
[43] "mirrors" "RFRA" "provides"
[46] "n" "o" "government"
[49] "shall" "impose" "substantial"
[52] "burden" "religious" "exercise"
[55] "person" "residing" "confined"
[58] "institution" "even" "burden"
[61] "results" "rule" "general"
[64] "applicability" "unless" "government"
[67] "demonstrates" "imposition" "burden"
[70] "person" "furtherance" "compelling"
[73] "governmental" "interest" "least"
[76] "restrictive" "means" "furthering"
[79] "compelling" "governmental" "interest"
[82] "cc" "RLUIPA" "thus"
[85] "allows" "prisoners" "seek"
[88] "religious" "accommodations" "pursuant"
[91] "standard" "set" "forth"
[94] "RFRA" "Gonzales" "v"
[97] "O" "Centro" "Esp"
[100] "rita" "Beneficente" "Uni"
[103] "Vegetal" "U" "S"
[106] "S" "Ct" "L"
[109] "Ed" "d" ""
[[749]]
[1] "Several" "provisions" "RLUIPA" "underscore"
[5] "expansive" "protection" "religious" "liberty"
[9] "Congress" "defined" "religious" "exercise"
[13] "capaciously" "include" "exercise" "religion"
[17] "whether" "compelled" "central" "system"
[21] "religious" "belief" "cc" "A"
[25] "Congress" "mandated" "concept" "shall"
[29] "construed" "favor" "broad" "protection"
[33] "religious" "exercise" "maximum" "extent"
[37] "permitted" "terms" "chapter" "Constitution"
[41] "cc" "g" "And" "Congress"
[45] "stated" "RLUIPA" "may" "require"
[49] "government" "incur" "expenses" "operations"
[53] "avoid" "imposing" "substantial" "burden"
[57] "religious" "exercise" "cc" "c"
[61] "See" "Hobby" "Lobby" "supra"
[65] "S" "Ct" ""
[[750]]
[1] "B" ""
[[751]]
[1] "Petitioner" "noted" "custody"
[4] "Arkansas" "Department" "Correction"
[7] "objects" "religious" "grounds"
[10] "Department" "s" "grooming"
[13] "policy" "provides" "n"
[16] "o" "inmates" "will"
[19] "permitted" "wear" "facial"
[22] "hair" "neatly" "trimmed"
[25] "mustache" "extend" "beyond"
[28] "corner" "mouth" "lip"
[31] "App" "Brief" "Petitioner"
[34] "The" "policy" "makes"
[37] "exception" "inmates" "object"
[40] "religious" "grounds" "contain"
[43] "exemption" "prisoners" "medical"
[46] "needs" "Medical" "staff"
[49] "may" "prescribe" "inmates"
[52] "diagnosed" "dermatological" "problem"
[55] "may" "wear" "facial"
[58] "hair" "longer" "one"
[61] "quarter" "inch" "Ibid"
[64] "The" "policy" "provides"
[67] "f" "ailure" "abide"
[70] "Department" "s" "grooming"
[73] "standards" "grounds" "disciplinary"
[76] "action" "Id" ""
[[752]]
[1] "" "Petitioner" "sought" "permission"
[5] "grow" "beard" "although" "believes"
[9] "faith" "requires" "trim" "beard"
[13] "proposed" "compromise" "grow" "inch"
[17] "beard" "App" "Prison" "officials"
[21] "denied" "request" "warden" "told"
[25] "Y" "ou" "will" "abide"
[29] "Arkansas" "Department" "Correction" "policies"
[33] "choose" "disobey" "can" "suffer"
[37] "consequences" "No" "cv" "ED"
[41] "Ark" "July" "Doc" "p"
[45] "Letter" "G" "Lay" "G"
[49] "Holt" "July" ""
[[753]]
[1] "Petitioner" "filed" "pro" "se"
[5] "complaint" "Federal" "District" "Court"
[9] "challenging" "grooming" "policy" "RLUIPA"
[13] "We" "refer" "respondent" "prison"
[17] "officials" "collectively" "Department" "In"
[21] "October" "District" "Court" "granted"
[25] "petitioner" "preliminary" "injunction" "remanded"
[29] "Magistrate" "Judge" "evidentiary" "hearing"
[33] "At" "hearing" "Department" "called"
[37] "two" "witnesses" "Both" "expressed"
[41] "belief" "inmates" "hide" "contraband"
[45] "even" "inch" "beard" "neither"
[49] "pointed" "instances" "done" "Arkansas"
[53] "elsewhere" "Both" "witnesses" "also"
[57] "acknowledged" "inmates" "hide" "items"
[61] "many" "places" "hair" "heads"
[65] "clothing" "In" "addition" "one"
[69] "witnesses" "Gaylon" "Lay" "warden"
[73] "petitioner" "s" "prison" "testified"
[77] "prisoner" "escaped" "change" "appearance"
[81] "shaving" "beard" "prisoner" "shave"
[85] "beard" "disguise" "enter" "restricted"
[89] "area" "prison" "Neither" "witness"
[93] "however" "able" "explain" "problems"
[97] "addressed" "taking" "photograph" "inmate"
[101] "without" "beard" "practice" "followed"
[105] "prison" "systems" "Lay" "voiced"
[109] "concern" "Department" "unable" "monitor"
[113] "length" "prisoner" "s" "beard"
[117] "ensure" "exceed" "one" "half"
[121] "inch" "acknowledged" "Department" "kept"
[125] "track" "length" "beards" "inmates"
[129] "allowed" "wear" "inch" "beard"
[133] "medical" "reasons" ""
[[754]]
[1] "As" "result" "preliminary" "injunction"
[5] "petitioner" "short" "beard" "time"
[9] "hearing" "Magistrate" "Judge" "commented"
[13] "I" "look" "particular" "circumstance"
[17] "I" "say" "know" "s"
[21] "almost" "preposterous" "think" "hide"
[25] "contraband" "beard" "App" "Nevertheless"
[29] "Magistrate" "Judge" "recommended" "preliminary"
[33] "injunction" "vacated" "petitioner" "s"
[37] "complaint" "dismissed" "failure" "state"
[41] "claim" "relief" "can" "granted"
[45] "The" "Magistrate" "Judge" "emphasized"
[49] "prison" "officials" "entitled" "deference"
[53] "id" "grooming" "policy" "allowed"
[57] "petitioner" "exercise" "religion" "ways"
[61] "praying" "prayer" "rug" "maintaining"
[65] "diet" "required" "faith" "observing"
[69] "religious" "holidays" ""
[[755]]
[1] "The" "District" "Court"
[4] "adopted" "Magistrate" "Judge"
[7] "s" "recommendation" "full"
[10] "Court" "Appeals" "Eighth"
[13] "Circuit" "affirmed" "brief"
[16] "per" "curiam" "opinion"
[19] "holding" "Department" "satisfied"
[22] "burden" "showing" "grooming"
[25] "policy" "least" "restrictive"
[28] "means" "furthering" "compelling"
[31] "security" "interests" "Fed"
[34] "Appx" "The" "Court"
[37] "Appeals" "stated" "courts"
[40] "ordinarily" "defer" "prison"
[43] "officials" "expert" "judgment"
[46] "security" "matters" "unless"
[49] "substantial" "evidence" "prison"
[52] "s" "response" "exaggerated"
[55] "Id" "And" "acknowledging"
[58] "prisons" "allow" "inmates"
[61] "maintain" "facial" "hair"
[64] "Eighth" "Circuit" "held"
[67] "evidence" "outweigh" "deference"
[70] "owed" "expert" "judgment"
[73] "prison" "officials" "familiar"
[76] "institutions" "Ibid" ""
[[756]]
[1] "We" "entered" "injunction" "pending" "resolution"
[6] "petitioner" "s" "petition" "writ" "certiorari"
[11] "U" "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[16] "Ed" "d" "granted" "certiorari" "U"
[21] "S" "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[26] "d" ""
[[757]]
[1] "II" ""
[[758]]
[1] "" "Under" "RLUIPA" "petitioner"
[5] "bore" "initial" "burden" "proving"
[9] "Department" "s" "grooming" "policy"
[13] "implicates" "religious" "exercise" "RLUIPA"
[17] "protects" "exercise" "religion" "whether"
[21] "compelled" "central" "system" "religious"
[25] "belief" "cc" "A" "course"
[29] "prisoner" "s" "request" "accommodation"
[33] "must" "sincerely" "based" "religious"
[37] "belief" "motivation" "see" "Hobby"
[41] "Lobby" "U" "S" "n"
[45] "S" "Ct" "n" "Here"
[49] "religious" "exercise" "issue" "growing"
[53] "beard" "petitioner" "believes" "dictate"
[57] "religious" "faith" "Department" "dispute"
[61] "sincerity" "petitioner" "s" "belief"
[65] ""
[[759]]
[1] "" "In" "addition" "showing"
[5] "relevant" "exercise" "religion" "grounded"
[9] "sincerely" "held" "religious" "belief"
[13] "petitioner" "also" "bore" "burden"
[17] "proving" "Department" "s" "grooming"
[21] "policy" "substantially" "burdened" "exercise"
[25] "religion" "Petitioner" "easily" "satisfied"
[29] "obligation" "The" "Department" "s"
[33] "grooming" "policy" "requires" "petitioner"
[37] "shave" "beard" "thus" "engage"
[41] "conduct" "seriously" "violates" "religious"
[45] "beliefs" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[49] "If" "petitioner" "contravenes" "policy"
[53] "grows" "beard" "will" "face"
[57] "serious" "disciplinary" "action" "Because"
[61] "grooming" "policy" "puts" "petitioner"
[65] "choice" "substantially" "burdens" "religious"
[69] "exercise" "Indeed" "Department" "argue"
[73] "otherwise" ""
[[760]]
[1] "" "The" "District"
[4] "Court" "reached" "opposite"
[7] "conclusion" "reasoning" "adopted"
[10] "recommendation" "Magistrate" "Judge"
[13] "misunderstood" "analysis" "RLUIPA"
[16] "demands" "First" "District"
[19] "Court" "erred" "concluding"
[22] "grooming" "policy" "substantially"
[25] "burden" "petitioner" "s"
[28] "religious" "exercise" "provided"
[31] "prayer" "rug" "list"
[34] "distributors" "Islamic" "material"
[37] "allowed" "correspond" "religious"
[40] "advisor" "allowed" "maintain"
[43] "required" "diet" "observe"
[46] "religious" "holidays" "App"
[49] "In" "taking" "approach"
[52] "District" "Court" "improperly"
[55] "imported" "strand" "reasoning"
[58] "cases" "involving" "prisoners"
[61] "First" "Amendment" "rights"
[64] "See" "e" "g"
[67] "O" "Lone" "v"
[70] "Estate" "Shabazz" "U"
[73] "S" "S" "Ct"
[76] "L" "Ed" "d"
[79] "see" "also" "Turner"
[82] "v" "Safley" "U"
[85] "S" "S" "Ct"
[88] "L" "Ed" "d"
[91] "Under" "cases" "availability"
[94] "alternative" "means" "practicing"
[97] "religion" "relevant" "consideration"
[100] "RLUIPA" "provides" "greater"
[103] "protection" "RLUIPA" "s"
[106] "substantial" "burden" "inquiry"
[109] "asks" "whether" "government"
[112] "substantially" "burdened" "religious"
[115] "exercise" "growing" "inch"
[118] "beard" "whether" "RLUIPA"
[121] "claimant" "able" "engage"
[124] "forms" "religious" "exercise"
[127] ""
[[761]]
[1] "Second" "District" "Court" "committed"
[5] "similar" "error" "suggesting" "burden"
[9] "petitioner" "s" "religious" "exercise"
[13] "slight" "according" "petitioner" "s"
[17] "testimony" "religion" "credit" "attempting"
[21] "follow" "religious" "beliefs" "even"
[25] "attempt" "proved" "unsuccessful" "RLUIPA"
[29] "however" "applies" "exercise" "religion"
[33] "regardless" "whether" "compelled" "cc"
[37] "A" ""
[[762]]
[1] "" "Finally" "District" "Court"
[5] "went" "astray" "relied" "petitioner"
[9] "s" "testimony" "Muslims" "believe"
[13] "men" "must" "grow" "beards"
[17] "Petitioner" "s" "belief" "means"
[21] "idiosyncratic" "See" "Brief" "Islamic"
[25] "Law" "Scholars" "Amici" "Curiae"
[29] "hadith" "requiring" "beards" "widely"
[33] "followed" "observant" "Muslims" "across"
[37] "various" "schools" "Islam" "But"
[41] "even" "protection" "RLUIPA" "less"
[45] "guarantee" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[49] "limited" "beliefs" "shared" "members"
[53] "religious" "sect" "Thomas" "v"
[57] "Review" "Bd" "Indiana" "Employment"
[61] "Security" "Div" "U" "S"
[65] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[69] "d" ""
[[763]]
[1] "III" ""
[[764]]
[1] "Since" "petitioner" "met" "burden"
[5] "showing" "Department" "s" "grooming"
[9] "policy" "substantially" "burdened" "exercise"
[13] "religion" "burden" "shifted" "Department"
[17] "show" "refusal" "allow" "petitioner"
[21] "grow" "inch" "beard" "furtherance"
[25] "compelling" "governmental" "interest" "least"
[29] "restrictive" "means" "furthering" "compelling"
[33] "governmental" "interest" "cc" ""
[[765]]
[1] "" "The" "Department" "argues"
[5] "grooming" "policy" "represents" "least"
[9] "restrictive" "means" "furthering" "broadly"
[13] "formulated" "interes" "t" "Hobby"
[17] "Lobby" "supra" "S" "Ct"
[21] "quoting" "O" "Centro" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct" "namely"
[29] "Department" "s" "compelling" "interest"
[33] "prison" "safety" "security" "But"
[37] "RLUIPA" "like" "RFRA" "contemplates"
[41] "focused" "inquiry" "requires" "Government"
[45] "demonstrate" "compelling" "interest" "test"
[49] "satisfied" "application" "challenged" "law"
[53] "person" "particular" "claimant" "whose"
[57] "sincere" "exercise" "religion" "substantially"
[61] "burdened" "Hobby" "Lobby" "supra"
[65] "S" "Ct" "quoting" "O"
[69] "Centro" "supra" "S" "Ct"
[73] "quoting" "bb" "b" "RLUIPA"
[77] "requires" "us" "scrutiniz" "e"
[81] "asserted" "harm" "granting" "specific"
[85] "exemptions" "particular" "religious" "claimants"
[89] "look" "marginal" "interest" "enforcing"
[93] "challenged" "government" "action" "particular"
[97] "context" "Hobby" "Lobby" "supra"
[101] "S" "Ct" "quoting" "O"
[105] "Centro" "supra" "S" "Ct"
[109] "alteration" "original" "In" "case"
[113] "means" "enforcement" "Department" "s"
[117] "policy" "prevent" "petitioner" "growing"
[121] "inch" "beard" ""
[[766]]
[1] "The" "Department" "contends" "enforcing"
[5] "prohibition" "least" "restrictive" "means"
[9] "furthering" "prison" "safety" "security"
[13] "two" "specific" "ways" ""
[[767]]
[1] "A" ""
[[768]]
[1] "" "The" "Department" "first" "claims"
[6] "beard" "policy" "prevents" "prisoners" "hiding"
[11] "contraband" "The" "Department" "worries" "prisoners"
[16] "may" "use" "beards" "conceal" "manner"
[21] "prohibited" "items" "including" "razors" "needles"
[26] "drugs" "cellular" "phone" "subscriber" "identity"
[31] "module" "SIM" "cards" ""
[[769]]
[1] "We" "readily" "agree" "Department"
[5] "compelling" "interest" "staunching" "flow"
[9] "contraband" "within" "facilities" "argument"
[13] "interest" "seriously" "compromised" "allowing"
[17] "inmate" "grow" "inch" "beard"
[21] "hard" "take" "seriously" "As"
[25] "noted" "Magistrate" "Judge" "observed"
[29] "almost" "preposterous" "think" "petitioner"
[33] "hide" "contraband" "short" "beard"
[37] "grown" "time" "evidentiary" "hearing"
[41] "App" "An" "item" "contraband"
[45] "small" "indeed" "concealed" "inch"
[49] "beard" "prisoner" "seeking" "hide"
[53] "item" "short" "beard" "find"
[57] "way" "prevent" "item" "falling"
[61] "Since" "Department" "demand" "inmates"
[65] "shaved" "heads" "short" "crew"
[69] "cuts" "hard" "see" "inmate"
[73] "seek" "hide" "contraband" "inch"
[77] "beard" "rather" "longer" "hair"
[81] "head" ""
[[770]]
[1] "" "Although" "Magistrate"
[4] "Judge" "dismissed" "possibility"
[7] "contraband" "hidden" "short"
[10] "beard" "Magistrate" "Judge"
[13] "District" "Court" "Court"
[16] "Appeals" "thought" "bound"
[19] "defer" "Department" "s"
[22] "assertion" "allowing" "petitioner"
[25] "grow" "beard" "undermine"
[28] "interest" "suppressing" "contraband"
[31] "RLUIPA" "however" "permit"
[34] "unquestioning" "deference" "RLUIPA"
[37] "like" "RFRA" "makes"
[40] "clear" "obligation" "courts"
[43] "consider" "whether" "exceptions"
[46] "required" "test" "set"
[49] "forth" "Congress" "O"
[52] "Centro" "supra" "S"
[55] "Ct" "That" "test"
[58] "requires" "Department" "merely"
[61] "explain" "denied" "exemption"
[64] "prove" "denying" "exemption"
[67] "least" "restrictive" "means"
[70] "furthering" "compelling" "governmental"
[73] "interest" "Prison" "officials"
[76] "experts" "running" "prisons"
[79] "evaluating" "likely" "effects"
[82] "altering" "prison" "rules"
[85] "courts" "respect" "expertise"
[88] "But" "respect" "justify"
[91] "abdication" "responsibility" "conferred"
[94] "Congress" "apply" "RLUIPA"
[97] "s" "rigorous" "standard"
[100] "And" "without" "degree"
[103] "deference" "tantamount" "unquestioning"
[106] "acceptance" "hard" "swallow"
[109] "argument" "denying" "petitioner"
[112] "inch" "beard" "actually"
[115] "furthers" "Department" "s"
[118] "interest" "rooting" "contraband"
[121] ""
[[771]]
[1] "" "Even" "Department" "make"
[5] "showing" "contraband" "argument" "still"
[9] "fail" "Department" "show" "forbidding"
[13] "short" "beards" "least" "restrictive"
[17] "means" "preventing" "concealment" "contraband"
[21] "The" "least" "restrictive" "means"
[25] "standard" "exceptionally" "demanding" "requires"
[29] "government" "sho" "w" "lacks"
[33] "means" "achieving" "desired" "goal"
[37] "without" "imposing" "substantial" "burden"
[41] "exercise" "religion" "objecting" "part"
[45] "y" "Hobby" "Lobby" "supra"
[49] "S" "Ct" "I" "f"
[53] "less" "restrictive" "means" "available"
[57] "Government" "achieve" "goals" "Government"
[61] "must" "use" "United" "States"
[65] "v" "Playboy" "Entertainment" "Group"
[69] "Inc" "U" "S" "S"
[73] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[77] ""
[[772]]
[1] "The" "Department" "failed"
[4] "establish" "satisfy" "security"
[7] "concerns" "simply" "searching"
[10] "petitioner" "s" "beard"
[13] "The" "Department" "already"
[16] "searches" "prisoners" "hair"
[19] "clothing" "presumably" "examines"
[22] "inch" "beards" "inmates"
[25] "dermatological" "conditions" "It"
[28] "offered" "sound" "reason"
[31] "hair" "clothing" "inch"
[34] "beards" "can" "searched"
[37] "inch" "beards" "The"
[40] "Department" "suggests" "requiring"
[43] "guards" "search" "prisoner"
[46] "s" "beard" "pose"
[49] "risk" "physical" "safety"
[52] "guard" "razor" "needle"
[55] "concealed" "beard" "But"
[58] "less" "true" "searches"
[61] "hair" "clothing" "inch"
[64] "beards" "And" "Department"
[67] "failed" "prove" "adopt"
[70] "less" "restrictive" "alternative"
[73] "prisoner" "run" "comb"
[76] "beard" "For" "reasons"
[79] "Department" "s" "interest"
[82] "eliminating" "contraband" "sustain"
[85] "refusal" "allow" "petitioner"
[88] "grow" "inch" "beard"
[91] ""
[[773]]
[1] "B" ""
[[774]]
[1] "" "The" "Department" "contends"
[5] "grooming" "policy" "necessary" "additional"
[9] "compelling" "interest" "e" "preventing"
[13] "prisoners" "disguising" "identities" "The"
[17] "Department" "tells" "us" "beard"
[21] "policy" "allows" "security" "officers"
[25] "identify" "prisoners" "quickly" "accurately"
[29] "It" "claims" "bearded" "inmates"
[33] "shave" "beards" "change" "appearance"
[37] "order" "enter" "restricted" "areas"
[41] "within" "prison" "escape" "evade"
[45] "apprehension" "escaping" ""
[[775]]
[1] "We" "agree" "prisons"
[4] "compelling" "interest" "quick"
[7] "reliable" "identification" "prisoners"
[10] "acknowledge" "alteration" "prisoner"
[13] "s" "appearance" "shaving"
[16] "beard" "might" "absence"
[19] "effective" "countermeasures" "least"
[22] "effect" "ability" "guards"
[25] "others" "make" "quick"
[28] "identification" "But" "even"
[31] "assume" "present" "purposes"
[34] "Department" "s" "grooming"
[37] "policy" "sufficiently" "furthers"
[40] "interest" "identification" "prisoners"
[43] "policy" "still" "violates"
[46] "RLUIPA" "applied" "circumstances"
[49] "present" "The" "Department"
[52] "contends" "prisoner" "beard"
[55] "photographed" "identification" "purposes"
[58] "might" "confuse" "guards"
[61] "shaving" "beard" "But"
[64] "petitioner" "argued" "Department"
[67] "largely" "solve" "problem"
[70] "requiring" "inmates" "photographed"
[73] "without" "beards" "first"
[76] "admitted" "facility" "necessary"
[79] "periodically" "thereafter" "Once"
[82] "done" "inmate" "like"
[85] "petitioner" "allowed" "grow"
[88] "short" "beard" "photographed"
[91] "beard" "reached" "inch"
[94] "limit" "Prison" "guards"
[97] "bearded" "clean" "shaven"
[100] "photo" "use" "making"
[103] "identifications" "In" "fact"
[106] "Department" "like" "many"
[109] "States" "see" "Brief"
[112] "Petitioner" "already" "policy"
[115] "photographing" "prisoner" "enters"
[118] "institution" "appearance" "changes"
[121] "time" "incarceration" "Arkansas"
[124] "Department" "Correction" "Inmate"
[127] "Handbook" "rev" "Jan"
[130] ""
[[776]]
[1] "The" "Department" "argues"
[4] "dual" "photo" "method"
[7] "inadequate" "even" "might"
[10] "help" "authorities" "apprehend"
[13] "bearded" "prisoner" "escapes"
[16] "shaves" "beard" "outside"
[19] "prison" "method" "unlikely"
[22] "assist" "guards" "inmate"
[25] "quickly" "shaves" "beard"
[28] "order" "alter" "appearance"
[31] "within" "prison" "The"
[34] "Department" "contends" "identification"
[37] "concern" "particularly" "acute"
[40] "petitioner" "s" "prison"
[43] "inmates" "live" "barracks"
[46] "work" "fields" "Counsel"
[49] "Department" "suggested" "oral"
[52] "argument" "prisoner" "gain"
[55] "entry" "restricted" "area"
[58] "shaving" "beard" "swapping"
[61] "identification" "cards" "another"
[64] "inmate" "fields" "Tr"
[67] "Oral" "Arg" ""
[[777]]
[1] "" "We" "unpersuaded" "arguments"
[5] "least" "two" "reasons" "First"
[9] "Department" "failed" "show" "face"
[13] "petitioner" "s" "evidence" "prison"
[17] "system" "different" "many" "institutions"
[21] "allow" "facial" "hair" "dual"
[25] "photo" "method" "employed" "institutions"
[29] "Second" "Department" "failed" "establish"
[33] "risk" "prisoner" "will" "shave"
[37] "inch" "beard" "disguise" "great"
[41] "inch" "beards" "allowed" "even"
[45] "though" "prisoners" "allowed" "grow"
[49] "mustaches" "head" "hair" "inch"
[53] "beards" "medical" "reasons" "All"
[57] "also" "shaved" "moment" "s"
[61] "notice" "Department" "apparently" "think"
[65] "possibility" "raises" "serious" "security"
[69] "concern" ""
[[778]]
[1] "C" ""
[[779]]
[1] "" "In" "addition" "failure"
[5] "prove" "petitioner" "s" "proposed"
[9] "alternatives" "sufficiently" "serve" "security"
[13] "interests" "Department" "provided" "adequate"
[17] "response" "two" "additional" "arguments"
[21] "implicate" "RLUIPA" "analysis" ""
[[780]]
[1] "First" "Department" "adequately"
[4] "demonstrated" "grooming" "policy"
[7] "substantially" "underinclusive" "least"
[10] "two" "respects" "Although"
[13] "Department" "denied" "petitioner"
[16] "s" "request" "grow"
[19] "inch" "beard" "permits"
[22] "prisoners" "dermatological" "condition"
[25] "grow" "inch" "beards"
[28] "The" "Department" "even"
[31] "though" "beards" "pose"
[34] "similar" "risks" "And"
[37] "Department" "permits" "inmates"
[40] "grow" "inch" "hair"
[43] "heads" "With" "respect"
[46] "hair" "length" "grooming"
[49] "policy" "provides" "hair"
[52] "must" "worn" "ear"
[55] "longer" "back" "middle"
[58] "nape" "neck" "App"
[61] "Brief" "Petitioner" "Hair"
[64] "head" "plausible" "place"
[67] "hide" "contraband" "inch"
[70] "beard" "true" "inmate"
[73] "s" "clothing" "shoes"
[76] "Nevertheless" "Department" "require"
[79] "inmates" "go" "bald"
[82] "barefoot" "naked" "Although"
[85] "Department" "s" "proclaimed"
[88] "objectives" "stop" "flow"
[91] "contraband" "facilitate" "prisoner"
[94] "identification" "t" "proffered"
[97] "objectives" "pursued" "respect"
[100] "analogous" "nonreligious" "conduct"
[103] "suggests" "interests" "achieved"
[106] "narrower" "ordinances" "burdened"
[109] "religion" "far" "lesser"
[112] "degree" "Church" "Lukumi"
[115] "Babalu" "Aye" "Inc"
[118] "v" "Hialeah" "U"
[121] "S" "S" "Ct"
[124] "L" "Ed" "d"
[127] ""
[[781]]
[1] "In" "attempt" "demonstrate"
[4] "grooming" "policy" "underinclusive"
[7] "respects" "Department" "emphasizes"
[10] "petitioner" "s" "inch"
[13] "beard" "longer" "inch"
[16] "beard" "allowed" "medical"
[19] "reasons" "But" "Department"
[22] "failed" "establish" "District"
[25] "Court" "find" "inch"
[28] "difference" "beard" "length"
[31] "poses" "meaningful" "increase"
[34] "security" "risk" "The"
[37] "Department" "also" "asserts"
[40] "inmates" "require" "beards"
[43] "medical" "reasons" "many"
[46] "may" "request" "beards"
[49] "religious" "reasons" "But"
[52] "Department" "argued" "denying"
[55] "petitioner" "exemption" "necessary"
[58] "compelling" "interest" "cost"
[61] "control" "program" "administration"
[64] "At" "bottom" "argument"
[67] "another" "formulation" "classic"
[70] "rejoinder" "bureaucrats" "throughout"
[73] "history" "If" "I"
[76] "make" "exception" "I"
[79] "ll" "make" "one"
[82] "everybody" "exceptions" "O"
[85] "Centro" "U" "S"
[88] "S" "Ct" "We"
[91] "rejected" "similar" "argument"
[94] "analogous" "contexts" "see"
[97] "ibid" "Sherbert" "U"
[100] "S" "S" "Ct"
[103] "reject" "today" ""
[[782]]
[1] "Second" "Department" "failed" "show"
[5] "face" "petitioner" "s" "evidence"
[9] "vast" "majority" "States" "Federal"
[13] "Government" "permit" "inmates" "grow"
[17] "inch" "beards" "either" "reason"
[21] "religious" "reasons" "See" "Brief"
[25] "Petitioner" "Brief" "United" "States"
[29] "Amicus" "Curiae" "While" "necessarily"
[33] "controlling" "policies" "followed" "well"
[37] "run" "institutions" "relevant" "determination"
[41] "need" "particular" "type" "restriction"
[45] "Procunier" "v" "Martinez" "U"
[49] "S" "n" "S" "Ct"
[53] "L" "Ed" "d" "That"
[57] "many" "prisons" "allow" "inmates"
[61] "grow" "beards" "ensuring" "prison"
[65] "safety" "security" "suggests" "Department"
[69] "satisfy" "security" "concerns" "means"
[73] "less" "restrictive" "denying" "petitioner"
[77] "exemption" "seeks" ""
[[783]]
[1] "" "We" "suggest" "RLUIPA"
[5] "requires" "prison" "grant" "particular"
[9] "religious" "exemption" "soon" "jurisdictions"
[13] "But" "many" "prisons" "offer"
[17] "accommodation" "prison" "must" "minimum"
[21] "offer" "persuasive" "reasons" "believes"
[25] "must" "take" "different" "course"
[29] "Department" "failed" "make" "showing"
[33] "Despite" "courts" "deferred" "prison"
[37] "officials" "mere" "say" "accommodate"
[41] "petitioner" "s" "request" "RLUIPA"
[45] "however" "demands" "much" "Courts"
[49] "must" "hold" "prisons" "statutory"
[53] "burden" "must" "assume" "plausible"
[57] "less" "restrictive" "alternative" "ineffective"
[61] "Playboy" "Entertainment" "U" "S"
[65] "S" "Ct" ""
[[784]]
[1] "" "We" "emphasize"
[4] "although" "RLUIPA" "provides"
[7] "substantial" "protection" "religious"
[10] "exercise" "institutionalized" "persons"
[13] "also" "affords" "prison"
[16] "officials" "ample" "ability"
[19] "maintain" "security" "We"
[22] "highlight" "three" "ways"
[25] "First" "applying" "RLUIPA"
[28] "s" "statutory" "standard"
[31] "courts" "blind" "fact"
[34] "analysis" "conducted" "prison"
[37] "setting" "Second" "institution"
[40] "suspects" "inmate" "using"
[43] "religious" "activity" "cloak"
[46] "illicit" "conduct" "prison"
[49] "officials" "may" "appropriately"
[52] "question" "whether" "prisoner"
[55] "s" "religiosity" "asserted"
[58] "basis" "requested" "accommodation"
[61] "authentic" "Cutter" "v"
[64] "Wilkinson" "U" "S"
[67] "n" "S" "Ct"
[70] "L" "Ed" "d"
[73] "See" "also" "Hobby"
[76] "Lobby" "U" "S"
[79] "n" "S" "Ct"
[82] "n" "Third" "even"
[85] "claimant" "s" "religious"
[88] "belief" "sincere" "institution"
[91] "might" "entitled" "withdraw"
[94] "accommodation" "claimant" "abuses"
[97] "exemption" "manner" "undermines"
[100] "prison" "s" "compelling"
[103] "interests" ""
[[785]]
[1] "IV" ""
[[786]]
[1] "In" "sum" "hold" "Department"
[5] "s" "grooming" "policy" "violates"
[9] "RLUIPA" "insofar" "prevents" "petitioner"
[13] "growing" "inch" "beard" "accordance"
[17] "religious" "beliefs" "The" "judgment"
[21] "United" "States" "Court" "Appeals"
[25] "Eighth" "Circuit" "reversed" "case"
[29] "remanded" "proceedings" "consistent" "opinion"
[33] ""
[[787]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[788]]
[1] "Chief" "Justice" "ROBERTS" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[789]]
[1] "" "Certain" "employment"
[4] "discrimination" "laws" "authorize"
[7] "employees" "wrongfully" "terminated"
[10] "sue" "employers" "reinstatement"
[13] "damages" "The" "question"
[16] "presented" "whether" "Establishment"
[19] "Free" "Exercise" "Clauses"
[22] "First" "Amendment" "bar"
[25] "action" "employer" "religious"
[28] "group" "employee" "one"
[31] "group" "s" "ministers"
[34] ""
[[790]]
[1] "I" ""
[[791]]
[1] "A" ""
[[792]]
[1] "Petitioner" "Hosanna" "Tabor" "Evangelical"
[5] "Lutheran" "Church" "School" "member"
[9] "congregation" "Lutheran" "Church" "Missouri"
[13] "Synod" "second" "largest" "Lutheran"
[17] "denomination" "America" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[21] "operated" "small" "school" "Redford"
[25] "Michigan" "offering" "Christ" "centered"
[29] "education" "students" "kindergarten" "eighth"
[33] "grade" "F" "Supp" "d"
[37] "E" "D" "Mich" "internal"
[41] "quotation" "marks" "omitted" ""
[[793]]
[1] "The" "Synod" "classifies" "teachers"
[5] "two" "categories" "called" "lay"
[9] "Called" "teachers" "regarded" "called"
[13] "vocation" "God" "congregation" "To"
[17] "eligible" "receive" "call" "congregation"
[21] "teacher" "must" "satisfy" "certain"
[25] "academic" "requirements" "One" "way"
[29] "completing" "colloquy" "program" "Lutheran"
[33] "college" "university" "The" "program"
[37] "requires" "candidates" "take" "eight"
[41] "courses" "theological" "study" "obtain"
[45] "endorsement" "local" "Synod" "district"
[49] "pass" "oral" "examination" "faculty"
[53] "committee" "A" "teacher" "meets"
[57] "requirements" "may" "called" "congregation"
[61] "Once" "called" "teacher" "receives"
[65] "formal" "title" "Minister" "Religion"
[69] "Commissioned" "App" "A" "commissioned"
[73] "minister" "serves" "open" "ended"
[77] "term" "Hosanna" "Tabor" "call"
[81] "rescinded" "cause" "supermajority" "vote"
[85] "congregation" ""
[[794]]
[1] "" "Lay" "contract" "teachers"
[5] "contrast" "required" "trained" "Synod"
[9] "even" "Lutheran" "At" "Hosanna"
[13] "Tabor" "appointed" "school" "board"
[17] "without" "vote" "congregation" "one"
[21] "year" "renewable" "terms" "Although"
[25] "teachers" "school" "generally" "performed"
[29] "duties" "regardless" "whether" "lay"
[33] "called" "lay" "teachers" "hired"
[37] "called" "teachers" "unavailable" ""
[[795]]
[1] "" "Respondent" "Cheryl" "Perich"
[5] "first" "employed" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[9] "lay" "teacher" "After" "Perich"
[13] "completed" "colloquy" "later" "school"
[17] "year" "Hosanna" "Tabor" "asked"
[21] "become" "called" "teacher" "Perich"
[25] "accepted" "call" "received" "diploma"
[29] "vocation" "designating" "commissioned" "minister"
[33] "Id" ""
[[796]]
[1] "Perich" "taught" "kindergarten" "first"
[5] "four" "years" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[9] "fourth" "grade" "school" "year"
[13] "She" "taught" "math" "language"
[17] "arts" "social" "studies" "science"
[21] "gym" "art" "music" "She"
[25] "also" "taught" "religion" "class"
[29] "four" "days" "week" "led"
[33] "students" "prayer" "devotional" "exercises"
[37] "day" "attended" "weekly" "school"
[41] "wide" "chapel" "service" "Perich"
[45] "led" "chapel" "service" "twice"
[49] "year" ""
[[797]]
[1] "Perich" "became" "ill" "June" "eventually"
[6] "diagnosed" "narcolepsy" "Symptoms" "included" "sudden"
[11] "deep" "sleeps" "roused" "Because" "illness"
[16] "Perich" "began" "school" "year" "disability"
[21] "leave" "On" "January" "however" "Perich"
[26] "notified" "school" "principal" "Stacey" "Hoeft"
[31] "able" "report" "work" "following" "month"
[36] "Hoeft" "responded" "school" "already" "contracted"
[41] "lay" "teacher" "fill" "Perich" "s"
[46] "position" "remainder" "school" "year" "Hoeft"
[51] "also" "expressed" "concern" "Perich" "yet"
[56] "ready" "return" "classroom" ""
[[798]]
[1] "On" "January" "Hosanna"
[4] "Tabor" "held" "meeting"
[7] "congregation" "school" "administrators"
[10] "stated" "Perich" "unlikely"
[13] "physically" "capable" "returning"
[16] "work" "school" "year"
[19] "next" "The" "congregation"
[22] "voted" "offer" "Perich"
[25] "peaceful" "release" "call"
[28] "whereby" "congregation" "pay"
[31] "portion" "health" "insurance"
[34] "premiums" "exchange" "resignation"
[37] "called" "teacher" "Id"
[40] "Perich" "refused" "resign"
[43] "produced" "note" "doctor"
[46] "stating" "able" "return"
[49] "work" "February" "The"
[52] "school" "board" "urged"
[55] "Perich" "reconsider" "informing"
[58] "school" "longer" "position"
[61] "Perich" "stood" "decision"
[64] "resign" ""
[[799]]
[1] "On" "morning" "February" "first"
[5] "day" "medically" "cleared" "return"
[9] "work" "Perich" "presented" "school"
[13] "Hoeft" "asked" "leave" "obtained"
[17] "written" "documentation" "reported" "work"
[21] "Later" "afternoon" "Hoeft" "called"
[25] "Perich" "home" "told" "likely"
[29] "fired" "Perich" "responded" "spoken"
[33] "attorney" "intended" "assert" "legal"
[37] "rights" ""
[[800]]
[1] "Following" "school" "board"
[4] "meeting" "evening" "board"
[7] "chairman" "Scott" "Salo"
[10] "sent" "Perich" "letter"
[13] "stating" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[16] "reviewing" "process" "rescinding"
[19] "call" "light" "regrettable"
[22] "actions" "Id" "Salo"
[25] "subsequently" "followed" "letter"
[28] "advising" "Perich" "congregation"
[31] "consider" "whether" "rescind"
[34] "call" "next" "meeting"
[37] "As" "grounds" "termination"
[40] "letter" "cited" "Perich"
[43] "s" "insubordination" "disruptive"
[46] "behavior" "February" "well"
[49] "damage" "done" "working"
[52] "relationship" "school" "threatening"
[55] "take" "legal" "action"
[58] "Id" "The" "congregation"
[61] "voted" "rescind" "Perich"
[64] "s" "call" "April"
[67] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "sent"
[70] "letter" "termination" "next"
[73] "day" ""
[[801]]
[1] "" "B" ""
[[802]]
[1] "Perich" "filed" "charge"
[4] "Equal" "Employment" "Opportunity"
[7] "Commission" "alleging" "employment"
[10] "terminated" "violation" "Americans"
[13] "Disabilities" "Act" "Stat"
[16] "U" "S" "C"
[19] "et" "seq" "The"
[22] "ADA" "prohibits" "employer"
[25] "discriminating" "qualified" "individual"
[28] "basis" "disability" "It"
[31] "also" "prohibits" "employer"
[34] "retaliating" "individual" "individual"
[37] "opposed" "act" "practice"
[40] "made" "unlawful" "ADA"
[43] "individual" "made" "charge"
[46] "testified" "assisted" "participated"
[49] "manner" "investigation" "proceeding"
[52] "hearing" "ADA" ""
[[803]]
[1] "The" "EEOC" "brought" "suit"
[5] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "alleging" "Perich"
[9] "fired" "retaliation" "threatening" "file"
[13] "ADA" "lawsuit" "Perich" "intervened"
[17] "litigation" "claiming" "unlawful" "retaliation"
[21] "ADA" "Michigan" "Persons" "Disabilities"
[25] "Civil" "Rights" "Act" "Mich"
[29] "Comp" "Laws" "The" "EEOC"
[33] "Perich" "sought" "Perich" "s"
[37] "reinstatement" "former" "position" "frontpay"
[41] "lieu" "thereof" "along" "backpay"
[45] "compensatory" "punitive" "damages" "attorney"
[49] "s" "fees" "injunctive" "relief"
[53] ""
[[804]]
[1] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "moved" "summary"
[5] "judgment" "Invoking" "known" "ministerial"
[9] "exception" "Church" "argued" "suit"
[13] "barred" "First" "Amendment" "claims"
[17] "issue" "concerned" "employment" "relationship"
[21] "religious" "institution" "one" "ministers"
[25] "According" "Church" "Perich" "minister"
[29] "fired" "religious" "reason" "namely"
[33] "threat" "sue" "Church" "violated"
[37] "Synod" "s" "belief" "Christians"
[41] "resolve" "disputes" "internally" ""
[[805]]
[1] "The" "District" "Court"
[4] "agreed" "suit" "barred"
[7] "ministerial" "exception" "granted"
[10] "summary" "judgment" "Hosanna"
[13] "Tabor" "s" "favor"
[16] "The" "court" "explained"
[19] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "treated"
[22] "Perich" "like" "minister"
[25] "held" "world" "long"
[28] "litigation" "began" "facts"
[31] "surrounding" "Perich" "s"
[34] "employment" "religious" "school"
[37] "sectarian" "mission" "supported"
[40] "Church" "s" "characterization"
[43] "F" "Supp" "d"
[46] "In" "light" "determination"
[49] "court" "concluded" "inquire"
[52] "claims" "retaliation" "Id"
[55] ""
[[806]]
[1] "The" "Court" "Appeals"
[4] "Sixth" "Circuit" "vacated"
[7] "remanded" "directing" "District"
[10] "Court" "proceed" "merits"
[13] "Perich" "s" "retaliation"
[16] "claims" "The" "Court"
[19] "Appeals" "recognized" "existence"
[22] "ministerial" "exception" "barring"
[25] "certain" "employment" "discrimination"
[28] "claims" "religious" "institutions"
[31] "exception" "rooted" "First"
[34] "Amendment" "s" "guarantees"
[37] "religious" "freedom" "F"
[40] "d" "The" "court"
[43] "concluded" "however" "Perich"
[46] "qualify" "minister" "exception"
[49] "noting" "particular" "duties"
[52] "called" "teacher" "identical"
[55] "duties" "lay" "teacher"
[58] "Id" "Judge" "White"
[61] "concurred" "She" "viewed"
[64] "question" "whether" "Perich"
[67] "qualified" "minister" "closer"
[70] "majority" "agreed" "fact"
[73] "duties" "contract" "teachers"
[76] "duties" "called" "teachers"
[79] "telling" "Id" ""
[[807]]
[1] "We" "granted" "certiorari" "U" "S"
[6] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[11] ""
[[808]]
[1] "II" ""
[[809]]
[1] "The" "First" "Amendment" "provides"
[5] "part" "Congress" "shall" "make"
[9] "law" "respecting" "establishment" "religion"
[13] "prohibiting" "free" "exercise" "thereof"
[17] "We" "said" "two" "Clauses"
[21] "often" "exert" "conflicting" "pressures"
[25] "Cutter" "v" "Wilkinson" "U"
[29] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[33] "Ed" "d" "can" "internal"
[37] "tension" "Establishment" "Clause" "Free"
[41] "Exercise" "Clause" "Tilton" "v"
[45] "Richardson" "U" "S" "S"
[49] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[53] "plurality" "opinion" "Not" "Both"
[57] "Religion" "Clauses" "bar" "government"
[61] "interfering" "decision" "religious" "group"
[65] "fire" "one" "ministers" ""
[[810]]
[1] "" "A" ""
[[811]]
[1] "Controversy" "church" "state" "religious"
[5] "offices" "hardly" "new" "In"
[9] "issue" "addressed" "first" "clause"
[13] "Magna" "Carta" "There" "King"
[17] "John" "agreed" "English" "church"
[21] "shall" "free" "shall" "rights"
[25] "undiminished" "liberties" "unimpaired" "The"
[29] "King" "particular" "accepted" "freedom"
[33] "elections" "right" "thought" "greatest"
[37] "necessity" "importance" "English" "church"
[41] "J" "Holt" "Magna" "Carta"
[45] "App" "IV" "p" "cl"
[49] ""
[[812]]
[1] "That" "freedom" "many" "cases"
[5] "may" "theoretical" "real" "See"
[9] "e" "g" "W" "Warren"
[13] "Henry" "II" "recounting" "writ"
[17] "sent" "Henry" "II" "electors"
[21] "bishopric" "Winchester" "stating" "I"
[25] "order" "hold" "free" "election"
[29] "forbid" "elect" "anyone" "Richard"
[33] "clerk" "In" "event" "survive"
[37] "reign" "Henry" "VIII" "even"
[41] "theory" "The" "Act" "Supremacy"
[45] "Hen" "ch" "made" "English"
[49] "monarch" "supreme" "head" "Church"
[53] "Act" "Restraint" "Annates" "Hen"
[57] "ch" "passed" "year" "gave"
[61] "authority" "appoint" "Church" "s"
[65] "high" "officials" "See" "G"
[69] "Elton" "The" "Tudor" "Constitution"
[73] "Documents" "Commentary" "Various" "Acts"
[77] "Uniformity" "enacted" "subsequently" "tightened"
[81] "government" "s" "grip" "exercise"
[85] "religion" "See" "e" "g"
[89] "Act" "Uniformity" "Eliz" "ch"
[93] "Act" "Uniformity" "Edw" "ch"
[97] "The" "Uniformity" "Act" "instance"
[101] "limited" "service" "minister" "formally"
[105] "assented" "prescribed" "tenets" "pledged"
[109] "follow" "mode" "worship" "set"
[113] "forth" "Book" "Common" "Prayer"
[117] "Any" "minister" "refused" "make"
[121] "pledge" "deprived" "Spiritual" "Promotions"
[125] "Act" "Uniformity" "Car" "ch"
[129] ""
[[813]]
[1] "Seeking" "escape" "control" "national"
[5] "church" "Puritans" "fled" "New"
[9] "England" "hoped" "elect" "ministers"
[13] "establish" "modes" "worship" "See"
[17] "T" "Curry" "The" "First"
[21] "Freedoms" "Church" "State" "America"
[25] "Passage" "First" "Amendment" "McConnell"
[29] "The" "Origins" "Historical" "Understanding"
[33] "Free" "Exercise" "Religion" "Harv"
[37] "L" "Rev" "William" "Penn"
[41] "Quaker" "proprietor" "eventually" "become"
[45] "Pennsylvania" "Delaware" "also" "sought"
[49] "independence" "Church" "England" "The"
[53] "charter" "creating" "province" "Pennsylvania"
[57] "contained" "clause" "establishing" "religion"
[61] "See" "S" "Cobb" "The"
[65] "Rise" "Religious" "Liberty" "America"
[69] ""
[[814]]
[1] "" "Colonists" "South"
[4] "contrast" "brought" "Church"
[7] "England" "But" "even"
[10] "sometimes" "chafed" "control"
[13] "exercised" "Crown" "representatives"
[16] "religious" "offices" "In"
[19] "Virginia" "example" "law"
[22] "vested" "governor" "power"
[25] "induct" "ministers" "presented"
[28] "parish" "vestries" "Hening"
[31] "s" "Statutes" "Large"
[34] "vestries" "often" "refused"
[37] "make" "presentations" "instead"
[40] "chose" "ministers" "See"
[43] "H" "Eckenrode" "Separation"
[46] "Church" "State" "Virginia"
[49] "Controversies" "selection" "ministers"
[52] "also" "arose" "Colonies"
[55] "Anglican" "establishments" "including"
[58] "North" "Carolina" "See"
[61] "C" "Antieau" "A"
[64] "Downey" "E" "Roberts"
[67] "Freedom" "From" "Federal"
[70] "Establishment" "Formation" "Early"
[73] "History" "First" "Amendment"
[76] "Religion" "Clauses" "There"
[79] "royal" "governor" "insisted"
[82] "right" "presentation" "lay"
[85] "Bishop" "London" "colonial"
[88] "assembly" "enacted" "laws"
[91] "placing" "right" "vestries"
[94] "Authorities" "England" "intervened"
[97] "repealing" "laws" "inconsistent"
[100] "rights" "Crown" "See"
[103] "id" "Weeks" "Church"
[106] "State" "North" "Carolina"
[109] "Johns" "Hopkins" "U"
[112] "Studies" "Hist" "Pol"
[115] "Sci" "th" "Ser"
[118] "Nos" "pp" ""
[[815]]
[1] "It" "background" "First"
[4] "Amendment" "adopted" "Familiar"
[7] "life" "established" "Church"
[10] "England" "founding" "generation"
[13] "sought" "foreclose" "possibility"
[16] "national" "church" "See"
[19] "Annals" "Cong" "remarks"
[22] "J" "Madison" "noting"
[25] "Establishment" "Clause" "addressed"
[28] "fear" "one" "sect"
[31] "might" "obtain" "pre"
[34] "eminence" "two" "combine"
[37] "together" "establish" "religion"
[40] "compel" "others" "conform"
[43] "By" "forbidding" "establishment"
[46] "religion" "guaranteeing" "free"
[49] "exercise" "thereof" "Religion"
[52] "Clauses" "ensured" "new"
[55] "Federal" "Government" "unlike"
[58] "English" "Crown" "role"
[61] "filling" "ecclesiastical" "offices"
[64] "The" "Establishment" "Clause"
[67] "prevents" "Government" "appointing"
[70] "ministers" "Free" "Exercise"
[73] "Clause" "prevents" "interfering"
[76] "freedom" "religious" "groups"
[79] "select" ""
[[816]]
[1] "This" "understanding" "Religion"
[4] "Clauses" "reflected" "two"
[7] "events" "involving" "James"
[10] "Madison" "leading" "architect"
[13] "religion" "clauses" "First"
[16] "Amendment" "Arizona" "Christian"
[19] "School" "Tuition" "Organization"
[22] "v" "Winn" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct"
[28] "L" "Ed" "d"
[31] "quoting" "Flast" "v"
[34] "Cohen" "U" "S"
[37] "S" "Ct" "L"
[40] "Ed" "d" "The"
[43] "first" "occurred" "John"
[46] "Carroll" "first" "Catholic"
[49] "bishop" "United" "States"
[52] "solicited" "Executive" "s"
[55] "opinion" "appointed" "direct"
[58] "affairs" "Catholic" "Church"
[61] "territory" "newly" "acquired"
[64] "Louisiana" "Purchase" "After"
[67] "consulting" "President" "Jefferson"
[70] "Secretary" "State" "Madison"
[73] "responded" "selection" "church"
[76] "functionaries" "entirely" "ecclesiastical"
[79] "matter" "left" "Church"
[82] "s" "judgment" "Letter"
[85] "James" "Madison" "Bishop"
[88] "Carroll" "Nov" "reprinted"
[91] "Records" "American" "Catholic"
[94] "Historical" "Society" "The"
[97] "scrupulous" "policy" "Constitution"
[100] "guarding" "political" "interference"
[103] "religious" "affairs" "Madison"
[106] "explained" "prevented" "Government"
[109] "rendering" "opinion" "selection"
[112] "ecclesiastical" "individuals" "Id"
[115] ""
[[817]]
[1] "The" "second" "episode" "occurred"
[5] "Madison" "President" "Congress" "passed"
[9] "bill" "incorporating" "Protestant" "Episcopal"
[13] "Church" "town" "Alexandria" "District"
[17] "Columbia" "Madison" "vetoed" "bill"
[21] "ground" "exceeds" "rightful" "authority"
[25] "Governments" "limited" "essential" "distinction"
[29] "civil" "religious" "functions" "violates"
[33] "particular" "article" "Constitution" "United"
[37] "States" "declares" "Congress" "shall"
[41] "make" "law" "respecting" "religious"
[45] "establishment" "Annals" "Cong" "Madison"
[49] "explained" ""
[[818]]
[1] "" "The" "bill" "enacts"
[5] "establishes" "law" "sundry" "rules"
[9] "proceedings" "relative" "purely" "organization"
[13] "polity" "church" "incorporated" "comprehending"
[17] "even" "election" "removal" "Minister"
[21] "change" "made" "therein" "particular"
[25] "society" "general" "church" "member"
[29] "whose" "authority" "recognises" "Id"
[33] "emphasis" "added" ""
[[819]]
[1] "B" ""
[[820]]
[1] "Given" "understanding" "Religion" "Clauses"
[5] "absence" "government" "employment" "regulation"
[9] "generally" "time" "questions" "government"
[13] "interference" "church" "s" "ability"
[17] "select" "ministers" "came" "courts"
[21] "This" "Court" "touched" "upon"
[25] "issue" "indirectly" "however" "context"
[29] "disputes" "church" "property" "Our"
[33] "decisions" "area" "confirm" "impermissible"
[37] "government" "contradict" "church" "s"
[41] "determination" "can" "act" "ministers"
[45] ""
[[821]]
[1] "In" "Watson" "v"
[4] "Jones" "Wall" "L"
[7] "Ed" "Court" "considered"
[10] "dispute" "antislavery" "proslavery"
[13] "factions" "controlled" "property"
[16] "Walnut" "Street" "Presbyterian"
[19] "Church" "Louisville" "Kentucky"
[22] "The" "General" "Assembly"
[25] "Presbyterian" "Church" "recognized"
[28] "antislavery" "faction" "Court"
[31] "applying" "Constitution" "broad"
[34] "sound" "view" "relations"
[37] "church" "state" "system"
[40] "laws" "declined" "question"
[43] "determination" "Id" "We"
[46] "explained" "whenever" "questions"
[49] "discipline" "faith" "ecclesiastical"
[52] "rule" "custom" "law"
[55] "decided" "highest" "church"
[58] "judicatories" "matter" "carried"
[61] "legal" "tribunals" "must"
[64] "accept" "decisions" "final"
[67] "binding" "Ibid" "As"
[70] "put" "later" "opinion"
[73] "Watson" "radiates" "spirit"
[76] "freedom" "religious" "organizations"
[79] "independence" "secular" "control"
[82] "manipulation" "short" "power"
[85] "decide" "free" "state"
[88] "interference" "matters" "church"
[91] "government" "well" "faith"
[94] "doctrine" "Kedroff" "v"
[97] "Saint" "Nicholas" "Cathedral"
[100] "Russian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[103] "North" "America" "U"
[106] "S" "S" "Ct"
[109] "L" "Ed" ""
[[822]]
[1] "Confronting" "issue" "Constitution" "first"
[5] "time" "Kedroff" "Court" "recognized"
[9] "f" "reedom" "select" "clergy"
[13] "improper" "methods" "choice" "proven"
[17] "part" "free" "exercise" "religion"
[21] "protected" "First" "Amendment" "government"
[25] "interference" "Ibid" "At" "issue"
[29] "Kedroff" "right" "use" "Russian"
[33] "Orthodox" "cathedral" "New" "York"
[37] "City" "The" "Russian" "Orthodox"
[41] "churches" "North" "America" "split"
[45] "Supreme" "Church" "Authority" "Moscow"
[49] "concern" "Authority" "become" "tool"
[53] "Soviet" "Government" "The" "North"
[57] "American" "churches" "claimed" "right"
[61] "use" "cathedral" "belonged" "archbishop"
[65] "elected" "Supreme" "Church" "Authority"
[69] "claimed" "belonged" "instead" "archbishop"
[73] "appointed" "patriarch" "Moscow" "New"
[77] "York" "s" "highest" "court"
[81] "ruled" "favor" "North" "American"
[85] "churches" "based" "state" "law"
[89] "requiring" "every" "Russian" "Orthodox"
[93] "church" "New" "York" "recognize"
[97] "determination" "governing" "body" "North"
[101] "American" "churches" "authoritative" "Id"
[105] "n" "n" "S" "Ct"
[109] ""
[[823]]
[1] "" "This" "Court"
[4] "reversed" "concluding" "New"
[7] "York" "law" "violated"
[10] "First" "Amendment" "Id"
[13] "S" "Ct" "We"
[16] "explained" "controversy" "right"
[19] "use" "cathedral" "strictly"
[22] "matter" "ecclesiastical" "government"
[25] "power" "Supreme" "Church"
[28] "Authority" "Russian" "Orthodox"
[31] "Church" "appoint" "ruling"
[34] "hierarch" "archdiocese" "North"
[37] "America" "Id" "S"
[40] "Ct" "By" "pass"
[43] "ing" "control" "matters"
[46] "strictly" "ecclesiastical" "one"
[49] "church" "authority" "another"
[52] "New" "York" "law"
[55] "intruded" "power" "state"
[58] "forbidden" "area" "religious"
[61] "freedom" "contrary" "principles"
[64] "First" "Amendment" "Id"
[67] "S" "Ct" "Accordingly"
[70] "declared" "law" "unconstitutional"
[73] "directly" "prohibit" "ed"
[76] "free" "exercise" "ecclesiastical"
[79] "right" "Church" "s"
[82] "choice" "hierarchy" "Ibid"
[85] ""
[[824]]
[1] "This" "Court" "reaffirmed" "First"
[5] "Amendment" "principles" "Serbian" "Eastern"
[9] "Orthodox" "Diocese" "United" "States"
[13] "Canada" "v" "Milivojevich" "U"
[17] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[21] "Ed" "d" "case" "involving"
[25] "dispute" "control" "American" "Canadian"
[29] "Diocese" "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[33] "including" "property" "assets" "The"
[37] "Church" "removed" "Dionisije" "Milivojevich"
[41] "bishop" "American" "Canadian" "Diocese"
[45] "defiance" "church" "hierarchy" "Following"
[49] "removal" "Dionisije" "brought" "civil"
[53] "action" "state" "court" "challenging"
[57] "Church" "s" "decision" "Illinois"
[61] "Supreme" "Court" "purported" "effect"
[65] "reinstate" "Dionisije" "Diocesan" "Bishop"
[69] "ground" "proceedings" "resulting" "removal"
[73] "failed" "comply" "church" "laws"
[77] "regulations" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[81] ""
[[825]]
[1] "Reversing" "judgment" "Court"
[4] "explained" "First" "Amendment"
[7] "permit" "s" "hierarchical"
[10] "religious" "organizations" "establish"
[13] "rules" "regulations" "internal"
[16] "discipline" "government" "create"
[19] "tribunals" "adjudicating" "disputes"
[22] "matters" "Id" "S"
[25] "Ct" "When" "ecclesiastical"
[28] "tribunals" "decide" "disputes"
[31] "explained" "Constitution" "requires"
[34] "civil" "courts" "accept"
[37] "decisions" "binding" "upon"
[40] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[43] "We" "thus" "held"
[46] "inquiring" "whether" "Church"
[49] "followed" "procedures" "State"
[52] "Supreme" "Court" "unconstitutionally"
[55] "undertaken" "resolution" "quintessentially"
[58] "religious" "controversies" "whose"
[61] "resolution" "First" "Amendment"
[64] "commits" "exclusively" "highest"
[67] "ecclesiastical" "tribunals" "Church"
[70] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[73] ""
[[826]]
[1] "" "C" ""
[[827]]
[1] "Until" "today" "occasion"
[4] "consider" "whether" "freedom"
[7] "religious" "organization" "select"
[10] "ministers" "implicated" "suit"
[13] "alleging" "discrimination" "employment"
[16] "The" "Courts" "Appeals"
[19] "contrast" "extensive" "experience"
[22] "issue" "Since" "passage"
[25] "Title" "VII" "Civil"
[28] "Rights" "Act" "U"
[31] "S" "C" "e"
[34] "et" "seq" "employment"
[37] "discrimination" "laws" "Courts"
[40] "Appeals" "uniformly" "recognized"
[43] "existence" "ministerial" "exception"
[46] "grounded" "First" "Amendment"
[49] "precludes" "application" "legislation"
[52] "claims" "concerning" "employment"
[55] "relationship" "religious" "institution"
[58] "ministers" ""
[[828]]
[1] "" "We" "agree"
[4] "ministerial" "exception" "The"
[7] "members" "religious" "group"
[10] "put" "faith" "hands"
[13] "ministers" "Requiring" "church"
[16] "accept" "retain" "unwanted"
[19] "minister" "punishing" "church"
[22] "failing" "intrudes" "upon"
[25] "mere" "employment" "decision"
[28] "Such" "action" "interferes"
[31] "internal" "governance" "church"
[34] "depriving" "church" "control"
[37] "selection" "will" "personify"
[40] "beliefs" "By" "imposing"
[43] "unwanted" "minister" "state"
[46] "infringes" "Free" "Exercise"
[49] "Clause" "protects" "religious"
[52] "group" "s" "right"
[55] "shape" "faith" "mission"
[58] "appointments" "According" "state"
[61] "power" "determine" "individuals"
[64] "will" "minister" "faithful"
[67] "also" "violates" "Establishment"
[70] "Clause" "prohibits" "government"
[73] "involvement" "ecclesiastical" "decisions"
[76] ""
[[829]]
[1] "The" "EEOC" "Perich"
[4] "acknowledge" "employment" "discrimination"
[7] "laws" "unconstitutional" "applied"
[10] "religious" "groups" "certain"
[13] "circumstances" "They" "grant"
[16] "example" "violate" "First"
[19] "Amendment" "courts" "apply"
[22] "laws" "compel" "ordination"
[25] "women" "Catholic" "Church"
[28] "Orthodox" "Jewish" "seminary"
[31] "Brief" "Federal" "Respondent"
[34] "Brief" "Respondent" "Perich"
[37] "According" "EEOC" "Perich"
[40] "religious" "organizations" "successfully"
[43] "defend" "employment" "discrimination"
[46] "claims" "circumstances" "invoking"
[49] "constitutional" "right" "freedom"
[52] "association" "right" "implicit"
[55] "First" "Amendment" "Roberts"
[58] "v" "United" "States"
[61] "Jaycees" "U" "S"
[64] "S" "Ct" "L"
[67] "Ed" "d" "The"
[70] "EEOC" "Perich" "thus"
[73] "see" "need" "basis"
[76] "special" "rule" "ministers"
[79] "grounded" "Religion" "Clauses"
[82] ""
[[830]]
[1] "" "We" "find" "position"
[5] "untenable" "The" "right" "freedom"
[9] "association" "right" "enjoyed" "religious"
[13] "secular" "groups" "alike" "It"
[17] "follows" "EEOC" "s" "Perich"
[21] "s" "view" "First" "Amendment"
[25] "analysis" "whether" "association" "question"
[29] "Lutheran" "Church" "labor" "union"
[33] "social" "club" "See" "Perich"
[37] "Brief" "Tr" "Oral" "Arg"
[41] "That" "result" "hard" "square"
[45] "text" "First" "Amendment" "gives"
[49] "special" "solicitude" "rights" "religious"
[53] "organizations" "We" "accept" "remarkable"
[57] "view" "Religion" "Clauses" "nothing"
[61] "say" "religious" "organization" "s"
[65] "freedom" "select" "ministers" ""
[[831]]
[1] "The" "EEOC" "Perich" "also"
[5] "contend" "decision" "Employment" "Div"
[9] "Dept" "Human" "Resources" "Ore"
[13] "v" "Smith" "U" "S"
[17] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[21] "d" "precludes" "recognition" "ministerial"
[25] "exception" "In" "Smith" "two"
[29] "members" "Native" "American" "Church"
[33] "denied" "state" "unemployment" "benefits"
[37] "determined" "fired" "jobs" "ingesting"
[41] "peyote" "crime" "Oregon" "law"
[45] "We" "held" "violate" "Free"
[49] "Exercise" "Clause" "even" "though"
[53] "peyote" "ingested" "sacramental" "purposes"
[57] "right" "free" "exercise" "relieve"
[61] "individual" "obligation" "comply" "valid"
[65] "neutral" "law" "general" "applicability"
[69] "ground" "law" "proscribes" "prescribes"
[73] "conduct" "religion" "prescribes" "proscribes"
[77] "Id" "S" "Ct" "internal"
[81] "quotation" "marks" "omitted" ""
[[832]]
[1] "It" "true" "ADA"
[4] "s" "prohibition" "retaliation"
[7] "like" "Oregon" "s"
[10] "prohibition" "peyote" "use"
[13] "valid" "neutral" "law"
[16] "general" "applicability" "But"
[19] "church" "s" "selection"
[22] "ministers" "unlike" "individual"
[25] "s" "ingestion" "peyote"
[28] "Smith" "involved" "government"
[31] "regulation" "outward" "physical"
[34] "acts" "The" "present"
[37] "case" "contrast" "concerns"
[40] "government" "interference" "internal"
[43] "church" "decision" "affects"
[46] "faith" "mission" "church"
[49] "See" "id" "S"
[52] "Ct" "distinguishing" "government"
[55] "s" "regulation" "physical"
[58] "acts" "lend" "ing"
[61] "power" "one" "side"
[64] "controversies" "religious" "authority"
[67] "dogma" "The" "contention"
[70] "Smith" "forecloses" "recognition"
[73] "ministerial" "exception" "rooted"
[76] "Religion" "Clauses" "merit"
[79] ""
[[833]]
[1] "III" ""
[[834]]
[1] "" "Having" "concluded" "ministerial"
[5] "exception" "grounded" "Religion" "Clauses"
[9] "First" "Amendment" "consider" "whether"
[13] "exception" "applies" "case" "We"
[17] "hold" ""
[[835]]
[1] "Every" "Court" "Appeals" "considered"
[5] "question" "concluded" "ministerial" "exception"
[9] "limited" "head" "religious" "congregation"
[13] "agree" "We" "reluctant" "however"
[17] "adopt" "rigid" "formula" "deciding"
[21] "employee" "qualifies" "minister" "It"
[25] "enough" "us" "conclude" "first"
[29] "case" "involving" "ministerial" "exception"
[33] "exception" "covers" "Perich" "given"
[37] "circumstances" "employment" ""
[[836]]
[1] "" "To" "begin"
[4] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "held"
[7] "Perich" "minister" "role"
[10] "distinct" "members" "When"
[13] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "extended"
[16] "call" "issued" "diploma"
[19] "vocation" "according" "title"
[22] "Minister" "Religion" "Commissioned"
[25] "App" "She" "tasked"
[28] "performing" "office" "according"
[31] "Word" "God" "confessional"
[34] "standards" "Evangelical" "Lutheran"
[37] "Church" "drawn" "Sacred"
[40] "Scriptures" "Ibid" "The"
[43] "congregation" "prayed" "God"
[46] "bless" "ministrations" "glory"
[49] "His" "holy" "name"
[52] "building" "His" "church"
[55] "Id" "In" "supplement"
[58] "diploma" "congregation" "undertook"
[61] "periodically" "review" "Perich"
[64] "s" "skills" "ministry"
[67] "ministerial" "responsibilities" "provide"
[70] "continuing" "education" "professional"
[73] "person" "ministry" "Gospel"
[76] "Id" ""
[[837]]
[1] "Perich" "s" "title"
[4] "minister" "reflected" "significant"
[7] "degree" "religious" "training"
[10] "followed" "formal" "process"
[13] "commissioning" "To" "eligible"
[16] "become" "commissioned" "minister"
[19] "Perich" "complete" "eight"
[22] "college" "level" "courses"
[25] "subjects" "including" "biblical"
[28] "interpretation" "church" "doctrine"
[31] "ministry" "Lutheran" "teacher"
[34] "She" "also" "obtain"
[37] "endorsement" "local" "Synod"
[40] "district" "submitting" "petition"
[43] "contained" "academic" "transcripts"
[46] "letters" "recommendation" "personal"
[49] "statement" "written" "answers"
[52] "various" "ministry" "related"
[55] "questions" "Finally" "pass"
[58] "oral" "examination" "faculty"
[61] "committee" "Lutheran" "college"
[64] "It" "took" "Perich"
[67] "six" "years" "fulfill"
[70] "requirements" "And" "eventually"
[73] "commissioned" "minister" "upon"
[76] "election" "congregation" "recognized"
[79] "God" "s" "call"
[82] "teach" "At" "point"
[85] "call" "rescinded" "upon"
[88] "supermajority" "vote" "congregation"
[91] "protection" "designed" "allow"
[94] "preach" "Word" "God"
[97] "boldly" "Brief" "Lutheran"
[100] "Church" "Missouri" "Synod"
[103] "Amicus" "Curiae" ""
[[838]]
[1] "Perich" "held" "minister" "Church"
[5] "accepting" "formal" "call" "religious"
[9] "service" "according" "terms" "She"
[13] "ways" "well" "For" "example"
[17] "claimed" "special" "housing" "allowance"
[21] "taxes" "available" "employees" "earning"
[25] "compensation" "exercise" "ministry" "App"
[29] "If" "conducting" "activities" "exercise"
[33] "ministry" "take" "advantage" "parsonage"
[37] "housing" "allowance" "exclusion" "quoting"
[41] "Lutheran" "Church" "Missouri" "Synod"
[45] "Brochure" "Whether" "IRS" "Considers"
[49] "Employees" "Minister" "In" "form"
[53] "submitted" "Synod" "following" "termination"
[57] "Perich" "indicated" "regarded" "minister"
[61] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "stating" "I"
[65] "feel" "God" "leading" "serve"
[69] "teaching" "ministry" "I" "anxious"
[73] "teaching" "ministry" "soon" "App"
[77] ""
[[839]]
[1] "Perich" "s" "job"
[4] "duties" "reflected" "role"
[7] "conveying" "Church" "s"
[10] "message" "carrying" "mission"
[13] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "expressly"
[16] "charged" "lead" "ing"
[19] "others" "toward" "Christian"
[22] "maturity" "teach" "ing"
[25] "faithfully" "Word" "God"
[28] "Sacred" "Scriptures" "truth"
[31] "purity" "set" "forth"
[34] "symbolical" "books" "Evangelical"
[37] "Lutheran" "Church" "Id"
[40] "In" "fulfilling" "responsibilities"
[43] "Perich" "taught" "students"
[46] "religion" "four" "days"
[49] "week" "led" "prayer"
[52] "three" "times" "day"
[55] "Once" "week" "took"
[58] "students" "school" "wide"
[61] "chapel" "service" "twice"
[64] "year" "took" "turn"
[67] "leading" "choosing" "liturgy"
[70] "selecting" "hymns" "delivering"
[73] "short" "message" "based"
[76] "verses" "Bible" "During"
[79] "last" "year" "teaching"
[82] "Perich" "also" "led"
[85] "fourth" "graders" "brief"
[88] "devotional" "exercise" "morning"
[91] "As" "source" "religious"
[94] "instruction" "Perich" "performed"
[97] "important" "role" "transmitting"
[100] "Lutheran" "faith" "next"
[103] "generation" ""
[[840]]
[1] "In" "light" "considerations"
[4] "formal" "title" "given"
[7] "Perich" "Church" "substance"
[10] "reflected" "title" "use"
[13] "title" "important" "religious"
[16] "functions" "performed" "Church"
[19] "conclude" "Perich" "minister"
[22] "covered" "ministerial" "exception"
[25] ""
[[841]]
[1] "" "In" "reaching" "contrary"
[5] "conclusion" "Court" "Appeals" "committed"
[9] "three" "errors" "First" "Sixth"
[13] "Circuit" "failed" "see" "relevance"
[17] "fact" "Perich" "commissioned" "minister"
[21] "Although" "title" "automatically" "ensure"
[25] "coverage" "fact" "employee" "ordained"
[29] "commissioned" "minister" "surely" "relevant"
[33] "fact" "significant" "religious" "training"
[37] "recognized" "religious" "mission" "underlie"
[41] "description" "employee" "s" "position"
[45] "It" "wrong" "Court" "Appeals"
[49] "Perich" "adopted" "court" "s"
[53] "view" "see" "Perich" "Brief"
[57] "say" "employee" "s" "title"
[61] "matter" ""
[[842]]
[1] "" "Second" "Sixth"
[4] "Circuit" "gave" "much"
[7] "weight" "fact" "lay"
[10] "teachers" "school" "performed"
[13] "religious" "duties" "Perich"
[16] "We" "express" "view"
[19] "whether" "someone" "Perich"
[22] "s" "duties" "covered"
[25] "ministerial" "exception" "absence"
[28] "considerations" "discussed" "But"
[31] "though" "relevant" "dispositive"
[34] "others" "formally" "recognized"
[37] "ministers" "church" "perform"
[40] "functions" "particularly" "commissioned"
[43] "ministers" "unavailable" ""
[[843]]
[1] "Third" "Sixth" "Circuit" "placed"
[5] "much" "emphasis" "Perich" "s"
[9] "performance" "secular" "duties" "It"
[13] "true" "religious" "duties" "consumed"
[17] "minutes" "workday" "rest" "day"
[21] "devoted" "teaching" "secular" "subjects"
[25] "The" "EEOC" "regards" "conclusive"
[29] "contending" "ministerial" "exception" "limited"
[33] "employees" "perform" "exclusively" "religious"
[37] "functions" "Brief" "Federal" "Respondent"
[41] "We" "accept" "view" "Indeed"
[45] "unsure" "whether" "employees" "exist"
[49] "The" "heads" "congregations" "often"
[53] "mix" "duties" "including" "secular"
[57] "ones" "helping" "manage" "congregation"
[61] "s" "finances" "supervising" "purely"
[65] "secular" "personnel" "overseeing" "upkeep"
[69] "facilities" ""
[[844]]
[1] "" "Although" "Sixth"
[4] "Circuit" "adopt" "extreme"
[7] "position" "pressed" "EEOC"
[10] "regard" "relative" "amount"
[13] "time" "Perich" "spent"
[16] "performing" "religious" "functions"
[19] "largely" "determinative" "The"
[22] "issue" "us" "however"
[25] "one" "can" "resolved"
[28] "stopwatch" "The" "amount"
[31] "time" "employee" "spends"
[34] "particular" "activities" "relevant"
[37] "assessing" "employee" "s"
[40] "status" "factor" "considered"
[43] "isolation" "without" "regard"
[46] "nature" "religious" "functions"
[49] "performed" "considerations" "discussed"
[52] ""
[[845]]
[1] "Because" "Perich" "minister"
[4] "within" "meaning" "exception"
[7] "First" "Amendment" "requires"
[10] "dismissal" "employment" "discrimination"
[13] "suit" "religious" "employer"
[16] "The" "EEOC" "Perich"
[19] "originally" "sought" "order"
[22] "reinstating" "Perich" "former"
[25] "position" "called" "teacher"
[28] "By" "requiring" "Church"
[31] "accept" "minister" "want"
[34] "order" "plainly" "violated"
[37] "Church" "s" "freedom"
[40] "Religion" "Clauses" "select"
[43] "ministers" ""
[[846]]
[1] "Perich" "longer" "seeks" "reinstatement"
[5] "abandoned" "relief" "Court" "See"
[9] "Perich" "Brief" "But" "immaterial"
[13] "Perich" "continues" "seek" "frontpay"
[17] "lieu" "reinstatement" "backpay" "compensatory"
[21] "punitive" "damages" "attorney" "s"
[25] "fees" "An" "award" "relief"
[29] "operate" "penalty" "Church" "terminating"
[33] "unwanted" "minister" "less" "prohibited"
[37] "First" "Amendment" "order" "overturning"
[41] "termination" "Such" "relief" "depend"
[45] "determination" "Hosanna" "Tabor" "wrong"
[49] "relieved" "Perich" "position" "precisely"
[53] "ruling" "barred" "ministerial" "exception"
[57] ""
[[847]]
[1] "" "The" "EEOC"
[4] "Perich" "suggest" "Hosanna"
[7] "Tabor" "s" "asserted"
[10] "religious" "reason" "firing"
[13] "Perich" "violated" "Synod"
[16] "s" "commitment" "internal"
[19] "dispute" "resolution" "pretextual"
[22] "That" "suggestion" "misses"
[25] "point" "ministerial" "exception"
[28] "The" "purpose" "exception"
[31] "safeguard" "church" "s"
[34] "decision" "fire" "minister"
[37] "made" "religious" "reason"
[40] "The" "exception" "instead"
[43] "ensures" "authority" "select"
[46] "control" "will" "minister"
[49] "faithful" "matter" "strictly"
[52] "ecclesiastical" "Kedroff" "U"
[55] "S" "S" "Ct"
[58] "church" "s" "alone"
[61] ""
[[848]]
[1] "" "IV" ""
[[849]]
[1] "The" "EEOC" "Perich"
[4] "foresee" "parade" "horribles"
[7] "will" "follow" "recognition"
[10] "ministerial" "exception" "employment"
[13] "discrimination" "suits" "According"
[16] "EEOC" "Perich" "exception"
[19] "protect" "religious" "organizations"
[22] "liability" "retaliating" "employees"
[25] "reporting" "criminal" "misconduct"
[28] "testifying" "grand" "jury"
[31] "criminal" "trial" "What"
[34] "EEOC" "contends" "logic"
[37] "exception" "confer" "religious"
[40] "employers" "unfettered" "discretion"
[43] "violate" "employment" "laws"
[46] "example" "hiring" "children"
[49] "aliens" "authorized" "work"
[52] "United" "States" "Brief"
[55] "Federal" "Respondent" ""
[[850]]
[1] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "responds"
[4] "ministerial" "exception" "way"
[7] "bar" "criminal" "prosecutions"
[10] "interfering" "law" "enforcement"
[13] "investigations" "proceedings" "Nor"
[16] "according" "Church" "exception"
[19] "bar" "government" "enforcement"
[22] "general" "laws" "restricting"
[25] "eligibility" "employment" "exception"
[28] "applies" "suits" "behalf"
[31] "ministers" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[34] "also" "notes" "ministerial"
[37] "exception" "around" "lower"
[40] "courts" "years" "see"
[43] "McClure" "v" "Salvation"
[46] "Army" "F" "d"
[49] "C" "A" "given"
[52] "rise" "dire" "consequences"
[55] "predicted" "EEOC" "Perich"
[58] ""
[[851]]
[1] "The" "case" "us"
[4] "employment" "discrimination" "suit"
[7] "brought" "behalf" "minister"
[10] "challenging" "church" "s"
[13] "decision" "fire" "Today"
[16] "hold" "ministerial" "exception"
[19] "bars" "suit" "We"
[22] "express" "view" "whether"
[25] "exception" "bars" "types"
[28] "suits" "including" "actions"
[31] "employees" "alleging" "breach"
[34] "contract" "tortious" "conduct"
[37] "religious" "employers" "There"
[40] "will" "time" "enough"
[43] "address" "applicability" "exception"
[46] "circumstances" "arise" ""
[[852]]
[1] "" ""
[[853]]
[1] "The" "interest" "society"
[4] "enforcement" "employment" "discrimination"
[7] "statutes" "undoubtedly" "important"
[10] "But" "interest" "religious"
[13] "groups" "choosing" "will"
[16] "preach" "beliefs" "teach"
[19] "faith" "carry" "mission"
[22] "When" "minister" "fired"
[25] "sues" "church" "alleging"
[28] "termination" "discriminatory" "First"
[31] "Amendment" "struck" "balance"
[34] "us" "The" "church"
[37] "must" "free" "choose"
[40] "will" "guide" "way"
[43] ""
[[854]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "Court" "Appeals" "Sixth" "Circuit"
[7] "reversed" ""
[[855]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[856]]
[1] "Justice" "O" "CONNOR" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[857]]
[1] "This" "case" "presents" "question"
[5] "whether" "Religion" "Clauses" "First"
[9] "Amendment" "prohibit" "State" "imposing"
[13] "generally" "applicable" "sales" "use"
[17] "tax" "distribution" "religious" "materials"
[21] "religious" "organization" ""
[[858]]
[1] "" "I" ""
[[859]]
[1] "California" "s" "Sales" "Use"
[5] "Tax" "Law" "requires" "retailers"
[9] "pay" "sales" "tax" "f"
[13] "privilege" "selling" "tangible" "personal"
[17] "property" "retail" "Cal" "Rev"
[21] "Tax" "Code" "Ann" "West"
[25] "A" "sale" "includes" "transfer"
[29] "title" "possession" "tangible" "personal"
[33] "property" "consideration" "Cal" "Rev"
[37] "Tax" "Code" "Ann" "West"
[41] "Supp" ""
[[860]]
[1] "The" "use" "tax" "complement"
[5] "sales" "tax" "reaches" "state"
[9] "purchases" "residents" "State" "It"
[13] "imposed" "storage" "use" "consumption"
[17] "state" "tangible" "personal" "property"
[21] "purchased" "retailer" "rate" "sales"
[25] "tax" "percent" "Although" "use"
[29] "tax" "imposed" "purchaser" "generally"
[33] "collected" "retailer" "time" "sale"
[37] "made" "Neither" "State" "Constitution"
[41] "State" "Sales" "Use" "Tax"
[45] "Law" "exempts" "religious" "organizations"
[49] "sales" "use" "tax" "apart"
[53] "limited" "exemption" "serving" "meals"
[57] "religious" "organizations" ""
[[861]]
[1] "During" "tax" "period" "question"
[5] "appellant" "Jimmy" "Swaggart" "Ministries"
[9] "religious" "organization" "incorporated" "Louisiana"
[13] "nonprofit" "corporation" "recognized" "Internal"
[17] "Revenue" "Service" "pursuant" "c"
[21] "Internal" "Revenue" "Code" "amended"
[25] "U" "S" "C" "c"
[29] "ed" "California" "State" "Controller"
[33] "pursuant" "Inheritance" "Tax" "Gift"
[37] "Tax" "Laws" "State" "California"
[41] "Appellant" "s" "constitution" "bylaws"
[45] "provide" "called" "purpose" "establishing"
[49] "maintaining" "evangelistic" "outreach" "worship"
[53] "Almighty" "God" "App" "This"
[57] "outreach" "performed" "available" "means"
[61] "home" "foreign" "lands" ""
[[862]]
[1] "" "shall" "specifically" "include"
[5] "evangelistic" "crusades" "missionary" "endeavors"
[9] "radio" "broadcasting" "owner" "broadcaster"
[13] "placement" "agency" "television" "broadcasting"
[17] "owner" "broadcaster" "audio" "production"
[21] "reproduction" "music" "audio" "production"
[25] "reproduction" "preaching" "audio" "production"
[29] "reproduction" "teaching" "writing" "printing"
[33] "publishing" "individual" "mass" "media"
[37] "methods" "presently" "exist" "may"
[41] "devised" "future" "proclaim" "good"
[45] "news" "Jesus" "Christ" "Id"
[49] ""
[[863]]
[1] "From" "appellant" "conducted" "numerous"
[5] "evangelistic" "crusades" "auditoriums" "arenas"
[9] "across" "country" "cooperation" "local"
[13] "churches" "Id" "During" "period"
[17] "appellant" "held" "crusades" "California"
[21] "lasting" "days" "one" "crusade"
[25] "lasting" "days" "total" "days"
[29] "Id" "At" "crusades" "appellant"
[33] "conducted" "religious" "services" "included"
[37] "preaching" "singing" "Some" "services"
[41] "recorded" "later" "sale" "broadcast"
[45] "Appellant" "also" "sold" "religious"
[49] "books" "tapes" "records" "religious"
[53] "nonreligious" "merchandise" "crusades" ""
[[864]]
[1] "Appellant" "also" "published"
[4] "monthly" "magazine" "The"
[7] "Evangelist" "sold" "nationwide"
[10] "subscription" "The" "magazine"
[13] "contained" "articles" "religious"
[16] "nature" "well" "advertisements"
[19] "appellant" "s" "religious"
[22] "books" "tapes" "records"
[25] "The" "magazine" "included"
[28] "order" "form" "listing"
[31] "various" "items" "sale"
[34] "particular" "issue" "unit"
[37] "price" "spaces" "purchasers"
[40] "fill" "quantity" "desired"
[43] "total" "price" "Appellant"
[46] "also" "offered" "items"
[49] "sale" "radio" "television"
[52] "cable" "television" "broadcasts"
[55] "including" "broadcasts" "local"
[58] "California" "stations" ""
[[865]]
[1] "In" "appellee" "Board" "Equalization"
[5] "State" "California" "Board" "informed"
[9] "appellant" "religious" "materials" "exempt"
[13] "sales" "tax" "requested" "appellant"
[17] "register" "seller" "facilitate" "reporting"
[21] "payment" "tax" "See" "Cal"
[25] "Rev" "Tax" "Code" "Ann"
[29] "West" "Supp" "tax" "registration"
[33] "requirements" "Appellant" "responded" "exempt"
[37] "taxes" "First" "Amendment" "In"
[41] "Board" "audited" "appellant" "advised"
[45] "appellant" "register" "seller" "report"
[49] "pay" "sales" "tax" "sales"
[53] "made" "California" "crusades" "The"
[57] "Board" "also" "opined" "appellant"
[61] "sufficient" "nexus" "State" "California"
[65] "require" "appellant" "collect" "report"
[69] "use" "tax" "mail" "order"
[73] "sales" "California" "purchasers" ""
[[866]]
[1] "Based" "Board" "s" "review"
[5] "appellant" "s" "records" "parties"
[9] "stipulated" "appellant" "sold" "use"
[13] "California" "tangible" "personal" "property"
[17] "period" "April" "December" "measured"
[21] "payment" "appellant" "mail" "order"
[25] "sales" "Baton" "Rouge" "Louisiana"
[29] "crusade" "merchandise" "sales" "California"
[33] "App" "These" "figures" "represented"
[37] "sales" "use" "California" "merchandise"
[41] "specific" "religious" "content" "Bibles"
[45] "Bible" "study" "manuals" "printed"
[49] "sermons" "collections" "sermons" "audiocassette"
[53] "tapes" "sermons" "religious" "books"
[57] "pamphlets" "religious" "music" "form"
[61] "songbooks" "tapes" "records" "See"
[65] "App" "Juris" "Statement" "B"
[69] "B" "Based" "sales" "figures"
[73] "appellant" "s" "religious" "materials"
[77] "Board" "notified" "appellant" "owed"
[81] "sales" "use" "taxes" "plus"
[85] "interest" "penalty" "total" "amount"
[89] "due" "App" "Appellant" "contest"
[93] "Board" "s" "assessment" "tax"
[97] "liability" "sale" "use" "certain"
[101] "nonreligious" "merchandise" "including" "items"
[105] "T" "shirts" "JSM" "logo"
[109] "mugs" "bowls" "plates" "replicas"
[113] "crown" "thorns" "ark" "covenant"
[117] "Roman" "coin" "candlesticks" "Bible"
[121] "stand" "pen" "pencil" "sets"
[125] "prints" "religious" "scenes" "bud"
[129] "vase" "communion" "cups" "Id"
[133] ""
[[867]]
[1] "Appellant" "filed" "petition"
[4] "redetermination" "Board" "reiterating"
[7] "view" "tax" "religious"
[10] "materials" "violated" "First"
[13] "Amendment" "Following" "hearing"
[16] "appeal" "Board" "Board"
[19] "deleted" "penalty" "otherwise"
[22] "redetermined" "matter" "without"
[25] "adjustment" "amount" "taxes"
[28] "owing" "plus" "interest"
[31] "Pursuant" "state" "procedural"
[34] "law" "appellant" "paid"
[37] "amount" "filed" "petition"
[40] "redetermination" "refund" "Board"
[43] "See" "Cal" "Rev"
[46] "Tax" "Code" "Ann"
[49] "West" "The" "Board"
[52] "denied" "appellant" "s"
[55] "petition" "appellant" "brought"
[58] "suit" "state" "court"
[61] "seeking" "refund" "tax"
[64] "paid" ""
[[868]]
[1] "The" "trial" "court" "entered"
[5] "judgment" "Board" "ruling" "appellant"
[9] "entitled" "refund" "tax" "The"
[13] "California" "Court" "Appeal" "affirmed"
[17] "Cal" "App" "d" "Cal"
[21] "Rptr" "California" "Supreme" "Court"
[25] "denied" "discretionary" "review" "We"
[29] "noted" "probable" "jurisdiction" "pursuant"
[33] "U" "S" "C" "ed"
[37] "amended" "U" "S" "S"
[41] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[45] "now" "affirm" ""
[[869]]
[1] "" "II" ""
[[870]]
[1] "Appellant" "s" "central" "contention"
[5] "State" "s" "imposition" "sales"
[9] "use" "tax" "liability" "sale"
[13] "religious" "materials" "contravenes" "First"
[17] "Amendment" "s" "command" "made"
[21] "applicable" "States" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[25] "make" "law" "respecting" "establishment"
[29] "religion" "prohibiting" "free" "exercise"
[33] "thereof" "Appellant" "challenges" "Sales"
[37] "Use" "Tax" "Law" "Free"
[41] "Exercise" "Establishment" "Clauses" ""
[[871]]
[1] "A" ""
[[872]]
[1] "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[4] "Clause" "noted" "withdraws"
[7] "legislative" "power" "state"
[10] "federal" "exertion" "restraint"
[13] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[16] "Its" "purpose" "secure"
[19] "religious" "liberty" "individual"
[22] "prohibiting" "invasions" "thereof"
[25] "civil" "authority" "Abington"
[28] "School" "Dist" "v"
[31] "Schempp" "U" "S"
[34] "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "d" "Indeed"
[40] "regulation" "neutral" "face"
[43] "may" "application" "nonetheless"
[46] "offend" "constitutional" "requirement"
[49] "governmental" "neutrality" "unduly"
[52] "burdens" "free" "exercise"
[55] "religion" "Wisconsin" "v"
[58] "Yoder" "U" "S"
[61] "S" "Ct" "L"
[64] "Ed" "d" "Our"
[67] "cases" "established" "t"
[70] "free" "exercise" "inquiry"
[73] "asks" "whether" "government"
[76] "placed" "substantial" "burden"
[79] "observation" "central" "religious"
[82] "belief" "practice" "whether"
[85] "compelling" "governmental" "interest"
[88] "justifies" "burden" "Hernandez"
[91] "v" "Commissioner" "U"
[94] "S" "S" "Ct"
[97] "L" "Ed" "d"
[100] "citations" "omitted" ""
[[873]]
[1] "Appellant" "relies" "almost" "exclusively"
[5] "decisions" "Murdock" "v" "Pennsylvania"
[9] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[13] "L" "Ed" "Follett" "v"
[17] "McCormick" "U" "S" "S"
[21] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "proposition"
[25] "State" "may" "impose" "sales"
[29] "use" "tax" "evangelical" "distribution"
[33] "religious" "material" "religious" "organization"
[37] "Appellant" "contends" "State" "s"
[41] "imposition" "use" "sales" "tax"
[45] "liability" "burdens" "evangelical" "distribution"
[49] "religious" "materials" "manner" "identical"
[53] "manner" "evangelists" "Murdock" "Follett"
[57] "burdened" ""
[[874]]
[1] "We" "reject" "appellant"
[4] "s" "expansive" "reading"
[7] "Murdock" "Follett" "contrary"
[10] "decisions" "In" "Murdock"
[13] "considered" "constitutionality" "city"
[16] "ordinance" "requiring" "persons"
[19] "canvassing" "soliciting" "within"
[22] "city" "procure" "license"
[25] "paying" "flat" "fee"
[28] "Reversing" "convictions" "Jehovah"
[31] "s" "Witnesses" "convicted"
[34] "ordinance" "soliciting" "distributing"
[37] "religious" "literature" "without"
[40] "license" "explained" ""
[[875]]
[1] "" "The" "hand" "distribution"
[5] "religious" "tracts" "age" "old"
[9] "form" "missionary" "evangelism" "potent"
[13] "force" "various" "religious" "movements"
[17] "years" "This" "form" "evangelism"
[21] "utilized" "today" "large" "scale"
[25] "various" "religious" "sects" "whose"
[29] "colporteurs" "carry" "Gospel" "thousands"
[33] "upon" "thousands" "homes" "seek"
[37] "personal" "visitations" "win" "adherents"
[41] "faith" "It" "preaching" "distribution"
[45] "religious" "literature" "It" "combination"
[49] "Its" "purpose" "evangelical" "revival"
[53] "meeting" "This" "form" "religious"
[57] "activity" "occupies" "high" "estate"
[61] "First" "Amendment" "worship" "churches"
[65] "preaching" "pulpits" "U" "S"
[69] "S" "Ct" "footnotes" "omitted"
[73] ""
[[876]]
[1] "Accordingly" "held" "spreading"
[4] "one" "s" "religious"
[7] "beliefs" "preaching" "Gospel"
[10] "distribution" "religious" "literature"
[13] "personal" "visitations" "age"
[16] "old" "type" "evangelism"
[19] "high" "claim" "constitutional"
[22] "protection" "orthodox" "types"
[25] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[28] "see" "also" "Jones"
[31] "v" "Opelika" "U"
[34] "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "L" "Ed" "Martin"
[40] "v" "Struthers" "U"
[43] "S" "S" "Ct"
[46] "L" "Ed" ""
[[877]]
[1] "We" "extended" "Murdock" "following"
[5] "Term" "invalidating" "applied" "one"
[9] "earns" "livelihood" "evangelist" "preacher"
[13] "home" "town" "ordinance" "similar"
[17] "involved" "Murdock" "required" "booksellers"
[21] "pay" "flat" "fee" "procure"
[25] "license" "sell" "books" "Follett"
[29] "v" "McCormick" "U" "S"
[33] "S" "Ct" "Reaffirming" "observation"
[37] "Murdock" "power" "tax" "exercise"
[41] "privilege" "power" "control" "suppress"
[45] "enjoyment" "U" "S" "S"
[49] "Ct" "quoting" "Murdock" "supra"
[53] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[57] "reasoned" "t" "protection" "First"
[61] "Amendment" "restricted" "orthodox" "religious"
[65] "practices" "expression" "orthodox" "economic"
[69] "views" "He" "makes" "profession"
[73] "evangelism" "less" "preferred" "position"
[77] "casual" "worker" "U" "S"
[81] "S" "Ct" ""
[[878]]
[1] "Our" "decisions" "cases" "however" "resulted"
[6] "particular" "nature" "challenged" "taxes" "flat"
[11] "license" "taxes" "operated" "prior" "restraint"
[16] "exercise" "religious" "liberty" "In" "Murdock"
[21] "instance" "emphasized" "tax" "issue" "license"
[26] "tax" "flat" "tax" "imposed" "exercise"
[31] "privilege" "granted" "Bill" "Rights" "U"
[36] "S" "S" "Ct" "cautioned" "w"
[41] "e" "mean" "say" "religious" "groups"
[46] "press" "free" "financial" "burdens" "government"
[51] "We" "something" "quite" "different" "example"
[56] "tax" "income" "one" "engages" "religious"
[61] "activities" "tax" "property" "used" "employed"
[66] "connection" "activities" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[71] "citing" "Grosjean" "v" "American" "Press"
[76] "Co" "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[81] "L" "Ed" "see" "also" "U"
[86] "S" "S" "Ct" "This" "tax"
[91] "charge" "enjoyment" "privilege" "benefit" "bestowed"
[96] "state" "In" "Follett" "reiterated" "preacher"
[101] "free" "financial" "burdens" "government" "including"
[106] "taxes" "income" "property" "like" "citizens"
[111] "may" "subject" "general" "taxation" "U"
[116] "S" "S" "Ct" "emphasis" "added"
[121] ""
[[879]]
[1] "Significantly" "noted" "cases"
[4] "primary" "vice" "ordinances"
[7] "issue" "operated" "prior"
[10] "restraints" "constitutionally" "protected"
[13] "conduct" ""
[[880]]
[1] "" "In" "cases"
[4] "license" "taxes" "invalidated"
[7] "issuance" "permit" "license"
[10] "dependent" "payment" "license"
[13] "tax" "And" "license"
[16] "tax" "fixed" "amount"
[19] "unrelated" "scope" "activities"
[22] "petitioners" "realized" "revenues"
[25] "It" "nominal" "fee"
[28] "imposed" "regulatory" "measure"
[31] "defray" "expenses" "policing"
[34] "activities" "question" "It"
[37] "way" "apportioned" "It"
[40] "flat" "license" "tax"
[43] "levied" "collected" "condition"
[46] "pursuit" "activities" "whose"
[49] "enjoyment" "guaranteed" "First"
[52] "Amendment" "Accordingly" "restrains"
[55] "advance" "constitutional" "liberties"
[58] "press" "religion" "inevitably"
[61] "tends" "suppress" "exercise"
[64] "That" "almost" "uniformly"
[67] "recognized" "inherent" "vice"
[70] "evil" "flat" "license"
[73] "tax" "Murdock" "supra"
[76] "U" "S" "S"
[79] "Ct" "emphasis" "added"
[82] ""
[[881]]
[1] "See" "also" "Follett"
[4] "supra" "U" "S"
[7] "S" "Ct" "The"
[10] "exaction" "tax" "condition"
[13] "exercise" "great" "liberties"
[16] "guaranteed" "First" "Amendment"
[19] "obnoxious" "imposition" "censorship"
[22] "previous" "restraint" "citations"
[25] "omitted" "Thus" "although"
[28] "Murdock" "Follett" "establish"
[31] "appellant" "s" "form"
[34] "religious" "exercise" "high"
[37] "claim" "constitutional" "protection"
[40] "orthodox" "types" "Murdock"
[43] "supra" "U" "S"
[46] "S" "Ct" "cases"
[49] "help" "appellant" "Our"
[52] "concern" "Murdock" "Follett"
[55] "flat" "license" "tax"
[58] "act" "precondition" "free"
[61] "exercise" "religious" "beliefs"
[64] "simply" "present" "tax"
[67] "applies" "sales" "uses"
[70] "tangible" "personal" "property"
[73] "State" ""
[[882]]
[1] "Our" "reading" "Murdock" "Follett"
[5] "confirmed" "decision" "Minneapolis" "Star"
[9] "Tribune" "Co" "v" "Minnesota"
[13] "Commissioner" "Revenue" "U" "S"
[17] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[21] "d" "considered" "newspaper" "s"
[25] "First" "Amendment" "challenge" "state"
[29] "use" "tax" "ink" "paper"
[33] "products" "used" "production" "periodic"
[37] "publications" "In" "course" "striking"
[41] "tax" "rejected" "newspaper" "s"
[45] "suggestion" "premised" "Murdock" "Follett"
[49] "generally" "applicable" "sales" "tax"
[53] "applied" "publications" "Construing" "cases"
[57] "involving" "flat" "tax" "unrelated"
[61] "receipts" "income" "speaker" "expenses"
[65] "administering" "valid" "regulatory" "scheme"
[69] "condition" "right" "speak" "U"
[73] "S" "n" "S" "Ct"
[77] "n" "emphasis" "original" "noted"
[81] ""
[[883]]
[1] "" "By" "imposing"
[4] "tax" "condition" "engaging"
[7] "protected" "activity" "defendants"
[10] "cases" "imposed" "form"
[13] "prior" "restraint" "speech"
[16] "rendering" "tax" "highly"
[19] "susceptible" "constitutional" "challenge"
[22] "In" "regard" "cases"
[25] "cited" "Star" "Tribune"
[28] "resemble" "generally" "applicable"
[31] "sales" "tax" "Indeed"
[34] "cases" "consistently" "recognized"
[37] "nondiscriminatory" "taxes" "receipts"
[40] "income" "newspapers" "permissible"
[43] "Ibid" "citations" "omitted"
[46] ""
[[884]]
[1] "Accord" "Arkansas" "Writers"
[4] "Project" "Inc" "v"
[7] "Ragland" "U" "S"
[10] "S" "Ct" "L"
[13] "Ed" "d" "A"
[16] "genuinely" "nondiscriminatory" "tax"
[19] "receipts" "newspapers" "constitutionally"
[22] "permissible" ""
[[885]]
[1] "We" "also" "note" "just"
[5] "last" "Term" "plurality" "Court"
[9] "rejected" "precise" "argument" "appellant"
[13] "now" "makes" "In" "Texas"
[17] "Monthly" "Inc" "v" "Bullock"
[21] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[25] "L" "Ed" "d" "Justice"
[29] "BRENNAN" "writing" "three" "Justices"
[33] "held" "state" "sales" "tax"
[37] "exemption" "religious" "publications" "violated"
[41] "Establishment" "Clause" "Id" "S"
[45] "Ct" "plurality" "opinion" "In"
[49] "concluding" "plurality" "held" "Free"
[53] "Exercise" "Clause" "prevent" "State"
[57] "withdrawing" "exemption" "noting" "t"
[61] "o" "extent" "opinions" "Murdock"
[65] "Follett" "might" "read" "suggest"
[69] "States" "Federal" "Government" "may"
[73] "never" "tax" "sale" "religious"
[77] "publications" "reject" "dicta" "Id"
[81] "S" "Ct" "Justice" "WHITE"
[85] "concurring" "judgment" "concluded" "exemption"
[89] "violated" "Free" "Press" "Clause"
[93] "content" "publication" "determined" "tax"
[97] "exempt" "status" "Id" "S"
[101] "Ct" "Justice" "BLACKMUN" "joined"
[105] "Justice" "O" "CONNOR" "concurred"
[109] "plurality" "s" "holding" "tax"
[113] "exemption" "issue" "case" "contravened"
[117] "Establishment" "Clause" "reserved" "question"
[121] "whether" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[125] "requires" "tax" "exemption" "sale"
[129] "religious" "literature" "religious" "organization"
[133] "words" "defining" "ultimate" "scope"
[137] "Follett" "Murdock" "may" "left"
[141] "another" "day" "Id" "S"
[145] "Ct" "In" "case" "course"
[149] "California" "chosen" "create" "tax"
[153] "exemption" "religious" "materials" "therefore"
[157] "need" "revisit" "Establishment" "Clause"
[161] "question" "presented" "Texas" "Monthly"
[165] ""
[[886]]
[1] "" "We" "however" "decide"
[5] "free" "exercise" "question" "left"
[9] "open" "Justice" "BLACKMUN" "s"
[13] "concurrence" "Texas" "Monthly" "limiting"
[17] "Murdock" "Follett" "apply" "flat"
[21] "license" "tax" "operates" "prior"
[25] "restraint" "free" "exercise" "religious"
[29] "beliefs" "As" "Murdock" "Follett"
[33] "plainly" "support" "appellant" "s"
[37] "free" "exercise" "claim" "California"
[41] "s" "generally" "applicable" "sales"
[45] "use" "tax" "flat" "tax"
[49] "represents" "small" "fraction" "retail"
[53] "sale" "applies" "neutrally" "retail"
[57] "sales" "tangible" "personal" "property"
[61] "made" "California" "California" "imposes"
[65] "sales" "use" "tax" "even"
[69] "seller" "purchaser" "charitable" "religious"
[73] "nonprofit" "state" "local" "governmental"
[77] "nature" "See" "Union" "League"
[81] "Club" "v" "Johnson" "Cal"
[85] "d" "P" "d" "People"
[89] "v" "Imperial" "County" "Cal"
[93] "App" "d" "P" "d"
[97] "Bank" "America" "National" "Trust"
[101] "Savings" "Assn" "v" "State"
[105] "Board" "Equalization" "Cal" "App"
[109] "d" "Cal" "Rptr" "Thus"
[113] "sales" "use" "tax" "tax"
[117] "right" "disseminate" "religious" "information"
[121] "ideas" "beliefs" "per" "se"
[125] "rather" "tax" "privilege" "making"
[129] "retail" "sales" "tangible" "personal"
[133] "property" "storage" "use" "consumption"
[137] "tangible" "personal" "property" "California"
[141] "For" "example" "California" "treats"
[145] "sale" "Bible" "religious" "organization"
[149] "just" "treat" "sale" "Bible"
[153] "bookstore" "long" "state" "retail"
[157] "sales" "tangible" "personal" "property"
[161] "subject" "tax" "regardless" "motivation"
[165] "sale" "purchase" "There" "danger"
[169] "appellant" "s" "religious" "activity"
[173] "singled" "special" "burdensome" "treatment"
[177] ""
[[887]]
[1] "" "Moreover" "concern"
[4] "Murdock" "Follett" "flat"
[7] "license" "taxes" "operate"
[10] "precondition" "exercise" "evangelistic"
[13] "activity" "present" "case"
[16] "registration" "requirement" "see"
[19] "Cal" "Rev" "Tax"
[22] "Code" "Ann" "West"
[25] "Supp" "tax" "act"
[28] "prior" "restraints" "fee"
[31] "charged" "registering" "tax"
[34] "due" "regardless" "preregistration"
[37] "tax" "imposed" "precondition"
[40] "disseminating" "message" "Thus"
[43] "unlike" "license" "tax"
[46] "Murdock" "way" "apportioned"
[49] "realized" "revenues" "itinerant"
[52] "preachers" "forced" "pay"
[55] "tax" "U" "S"
[58] "S" "Ct" "see"
[61] "also" "Texas" "Monthly"
[64] "supra" "U" "S"
[67] "S" "Ct" "tax"
[70] "issue" "case" "akin"
[73] "generally" "applicable" "income"
[76] "property" "tax" "Murdock"
[79] "Follett" "specifically" "state"
[82] "may" "constitutionally" "imposed"
[85] "religious" "activity" ""
[[888]]
[1] "" "In" "addition" "appellant"
[5] "s" "misplaced" "reliance" "Murdock"
[9] "Follett" "appellant" "s" "free"
[13] "exercise" "claim" "also" "significant"
[17] "tension" "Court" "s" "decision"
[21] "last" "Term" "Hernandez" "v"
[25] "Commissioner" "U" "S" "S"
[29] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[33] "holding" "Government" "s" "disallowance"
[37] "tax" "deduction" "religious" "auditing"
[41] "training" "services" "violate" "Free"
[45] "Exercise" "Clause" "Id" "S"
[49] "Ct" "The" "Court" "reasoned"
[53] ""
[[889]]
[1] "" "ny" "burden" "imposed"
[5] "auditing" "training" "derives" "solely"
[9] "fact" "result" "deduction" "denial"
[13] "adherents" "less" "money" "gain"
[17] "access" "sessions" "This" "burden"
[21] "different" "imposed" "public" "tax"
[25] "fee" "indeed" "burden" "imposed"
[29] "denial" "contribution" "gift" "deduction"
[33] "seem" "pale" "comparison" "overall"
[37] "federal" "income" "tax" "burden"
[41] "adherent" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[45] ""
[[890]]
[1] "There" "evidence" "case"
[4] "collection" "payment" "tax"
[7] "violates" "appellant" "s"
[10] "sincere" "religious" "beliefs"
[13] "California" "s" "nondiscriminatory"
[16] "Sales" "Use" "Tax"
[19] "Law" "requires" "appellant"
[22] "collect" "tax" "California"
[25] "purchasers" "remit" "tax"
[28] "money" "State" "The"
[31] "burden" "appellant" "claimed"
[34] "reduction" "income" "resulting"
[37] "presumably" "lower" "demand"
[40] "appellant" "s" "wares"
[43] "caused" "marginally" "higher"
[46] "price" "costs" "associated"
[49] "administering" "tax" "As"
[52] "Court" "made" "clear"
[55] "Hernandez" "however" "extent"
[58] "imposition" "generally" "applicable"
[61] "tax" "merely" "decreases"
[64] "amount" "money" "appellant"
[67] "spend" "religious" "activities"
[70] "burden" "constitutionally" "significant"
[73] "See" "ibid" "Texas"
[76] "Monthly" "supra" "U"
[79] "S" "S" "Ct"
[82] "plurality" "opinion" "see"
[85] "also" "Bob" "Jones"
[88] "University" "v" "United"
[91] "States" "U" "S"
[94] "S" "Ct" "L"
[97] "Ed" "d" ""
[[891]]
[1] "Appellant" "contends" "availability"
[4] "deduction" "issue" "Hernandez"
[7] "imposition" "tax" "issue"
[10] "distinguishable" "cases" "adherents"
[13] "base" "claim" "exemption"
[16] "argument" "incrementally" "larger"
[19] "tax" "burden" "interferes"
[22] "religious" "activities" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct"
[28] "It" "precisely" "argument"
[31] "rather" "one" "applicable"
[34] "deductions" "Court" "rejected"
[37] "Hernandez" "At" "bottom"
[40] "though" "doubt" "economic"
[43] "cost" "appellant" "complying"
[46] "generally" "applicable" "sales"
[49] "use" "tax" "tax"
[52] "different" "generally" "applicable"
[55] "laws" "regulations" "health"
[58] "safety" "regulations" "appellant"
[61] "must" "adhere" ""
[[892]]
[1] "Finally" "appellant" "s" "religious"
[5] "beliefs" "forbid" "payment" "sales"
[9] "use" "tax" "appellant" "s"
[13] "reliance" "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[17] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[21] "L" "Ed" "d" "progeny"
[25] "misplaced" "sense" "State" "condition"
[29] "ed" "receipt" "important" "benefit"
[33] "upon" "conduct" "proscribed" "religious"
[37] "faith" "denie" "d" "benefit"
[41] "conduct" "mandated" "religious" "belief"
[45] "thereby" "putting" "substantial" "pressure"
[49] "adherent" "modify" "behavior" "violate"
[53] "beliefs" "Hobbie" "v" "Unemployment"
[57] "Appeals" "Comm" "n" "Florida"
[61] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[65] "L" "Ed" "d" "quoting"
[69] "Thomas" "v" "Review" "Bd"
[73] "Indiana" "Employment" "Security" "Div"
[77] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[81] "L" "Ed" "d" "Appellant"
[85] "never" "alleged" "mere" "act"
[89] "paying" "tax" "violates" "sincere"
[93] "religious" "beliefs" ""
[[893]]
[1] "We" "therefore" "conclude"
[4] "collection" "payment" "generally"
[7] "applicable" "tax" "case"
[10] "imposes" "constitutionally" "significant"
[13] "burden" "appellant" "s"
[16] "religious" "practices" "beliefs"
[19] "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[22] "Clause" "accordingly" "require"
[25] "State" "grant" "appellant"
[28] "exemption" "generally" "applicable"
[31] "sales" "use" "tax"
[34] "Although" "course" "possible"
[37] "imagine" "onerous" "tax"
[40] "rate" "even" "generally"
[43] "applicable" "might" "effectively"
[46] "choke" "adherent" "s"
[49] "religious" "practices" "cf"
[52] "Murdock" "supra" "U"
[55] "S" "S" "Ct"
[58] "burden" "flat" "tax"
[61] "render" "itinerant" "evangelism"
[64] "crushed" "closed" "sheer"
[67] "weight" "toll" "tribute"
[70] "exacted" "town" "town"
[73] "face" "situation" "case"
[76] "Accordingly" "intimate" "views"
[79] "whether" "generally" "applicable"
[82] "tax" "might" "violate"
[85] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[88] ""
[[894]]
[1] "B" ""
[[895]]
[1] "" "Appellant" "also"
[4] "contends" "application" "sales"
[7] "use" "tax" "sale"
[10] "religious" "materials" "violates"
[13] "Establishment" "Clause" "fosters"
[16] "excessive" "government" "entanglement"
[19] "religion" "Lemon" "v"
[22] "Kurtzman" "U" "S"
[25] "S" "Ct" "L"
[28] "Ed" "d" "quoting"
[31] "Walz" "v" "Tax"
[34] "Comm" "n" "New"
[37] "York" "City" "U"
[40] "S" "S" "Ct"
[43] "L" "Ed" "d"
[46] "Appellant" "alleges" "example"
[49] "present" "controversy" "featured"
[52] "site" "inspections" "appellant"
[55] "s" "evangelistic" "crusades"
[58] "lengthy" "site" "audits"
[61] "examinations" "appellant" "s"
[64] "books" "records" "threats"
[67] "criminal" "prosecution" "layers"
[70] "administrative" "judicial" "proceedings"
[73] ""
[[896]]
[1] "" "The" "Establishment"
[4] "Clause" "prohibits" "sponsorship"
[7] "financial" "support" "active"
[10] "involvement" "sovereign" "religious"
[13] "activity" "Walz" "supra"
[16] "S" "Ct" "The"
[19] "excessive" "entanglement" "prong"
[22] "tripartite" "purpose" "effect"
[25] "entanglement" "Lemon" "test"
[28] "see" "Lemon" "U"
[31] "S" "S" "Ct"
[34] "requires" "examination" "character"
[37] "purposes" "institutions" "benefited"
[40] "nature" "aid" "State"
[43] "provides" "resulting" "relationship"
[46] "government" "religious" "authority"
[49] "id" "S" "Ct"
[52] "see" "also" "Walz"
[55] "U" "S" "S"
[58] "Ct" "separate" "opinion"
[61] "Harlan" "J" "warning"
[64] "programs" "whose" "nature"
[67] "apt" "entangle" "state"
[70] "details" "administration" "Indeed"
[73] "Walz" "held" "tax"
[76] "exemption" "religious" "organizations"
[79] "religious" "properties" "used"
[82] "solely" "religious" "worship"
[85] "part" "general" "exemption"
[88] "nonprofit" "institutions" "id"
[91] "S" "Ct" "violate"
[94] "Establishment" "Clause" "In"
[97] "upholding" "tax" "exemption"
[100] "specifically" "noted" "taxation"
[103] "religious" "properties" "cause"
[106] "least" "much" "administrative"
[109] "entanglement" "government" "religious"
[112] "authorities" "exemption" ""
[[897]]
[1] "" "Either" "course"
[4] "taxation" "churches" "exemption"
[7] "occasions" "degree" "involvement"
[10] "religion" "Elimination" "exemption"
[13] "tend" "expand" "involvement"
[16] "government" "giving" "rise"
[19] "tax" "valuation" "church"
[22] "property" "tax" "liens"
[25] "tax" "foreclosures" "direct"
[28] "confrontations" "conflicts" "follow"
[31] "train" "legal" "processes"
[34] ""
[[898]]
[1] "" "Granting" "tax" "exemptions"
[5] "churches" "necessarily" "operates" "afford"
[9] "indirect" "economic" "benefit" "also"
[13] "gives" "rise" "yet" "lesser"
[17] "involvement" "taxing" "In" "analyzing"
[21] "either" "alternative" "questions" "whether"
[25] "involvement" "excessive" "whether" "continuing"
[29] "one" "calling" "official" "continuing"
[33] "surveillance" "leading" "impermissible" "degree"
[37] "entanglement" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[41] ""
[[899]]
[1] "" "The" "issue" "presented"
[5] "therefore" "whether" "imposition" "sales"
[9] "use" "tax" "liability" "case"
[13] "appellant" "results" "excessive" "involvement"
[17] "appellant" "State" "continuing" "surveillance"
[21] "leading" "impermissible" "degree" "entanglement"
[25] ""
[[900]]
[1] "At" "outset" "undeniable"
[4] "generally" "applicable" "tax"
[7] "secular" "purpose" "neither"
[10] "advances" "inhibits" "religion"
[13] "essence" "tax" "neutral"
[16] "nondiscriminatory" "questions" "religious"
[19] "belief" "Thus" "whatever"
[22] "precise" "contours" "Establishment"
[25] "Clause" "see" "County"
[28] "Allegheny" "v" "American"
[31] "Civil" "Liberties" "Union"
[34] "Pittsburgh" "U" "S"
[37] "S" "Ct" "L"
[40] "Ed" "d" "tracing"
[43] "evolution" "Establishment" "Clause"
[46] "doctrine" "cf" "Bowen"
[49] "v" "Kendrick" "U"
[52] "S" "S" "Ct"
[55] "L" "Ed" "d"
[58] "applying" "noting" "criticism"
[61] "entanglement" "prong" "Lemon"
[64] "test" "undisputed" "core"
[67] "values" "even" "remotely"
[70] "called" "question" "generally"
[73] "applicable" "tax" "case"
[76] ""
[[901]]
[1] "Even" "applying" "excessive"
[4] "entanglement" "prong" "Lemon"
[7] "test" "however" "hold"
[10] "California" "s" "imposition"
[13] "sales" "use" "tax"
[16] "liability" "appellant" "threatens"
[19] "excessive" "entanglement" "church"
[22] "state" "First" "note"
[25] "evidence" "administrative" "entanglement"
[28] "case" "thin" "Appellant"
[31] "alleges" "collection" "payment"
[34] "sales" "use" "tax"
[37] "impose" "severe" "accounting"
[40] "burdens" "The" "Court"
[43] "Appeal" "however" "expressly"
[46] "found" "record" "support"
[49] "appellant" "s" "factual"
[52] "assertions" "noting" "appellant"
[55] "sophisticated" "accounting" "staff"
[58] "recently" "computerized" "accounting"
[61] "appellant" "books" "purposes"
[64] "obtaining" "federal" "income"
[67] "tax" "exemption" "segregated"
[70] "retail" "sales" "donations"
[73] "Cal" "App" "d"
[76] "Cal" "Rptr" ""
[[902]]
[1] "Second" "even" "assuming"
[4] "tax" "imposes" "substantial"
[7] "administrative" "burdens" "appellant"
[10] "administrative" "recordkeeping" "burdens"
[13] "rise" "constitutionally" "significant"
[16] "level" "Collection" "payment"
[19] "tax" "will" "course"
[22] "require" "contact" "appellant"
[25] "State" "held" "generally"
[28] "applicable" "administrative" "recordkeeping"
[31] "regulations" "may" "imposed"
[34] "religious" "organization" "without"
[37] "running" "afoul" "Establishment"
[40] "Clause" "See" "Hernandez"
[43] "U" "S" "S"
[46] "Ct" "R" "outine"
[49] "regulatory" "interaction" "application"
[52] "neutral" "tax" "laws"
[55] "involves" "inquiries" "religious"
[58] "doctrine" "delegation" "state"
[61] "power" "religious" "body"
[64] "detailed" "monitoring" "close"
[67] "administrative" "contact" "secular"
[70] "religious" "bodies" "violate"
[73] "nonentanglement" "command" "Tony"
[76] "Susan" "Alamo" "Foundation"
[79] "v" "Secretary" "Labor"
[82] "U" "S" "S"
[85] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[88] "d" "The" "Establishment"
[91] "Clause" "exempt" "religious"
[94] "organizations" "secular" "governmental"
[97] "activity" "fire" "inspections"
[100] "building" "zoning" "regulations"
[103] "Lemon" "supra" "U"
[106] "S" "S" "Ct"
[109] "recordkeeping" "requirements" "Fair"
[112] "Labor" "Standards" "Act"
[115] "perhaps" "burdensome" "terms"
[118] "paperwork" "significantly" "intrusive"
[121] "religious" "affairs" "To"
[124] "sure" "noted" "Tony"
[127] "Susan" "Alamo" "Foundation"
[130] "recordkeeping" "requirements" "issue"
[133] "case" "appl" "ied"
[136] "commercial" "activities" "undertaken"
[139] "business" "purpose" "therefore"
[142] "impact" "petitioners" "evangelical"
[145] "activities" "U" "S"
[148] "S" "Ct" "recognition"
[151] "bear" "whether" "generally"
[154] "applicable" "regulation" "nevertheless"
[157] "kind" "government" "surveillance"
[160] "Court" "previously" "held"
[163] "pose" "intolerable" "risk"
[166] "government" "entanglement" "religion"
[169] "ibid" ""
[[903]]
[1] "The" "fact" "appellant"
[4] "must" "bear" "cost"
[7] "collecting" "remitting" "generally"
[10] "applicable" "sales" "use"
[13] "tax" "even" "financial"
[16] "burden" "costs" "may"
[19] "vary" "religion" "religion"
[22] "enmesh" "government" "religious"
[25] "affairs" "Contrary" "appellant"
[28] "s" "contentions" "statutory"
[31] "scheme" "requires" "neither"
[34] "involvement" "state" "employees"
[37] "site" "continuing" "inspection"
[40] "appellant" "s" "day"
[43] "day" "operations" "There"
[46] "official" "continuing" "surveillance"
[49] "Walz" "supra" "U"
[52] "S" "S" "Ct"
[55] "government" "auditors" "The"
[58] "sorts" "government" "entanglement"
[61] "found" "violate" "Establishment"
[64] "Clause" "far" "invasive"
[67] "level" "contact" "created"
[70] "administration" "neutral" "tax"
[73] "laws" "Cf" "Aguilar"
[76] "v" "Felton" "U"
[79] "S" "S" "Ct"
[82] "L" "Ed" "d"
[85] "Larkin" "v" "Grendel"
[88] "s" "Den" "Inc"
[91] "U" "S" "S"
[94] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[97] "d" ""
[[904]]
[1] "Most" "significantly" "imposition" "sales"
[5] "use" "tax" "without" "exemption"
[9] "appellant" "require" "State" "inquire"
[13] "religious" "content" "items" "sold"
[17] "religious" "motivation" "selling" "purchasing"
[21] "items" "materials" "subject" "tax"
[25] "regardless" "content" "motive" "From"
[29] "State" "s" "point" "view"
[33] "critical" "question" "whether" "materials"
[37] "religious" "whether" "sale" "use"
[41] "question" "involves" "secular" "determination"
[45] "Thus" "case" "stands" "firmer"
[49] "ground" "Hernandez" "appellant" "offers"
[53] "items" "stated" "price" "thereby"
[57] "relieving" "State" "need" "place"
[61] "monetary" "value" "appellant" "s"
[65] "religious" "items" "Compare" "Hernandez"
[69] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[73] "comparable" "good" "service" "sold"
[77] "marketplace" "Internal" "Revenue" "Service"
[81] "looks" "cost" "providing" "good"
[85] "service" "id" "S" "Ct"
[89] "O" "CONNOR" "J" "dissenting"
[93] "It" "becomes" "impossible" "compute"
[97] "contribution" "portion" "payment" "charity"
[101] "received" "return" "merely" "intangible"
[105] "intangible" "matter" "tangible" "bought"
[109] "sold" "except" "donative" "contexts"
[113] "Although" "appellant" "asserts" "donations"
[117] "often" "accompany" "payments" "made"
[121] "religious" "items" "items" "sometimes"
[125] "given" "away" "without" "payment"
[129] "nominal" "payment" "plain" "first"
[133] "case" "appellant" "s" "use"
[137] "order" "forms" "price" "lists"
[141] "renders" "illusory" "difficulty" "separating"
[145] "two" "portions" "second" "case"
[149] "question" "whether" "particular" "transfer"
[153] "constitutes" "sale" "Ironically" "appellant"
[157] "s" "theory" "government" "may"
[161] "tax" "religious" "core" "activities"
[165] "may" "tax" "nonreligious" "activities"
[169] "require" "government" "precisely" "appellant"
[173] "asserts" "Religion" "Clauses" "prohibit"
[177] "determine" "expenditures" "religious" "secular"
[181] "Lemon" "U" "S" "S"
[185] "Ct" ""
[[905]]
[1] "Accordingly" "find" "excessive" "entanglement"
[5] "government" "religion" "case" "hold"
[9] "imposition" "sales" "use" "tax"
[13] "liability" "appellant" "violate" "Establishment"
[17] "Clause" ""
[[906]]
[1] "III" ""
[[907]]
[1] "" "Appellant" "also" "contends"
[5] "State" "s" "imposition" "use"
[9] "tax" "liability" "violates" "Commerce"
[13] "Due" "Process" "Clauses" "state"
[17] "distributor" "insufficient" "nexus" "State"
[21] "See" "National" "Geographic" "Society"
[25] "v" "California" "Bd" "Equalization"
[29] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[33] "L" "Ed" "d" "National"
[37] "Bellas" "Hess" "Inc" "v"
[41] "Department" "Revenue" "Ill" "U"
[45] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[49] "Ed" "d" "We" "decline"
[53] "reach" "merits" "claim" "however"
[57] "courts" "ruled" "claim" "procedurally"
[61] "barred" ""
[[908]]
[1] "California" "law" "provides"
[4] "administrative" "claim" "tax"
[7] "refund" "shall" "state"
[10] "specific" "grounds" "upon"
[13] "claim" "founded" "Cal"
[16] "Rev" "Tax" "Code"
[19] "Ann" "West" "Supp"
[22] "refund" "suits" "will"
[25] "entertained" "claim" "refund"
[28] "credit" "duly" "filed"
[31] "Board" "Suit" "may"
[34] "thereafter" "brought" "grounds"
[37] "set" "forth" "claim"
[40] "Thus" "state" "law"
[43] "t" "claim" "refund"
[46] "delineates" "restricts" "issues"
[49] "considered" "taxpayer" "s"
[52] "refund" "action" "The"
[55] "trial" "court" "appellate"
[58] "court" "without" "jurisdiction"
[61] "consider" "grounds" "set"
[64] "forth" "claim" "Atari"
[67] "Inc" "v" "State"
[70] "Board" "Equalization" "Cal"
[73] "App" "d" "Cal"
[76] "Rptr" "citations" "omitted"
[79] "This" "rule" "serves"
[82] "legitimate" "state" "interest"
[85] "requiring" "parties" "exhaust"
[88] "administrative" "remedies" "proceeding"
[91] "court" "s" "uch"
[94] "rule" "prevents" "overworked"
[97] "court" "consider" "issues"
[100] "remedies" "available" "administrative"
[103] "channels" "Id" "Cal"
[106] "Rptr" ""
[[909]]
[1] "" "The" "record"
[4] "case" "makes" "clear"
[7] "appellant" "refund" "claim"
[10] "Board" "failed" "even"
[13] "cite" "Commerce" "Clause"
[16] "Due" "Process" "Clause"
[19] "much" "less" "articulate"
[22] "legal" "arguments" "contesting"
[25] "nexus" "issue" "See"
[28] "App" "incorporating" "petition"
[31] "redetermination" "turn" "raised"
[34] "First" "Amendment" "arguments"
[37] "see" "id" "The"
[40] "Board" "s" "hearing"
[43] "officer" "specifically" "noted"
[46] "forwarding" "decision" "Board"
[49] "appellant" "s" "c"
[52] "ounsel" "argue" "nexus"
[55] "id" "indeed" "parties"
[58] "stipulated" "trial" "court"
[61] "appellant" "s" "request"
[64] "refund" "based" "First"
[67] "Amendment" "claim" "id"
[70] "Accordingly" "trial" "court"
[73] "Court" "Appeal" "declined"
[76] "rule" "nexus" "issue"
[79] "ground" "appellant" "failed"
[82] "raise" "refund" "claim"
[85] "Board" "Cal" "App"
[88] "d" "Cal" "Rptr"
[91] "App" "This" "unambiguous"
[94] "application" "state" "procedural"
[97] "law" "makes" "unnecessary"
[100] "us" "review" "asserted"
[103] "claim" "See" "Michigan"
[106] "v" "Long" "U"
[109] "S" "S" "Ct"
[112] "L" "Ed" "d"
[115] "Michigan" "v" "Tyler"
[118] "U" "S" "n"
[121] "S" "Ct" "n"
[124] "L" "Ed" "d"
[127] ""
[[910]]
[1] "" "Appellant" "nevertheless"
[4] "urges" "state" "procedural"
[7] "ground" "relied" "upon"
[10] "courts" "inadequate" "procedural"
[13] "rule" "strictly" "regularly"
[16] "followed" "Hathorn" "v"
[19] "Lovorn" "U" "S"
[22] "S" "Ct" "L"
[25] "Ed" "d" "quoting"
[28] "Barr" "v" "City"
[31] "Columbia" "U" "S"
[34] "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "d" "Appellant"
[40] "asserts" "state" "courts"
[43] "California" "retain" "authority"
[46] "hear" "claims" "involving"
[49] "important" "questions" "public"
[52] "policy" "notwithstanding" "parties"
[55] "failure" "raise" "claims"
[58] "administrative" "agency" "See"
[61] "Lindeleaf" "v" "Agricultural"
[64] "Labor" "Relations" "Bd"
[67] "Cal" "d" "Cal"
[70] "Rptr" "P" "d"
[73] "Hale" "v" "Morgan"
[76] "Cal" "d" "Cal"
[79] "Rptr" "P" "d"
[82] "Appellant" "observes" "example"
[85] "although" "Court" "Appeal"
[88] "case" "found" "appellant"
[91] "s" "nexus" "claim"
[94] "procedurally" "barred" "ignored"
[97] "procedural" "bar" "ruled"
[100] "merits" "appellant" "s"
[103] "Ninth" "Tenth" "Amendment"
[106] "arguments" "see" "Cal"
[109] "App" "d" "Cal"
[112] "Rptr" "even" "though"
[115] "arguments" "likewise" "raised"
[118] "appellant" "s" "refund"
[121] "claim" "see" "id"
[124] "n" "Cal" "Rptr"
[127] "n" ""
[[911]]
[1] "The" "Court" "Appeal" "however"
[5] "specifically" "rejected" "appellant" "s"
[9] "claim" "nexus" "issue" "raised"
[13] "important" "questions" "public" "policy"
[17] "noting" "issue" "instead" "raise"
[21] "d" "factual" "questions" "determination"
[25] "matter" "public" "policy" "matter"
[29] "evidence" "Id" "Cal" "Rptr"
[33] "Even" "Court" "Appeal" "erred"
[37] "matter" "state" "law" "declining"
[41] "rule" "appellant" "s" "nexus"
[45] "claim" "appellant" "failed" "substantiate"
[49] "claim" "California" "courts" "general"
[53] "apply" "exception" "irregular" "arbitrary"
[57] "inconsistent" "manner" "Accordingly" "conclude"
[61] "appellant" "s" "Commerce" "Clause"
[65] "Due" "Process" "Clause" "argument"
[69] "properly" "us" "We" "thus"
[73] "express" "opinion" "merits" "claim"
[77] ""
[[912]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "California" "Court" "Appeal"
[6] "affirmed" ""
[[913]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[914]]
[1] "Mr" "Justice" "BLACKMUN" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[915]]
[1] "This" "case" "involves" "dispute"
[5] "ownership" "church" "property" "following"
[9] "schism" "local" "church" "affiliated"
[13] "hierarchical" "church" "organization" "The"
[17] "question" "decision" "whether" "civil"
[21] "courts" "consistent" "First" "Fourteenth"
[25] "Amendments" "Constitution" "may" "resolve"
[29] "dispute" "basis" "neutral" "principles"
[33] "law" "whether" "must" "defer"
[37] "resolution" "authoritative" "tribunal" "hierarchical"
[41] "church" ""
[[916]]
[1] "I" ""
[[917]]
[1] "The" "Vineville" "Presbyterian" "Church"
[5] "Macon" "Ga" "organized" "first"
[9] "incorporated" "Its" "corporate" "charter"
[13] "lapsed" "revived" "renewed" "continues"
[17] "effect" "present" "time" ""
[[918]]
[1] "The" "property" "issue" "church"
[5] "located" "acquired" "three" "transactions"
[9] "evidenced" "conveyances" "Trustees" "Vineville"
[13] "Presbyterian" "Church" "successors" "office"
[17] "App" "simply" "Vineville" "Presbyterian"
[21] "Church" "Id" "The" "funds"
[25] "used" "acquire" "property" "contributed"
[29] "entirely" "local" "church" "members"
[33] "Pursuant" "resolutions" "adopted" "congregation"
[37] "church" "repeatedly" "borrowed" "money"
[41] "property" "This" "indebtedness" "evidenced"
[45] "security" "deeds" "variously" "issued"
[49] "name" "Trustees" "Vineville" "Presbyterian"
[53] "Church" "e" "g" "id"
[57] "simply" "Vineville" "Presbyterian" "Church"
[61] "Id" ""
[[919]]
[1] "In" "year" "organized"
[4] "Vineville" "church" "established"
[7] "member" "church" "Augusta"
[10] "Macon" "Presbytery" "Presbyterian"
[13] "Church" "United" "States"
[16] "PCUS" "The" "PCUS"
[19] "generally" "hierarchical" "connectional"
[22] "form" "government" "contrasted"
[25] "congregational" "form" "Under"
[28] "polity" "PCUS" "government"
[31] "local" "church" "committed"
[34] "Session" "first" "instance"
[37] "actions" "assembly" "court"
[40] "subject" "review" "control"
[43] "higher" "church" "courts"
[46] "Presbytery" "Synod" "General"
[49] "Assembly" "respectively" "The"
[52] "powers" "duties" "level"
[55] "hierarchy" "set" "forth"
[58] "constitution" "PCUS" "Book"
[61] "Church" "Order" "part"
[64] "record" "present" "case"
[67] ""
[[920]]
[1] "On" "May" "congregational"
[4] "meeting" "Vineville" "church"
[7] "attended" "quorum" "duly"
[10] "enrolled" "members" "including"
[13] "pastor" "voted" "separate"
[16] "PCUS" "Ninety" "four"
[19] "members" "opposed" "resolution"
[22] "The" "majority" "immediately"
[25] "informed" "PCUS" "action"
[28] "united" "another" "denomination"
[31] "Presbyterian" "Church" "America"
[34] "Although" "minority" "remained"
[37] "church" "rolls" "three"
[40] "years" "ceased" "participate"
[43] "affairs" "Vineville" "church"
[46] "conducted" "religious" "activities"
[49] "elsewhere" ""
[[921]]
[1] "In" "response" "schism" "within"
[5] "Vineville" "congregation" "Augusta" "Macon"
[9] "Presbytery" "appointed" "commission" "investigate"
[13] "dispute" "possible" "resolve" "The"
[17] "commission" "eventually" "issued" "written"
[21] "ruling" "declaring" "minority" "faction"
[25] "constituted" "true" "congregation" "Vineville"
[29] "Presbyterian" "Church" "withdrawing" "majority"
[33] "faction" "authority" "exercise" "office"
[37] "derived" "PCUS" "App" "The"
[41] "majority" "took" "part" "commission"
[45] "s" "inquiry" "appeal" "ruling"
[49] "higher" "PCUS" "tribunal" ""
[[922]]
[1] "Representatives" "minority" "faction"
[4] "sought" "relief" "federal"
[7] "court" "complaint" "dismissed"
[10] "want" "jurisdiction" "Lucas"
[13] "v" "Hope" "F"
[16] "d" "CA" "cert"
[19] "denied" "U" "S"
[22] "S" "Ct" "L"
[25] "Ed" "d" "They"
[28] "brought" "class" "action"
[31] "state" "court" "seeking"
[34] "declaratory" "injunctive" "orders"
[37] "establishing" "right" "exclusive"
[40] "possession" "use" "Vineville"
[43] "church" "property" "member"
[46] "congregation" "PCUS" "The"
[49] "trial" "court" "purporting"
[52] "apply" "Georgia" "s"
[55] "neutral" "principles" "law"
[58] "approach" "church" "property"
[61] "disputes" "granted" "judgment"
[64] "majority" "The" "Supreme"
[67] "Court" "Georgia" "holding"
[70] "trial" "court" "correctly"
[73] "stated" "applied" "Georgia"
[76] "law" "rejecting" "minority"
[79] "s" "challenge" "based"
[82] "First" "Fourteenth" "Amendments"
[85] "affirmed" "Ga" "S"
[88] "E" "d" "We"
[91] "granted" "certiorari" "U"
[94] "S" "S" "Ct"
[97] "L" "Ed" ""
[[923]]
[1] "II" ""
[[924]]
[1] "Georgia" "s" "approach" "church"
[5] "property" "litigation" "evolved" "response"
[9] "Presbyterian" "Church" "v" "Hull"
[13] "Church" "U" "S" "S"
[17] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[21] "Presbyterian" "Church" "I" "rev"
[25] "g" "Presbyterian" "Church" "v"
[29] "Eastern" "Heights" "Church" "Ga"
[33] "S" "E" "d" "That"
[37] "case" "property" "dispute" "PCUS"
[41] "two" "local" "Georgia" "churches"
[45] "withdrawn" "PCUS" "The" "Georgia"
[49] "Supreme" "Court" "resolved" "controversy"
[53] "applying" "theory" "implied" "trust"
[57] "whereby" "property" "local" "church"
[61] "affiliated" "hierarchical" "church" "organization"
[65] "deemed" "held" "trust" "general"
[69] "church" "provided" "general" "church"
[73] "substantially" "abandoned" "tenets" "faith"
[77] "practice" "existed" "time" "affiliation"
[81] "This" "Court" "reversed" "holding"
[85] "Georgia" "find" "way" "resolving"
[89] "church" "property" "disputes" "draw"
[93] "state" "courts" "religious" "controversies"
[97] "The" "Court" "specify" "method"
[101] "although" "noted" "passing" "neutral"
[105] "principles" "law" "developed" "use"
[109] "property" "disputes" "can" "applied"
[113] "without" "establishing" "churches" "property"
[117] "awarded" "U" "S" "S"
[121] "Ct" ""
[[925]]
[1] "" "On" "remand" "Georgia"
[5] "Supreme" "Court" "concluded" "without"
[9] "departure" "doctrine" "element" "implied"
[13] "trust" "theory" "abandoned" "entirety"
[17] "Presbyterian" "Church" "v" "Eastern"
[21] "Heights" "Church" "Ga" "S"
[25] "E" "d" "Presbyterian" "Church"
[29] "II" "In" "place" "court"
[33] "adopted" "now" "known" "neutral"
[37] "principles" "law" "method" "resolving"
[41] "church" "property" "disputes" "The"
[45] "court" "examined" "deeds" "properties"
[49] "state" "statutes" "dealing" "implied"
[53] "trusts" "Ga" "Code" "Book"
[57] "Church" "Order" "determine" "whether"
[61] "basis" "trust" "favor" "general"
[65] "church" "Finding" "nothing" "give"
[69] "rise" "trust" "documents" "court"
[73] "awarded" "property" "basis" "legal"
[77] "title" "local" "church" "names"
[81] "trustees" "local" "church" "Ga"
[85] "S" "E" "d" "Review"
[89] "sought" "Court" "denied" "U"
[93] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[97] "Ed" "d" ""
[[926]]
[1] "The" "neutral" "principles"
[4] "analysis" "refined" "Georgia"
[7] "Supreme" "Court" "Carnes"
[10] "v" "Smith" "Ga"
[13] "S" "E" "d"
[16] "cert" "denied" "U"
[19] "S" "S" "Ct"
[22] "L" "Ed" "d"
[25] "That" "case" "concerned"
[28] "property" "dispute" "The"
[31] "United" "Methodist" "Church"
[34] "local" "congregation" "withdrawn"
[37] "church" "As" "Presbyterian"
[40] "Church" "II" "court"
[43] "found" "basis" "trust"
[46] "favor" "general" "church"
[49] "deeds" "corporate" "charter"
[52] "state" "statutes" "dealing"
[55] "implied" "trusts" "The"
[58] "court" "observed" "however"
[61] "constitution" "The" "United"
[64] "Methodist" "Church" "Book"
[67] "Discipline" "contained" "express"
[70] "trust" "provision" "favor"
[73] "general" "church" "On"
[76] "basis" "church" "property"
[79] "awarded" "denominational" "church"
[82] "Ga" "S" "E"
[85] "d" ""
[[927]]
[1] "In" "present" "case" "Georgia"
[5] "courts" "sought" "apply" "neutral"
[9] "principles" "analysis" "Presbyterian" "Church"
[13] "II" "Carnes" "facts" "presented"
[17] "Vineville" "church" "controversy" "Here"
[21] "two" "earlier" "cases" "deeds"
[25] "conveyed" "property" "local" "church"
[29] "Here" "earlier" "cases" "neither"
[33] "state" "statutes" "dealing" "implied"
[37] "trusts" "corporate" "charter" "Vineville"
[41] "church" "indicated" "general" "church"
[45] "interest" "property" "And" "Presbyterian"
[49] "Church" "II" "contrast" "Carnes"
[53] "provisions" "constitution" "general" "church"
[57] "Book" "Church" "Order" "concerning"
[61] "ownership" "control" "property" "failed"
[65] "reveal" "language" "trust" "favor"
[69] "general" "church" "The" "courts"
[73] "accordingly" "held" "legal" "title"
[77] "property" "Vineville" "church" "vested"
[81] "local" "congregation" "Without" "analysis"
[85] "elaboration" "decreed" "local" "congregation"
[89] "represented" "majority" "faction" "respondents"
[93] "herein" "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[97] "Ga" "S" "E" "d"
[101] ""
[[928]]
[1] "" "III" ""
[[929]]
[1] "" "The" "question" "presented"
[5] "case" "faction" "formerly" "united"
[9] "Vineville" "congregation" "entitled" "possess"
[13] "enjoy" "property" "located" "Vineville"
[17] "Avenue" "Macon" "Ga" "There"
[21] "can" "little" "doubt" "general"
[25] "authority" "civil" "courts" "resolve"
[29] "question" "The" "State" "obvious"
[33] "legitimate" "interest" "peaceful" "resolution"
[37] "property" "disputes" "providing" "civil"
[41] "forum" "ownership" "church" "property"
[45] "can" "determined" "conclusively" "Presbyterian"
[49] "Church" "I" "U" "S"
[53] "S" "Ct" ""
[[930]]
[1] "It" "also" "clear" "however"
[5] "First" "Amendment" "severely" "circumscribes"
[9] "role" "civil" "courts" "may"
[13] "play" "resolving" "church" "property"
[17] "disputes" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[21] "Most" "importantly" "First" "Amendment"
[25] "prohibits" "civil" "courts" "resolving"
[29] "church" "property" "disputes" "basis"
[33] "religious" "doctrine" "practice" "Serbian"
[37] "Orthodox" "Diocese" "v" "Milivojevich"
[41] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[45] "L" "Ed" "d" "Maryland"
[49] "Va" "Churches" "v" "Sharpsburg"
[53] "Church" "U" "S" "S"
[57] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[61] "Presbyterian" "Church" "I" "U"
[65] "S" "S" "Ct" "As"
[69] "corollary" "commandment" "Amendment" "requires"
[73] "civil" "courts" "defer" "resolution"
[77] "issues" "religious" "doctrine" "polity"
[81] "highest" "court" "hierarchical" "church"
[85] "organization" "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Diocese"
[89] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[93] "cf" "Watson" "v" "Jones"
[97] "U" "S" "Wall" "L"
[101] "Ed" "Subject" "limitations" "however"
[105] "First" "Amendment" "dictate" "State"
[109] "must" "follow" "particular" "method"
[113] "resolving" "church" "property" "disputes"
[117] "Indeed" "State" "may" "adopt"
[121] "one" "various" "approaches" "settling"
[125] "church" "property" "disputes" "long"
[129] "involves" "consideration" "doctrinal" "matters"
[133] "whether" "ritual" "liturgy" "worship"
[137] "tenets" "faith" "Maryland" "Va"
[141] "Churches" "U" "S" "S"
[145] "Ct" "BRENNAN" "J" "concurring"
[149] "emphasis" "original" ""
[[931]]
[1] "" "At" "least"
[4] "general" "outline" "think"
[7] "neutral" "principles" "law"
[10] "approach" "consistent" "foregoing"
[13] "constitutional" "principles" "The"
[16] "neutral" "principles" "approach"
[19] "approved" "Maryland" "Va"
[22] "Churches" "supra" "appeal"
[25] "judgment" "Court" "Appeals"
[28] "Maryland" "settling" "local"
[31] "church" "property" "dispute"
[34] "basis" "language" "deeds"
[37] "terms" "local" "church"
[40] "charters" "state" "statutes"
[43] "governing" "holding" "church"
[46] "property" "provisions" "constitution"
[49] "general" "church" "concerning"
[52] "ownership" "control" "church"
[55] "property" "Finding" "analysis"
[58] "entailed" "inquiry" "religious"
[61] "doctrine" "Court" "dismissed"
[64] "appeal" "want" "substantial"
[67] "federal" "question" "U"
[70] "S" "S" "Ct"
[73] "Neutral" "principles" "law"
[76] "also" "received" "approving"
[79] "reference" "Presbyterian" "Church"
[82] "I" "U" "S"
[85] "S" "Ct" "Mr"
[88] "Justice" "BRENNAN" "s"
[91] "concurrence" "Maryland" "Va"
[94] "Churches" "U" "S"
[97] "S" "Ct" "Serbian"
[100] "Orthodox" "Diocese" "U"
[103] "S" "n" "S"
[106] "Ct" ""
[[932]]
[1] "The" "primary" "advantages" "neutral"
[5] "principles" "approach" "completely" "secular"
[9] "operation" "yet" "flexible" "enough"
[13] "accommodate" "forms" "religious" "organization"
[17] "polity" "The" "method" "relies"
[21] "exclusively" "objective" "well" "established"
[25] "concepts" "trust" "property" "law"
[29] "familiar" "lawyers" "judges" "It"
[33] "thereby" "promises" "free" "civil"
[37] "courts" "completely" "entanglement" "questions"
[41] "religious" "doctrine" "polity" "practice"
[45] "Furthermore" "neutral" "principles" "analysis"
[49] "shares" "peculiar" "genius" "private"
[53] "law" "systems" "general" "flexibility"
[57] "ordering" "private" "rights" "obligations"
[61] "reflect" "intentions" "parties" "Through"
[65] "appropriate" "reversionary" "clauses" "trust"
[69] "provisions" "religious" "societies" "can"
[73] "specify" "happen" "church" "property"
[77] "event" "particular" "contingency" "religious"
[81] "body" "will" "determine" "ownership"
[85] "event" "schism" "doctrinal" "controversy"
[89] "In" "manner" "religious" "organization"
[93] "can" "ensure" "dispute" "ownership"
[97] "church" "property" "will" "resolved"
[101] "accord" "desires" "members" ""
[[933]]
[1] "This" "say" "application"
[4] "neutral" "principles" "approach"
[7] "wholly" "free" "difficulty"
[10] "The" "neutral" "principles"
[13] "method" "least" "evolved"
[16] "Georgia" "requires" "civil"
[19] "court" "examine" "certain"
[22] "religious" "documents" "church"
[25] "constitution" "language" "trust"
[28] "favor" "general" "church"
[31] "In" "undertaking" "examination"
[34] "civil" "court" "must"
[37] "take" "special" "care"
[40] "scrutinize" "document" "purely"
[43] "secular" "terms" "rely"
[46] "religious" "precepts" "determining"
[49] "whether" "document" "indicates"
[52] "parties" "intended" "create"
[55] "trust" "In" "addition"
[58] "may" "cases" "deed"
[61] "corporate" "charter" "constitution"
[64] "general" "church" "incorporates"
[67] "religious" "concepts" "provisions"
[70] "relating" "ownership" "property"
[73] "If" "case" "interpretation"
[76] "instruments" "ownership" "require"
[79] "civil" "court" "resolve"
[82] "religious" "controversy" "court"
[85] "must" "defer" "resolution"
[88] "doctrinal" "issue" "authoritative"
[91] "ecclesiastical" "body" "Serbian"
[94] "Orthodox" "Diocese" "U"
[97] "S" "S" "Ct"
[100] ""
[[934]]
[1] "On" "balance" "however"
[4] "promise" "nonentanglement" "neutrality"
[7] "inherent" "neutral" "principles"
[10] "approach" "compensates" "will"
[13] "occasional" "problems" "application"
[16] "These" "problems" "addition"
[19] "gradually" "eliminated" "recognition"
[22] "given" "obligation" "States"
[25] "religious" "organizations" "individuals"
[28] "structure" "relationships" "involving"
[31] "church" "property" "require"
[34] "civil" "courts" "resolve"
[37] "ecclesiastical" "questions" "Presbyterian"
[40] "Church" "I" "U"
[43] "S" "S" "Ct"
[46] "We" "therefore" "hold"
[49] "State" "constitutionally" "entitled"
[52] "adopt" "neutral" "principles"
[55] "law" "means" "adjudicating"
[58] "church" "property" "dispute"
[61] ""
[[935]]
[1] "" "The" "dissent"
[4] "require" "States" "abandon"
[7] "neutral" "principles" "method"
[10] "instead" "insist" "matter"
[13] "constitutional" "law" "whenever"
[16] "dispute" "arises" "ownership"
[19] "church" "property" "civil"
[22] "courts" "must" "defer"
[25] "authoritative" "resolution" "dispute"
[28] "within" "church" "Post"
[31] "It" "require" "first"
[34] "civil" "courts" "review"
[37] "ecclesiastical" "doctrine" "polity"
[40] "determine" "church" "placed"
[43] "ultimate" "authority" "use"
[46] "church" "property" "Post"
[49] "After" "answering" "question"
[52] "courts" "required" "determine"
[55] "whether" "dispute" "resolved"
[58] "within" "structure" "government"
[61] "decision" "made" "Post"
[64] "n" "They" "required"
[67] "enforce" "decision" "We"
[70] "agree" "however" "First"
[73] "Amendment" "requires" "States"
[76] "adopt" "rule" "compulsory"
[79] "deference" "religious" "authority"
[82] "resolving" "church" "property"
[85] "disputes" "even" "issue"
[88] "doctrinal" "controversy" "involved"
[91] ""
[[936]]
[1] "The" "dissent" "suggests"
[4] "rule" "compulsory" "deference"
[7] "somehow" "involve" "less"
[10] "entanglement" "civil" "courts"
[13] "matters" "religious" "doctrine"
[16] "practice" "administration" "Under"
[19] "approach" "however" "civil"
[22] "courts" "always" "required"
[25] "examine" "polity" "administration"
[28] "church" "determine" "unit"
[31] "government" "ultimate" "control"
[34] "church" "property" "In"
[37] "cases" "task" "prove"
[40] "difficult" "But" "others"
[43] "locus" "control" "ambiguous"
[46] "careful" "examination" "constitutions"
[49] "general" "local" "church"
[52] "well" "relevant" "documents"
[55] "necessary" "ascertain" "form"
[58] "governance" "adopted" "members"
[61] "religious" "association" "Post"
[64] "In" "cases" "suggested"
[67] "rule" "appear" "require"
[70] "searching" "therefore" "impermissible"
[73] "inquiry" "church" "polity"
[76] "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Diocese"
[79] "U" "S" "S"
[82] "Ct" "The" "neutral"
[85] "principles" "approach" "contrast"
[88] "obviates" "entirely" "need"
[91] "analysis" "examination" "ecclesiastical"
[94] "polity" "doctrine" "settling"
[97] "church" "property" "disputes"
[100] ""
[[937]]
[1] "The" "dissent" "also"
[4] "argues" "rule" "compulsory"
[7] "deference" "necessary" "order"
[10] "protect" "free" "exercise"
[13] "rights" "formed" "association"
[16] "submitted" "authority" "Post"
[19] "This" "argument" "assumes"
[22] "neutral" "principles" "method"
[25] "somehow" "frustrate" "free"
[28] "exercise" "rights" "members"
[31] "religious" "association" "Nothing"
[34] "truth" "The" "neutral"
[37] "principles" "approach" "said"
[40] "inhibit" "free" "exercise"
[43] "religion" "neutral" "provisions"
[46] "state" "law" "governing"
[49] "manner" "churches" "property"
[52] "hire" "employees" "purchase"
[55] "goods" "Under" "neutral"
[58] "principles" "approach" "outcome"
[61] "church" "property" "dispute"
[64] "foreordained" "At" "time"
[67] "dispute" "erupts" "parties"
[70] "can" "ensure" "desire"
[73] "faction" "loyal" "hierarchical"
[76] "church" "will" "retain"
[79] "church" "property" "They"
[82] "can" "modify" "deeds"
[85] "corporate" "charter" "include"
[88] "right" "reversion" "trust"
[91] "favor" "general" "church"
[94] "Alternatively" "constitution" "general"
[97] "church" "can" "made"
[100] "recite" "express" "trust"
[103] "favor" "denominational" "church"
[106] "The" "burden" "involved"
[109] "taking" "steps" "will"
[112] "minimal" "And" "civil"
[115] "courts" "will" "bound"
[118] "give" "effect" "result"
[121] "indicated" "parties" "provided"
[124] "embodied" "legally" "cognizable"
[127] "form" ""
[[938]]
[1] "IV" ""
[[939]]
[1] "It" "remains" "determined"
[4] "whether" "Georgia" "neutral"
[7] "principles" "analysis" "constitutionally"
[10] "applied" "facts" "case"
[13] "Although" "trial" "court"
[16] "Supreme" "Court" "Georgia"
[19] "viewed" "case" "involving"
[22] "nothing" "application" "principles"
[25] "developed" "Presbyterian" "Church"
[28] "II" "Carnes" "present"
[31] "case" "contains" "significant"
[34] "complicating" "factor" "absent"
[37] "earlier" "cases" "Presbyterian"
[40] "Church" "II" "Carnes"
[43] "involved" "church" "property"
[46] "dispute" "general" "church"
[49] "entire" "local" "congregation"
[52] "Here" "local" "congregation"
[55] "divided" "majority" "members"
[58] "sought" "withdraw" "PCUS"
[61] "minority" "members" "wished"
[64] "maintain" "affiliation" "Neither"
[67] "state" "courts" "alluded"
[70] "problem" "however" "concluded"
[73] "without" "discussion" "analysis"
[76] "title" "property" "local"
[79] "church" "local" "church"
[82] "represented" "majority" "rather"
[85] "minority" ""
[[940]]
[1] "Petitioners" "earnestly" "submit"
[4] "question" "faction" "true"
[7] "representative" "Vineville" "church"
[10] "ecclesiastical" "question" "answered"
[13] "civil" "court" "At"
[16] "least" "said" "answered"
[19] "civil" "court" "case"
[22] "involving" "hierarchical" "church"
[25] "like" "PCUS" "duly"
[28] "appointed" "church" "commission"
[31] "determined" "two" "factions"
[34] "represents" "true" "congregation"
[37] "Respondents" "opposition" "argue"
[40] "effect" "Georgia" "courts"
[43] "apply" "ordinary" "presumption"
[46] "absent" "indication" "contrary"
[49] "voluntary" "religious" "association"
[52] "represented" "majority" "members"
[55] ""
[[941]]
[1] "" "If" "fact"
[4] "Georgia" "adopted" "presumptive"
[7] "rule" "majority" "representation"
[10] "defeasible" "upon" "showing"
[13] "identity" "local" "church"
[16] "determined" "means" "think"
[19] "consistent" "neutral" "principles"
[22] "analysis" "First" "Amendment"
[25] "Majority" "rule" "generally"
[28] "employed" "governance" "religious"
[31] "societies" "See" "Bouldin"
[34] "v" "Alexander" "U"
[37] "S" "Wall" "L"
[40] "Ed" "Furthermore" "majority"
[43] "faction" "generally" "can"
[46] "identified" "without" "resolving"
[49] "question" "religious" "doctrine"
[52] "polity" "Certainly" "dispute"
[55] "present" "case" "identity"
[58] "duly" "enrolled" "members"
[61] "Vineville" "church" "dispute"
[64] "arose" "fact" "quorum"
[67] "present" "final" "vote"
[70] "Most" "importantly" "rule"
[73] "majority" "representation" "can"
[76] "always" "overcome" "neutral"
[79] "principles" "approach" "either"
[82] "providing" "corporate" "charter"
[85] "constitution" "general" "church"
[88] "identity" "local" "church"
[91] "established" "way" "providing"
[94] "church" "property" "held"
[97] "trust" "general" "church"
[100] "remain" "loyal" "Indeed"
[103] "State" "may" "adopt"
[106] "method" "overcoming" "majoritarian"
[109] "presumption" "long" "use"
[112] "method" "impair" "free"
[115] "exercise" "rights" "entangle"
[118] "civil" "courts" "matters"
[121] "religious" "controversy" ""
[[942]]
[1] "" "Neither" "trial"
[4] "court" "Supreme" "Court"
[7] "Georgia" "however" "explicitly"
[10] "stated" "adopting" "presumptive"
[13] "rule" "majority" "representation"
[16] "Moreover" "least" "indications"
[19] "Georgia" "law" "process"
[22] "identifying" "faction" "represents"
[25] "Vineville" "church" "involves"
[28] "considerations" "religious" "doctrine"
[31] "polity" "Georgia" "law"
[34] "requires" "church" "property"
[37] "held" "according" "terms"
[40] "church" "government" "provides"
[43] "local" "church" "affiliated"
[46] "hierarchical" "religious" "association"
[49] "part" "whole" "body"
[52] "general" "church" "subject"
[55] "higher" "authority" "organization"
[58] "laws" "regulations" "Carnes"
[61] "v" "Smith" "Ga"
[64] "S" "E" "d"
[67] "see" "Ga" "Code"
[70] "All" "may" "suggest"
[73] "identity" "Vineville" "Presbyterian"
[76] "Church" "named" "deeds"
[79] "must" "determined" "according"
[82] "terms" "Book" "Church"
[85] "Order" "sets" "laws"
[88] "regulations" "churches" "affiliated"
[91] "PCUS" "Such" "determination"
[94] "however" "appear" "require"
[97] "civil" "court" "pass"
[100] "questions" "religious" "doctrine"
[103] "usurp" "function" "commission"
[106] "appointed" "Presbytery" "already"
[109] "determined" "petitioners" "represent"
[112] "true" "congregation" "Vineville"
[115] "church" "Therefore" "Georgia"
[118] "law" "provides" "identity"
[121] "Vineville" "church" "determined"
[124] "according" "laws" "regulations"
[127] "PCUS" "First" "Amendment"
[130] "requires" "Georgia" "courts"
[133] "give" "deference" "presbyterial"
[136] "commission" "s" "determination"
[139] "church" "s" "identity"
[142] ""
[[943]]
[1] "This" "Court" "course" "declare"
[5] "law" "Georgia" "Since" "grounds"
[9] "decision" "respondents" "represent" "Vineville"
[13] "church" "remain" "unarticulated" "judgment"
[17] "Supreme" "Court" "Georgia" "vacated"
[21] "case" "remanded" "proceedings" "inconsistent"
[25] "opinion" ""
[[944]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[945]]
[1] "Justice" "WHITE" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[946]]
[1] "New" "York" "Educ"
[4] "Law" "McKinney" "Supp"
[7] "authorizes" "local" "school"
[10] "boards" "adopt" "reasonable"
[13] "regulations" "use" "school"
[16] "property" "specified" "purposes"
[19] "property" "use" "school"
[22] "purposes" "Among" "permitted"
[25] "uses" "holding" "social"
[28] "civic" "recreational" "meetings"
[31] "entertainments" "uses" "pertaining"
[34] "welfare" "community" "meetings"
[37] "entertainment" "uses" "shall"
[40] "non" "exclusive" "shall"
[43] "open" "general" "public"
[46] "c" "The" "list"
[49] "permitted" "uses" "include"
[52] "meetings" "religious" "purposes"
[55] "New" "York" "appellate"
[58] "court" "Trietley" "v"
[61] "Board" "Ed" "Buffalo"
[64] "A" "D" "d"
[67] "N" "Y" "S"
[70] "d" "ruled" "local"
[73] "boards" "allow" "student"
[76] "bible" "clubs" "meet"
[79] "school" "property" "r"
[82] "eligious" "purposes" "included"
[85] "enumerated" "purposes" "school"
[88] "may" "used" "section"
[91] "In" "Deeper" "Life"
[94] "Christian" "Fellowship" "Inc"
[97] "v" "Sobol" "F"
[100] "d" "Court" "Appeals"
[103] "Second" "Circuit" "accepted"
[106] "Trietley" "authoritative" "interpretation"
[109] "state" "law" "Furthermore"
[112] "Attorney" "General" "New"
[115] "York" "supports" "Trietley"
[118] "appropriate" "approach" "deciding"
[121] "case" ""
[[947]]
[1] "Pursuant" "s" "empowerment"
[4] "local" "school" "districts"
[7] "Board" "Center" "Moriches"
[10] "Union" "Free" "School"
[13] "District" "District" "issued"
[16] "rules" "regulations" "respect"
[19] "use" "school" "property"
[22] "use" "school" "purposes"
[25] "The" "rules" "allow"
[28] "purposes" "authorized" "social"
[31] "civic" "recreational" "uses"
[34] "Rule" "use" "political"
[37] "organizations" "secured" "compliance"
[40] "Rule" "Rule" "however"
[43] "consistent" "judicial" "interpretation"
[46] "state" "law" "provides"
[49] "t" "school" "premises"
[52] "shall" "used" "group"
[55] "religious" "purposes" "App"
[58] "Pet" "Cert" ""
[[948]]
[1] "The" "issue" "case" "whether" "background"
[6] "state" "law" "violates" "Free" "Speech"
[11] "Clause" "First" "Amendment" "made" "applicable"
[16] "States" "Fourteenth" "Amendment" "deny" "church"
[21] "access" "school" "premises" "exhibit" "public"
[26] "viewing" "assertedly" "religious" "purposes" "film"
[31] "series" "dealing" "family" "child" "rearing"
[36] "issues" "faced" "parents" "today" ""
[[949]]
[1] "I" ""
[[950]]
[1] "Petitioners" "Church" "Lamb"
[4] "s" "Chapel" "evangelical"
[7] "church" "community" "Center"
[10] "Moriches" "pastor" "John"
[13] "Steigerwald" "Twice" "Church"
[16] "applied" "District" "permission"
[19] "use" "school" "facilities"
[22] "show" "six" "part"
[25] "film" "series" "containing"
[28] "lectures" "Doctor" "James"
[31] "Dobson" "A" "brochureprovided"
[34] "request" "District" "identified"
[37] "Dr" "Dobson" "licensed"
[40] "psychologist" "former" "associate"
[43] "clinical" "professor" "pediatrics"
[46] "University" "Southern" "California"
[49] "best" "selling" "author"
[52] "radio" "commentator" "The"
[55] "brochure" "stated" "film"
[58] "series" "discuss" "Dr"
[61] "Dobson" "s" "views"
[64] "undermining" "influences" "media"
[67] "counterbalanced" "returning" "traditional"
[70] "Christian" "family" "values"
[73] "instilled" "early" "stage"
[76] "The" "brochure" "went"
[79] "describe" "contents" "six"
[82] "parts" "series" "The"
[85] "District" "denied" "first"
[88] "application" "saying" "t"
[91] "film" "appear" "church"
[94] "related" "therefore" "request"
[97] "must" "refused" "App"
[100] "The" "second" "application"
[103] "permission" "use" "school"
[106] "premises" "showing" "film"
[109] "series" "described" "Family"
[112] "oriented" "movie" "Christian"
[115] "perspective" "id" "denied"
[118] "using" "identical" "language"
[121] ""
[[951]]
[1] "The" "Church" "brought" "suit"
[5] "District" "Court" "challenging" "denial"
[9] "violation" "Freedom" "Speech" "Assembly"
[13] "Clauses" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[17] "Establishment" "Clause" "First" "Amendment"
[21] "well" "Equal" "Protection" "Clause"
[25] "Fourteenth" "Amendment" "As" "cause"
[29] "action" "Church" "alleged" "actions"
[33] "undertaken" "color" "state" "law"
[37] "violation" "U" "S" "C"
[41] "The" "District" "Court" "granted"
[45] "summary" "judgment" "respondents" "rejecting"
[49] "Church" "s" "claims" "With"
[53] "respect" "free" "speech" "claim"
[57] "First" "Amendment" "District" "Court"
[61] "characterized" "District" "s" "facilities"
[65] "limited" "public" "forum" "The"
[69] "court" "noted" "enumerated" "purposes"
[73] "allowed" "access" "school" "facilities"
[77] "include" "religious" "worship" "instruction"
[81] "Rule" "explicitly" "proscribes" "using"
[85] "school" "facilities" "religious" "purposes"
[89] "Church" "conceded" "showing" "film"
[93] "series" "religious" "purposes" "F"
[97] "Supp" "E" "D" "N"
[101] "Y" "The" "District" "Court"
[105] "stated" "limited" "public" "forum"
[109] "opened" "particular" "type" "speech"
[113] "selectively" "denying" "access" "activities"
[117] "genre" "forbidden" "Id" "Noting"
[121] "District" "opened" "facilities" "organizations"
[125] "similar" "Lamb" "s" "Chapel"
[129] "religious" "purposes" "District" "Court"
[133] "held" "denial" "case" "viewpoint"
[137] "neutral" "hence" "violation" "Freedom"
[141] "Speech" "Clause" "Ibid" "The"
[145] "District" "Court" "also" "rejected"
[149] "assertion" "Church" "denying" "application"
[153] "demonstrated" "hostility" "religion" "advancement"
[157] "nonreligion" "justified" "Establishment" "Religion"
[161] "Clause" "First" "Amendment" "F"
[165] "Supp" ""
[[952]]
[1] "The" "Court" "Appeals"
[4] "affirmed" "judgment" "District"
[7] "Court" "respects" "F"
[10] "d" "CA" "It"
[13] "held" "school" "property"
[16] "use" "school" "purposes"
[19] "neither" "traditional" "designated"
[22] "public" "forum" "rather"
[25] "limited" "public" "forum"
[28] "open" "designated" "purposes"
[31] "classification" "allows" "remain"
[34] "non" "public" "except"
[37] "specified" "uses" "Id"
[40] "The" "court" "observed"
[43] "exclusions" "forum" "need"
[46] "reasonable" "viewpoint" "neutral"
[49] "ibid" "ruled" "denying"
[52] "access" "Church" "purpose"
[55] "showing" "film" "violate"
[58] "standard" "Because" "holding"
[61] "questionable" "decisions" "granted"
[64] "petition" "certiorari" "U"
[67] "S" "S" "Ct"
[70] "L" "Ed" "d"
[73] "principal" "part" "challenged"
[76] "holding" "contrary" "Free"
[79] "Speech" "Clause" "First"
[82] "Amendment" ""
[[953]]
[1] "II" ""
[[954]]
[1] "" "There" "question"
[4] "District" "like" "private"
[7] "owner" "property" "may"
[10] "legally" "preserve" "property"
[13] "control" "use" "dedicated"
[16] "Cornelius" "v" "NAACP"
[19] "Legal" "Defense" "Ed"
[22] "Fund" "Inc" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct"
[28] "L" "Ed" "d"
[31] "Perry" "Ed" "Assn"
[34] "v" "Perry" "Local"
[37] "Educators" "Assn" "U"
[40] "S" "S" "Ct"
[43] "L" "Ed" "d"
[46] "Postal" "Service" "v"
[49] "Council" "Greenburgh" "Civic"
[52] "Assns" "U" "S"
[55] "S" "Ct" "L"
[58] "Ed" "d" "Greer"
[61] "v" "Spock" "U"
[64] "S" "S" "Ct"
[67] "L" "Ed" "d"
[70] "Adderley" "v" "Florida"
[73] "U" "S" "S"
[76] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[79] "d" "It" "also"
[82] "common" "ground" "District"
[85] "need" "permitted" "hours"
[88] "use" "property" "uses"
[91] "permitted" "N" "Y"
[94] "Educ" "Law" "The"
[97] "District" "however" "open"
[100] "property" "uses" "permitted"
[103] "The" "Church" "argued"
[106] "Rule" "rules" "issued"
[109] "District" "school" "property"
[112] "used" "social" "civic"
[115] "recreational" "purposes" "District"
[118] "opened" "property" "wide"
[121] "variety" "communicative" "purposes"
[124] "restrictions" "communicative" "uses"
[127] "property" "subject" "constitutional"
[130] "limitations" "restrictions" "traditional"
[133] "public" "forums" "parks"
[136] "sidewalks" "Hence" "view"
[139] "subject" "matter" "speaker"
[142] "exclusions" "District" "property"
[145] "required" "justified" "compelling"
[148] "state" "interest" "narrowly"
[151] "drawn" "achieve" "end"
[154] "See" "Perry" "supra"
[157] "U" "S" "S"
[160] "Ct" "Cornelius" "supra"
[163] "U" "S" "S"
[166] "Ct" "Both" "District"
[169] "Court" "Court" "Appeals"
[172] "rejected" "submission" "also"
[175] "presented" "Court" "The"
[178] "argument" "considerable" "force"
[181] "District" "s" "property"
[184] "heavily" "used" "wide"
[187] "variety" "private" "organizations"
[190] "including" "presented" "close"
[193] "question" "Court" "Appeals"
[196] "resolved" "District" "s"
[199] "favor" "whether" "District"
[202] "fact" "already" "opened"
[205] "property" "religious" "uses"
[208] "F" "d" "We"
[211] "need" "rule" "issue"
[214] "however" "even" "courts"
[217] "correct" "respect" "shall"
[220] "assume" "present" "purposes"
[223] "judgment" "must" "reversed"
[226] ""
[[955]]
[1] "With" "respect" "public"
[4] "property" "designated" "public"
[7] "forum" "open" "indiscriminate"
[10] "public" "use" "communicative"
[13] "purposes" "said" "c"
[16] "ontrol" "access" "nonpublic"
[19] "forum" "can" "based"
[22] "subject" "matter" "speaker"
[25] "identity" "long" "distinctions"
[28] "drawn" "reasonable" "light"
[31] "purpose" "served" "forum"
[34] "viewpoint" "neutral" "Cornelius"
[37] "U" "S" "S"
[40] "Ct" "citing" "Perry"
[43] "Education" "Assn" "supra"
[46] "U" "S" "S"
[49] "Ct" "The" "Court"
[52] "Appeals" "appeared" "recognize"
[55] "total" "ban" "using"
[58] "District" "property" "religious"
[61] "purposes" "survive" "First"
[64] "Amendment" "challenge" "excluding"
[67] "category" "speech" "reasonable"
[70] "viewpoint" "neutral" "The"
[73] "court" "s" "conclusion"
[76] "case" "Rule" "met"
[79] "test" "We" "agree"
[82] "holding" "Rule" "unconstitutionally"
[85] "applied" "case" ""
[[956]]
[1] "" "The" "Court" "Appeals"
[5] "thought" "application" "Rule" "case"
[9] "viewpoint" "neutral" "applied" "way"
[13] "uses" "school" "property" "religious"
[17] "purposes" "That" "religions" "uses"
[21] "religious" "purposes" "treated" "alike"
[25] "Rule" "however" "answer" "critical"
[29] "question" "whether" "discriminates" "basis"
[33] "viewpoint" "permit" "school" "property"
[37] "used" "presentation" "views" "family"
[41] "issues" "child" "rearing" "except"
[45] "dealing" "subject" "matter" "religious"
[49] "standpoint" ""
[[957]]
[1] "" "There" "suggestion" "courts"
[5] "District" "State" "lecture" "film"
[9] "child" "rearing" "family" "values"
[13] "use" "social" "civic" "purposes"
[17] "otherwise" "permitted" "Rule" "That"
[21] "subject" "matter" "one" "District"
[25] "placed" "limits" "speakers" "Nor"
[29] "indication" "record" "us" "application"
[33] "exhibit" "particular" "film" "series"
[37] "involved" "denied" "reason" "fact"
[41] "presentation" "religious" "perspective" "In"
[45] "view" "denial" "basis" "plainly"
[49] "invalid" "holding" "Cornelius" "supra"
[53] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[57] ""
[[958]]
[1] "" "lthough" "speaker" "may"
[5] "excluded" "non" "public" "forum"
[9] "wishes" "address" "topic" "encompassed"
[13] "within" "purpose" "forum" "member"
[17] "class" "speakers" "whose" "especial"
[21] "benefit" "forum" "created" "government"
[25] "violates" "First" "Amendment" "denies"
[29] "access" "speaker" "solely" "suppress"
[33] "point" "view" "espouses" "otherwise"
[37] "includible" "subject" ""
[[959]]
[1] "The" "film" "series" "involved"
[5] "doubt" "dealt" "subject" "otherwise"
[9] "permissible" "Rule" "exhibition" "denied"
[13] "solely" "series" "dealt" "subject"
[17] "religious" "standpoint" "The" "principle"
[21] "emerged" "cases" "First" "Amendment"
[25] "forbids" "government" "regulate" "speech"
[29] "ways" "favor" "viewpoints" "ideas"
[33] "expense" "others" "City" "Council"
[37] "Los" "Angeles" "v" "Taxpayers"
[41] "Vincent" "U" "S" "S"
[45] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[49] "That" "principle" "applies" "circumstances"
[53] "case" "Judge" "Posner" "said"
[57] "Court" "Appeals" "Seventh" "Circuit"
[61] "discriminate" "particular" "point" "view"
[65] "flunk" "test" "Cornelius" "provided"
[69] "defendants" "defense" "based" "establishment"
[73] "clause" "May" "v" "Evansville"
[77] "Vanderburgh" "School" "Corp" "F"
[81] "d" ""
[[960]]
[1] "The" "District" "respondent" "save"
[5] "judgment" "ground" "permit" "property"
[9] "used" "religious" "purposes" "establishment"
[13] "religion" "forbidden" "First" "Amendment"
[17] "This" "Court" "suggested" "Widmar"
[21] "v" "Vincent" "U" "S"
[25] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[29] "d" "interest" "State" "avoiding"
[33] "Establishment" "Clause" "violation" "may"
[37] "compelling" "one" "justifying" "abridgment"
[41] "free" "speech" "otherwise" "protected"
[45] "First" "Amendment" "Court" "went"
[49] "hold" "permitting" "use" "university"
[53] "property" "religious" "purposes" "open"
[57] "access" "policy" "involved" "incompatible"
[61] "Court" "s" "Establishment" "Clause"
[65] "cases" ""
[[961]]
[1] "" "We" "trouble" "Widmar"
[5] "Court" "disposing" "claimed" "defense"
[9] "ground" "posited" "fears" "Establishment"
[13] "Clause" "violation" "unfounded" "The"
[17] "showing" "film" "series" "school"
[21] "hours" "sponsored" "school" "open"
[25] "public" "just" "church" "members"
[29] "The" "District" "property" "repeatedly"
[33] "used" "wide" "variety" "private"
[37] "organizations" "Under" "circumstances" "Widmar"
[41] "realistic" "danger" "community" "think"
[45] "District" "endorsing" "religion" "particular"
[49] "creed" "benefit" "religion" "Church"
[53] "incidental" "As" "Widmar" "supra"
[57] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[61] "permitting" "District" "property" "used"
[65] "exhibit" "film" "series" "involved"
[69] "case" "establishment" "religion" "three"
[73] "part" "test" "articulated" "Lemon"
[77] "v" "Kurtzman" "U" "S"
[81] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[85] "d" "The" "challenged" "governmental"
[89] "action" "secular" "purpose" "principal"
[93] "primary" "effect" "advancing" "inhibiting"
[97] "religion" "foster" "excessive" "entanglement"
[101] "religion" ""
[[962]]
[1] "The" "District" "also" "submits"
[5] "justifiably" "denied" "use" "property"
[9] "radical" "church" "purpose" "proselytizing"
[13] "since" "lead" "threats" "public"
[17] "unrest" "even" "violence" "Brief"
[21] "Respondent" "Center" "Moriches" "Union"
[25] "Free" "School" "District" "et"
[29] "al" "There" "nothing" "record"
[33] "support" "justification" "event" "difficult"
[37] "defend" "reason" "deny" "presentation"
[41] "religious" "point" "view" "subject"
[45] "District" "otherwise" "opens" "discussion"
[49] "District" "property" ""
[[963]]
[1] "We" "note" "New" "York"
[5] "State" "Attorney" "General" "respondent"
[9] "rely" "either" "Establishment" "Clause"
[13] "possible" "danger" "public" "peace"
[17] "supporting" "judgment" "Rather" "submits"
[21] "exclusion" "justified" "purpose" "access"
[25] "rules" "promote" "interests" "public"
[29] "general" "rather" "sectarian" "private"
[33] "interests" "In" "light" "variety"
[37] "uses" "District" "property" "permitted"
[41] "Rule" "approach" "difficulties" "This"
[45] "particularly" "since" "Rule" "states"
[49] "District" "property" "may" "used"
[53] "social" "civic" "recreational" "use"
[57] "can" "non" "exclusive" "open"
[61] "residents" "school" "district" "form"
[65] "homogeneous" "group" "deemed" "relevant"
[69] "event" "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[73] "At" "least" "arguably" "Rule"
[77] "require" "permitted" "uses" "need"
[81] "open" "public" "large" "However"
[85] "may" "basis" "judgment" "reviewing"
[89] "The" "Court" "Appeals" "understand"
[93] "ruled" "District" "power" "permit"
[97] "exclude" "certain" "subject" "matters"
[101] "entitled" "deny" "use" "religious"
[105] "purpose" "including" "purpose" "case"
[109] "The" "Attorney" "General" "also"
[113] "defends" "permissible" "subject" "matter"
[117] "exclusion" "rather" "denial" "based"
[121] "viewpoint" "submission" "already" "rejected"
[125] ""
[[964]]
[1] "The" "Attorney" "General" "also"
[5] "argues" "express" "finding" "Church"
[9] "s" "application" "granted" "absent"
[13] "religious" "connection" "This" "fact"
[17] "beside" "point" "purposes" "opinion"
[21] "concerned" "validity" "stated" "reason"
[25] "denying" "Church" "s" "application"
[29] "namely" "film" "series" "sought"
[33] "shown" "appeared" "church" "related"
[37] ""
[[965]]
[1] "For" "reasons" "stated" "opinion" "judgment" "Court"
[7] "Appeals" ""
[[966]]
[1] "Reversed" ""
[[967]]
[1] "Justice" "O" "CONNOR" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[968]]
[1] "This" "case" "requires" "us"
[5] "consider" "whether" "First" "Amendment"
[9] "s" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[13] "prohibits" "Government" "permitting" "timber"
[17] "harvesting" "constructing" "road" "portion"
[21] "National" "Forest" "traditionally" "used"
[25] "religious" "purposes" "members" "three"
[29] "American" "Indian" "tribes" "northwestern"
[33] "California" "We" "conclude" ""
[[969]]
[1] "I" ""
[[970]]
[1] "As" "part" "project" "create" "paved"
[6] "mile" "road" "linking" "two" "California"
[11] "towns" "Gasquet" "Orleans" "United" "States"
[16] "Forest" "Service" "upgraded" "miles" "previously"
[21] "unpaved" "roads" "federal" "land" "In"
[26] "order" "complete" "project" "G" "O"
[31] "road" "Forest" "Service" "must" "build"
[36] "mile" "paved" "segment" "Chimney" "Rock"
[41] "section" "Six" "Rivers" "National" "Forest"
[46] "That" "section" "forest" "situated" "two"
[51] "portions" "road" "already" "complete" ""
[[971]]
[1] "In" "Forest" "Service"
[4] "issued" "draft" "environmental"
[7] "impact" "statement" "discussed"
[10] "proposals" "upgrading" "existing"
[13] "unpaved" "road" "runs"
[16] "Chimney" "Rock" "area"
[19] "In" "response" "comments"
[22] "draft" "statement" "Forest"
[25] "Service" "commissioned" "study"
[28] "American" "Indian" "cultural"
[31] "religious" "sites" "area"
[34] "The" "Hoopa" "Valley"
[37] "Indian" "Reservation" "adjoins"
[40] "Six" "Rivers" "National"
[43] "Forest" "Chimney" "Rock"
[46] "area" "historically" "used"
[49] "religious" "purposes" "Yurok"
[52] "Karok" "Tolowa" "Indians"
[55] "The" "commissioned" "study"
[58] "completed" "found" "entire"
[61] "area" "significant" "integral"
[64] "indispensible" "part" "Indian"
[67] "religious" "conceptualization" "practice"
[70] "App" "Specific" "sites"
[73] "used" "certain" "rituals"
[76] "successful" "use" "area"
[79] "dependent" "upon" "facilitated"
[82] "certain" "qualities" "physical"
[85] "environment" "important" "privacy"
[88] "silence" "undisturbed" "natural"
[91] "setting" "Ibid" "footnote"
[94] "omitted" "The" "study"
[97] "concluded" "constructing" "road"
[100] "along" "available" "routes"
[103] "cause" "serious" "irreparable"
[106] "damage" "sacred" "areas"
[109] "integral" "necessary" "part"
[112] "belief" "systems" "lifeway"
[115] "Northwest" "California" "Indian"
[118] "peoples" "Id" "Accordingly"
[121] "report" "recommended" "G"
[124] "O" "road" "completed"
[127] ""
[[972]]
[1] "" "In" "Forest"
[4] "Service" "decided" "adopt"
[7] "recommendation" "prepared" "final"
[10] "environmental" "impact" "statement"
[13] "construction" "road" "The"
[16] "Regional" "Forester" "selected"
[19] "route" "avoided" "archeological"
[22] "sites" "removed" "far"
[25] "possible" "sites" "used"
[28] "contemporary" "Indians" "specific"
[31] "spiritual" "activities" "Alternative"
[34] "routes" "avoided" "Chimney"
[37] "Rock" "area" "altogether"
[40] "rejected" "required" "acquisition"
[43] "private" "land" "serious"
[46] "soil" "stability" "problems"
[49] "event" "traversed" "areas"
[52] "ritualistic" "value" "American"
[55] "Indians" "See" "id"
[58] "At" "time" "Forest"
[61] "Service" "adopted" "management"
[64] "plan" "allowing" "harvesting"
[67] "significant" "amounts" "timber"
[70] "area" "forest" "The"
[73] "management" "plan" "provided"
[76] "one" "half" "mile"
[79] "protective" "zones" "around"
[82] "religious" "sites" "identified"
[85] "report" "commissioned" "connection"
[88] "G" "O" "road"
[91] ""
[[973]]
[1] "After" "exhausting" "administrative"
[4] "remedies" "respondents" "Indian"
[7] "organization" "individual" "Indians"
[10] "nature" "organizations" "individual"
[13] "members" "organizations" "State"
[16] "California" "challenged" "road"
[19] "building" "timber" "harvesting"
[22] "decisions" "United" "States"
[25] "District" "Court" "Northern"
[28] "District" "California" "Respondents"
[31] "claimed" "Forest" "Service"
[34] "s" "decisions" "violated"
[37] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[40] "Federal" "Water" "Pollution"
[43] "Control" "Act" "FWPCA"
[46] "Stat" "amended" "U"
[49] "S" "C" "et"
[52] "seq" "National" "Environmental"
[55] "Policy" "Act" "NEPA"
[58] "Stat" "U" "S"
[61] "C" "et" "seq"
[64] "several" "federal" "statutes"
[67] "governmental" "trust" "responsibilities"
[70] "Indians" "living" "Hoopa"
[73] "Valley" "Reservation" ""
[[974]]
[1] "After" "trial" "District"
[4] "Court" "issued" "permanent"
[7] "injunction" "prohibiting" "Government"
[10] "constructing" "Chimney" "Rock"
[13] "section" "G" "O"
[16] "road" "putting" "timber"
[19] "harvesting" "management" "plan"
[22] "effect" "See" "Northwest"
[25] "Indian" "Cemetery" "Protective"
[28] "Assn" "v" "Peterson"
[31] "F" "Supp" "The"
[34] "court" "found" "actions"
[37] "violate" "Free" "Exercise"
[40] "Clause" "seriously" "damage"
[43] "salient" "visual" "aural"
[46] "environmental" "qualities" "high"
[49] "country" "Id" "The"
[52] "court" "also" "found"
[55] "proposed" "actions" "violate"
[58] "FWPCA" "environmental" "impact"
[61] "statements" "construction" "road"
[64] "deficient" "NEPA" "Finally"
[67] "court" "concluded" "projects"
[70] "breach" "Government" "s"
[73] "trust" "responsibilities" "protect"
[76] "water" "fishing" "rights"
[79] "reserved" "Hoopa" "Valley"
[82] "Indians" ""
[[975]]
[1] "While" "appeal" "pending" "United"
[5] "States" "Court" "Appeals" "Ninth"
[9] "Circuit" "Congress" "enacted" "California"
[13] "Wilderness" "Act" "Pub" "L"
[17] "Stat" "Under" "statute" "much"
[21] "property" "covered" "Forest" "Service"
[25] "s" "management" "plan" "now"
[29] "designated" "wilderness" "area" "means"
[33] "commercial" "activities" "timber" "harvesting"
[37] "forbidden" "The" "statute" "exempts"
[41] "narrow" "strip" "land" "coinciding"
[45] "Forest" "Service" "s" "proposed"
[49] "route" "remaining" "segment" "G"
[53] "O" "road" "wilderness" "designation"
[57] "The" "legislative" "history" "indicates"
[61] "exemption" "adopted" "enable" "completion"
[65] "Gasquet" "Orleans" "Road" "project"
[69] "responsible" "authorities" "decide" "S"
[73] "Rep" "No" "p" "The"
[77] "existing" "unpaved" "section" "road"
[81] "however" "lies" "within" "wilderness"
[85] "area" "therefore" "now" "closed"
[89] "general" "traffic" ""
[[976]]
[1] "A" "panel" "Ninth"
[4] "Circuit" "affirmed" "part"
[7] "Northwest" "Indian" "Cemetery"
[10] "Protective" "Assn" "v"
[13] "Peterson" "F" "d"
[16] "The" "panel" "unanimously"
[19] "rejected" "District" "Court"
[22] "s" "conclusion" "Government"
[25] "s" "proposed" "actions"
[28] "breach" "trust" "responsibilities"
[31] "Indians" "Hoopa" "Valley"
[34] "Reservation" "The" "panel"
[37] "also" "vacated" "injunction"
[40] "extent" "rendered" "moot"
[43] "California" "Wilderness" "Act"
[46] "now" "prevents" "timber"
[49] "harvesting" "certain" "areas"
[52] "covered" "District" "Court"
[55] "s" "order" "The"
[58] "District" "Court" "s"
[61] "decision" "extent" "rested"
[64] "statutory" "grounds" "otherwise"
[67] "unanimously" "affirmed" ""
[[977]]
[1] "" "By" "divided"
[4] "decision" "District" "Court"
[7] "s" "constitutional" "ruling"
[10] "also" "affirmed" "Relying"
[13] "primarily" "Forest" "Service"
[16] "s" "commissioned" "study"
[19] "majority" "found" "construction"
[22] "Chimney" "Rock" "section"
[25] "G" "O" "road"
[28] "significant" "though" "largely"
[31] "indirect" "adverse" "effects"
[34] "Indian" "religious" "practices"
[37] "The" "majority" "concluded"
[40] "Government" "failed" "demonstrate"
[43] "compelling" "interest" "completion"
[46] "road" "abandoned" "road"
[49] "without" "thereby" "creating"
[52] "religious" "preserve" "single"
[55] "group" "violation" "establishment"
[58] "clause" "Id" "The"
[61] "majority" "apparently" "applied"
[64] "analysis" "logging" "operations"
[67] "might" "carried" "portions"
[70] "Chimney" "Rock" "area"
[73] "covered" "California" "Wilderness"
[76] "Act" "See" "id"
[79] "Because" "high" "country"
[82] "now" "designated" "Congress"
[85] "wilderness" "area" "issue"
[88] "logging" "becomes" "less"
[91] "significant" "although" "disappear"
[94] ""
[[978]]
[1] "The" "dissenting" "judge" "argued"
[5] "certain" "adverse" "effects" "Indian"
[9] "respondents" "religious" "practices" "eliminated"
[13] "less" "drastic" "measures" "ban"
[17] "building" "road" "actual" "suggested"
[21] "adverse" "effects" "pose" "serious"
[25] "threat" "Indians" "religious" "practices"
[29] "He" "also" "concluded" "injunction"
[33] "timber" "harvesting" "needed" "reconsidered"
[37] "light" "California" "Wilderness" "Act"
[41] "It" "clear" "whether" "district"
[45] "court" "issued" "injunction" "based"
[49] "upon" "development" "remaining" "small"
[53] "parcels" "Accordingly" "I" "remand"
[57] "allow" "district" "court" "reevaluate"
[61] "injunction" "light" "Act" "Id"
[65] ""
[[979]]
[1] "II" ""
[[980]]
[1] "" "We" "begin"
[4] "noting" "courts" "articulate"
[7] "bases" "decisions" "perfect"
[10] "clarity" "A" "fundamental"
[13] "longstanding" "principle" "judicial"
[16] "restraint" "requires" "courts"
[19] "avoid" "reaching" "constitutional"
[22] "questions" "advance" "necessity"
[25] "deciding" "See" "Three"
[28] "Affiliated" "Tribes" "Ft"
[31] "Berthold" "Reservation" "v"
[34] "Wold" "Engineering" "P"
[37] "C" "U" "S"
[40] "S" "Ct" "L"
[43] "Ed" "d" "see"
[46] "also" "e" "g"
[49] "Jean" "v" "Nelson"
[52] "U" "S" "S"
[55] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[58] "d" "Gulf" "Oil"
[61] "Co" "v" "Bernard"
[64] "U" "S" "S"
[67] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[70] "d" "Ashwander" "v"
[73] "TVA" "U" "S"
[76] "S" "Ct" "L"
[79] "Ed" "Brandeis" "J"
[82] "concurring" "This" "principle"
[85] "required" "courts" "determine"
[88] "addressing" "constitutional" "issue"
[91] "whether" "decision" "question"
[94] "entitled" "respondents" "relief"
[97] "beyond" "entitled" "statutory"
[100] "claims" "If" "additional"
[103] "relief" "warranted" "constitutional"
[106] "decision" "unnecessary" "therefore"
[109] "inappropriate" ""
[[981]]
[1] "" "Neither" "District"
[4] "Court" "Court" "Appeals"
[7] "explained" "expressly" "articulated"
[10] "necessity" "constitutional" "holdings"
[13] "Were" "persuaded" "holdings"
[16] "unnecessary" "simply" "vacate"
[19] "relevant" "portions" "judgment"
[22] "without" "discussing" "merits"
[25] "constitutional" "issue" "The"
[28] "structure" "wording" "District"
[31] "Court" "s" "injunctive"
[34] "order" "however" "suggest"
[37] "statutory" "holdings" "supported"
[40] "relief" "granted" "The"
[43] "order" "divided" "four"
[46] "sections" "Two" "sections"
[49] "deal" "acre" "tract"
[52] "referred" "Blue" "Creek"
[55] "Roadless" "Area" "The"
[58] "injunction" "prohibits" "Forest"
[61] "Service" "engaging" "timber"
[64] "harvesting" "road" "building"
[67] "anywhere" "tract" "unless"
[70] "compliance" "NEPA" "FWPCA"
[73] "demonstrated" "F" "Supp"
[76] "The" "sections" "injunction"
[79] "dealing" "smaller" "Chimney"
[82] "Rock" "area" "e"
[85] "area" "affected" "First"
[88] "Amendment" "challenge" "worded"
[91] "differently" "The" "Forest"
[94] "Service" "permanently" "enjoined"
[97] "without" "qualifying" "language"
[100] "constructing" "proposed" "portion"
[103] "G" "O" "road"
[106] "alternative" "route" "area"
[109] "similarly" "injunction" "forbids"
[112] "timber" "harvesting" "construction"
[115] "logging" "roads" "Chimney"
[118] "Rock" "area" "pursuant"
[121] "Forest" "Service" "s"
[124] "proposed" "management" "plan"
[127] "land" "management" "plan"
[130] "Id" "emphasis" "added"
[133] "These" "differences" "wording"
[136] "suggest" "without" "absolutely"
[139] "implying" "injunction" "covering"
[142] "Chimney" "Rock" "area"
[145] "way" "conditional" "narrower"
[148] "scope" "District" "Court"
[151] "decided" "First" "Amendment"
[154] "issue" "Similarly" "silence"
[157] "Court" "Appeals" "necessity"
[160] "reaching" "First" "Amendment"
[163] "issue" "may" "reflected"
[166] "understanding" "District" "Court"
[169] "s" "injunction" "necessarily"
[172] "rested" "part" "constitutional"
[175] "grounds" ""
[[982]]
[1] "Because" "appears" "reasonably"
[4] "likely" "First" "Amendment"
[7] "issue" "necessary" "decisions"
[10] "believe" "inadvisable" "vacate"
[13] "remand" "without" "addressing"
[16] "issue" "merits" "This"
[19] "conclusion" "strengthened" "considerations"
[22] "judicial" "economy" "The"
[25] "Government" "petitioned" "certiorari"
[28] "constitutional" "issue" "alone"
[31] "informed" "us" "believes"
[34] "can" "cure" "statutory"
[37] "defects" "identified" "intends"
[40] "will" "challenge" "adverse"
[43] "statutory" "rulings" "Tr"
[46] "Oral" "Arg" "In"
[49] "circumstance" "difficult" "see"
[52] "principle" "vindicated" "sending"
[55] "case" "almost" "certainly"
[58] "brief" "round" "trip"
[61] "courts" ""
[[983]]
[1] "III" ""
[[984]]
[1] "A" ""
[[985]]
[1] "" "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[5] "Clause" "First" "Amendment" "provides"
[9] "Congress" "shall" "make" "law"
[13] "prohibiting" "free" "exercise" "religion"
[17] "It" "undisputed" "Indian" "respondents"
[21] "beliefs" "sincere" "Government" "s"
[25] "proposed" "actions" "will" "severe"
[29] "adverse" "effects" "practice" "religion"
[33] "Those" "respondents" "contend" "burden"
[37] "religious" "practices" "heavy" "enough"
[41] "violate" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[45] "unless" "Government" "can" "demonstrate"
[49] "compelling" "need" "complete" "G"
[53] "O" "road" "engage" "timber"
[57] "harvesting" "Chimney" "Rock" "area"
[61] "We" "disagree" ""
[[986]]
[1] "" "In" "Bowen" "v"
[5] "Roy" "U" "S" "S"
[9] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[13] "considered" "challenge" "federal" "statute"
[17] "required" "States" "use" "Social"
[21] "Security" "numbers" "administering" "certain"
[25] "welfare" "programs" "Two" "applicants"
[29] "benefits" "programs" "contended" "religious"
[33] "beliefs" "prevented" "acceding" "use"
[37] "Social" "Security" "number" "year"
[41] "old" "daughter" "use" "numerical"
[45] "identifier" "rob" "spirit" "daughter"
[49] "prevent" "attaining" "greater" "spiritual"
[53] "power" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[57] "Similarly" "case" "said" "disruption"
[61] "natural" "environment" "caused" "G"
[65] "O" "road" "will" "diminish"
[69] "sacredness" "area" "question" "create"
[73] "distractions" "will" "interfere" "training"
[77] "ongoing" "religious" "experience" "individuals"
[81] "using" "sites" "within" "area"
[85] "personal" "medicine" "growth" "integrated"
[89] "parts" "system" "religious" "belief"
[93] "practice" "correlates" "ascending" "degrees"
[97] "personal" "power" "geographic" "hierarchy"
[101] "power" "App" "Cf" "id"
[105] "Scarred" "hills" "mountains" "disturbed"
[109] "rocks" "destroy" "purity" "sacred"
[113] "areas" "Indian" "consultants" "repeatedly"
[117] "stressed" "need" "training" "doctor"
[121] "undistracted" "disturbance" "The" "Court"
[125] "rejected" "kind" "challenge" "Roy"
[129] ""
[[987]]
[1] "" "The" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[6] "simply" "understood" "require" "Government" "conduct"
[11] "internal" "affairs" "ways" "comport" "religious"
[16] "beliefs" "particular" "citizens" "Just" "Government"
[21] "may" "insist" "Roys" "engage" "set"
[26] "form" "religious" "observance" "may" "demand"
[31] "Government" "join" "chosen" "religious" "practices"
[36] "refraining" "using" "number" "identify" "daughter"
[41] ""
[[988]]
[1] "" "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[5] "Clause" "affords" "individual" "protection"
[9] "certain" "forms" "governmental" "compulsion"
[13] "afford" "individual" "right" "dictate"
[17] "conduct" "Government" "s" "internal"
[21] "procedures" "U" "S" "S"
[25] "Ct" ""
[[989]]
[1] "" "The" "building" "road"
[5] "harvesting" "timber" "publicly" "owned"
[9] "land" "meaningfully" "distinguished" "use"
[13] "Social" "Security" "number" "Roy"
[17] "In" "cases" "challenged" "Government"
[21] "action" "interfere" "significantly" "private"
[25] "persons" "ability" "pursue" "spiritual"
[29] "fulfillment" "according" "religious" "beliefs"
[33] "In" "neither" "case" "however"
[37] "affected" "individuals" "coerced" "Government"
[41] "s" "action" "violating" "religious"
[45] "beliefs" "either" "governmental" "action"
[49] "penalize" "religious" "activity" "denying"
[53] "person" "equal" "share" "rights"
[57] "benefits" "privileges" "enjoyed" "citizens"
[61] ""
[[990]]
[1] "We" "asked" "distinguish" "case"
[5] "Roy" "ground" "infringement" "religious"
[9] "liberty" "significantly" "greater" "ground"
[13] "Government" "practice" "Roy" "purely"
[17] "mechanical" "whereas" "case" "involves"
[21] "case" "case" "substantive" "determination"
[25] "particular" "unit" "land" "will"
[29] "managed" "Brief" "Indian" "Respondents"
[33] "Similarly" "told" "case" "can"
[37] "distinguished" "Roy" "government" "action"
[41] "physically" "removed" "location" "places"
[45] "restriction" "practitioner" "may" "Brief"
[49] "Respondent" "State" "California" "The"
[53] "State" "suggests" "Social" "Security"
[57] "number" "Roy" "characterized" "interfering"
[61] "Roy" "s" "religious" "tenets"
[65] "subjective" "point" "view" "government"
[69] "s" "conduct" "internal" "affairs"
[73] "known" "secondhand" "interfere" "ability"
[77] "practice" "religion" "Id" "footnote"
[81] "omitted" "internal" "citation" "omitted"
[85] "In" "case" "however" "said"
[89] "proposed" "road" "will" "physically"
[93] "destro" "y" "environmental" "conditions"
[97] "privacy" "without" "religious" "practices"
[101] "conducted" "Ibid" ""
[[991]]
[1] "These" "efforts" "distinguish"
[4] "Roy" "unavailing" "This"
[7] "Court" "determine" "truth"
[10] "underlying" "beliefs" "led"
[13] "religious" "objections" "Roy"
[16] "see" "Hobbie" "v"
[19] "Unemployment" "Appeals" "Comm"
[22] "n" "Fla" "U"
[25] "S" "n" "S"
[28] "Ct" "n" "L"
[31] "Ed" "d" "accordingly"
[34] "weigh" "adverse" "effects"
[37] "appellees" "Roy" "compare"
[40] "adverse" "effects" "Indian"
[43] "respondents" "Without" "ability"
[46] "make" "comparisons" "say"
[49] "one" "form" "incidental"
[52] "interference" "individual" "s"
[55] "spiritual" "activities" "subjected"
[58] "different" "constitutional" "analysis"
[61] ""
[[992]]
[1] "Respondents" "insist" "nonetheless" "courts"
[5] "properly" "relied" "factual" "inquiry"
[9] "degree" "Indians" "spiritual" "practices"
[13] "become" "ineffectual" "G" "O"
[17] "road" "built" "They" "rely"
[21] "several" "cases" "Court" "sustained"
[25] "free" "exercise" "challenges" "government"
[29] "programs" "interfered" "individuals" "ability"
[33] "practice" "religion" "See" "Wisconsin"
[37] "v" "Yoder" "U" "S"
[41] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[45] "d" "compulsory" "school" "attendance"
[49] "law" "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[53] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[57] "L" "Ed" "d" "denial"
[61] "unemployment" "benefits" "applicant" "refused"
[65] "accept" "work" "requiring" "violate"
[69] "Sabbath" "Thomas" "v" "Review"
[73] "Board" "Indiana" "Employment" "Security"
[77] "Div" "U" "S" "S"
[81] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[85] "denial" "unemployment" "benefits" "applicant"
[89] "whose" "religion" "forbade" "fabricate"
[93] "weapons" "Hobbie" "supra" "denial"
[97] "unemployment" "benefits" "religious" "convert"
[101] "resigned" "position" "required" "work"
[105] "Sabbath" ""
[[993]]
[1] "Even" "apart" "inconsistency"
[4] "Roy" "respondents" "reading"
[7] "cases" "interpretation" "will"
[10] "withstand" "analysis" "It"
[13] "true" "Court" "repeatedly"
[16] "held" "indirect" "coercion"
[19] "penalties" "free" "exercise"
[22] "religion" "just" "outright"
[25] "prohibitions" "subject" "scrutiny"
[28] "First" "Amendment" "Thus"
[31] "example" "ineligibility" "unemployment"
[34] "benefits" "based" "solely"
[37] "refusal" "violate" "Sabbath"
[40] "analogized" "fine" "imposed"
[43] "Sabbath" "worship" "Sherbert"
[46] "supra" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "This"
[52] "imply" "incidental" "effects"
[55] "government" "programs" "may"
[58] "make" "difficult" "practice"
[61] "certain" "religions" "tendency"
[64] "coerce" "individuals" "acting"
[67] "contrary" "religious" "beliefs"
[70] "require" "government" "bring"
[73] "forward" "compelling" "justification"
[76] "otherwise" "lawful" "actions"
[79] "The" "crucial" "word"
[82] "constitutional" "text" "prohibit"
[85] "For" "Free" "Exercise"
[88] "Clause" "written" "terms"
[91] "government" "individual" "terms"
[94] "individual" "can" "exact"
[97] "government" "Sherbert" "supra"
[100] "S" "Ct" "Douglas"
[103] "J" "concurring" ""
[[994]]
[1] "" "Whatever" "may"
[4] "exact" "line" "unconstitutional"
[7] "prohibitions" "free" "exercise"
[10] "religion" "legitimate" "conduct"
[13] "government" "affairs" "location"
[16] "line" "depend" "measuring"
[19] "effects" "governmental" "action"
[22] "religious" "objector" "s"
[25] "spiritual" "development" "The"
[28] "Government" "dispute" "reason"
[31] "doubt" "logging" "road"
[34] "building" "projects" "issue"
[37] "case" "devastating" "effects"
[40] "traditional" "Indian" "religious"
[43] "practices" "Those" "practices"
[46] "intimately" "inextricably" "bound"
[49] "unique" "features" "Chimney"
[52] "Rock" "area" "known"
[55] "Indians" "high" "country"
[58] "Individual" "practitioners" "use"
[61] "area" "personal" "spiritual"
[64] "development" "activities" "believed"
[67] "critically" "important" "advancing"
[70] "welfare" "Tribe" "indeed"
[73] "mankind" "The" "Indians"
[76] "use" "area" "used"
[79] "long" "time" "conduct"
[82] "wide" "variety" "specific"
[85] "rituals" "aim" "accomplish"
[88] "religious" "goals" "According"
[91] "beliefs" "rituals" "efficacious"
[94] "conducted" "sites" "ones"
[97] "traditionally" "used" "much"
[100] "disturbance" "area" "s"
[103] "natural" "state" "clearly"
[106] "render" "meaningful" "continuation"
[109] "traditional" "practices" "impossible"
[112] "To" "sure" "Indians"
[115] "far" "unanimous" "opposing"
[118] "G" "O" "road"
[121] "see" "App" "seems"
[124] "less" "certain" "construction"
[127] "road" "will" "disruptive"
[130] "will" "doom" "religion"
[133] "Nevertheless" "can" "assume"
[136] "threat" "efficacy" "least"
[139] "religious" "practices" "extremely"
[142] "grave" ""
[[995]]
[1] "Even" "assume" "accept" "Ninth"
[5] "Circuit" "s" "prediction" "according"
[9] "G" "O" "road" "will"
[13] "virtually" "destroy" "Indians" "ability"
[17] "practice" "religion" "F" "d"
[21] "opinion" "Constitution" "simply" "provide"
[25] "principle" "justify" "upholding" "respondents"
[29] "legal" "claims" "However" "much"
[33] "might" "wish" "otherwise" "government"
[37] "simply" "operate" "required" "satisfy"
[41] "every" "citizen" "s" "religious"
[45] "needs" "desires" "A" "broad"
[49] "range" "government" "activities" "social"
[53] "welfare" "programs" "foreign" "aid"
[57] "conservation" "projects" "will" "always"
[61] "considered" "essential" "spiritual" "well"
[65] "citizens" "often" "basis" "sincerely"
[69] "held" "religious" "beliefs" "Others"
[73] "will" "find" "activities" "deeply"
[77] "offensive" "perhaps" "incompatible" "search"
[81] "spiritual" "fulfillment" "tenets" "religion"
[85] "The" "First" "Amendment" "must"
[89] "apply" "citizens" "alike" "can"
[93] "give" "none" "veto" "public"
[97] "programs" "prohibit" "free" "exercise"
[101] "religion" "The" "Constitution" "courts"
[105] "offer" "reconcile" "various" "competing"
[109] "demands" "government" "many" "rooted"
[113] "sincere" "religious" "belief" "inevitably"
[117] "arise" "diverse" "society" "That"
[121] "task" "extent" "feasible" "legislatures"
[125] "institutions" "Cf" "The" "Federalist"
[129] "No" "suggesting" "effects" "religious"
[133] "factionalism" "best" "restrained" "competition"
[137] "among" "multiplicity" "religious" "sects"
[141] ""
[[996]]
[1] "One" "need" "look" "far"
[5] "beyond" "present" "case" "see"
[9] "analysis" "Roy" "respondents" "proposed"
[13] "extension" "Sherbert" "progeny" "offers"
[17] "sound" "reading" "Constitution" "Respondents"
[21] "attempt" "stress" "limits" "religious"
[25] "servitude" "now" "seeking" "impose"
[29] "Chimney" "Rock" "area" "Six"
[33] "Rivers" "National" "Forest" "While"
[37] "defending" "injunction" "logging" "operations"
[41] "construction" "road" "apparently" "present"
[45] "object" "area" "s" "used"
[49] "recreational" "visitors" "Indians" "forest"
[53] "rangers" "Nothing" "principle" "contend"
[57] "however" "distinguish" "case" "another"
[61] "lawsuit" "similarly" "situated" "religious"
[65] "objectors" "might" "seek" "exclude"
[69] "human" "activity" "sacred" "areas"
[73] "public" "lands" "The" "Indian"
[77] "respondents" "insist" "p" "rivacy"
[81] "power" "quests" "required" "practitioners"
[85] "maintain" "purity" "needed" "successful"
[89] "journey" "Brief" "Indian" "Respondents"
[93] "emphasis" "added" "citation" "record"
[97] "omitted" "Similarly" "The" "practices"
[101] "conducted" "high" "country" "entail"
[105] "intense" "meditation" "require" "practitioner"
[109] "achieve" "profound" "awareness" "natural"
[113] "environment" "Prayer" "seats" "oriented"
[117] "unobstructed" "view" "practitioner" "must"
[121] "surrounded" "undisturbed" "naturalness" "Id"
[125] "n" "emphasis" "added" "citations"
[129] "record" "omitted" "No" "disrespect"
[133] "practices" "implied" "one" "notes"
[137] "beliefs" "easily" "require" "de"
[141] "facto" "beneficial" "ownership" "rather"
[145] "spacious" "tracts" "public" "property"
[149] "Even" "without" "anticipating" "future"
[153] "cases" "diminution" "Government" "s"
[157] "property" "rights" "concomitant" "subsidy"
[161] "Indian" "religion" "case" "far"
[165] "trivial" "District" "Court" "s"
[169] "order" "permanently" "forbade" "commercial"
[173] "timber" "harvesting" "construction" "two"
[177] "lane" "road" "anywhere" "within"
[181] "area" "covering" "full" "sections"
[185] "e" "acres" "public" "land"
[189] ""
[[997]]
[1] "The" "Constitution" "permit"
[4] "government" "discriminate" "religions"
[7] "treat" "particular" "physical"
[10] "sites" "sacred" "law"
[13] "prohibiting" "Indian" "respondents"
[16] "visiting" "Chimney" "Rock"
[19] "area" "raise" "different"
[22] "set" "constitutional" "questions"
[25] "Whatever" "rights" "Indians"
[28] "may" "use" "area"
[31] "however" "rights" "divest"
[34] "Government" "right" "use"
[37] "land" "Cf" "Bowen"
[40] "v" "Roy" "U"
[43] "S" "S" "Ct"
[46] "O" "CONNOR" "J"
[49] "concurring" "part" "dissenting"
[52] "part" "distinguishing" "Government"
[55] "s" "use" "information"
[58] "possession" "Government" "s"
[61] "requiring" "individual" "provide"
[64] "information" ""
[[998]]
[1] "B" ""
[[999]]
[1] "Nothing" "opinion" "read" "encourage"
[5] "governmental" "insensitivity" "religious" "needs"
[9] "citizen" "The" "Government" "s"
[13] "rights" "use" "land" "example"
[17] "need" "discourage" "accommodating" "religious"
[21] "practices" "like" "engaged" "Indian"
[25] "respondents" "Cf" "Sherbert" "U"
[29] "S" "S" "Ct" "Harlan"
[33] "J" "dissenting" "It" "worth"
[37] "emphasizing" "therefore" "Government" "taken"
[41] "numerous" "steps" "case" "minimize"
[45] "impact" "construction" "G" "O"
[49] "road" "will" "Indians" "religious"
[53] "activities" "First" "Forest" "Service"
[57] "commissioned" "comprehensive" "study" "effects"
[61] "project" "cultural" "religious" "value"
[65] "Chimney" "Rock" "area" "The"
[69] "resulting" "page" "report" "sympathetic"
[73] "Indians" "interests" "constituted" "principal"
[77] "piece" "evidence" "relied" "respondents"
[81] "throughout" "litigation" ""
[[1000]]
[1] "Although" "Forest" "Service"
[4] "end" "adopt" "report"
[7] "s" "recommendation" "project"
[10] "abandoned" "many" "ameliorative"
[13] "measures" "planned" "No"
[16] "sites" "specific" "rituals"
[19] "take" "place" "disturbed"
[22] "In" "fact" "major"
[25] "factor" "choosing" "among"
[28] "alternative" "routes" "road"
[31] "relation" "various" "routes"
[34] "religious" "sites" "route"
[37] "selected" "Regional" "Forester"
[40] "noted" "farthest" "removed"
[43] "contemporary" "spiritual" "sites"
[46] "thus" "adverse" "audible"
[49] "intrusions" "associated" "road"
[52] "less" "alternatives" "App"
[55] "Nor" "Forest" "Service"
[58] "s" "concerns" "limited"
[61] "audible" "intrusions" "As"
[64] "dissenting" "judge" "observed"
[67] "specific" "steps" "planned"
[70] "reduce" "visual" "impact"
[73] "road" "surrounding" "country"
[76] "See" "F" "d"
[79] "Beezer" "J" "dissenting"
[82] "part" ""
[[1001]]
[1] "Except" "abandoning" "project" "entirely"
[5] "thereby" "leaving" "two" "existing"
[9] "segments" "road" "dead" "end"
[13] "middle" "National" "Forest" "difficult"
[17] "see" "Government" "solicitous" "Such"
[21] "solicitude" "accords" "policy" "United"
[25] "States" "protect" "preserve" "American"
[29] "Indians" "inherent" "right" "freedom"
[33] "believe" "express" "exercise" "traditional"
[37] "religions" "American" "Indian" "including"
[41] "limited" "access" "sites" "use"
[45] "possession" "sacred" "objects" "freedom"
[49] "worship" "ceremonials" "traditional" "rites"
[53] "American" "Indian" "Religious" "Freedom"
[57] "Act" "AIRFA" "Pub" "L"
[61] "Stat" "U" "S" "C"
[65] ""
[[1002]]
[1] "" "Respondents" "however"
[4] "suggest" "AIRFA" "goes"
[7] "effect" "enacts" "interpretation"
[10] "First" "Amendment" "statutory"
[13] "law" "Although" "contention"
[16] "rejected" "District" "Court"
[19] "seek" "defend" "judgment"
[22] "arguing" "AIRFA" "authorizes"
[25] "injunction" "completion" "G"
[28] "O" "road" "This"
[31] "argument" "without" "merit"
[34] "After" "reciting" "several"
[37] "legislative" "findings" "AIRFA"
[40] "resolves" "upon" "policy"
[43] "quoted" "A" "second"
[46] "section" "statute" "Stat"
[49] "required" "evaluation" "federal"
[52] "policies" "procedures" "consultation"
[55] "native" "religious" "leaders"
[58] "changes" "necessary" "protect"
[61] "preserve" "rights" "practices"
[64] "question" "The" "required"
[67] "report" "dealing" "evaluation"
[70] "completed" "released" "Reply"
[73] "Brief" "Petitioners" "n"
[76] "Nowhere" "law" "much"
[79] "hint" "intent" "create"
[82] "cause" "action" "judicially"
[85] "enforceable" "individual" "rights"
[88] ""
[[1003]]
[1] "What" "obvious" "face"
[4] "statute" "confirmed" "numerous"
[7] "indications" "legislative" "history"
[10] "The" "sponsor" "bill"
[13] "became" "AIRFA" "Representative"
[16] "Udall" "called" "sense"
[19] "Congress" "joint" "resolution"
[22] "aimed" "ensuring" "basic"
[25] "right" "Indian" "people"
[28] "exercise" "traditional" "religious"
[31] "practices" "infringed" "without"
[34] "clear" "decision" "part"
[37] "Congress" "administrators" "religious"
[40] "practices" "must" "yield"
[43] "higher" "consideration" "Cong"
[46] "Rec" "Representative" "Udall"
[49] "emphasized" "bill" "confer"
[52] "special" "religious" "rights"
[55] "Indians" "change" "existing"
[58] "State" "Federal" "law"
[61] "fact" "teeth" "Id"
[64] ""
[[1004]]
[1] "" "C" ""
[[1005]]
[1] "The" "dissent" "proposes"
[4] "approach" "First" "Amendment"
[7] "fundamentally" "inconsistent" "principles"
[10] "decision" "rests" "Notwithstanding"
[13] "sympathy" "must" "feel"
[16] "plight" "Indian" "respondents"
[19] "plain" "approach" "taken"
[22] "dissent" "withstand" "analysis"
[25] "On" "contrary" "path"
[28] "towards" "points" "us"
[31] "incompatible" "text" "Constitution"
[34] "precedents" "Court" "responsible"
[37] "sense" "institutional" "role"
[40] ""
[[1006]]
[1] "The" "dissent" "begins"
[4] "asserting" "constitutional" "guarantee"
[7] "interpret" "today" "directed"
[10] "form" "government" "action"
[13] "frustrates" "inhibits" "religious"
[16] "practice" "Post" "emphasis"
[19] "added" "The" "Constitution"
[22] "however" "says" "thing"
[25] "Rather" "states" "Congress"
[28] "shall" "make" "law"
[31] "prohibiting" "free" "exercise"
[34] "religion" "U" "S"
[37] "Const" "Amdt" "emphasis"
[40] "added" ""
[[1007]]
[1] "As" "explained" "Bowen" "v"
[5] "Roy" "rejected" "First" "Amendment"
[9] "challenge" "Government" "activities" "religious"
[13] "objectors" "sincerely" "believed" "rob"
[17] "spirit" "daughter" "prevent" "attaining"
[21] "greater" "spiritual" "power" "See"
[25] "supra" "quoting" "Roy" "U"
[29] "S" "S" "Ct" "The"
[33] "dissent" "now" "offers" "distinguish"
[37] "case" "saying" "Government" "acting"
[41] "purely" "internal" "manner" "whereas"
[45] "land" "use" "decisions" "likely"
[49] "substantial" "external" "effects" "Post"
[53] "Whatever" "source" "meaning" "dissent"
[57] "s" "distinction" "basis" "Roy"
[61] "Robbing" "spirit" "child" "preventing"
[65] "attaining" "greater" "spiritual" "power"
[69] "substantial" "external" "effect" "one"
[73] "remarkably" "similar" "injury" "claimed"
[77] "respondents" "case" "us" "today"
[81] "The" "dissent" "s" "reading"
[85] "Roy" "effectively" "overrule" "decision"
[89] "without" "providing" "compelling" "justification"
[93] ""
[[1008]]
[1] "The" "dissent" "also"
[4] "misreads" "Wisconsin" "v"
[7] "Yoder" "U" "S"
[10] "S" "Ct" "L"
[13] "Ed" "d" "The"
[16] "statute" "issue" "case"
[19] "prohibited" "Amish" "parents"
[22] "pain" "criminal" "prosecution"
[25] "providing" "children" "kind"
[28] "education" "required" "Amish"
[31] "religion" "Id" "S"
[34] "Ct" "The" "statute"
[37] "directly" "compelled" "Amish"
[40] "send" "children" "public"
[43] "high" "schools" "contrary"
[46] "Amish" "religion" "way"
[49] "life" "Id" "S"
[52] "Ct" "The" "Court"
[55] "acknowledged" "statute" "might"
[58] "constitutional" "despite" "coercive"
[61] "nature" "State" "show"
[64] "sufficient" "particularity" "admittedly"
[67] "strong" "interest" "compulsory"
[70] "education" "adversely" "affected"
[73] "granting" "exemption" "Amish"
[76] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[79] "citation" "omitted" "The"
[82] "dissent" "s" "context"
[85] "quotations" "notwithstanding" "nothing"
[88] "whatsoever" "Yoder" "opinion"
[91] "support" "proposition" "impact"
[94] "Amish" "religion" "constitutionally"
[97] "problematic" "statute" "issue"
[100] "coercive" "nature" "Cf"
[103] "post" ""
[[1009]]
[1] "Perceiving" "stress" "point"
[4] "longstanding" "conflict" "two"
[7] "disparate" "cultures" "dissent"
[10] "attacks" "us" "declining"
[13] "balanc" "e" "competing"
[16] "potentially" "irreconcilable" "interests"
[19] "choosing" "instead" "turn"
[22] "difficult" "task" "Federal"
[25] "Legislature" "Post" "Seeing"
[28] "Court" "arbiter" "dissent"
[31] "proposes" "legal" "test"
[34] "decide" "public" "lands"
[37] "central" "indispensable" "religions"
[40] "implication" "dispensable" "peripheral"
[43] "decide" "government" "programs"
[46] "compelling" "enough" "justify"
[49] "infringement" "practices" "Post"
[52] "We" "accordingly" "required"
[55] "weigh" "value" "every"
[58] "religious" "belief" "practice"
[61] "said" "threatened" "government"
[64] "program" "Unless" "showing"
[67] "centrality" "post" "nothing"
[70] "assertion" "centrality" "see"
[73] "post" "dissent" "thus"
[76] "offers" "us" "prospect"
[79] "Courts" "holding" "sincerely"
[82] "held" "religious" "beliefs"
[85] "practices" "central" "certain"
[88] "religions" "despite" "protestations"
[91] "contrary" "religious" "objectors"
[94] "brought" "lawsuit" "In"
[97] "words" "dissent" "s"
[100] "approach" "require" "us"
[103] "rule" "religious" "adherents"
[106] "misunderstand" "religious" "beliefs"
[109] "We" "think" "approach"
[112] "squared" "Constitution" "precedents"
[115] "cast" "Judiciary" "role"
[118] "never" "intended" "play"
[121] ""
[[1010]]
[1] "IV" ""
[[1011]]
[1] "The" "decision" "court" "according"
[5] "First" "Amendment" "precludes" "Government"
[9] "completing" "G" "O" "road"
[13] "permitting" "timber" "harvesting" "Chimney"
[17] "Rock" "area" "reversed" "In"
[21] "order" "District" "Court" "s"
[25] "injunction" "may" "reconsidered" "light"
[29] "holding" "light" "relevant" "events"
[33] "may" "intervened" "since" "injunction"
[37] "issued" "case" "remanded" "proceedings"
[41] "consistent" "opinion" ""
[[1012]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[1013]]
[1] "In" "sex" "couple"
[4] "visited" "Masterpiece" "Cakeshop"
[7] "bakery" "Colorado" "make"
[10] "inquiries" "ordering" "cake"
[13] "wedding" "reception" "The"
[16] "shop" "s" "owner"
[19] "told" "couple" "create"
[22] "cake" "wedding" "religious"
[25] "opposition" "sex" "marriages"
[28] "marriages" "State" "Colorado"
[31] "recognize" "time" "The"
[34] "couple" "filed" "charge"
[37] "Colorado" "Civil" "Rights"
[40] "Commission" "alleging" "discrimination"
[43] "basis" "sexual" "orientation"
[46] "violation" "Colorado" "Anti"
[49] "Discrimination" "Act" ""
[[1014]]
[1] "The" "Commission" "determined" "shop"
[5] "s" "actions" "violated" "Act"
[9] "ruled" "couple" "s" "favor"
[13] "The" "Colorado" "state" "courts"
[17] "affirmed" "ruling" "enforcement" "order"
[21] "Court" "now" "must" "decide"
[25] "whether" "Commission" "s" "order"
[29] "violated" "Constitution" ""
[[1015]]
[1] "The" "case" "presents"
[4] "difficult" "questions" "proper"
[7] "reconciliation" "least" "two"
[10] "principles" "The" "first"
[13] "authority" "State" "governmental"
[16] "entities" "protect" "rights"
[19] "dignity" "gay" "persons"
[22] "wish" "married" "face"
[25] "discrimination" "seek" "goods"
[28] "services" "The" "second"
[31] "right" "persons" "exercise"
[34] "fundamental" "freedoms" "First"
[37] "Amendment" "applied" "States"
[40] "Fourteenth" "Amendment" ""
[[1016]]
[1] "The" "freedoms" "asserted"
[4] "freedom" "speech" "free"
[7] "exercise" "religion" "The"
[10] "free" "speech" "aspect"
[13] "case" "difficult" "persons"
[16] "seen" "beautiful" "wedding"
[19] "cake" "might" "thought"
[22] "creation" "exercise" "protected"
[25] "speech" "This" "instructive"
[28] "example" "however" "proposition"
[31] "application" "constitutional" "freedoms"
[34] "new" "contexts" "can"
[37] "deepen" "understanding" "meaning"
[40] ""
[[1017]]
[1] "One" "difficulties" "case" "parties"
[5] "disagree" "extent" "baker" "s"
[9] "refusal" "provide" "service" "If"
[13] "baker" "refused" "design" "special"
[17] "cake" "words" "images" "celebrating"
[21] "marriage" "instance" "cake" "showing"
[25] "words" "religious" "meaning" "might"
[29] "different" "refusal" "sell" "cake"
[33] "In" "defining" "whether" "baker"
[37] "s" "creation" "can" "protected"
[41] "details" "might" "make" "difference"
[45] ""
[[1018]]
[1] "The" "difficulties" "arise" "determining"
[5] "whether" "baker" "valid" "free"
[9] "exercise" "claim" "A" "baker"
[13] "s" "refusal" "attend" "wedding"
[17] "ensure" "cake" "cut" "right"
[21] "way" "refusal" "put" "certain"
[25] "religious" "words" "decorations" "cake"
[29] "even" "refusal" "sell" "cake"
[33] "baked" "public" "generally" "includes"
[37] "certain" "religious" "words" "symbols"
[41] "just" "three" "examples" "possibilities"
[45] "seem" "endless" ""
[[1019]]
[1] "Whatever" "confluence" "speech" "free"
[5] "exercise" "principles" "might" "cases"
[9] "Colorado" "Civil" "Rights" "Commission"
[13] "s" "consideration" "case" "inconsistent"
[17] "State" "s" "obligation" "religious"
[21] "neutrality" "The" "reason" "motive"
[25] "baker" "s" "refusal" "based"
[29] "sincere" "religious" "beliefs" "convictions"
[33] "The" "Court" "s" "precedents"
[37] "make" "clear" "baker" "capacity"
[41] "owner" "business" "serving" "public"
[45] "might" "right" "free" "exercise"
[49] "religion" "limited" "generally" "applicable"
[53] "laws" "Still" "delicate" "question"
[57] "free" "exercise" "religion" "must"
[61] "yield" "otherwise" "valid" "exercise"
[65] "state" "power" "needed" "determined"
[69] "adjudication" "religious" "hostility" "part"
[73] "State" "factor" "balance" "State"
[77] "sought" "reach" "That" "requirement"
[81] "however" "met" "When" "Colorado"
[85] "Civil" "Rights" "Commission" "considered"
[89] "case" "religious" "neutrality" "Constitution"
[93] "requires" ""
[[1020]]
[1] "Given" "considerations" "proper"
[4] "hold" "whatever" "outcome"
[7] "future" "controversy" "involving"
[10] "facts" "similar" "Commission"
[13] "s" "actions" "violated"
[16] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[19] "order" "must" "set"
[22] "aside" ""
[[1021]]
[1] "I" ""
[[1022]]
[1] "A" ""
[[1023]]
[1] "Masterpiece" "Cakeshop" "Ltd" "bakery"
[5] "Lakewood" "Colorado" "suburb" "Denver"
[9] "The" "shop" "offers" "variety"
[13] "baked" "goods" "ranging" "everyday"
[17] "cookies" "brownies" "elaborate" "custom"
[21] "designed" "cakes" "birthday" "parties"
[25] "weddings" "events" ""
[[1024]]
[1] "Jack" "Phillips" "expert" "baker"
[5] "owned" "operated" "shop" "years"
[9] "Phillips" "devout" "Christian" "He"
[13] "explained" "main" "goal" "life"
[17] "obedient" "Jesus" "Christ" "Christ"
[21] "s" "teachings" "aspects" "life"
[25] "App" "And" "seeks" "honor"
[29] "God" "work" "Masterpiece" "Cakeshop"
[33] "Ibid" "One" "Phillips" "religious"
[37] "beliefs" "God" "s" "intention"
[41] "marriage" "beginning" "history" "union"
[45] "one" "man" "one" "woman"
[49] "Id" "To" "Phillips" "creating"
[53] "wedding" "cake" "sex" "wedding"
[57] "equivalent" "participating" "celebration" "contrary"
[61] "deeply" "held" "beliefs" ""
[[1025]]
[1] "Phillips" "met" "Charlie" "Craig"
[5] "Dave" "Mullins" "entered" "shop"
[9] "summer" "Craig" "Mullins" "planning"
[13] "marry" "At" "time" "Colorado"
[17] "recognize" "sex" "marriages" "couple"
[21] "planned" "wed" "legally" "Massachusetts"
[25] "afterwards" "host" "reception" "family"
[29] "friends" "Denver" "To" "prepare"
[33] "celebration" "Craig" "Mullins" "visited"
[37] "shop" "told" "Phillips" "interested"
[41] "ordering" "cake" "wedding" "Id"
[45] "emphasis" "deleted" "They" "mention"
[49] "design" "cake" "envisioned" ""
[[1026]]
[1] "Phillips" "informed" "couple" "create" "wedding"
[6] "cakes" "sex" "weddings" "Ibid" "He"
[11] "explained" "I" "ll" "make" "birthday"
[16] "cakes" "shower" "cakes" "sell" "cookies"
[21] "brownies" "I" "just" "don" "t"
[26] "make" "cakes" "sex" "weddings" "Ibid"
[31] "The" "couple" "left" "shop" "without"
[36] "discussion" ""
[[1027]]
[1] "The" "following" "day" "Craig"
[5] "s" "mother" "accompanied" "couple"
[9] "cakeshop" "present" "interaction" "Phillips"
[13] "telephoned" "ask" "Phillips" "declined"
[17] "serve" "son" "Phillips" "explained"
[21] "create" "wedding" "cakes" "sex"
[25] "weddings" "religious" "opposition" "sex"
[29] "marriage" "also" "Colorado" "time"
[33] "recognize" "sex" "marriages" "Id"
[37] "He" "later" "explained" "belief"
[41] "create" "wedding" "cake" "event"
[45] "celebrates" "something" "directly" "goes"
[49] "teachings" "Bible" "personal" "endorsement"
[53] "participation" "ceremony" "relationship" "entering"
[57] "Ibid" "emphasis" "deleted" ""
[[1028]]
[1] "B" ""
[[1029]]
[1] "For" "history" "Colorado"
[4] "prohibited" "discrimination" "places"
[7] "public" "accommodation" "In"
[10] "less" "decade" "Colorado"
[13] "achieved" "statehood" "General"
[16] "Assembly" "passed" "An"
[19] "Act" "Protect" "All"
[22] "Citizens" "Their" "Civil"
[25] "Rights" "guaranteed" "full"
[28] "equal" "enjoyment" "certain"
[31] "public" "facilities" "citizens"
[34] "regardless" "race" "color"
[37] "previous" "condition" "servitude"
[40] "Colo" "Sess" "Laws"
[43] "pp" "A" "decade"
[46] "later" "General" "Assembly"
[49] "expanded" "requirement" "apply"
[52] "places" "public" "accommodation"
[55] "Colo" "Sess" "Laws"
[58] "ch" "p" ""
[[1030]]
[1] "Today" "Colorado" "Anti"
[4] "Discrimination" "Act" "CADA"
[7] "carries" "forward" "state"
[10] "s" "tradition" "prohibiting"
[13] "discrimination" "places" "public"
[16] "accommodation" "Amended" "prohibit"
[19] "discrimination" "basis" "sexual"
[22] "orientation" "well" "protected"
[25] "characteristics" "CADA" "relevant"
[28] "part" "provides" "follows"
[31] ""
[[1031]]
[1] "" "It" "discriminatory"
[4] "practice" "unlawful" "person"
[7] "directly" "indirectly" "refuse"
[10] "withhold" "deny" "individual"
[13] "group" "disability" "race"
[16] "creed" "color" "sex"
[19] "sexual" "orientation" "marital"
[22] "status" "national" "origin"
[25] "ancestry" "full" "equal"
[28] "enjoyment" "goods" "services"
[31] "facilities" "privileges" "advantages"
[34] "accommodations" "place" "public"
[37] "accommodation" "Colo" "Rev"
[40] "Stat" ""
[[1032]]
[1] "The" "Act" "defines" "public"
[5] "accommodation" "broadly" "include" "place"
[9] "business" "engaged" "sales" "public"
[13] "place" "offering" "services" "public"
[17] "excludes" "church" "synagogue" "mosque"
[21] "place" "principally" "used" "religious"
[25] "purposes" ""
[[1033]]
[1] "CADA" "establishes" "administrative"
[4] "system" "resolution" "discrimination"
[7] "claims" "Complaints" "discrimination"
[10] "violation" "CADA" "addressed"
[13] "first" "instance" "Colorado"
[16] "Civil" "Rights" "Division"
[19] "The" "Division" "investigates"
[22] "claim" "finds" "probable"
[25] "cause" "CADA" "violated"
[28] "will" "refer" "matter"
[31] "Colorado" "Civil" "Rights"
[34] "Commission" "The" "Commission"
[37] "turn" "decides" "whether"
[40] "initiate" "formal" "hearing"
[43] "state" "Administrative" "Law"
[46] "Judge" "ALJ" "will"
[49] "hear" "evidence" "argument"
[52] "issuing" "written" "decision"
[55] "See" "The" "decision"
[58] "ALJ" "may" "appealed"
[61] "full" "Commission" "seven"
[64] "member" "appointed" "body"
[67] "The" "Commission" "holds"
[70] "public" "hearing" "deliberative"
[73] "session" "voting" "case"
[76] "If" "Commission" "determines"
[79] "evidence" "proves" "CADA"
[82] "violation" "may" "impose"
[85] "remedial" "measures" "provided"
[88] "statute" "See" "Available"
[91] "remedies" "include" "among"
[94] "things" "orders" "cease"
[97] "desist" "discriminatory" "policy"
[100] "file" "regular" "compliance"
[103] "reports" "Commission" "take"
[106] "affirmative" "action" "including"
[109] "posting" "notices" "setting"
[112] "forth" "substantive" "rights"
[115] "public" "Colorado" "law"
[118] "permit" "Commission" "assess"
[121] "money" "damages" "fines"
[124] ""
[[1034]]
[1] "C" ""
[[1035]]
[1] "Craig" "Mullins" "filed"
[4] "discrimination" "complaint" "Masterpiece"
[7] "Cakeshop" "Phillips" "September"
[10] "shortly" "couple" "s"
[13] "visit" "shop" "App"
[16] "The" "complaint" "alleged"
[19] "Craig" "Mullins" "denied"
[22] "full" "equal" "service"
[25] "bakery" "sexual" "orientation"
[28] "id" "Phillips" "standard"
[31] "business" "practice" "provide"
[34] "cakes" "sex" "weddings"
[37] "id" ""
[[1036]]
[1] "The" "Civil" "Rights" "Division"
[5] "opened" "investigation" "The" "investigator"
[9] "found" "multiple" "occasions" "Phillips"
[13] "turned" "away" "potential" "customers"
[17] "basis" "sexual" "orientation" "stating"
[21] "create" "cake" "sex" "wedding"
[25] "ceremony" "reception" "religious" "beliefs"
[29] "prohibited" "potential" "customers" "something"
[33] "illegal" "time" "Id" "The"
[37] "investigation" "found" "Phillips" "declined"
[41] "sell" "custom" "wedding" "cakes"
[45] "six" "sex" "couples" "basis"
[49] "Id" "The" "investigator" "also"
[53] "recounted" "according" "affidavits" "submitted"
[57] "Craig" "Mullins" "Phillips" "shop"
[61] "refused" "sell" "cupcakes" "lesbian"
[65] "couple" "commitment" "celebration" "shop"
[69] "policy" "selling" "baked" "goods"
[73] "sex" "couples" "type" "event"
[77] "Id" "Based" "findings" "Division"
[81] "found" "probable" "cause" "Phillips"
[85] "violated" "CADA" "referred" "case"
[89] "Civil" "Rights" "Commission" "Id"
[93] ""
[[1037]]
[1] "The" "Commission" "found"
[4] "proper" "conduct" "formal"
[7] "hearing" "sent" "case"
[10] "State" "ALJ" "Finding"
[13] "dispute" "material" "facts"
[16] "ALJ" "entertained" "cross"
[19] "motions" "summary" "judgment"
[22] "ruled" "couple" "s"
[25] "favor" "The" "ALJ"
[28] "first" "rejected" "Phillips"
[31] "argument" "declining" "make"
[34] "create" "wedding" "cake"
[37] "Craig" "Mullins" "violate"
[40] "Colorado" "law" "It"
[43] "undisputed" "shop" "subject"
[46] "state" "public" "accommodations"
[49] "laws" "And" "ALJ"
[52] "determined" "Phillips" "actions"
[55] "constituted" "prohibited" "discrimination"
[58] "basis" "sexual" "orientation"
[61] "simply" "opposition" "sex"
[64] "marriage" "Phillips" "contended"
[67] "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[70] ""
[[1038]]
[1] "Phillips" "raised" "two"
[4] "constitutional" "claims" "ALJ"
[7] "He" "first" "asserted"
[10] "applying" "CADA" "way"
[13] "require" "create" "cake"
[16] "sex" "wedding" "violate"
[19] "First" "Amendment" "right"
[22] "free" "speech" "compelling"
[25] "exercise" "artistic" "talents"
[28] "express" "message" "disagreed"
[31] "The" "ALJ" "rejected"
[34] "contention" "preparing" "wedding"
[37] "cake" "form" "protected"
[40] "speech" "agree" "creating"
[43] "Craig" "Mullins" "cake"
[46] "force" "Phillips" "adhere"
[49] "ideological" "point" "view"
[52] "Id" "Applying" "CADA"
[55] "facts" "hand" "ALJ"
[58] "s" "view" "interfere"
[61] "Phillips" "freedom" "speech"
[64] ""
[[1039]]
[1] "Phillips" "also" "contended"
[4] "requiring" "create" "cakes"
[7] "sex" "weddings" "violate"
[10] "right" "free" "exercise"
[13] "religion" "also" "protected"
[16] "First" "Amendment" "Citing"
[19] "Court" "s" "precedent"
[22] "Employment" "Div" "Dept"
[25] "Human" "Resources" "Ore"
[28] "v" "Smith" "U"
[31] "S" "S" "Ct"
[34] "L" "Ed" "d"
[37] "ALJ" "determined" "CADA"
[40] "valid" "neutral" "law"
[43] "general" "applicability" "therefore"
[46] "applying" "Phillips" "case"
[49] "violate" "Free" "Exercise"
[52] "Clause" "Id" "S"
[55] "Ct" "App" "Pet"
[58] "Cert" "The" "ALJ"
[61] "thus" "ruled" "Phillips"
[64] "cakeshop" "favor" "Craig"
[67] "Mullins" "constitutional" "claims"
[70] ""
[[1040]]
[1] "The" "Commission" "affirmed"
[4] "ALJ" "s" "decision"
[7] "full" "Id" "The"
[10] "Commission" "ordered" "Phillips"
[13] "cease" "desist" "discriminating"
[16] "sex" "couples" "refusing"
[19] "sell" "wedding" "cakes"
[22] "product" "sell" "heterosexual"
[25] "couples" "Ibid" "It"
[28] "also" "ordered" "additional"
[31] "remedial" "measures" "including"
[34] "comprehensive" "staff" "training"
[37] "Public" "Accommodations" "section"
[40] "CADA" "changes" "company"
[43] "policies" "comply" "Order"
[46] "Id" "The" "Commission"
[49] "additionally" "required" "Phillips"
[52] "prepare" "quarterly" "compliance"
[55] "reports" "period" "two"
[58] "years" "documenting" "number"
[61] "patrons" "denied" "service"
[64] "along" "statement" "describing"
[67] "remedial" "actions" "taken"
[70] "Ibid" ""
[[1041]]
[1] "Phillips" "appealed" "Colorado"
[4] "Court" "Appeals" "affirmed"
[7] "Commission" "s" "legal"
[10] "determinations" "remedial" "order"
[13] "The" "court" "rejected"
[16] "argument" "Commission" "s"
[19] "order" "unconstitutionally" "compels"
[22] "Phillips" "shop" "convey"
[25] "celebratory" "message" "sex"
[28] "marriage" "Craig" "v"
[31] "Masterpiece" "Cakeshop" "Inc"
[34] "P" "d" "The"
[37] "court" "also" "rejected"
[40] "argument" "Commission" "s"
[43] "order" "violated" "Free"
[46] "Exercise" "Clause" "Relying"
[49] "Court" "s" "precedent"
[52] "Smith" "supra" "S"
[55] "Ct" "court" "stated"
[58] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[61] "relieve" "individual" "obligation"
[64] "comply" "valid" "neutral"
[67] "law" "general" "applicability"
[70] "ground" "following" "law"
[73] "interfere" "religious" "practice"
[76] "belief" "P" "d"
[79] "The" "court" "concluded"
[82] "requiring" "Phillips" "comply"
[85] "statute" "violate" "free"
[88] "exercise" "rights" "The"
[91] "Colorado" "Supreme" "Court"
[94] "declined" "hear" "case"
[97] ""
[[1042]]
[1] "Phillips" "sought" "review" "Court" "granted"
[6] "certiorari" "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[11] "L" "Ed" "d" "He" "now"
[16] "renews" "claims" "Free" "Speech" "Free"
[21] "Exercise" "Clauses" "First" "Amendment" ""
[[1043]]
[1] "II" ""
[[1044]]
[1] "A" ""
[[1045]]
[1] "" "Our" "society"
[4] "come" "recognition" "gay"
[7] "persons" "gay" "couples"
[10] "treated" "social" "outcasts"
[13] "inferior" "dignity" "worth"
[16] "For" "reason" "laws"
[19] "Constitution" "can" "instances"
[22] "must" "protect" "exercise"
[25] "civil" "rights" "The"
[28] "exercise" "freedom" "terms"
[31] "equal" "others" "must"
[34] "given" "great" "weight"
[37] "respect" "courts" "At"
[40] "time" "religious" "philosophical"
[43] "objections" "gay" "marriage"
[46] "protected" "views" "instances"
[49] "protected" "forms" "expression"
[52] "As" "Court" "observed"
[55] "Obergefell" "v" "Hodges"
[58] "U" "S" "S"
[61] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[64] "d" "t" "First"
[67] "Amendment" "ensures" "religious"
[70] "organizations" "persons" "given"
[73] "proper" "protection" "seek"
[76] "teach" "principles" "fulfilling"
[79] "central" "lives" "faiths"
[82] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[85] "Nevertheless" "religious" "philosophical"
[88] "objections" "protected" "general"
[91] "rule" "objections" "allow"
[94] "business" "owners" "actors"
[97] "economy" "society" "deny"
[100] "protected" "persons" "equal"
[103] "access" "goods" "services"
[106] "neutral" "generally" "applicable"
[109] "public" "accommodations" "law"
[112] "See" "Newman" "v"
[115] "Piggie" "Park" "Enterprises"
[118] "Inc" "U" "S"
[121] "n" "S" "Ct"
[124] "L" "Ed" "d"
[127] "per" "curiam" "see"
[130] "also" "Hurley" "v"
[133] "Irish" "American" "Gay"
[136] "Lesbian" "Bisexual" "Group"
[139] "Boston" "Inc" "U"
[142] "S" "S" "Ct"
[145] "L" "Ed" "d"
[148] "Provisions" "like" "well"
[151] "within" "State" "s"
[154] "usual" "power" "enact"
[157] "legislature" "reason" "believe"
[160] "given" "group" "target"
[163] "discrimination" "general" "matter"
[166] "violate" "First" "Fourteenth"
[169] "Amendments" ""
[[1046]]
[1] "When" "comes" "weddings"
[4] "can" "assumed" "member"
[7] "clergy" "objects" "gay"
[10] "marriage" "moral" "religious"
[13] "grounds" "compelled" "perform"
[16] "ceremony" "without" "denial"
[19] "right" "free" "exercise"
[22] "religion" "This" "refusal"
[25] "well" "understood" "constitutional"
[28] "order" "exercise" "religion"
[31] "exercise" "gay" "persons"
[34] "recognize" "accept" "without"
[37] "serious" "diminishment" "dignity"
[40] "worth" "Yet" "exception"
[43] "confined" "long" "list"
[46] "persons" "provide" "goods"
[49] "services" "marriages" "weddings"
[52] "might" "refuse" "gay"
[55] "persons" "thus" "resulting"
[58] "community" "wide" "stigma"
[61] "inconsistent" "history" "dynamics"
[64] "civil" "rights" "laws"
[67] "ensure" "equal" "access"
[70] "goods" "services" "public"
[73] "accommodations" ""
[[1047]]
[1] "" "It" "unexceptional"
[4] "Colorado" "law" "can"
[7] "protect" "gay" "persons"
[10] "just" "can" "protect"
[13] "classes" "individuals" "acquiring"
[16] "whatever" "products" "services"
[19] "choose" "terms" "conditions"
[22] "offered" "members" "public"
[25] "And" "doubt" "innumerable"
[28] "goods" "services" "one"
[31] "argue" "implicate" "First"
[34] "Amendment" "Petitioners" "conceded"
[37] "moreover" "baker" "refused"
[40] "sell" "goods" "cakes"
[43] "gay" "weddings" "different"
[46] "matter" "State" "strong"
[49] "case" "Court" "s"
[52] "precedents" "denial" "goods"
[55] "services" "went" "beyond"
[58] "protected" "rights" "baker"
[61] "offers" "goods" "services"
[64] "general" "public" "subject"
[67] "neutrally" "applied" "generally"
[70] "applicable" "public" "accommodations"
[73] "law" "See" "Tr"
[76] "Oral" "Arg" ""
[[1048]]
[1] "Phillips" "claims" "however" "narrower"
[5] "issue" "presented" "He" "argues"
[9] "use" "artistic" "skills" "make"
[13] "expressive" "statement" "wedding" "endorsement"
[17] "voice" "creation" "As" "Phillips"
[21] "see" "case" "contention" "significant"
[25] "First" "Amendment" "speech" "component"
[29] "implicates" "deep" "sincere" "religious"
[33] "beliefs" "In" "context" "baker"
[37] "likely" "found" "difficult" "find"
[41] "line" "customers" "rights" "goods"
[45] "services" "became" "demand" "exercise"
[49] "right" "personal" "expression" "message"
[53] "message" "express" "way" "consistent"
[57] "religious" "beliefs" ""
[[1049]]
[1] "Phillips" "dilemma" "particularly"
[4] "understandable" "given" "background"
[7] "legal" "principles" "administration"
[10] "law" "Colorado" "time"
[13] "His" "decision" "actions"
[16] "leading" "refusal" "service"
[19] "occurred" "year" "At"
[22] "point" "Colorado" "recognize"
[25] "validity" "gay" "marriages"
[28] "performed" "State" "See"
[31] "Colo" "Const" "Art"
[34] "II" "P" "d"
[37] "At" "time" "events"
[40] "question" "Court" "issued"
[43] "decisions" "either" "United"
[46] "States" "v" "Windsor"
[49] "U" "S" "S"
[52] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[55] "d" "Obergefell" "Since"
[58] "State" "allow" "marriages"
[61] "performed" "Colorado" "force"
[64] "argument" "baker" "unreasonable"
[67] "deeming" "lawful" "decline"
[70] "take" "action" "understood"
[73] "expression" "support" "validity"
[76] "expression" "contrary" "sincerely"
[79] "held" "religious" "beliefs"
[82] "least" "insofar" "refusal"
[85] "limited" "refusing" "create"
[88] "express" "message" "support"
[91] "gay" "marriage" "even"
[94] "one" "planned" "take"
[97] "place" "another" "State"
[100] ""
[[1050]]
[1] "At" "time" "state" "law"
[5] "also" "afforded" "storekeepers" "latitude"
[9] "decline" "create" "specific" "messages"
[13] "storekeeper" "considered" "offensive" "Indeed"
[17] "enforcement" "proceedings" "Phillips" "ongoing"
[21] "Colorado" "Civil" "Rights" "Division"
[25] "endorsed" "proposition" "cases" "involving"
[29] "bakers" "creation" "cakes" "concluding"
[33] "least" "three" "occasions" "baker"
[37] "acted" "lawfully" "declining" "create"
[41] "cakes" "decorations" "demeaned" "gay"
[45] "persons" "gay" "marriages" "See"
[49] "Jack" "v" "Gateaux" "Ltd"
[53] "Charge" "No" "P" "X"
[57] "Mar" "Jack" "v" "Le"
[61] "Bakery" "Sensual" "Inc" "Charge"
[65] "No" "P" "X" "Mar"
[69] "Jack" "v" "Azucar" "Bakery"
[73] "Charge" "No" "P" "X"
[77] "Mar" ""
[[1051]]
[1] "There" "sure" "responses" "arguments"
[5] "State" "make" "contended" "different"
[9] "result" "seeking" "enforcement" "generally"
[13] "applicable" "state" "regulations" "businesses"
[17] "serve" "public" "And" "decision"
[21] "favor" "baker" "sufficiently" "constrained"
[25] "lest" "purveyors" "goods" "services"
[29] "object" "gay" "marriages" "moral"
[33] "religious" "reasons" "effect" "allowed"
[37] "put" "signs" "saying" "goods"
[41] "services" "will" "sold" "will"
[45] "used" "gay" "marriages" "something"
[49] "impose" "serious" "stigma" "gay"
[53] "persons" "But" "nonetheless" "Phillips"
[57] "entitled" "neutral" "respectful" "consideration"
[61] "claims" "circumstances" "case" ""
[[1052]]
[1] "B" ""
[[1053]]
[1] "" "The" "neutral" "respectful"
[5] "consideration" "Phillips" "entitled" "compromised"
[9] "however" "The" "Civil" "Rights"
[13] "Commission" "s" "treatment" "case"
[17] "elements" "clear" "impermissible" "hostility"
[21] "toward" "sincere" "religious" "beliefs"
[25] "motivated" "objection" ""
[[1054]]
[1] "That" "hostility" "surfaced"
[4] "Commission" "s" "formal"
[7] "public" "hearings" "shown"
[10] "record" "On" "May"
[13] "seven" "member" "Commission"
[16] "convened" "publicly" "consider"
[19] "Phillips" "case" "At"
[22] "several" "points" "meeting"
[25] "commissioners" "endorsed" "view"
[28] "religious" "beliefs" "legitimately"
[31] "carried" "public" "sphere"
[34] "commercial" "domain" "implying"
[37] "religious" "beliefs" "persons"
[40] "less" "fully" "welcome"
[43] "Colorado" "s" "business"
[46] "community" "One" "commissioner"
[49] "suggested" "Phillips" "can"
[52] "believe" "wants" "believe"
[55] "act" "religious" "beliefs"
[58] "decides" "business" "state"
[61] "Tr" "A" "moments"
[64] "later" "commissioner" "restated"
[67] "position" "I" "f"
[70] "businessman" "wants" "business"
[73] "state" "s" "got"
[76] "issue" "law" "s"
[79] "impacting" "personal" "belief"
[82] "system" "needs" "look"
[85] "able" "compromise" "Id"
[88] "Standing" "alone" "statements"
[91] "susceptible" "different" "interpretations"
[94] "On" "one" "hand"
[97] "might" "mean" "simply"
[100] "business" "refuse" "provide"
[103] "services" "based" "sexual"
[106] "orientation" "regardless" "proprietor"
[109] "s" "personal" "views"
[112] "On" "hand" "might"
[115] "seen" "inappropriate" "dismissive"
[118] "comments" "showing" "lack"
[121] "due" "consideration" "Phillips"
[124] "free" "exercise" "rights"
[127] "dilemma" "faced" "In"
[130] "view" "comments" "followed"
[133] "latter" "seems" "likely"
[136] ""
[[1055]]
[1] "On" "July" "Commission" "met"
[5] "This" "meeting" "conducted" "public"
[9] "record" "On" "occasion" "another"
[13] "commissioner" "made" "specific" "reference"
[17] "previous" "meeting" "s" "discussion"
[21] "said" "far" "disparage" "Phillips"
[25] "beliefs" "The" "commissioner" "stated"
[29] ""
[[1056]]
[1] "" "I" "also"
[4] "like" "reiterate" "said"
[7] "hearing" "last" "meeting"
[10] "Freedom" "religion" "religion"
[13] "used" "justify" "kinds"
[16] "discrimination" "throughout" "history"
[19] "whether" "slavery" "whether"
[22] "holocaust" "whether" "I"
[25] "mean" "can" "list"
[28] "hundreds" "situations" "freedom"
[31] "religion" "used" "justify"
[34] "discrimination" "And" "one"
[37] "despicable" "pieces" "rhetoric"
[40] "people" "can" "use"
[43] "use" "religion" "hurt"
[46] "others" "Tr" ""
[[1057]]
[1] "To" "describe" "man"
[4] "s" "faith" "one"
[7] "despicable" "pieces" "rhetoric"
[10] "people" "can" "use"
[13] "disparage" "religion" "least"
[16] "two" "distinct" "ways"
[19] "describing" "despicable" "also"
[22] "characterizing" "merely" "rhetorical"
[25] "something" "insubstantial" "even"
[28] "insincere" "The" "commissioner"
[31] "even" "went" "far"
[34] "compare" "Phillips" "invocation"
[37] "sincerely" "held" "religious"
[40] "beliefs" "defenses" "slavery"
[43] "Holocaust" "This" "sentiment"
[46] "inappropriate" "Commission" "charged"
[49] "solemn" "responsibility" "fair"
[52] "neutral" "enforcement" "Colorado"
[55] "s" "antidiscrimination" "law"
[58] "law" "protects" "discrimination"
[61] "basis" "religion" "well"
[64] "sexual" "orientation" ""
[[1058]]
[1] "The" "record" "shows" "objection"
[5] "comments" "commissioners" "And" "later"
[9] "state" "court" "ruling" "reviewing"
[13] "Commission" "s" "decision" "mention"
[17] "comments" "much" "less" "express"
[21] "concern" "content" "Nor" "comments"
[25] "commissioners" "disavowed" "briefs" "filed"
[29] "Court" "For" "reasons" "Court"
[33] "avoid" "conclusion" "statements" "cast"
[37] "doubt" "fairness" "impartiality" "Commission"
[41] "s" "adjudication" "Phillips" "case"
[45] "Members" "Court" "disagreed" "question"
[49] "whether" "statements" "made" "lawmakers"
[53] "may" "properly" "taken" "account"
[57] "determining" "whether" "law" "intentionally"
[61] "discriminates" "basis" "religion" "See"
[65] "Church" "Lukumi" "Babalu" "Aye"
[69] "Inc" "v" "Hialeah" "U"
[73] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[77] "Ed" "d" "id" "S"
[81] "Ct" "Scalia" "J" "concurring"
[85] "part" "concurring" "judgment" "In"
[89] "case" "however" "remarks" "made"
[93] "different" "context" "adjudicatory" "body"
[97] "deciding" "particular" "case" ""
[[1059]]
[1] "Another" "indication" "hostility" "difference" "treatment"
[6] "Phillips" "case" "cases" "bakers" "objected"
[11] "requested" "cake" "basis" "conscience" "prevailed"
[16] "Commission" ""
[[1060]]
[1] "As" "noted" "least"
[4] "three" "occasions" "Civil"
[7] "Rights" "Division" "considered"
[10] "refusal" "bakers" "create"
[13] "cakes" "images" "conveyed"
[16] "disapproval" "sex" "marriage"
[19] "along" "religious" "text"
[22] "Each" "time" "Division"
[25] "found" "baker" "acted"
[28] "lawfully" "refusing" "service"
[31] "It" "made" "determinations"
[34] "words" "Division" "requested"
[37] "cake" "included" "wording"
[40] "images" "baker" "deemed"
[43] "derogatory" "Jack" "v"
[46] "Gateaux" "Ltd" "Charge"
[49] "No" "P" "X"
[52] "featured" "language" "images"
[55] "baker" "deemed" "hateful"
[58] "Jack" "v" "Le"
[61] "Bakery" "Sensual" "Inc"
[64] "Charge" "No" "P"
[67] "X" "displayed" "message"
[70] "baker" "deemed" "discriminatory"
[73] "Jack" "v" "Azucar"
[76] "Bakery" "Charge" "No"
[79] "P" "X" ""
[[1061]]
[1] "The" "treatment" "conscience" "based"
[5] "objections" "issue" "three" "cases"
[9] "contrasts" "Commission" "s" "treatment"
[13] "Phillips" "objection" "The" "Commission"
[17] "ruled" "Phillips" "part" "theory"
[21] "message" "requested" "wedding" "cake"
[25] "carry" "attributed" "customer" "baker"
[29] "Yet" "Division" "address" "point"
[33] "cases" "respect" "cakes" "depicting"
[37] "anti" "gay" "marriage" "symbolism"
[41] "Additionally" "Division" "found" "violation"
[45] "CADA" "cases" "part" "bakery"
[49] "willing" "sell" "products" "including"
[53] "depicting" "Christian" "themes" "prospective"
[57] "customers" "But" "Commission" "dismissed"
[61] "Phillips" "willingness" "sell" "birthday"
[65] "cakes" "shower" "cakes" "cookies"
[69] "brownies" "App" "gay" "lesbian"
[73] "customers" "irrelevant" "The" "treatment"
[77] "cases" "Phillips" "case" "reasonably"
[81] "interpreted" "inconsistent" "question" "whether"
[85] "speech" "involved" "quite" "apart"
[89] "whether" "cases" "ultimately" "distinguished"
[93] "In" "short" "Commission" "s"
[97] "consideration" "Phillips" "religious" "objection"
[101] "accord" "treatment" "objections" ""
[[1062]]
[1] "Before" "Colorado" "Court"
[4] "Appeals" "Phillips" "protested"
[7] "disparity" "treatment" "reflected"
[10] "hostility" "part" "Commission"
[13] "toward" "beliefs" "He"
[16] "argued" "Commission" "treated"
[19] "bakers" "conscience" "based"
[22] "objections" "legitimate" "treated"
[25] "illegitimate" "thus" "sitting"
[28] "judgment" "religious" "beliefs"
[31] "The" "Court" "Appeals"
[34] "addressed" "disparity" "passing"
[37] "relegated" "complete" "analysis"
[40] "issue" "footnote" "There"
[43] "court" "stated" "t"
[46] "case" "distinguishable" "Colorado"
[49] "Civil" "Rights" "Division"
[52] "s" "recent" "findings"
[55] "bakeries" "Denver" "discriminate"
[58] "Christian" "patron" "basis"
[61] "creed" "refused" "create"
[64] "requested" "cakes" "P"
[67] "d" "n" "In"
[70] "cases" "court" "continued"
[73] "impermissible" "discrimination" "Division"
[76] "found" "bakeries" "refuse"
[79] "d" "patron" "s"
[82] "request" "offensive" "nature"
[85] "requested" "message" "Ibid"
[88] ""
[[1063]]
[1] "A" "principled" "rationale" "difference"
[5] "treatment" "two" "instances" "based"
[9] "government" "s" "assessment" "offensiveness"
[13] "Just" "official" "high" "petty"
[17] "can" "prescribe" "shall" "orthodox"
[21] "politics" "nationalism" "religion" "matters"
[25] "opinion" "West" "Virginia" "Bd"
[29] "Ed" "v" "Barnette" "U"
[33] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "Court" "repeatedly" "held"
[41] "role" "State" "officials" "prescribe"
[45] "shall" "offensive" "See" "Matal"
[49] "v" "Tam" "U" "S"
[53] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[57] "d" "opinion" "ALITO" "J"
[61] "The" "Colorado" "court" "s"
[65] "attempt" "account" "difference" "treatment"
[69] "elevates" "one" "view" "offensive"
[73] "another" "sends" "signal" "official"
[77] "disapproval" "Phillips" "religious" "beliefs"
[81] "The" "court" "s" "footnote"
[85] "therefore" "answer" "baker" "s"
[89] "concern" "State" "s" "practice"
[93] "disfavor" "religious" "basis" "objection"
[97] ""
[[1064]]
[1] "C" ""
[[1065]]
[1] "For" "reasons" "just" "described"
[5] "Commission" "s" "treatment" "Phillips"
[9] "case" "violated" "State" "s"
[13] "duty" "First" "Amendment" "base"
[17] "laws" "regulations" "hostility" "religion"
[21] "religious" "viewpoint" ""
[[1066]]
[1] "" "In" "Church" "Lukumi"
[5] "Babalu" "Aye" "supra" "Court"
[9] "made" "clear" "government" "respect"
[13] "Constitution" "s" "guarantee" "free"
[17] "exercise" "impose" "regulations" "hostile"
[21] "religious" "beliefs" "affected" "citizens"
[25] "act" "manner" "passes" "judgment"
[29] "upon" "presupposes" "illegitimacy" "religious"
[33] "beliefs" "practices" "The" "Free"
[37] "Exercise" "Clause" "bars" "even"
[41] "subtle" "departures" "neutrality" "matters"
[45] "religion" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[49] "Here" "means" "Commission" "obliged"
[53] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "proceed"
[57] "manner" "neutral" "toward" "tolerant"
[61] "Phillips" "religious" "beliefs" "The"
[65] "Constitution" "commits" "government" "religious"
[69] "tolerance" "upon" "even" "slight"
[73] "suspicion" "proposals" "state" "intervention"
[77] "stem" "animosity" "religion" "distrust"
[81] "practices" "officials" "must" "pause"
[85] "remember" "high" "duty" "Constitution"
[89] "rights" "secures" "Id" "S"
[93] "Ct" ""
[[1067]]
[1] "" "Factors" "relevant"
[4] "assessment" "governmental" "neutrality"
[7] "include" "historical" "background"
[10] "decision" "challenge" "specific"
[13] "series" "events" "leading"
[16] "enactment" "official" "policy"
[19] "question" "legislative" "administrative"
[22] "history" "including" "contemporaneous"
[25] "statements" "made" "members"
[28] "decisionmaking" "body" "Id"
[31] "S" "Ct" "In"
[34] "view" "factors" "record"
[37] "demonstrates" "Commission" "s"
[40] "consideration" "Phillips" "case"
[43] "neither" "tolerant" "respectful"
[46] "Phillips" "religious" "beliefs"
[49] "The" "Commission" "gave"
[52] "every" "appearance" "id"
[55] "S" "Ct" "adjudicating"
[58] "Phillips" "religious" "objection"
[61] "based" "negative" "normative"
[64] "evaluation" "particular" "justification"
[67] "objection" "religious" "grounds"
[70] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[73] "It" "hardly" "requires"
[76] "restating" "government" "role"
[79] "deciding" "even" "suggesting"
[82] "whether" "religious" "ground"
[85] "Phillips" "conscience" "based"
[88] "objection" "legitimate" "illegitimate"
[91] "On" "facts" "Court"
[94] "must" "draw" "inference"
[97] "Phillips" "religious" "objection"
[100] "considered" "neutrality" "Free"
[103] "Exercise" "Clause" "requires"
[106] ""
[[1068]]
[1] "" "While" "issues" "difficult"
[5] "resolve" "must" "concluded" "State"
[9] "s" "interest" "weighed" "Phillips"
[13] "sincere" "religious" "objections" "way"
[17] "consistent" "requisite" "religious" "neutrality"
[21] "must" "strictly" "observed" "The"
[25] "official" "expressions" "hostility" "religion"
[29] "commissioners" "comments" "comments" "disavowed"
[33] "Commission" "State" "point" "proceedings"
[37] "led" "affirmance" "order" "inconsistent"
[41] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "requires"
[45] "The" "Commission" "s" "disparate"
[49] "consideration" "Phillips" "case" "compared"
[53] "cases" "bakers" "suggests" "For"
[57] "reasons" "order" "must" "set"
[61] "aside" ""
[[1069]]
[1] "III" ""
[[1070]]
[1] "The" "Commission" "s" "hostility"
[5] "inconsistent" "First" "Amendment" "s"
[9] "guarantee" "laws" "applied" "manner"
[13] "neutral" "toward" "religion" "Phillips"
[17] "entitled" "neutral" "decisionmaker" "give"
[21] "full" "fair" "consideration" "religious"
[25] "objection" "sought" "assert" "circumstances"
[29] "case" "presented" "considered" "decided"
[33] "In" "case" "adjudication" "concerned"
[37] "context" "may" "well" "different"
[41] "going" "forward" "respects" "noted"
[45] "However" "later" "cases" "raising"
[49] "similar" "concerns" "resolved" "future"
[53] "reasons" "rulings" "Commission" "state"
[57] "court" "enforced" "Commission" "s"
[61] "order" "must" "invalidated" ""
[[1071]]
[1] "The" "outcome" "cases" "like"
[5] "circumstances" "must" "await" "elaboration"
[9] "courts" "context" "recognizing" "disputes"
[13] "must" "resolved" "tolerance" "without"
[17] "undue" "disrespect" "sincere" "religious"
[21] "beliefs" "without" "subjecting" "gay"
[25] "persons" "indignities" "seek" "goods"
[29] "services" "open" "market" ""
[[1072]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "Colorado" "Court" "Appeals" "reversed"
[7] ""
[[1073]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[1074]]
[1] "Mr" "Chief" "Justice" "BURGER" "announced"
[6] "judgment" "Court" "delivered" "opinion" "Mr"
[11] "Justice" "POWELL" "Mr" "Justice" "REHNQUIST"
[16] "Mr" "Justice" "STEVENS" "joined" ""
[[1075]]
[1] "The" "question" "presented"
[4] "appeal" "whether" "Tennessee"
[7] "statute" "barring" "Minister"
[10] "s" "Gospel" "priest"
[13] "s" "denomination" "whatever"
[16] "serving" "delegates" "State"
[19] "s" "limited" "constitutional"
[22] "convention" "deprived" "appellant"
[25] "McDaniel" "ordained" "minister"
[28] "right" "free" "exercise"
[31] "religion" "guaranteed" "First"
[34] "Amendment" "made" "applicable"
[37] "States" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[40] "The" "First" "Amendment"
[43] "forbids" "laws" "prohibiting"
[46] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[49] ""
[[1076]]
[1] "" "I" ""
[[1077]]
[1] "In" "first" "Constitution"
[4] "Tennessee" "disqualified" "ministers"
[7] "serving" "legislators" "That"
[10] "disqualifying" "provision" "continued"
[13] "unchanged" "since" "adoption"
[16] "now" "Art" "State"
[19] "Constitution" "The" "state"
[22] "legislature" "applied" "provision"
[25] "candidates" "delegate" "State"
[28] "s" "limited" "constitutional"
[31] "convention" "enacted" "ch"
[34] "Tenn" "Pub" "Acts"
[37] "Any" "citizen" "state"
[40] "can" "qualify" "membership"
[43] "House" "Representatives" "General"
[46] "Assembly" "may" "become"
[49] "candidate" "delegate" "convention"
[52] ""
[[1078]]
[1] "McDaniel" "ordained" "minister"
[4] "Baptist" "Church" "Chattanooga"
[7] "Tenn" "filed" "candidate"
[10] "delegate" "constitutional" "convention"
[13] "An" "opposing" "candidate"
[16] "appellee" "Selma" "Cash"
[19] "Paty" "sued" "Chancery"
[22] "Court" "declaratory" "judgment"
[25] "McDaniel" "disqualified" "serving"
[28] "delegate" "judgment" "striking"
[31] "name" "ballot" "Chancellor"
[34] "Franks" "Chancery" "Court"
[37] "held" "ch" "violated"
[40] "First" "Fourteenth" "Amendments"
[43] "Federal" "Constitution" "declared"
[46] "McDaniel" "eligible" "office"
[49] "delegate" "Accordingly" "McDaniel"
[52] "s" "name" "remained"
[55] "ballot" "ensuing" "election"
[58] "elected" "vote" "almost"
[61] "equal" "three" "opposing"
[64] "candidates" ""
[[1079]]
[1] "After" "election" "Tennessee"
[4] "Supreme" "Court" "reversed"
[7] "Chancery" "Court" "holding"
[10] "disqualification" "clergy" "imposed"
[13] "burden" "upon" "religious"
[16] "belief" "restricted" "religious"
[19] "action" "lawmaking" "process"
[22] "government" "religious" "action"
[25] "absolutely" "prohibited" "establishment"
[28] "clause" "S" "W"
[31] "d" "The" "state"
[34] "interests" "preventing" "establishment"
[37] "religion" "avoiding" "divisiveness"
[40] "tendency" "channel" "political"
[43] "activity" "along" "religious"
[46] "lines" "resulting" "clergy"
[49] "participation" "political" "affairs"
[52] "deemed" "court" "sufficiently"
[55] "weighty" "justify" "disqualification"
[58] "notwithstanding" "guarantee" "Free"
[61] "Exercise" "Clause" ""
[[1080]]
[1] "We" "noted" "probable" "jurisdiction"
[5] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[9] "L" "Ed" "d" ""
[[1081]]
[1] "II" ""
[[1082]]
[1] "A" ""
[[1083]]
[1] "The" "disqualification" "ministers"
[4] "legislative" "office" "practice"
[7] "carried" "England" "seven"
[10] "original" "States" "later"
[13] "six" "new" "States"
[16] "similarly" "excluded" "clergymen"
[19] "political" "offices" "A"
[22] "Stokes" "Church" "State"
[25] "United" "States" "hereafter"
[28] "Stokes" "In" "England"
[31] "practice" "excluding" "clergy"
[34] "House" "Commons" "justified"
[37] "variety" "grounds" "prevent"
[40] "dual" "officeholding" "membership"
[43] "minister" "Parliament" "Convocation"
[46] "insure" "priest" "deacon"
[49] "devoted" "sacred" "calling"
[52] "rather" "mundane" "activities"
[55] "appropriate" "member" "House"
[58] "Commons" "prevent" "ministers"
[61] "subject" "Crown" "s"
[64] "powers" "benefices" "clergy"
[67] "using" "membership" "Commons"
[70] "diminish" "independence" "increasing"
[73] "influence" "King" "nobility"
[76] "In" "re" "MacManaway"
[79] "A" "C" ""
[[1084]]
[1] "The" "purpose" "several"
[4] "States" "providing" "disqualification"
[7] "primarily" "assure" "success"
[10] "new" "political" "experiment"
[13] "separation" "church" "state"
[16] "Stokes" "Prior" "Colonies"
[19] "form" "established" "government"
[22] "sponsored" "church" "Id"
[25] "Even" "ratification" "First"
[28] "Amendment" "prohibited" "Federal"
[31] "Government" "following" "course"
[34] "States" "continued" "pro"
[37] "establishment" "provisions" "See"
[40] "id" "Massachusetts" "last"
[43] "State" "accept" "disestablishment"
[46] "Id" ""
[[1085]]
[1] "In" "light" "history"
[4] "widespread" "awareness" "period"
[7] "undue" "often" "dominant"
[10] "clerical" "influence" "public"
[13] "political" "affairs" "England"
[16] "Continent" "surprising" "strong"
[19] "views" "held" "one"
[22] "way" "assure" "disestablishment"
[25] "keep" "clergymen" "public"
[28] "office" "Indeed" "foremost"
[31] "political" "philosophers" "statesmen"
[34] "period" "held" "views"
[37] "regarding" "clergy" "Earlier"
[40] "John" "Locke" "argued"
[43] "confining" "authority" "English"
[46] "clergy" "within" "bounds"
[49] "church" "can" "manner"
[52] "extended" "civil" "affairs"
[55] "church" "thing" "absolutely"
[58] "separate" "distinct" "commonwealth"
[61] "Works" "John" "Locke"
[64] "C" "Baldwin" "ed"
[67] "Thomas" "Jefferson" "initially"
[70] "advocated" "position" "draft"
[73] "constitution" "Virginia" "James"
[76] "Madison" "however" "disagreed"
[79] "vigorously" "urged" "position"
[82] "view" "accurately" "reflects"
[85] "spirit" "purpose" "Religion"
[88] "Clauses" "First" "Amendment"
[91] "Madison" "s" "response"
[94] "Jefferson" "s" "position"
[97] ""
[[1086]]
[1] "" "Does" "The" "exclusion"
[5] "Ministers" "Gospel" "violate" "fundamental"
[9] "principle" "liberty" "punishing" "religious"
[13] "profession" "privation" "civil" "right"
[17] "violate" "another" "article" "plan"
[21] "exempts" "religion" "cognizance" "Civil"
[25] "power" "violate" "justice" "taking"
[29] "away" "right" "prohibiting" "compensation"
[33] "fine" "violate" "impartiality" "shutting"
[37] "door" "Ministers" "one" "Religion"
[41] "leaving" "open" "every" "Writings"
[45] "James" "Madison" "G" "Hunt"
[49] "ed" ""
[[1087]]
[1] "Madison" "articulate" "opponent"
[4] "clergy" "disqualification" "When"
[7] "proposals" "made" "earlier"
[10] "prevent" "clergymen" "holding"
[13] "public" "office" "John"
[16] "Witherspoon" "Presbyterian" "minister"
[19] "president" "Princeton" "University"
[22] "clergyman" "sign" "Declaration"
[25] "Independence" "made" "cogent"
[28] "protest" "tongue" "cheek"
[31] "offered" "amendment" "provision"
[34] "much" "like" "challenged"
[37] ""
[[1088]]
[1] "" "No" "clergyman"
[4] "denomination" "shall" "capable"
[7] "elected" "member" "Senate"
[10] "House" "Representatives" "insert"
[13] "grounds" "offensive" "disqualification"
[16] "I" "able" "discover"
[19] "Provided" "always" "true"
[22] "intent" "meaning" "part"
[25] "constitution" "time" "shall"
[28] "completely" "deprived" "clerical"
[31] "character" "invested" "deposition"
[34] "cursing" "swearing" "drunkenness"
[37] "uncleanness" "shall" "fully"
[40] "restored" "privileges" "free"
[43] "citizen" "offense" "clergyman"
[46] "shall" "remembered" "may"
[49] "chosen" "either" "Senate"
[52] "House" "Representatives" "shall"
[55] "treated" "respect" "due"
[58] "brethren" "members" "Assembly"
[61] "Stokes" ""
[[1089]]
[1] "As" "value" "disestablishment"
[4] "experiment" "perceived" "States"
[7] "disqualifying" "clergy" "types"
[10] "public" "office" "gradually"
[13] "abandoned" "limitation" "New"
[16] "York" "example" "took"
[19] "step" "delegates" "State"
[22] "s" "constitutional" "convention"
[25] "argued" "exclusion" "clergymen"
[28] "legislature" "odious" "distinction"
[31] "C" "Lincoln" "The"
[34] "Constitutional" "History" "New"
[37] "York" "Only" "Maryland"
[40] "Tennessee" "continued" "clergy"
[43] "disqualification" "provisions" "century"
[46] "District" "Court" "held"
[49] "Maryland" "s" "provision"
[52] "violative" "First" "Fourteenth"
[55] "Amendments" "guarantees" "free"
[58] "exercise" "religion" "Kirkley"
[61] "v" "Maryland" "F"
[64] "Supp" "Today" "Tennessee"
[67] "remains" "State" "excluding"
[70] "ministers" "certain" "public"
[73] "offices" ""
[[1090]]
[1] "The" "essence" "aspect" "national" "history"
[6] "States" "selection" "rejection" "clergymen" "public"
[11] "office" "soon" "came" "viewed" "something"
[16] "safely" "left" "good" "sense" "desires"
[21] "people" ""
[[1091]]
[1] "B" ""
[[1092]]
[1] "This" "brief" "review"
[4] "history" "clergy" "disqualification"
[7] "provisions" "also" "amply"
[10] "demonstrates" "however" "least"
[13] "early" "segment" "national"
[16] "life" "provisions" "enjoyed"
[19] "support" "responsible" "American"
[22] "statesmen" "accepted" "rational"
[25] "basis" "Against" "background"
[28] "lightly" "invalidate" "statute"
[31] "enacted" "pursuant" "provision"
[34] "state" "constitution" "sustained"
[37] "highest" "court" "The"
[40] "challenged" "provision" "came"
[43] "Tennessee" "Supreme" "Court"
[46] "clothed" "presumption" "validity"
[49] "court" "bound" "give"
[52] "deference" ""
[[1093]]
[1] "" "However" "right"
[4] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[7] "unquestionably" "encompasses" "right"
[10] "preach" "proselyte" "perform"
[13] "similar" "religious" "functions"
[16] "words" "minister" "type"
[19] "McDaniel" "found" "Murdock"
[22] "v" "Pennsylvania" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct"
[28] "L" "Ed" "Cantwell"
[31] "v" "Connecticut" "U"
[34] "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "L" "Ed" "Tennessee"
[40] "also" "acknowledges" "right"
[43] "adult" "citizens" "generally"
[46] "seek" "hold" "office"
[49] "legislators" "delegates" "state"
[52] "constitutional" "convention" "Tenn"
[55] "Const" "Art" "Tenn"
[58] "Code" "Ann" "Supp"
[61] "Yet" "clergy" "disqualification"
[64] "provision" "McDaniel" "exercise"
[67] "rights" "simultaneously" "State"
[70] "conditioned" "exercise" "one"
[73] "surrender" "Or" "James"
[76] "Madison" "s" "words"
[79] "State" "punishing" "religious"
[82] "profession" "privation" "civil"
[85] "right" "Writings" "James"
[88] "Madison" "supra" "In"
[91] "Tennessee" "encroached" "upon"
[94] "McDaniel" "s" "right"
[97] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[100] "T" "o" "condition"
[103] "availability" "benefits" "including"
[106] "access" "ballot" "upon"
[109] "appellant" "s" "willingness"
[112] "violate" "cardinal" "principle"
[115] "religious" "faith" "surrendering"
[118] "religiously" "impelled" "ministry"
[121] "effectively" "penalizes" "free"
[124] "exercise" "constitutional" "liberties"
[127] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[130] "U" "S" "S"
[133] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[136] "d" ""
[[1094]]
[1] "If" "Tennessee" "disqualification"
[4] "provision" "viewed" "depriving"
[7] "clergy" "civil" "right"
[10] "solely" "religious" "beliefs"
[13] "inquiry" "end" "The"
[16] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[19] "categorically" "prohibits" "government"
[22] "regulating" "prohibiting" "rewarding"
[25] "religious" "beliefs" "Id"
[28] "S" "Ct" "Cantwell"
[31] "v" "Connecticut" "supra"
[34] "U" "S" "S"
[37] "Ct" "In" "Torcaso"
[40] "v" "Watkins" "U"
[43] "S" "S" "Ct"
[46] "L" "Ed" "d"
[49] "Court" "reviewed" "Maryland"
[52] "constitutional" "requirement" "holders"
[55] "office" "profit" "trust"
[58] "State" "declare" "belief"
[61] "existence" "God" "In"
[64] "striking" "Maryland" "requirement"
[67] "Court" "evaluate" "interests"
[70] "assertedly" "justifying" "rather"
[73] "held" "violated" "freedom"
[76] "religious" "belief" ""
[[1095]]
[1] "" "In" "view"
[4] "however" "Torcaso" "govern"
[7] "By" "terms" "Tennessee"
[10] "disqualification" "operates" "McDaniel"
[13] "status" "minister" "priest"
[16] "The" "meaning" "words"
[19] "course" "question" "state"
[22] "law" "And" "although"
[25] "question" "examined" "extensively"
[28] "state" "law" "sources"
[31] "authority" "available" "indicates"
[34] "ministerial" "status" "defined"
[37] "terms" "conduct" "activity"
[40] "rather" "terms" "belief"
[43] "Because" "Tennessee" "disqualification"
[46] "directed" "primarily" "status"
[49] "acts" "conduct" "unlike"
[52] "requirement" "Torcaso" "focused"
[55] "belief" "Hence" "Free"
[58] "Exercise" "Clause" "s"
[61] "absolute" "prohibition" "infringements"
[64] "freedom" "believe" "inapposite"
[67] ""
[[1096]]
[1] "" "This" "mean"
[4] "course" "disqualification" "escapes"
[7] "judicial" "scrutiny" "McDaniel"
[10] "s" "activity" "enjoy"
[13] "significant" "First" "Amendment"
[16] "protection" "The" "Court"
[19] "recently" "declared" "Wisconsin"
[22] "v" "Yoder" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct"
[28] "L" "Ed" "d"
[31] ""
[[1097]]
[1] "" "The" "essence" "said"
[5] "written" "subject" "interests" "highest"
[9] "order" "otherwise" "served" "can"
[13] "overbalance" "legitimate" "claims" "free"
[17] "exercise" "religion" ""
[[1098]]
[1] "" "Tennessee" "asserts"
[4] "interest" "preventing" "establishment"
[7] "state" "religion" "consistent"
[10] "Establishment" "Clause" "thus"
[13] "highest" "order" "The"
[16] "constitutional" "history" "several"
[19] "States" "reveals" "generally"
[22] "interest" "preventing" "establishment"
[25] "prompted" "adoption" "clergy"
[28] "disqualification" "provisions" "see"
[31] "Stokes" "Tennessee" "appear"
[34] "exception" "pattern" "Cf"
[37] "post" "n" "Brennan"
[40] "J" "concurring" "judgment"
[43] "There" "occasion" "inquire"
[46] "whether" "promoting" "interest"
[49] "permissible" "legislative" "goal"
[52] "however" "see" "post"
[55] "Tennessee" "failed" "demonstrate"
[58] "views" "dangers" "clergy"
[61] "participation" "political" "process"
[64] "lost" "whatever" "validity"
[67] "may" "enjoyed" "The"
[70] "essence" "rationale" "underlying"
[73] "Tennessee" "restriction" "ministers"
[76] "elected" "public" "office"
[79] "will" "necessarily" "exercise"
[82] "powers" "influence" "promote"
[85] "interests" "one" "sect"
[88] "thwart" "interests" "another"
[91] "thus" "pitting" "one"
[94] "others" "contrary" "anti"
[97] "establishment" "principle" "command"
[100] "neutrality" "See" "Walz"
[103] "v" "Tax" "Comm"
[106] "n" "U" "S"
[109] "S" "Ct" "L"
[112] "Ed" "d" "However"
[115] "widely" "view" "may"
[118] "held" "th" "century"
[121] "many" "including" "enlightened"
[124] "statesmen" "day" "American"
[127] "experience" "provides" "persuasive"
[130] "support" "fear" "clergymen"
[133] "public" "office" "will"
[136] "less" "careful" "anti"
[139] "establishment" "interests" "less"
[142] "faithful" "oaths" "civil"
[145] "office" "unordained" "counterparts"
[148] ""
[[1099]]
[1] "We" "hold" "ch" "violates"
[5] "McDaniel" "s" "First" "Amendment"
[9] "right" "free" "exercise" "religion"
[13] "made" "applicable" "States" "Fourteenth"
[17] "Amendment" "Accordingly" "judgment" "Tennessee"
[21] "Supreme" "Court" "reversed" "case"
[25] "remanded" "court" "proceedings" "inconsistent"
[29] "opinion" ""
[[1100]]
[1] "Reversed" "remanded" ""
[[1101]]
[1] "Chief" "Justice" "REHNQUIST" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[1102]]
[1] "This" "case" "requires"
[4] "us" "consider" "standard"
[7] "review" "prison" "regulations"
[10] "claimed" "inhibit" "exercise"
[13] "constitutional" "rights" "Respondents"
[16] "members" "Islamic" "faith"
[19] "prisoners" "New" "Jersey"
[22] "s" "Leesburg" "State"
[25] "Prison" "They" "challenged"
[28] "policies" "adopted" "prison"
[31] "officials" "resulted" "inability"
[34] "attend" "Jumu" "ah"
[37] "weekly" "Muslim" "congregational"
[40] "service" "regularly" "held"
[43] "main" "prison" "building"
[46] "separate" "facility" "known"
[49] "Farm" "Jumu" "ah"
[52] "commanded" "Koran" "must"
[55] "held" "every" "Friday"
[58] "sun" "reaches" "zenith"
[61] "Asr" "afternoon" "prayer"
[64] "See" "Koran" "Brief"
[67] "Imam" "Jamil" "Abdullah"
[70] "Al" "Amin" "et"
[73] "al" "Amici" "Curiae"
[76] "There" "question" "respondents"
[79] "sincerely" "held" "religious"
[82] "beliefs" "compelled" "attendance"
[85] "Jumu" "ah" "We"
[88] "hold" "prison" "regulations"
[91] "challenged" "violate" "respondents"
[94] "rights" "Free" "Exercise"
[97] "Clause" "First" "Amendment"
[100] "United" "States" "Constitution"
[103] ""
[[1103]]
[1] "Inmates" "Leesburg" "placed"
[4] "one" "three" "custody"
[7] "classifications" "Maximum" "security"
[10] "gang" "minimum" "security"
[13] "inmates" "housed" "main"
[16] "prison" "building" "lowest"
[19] "classification" "full" "minimum"
[22] "live" "Farm" "Both"
[25] "respondents" "classified" "gang"
[28] "minimum" "security" "prisoners"
[31] "suit" "filed" "respondent"
[34] "Mateen" "later" "classified"
[37] "full" "minimum" ""
[[1104]]
[1] "Several" "changes" "prison" "policy"
[5] "prompted" "litigation" "In" "April"
[9] "New" "Jersey" "Department" "Corrections"
[13] "issued" "Standard" "provided" "inmates"
[17] "longer" "move" "directly" "maximum"
[21] "security" "full" "minimum" "status"
[25] "instead" "required" "first" "spend"
[29] "period" "time" "intermediate" "gang"
[33] "minimum" "status" "App" "This"
[37] "change" "designed" "redress" "problems"
[41] "arisen" "inmates" "transferred" "directly"
[45] "restrictive" "maximum" "security" "status"
[49] "full" "minimum" "status" "markedly"
[53] "higher" "level" "freedom" "Because"
[57] "serious" "overcrowding" "main" "building"
[61] "Standard" "mandated" "gang" "minimum"
[65] "inmates" "ordinarily" "assigned" "jobs"
[69] "outside" "main" "building" "Ibid"
[73] "These" "inmates" "work" "details"
[77] "persons" "supervised" "one" "guard"
[81] "Standard" "also" "required" "full"
[85] "minimum" "inmates" "work" "outside"
[89] "main" "institution" "whether" "prison"
[93] "grounds" "satellite" "building" "Farm"
[97] "Ibid" ""
[[1105]]
[1] "Corrections" "officials" "Leesburg" "implemented"
[5] "policies" "gradually" "District" "Court"
[9] "noted" "difficulty" "Shabazz" "v"
[13] "O" "Lone" "F" "Supp"
[17] "NJ" "In" "initial" "stages"
[21] "outside" "work" "details" "gang"
[25] "minimum" "prisoners" "officials" "apparently"
[29] "allowed" "Muslim" "inmates" "work"
[33] "inside" "main" "building" "Fridays"
[37] "attend" "Jumu" "ah" "This"
[41] "alternative" "eventually" "eliminated" "March"
[45] "light" "directive" "Standard" "gang"
[49] "minimum" "inmates" "work" "outside"
[53] "main" "building" ""
[[1106]]
[1] "Significant" "problems" "arose"
[4] "inmates" "assigned" "outside"
[7] "work" "details" "Some"
[10] "avoided" "reporting" "assignments"
[13] "others" "found" "reasons"
[16] "returning" "main" "building"
[19] "course" "workday" "including"
[22] "desire" "attend" "religious"
[25] "services" "Evidence" "showed"
[28] "return" "prisoners" "day"
[31] "resulted" "security" "risks"
[34] "administrative" "burdens" "prison"
[37] "officials" "found" "unacceptable"
[40] "Because" "details" "inmates"
[43] "supervised" "one" "guard"
[46] "whole" "detail" "forced"
[49] "return" "main" "gate"
[52] "one" "prisoner" "desired"
[55] "return" "facility" "The"
[58] "gate" "site" "incoming"
[61] "foot" "vehicle" "traffic"
[64] "day" "prison" "officials"
[67] "viewed" "high" "security"
[70] "risk" "area" "When"
[73] "inmate" "returned" "vehicle"
[76] "traffic" "delayed" "inmate"
[79] "logged" "searched" ""
[[1107]]
[1] "In" "response" "burdens" "Leesburg"
[5] "officials" "took" "steps" "ensure"
[9] "assigned" "outside" "details" "remained"
[13] "whole" "day" "Thus" "arrangements"
[17] "made" "lunch" "required" "medications"
[21] "brought" "prisoners" "appointments" "doctors"
[25] "social" "workers" "scheduled" "late"
[29] "afternoon" "These" "changes" "proved"
[33] "insufficient" "however" "prison" "officials"
[37] "began" "study" "alternatives" "After"
[41] "consulting" "director" "social" "services"
[45] "director" "professional" "services" "prison"
[49] "s" "imam" "chaplain" "prison"
[53] "officials" "March" "issued" "policy"
[57] "memorandum" "prohibited" "inmates" "assigned"
[61] "outside" "work" "details" "returning"
[65] "prison" "day" "except" "case"
[69] "emergency" ""
[[1108]]
[1] "The" "prohibition" "returns"
[4] "prevented" "Muslims" "assigned"
[7] "outside" "work" "details"
[10] "attending" "Jumu" "ah"
[13] "Respondents" "filed" "suit"
[16] "U" "S" "C"
[19] "alleging" "prison" "policies"
[22] "unconstitutionally" "denied" "Free"
[25] "Exercise" "rights" "First"
[28] "Amendment" "applied" "States"
[31] "Fourteenth" "Amendment" "The"
[34] "District" "Court" "applying"
[37] "standards" "announced" "earlier"
[40] "decision" "Court" "Appeals"
[43] "Third" "Circuit" "concluded"
[46] "constitutional" "violation" "occurred"
[49] "The" "District" "Court"
[52] "decided" "Standard" "March"
[55] "prohibition" "returns" "plausibly"
[58] "advance" "goals" "security"
[61] "order" "rehabilitation" "F"
[64] "Supp" "It" "rejected"
[67] "alternative" "arrangements" "suggested"
[70] "respondents" "finding" "less"
[73] "restrictive" "alternative" "adopted"
[76] "without" "potentially" "compromising"
[79] "legitimate" "institutional" "objective"
[82] "Ibid" ""
[[1109]]
[1] "The" "Court" "Appeals" "sua"
[5] "sponte" "hearing" "case" "en"
[9] "banc" "decided" "earlier" "decision"
[13] "relied" "upon" "District" "Court"
[17] "sufficiently" "protective" "prisoners" "free"
[21] "exercise" "rights" "went" "state"
[25] "prison" "policies" "sustained" ""
[[1110]]
[1] "" "state" "show" "s"
[5] "challenged" "regulations" "intended" "serve"
[9] "serve" "important" "penological" "goal"
[13] "security" "reasonable" "method" "exists"
[17] "prisoners" "religious" "rights" "can"
[21] "accommodated" "without" "creating" "bona"
[25] "fide" "security" "problems" "The"
[29] "expert" "testimony" "prison" "officials"
[33] "given" "due" "weight" "testimony"
[37] "dispositive" "issue" "whether" "reasonable"
[41] "adjustment" "possible" "Where" "found"
[45] "reasonable" "methods" "accommodation" "can"
[49] "adopted" "without" "sacrificing" "either"
[53] "state" "s" "interest" "security"
[57] "prisoners" "interest" "freely" "exercising"
[61] "religious" "rights" "state" "s"
[65] "refusal" "allow" "observance" "central"
[69] "religious" "practice" "justified" "violates"
[73] "prisoner" "s" "first" "amendment"
[77] "rights" "Shabazz" "v" "O"
[81] "Lone" "F" "d" "CA"
[85] "footnotes" "omitted" ""
[[1111]]
[1] "In" "considering" "whether"
[4] "potential" "method" "accommodation"
[7] "reasonable" "court" "added"
[10] "relevant" "factors" "include"
[13] "cost" "effects" "overcrowding"
[16] "understaffing" "inmates" "demonstrated"
[19] "proclivity" "unruly" "conduct"
[22] "See" "id" "n"
[25] "The" "case" "remanded"
[28] "District" "Court" "reconsideration"
[31] "standards" "enumerated" "opinion"
[34] "We" "granted" "certiorari"
[37] "consider" "important" "federal"
[40] "constitutional" "issues" "presented"
[43] "Court" "Appeals" "decision"
[46] "resolve" "apparent" "confusion"
[49] "among" "Courts" "Appeals"
[52] "proper" "standards" "applied"
[55] "considering" "prisoners" "free"
[58] "exercise" "claims" "U"
[61] "S" "S" "Ct"
[64] "L" "Ed" "d"
[67] ""
[[1112]]
[1] "Several" "general" "principles"
[4] "guide" "consideration" "issues"
[7] "presented" "First" "convicted"
[10] "prisoners" "forfeit" "constitutional"
[13] "protections" "reason" "conviction"
[16] "confinement" "prison" "Bell"
[19] "v" "Wolfish" "U"
[22] "S" "S" "Ct"
[25] "L" "Ed" "d"
[28] "See" "Turner" "v"
[31] "Safley" "U" "S"
[34] "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "d" "Jones"
[40] "v" "North" "Carolina"
[43] "Prisoners" "Labor" "Union"
[46] "Inc" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "L"
[52] "Ed" "d" "Inmates"
[55] "clearly" "retain" "protections"
[58] "afforded" "First" "Amendment"
[61] "Pell" "v" "Procunier"
[64] "U" "S" "S"
[67] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[70] "d" "including" "directive"
[73] "law" "shall" "prohibit"
[76] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[79] "See" "Cruz" "v"
[82] "Beto" "U" "S"
[85] "S" "Ct" "L"
[88] "Ed" "d" "per"
[91] "curiam" "Second" "l"
[94] "awful" "incarceration" "brings"
[97] "necessary" "withdrawal" "limitation"
[100] "many" "privileges" "rights"
[103] "retraction" "justified" "considerations"
[106] "underlying" "penal" "system"
[109] "Price" "v" "Johnston"
[112] "U" "S" "S"
[115] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[118] "The" "limitations" "exercise"
[121] "constitutional" "rights" "arise"
[124] "fact" "incarceration" "valid"
[127] "penological" "objectives" "including"
[130] "deterrence" "crime" "rehabilitation"
[133] "prisoners" "institutional" "security"
[136] "Pell" "v" "Procunier"
[139] "supra" "U" "S"
[142] "S" "Ct" "Procunier"
[145] "v" "Martinez" "U"
[148] "S" "S" "Ct"
[151] "L" "Ed" "d"
[154] ""
[[1113]]
[1] "" "In" "considering"
[4] "appropriate" "balance" "factors"
[7] "often" "said" "evaluation"
[10] "penological" "objectives" "committed"
[13] "considered" "judgment" "prison"
[16] "administrators" "actually" "charged"
[19] "trained" "running" "particular"
[22] "institution" "examination" "Bell"
[25] "v" "Wolfish" "supra"
[28] "U" "S" "S"
[31] "Ct" "See" "Turner"
[34] "v" "Safley" "supra"
[37] "U" "S" "S"
[40] "Ct" "To" "ensure"
[43] "courts" "afford" "appropriate"
[46] "deference" "prison" "officials"
[49] "determined" "prison" "regulations"
[52] "alleged" "infringe" "constitutional"
[55] "rights" "judged" "reasonableness"
[58] "test" "less" "restrictive"
[61] "ordinarily" "applied" "alleged"
[64] "infringements" "fundamental" "constitutional"
[67] "rights" "See" "e"
[70] "g" "Jones" "v"
[73] "North" "Carolina" "Prisoners"
[76] "Labor" "Union" "Inc"
[79] "supra" "U" "S"
[82] "S" "Ct" "We"
[85] "recently" "restated" "proper"
[88] "standard" "W" "hen"
[91] "prison" "regulation" "impinges"
[94] "inmates" "constitutional" "rights"
[97] "regulation" "valid" "reasonably"
[100] "related" "legitimate" "penological"
[103] "interests" "Turner" "v"
[106] "Safley" "supra" "U"
[109] "S" "S" "Ct"
[112] "This" "approach" "ensures"
[115] "ability" "corrections" "officials"
[118] "anticipate" "security" "problems"
[121] "adopt" "innovative" "solutions"
[124] "intractable" "problems" "prison"
[127] "administration" "ibid" "avoids"
[130] "unnecessary" "intrusion" "judiciary"
[133] "problems" "particularly" "ill"
[136] "suited" "resolution" "decree"
[139] "Procunier" "v" "Martinez"
[142] "supra" "U" "S"
[145] "S" "Ct" "See"
[148] "also" "Turner" "v"
[151] "Safley" "supra" "U"
[154] "S" "S" "Ct"
[157] "Bell" "v" "Wolfish"
[160] "supra" "U" "S"
[163] "S" "Ct" ""
[[1114]]
[1] "" "We" "think"
[4] "Court" "Appeals" "decision"
[7] "case" "wrong" "established"
[10] "separate" "burden" "prison"
[13] "officials" "prove" "reasonable"
[16] "method" "exists" "prisoners"
[19] "religious" "rights" "can"
[22] "accommodated" "without" "creating"
[25] "bona" "fide" "security"
[28] "problems" "F" "d"
[31] "See" "also" "id"
[34] "Prison" "officials" "required"
[37] "produce" "convincing" "evidence"
[40] "unable" "satisfy" "institutional"
[43] "goals" "way" "infringe"
[46] "inmates" "free" "exercise"
[49] "rights" "Though" "availability"
[52] "accommodations" "relevant" "reasonableness"
[55] "inquiry" "rejected" "notion"
[58] "prison" "officials" "set"
[61] "shoot" "every" "conceivable"
[64] "alternative" "method" "accommodating"
[67] "claimant" "s" "constitutional"
[70] "complaint" "Turner" "v"
[73] "Safley" "supra" "U"
[76] "S" "S" "Ct"
[79] "By" "placing" "burden"
[82] "prison" "officials" "disprove"
[85] "availability" "alternatives" "approach"
[88] "articulated" "Court" "Appeals"
[91] "fails" "reflect" "respect"
[94] "deference" "United" "States"
[97] "Constitution" "allows" "judgment"
[100] "prison" "administrators" ""
[[1115]]
[1] "" "Turning" "consideration"
[4] "policies" "challenged" "case"
[7] "think" "findings" "District"
[10] "Court" "establish" "clearly"
[13] "prison" "officials" "acted"
[16] "reasonable" "manner" "Turner"
[19] "v" "Safley" "drew"
[22] "upon" "previous" "decisions"
[25] "identify" "several" "factors"
[28] "relevant" "reasonableness" "determination"
[31] "First" "regulation" "must"
[34] "logical" "connection" "legitimate"
[37] "governmental" "interests" "invoked"
[40] "justify" "Id" "S"
[43] "Ct" "The" "policies"
[46] "issue" "clearly" "meet"
[49] "standard" "The" "requirement"
[52] "full" "minimum" "gang"
[55] "minimum" "prisoners" "work"
[58] "outside" "main" "facility"
[61] "justified" "concerns" "institutional"
[64] "order" "security" "District"
[67] "Court" "found" "least"
[70] "part" "response" "critical"
[73] "overcrowding" "state" "s"
[76] "prisons" "least" "part"
[79] "designed" "ease" "tension"
[82] "drain" "facilities" "part"
[85] "day" "inmates" "outside"
[88] "confines" "main" "buildings"
[91] "F" "Supp" "We"
[94] "think" "beyond" "doubt"
[97] "standard" "related" "legitimate"
[100] "concern" ""
[[1116]]
[1] "The" "subsequent" "policy"
[4] "prohibiting" "returns" "institution"
[7] "day" "also" "passes"
[10] "muster" "standard" "Prison"
[13] "officials" "testified" "returns"
[16] "outside" "work" "details"
[19] "generated" "congestion" "delays"
[22] "main" "gate" "high"
[25] "risk" "area" "event"
[28] "Return" "requests" "also"
[31] "placed" "pressure" "guards"
[34] "supervising" "outside" "details"
[37] "previously" "required" "evaluate"
[40] "reason" "possibly" "justifying"
[43] "return" "facilities" "either"
[46] "accept" "reject" "reason"
[49] "Id" "Rehabilitative" "concerns"
[52] "supported" "policy" "corrections"
[55] "officials" "sought" "simulation"
[58] "working" "conditions" "responsibilities"
[61] "society" "Chief" "Deputy"
[64] "Ucci" "testified" "One"
[67] "things" "society" "demands"
[70] "expects" "job" "show"
[73] "time" "put" "eight"
[76] "hours" "whatever" "hours"
[79] "supposed" "put" "don"
[82] "t" "get" "If"
[85] "can" "show" "inmates"
[88] "re" "supposed" "show"
[91] "work" "work" "full"
[94] "day" "get" "least"
[97] "ve" "done" "something"
[100] "Tr" "These" "legitimate"
[103] "goals" "advanced" "prohibition"
[106] "returns" "seriously" "maintained"
[109] "logical" "connection" "regulation"
[112] "asserted" "goal" "remote"
[115] "render" "policy" "arbitrary"
[118] "irrational" "Turner" "v"
[121] "Safley" "U" "S"
[124] "S" "Ct" ""
[[1117]]
[1] "Our" "decision" "Turner"
[4] "also" "found" "relevant"
[7] "alternative" "means" "exercising"
[10] "right" "remain" "open"
[13] "prison" "inmates" "Ante"
[16] "There" "course" "alternative"
[19] "means" "attending" "Jumu"
[22] "ah" "respondents" "religious"
[25] "beliefs" "insist" "occur"
[28] "particular" "time" "But"
[31] "stringent" "requirements" "time"
[34] "Jumu" "ah" "may"
[37] "held" "may" "make"
[40] "extraordinarily" "difficult" "prison"
[43] "officials" "assure" "every"
[46] "Muslim" "prisoner" "able"
[49] "attend" "service" "While"
[52] "way" "minimize" "central"
[55] "importance" "Jumu" "ah"
[58] "respondents" "unwilling" "hold"
[61] "prison" "officials" "required"
[64] "Constitution" "sacrifice" "legitimate"
[67] "penological" "objectives" "end"
[70] "In" "Turner" "look"
[73] "see" "whether" "prisoners"
[76] "means" "communicating" "fellow"
[79] "inmates" "instead" "examined"
[82] "whether" "inmates" "deprived"
[85] "means" "expression" "Id"
[88] "S" "Ct" "Here"
[91] "similarly" "think" "appropriate"
[94] "see" "whether" "regulations"
[97] "respondents" "retain" "ability"
[100] "participate" "Muslim" "religious"
[103] "ceremonies" "The" "record"
[106] "establishes" "respondents" "deprived"
[109] "forms" "religious" "exercise"
[112] "instead" "freely" "observe"
[115] "number" "religious" "obligations"
[118] "The" "right" "congregate"
[121] "prayer" "discussion" "virtually"
[124] "unlimited" "except" "working"
[127] "hours" "Tr" "testimony"
[130] "O" "Lone" "state"
[133] "provided" "imam" "free"
[136] "access" "prison" "Muslim"
[139] "prisoners" "given" "different"
[142] "meals" "whenever" "pork"
[145] "served" "prison" "cafeteria"
[148] "Special" "arrangements" "also"
[151] "made" "month" "long"
[154] "observance" "Ramadan" "period"
[157] "fasting" "prayer" "During"
[160] "Ramadan" "Muslim" "prisoners"
[163] "awakened" "m" "early"
[166] "breakfast" "receive" "dinner"
[169] "evening" "We" "think"
[172] "ability" "part" "respondents"
[175] "participate" "religious" "observances"
[178] "faith" "supports" "conclusion"
[181] "restrictions" "issue" "reasonable"
[184] ""
[[1118]]
[1] "Finally" "case" "validity"
[4] "regulations" "strengthened" "examination"
[7] "impact" "accommodation" "respondents"
[10] "asserted" "right" "inmates"
[13] "prison" "personnel" "allocation"
[16] "prison" "resources" "generally"
[19] "See" "Turner" "v"
[22] "Safley" "supra" "S"
[25] "Ct" "Respondents" "suggest"
[28] "several" "accommodations" "practices"
[31] "including" "placing" "Muslim"
[34] "inmates" "one" "two"
[37] "inside" "work" "details"
[40] "providing" "weekend" "labor"
[43] "Muslim" "inmates" "See"
[46] "Brief" "Respondents" "As"
[49] "noted" "District" "Court"
[52] "however" "respondents" "suggested"
[55] "accommodations" "judgment" "prison"
[58] "officials" "adverse" "effects"
[61] "institution" "Inside" "work"
[64] "details" "gang" "minimum"
[67] "inmates" "inconsistent" "legitimate"
[70] "concerns" "underlying" "Standard"
[73] "District" "Court" "found"
[76] "extra" "supervision" "necessary"
[79] "establish" "weekend" "details"
[82] "Muslim" "prisoners" "drain"
[85] "scarce" "human" "resources"
[88] "prison" "F" "Supp"
[91] "Prison" "officials" "determined"
[94] "alternatives" "also" "threaten"
[97] "prison" "security" "allowing"
[100] "affinity" "groups" "prison"
[103] "flourish" "Administrator" "O"
[106] "Lone" "testified" "found"
[109] "think" "almost" "every"
[112] "prison" "administrator" "knows"
[115] "time" "put" "group"
[118] "individuals" "together" "one"
[121] "particular" "affinity" "interest"
[124] "wind" "leadership" "role"
[127] "organizational" "structure" "will"
[130] "almost" "invariably" "challenge"
[133] "institutional" "authority" "Tr"
[136] "Finally" "officials" "determined"
[139] "special" "arrangements" "one"
[142] "group" "create" "problems"
[145] "inmates" "see" "certain"
[148] "segment" "escaping" "rigorous"
[151] "work" "detail" "perceive"
[154] "favoritism" "Id" "These"
[157] "concerns" "prison" "administrators"
[160] "provide" "adequate" "support"
[163] "conclusion" "accommodations" "respondents"
[166] "request" "attend" "Jumu"
[169] "ah" "undesirable" "results"
[172] "institution" "These" "difficulties"
[175] "also" "make" "clear"
[178] "obvious" "easy" "alternatives"
[181] "policy" "adopted" "petitioners"
[184] "Turner" "v" "Safley"
[187] "U" "S" "S"
[190] "Ct" ""
[[1119]]
[1] "" "We" "take"
[4] "opportunity" "reaffirm" "refusal"
[7] "even" "claims" "made"
[10] "First" "Amendment" "substitute"
[13] "judgment" "difficult" "sensitive"
[16] "matters" "institutional" "administration"
[19] "Block" "v" "Rutherford"
[22] "U" "S" "S"
[25] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[28] "d" "determinations" "charged"
[31] "formidable" "task" "running"
[34] "prison" "Here" "District"
[37] "Court" "decided" "regulations"
[40] "alleged" "infringe" "constitutional"
[43] "rights" "reasonably" "related"
[46] "legitimate" "penological" "objectives"
[49] "We" "agree" "District"
[52] "Court" "necessarily" "follows"
[55] "regulations" "question" "offend"
[58] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[61] "First" "Amendment" "United"
[64] "States" "Constitution" "The"
[67] "judgment" "Court" "Appeals"
[70] "therefore" ""
[[1120]]
[1] "Reversed" ""
[[1121]]
[1] "Justice" "ALITO" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[1122]]
[1] "" "These" "cases"
[4] "require" "us" "decide"
[7] "whether" "First" "Amendment"
[10] "permits" "courts" "intervene"
[13] "employment" "disputes" "involving"
[16] "teachers" "religious" "schools"
[19] "entrusted" "responsibility" "instructing"
[22] "students" "faith" "The"
[25] "First" "Amendment" "protects"
[28] "right" "religious" "institutions"
[31] "decide" "free" "state"
[34] "interference" "matters" "church"
[37] "government" "well" "faith"
[40] "doctrine" "Kedroff" "v"
[43] "Saint" "Nicholas" "Cathedral"
[46] "Russian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[49] "North" "America" "U"
[52] "S" "S" "Ct"
[55] "L" "Ed" "Applying"
[58] "principle" "held" "Hosanna"
[61] "Tabor" "Evangelical" "Lutheran"
[64] "Church" "School" "v"
[67] "EEOC" "U" "S"
[70] "S" "Ct" "L"
[73] "Ed" "d" "First"
[76] "Amendment" "barred" "court"
[79] "entertaining" "employment" "discrimination"
[82] "claim" "brought" "elementary"
[85] "school" "teacher" "Cheryl"
[88] "Perich" "religious" "school"
[91] "taught" "Our" "decision"
[94] "built" "line" "lower"
[97] "court" "cases" "adopting"
[100] "dubbed" "ministerial" "exception"
[103] "laws" "governing" "employment"
[106] "relationship" "religious" "institution"
[109] "certain" "key" "employees"
[112] "We" "announce" "rigid"
[115] "formula" "determining" "whether"
[118] "employee" "falls" "within"
[121] "exception" "identified" "circumstances"
[124] "found" "relevant" "case"
[127] "including" "Perich" "s"
[130] "title" "Minister" "Religion"
[133] "Commissioned" "educational" "training"
[136] "responsibility" "teach" "religion"
[139] "participate" "students" "religious"
[142] "activities" "Id" "S"
[145] "Ct" ""
[[1123]]
[1] "In" "cases" "now"
[4] "us" "consider" "employment"
[7] "discrimination" "claims" "brought"
[10] "two" "elementary" "school"
[13] "teachers" "Catholic" "schools"
[16] "whose" "teaching" "responsibilities"
[19] "similar" "Perich" "s"
[22] "Although" "teachers" "given"
[25] "title" "minister" "less"
[28] "religious" "training" "Perich"
[31] "hold" "cases" "fall"
[34] "within" "rule" "dictated"
[37] "decision" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[40] "The" "religious" "education"
[43] "formation" "students" "reason"
[46] "existence" "private" "religious"
[49] "schools" "therefore" "selection"
[52] "supervision" "teachers" "upon"
[55] "schools" "rely" "work"
[58] "lie" "core" "mission"
[61] "Judicial" "review" "way"
[64] "religious" "schools" "discharge"
[67] "responsibilities" "undermine" "independence"
[70] "religious" "institutions" "way"
[73] "First" "Amendment" "tolerate"
[76] ""
[[1124]]
[1] "" "I" ""
[[1125]]
[1] "A" ""
[[1126]]
[1] "" ""
[[1127]]
[1] "The" "first" "two" "cases"
[5] "now" "decide" "involves" "Agnes"
[9] "Morrissey" "Berru" "employed" "Our"
[13] "Lady" "Guadalupe" "School" "OLG"
[17] "Roman" "Catholic" "primary" "school"
[21] "Archdiocese" "Los" "Angeles" "Excerpts"
[25] "Record" "ER" "No" "CA"
[29] "OLG" "For" "many" "years"
[33] "Morrissey" "Berru" "employed" "OLG"
[37] "lay" "fifth" "sixth" "grade"
[41] "teacher" "Like" "elementary" "school"
[45] "teachers" "taught" "subjects" "since"
[49] "OLG" "Catholic" "school" "curriculum"
[53] "included" "religion" "App" "As"
[57] "result" "students" "religion" "teacher"
[61] ""
[[1128]]
[1] "Morrissey" "Berru" "earned" "B" "A"
[6] "English" "Language" "Arts" "minor" "secondary"
[11] "education" "holds" "California" "teaching" "credential"
[16] "Id" "While" "faculty" "OLG" "took"
[21] "religious" "education" "courses" "school" "s"
[26] "request" "ER" "ER" "ER" "ER"
[31] "ER" "expected" "attend" "faculty" "prayer"
[36] "services" "App" "Pet" "Cert" "No"
[41] "p" ""
[[1129]]
[1] "Each" "year" "Morrissey"
[4] "Berru" "OLG" "entered"
[7] "employment" "agreement" "App"
[10] "set" "school" "s"
[13] "mission" "Morrissey" "Berru"
[16] "s" "duties" "See"
[19] "e" "g" "id"
[22] "The" "agreement" "stated"
[25] "school" "s" "mission"
[28] "develop" "promote" "Catholic"
[31] "School" "Faith" "Community"
[34] "id" "informed" "Morrissey"
[37] "Berru" "ll" "duties"
[40] "responsibilities" "Teache" "r"
[43] "performed" "within" "overriding"
[46] "commitment" "Ibid" "The"
[49] "agreement" "explained" "school"
[52] "s" "hiring" "retention"
[55] "decisions" "guided" "Catholic"
[58] "mission" "agreement" "made"
[61] "clear" "teachers" "expected"
[64] "model" "promote" "Catholic"
[67] "faith" "morals" "Id"
[70] "Under" "agreement" "Morrissey"
[73] "Berru" "required" "participate"
[76] "s" "chool" "liturgical"
[79] "activities" "requested" "ibid"
[82] "agreement" "specified" "terminated"
[85] "cause" "failing" "carry"
[88] "duties" "conduct" "brings"
[91] "discredit" "upon" "School"
[94] "Roman" "Catholic" "Church"
[97] "Id" "The" "agreement"
[100] "required" "compliance" "faculty"
[103] "handbook" "sets" "similar"
[106] "expectations" "Id" "App"
[109] "Pet" "Cert" "No"
[112] "The" "pastor" "parish"
[115] "Catholic" "priest" "approve"
[118] "Morrissey" "Berru" "s"
[121] "hiring" "year" "Id"
[124] "see" "also" "App"
[127] ""
[[1130]]
[1] "Like" "teachers" "Archdiocese" "Los"
[5] "Angeles" "Morrissey" "Berru" "considered"
[9] "catechist" "e" "teacher" "religio"
[13] "n" "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[17] "No" "Catechists" "responsible" "faith"
[21] "formation" "students" "charge" "day"
[25] "Id" "Morrissey" "Berru" "provided"
[29] "religious" "instruction" "every" "day"
[33] "using" "textbook" "designed" "use"
[37] "teaching" "religion" "young" "Catholic"
[41] "students" "Id" "see" "App"
[45] "Under" "prescribed" "curriculum" "expected"
[49] "teach" "students" "among" "things"
[53] "learn" "express" "belief" "Jesus"
[57] "son" "God" "Word" "made"
[61] "flesh" "identify" "ways" "church"
[65] "carries" "mission" "Jesus" "locate"
[69] "read" "understand" "stories" "Bible"
[73] "know" "names" "meanings" "signs"
[77] "symbols" "seven" "sacraments" "able"
[81] "explain" "communion" "saints" "App"
[85] "Pet" "Cert" "No" "She"
[89] "tested" "students" "curriculum" "yearly"
[93] "exam" "Id" "She" "also"
[97] "directed" "produced" "annual" "passion"
[101] "play" "Id" ""
[[1131]]
[1] "Morrissey" "Berru" "prepared" "students"
[5] "participation" "Mass" "communion" "confession"
[9] "Id" "She" "also" "occasionally"
[13] "selected" "prepared" "students" "read"
[17] "Mass" "Id" "And" "expected"
[21] "take" "students" "Mass" "week"
[25] "certain" "feast" "days" "Feast"
[29] "Day" "St" "Juan" "Diego"
[33] "All" "Saints" "Day" "Feast"
[37] "Our" "Lady" "take" "confession"
[41] "pray" "Stations" "Cross" "Id"
[45] "Each" "year" "brought" "Catholic"
[49] "Cathedral" "Los" "Angeles" "participated"
[53] "altar" "servers" "Id" "This"
[57] "visit" "explained" "important" "experience"
[61] "t" "big" "honor" "children"
[65] "serve" "altar" "cathedral" "Id"
[69] ""
[[1132]]
[1] "Morrissey" "Berru" "also" "prayed" "students"
[6] "Her" "class" "began" "ended" "every"
[11] "day" "Hail" "Mary" "Id" "She"
[16] "led" "students" "prayer" "times" "family"
[21] "member" "ill" "Id" "And" "taught"
[26] "recite" "Apostle" "s" "Creed" "Nicene"
[31] "Creed" "well" "prayers" "specific" "purposes"
[36] "connection" "sacrament" "confession" "Id" ""
[[1133]]
[1] "The" "school" "reviewed" "Morrissey"
[5] "Berru" "s" "performance" "religious"
[9] "standards" "The" "Classroom" "Observation"
[13] "Report" "evaluated" "whether" "Catholic"
[17] "values" "infused" "subject" "areas"
[21] "whether" "religious" "signs" "displays"
[25] "classroom" "Id" "App" "Morrissey"
[29] "Berru" "testified" "tried" "instruct"
[33] "students" "manner" "consistent" "teachings"
[37] "Church" "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[41] "No" "said" "committed" "teaching"
[45] "children" "Catholic" "values" "providing"
[49] "faith" "based" "education" "Id"
[53] "And" "school" "principal" "confirmed"
[57] "Morrissey" "Berru" "expected" "things"
[61] ""
[[1134]]
[1] "" ""
[[1135]]
[1] "In" "OLG" "asked"
[4] "Morrissey" "Berru" "move"
[7] "full" "time" "part"
[10] "time" "position" "next"
[13] "year" "school" "declined"
[16] "renew" "contract" "She"
[19] "filed" "claim" "Equal"
[22] "Employment" "Opportunity" "Commission"
[25] "EEOC" "received" "right"
[28] "sue" "letter" "App"
[31] "filed" "suit" "Age"
[34] "Discrimination" "Employment" "Act"
[37] "Stat" "amended" "U"
[40] "S" "C" "et"
[43] "seq" "claiming" "school"
[46] "demoted" "failed" "renew"
[49] "contract" "replace" "younger"
[52] "teacher" "App" "The"
[55] "school" "maintains" "based"
[58] "decisions" "classroom" "performance"
[61] "specifically" "Morrissey" "Berru"
[64] "s" "difficulty" "administering"
[67] "new" "reading" "writing"
[70] "program" "introduced" "school"
[73] "s" "new" "principal"
[76] "part" "effort" "maintain"
[79] "accreditation" "improve" "school"
[82] "s" "academic" "program"
[85] "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[88] "No" ""
[[1136]]
[1] "Invoking" "ministerial" "exception"
[4] "recognized" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[7] "OLG" "successfully" "moved"
[10] "summary" "judgment" "Ninth"
[13] "Circuit" "reversed" "brief"
[16] "opinion" "Fed" "Appx"
[19] "The" "court" "acknowledged"
[22] "Morrissey" "Berru" "significant"
[25] "religious" "responsibilities" "reasoned"
[28] "employee" "s" "duties"
[31] "alone" "dispositive" "Hosanna"
[34] "Tabor" "s" "framework"
[37] "Ibid" "Unlike" "Perich"
[40] "court" "noted" "Morrissey"
[43] "Berru" "formal" "title"
[46] "minister" "limited" "formal"
[49] "religious" "training" "hold"
[52] "public" "religious" "leader"
[55] "minister" "Ibid" "In"
[58] "court" "s" "view"
[61] "factors" "outweighed" "fact"
[64] "invested" "significant" "religious"
[67] "responsibilities" "Ibid" "The"
[70] "court" "therefore" "held"
[73] "Morrissey" "Berru" "fall"
[76] "within" "ministerial" "exception"
[79] "OLG" "filed" "petition"
[82] "certiorari" "granted" "review"
[85] ""
[[1137]]
[1] "B" ""
[[1138]]
[1] "" ""
[[1139]]
[1] "The" "second" "case" "concerns" "late"
[6] "Kristen" "Biel" "worked" "year" "half"
[11] "lay" "teacher" "St" "James" "School"
[16] "another" "Catholic" "primary" "school" "Los"
[21] "Angeles" "For" "part" "one" "academic"
[26] "year" "Biel" "served" "long" "term"
[31] "substitute" "teacher" "first" "grade" "class"
[36] "one" "full" "year" "full" "time"
[41] "fifth" "grade" "teacher" "App" "Like"
[46] "Morrissey" "Berru" "taught" "subjects" "including"
[51] "religion" "Id" "ER" "No" "CA"
[56] "St" "James" ""
[[1140]]
[1] "Biel" "B" "A" "liberal"
[5] "studies" "teaching" "credential" "App"
[9] "During" "time" "St" "James"
[13] "attended" "religious" "conference" "imparted"
[17] "d" "ifferent" "techniques" "teaching"
[21] "incorporating" "God" "classroom" "Id"
[25] "Biel" "Catholic" ""
[[1141]]
[1] "Biel" "s" "employment" "agreement"
[5] "pertinent" "part" "nearly" "identical"
[9] "Morrissey" "Berru" "s" "Compare"
[13] "id" "id" "The" "agreement"
[17] "set" "religious" "mission" "required"
[21] "teachers" "serve" "mission" "imposed"
[25] "commitments" "regarding" "religious" "instruction"
[29] "worship" "personal" "modeling" "faith"
[33] "explained" "teachers" "performance" "reviewed"
[37] "bases" ""
[[1142]]
[1] "Biel" "s" "agreement" "also"
[5] "required" "compliance" "St" "James"
[9] "faculty" "handbook" "resembles" "OLG"
[13] "handbook" "Id" "Compare" "ER"
[17] "ER" "OLG" "ER" "ER"
[21] "St" "James" "The" "St"
[25] "James" "handbook" "defines" "religious"
[29] "development" "school" "s" "first"
[33] "goal" "provides" "teachers" "must"
[37] "mode" "l" "faith" "life"
[41] "exemplif" "y" "teachings" "Jesus"
[45] "Christ" "integrat" "e" "Catholic"
[49] "thought" "principles" "secular" "subjects"
[53] "prepar" "e" "students" "receive"
[57] "sacraments" "Id" "ER" "ER"
[61] "The" "school" "principal" "confirmed"
[65] "expectations" ""
[[1143]]
[1] "Like" "Morrissey" "Berru" "Biel"
[5] "instructed" "students" "tenets" "Catholicism"
[9] "She" "required" "teach" "religion"
[13] "minutes" "week" "App" "administered"
[17] "test" "religion" "every" "week"
[21] "id" "She" "used" "religion"
[25] "textbook" "selected" "school" "s"
[29] "principal" "Catholic" "nun" "Id"
[33] "ER" "St" "James" "The"
[37] "religious" "curriculum" "covered" "norms"
[41] "doctrines" "Catholic" "Faith" "including"
[45] "sacraments" "Catholic" "Church" "social"
[49] "teachings" "according" "Catholic" "Church"
[53] "morality" "history" "Catholic" "saints"
[57] "Catholic" "prayers" "App" "Pet"
[61] "Cert" "No" "p" ""
[[1144]]
[1] "Biel" "worshipped" "students" "At"
[5] "St" "James" "teachers" "responsible"
[9] "prepar" "ing" "students" "active"
[13] "participants" "Mass" "particular" "emphasis"
[17] "Mass" "responses" "ER" "Biel"
[21] "taught" "students" "Catholic" "practices"
[25] "like" "Eucharist" "confession" "id"
[29] "ER" "ER" "At" "monthly"
[33] "Masses" "prayed" "students" "App"
[37] "Pet" "Cert" "No" "Her"
[41] "students" "participated" "liturgy" "occasions"
[45] "presenting" "gifts" "bringing" "bread"
[49] "wine" "priest" "Ibid" ""
[[1145]]
[1] "Teachers" "St" "James" "required"
[5] "pray" "students" "every" "day"
[9] "id" "Biel" "observed" "requirement"
[13] "opening" "closing" "school" "day"
[17] "prayer" "including" "Lord" "s"
[21] "Prayer" "Hail" "Mary" "id"
[25] ""
[[1146]]
[1] "As" "OLG" "teachers" "St"
[5] "James" "evaluated" "fulfillment" "school"
[9] "s" "religious" "mission" "Id"
[13] "St" "James" "used" "classroom"
[17] "observation" "standards" "OLG" "thus"
[21] "examined" "whether" "teachers" "infus"
[25] "ed" "Catholic" "values" "teaching"
[29] "included" "religious" "displays" "classrooms"
[33] "Id" "The" "school" "s"
[37] "principal" "Catholic" "nun" "evaluated"
[41] "Biel" "measures" "Id" ""
[[1147]]
[1] "" ""
[[1148]]
[1] "St" "James" "declined" "renew"
[5] "Biel" "s" "contract" "one"
[9] "full" "year" "school" "She"
[13] "filed" "charges" "EEOC" "receiving"
[17] "right" "sue" "letter" "brought"
[21] "suit" "alleging" "discharged" "requested"
[25] "leave" "absence" "obtain" "treatment"
[29] "breast" "cancer" "App" "The"
[33] "school" "maintains" "decision" "based"
[37] "poor" "performance" "namely" "failure"
[41] "observe" "planned" "curriculum" "keep"
[45] "orderly" "classroom" "See" "id"
[49] "App" "Pet" "Cert" "No"
[53] ""
[[1149]]
[1] "Like" "OLG" "St" "James"
[5] "obtained" "summary" "judgment" "ministerial"
[9] "exception" "id" "divided" "panel"
[13] "Ninth" "Circuit" "reversed" "reasoning"
[17] "Biel" "lacked" "Perich" "s"
[21] "credentials" "training" "ministerial" "background"
[25] "F" "d" ""
[[1150]]
[1] "Judge" "D" "Michael" "Fisher"
[5] "sitting" "designation" "dissented" "Considering"
[9] "totality" "circumstances" "held" "ministerial"
[13] "exception" "applied" "substance" "reflected"
[17] "Biel" "s" "title" "important"
[21] "religious" "functions" "performed" "stewar"
[25] "d" "Catholic" "faith" "children"
[29] "class" "Id" ""
[[1151]]
[1] "An" "unsuccessful" "petition" "rehearing"
[5] "en" "banc" "ensued" "Judge"
[9] "Ryan" "D" "Nelson" "joined"
[13] "eight" "judges" "dissented" "F"
[17] "d" "C" "A" "Judge"
[21] "Nelson" "faulted" "panel" "majority"
[25] "embrac" "ing" "narrowest" "construction"
[29] "ministerial" "exception" "departing" "consensus"
[33] "sister" "circuits" "employee" "s"
[37] "ministerial" "function" "key" "focus"
[41] "demanding" "nothing" "less" "carbon"
[45] "copy" "specific" "facts" "Hosanna"
[49] "Tabor" "Ibid" "We" "granted"
[53] "review" "consolidated" "case" "OLG"
[57] "s" "U" "S" "S"
[61] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[65] ""
[[1152]]
[1] "II" ""
[[1153]]
[1] "A" ""
[[1154]]
[1] "" "The" "First" "Amendment"
[5] "provides" "Congress" "shall" "make"
[9] "law" "respecting" "establishment" "religion"
[13] "prohibiting" "free" "exercise" "thereof"
[17] "Among" "things" "Religion" "Clauses"
[21] "protect" "right" "churches" "religious"
[25] "institutions" "decide" "matters" "faith"
[29] "doctrine" "without" "government" "intrusion"
[33] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "U" "S"
[37] "S" "Ct" "quoting" "Kedroff"
[41] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[45] "State" "interference" "sphere" "obviously"
[49] "violate" "free" "exercise" "religion"
[53] "attempt" "government" "dictate" "even"
[57] "influence" "matters" "constitute" "one"
[61] "central" "attributes" "establishment" "religion"
[65] "The" "First" "Amendment" "outlaws"
[69] "intrusion" ""
[[1155]]
[1] "" "The" "independence" "religious"
[5] "institutions" "matters" "faith" "doctrine"
[9] "closely" "linked" "independence" "termed"
[13] "matters" "church" "government" "U"
[17] "S" "S" "Ct" "This"
[21] "mean" "religious" "institutions" "enjoy"
[25] "general" "immunity" "secular" "laws"
[29] "protect" "autonomy" "respect" "internal"
[33] "management" "decisions" "essential" "institution"
[37] "s" "central" "mission" "And"
[41] "component" "autonomy" "selection" "individuals"
[45] "play" "certain" "key" "roles"
[49] ""
[[1156]]
[1] "" "The" "ministerial" "exception"
[5] "based" "insight" "Under" "rule"
[9] "courts" "bound" "stay" "employment"
[13] "disputes" "involving" "holding" "certain"
[17] "important" "positions" "churches" "religious"
[21] "institutions" "The" "rule" "appears"
[25] "acquired" "label" "ministerial" "exception"
[29] "individuals" "involved" "pioneering" "cases"
[33] "described" "ministers" "See" "McClure"
[37] "v" "Salvation" "Army" "F"
[41] "d" "C" "A" "Rayburn"
[45] "v" "General" "Conference" "Seventh"
[49] "day" "Adventists" "F" "d"
[53] "C" "A" "Not" "pre"
[57] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "decisions" "applying"
[61] "exception" "involved" "ministers" "even"
[65] "members" "clergy" "See" "e"
[69] "g" "EEOC" "v" "Southwestern"
[73] "Baptist" "Theological" "Seminary" "F"
[77] "d" "C" "A" "EEOC"
[81] "v" "Roman" "Catholic" "Diocese"
[85] "Raleigh" "N" "C" "F"
[89] "d" "C" "A" "But"
[93] "instructive" "consider" "church" "s"
[97] "independence" "matters" "faith" "doctrine"
[101] "requires" "authority" "select" "supervise"
[105] "necessary" "remove" "minister" "without"
[109] "interference" "secular" "authorities" "Without"
[113] "power" "wayward" "minister" "s"
[117] "preaching" "teaching" "counseling" "contradict"
[121] "church" "s" "tenets" "lead"
[125] "congregation" "away" "faith" "The"
[129] "ministerial" "exception" "recognized" "preserve"
[133] "church" "s" "independent" "authority"
[137] "matters" ""
[[1157]]
[1] "B" ""
[[1158]]
[1] "When" "called" "ministerial"
[4] "exception" "finally" "reached"
[7] "Court" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[10] "unanimously" "recognized" "Religion"
[13] "Clauses" "foreclose" "certain"
[16] "employment" "discrimination" "claims"
[19] "brought" "religious" "organizations"
[22] "U" "S" "S"
[25] "Ct" "The" "constitutional"
[28] "foundation" "holding" "general"
[31] "principle" "church" "autonomy"
[34] "already" "referred" "independence"
[37] "matters" "faith" "doctrine"
[40] "closely" "linked" "matters"
[43] "internal" "government" "The"
[46] "three" "prior" "decisions"
[49] "primarily" "relied" "drew"
[52] "broad" "principle" "none"
[55] "exclusively" "concerned" "selection"
[58] "supervision" "clergy" "Watson"
[61] "v" "Jones" "Wall"
[64] "L" "Ed" "involved"
[67] "dispute" "control" "church"
[70] "property" "Kedroff" "U"
[73] "S" "S" "Ct"
[76] "L" "Ed" "Serbian"
[79] "Eastern" "Ort" "hodox"
[82] "Diocese" "United" "States"
[85] "Canada" "v" "Milivojevich"
[88] "U" "S" "S"
[91] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[94] "d" "also" "concerned"
[97] "control" "property" "well"
[100] "appointment" "authority" "bishops"
[103] ""
[[1159]]
[1] "In" "addition" "precedents" "looked"
[5] "background" "First" "Amendment" "adopted"
[9] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "U" "S"
[13] "S" "Ct" "We" "noted"
[17] "th" "century" "British" "statutes"
[21] "given" "Crown" "power" "fill"
[25] "high" "religious" "offices" "control"
[29] "exercise" "religion" "ways" "explained"
[33] "founding" "generation" "sought" "prevent"
[37] "repetition" "practices" "country" "Ibid"
[41] "Because" "Cheryl" "Perich" "teacher"
[45] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "title" "included"
[49] "word" "minister" "naturally" "concentrated"
[53] "historical" "events" "involving" "clerical"
[57] "offices" "abuses" "identified" "limited"
[61] "control" "appointments" ""
[[1160]]
[1] "We" "pointed" "various" "Acts"
[5] "Uniformity" "id" "S" "Ct"
[9] "dictated" "ministers" "preach" "imposed"
[13] "penalties" "non" "compliance" "Under"
[17] "Act" "minister" "preach" "ed"
[21] "declare" "d" "spoke" "thing"
[25] "derogation" "part" "Book" "Common"
[29] "Prayer" "sentenced" "six" "months"
[33] "jail" "first" "offense" "life"
[37] "imprisonment" "third" "violation" "Act"
[41] "Uniformity" "Edw" "ch" "In"
[45] "addition" "English" "subjects" "forbidden"
[49] "say" "anything" "Book" "Common"
[53] "Prayer" "nterludes" "play" "s"
[57] "song" "s" "r" "h"
[61] "ymes" "open" "w" "ord"
[65] "s" "Ibid" "A" "law"
[69] "contained" "similar" "prohibitions" "See"
[73] "Act" "Uniformity" "Eliz" "ch"
[77] ""
[[1161]]
[1] "After" "Restoration" "Parliament" "enacted"
[5] "new" "law" "similar" "aim"
[9] "Ministers" "Lecturer" "s" "required"
[13] "pledge" "unfeigned" "assent" "consent"
[17] "Book" "Common" "Prayer" "schoolmasters"
[21] "private" "tutors" "university" "professors"
[25] "required" "conforme" "Liturgy" "Church"
[29] "England" "endeavour" "change" "alteration"
[33] "church" "Act" "Uniformity" "Car"
[37] "ch" ""
[[1162]]
[1] "British" "law" "continued" "impose"
[5] "religious" "restrictions" "education" "th"
[9] "century" "past" "time" "adoption"
[13] "First" "Amendment" "The" "Schism"
[17] "Established" "Church" "Act" "Ann"
[21] "ch" "required" "schoolmasters" "tutors"
[25] "licensed" "bishop" "Non" "conforming"
[29] "Protestants" "well" "Catholics" "Jews"
[33] "teach" "attend" "two" "universities"
[37] "Blackstone" "wrote" "p" "ersons"
[41] "professing" "popish" "religion" "keep"
[45] "teach" "school" "pain" "perpetual"
[49] "imprisonment" "W" "Blackstone" "Commentaries"
[53] "Laws" "England" "th" "ed"
[57] "The" "law" "also" "imposed"
[61] "penalties" "person" "sen" "t"
[65] "another" "abroad" "educated" "popish"
[69] "religion" "contribute" "d" "maintenance"
[73] "Id" ""
[[1163]]
[1] "British" "colonies" "North"
[4] "America" "similarly" "controlled"
[7] "appointment" "clergy" "see"
[10] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "U"
[13] "S" "S" "Ct"
[16] "teaching" "students" "A"
[19] "Maryland" "law" "prohibited"
[22] "Catholic" "priest" "lay"
[25] "person" "keeping" "school"
[28] "taking" "upon" "education"
[31] "youth" "T" "Hughes"
[34] "History" "Society" "Jesus"
[37] "North" "America" "Colonial"
[40] "Federal" "In" "Governor"
[43] "New" "York" "instructed"
[46] "require" "schoolmasters" "arriving"
[49] "England" "obtain" "license"
[52] "Bishop" "London" "C"
[55] "Lincoln" "The" "Constitutional"
[58] "History" "New" "York"
[61] "New" "York" "law"
[64] "also" "required" "oath"
[67] "license" "vagrant" "Preacher"
[70] "Moravian" "disguised" "Papist"
[73] "Preach" "Teach" "Either"
[76] "Public" "Private" "S"
[79] "Cobb" "The" "Rise"
[82] "Religious" "Liberty" "America"
[85] ""
[[1164]]
[1] "C" ""
[[1165]]
[1] "In" "Hosanna" "Tabor" "Cheryl"
[5] "Perich" "kindergarten" "fourth" "grade"
[9] "teacher" "Evangelical" "Lutheran" "school"
[13] "filed" "suit" "federal" "court"
[17] "claiming" "discharged" "disability" "violation"
[21] "Americans" "Disabilities" "Act" "ADA"
[25] "U" "S" "C" "The"
[29] "school" "responded" "real" "reason"
[33] "dismissal" "violation" "Lutheran" "doctrine"
[37] "disputes" "resolved" "internally" "going"
[41] "outside" "authorities" "We" "held"
[45] "suit" "barred" "ministerial" "exception"
[49] "noted" "concern" "ed" "government"
[53] "interference" "internal" "church" "decision"
[57] "affects" "faith" "mission" "church"
[61] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[65] "We" "declined" "adopt" "rigid"
[69] "formula" "deciding" "employee" "qualifies"
[73] "minister" "added" "enough" "us"
[77] "conclude" "first" "case" "involving"
[81] "ministerial" "exception" "exception" "covers"
[85] "Perich" "given" "circumstances" "employment"
[89] "Id" "S" "Ct" "We"
[93] "identified" "four" "relevant" "circumstances"
[97] "highlight" "essential" ""
[[1166]]
[1] "First" "noted" "church" "given"
[5] "Perich" "title" "minister" "role"
[9] "distinct" "members" "Id" "S"
[13] "Ct" "Although" "minister" "usual"
[17] "sense" "term" "pastor" "deacon"
[21] "lead" "congregation" "regularly" "conduct"
[25] "religious" "services" "classified" "called"
[29] "teacher" "opposed" "lay" "teacher"
[33] "completing" "certain" "academic" "requirements"
[37] "given" "formal" "title" "Minister"
[41] "Religion" "Commissioned" "Id" "S"
[45] "Ct" ""
[[1167]]
[1] "Second" "Perich" "s" "position"
[5] "reflected" "significant" "degree" "religious"
[9] "training" "followed" "formal" "process"
[13] "commissioning" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[17] ""
[[1168]]
[1] "Third" "Perich" "held" "minister" "Church"
[6] "accepting" "formal" "call" "religious" "service"
[11] "according" "terms" "claiming" "certain" "tax"
[16] "benefits" "Id" "S" "Ct" ""
[[1169]]
[1] "Fourth" "Perich" "s" "job"
[5] "duties" "reflected" "role" "conveying"
[9] "Church" "s" "message" "carrying"
[13] "mission" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[17] "The" "church" "charged" "lead"
[21] "ing" "others" "toward" "Christian"
[25] "maturity" "teach" "ing" "faithfully"
[29] "Word" "God" "Sacred" "Scriptures"
[33] "truth" "purity" "set" "forth"
[37] "symbolical" "books" "Evangelical" "Lutheran"
[41] "Church" "Ibid" "Although" "Perich"
[45] "also" "provided" "instruction" "secular"
[49] "subjects" "taught" "religion" "four"
[53] "days" "week" "led" "students"
[57] "prayer" "three" "times" "day"
[61] "took" "students" "chapel" "service"
[65] "week" "participated" "liturgy" "twice"
[69] "year" "As" "source" "religious"
[73] "instruction" "explained" "Perich" "performed"
[77] "important" "role" "transmitting" "Lutheran"
[81] "faith" "next" "generation" "Ibid"
[85] ""
[[1170]]
[1] "The" "case" "featured" "two"
[5] "concurrences" "In" "first" "Justice"
[9] "THOMAS" "stressed" "courts" "defer"
[13] "religious" "organization" "s" "good"
[17] "faith" "understanding" "qualifies" "minister"
[21] "Id" "S" "Ct" "That"
[25] "Justice" "THOMAS" "explained" "religious"
[29] "organization" "s" "right" "choose"
[33] "ministers" "hollow" "secular" "courts"
[37] "second" "guess" "group" "s"
[41] "sincere" "application" "religious" "tenets"
[45] "Id" "S" "Ct" ""
[[1171]]
[1] "The" "second" "concurrence" "argued"
[5] "application" "ministerial" "exception" "focus"
[9] "function" "performed" "persons" "work"
[13] "religious" "bodies" "rather" "labels"
[17] "designations" "may" "vary" "across"
[21] "faiths" "Id" "S" "Ct"
[25] "opinion" "ALITO" "J" "joined"
[29] "KAGAN" "J" "This" "opinion"
[33] "viewed" "title" "minister" "relevant"
[37] "neither" "necessary" "sufficient" "Id"
[41] "S" "Ct" "It" "noted"
[45] "faiths" "employ" "term" "minister"
[49] "consider" "ministry" "consist" "large"
[53] "percentage" "members" "Ibid" "The"
[57] "opinion" "concluded" "ministerial" "exception"
[61] "apply" "employee" "leads" "religious"
[65] "organization" "conducts" "worship" "services"
[69] "important" "religious" "ceremonies" "rituals"
[73] "serves" "messenger" "teacher" "faith"
[77] "Id" "S" "Ct" ""
[[1172]]
[1] "D" ""
[[1173]]
[1] "" ""
[[1174]]
[1] "" "In" "determining" "whether"
[5] "particular" "position" "falls" "within"
[9] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "exception" "variety"
[13] "factors" "may" "important" "The"
[17] "circumstances" "informed" "decision" "Hosanna"
[21] "Tabor" "relevant" "relationship" "Perich"
[25] "s" "role" "conveying" "Church"
[29] "s" "message" "carrying" "mission"
[33] "id" "S" "Ct" "noted"
[37] "circumstances" "also" "shed" "light"
[41] "connection" "In" "denomination" "uses"
[45] "term" "minister" "conferring" "title"
[49] "naturally" "suggests" "recipient" "given"
[53] "important" "position" "trust" "In"
[57] "Perich" "s" "case" "title"
[61] "awarded" "used" "demanded" "satisfaction"
[65] "significant" "academic" "requirements" "conferred"
[69] "formal" "approval" "process" "id"
[73] "S" "Ct" "circumstances" "also"
[77] "evidenced" "importance" "attached" "role"
[81] "ibid" "But" "recognition" "significance"
[85] "factors" "Perich" "s" "case"
[89] "mean" "must" "met" "even"
[93] "necessarily" "important" "cases" ""
[[1175]]
[1] "" "Take" "question"
[4] "title" "minister" "Simply"
[7] "giving" "employee" "title"
[10] "minister" "enough" "justify"
[13] "exception" "And" "token"
[16] "since" "many" "religious"
[19] "traditions" "use" "title"
[22] "minister" "necessary" "requirement"
[25] "Requiring" "use" "title"
[28] "constitute" "impermissible" "discrimination"
[31] "problem" "solved" "simply"
[34] "including" "positions" "thought"
[37] "counterparts" "minister" "priests"
[40] "nuns" "rabbis" "imams"
[43] "See" "Brief" "Respondents"
[46] "Nuns" "Protestant" "ministers"
[49] "A" "brief" "submitted"
[52] "Jewish" "organizations" "makes"
[55] "point" "Judaism" "many"
[58] "ministers" "term" "minister"
[61] "encompasses" "extensive" "breadth"
[64] "religious" "functionaries" "Judaism"
[67] "For" "Muslims" "inquiry"
[70] "whether" "imams" "leaders"
[73] "bear" "title" "equivalent"
[76] "minister" "can" "present"
[79] "troubling" "choice" "denying"
[82] "central" "pillar" "Islam"
[85] "e" "equality" "believers"
[88] "risking" "loss" "ministerial"
[91] "exception" "protections" ""
[[1176]]
[1] "If" "titles" "important"
[4] "courts" "decide" "titles"
[7] "count" "hard" "see"
[10] "done" "without" "looking"
[13] "behind" "titles" "positions"
[16] "actually" "entail" "Moreover"
[19] "attaching" "much" "significance"
[22] "titles" "risk" "privileging"
[25] "religious" "traditions" "formal"
[28] "organizational" "structures" "less"
[31] "formal" ""
[[1177]]
[1] "" "For" "related"
[4] "reasons" "academic" "requirements"
[7] "position" "may" "show"
[10] "church" "question" "regards"
[13] "position" "important" "responsibility"
[16] "elucidating" "teaching" "tenets"
[19] "faith" "Presumably" "purpose"
[22] "requirements" "make" "sure"
[25] "person" "holding" "position"
[28] "understands" "faith" "can"
[31] "explain" "accurately" "effectively"
[34] "But" "insisting" "every"
[37] "case" "rigid" "academic"
[40] "requirements" "distorting" "effect"
[43] "This" "certainly" "true"
[46] "respect" "teachers" "Teaching"
[49] "children" "elementary" "school"
[52] "demand" "formal" "religious"
[55] "education" "teaching" "theology"
[58] "divinity" "students" "Elementary"
[61] "school" "teachers" "often"
[64] "teach" "secular" "subjects"
[67] "little" "special" "training"
[70] "In" "addition" "religious"
[73] "traditions" "may" "differ"
[76] "degree" "formal" "religious"
[79] "training" "thought" "needed"
[82] "order" "teach" "See"
[85] "e" "g" "Brief"
[88] "Ethics" "Religious" "Liberty"
[91] "Commission" "Southern" "Baptist"
[94] "Convention" "et" "al"
[97] "Amici" "Curiae" "many"
[100] "Protestant" "groups" "historically"
[103] "rejected" "requirement" "formal"
[106] "theological" "training" "In"
[109] "short" "circumstances" "instructive"
[112] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "inflexible"
[115] "requirements" "may" "far"
[118] "less" "significance" "cases"
[121] ""
[[1178]]
[1] "" "What" "matters"
[4] "bottom" "employee" "And"
[7] "implicit" "decision" "Hosanna"
[10] "Tabor" "recognition" "educating"
[13] "young" "people" "faith"
[16] "inculcating" "teachings" "training"
[19] "live" "faith" "responsibilities"
[22] "lie" "core" "mission"
[25] "private" "religious" "school"
[28] "As" "put" "Perich"
[31] "entrusted" "responsibility" "transmitting"
[34] "Lutheran" "faith" "next"
[37] "generation" "U" "S"
[40] "S" "Ct" "One"
[43] "concurrences" "made" "point"
[46] "concluding" "exception" "include"
[49] "employee" "leads" "religious"
[52] "organization" "conducts" "worship"
[55] "services" "important" "religious"
[58] "ceremonies" "rituals" "serves"
[61] "messenger" "teacher" "faith"
[64] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[67] "opinion" "ALITO" "J"
[70] "emphasis" "added" ""
[[1179]]
[1] "Religious" "education" "vital" "many"
[5] "faiths" "practiced" "United" "States"
[9] "This" "point" "stressed" "briefs"
[13] "filed" "support" "OLG" "St"
[17] "James" "groups" "affiliated" "wide"
[21] "array" "faith" "traditions" "In"
[25] "Catholic" "tradition" "religious" "education"
[29] "intimately" "bound" "whole" "Church"
[33] "s" "life" "Catechism" "Catholic"
[37] "Church" "d" "ed" "Under"
[41] "canon" "law" "local" "bishops"
[45] "must" "satisfy" "designated" "teachers"
[49] "religious" "instruction" "schools" "outstanding"
[53] "correct" "doctrine" "witness" "Christian"
[57] "life" "teaching" "skill" "Code"
[61] "Canon" "Law" "Canon" "Eng"
[65] "transl" ""
[[1180]]
[1] "Similarly" "Protestant" "churches"
[4] "earliest" "settlements" "country"
[7] "viewed" "education" "religious"
[10] "obligation" "A" "core"
[13] "belief" "Puritans" "education"
[16] "essential" "thwart" "chief"
[19] "project" "old" "deluder"
[22] "Satan" "keep" "men"
[25] "knowledge" "Scriptures" "Thus"
[28] "Massachusetts" "General" "Court"
[31] "passed" "called" "Old"
[34] "Deluder" "Satan" "Act"
[37] "requiring" "every" "sizable"
[40] "town" "establish" "school"
[43] "Most" "oldest" "educational"
[46] "institutions" "country" "originally"
[49] "established" "affiliated" "churches"
[52] "recent" "years" "non"
[55] "denominational" "Christian" "schools"
[58] "proliferated" "aim" "inculcating"
[61] "Biblical" "values" "students"
[64] "Many" "schools" "expressly"
[67] "set" "apart" "public"
[70] "schools" "believe" "reflect"
[73] "values" ""
[[1181]]
[1] "Religious" "education" "matter" "central"
[5] "importance" "Judaism" "As" "explained"
[9] "briefs" "submitted" "Jewish" "organizations"
[13] "Torah" "understood" "require" "Jewish"
[17] "parents" "ensure" "children" "instructed"
[21] "faith" "One" "brief" "quotes"
[25] "Maimonides" "s" "statement" "religious"
[29] "instruction" "obligation" "highest" "order"
[33] "entrusted" "schoolteacher" "possessing" "fear"
[37] "Heaven" "The" "contemporary" "American"
[41] "Jewish" "community" "continues" "place"
[45] "education" "children" "faith" "rites"
[49] "center" "communal" "efforts" ""
[[1182]]
[1] "Religious" "education" "also" "important"
[5] "Islam" "T" "acquisition" "least"
[9] "rudimentary" "knowledge" "religion" "duties"
[13] "mandatory" "Muslim" "individual" "This"
[17] "precept" "traced" "Prophet" "Muhammad"
[21] "proclaimed" "t" "pursuit" "knowledge"
[25] "incumbent" "every" "Muslim" "T"
[29] "development" "independent" "private" "Islamic"
[33] "schools" "ha" "s" "become"
[37] "important" "part" "picture" "Muslim"
[41] "education" "America" ""
[[1183]]
[1] "" "The" "Church" "Jesus"
[5] "Christ" "Latter" "day" "Saints"
[9] "long" "tradition" "religious" "education"
[13] "roots" "revelations" "given" "Joseph"
[17] "Smith" "See" "Doctrine" "Covenants"
[21] "Church" "Jesus" "Christ" "Latter"
[25] "day" "Saints" "The" "Church"
[29] "Board" "Education" "established" "elementary"
[33] "middle" "secondary" "schools" "secular"
[37] "religious" "instruction" "offered" ""
[[1184]]
[1] "Seventh" "day" "Adventists"
[4] "trace" "importance" "education"
[7] "back" "Garden" "Eden"
[10] "Seventh" "day" "Adventist"
[13] "formation" "restore" "s"
[16] "human" "beings" "image"
[19] "God" "revealed" "life"
[22] "Jesus" "Christ" "focuses"
[25] "development" "knowledge" "skills"
[28] "understandings" "serve" "God"
[31] "humanity" ""
[[1185]]
[1] "This" "brief" "survey" "justice"
[5] "rich" "diversity" "religious" "education"
[9] "country" "shows" "close" "connection"
[13] "religious" "institutions" "draw" "central"
[17] "purpose" "educating" "young" "faith"
[21] ""
[[1186]]
[1] "" ""
[[1187]]
[1] "" "When" "apply"
[4] "understanding" "Religion" "Clauses"
[7] "cases" "now" "us"
[10] "apparent" "Morrissey" "Berru"
[13] "Biel" "qualify" "exemption"
[16] "recognized" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[19] "There" "abundant" "record"
[22] "evidence" "performed" "vital"
[25] "religious" "duties" "Educating"
[28] "forming" "students" "Catholic"
[31] "faith" "lay" "core"
[34] "mission" "schools" "taught"
[37] "employment" "agreements" "faculty"
[40] "handbooks" "specified" "uncertain"
[43] "terms" "expected" "help"
[46] "schools" "carry" "mission"
[49] "work" "evaluated" "ensure"
[52] "fulfilling" "responsibility" "As"
[55] "elementary" "school" "teachers"
[58] "responsible" "providing" "instruction"
[61] "subjects" "including" "religion"
[64] "members" "school" "staff"
[67] "entrusted" "directly" "responsibility"
[70] "educating" "students" "faith"
[73] "And" "obligated" "provide"
[76] "instruction" "Catholic" "faith"
[79] "also" "expected" "guide"
[82] "students" "word" "deed"
[85] "toward" "goal" "living"
[88] "lives" "accordance" "faith"
[91] "They" "prayed" "students"
[94] "attended" "Mass" "students"
[97] "prepared" "children" "participation"
[100] "religious" "activities" "Their"
[103] "positions" "attributes" "Perich"
[106] "s" "Their" "titles"
[109] "include" "term" "minister"
[112] "less" "formal" "religious"
[115] "training" "core" "responsibilities"
[118] "teachers" "religion" "essentially"
[121] "And" "schools" "expressly"
[124] "saw" "playing" "vital"
[127] "part" "carrying" "mission"
[130] "church" "schools" "definition"
[133] "explanation" "roles" "important"
[136] "In" "country" "religious"
[139] "diversity" "United" "States"
[142] "judges" "expected" "complete"
[145] "understanding" "appreciation" "role"
[148] "played" "every" "person"
[151] "performs" "particular" "role"
[154] "every" "religious" "tradition"
[157] "A" "religious" "institution"
[160] "s" "explanation" "role"
[163] "employees" "life" "religion"
[166] "question" "important" ""
[[1188]]
[1] "III" ""
[[1189]]
[1] "" "In" "holding" "Morrissey"
[5] "Berru" "Biel" "fall" "within"
[9] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "exception" "Ninth"
[13] "Circuit" "misunderstood" "decision" "Both"
[17] "panels" "treated" "circumstances" "found"
[21] "relevant" "case" "checklist" "items"
[25] "assessed" "weighed" "every" "case"
[29] "dissent" "much" "That" "approach"
[33] "contrary" "admonition" "imposing" "rigid"
[37] "formula" "U" "S" "S"
[41] "Ct" "Instead" "called" "courts"
[45] "take" "relevant" "circumstances" "account"
[49] "determine" "whether" "particular" "position"
[53] "implicated" "fundamental" "purpose" "exception"
[57] ""
[[1190]]
[1] "The" "Ninth" "Circuit"
[4] "s" "rigid" "test"
[7] "produced" "distorted" "analysis"
[10] "First" "invested" "undue"
[13] "significance" "fact" "Morrissey"
[16] "Berru" "Biel" "clerical"
[19] "titles" "Fed" "Appx"
[22] "F" "d" "Post"
[25] "It" "true" "Perich"
[28] "s" "title" "included"
[31] "term" "minister" "never"
[34] "said" "title" "reference"
[37] "minister" "necessary" "trigger"
[40] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "exception"
[43] "Instead" "considerations" "merely"
[46] "made" "Perich" "s"
[49] "case" "especially" "easy"
[52] "one" "Brief" "United"
[55] "States" "Amicus" "Curiae"
[58] "Moreover" "Morrissey" "Berru"
[61] "Biel" "titles" "They"
[64] "Catholic" "elementary" "school"
[67] "teachers" "meant" "students"
[70] "primary" "teachers" "religion"
[73] "The" "concept" "teacher"
[76] "religion" "loaded" "religious"
[79] "significance" "The" "term"
[82] "rabbi" "means" "teacher"
[85] "Jesus" "frequently" "called"
[88] "rabbi" "And" "esoteric"
[91] "title" "needed" "regarded"
[94] "catechists" ""
[[1191]]
[1] "" "Second" "Ninth" "Circuit"
[5] "assigned" "much" "weight" "fact"
[9] "Morrissey" "Berru" "Biel" "less"
[13] "formal" "religious" "schooling" "Perich"
[17] "Fed" "Appx" "F" "d"
[21] "post" "The" "significance" "formal"
[25] "training" "must" "evaluated" "light"
[29] "age" "students" "taught" "judgment"
[33] "religious" "institution" "regarding" "need"
[37] "formal" "training" "The" "schools"
[41] "question" "thought" "Morrissey" "Berru"
[45] "Biel" "sufficient" "understanding" "Catholicism"
[49] "teach" "students" "judges" "warrant"
[53] "second" "guess" "judgment" "impose"
[57] "credentialing" "requirements" ""
[[1192]]
[1] "Third" "St" "James"
[4] "panel" "inappropriately" "diminished"
[7] "significance" "Biel" "s"
[10] "duties" "evince" "close"
[13] "guidance" "involvement" "students"
[16] "spiritual" "lives" "F"
[19] "d" "post" "Specifically"
[22] "panel" "majority" "suggested"
[25] "Biel" "merely" "taught"
[28] "religion" "book" "required"
[31] "school" "joined" "students"
[34] "prayer" "accompanied" "students"
[37] "Mass" "order" "keep"
[40] "quiet" "seats" "F"
[43] "d" "This" "misrepresents"
[46] "record" "significance" "For"
[49] "better" "worse" "many"
[52] "primary" "school" "teachers"
[55] "tie" "instruction" "closely"
[58] "textbooks" "many" "faith"
[61] "traditions" "prioritize" "teaching"
[64] "authoritative" "texts" "See"
[67] "Brief" "InterVarsity" "Christian"
[70] "Fellowship" "USA" "et"
[73] "al" "Amici" "Curiae"
[76] "Brief" "Senator" "Mike"
[79] "Lee" "et" "al"
[82] "Amici" "Curiae" "As"
[85] "prayer" "Biel" "prayed"
[88] "students" "taught" "prayers"
[91] "supervised" "prayers" "led"
[94] "students" "She" "prepared"
[97] "Mass" "accompanied" "Mass"
[100] "prayed" "See" "supra"
[103] ""
[[1193]]
[1] "In" "Biel" "s"
[4] "appeal" "Ninth" "Circuit"
[7] "suggested" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[10] "exception" "interpreted" "narrowly"
[13] "ADA" "U" "S"
[16] "C" "et" "seq"
[19] "Title" "VII" "e"
[22] "contain" "provisions" "allowing"
[25] "religious" "employers" "give"
[28] "preference" "members" "particular"
[31] "faith" "employing" "individuals"
[34] "work" "connected" "activities"
[37] "F" "d" "n"
[40] "post" "But" "Hosanna"
[43] "Tabor" "exception" "serves"
[46] "entirely" "different" "purpose"
[49] "Think" "quintessential" "case"
[52] "church" "wants" "dismiss"
[55] "minister" "poor" "performance"
[58] "The" "church" "s"
[61] "objection" "situation" "minister"
[64] "gone" "faith" "simply"
[67] "minister" "failing" "perform"
[70] "essential" "functions" "satisfactory"
[73] "manner" ""
[[1194]]
[1] "While" "Ninth" "Circuit" "treated"
[5] "circumstances" "cited" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[9] "factors" "assessed" "weighed" "every"
[13] "case" "respondents" "make" "governing"
[17] "test" "even" "rigid" "In"
[21] "view" "courts" "begin" "deciding"
[25] "whether" "first" "three" "circumstances"
[29] "ministerial" "title" "formal" "religious"
[33] "education" "employee" "s" "self"
[37] "description" "minister" "met" "order"
[41] "check" "conclusion" "suggested" "factors"
[45] "ask" "whether" "employee" "performed"
[49] "religious" "function" "Brief" "Respondents"
[53] "For" "reasons" "already" "explained"
[57] "basis" "treating" "circumstances" "found"
[61] "relevant" "Hosanna" "Tabor" "rigid"
[65] "manner" ""
[[1195]]
[1] "" "Respondents" "go"
[4] "astray" "suggesting" "employee"
[7] "can" "never" "come"
[10] "within" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[13] "exception" "unless" "employee"
[16] "practicing" "member" "religion"
[19] "employer" "associated" "Brief"
[22] "Respondents" "In" "hiring"
[25] "teacher" "provide" "religious"
[28] "instruction" "religious" "school"
[31] "likely" "try" "select"
[34] "person" "meets" "requirement"
[37] "insisting" "necessary" "condition"
[40] "create" "host" "problems"
[43] "As" "pointed" "petitioners"
[46] "determining" "whether" "person"
[49] "co" "religionist" "will"
[52] "always" "easy" "See"
[55] "Reply" "Brief" "Are"
[58] "Orthodox" "Jews" "non"
[61] "Orthodox" "Jews" "coreligionists"
[64] "Would" "Presbyterians" "Baptists"
[67] "similar" "enough" "Southern"
[70] "Baptists" "Primitive" "Baptists"
[73] "Deciding" "questions" "risk"
[76] "judicial" "entanglement" "religious"
[79] "issues" ""
[[1196]]
[1] "Expanding" "co" "religionist" "requirement"
[5] "Brief" "Respondents" "exclude" "longer"
[9] "practice" "faith" "even" "worse"
[13] "post" "Would" "test" "depend"
[17] "whether" "person" "question" "longer"
[21] "considered" "member" "particular" "faith"
[25] "Or" "test" "turn" "whether"
[29] "faith" "tradition" "question" "still"
[33] "regarded" "person" "member" "sense"
[37] ""
[[1197]]
[1] "Respondents" "argue" "Morrissey" "Berru"
[5] "fall" "within" "Hosanna" "Tabor"
[9] "exception" "said" "connection" "lawsuit"
[13] "practicing" "Catholic" "acceptance" "argument"
[17] "require" "courts" "delve" "sensitive"
[21] "question" "means" "practicing" "member"
[25] "faith" "religious" "employers" "put"
[29] "impossible" "position" "Morrissey" "Berru"
[33] "s" "employment" "agreements" "required"
[37] "attest" "good" "standing" "church"
[41] "See" "App" "Beyond" "insisting"
[45] "attestation" "clear" "religious" "groups"
[49] "monitor" "whether" "employee" "abiding"
[53] "religious" "obligations" "away" "job"
[57] "Was" "OLG" "supposed" "interrogate"
[61] "Morrissey" "Berru" "confirm" "attended"
[65] "Mass" "every" "Sunday" ""
[[1198]]
[1] "" "Respondents" "argue"
[4] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "exception"
[7] "workable" "unless" "given"
[10] "rigid" "structure" "declined"
[13] "adopt" "rigid" "formula"
[16] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "lower"
[19] "courts" "applying" "exception"
[22] "many" "years" "without"
[25] "formula" "Here" "Hosanna"
[28] "Tabor" "sufficient" "decide"
[31] "cases" "us" "When"
[34] "school" "religious" "mission"
[37] "entrusts" "teacher" "responsibility"
[40] "educating" "forming" "students"
[43] "faith" "judicial" "intervention"
[46] "disputes" "school" "teacher"
[49] "threatens" "school" "s"
[52] "independence" "way" "First"
[55] "Amendment" "allow" ""
[[1199]]
[1] "" ""
[[1200]]
[1] "For" "reasons" "judgment" "Court"
[5] "Appeals" "case" "reversed" "cases"
[9] "remanded" "proceedings" "consistent" "opinion"
[13] ""
[[1201]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[1202]]
[1] "Mr" "Justice" "BRENNAN" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[1203]]
[1] "This" "church" "property"
[4] "dispute" "arose" "two"
[7] "local" "churches" "withdrew"
[10] "hierarchical" "general" "church"
[13] "organization" "Under" "Georgia"
[16] "law" "right" "property"
[19] "previously" "used" "local"
[22] "churches" "made" "turn"
[25] "civil" "court" "jury"
[28] "decision" "whether" "general"
[31] "church" "abandoned" "departed"
[34] "tenets" "faith" "practice"
[37] "held" "time" "local"
[40] "churches" "affiliated" "The"
[43] "question" "presented" "whether"
[46] "restraints" "First" "Amendment"
[49] "applied" "States" "Fourteenth"
[52] "Amendment" "permit" "civil"
[55] "court" "award" "church"
[58] "property" "basis" "interpretation"
[61] "significance" "civil" "court"
[64] "assigns" "aspects" "church"
[67] "doctrine" ""
[[1204]]
[1] "Petitioner" "Presbyterian" "Church" "United"
[5] "States" "association" "local" "Presbyterian"
[9] "churches" "governed" "hierarchical" "structure"
[13] "tribunals" "consists" "ascending" "order"
[17] "Church" "Session" "composed" "elders"
[21] "local" "church" "Presbytery" "composed"
[25] "several" "churches" "geographical" "area"
[29] "Synod" "generally" "composed" "Presbyteries"
[33] "within" "State" "General" "Assembly"
[37] "highest" "governing" "body" ""
[[1205]]
[1] "A" "dispute" "arose"
[4] "petitioner" "general" "church"
[7] "two" "local" "churches"
[10] "Savannah" "Georgia" "respondents"
[13] "Hull" "Memorial" "Presbyterian"
[16] "Church" "Eastern" "Heights"
[19] "Presbyterian" "Church" "control"
[22] "properties" "used" "local"
[25] "churches" "In" "membership"
[28] "local" "churches" "belief"
[31] "certain" "actions" "pronouncements"
[34] "general" "church" "violations"
[37] "organization" "s" "constitution"
[40] "departures" "doctrine" "practice"
[43] "force" "time" "affiliation"
[46] "voted" "withdraw" "general"
[49] "church" "reconstitute" "local"
[52] "churches" "autonomous" "Presbyterian"
[55] "organization" "The" "ministers"
[58] "two" "churches" "renounced"
[61] "general" "church" "s"
[64] "jurisdiction" "authority" "two"
[67] "ruling" "elders" "In"
[70] "response" "general" "church"
[73] "Presbytery" "Savannah" "established"
[76] "Administrative" "Commission" "seek"
[79] "conciliation" "The" "dissident"
[82] "local" "churchmen" "remained"
[85] "steadfast" "consequently" "Commission"
[88] "acknowledged" "withdrawal" "local"
[91] "leadership" "proceeded" "take"
[94] "local" "churches" "property"
[97] "behalf" "general" "church"
[100] "new" "local" "leadership"
[103] "appointed" ""
[[1206]]
[1] "" "The" "local" "churchmen"
[5] "made" "effort" "appeal" "Commission"
[9] "s" "action" "higher" "church"
[13] "tribunals" "Synod" "Georgia" "General"
[17] "Assembly" "Instead" "churches" "filed"
[21] "separate" "suits" "Superior" "Court"
[25] "Chatham" "County" "enjoin" "general"
[29] "church" "trespassing" "disputed" "property"
[33] "title" "local" "churches" "The"
[37] "cases" "consolidated" "trial" "The"
[41] "general" "church" "moved" "dismiss"
[45] "actions" "cross" "claimed" "injunctive"
[49] "relief" "behalf" "ground" "civil"
[53] "courts" "without" "power" "determine"
[57] "whether" "general" "church" "departed"
[61] "tenets" "faith" "practice" "The"
[65] "motion" "dismiss" "denied" "case"
[69] "submitted" "jury" "theory" "Georgia"
[73] "law" "implies" "trust" "local"
[77] "church" "property" "benefit" "general"
[81] "church" "sole" "condition" "general"
[85] "church" "adhere" "tenets" "faith"
[89] "practice" "existing" "time" "affiliation"
[93] "local" "churches" "Thus" "jury"
[97] "instructed" "determine" "whether" "actions"
[101] "general" "church" "amount" "fundamental"
[105] "substantial" "abandonment" "original" "tenets"
[109] "doctrines" "general" "church" "new"
[113] "tenets" "doctrines" "utterly" "variant"
[117] "purposes" "general" "church" "founded"
[121] "The" "jury" "returned" "verdict"
[125] "local" "churches" "trial" "judge"
[129] "thereupon" "declared" "implied" "trust"
[133] "terminated" "enjoined" "general" "church"
[137] "interfering" "use" "property" "question"
[141] "The" "Supreme" "Court" "Georgia"
[145] "affirmed" "Ga" "S" "E"
[149] "d" "We" "granted" "certiorari"
[153] "consider" "First" "Amendment" "questions"
[157] "raised" "U" "S" "S"
[161] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[165] "We" "reverse" ""
[[1207]]
[1] "" "It" "course"
[4] "true" "State" "legitimate"
[7] "interest" "resolving" "property"
[10] "disputes" "civil" "court"
[13] "proper" "forum" "resolution"
[16] "Special" "problems" "arise"
[19] "however" "disputes" "implicate"
[22] "controversies" "church" "doctrine"
[25] "practice" "The" "approach"
[28] "Court" "cases" "originally"
[31] "developed" "Watson" "v"
[34] "Jones" "Wall" "L"
[37] "Ed" "pre" "Erie"
[40] "R" "Co" "v"
[43] "Tompkins" "diversity" "decision"
[46] "decided" "application" "First"
[49] "Amendment" "States" "nonetheless"
[52] "informed" "First" "Amendment"
[55] "considerations" "There" "civil"
[58] "courts" "asked" "resolve"
[61] "property" "dispute" "national"
[64] "Presbyterian" "organization" "local"
[67] "churches" "organization" "There"
[70] "disputes" "arose" "controversy"
[73] "church" "doctrine" "There"
[76] "Court" "asked" "decree"
[79] "termination" "implied" "trust"
[82] "departures" "doctrine" "national"
[85] "organization" "The" "Watson"
[88] "Court" "refused" "pointing"
[91] "wholly" "inconsistent" "American"
[94] "concept" "relationship" "church"
[97] "state" "permit" "civil"
[100] "courts" "determine" "ecclesiastical"
[103] "questions" "In" "language"
[106] "clear" "constitutional" "ring"
[109] "Court" "said" ""
[[1208]]
[1] "" "In" "country"
[4] "full" "free" "right"
[7] "entertain" "religious" "belief"
[10] "practice" "religious" "principle"
[13] "teach" "religious" "doctrine"
[16] "violate" "laws" "morality"
[19] "property" "infringe" "personal"
[22] "rights" "conceded" "The"
[25] "law" "knows" "heresy"
[28] "committed" "support" "dogma"
[31] "establishment" "sect" "All"
[34] "unite" "body" "general"
[37] "church" "implied" "consent"
[40] "government" "bound" "submit"
[43] "But" "vain" "consent"
[46] "lead" "total" "subversion"
[49] "religious" "bodies" "one"
[52] "aggrieved" "one" "decisions"
[55] "appeal" "secular" "courts"
[58] "sic" "reversed" "It"
[61] "essence" "religious" "unions"
[64] "right" "establish" "tribunals"
[67] "decision" "questions" "arising"
[70] "among" "decisions" "binding"
[73] "cases" "ecclesiastical" "cognizance"
[76] "subject" "appeals" "organism"
[79] "provides" "Wall" ""
[[1209]]
[1] "" "The" "logic"
[4] "language" "leaves" "civil"
[7] "courts" "role" "determining"
[10] "ecclesiastical" "questions" "process"
[13] "resolving" "property" "disputes"
[16] ""
[[1210]]
[1] "Later" "cases" "however"
[4] "also" "decided" "nonconstitutional"
[7] "grounds" "recognized" "might"
[10] "circumstances" "marginal" "civil"
[13] "court" "review" "ecclesiastical"
[16] "determinations" "appropriate" "The"
[19] "scope" "review" "delineated"
[22] "Gonzalez" "v" "Roman"
[25] "Catholic" "Archbishop" "Manila"
[28] "U" "S" "S"
[31] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[34] "There" "Gonzalez" "claimed"
[37] "right" "appointed" "chaplaincy"
[40] "Roman" "Catholic" "Church"
[43] "will" "provided" "member"
[46] "family" "receive" "appointment"
[49] "The" "Roman" "Catholic"
[52] "Archbishop" "Manila" "Philippine"
[55] "Islands" "refused" "appoint"
[58] "Gonzalez" "ground" "satisfy"
[61] "qualifications" "established" "Canon"
[64] "Law" "office" "Gonzalez"
[67] "brought" "suit" "Court"
[70] "First" "Instance" "Manila"
[73] "judgment" "directing" "Archbishop"
[76] "among" "things" "appoint"
[79] "chaplain" "The" "trial"
[82] "court" "entered" "order"
[85] "Supreme" "Court" "Philippine"
[88] "Islands" "reversed" "absolved"
[91] "Archbishop" "complaint" "This"
[94] "Court" "affirmed" "Mr"
[97] "Justice" "Brandeis" "speaking"
[100] "Court" "defined" "civil"
[103] "court" "role" "following"
[106] "words" "In" "absence"
[109] "fraud" "collusion" "arbitrariness"
[112] "decisions" "proper" "church"
[115] "tribunals" "matters" "purely"
[118] "ecclesiastical" "although" "affecting"
[121] "civil" "rights" "accepted"
[124] "litigation" "secular" "courts"
[127] "conclusive" "parties" "interest"
[130] "made" "contract" "otherwise"
[133] "U" "S" ""
[[1211]]
[1] "In" "Kedroff" "v"
[4] "St" "Nicholas" "Cathedral"
[7] "Russian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[10] "North" "America" "U"
[13] "S" "S" "Ct"
[16] "L" "Ed" "Court"
[19] "converted" "principle" "Watson"
[22] "qualified" "Gonzalez" "constitutional"
[25] "rule" "Kedroff" "grew"
[28] "dispute" "Moscow" "based"
[31] "general" "Russian" "Orthodox"
[34] "Church" "Russian" "Orthodox"
[37] "churches" "located" "North"
[40] "America" "appointment" "St"
[43] "Nicholas" "Cathedral" "New"
[46] "York" "City" "The"
[49] "North" "American" "churches"
[52] "declared" "independence" "general"
[55] "church" "New" "York"
[58] "Legislature" "enacted" "statute"
[61] "recognizing" "administrative" "autonomy"
[64] "The" "New" "York"
[67] "courts" "sustained" "constitutionality"
[70] "statute" "held" "North"
[73] "American" "churches" "elected"
[76] "hierarch" "right" "use"
[79] "cathedral" "This" "Court"
[82] "reversed" "finding" "Moscow"
[85] "church" "acknowledged" "schism"
[88] "holding" "statute" "unconstitutional"
[91] "The" "Court" "said"
[94] "U" "S" "S"
[97] "Ct" ""
[[1212]]
[1] "" "The" "opinion"
[4] "Watson" "v" "Jones"
[7] "radiates" "spirit" "freedom"
[10] "religious" "organizations" "independence"
[13] "secular" "control" "manipulation"
[16] "short" "power" "decide"
[19] "free" "state" "interference"
[22] "matters" "church" "government"
[25] "well" "faith" "doctrine"
[28] "Freedom" "select" "clergy"
[31] "improper" "methods" "choice"
[34] "proven" "think" "must"
[37] "now" "said" "federal"
[40] "constitutional" "protection" "part"
[43] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[46] "state" "interference" "Italics"
[49] "supplied" ""
[[1213]]
[1] "And" "speaking" "New" "York" "statute" "Court"
[7] "said" "id" "S" "Ct" ""
[[1214]]
[1] "" "By" "fiat"
[4] "displaces" "one" "church"
[7] "administrator" "another" "It"
[10] "passes" "control" "matters"
[13] "strictly" "ecclesiastical" "one"
[16] "church" "authority" "another"
[19] "It" "thus" "intrudes"
[22] "benefit" "one" "segment"
[25] "church" "power" "state"
[28] "forbidden" "area" "religious"
[31] "freedom" "contrary" "principles"
[34] "First" "Amendment" "Italics"
[37] "supplied" ""
[[1215]]
[1] "This" "holding" "invalidating"
[4] "legislative" "action" "extended"
[7] "judicial" "action" "Kreshik"
[10] "v" "St" "Nicholas"
[13] "Cathedral" "U" "S"
[16] "S" "Ct" "L"
[19] "Ed" "d" "Court"
[22] "held" "constitutional" "guarantees"
[25] "religious" "liberty" "required"
[28] "reversal" "judgment" "New"
[31] "York" "courts" "transferred"
[34] "control" "St" "Nicholas"
[37] "Cathedral" "central" "governing"
[40] "authority" "Russian" "Orthodox"
[43] "Church" "independent" "Russian"
[46] "Church" "America" ""
[[1216]]
[1] "" "Thus" "First"
[4] "Amendment" "severely" "circumscribes"
[7] "role" "civil" "courts"
[10] "may" "play" "resolving"
[13] "church" "property" "disputes"
[16] "It" "obvious" "however"
[19] "every" "civil" "court"
[22] "decision" "property" "claimed"
[25] "religious" "organization" "jeopardizes"
[28] "values" "protected" "First"
[31] "Amendment" "Civil" "courts"
[34] "inhibit" "free" "exercise"
[37] "religion" "merely" "opening"
[40] "doors" "disputes" "involving"
[43] "church" "property" "And"
[46] "neutral" "principles" "law"
[49] "developed" "use" "property"
[52] "disputes" "can" "applied"
[55] "without" "establishing" "churches"
[58] "property" "awarded" "But"
[61] "First" "Amendment" "values"
[64] "plainly" "jeopardized" "church"
[67] "property" "litigation" "made"
[70] "turn" "resolution" "civil"
[73] "courts" "controversies" "religious"
[76] "doctrine" "practice" "If"
[79] "civil" "courts" "undertake"
[82] "resolve" "controversies" "order"
[85] "adjudicate" "property" "dispute"
[88] "hazards" "ever" "present"
[91] "inhibiting" "free" "development"
[94] "religious" "doctrine" "implicating"
[97] "secular" "interests" "matters"
[100] "purely" "ecclesiastical" "concern"
[103] "Because" "hazards" "First"
[106] "Amendment" "enjoins" "employment"
[109] "organs" "government" "essentially"
[112] "religious" "purposes" "School"
[115] "District" "Township" "Abington"
[118] "Pa" "v" "Schempp"
[121] "U" "S" "S"
[124] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[127] "d" "Amendment" "therefore"
[130] "commands" "civil" "courts"
[133] "decide" "church" "property"
[136] "disputes" "without" "resolving"
[139] "underlying" "controversies" "religious"
[142] "doctrine" "Hence" "States"
[145] "religious" "organizations" "individuals"
[148] "must" "structure" "relationships"
[151] "involving" "church" "property"
[154] "require" "civil" "courts"
[157] "resolve" "ecclesiastical" "questions"
[160] ""
[[1217]]
[1] "The" "Georgia" "courts"
[4] "violated" "command" "First"
[7] "Amendment" "The" "departure"
[10] "doctrine" "element" "implied"
[13] "trust" "theory" "applied"
[16] "requires" "civil" "judiciary"
[19] "determine" "whether" "actions"
[22] "general" "church" "constitute"
[25] "substantial" "departure" "tenets"
[28] "faith" "practice" "existing"
[31] "time" "local" "churches"
[34] "affiliation" "trust" "favor"
[37] "general" "church" "must"
[40] "declared" "terminated" "This"
[43] "determination" "two" "parts"
[46] "The" "civil" "court"
[49] "must" "first" "decide"
[52] "whether" "challenged" "actions"
[55] "general" "church" "depart"
[58] "substantially" "prior" "doctrine"
[61] "In" "reaching" "decision"
[64] "court" "must" "necessity"
[67] "make" "interpretation" "meaning"
[70] "church" "doctrines" "If"
[73] "court" "decide" "substantial"
[76] "departure" "occurred" "must"
[79] "go" "determine" "whether"
[82] "issue" "general" "church"
[85] "departed" "holds" "place"
[88] "importance" "traditional" "theology"
[91] "require" "trust" "terminated"
[94] "A" "civil" "court"
[97] "can" "make" "determination"
[100] "assessing" "relative" "significance"
[103] "religion" "tenets" "departure"
[106] "found" "Thus" "departure"
[109] "doctrine" "element" "Georgia"
[112] "implied" "trust" "theory"
[115] "requires" "civil" "court"
[118] "determine" "matters" "core"
[121] "religion" "interpretation" "particular"
[124] "church" "doctrines" "importance"
[127] "doctrines" "religion" "Plainly"
[130] "First" "Amendment" "forbids"
[133] "civil" "courts" "playing"
[136] "role" ""
[[1218]]
[1] "" "Since" "Georgia"
[4] "courts" "remand" "may"
[7] "undertake" "determine" "whether"
[10] "petitioner" "entitled" "relief"
[13] "cross" "claims" "find"
[16] "appropriate" "remark" "departure"
[19] "doctrine" "element" "Georgia"
[22] "s" "implied" "trust"
[25] "theory" "can" "play"
[28] "role" "future" "judicial"
[31] "proceedings" "The" "departure"
[34] "doctrine" "approach" "susceptible"
[37] "marginal" "judicial" "involvement"
[40] "contemplated" "Gonzalez" "Gonzalez"
[43] "rights" "will" "turned"
[46] "church" "decision" "Archbishop"
[49] "s" "church" "law"
[52] "qualifications" "chaplaincy" "It"
[55] "archbishopric" "civil" "courts"
[58] "task" "analyzing" "interpreting"
[61] "church" "law" "order"
[64] "determine" "validity" "Gonzalez"
[67] "claim" "chaplaincy" "Thus"
[70] "civil" "courts" "adjudicate"
[73] "rights" "will" "without"
[76] "interpreting" "weighing" "church"
[79] "doctrine" "simply" "engaging"
[82] "narrowest" "kind" "review"
[85] "specific" "church" "decision"
[88] "e" "whether" "decision"
[91] "resulted" "fraud" "collusion"
[94] "arbitrariness" "Such" "review"
[97] "inject" "civil" "courts"
[100] "substantive" "ecclesiastical" "matters"
[103] "In" "contrast" "Georgia"
[106] "s" "departure" "doctrine"
[109] "approach" "possible" "civil"
[112] "courts" "play" "limited"
[115] "role" "Under" "approach"
[118] "property" "rights" "turn"
[121] "church" "decision" "church"
[124] "doctrine" "The" "standard"
[127] "departure" "doctrine" "though"
[130] "calls" "resolution" "ecclesiastical"
[133] "questions" "creation" "state"
[136] "church" "law" "Nothing"
[139] "record" "suggests" "state"
[142] "standard" "interpreted" "applied"
[145] "decision" "general" "church"
[148] "Any" "decisions" "made"
[151] "general" "church" "local"
[154] "churches" "withdrawal" "tangential"
[157] "relationship" "state" "fashioned"
[160] "departure" "doctrine" "standard"
[163] "A" "determination" "whether"
[166] "decisions" "fraudulent" "collusive"
[169] "arbitrary" "therefore" "answer"
[172] "questions" "posed" "state"
[175] "standard" "To" "reach"
[178] "questions" "require" "civil"
[181] "courts" "engage" "forbidden"
[184] "process" "interpreting" "weighing"
[187] "church" "doctrine" "Even"
[190] "general" "church" "attempted"
[193] "apply" "state" "standard"
[196] "civil" "courts" "review"
[199] "enforce" "church" "decision"
[202] "without" "violating" "Constitution"
[205] "The" "First" "Amendment"
[208] "prohibits" "State" "employing"
[211] "religious" "organizations" "arm"
[214] "civil" "judiciary" "perform"
[217] "function" "interpreting" "applying"
[220] "state" "standards" "See"
[223] "School" "District" "Township"
[226] "Abington" "Pa" "v"
[229] "Schempp" "supra" "Thus"
[232] "civil" "court" "may"
[235] "review" "church" "decision"
[238] "applying" "state" "departure"
[241] "doctrine" "standard" "may"
[244] "apply" "standard" ""
[[1219]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "Supreme" "Court"
[5] "Georgia" "reversed" "case" "remanded"
[9] "proceedings" "inconsistent" "opinion" ""
[[1220]]
[1] "It" "Mr" "Justice" "BRENNAN" "delivered"
[6] "opinion" "Court" ""
[[1221]]
[1] "In" "Holy" "Assembly"
[4] "Bishops" "Holy" "Synod"
[7] "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[10] "Mother" "Church" "suspended"
[13] "ultimately" "removed" "respondent"
[16] "Dionisije" "Milivojevich" "Dionisije"
[19] "Bishop" "American" "Canadian"
[22] "Diocese" "Church" "appointed"
[25] "petitioner" "Bishop" "Firmilian"
[28] "Ocokoljich" "Firmilian" "Administrator"
[31] "Diocese" "Mother" "Church"
[34] "reorganized" "three" "Dioceses"
[37] "In" "Holy" "Assembly"
[40] "Holy" "Synod" "defrocked"
[43] "Dionisije" "Bishop" "cleric"
[46] "Mother" "Church" "In"
[49] "civil" "action" "brought"
[52] "Dionisije" "respondents" "Illinois"
[55] "Circuit" "Court" "Supreme"
[58] "Court" "Illinois" "held"
[61] "proceedings" "Mother" "Church"
[64] "respecting" "Dionisije" "procedurally"
[67] "substantively" "defective" "internal"
[70] "regulations" "Mother" "Church"
[73] "therefore" "arbitrary" "invalid"
[76] "The" "State" "Supreme"
[79] "Court" "also" "invalidated"
[82] "Diocesan" "reorganization" "three"
[85] "Dioceses" "Ill" "d"
[88] "N" "E" "d"
[91] "We" "granted" "certiorari"
[94] "determine" "whether" "actions"
[97] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[100] "constituted" "improper" "judicial"
[103] "interference" "decisions" "highest"
[106] "authorities" "hierarchical" "church"
[109] "violation" "First" "Fourteenth"
[112] "Amendments" "U" "S"
[115] "S" "Ct" "L"
[118] "Ed" "d" "We"
[121] "hold" "inquiries" "made"
[124] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[127] "matters" "ecclesiastical" "cognizance"
[130] "polity" "court" "s"
[133] "actions" "pursuant" "thereto"
[136] "contravened" "First" "Fourteenth"
[139] "Amendments" "We" "therefore"
[142] "reverse" ""
[[1222]]
[1] "I" ""
[[1223]]
[1] "The" "basic" "dispute" "control"
[5] "Serbian" "Eastern" "Orthodox" "Diocese"
[9] "United" "States" "America" "Canada"
[13] "American" "Canadian" "Diocese" "property"
[17] "assets" "Petitioners" "Bishops" "Firmilian"
[21] "Gregory" "Udicki" "Sava" "Vukovich"
[25] "Serbian" "Eastern" "Orthodox" "Diocese"
[29] "United" "States" "America" "Canada"
[33] "religious" "body" "country" "Respondents"
[37] "Bishop" "Dionisije" "Serbian" "Orthodox"
[41] "Monastery" "St" "Sava" "Serbian"
[45] "Eastern" "Orthodox" "Diocese" "United"
[49] "States" "America" "Canada" "Illinois"
[53] "religious" "corporation" "A" "proper"
[57] "perspective" "relationship" "parties" "nature"
[61] "dispute" "requires" "background" "discussion"
[65] ""
[[1224]]
[1] "The" "Serbian" "Orthodox"
[4] "Church" "one" "autocephalous"
[7] "hierarchical" "churches" "came"
[10] "existence" "following" "schism"
[13] "universal" "Christian" "church"
[16] "episcopal" "church" "whose"
[19] "seat" "Patriarchate" "Belgrade"
[22] "Yugoslavia" "Its" "highest"
[25] "legislative" "judicial" "ecclesiastical"
[28] "administrative" "authority" "resides"
[31] "Holy" "Assembly" "Bishops"
[34] "body" "composed" "Diocesan"
[37] "Bishops" "presided" "Bishop"
[40] "designated" "Assembly" "Patriarch"
[43] "The" "Church" "s"
[46] "highest" "executive" "body"
[49] "Holy" "Synod" "Bishops"
[52] "composed" "Patriarch" "four"
[55] "Diocesan" "Bishops" "selected"
[58] "Holy" "Assembly" "The"
[61] "Holy" "Synod" "Holy"
[64] "Assembly" "exclusive" "power"
[67] "remove" "suspend" "defrock"
[70] "appoint" "Diocesan" "Bishops"
[73] "The" "Mother" "Church"
[76] "governed" "according" "Holy"
[79] "Scriptures" "Holy" "Tradition"
[82] "Rules" "Ecumenical" "Councils"
[85] "Holy" "Apostles" "Holy"
[88] "Faiths" "Church" "Mother"
[91] "Church" "Constitution" "adopted"
[94] "penal" "code" "adopted"
[97] "These" "sources" "law"
[100] "sometimes" "ambiguous" "seemingly"
[103] "inconsistent" "Pertinent" "provisions"
[106] "Mother" "Church" "Constitution"
[109] "provide" "Church" "s"
[112] "main" "administrative" "division"
[115] "composed" "dioceses" "regard"
[118] "church" "hierarchical" "church"
[121] "administrative" "aspect" "Art"
[124] "d" "ecisions" "establishing"
[127] "naming" "liquidating" "reorganizing"
[130] "seat" "dioceses" "establishing"
[133] "eliminating" "position" "vicar"
[136] "bishops" "decided" "upon"
[139] "Holy" "Assembly" "agreement"
[142] "Patriarchal" "Council" "Art"
[145] ""
[[1225]]
[1] "During" "late" "th" "century"
[5] "migrants" "North" "America" "Serbian"
[9] "descent" "formed" "autonomous" "religious"
[13] "congregations" "throughout" "country" "Canada"
[17] "These" "congregations" "jurisdiction" "Russian"
[21] "Orthodox" "Church" "Church" "unable"
[25] "care" "needs" "congregations" "sought"
[29] "permission" "bring" "jurisdiction" "Serbian"
[33] "Orthodox" "Church" ""
[[1226]]
[1] "In" "Serbian" "priests" "laymen"
[5] "organized" "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[9] "North" "America" "The" "Serbian"
[13] "Orthodox" "congregations" "divided" "presbyteries"
[17] "presided" "Bishop" "s" "Aide"
[21] "constitutions" "adopted" "In" "Russian"
[25] "Orthodox" "Church" "commissioned" "Serbian"
[29] "priest" "Father" "Mardary" "organize"
[33] "independent" "Serbian" "Diocese" "America"
[37] "Four" "years" "later" "result"
[41] "Father" "Mardary" "s" "efforts"
[45] "Holy" "Assembly" "Bishops" "Mother"
[49] "Church" "created" "Eastern" "Orthodox"
[53] "Diocese" "United" "States" "America"
[57] "Canada" "designated" "Serbian" "Bishop"
[61] "complete" "formal" "organization" "Diocese"
[65] "From" "time" "bishop" "governed"
[69] "American" "Canadian" "Diocese" "Yugoslav"
[73] "citizen" "appointed" "Mother" "Church"
[77] "without" "consultation" "Diocesan" "officials"
[81] ""
[[1227]]
[1] "In" "Father" "Mardary" "called"
[5] "Church" "National" "Assembly" "embracing"
[9] "known" "Serbian" "Orthodox" "congregations"
[13] "United" "States" "Canada" "The"
[17] "Assembly" "drafted" "adopted" "constitution"
[21] "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Diocese" "United"
[25] "States" "America" "Canada" "submitted"
[29] "constitution" "Mother" "Church" "approval"
[33] "The" "Holy" "Assembly" "made"
[37] "changes" "provide" "appointment" "Diocesan"
[41] "Bishop" "Holy" "Assembly" "require"
[45] "Holy" "Assembly" "approval" "amendments"
[49] "constitution" "changes" "approved" "constitution"
[53] "The" "American" "Canadian" "Diocese"
[57] "diocese" "Mother" "Church" "constitution"
[61] ""
[[1228]]
[1] "Article" "constitution" "provides"
[4] "American" "Canadian" "Diocese"
[7] "considered" "ecclesiastically" "judicially"
[10] "organic" "part" "Serbian"
[13] "Patriarchate" "Kingdom" "Yugoslavia"
[16] "Art" "provides" "statutes"
[19] "rules" "regulate" "ecclesiastical"
[22] "canonical" "authority" "position"
[25] "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[28] "Kingdom" "Yugoslavia" "also"
[31] "compulsory" "American" "Canadian"
[34] "Diocese" "Article" "states"
[37] "jurisdiction" "Diocese" "includes"
[40] "entire" "political" "territory"
[43] "United" "States" "America"
[46] "Canada" "geographical" "location"
[49] "enjoys" "full" "administrative"
[52] "freedom" "accordingly" "can"
[55] "independently" "regulate" "rule"
[58] "activities" "church" "school"
[61] "diocesan" "institutions" "funds"
[64] "beneficiencies" "organs" "Article"
[67] "provides" "Bishop" "Diocese"
[70] "appointed" "Holy" "Assembly"
[73] "Bishops" "Serbian" "Patriarchate"
[76] "various" "provisions" "constitution"
[79] "accord" "Bishop" "extensive"
[82] "powers" "respect" "religious"
[85] "matters" "control" "Diocesan"
[88] "property" "The" "constitution"
[91] "also" "provides" "Diocesan"
[94] "organs" "Diocesan" "National"
[97] "Assembly" "exercises" "considerable"
[100] "legislative" "administrative" "authority"
[103] "within" "Diocese" ""
[[1229]]
[1] "In" "Father" "Mardary" "also"
[5] "organized" "profit" "corporation" "Serbian"
[9] "Eastern" "Orthodox" "Council" "United"
[13] "States" "Canada" "laws" "Illinois"
[17] "The" "corporation" "hold" "title"
[21] "acres" "land" "Libertyville" "Ill"
[25] "Father" "Mardary" "personally" "purchased"
[29] "The" "charter" "corporation" "allowed"
[33] "lapse" "Father" "Mardary" "organized"
[37] "another" "Illinois" "profit" "corporation"
[41] "respondent" "Serbian" "Eastern" "Orthodox"
[45] "Diocese" "United" "States" "Canada"
[49] "Illinois" "laws" "governing" "incorporation"
[53] "hierarchical" "religious" "organizations" "In"
[57] "respondent" "profit" "monastery" "corporation"
[61] "Monastery" "St" "Sava" "organized"
[65] "Illinois" "laws" "title" "Libertyville"
[69] "property" "transrred" "Similar" "secular"
[73] "property" "holding" "corporations" "subsequently"
[77] "organized" "New" "York" "California"
[81] "Pennsylvania" ""
[[1230]]
[1] "Respondent" "Bishop" "Dionisije"
[4] "elected" "Bishop" "American"
[7] "Canadian" "Diocese" "Holy"
[10] "Assembly" "Bishops" "He"
[13] "became" "controversial" "figure"
[16] "years" "Holy" "Assembly"
[19] "received" "numerous" "complaints"
[22] "challenging" "fitness" "serve"
[25] "Bishop" "administration" "Diocese"
[28] ""
[[1231]]
[1] "During" "tenure" "however"
[4] "Diocese" "grew" "substantially"
[7] "Dionisije" "requested" "Patriarch"
[10] "Holy" "Assembly" "appoint"
[13] "bishops" "assist" "serve"
[16] "supervision" "Eventually" "Diocese"
[19] "sought" "elevation" "Holy"
[22] "Assembly" "rank" "Metropolia"
[25] "South" "America" "added"
[28] "Diocese" "several" "assistant"
[31] "bishops" "appointed" "Dionisije"
[34] "Dionisije" "specifically" "recommended"
[37] "petitioners" "Firmilian" "Gregory"
[40] "Udicki" "one" "Stefan"
[43] "Lastavica" "named" "assistant"
[46] "bishops" "A" "delegation"
[49] "Diocese" "sent" "May"
[52] "meeting" "Holy" "Assembly"
[55] "Belgrade" "urge" "adoption"
[58] "reorganization" "proposals" "June"
[61] "Holy" "Synod" "appointed"
[64] "delegation" "visit" "United"
[67] "States" "study" "proposals"
[70] "The" "delegation" "also"
[73] "directed" "confer" "Dionisije"
[76] "concerning" "complaints" "made"
[79] "administration" "years" ""
[[1232]]
[1] "The" "delegation" "remained"
[4] "United" "States" "three"
[7] "months" "visiting" "parishes"
[10] "throughout" "Diocese" "discusng"
[13] "reorganization" "proposals" "complaints"
[16] "Dionisije" "After" "completion"
[19] "survey" "delegation" "suggested"
[22] "Holy" "Synod" "assignment"
[25] "vicar" "bishops" "Diocese"
[28] "recommended" "commission" "appointed"
[31] "conduct" "thorough" "investigation"
[34] "complaints" "Dionisije" "However"
[37] "Holy" "Assembly" "May"
[40] "instead" "recommended" "Holy"
[43] "Synod" "institute" "disciplinary"
[46] "proceedings" "Dionisije" "The"
[49] "Holy" "Synod" "thereupon"
[52] "met" "immediately" "suspended"
[55] "Dionisije" "pending" "investigation"
[58] "disposition" "complaints" "The"
[61] "Holy" "Synod" "appointed"
[64] "petitioner" "Firmilian" "Dionisije"
[67] "s" "chief" "episcopal"
[70] "deputy" "since" "one"
[73] "Dionisije" "s" "candidates"
[76] "assistant" "bishop" "Administrator"
[79] "Diocese" "pending" "completion"
[82] "proceedings" ""
[[1233]]
[1] "The" "Holy" "Assembly"
[4] "thereafter" "reconvened" "acting"
[7] "Art" "constitution" "Mother"
[10] "Church" "reorganized" "American"
[13] "Canadian" "Diocese" "three"
[16] "new" "dioceses" "Middle"
[19] "Western" "Western" "Eastern"
[22] "whose" "boundaries" "roughly"
[25] "episcopal" "districts" "previously"
[28] "created" "Dionisije" "The"
[31] "final" "fixing" "boundaries"
[34] "new" "dioceses" "organizational"
[37] "administrative" "matters" "left"
[40] "determined" "officials" "old"
[43] "American" "Canadian" "Diocese"
[46] "Dionisije" "appointed" "Bishop"
[49] "Middle" "Western" "Diocese"
[52] "seven" "days" "later"
[55] "petitioners" "Archimandrites" "Firmilian"
[58] "Gregory" "Stefan" "appointed"
[61] "temporary" "administrators" "new"
[64] "Dioceses" ""
[[1234]]
[1] "" "Dionisije" "s"
[4] "immediate" "reaction" "decisions"
[7] "Mother" "Church" "refuse"
[10] "accept" "reorganization" "ground"
[13] "contravened" "administrative" "autonomy"
[16] "Diocese" "guaranteed" "Diocesan"
[19] "constitution" "refuse" "accept"
[22] "suspension" "ground" "effectuated"
[25] "compliance" "constitution" "laws"
[28] "Mother" "Church" "On"
[31] "May" "prepared" "mailed"
[34] "circular" "American" "Canadian"
[37] "parishes" "stating" "refusal"
[40] "recognize" "actions" "May"
[43] "issued" "press" "release"
[46] "stating" "refusal" "recognize"
[49] "suspension" "intent" "litigate"
[52] "civil" "courts" "This"
[55] "refusal" "recognize" "Diocesan"
[58] "reorganization" "suspension" "Bishop"
[61] "stated" "Dionisije" "circular"
[64] "issued" "June" "addressed"
[67] "Patriarch" "Holy" "Assembly"
[70] "Holy" "Synod" "clergy"
[73] "congregations" "Diocesan" "committees"
[76] "Serbians" "North" "America"
[79] "He" "also" "continued"
[82] "officiate" "Bishop" "refusing"
[85] "turn" "administration" "Diocese"
[88] "Firmilian" "May" "letter"
[91] "Firmilian" "Dionisije" "repeated"
[94] "refusal" "asserted" "longer"
[97] "recognized" "decisions" "Holy"
[100] "Assembly" "Holy" "Synod"
[103] "charged" "bodies" "communistic"
[106] ""
[[1235]]
[1] "The" "Diocesan" "Council"
[4] "met" "June" "Dionisije"
[7] "reaffirmed" "refusal" "turn"
[10] "administration" "Diocese" "Firmilian"
[13] "also" "announced" "discharged"
[16] "two" "vicars" "general"
[19] "loyalty" "Mother" "Church"
[22] "The" "Council" "resolved"
[25] "meeting" "advise" "Holy"
[28] "Synod" "proposal" "reorganize"
[31] "Diocese" "three" "dioceses"
[34] "submitted" "Diocesan" "National"
[37] "Assembly" "August" "acceptance"
[40] "rejection" "The" "Council"
[43] "also" "requested" "Holy"
[46] "Assembly" "promptly" "send"
[49] "committee" "investigate" "complaints"
[52] "Dionisije" ""
[[1236]]
[1] "On" "June" "Holy"
[4] "Synod" "appointed" "commission"
[7] "composed" "two" "Bishops"
[10] "Secretary" "ly" "Synod"
[13] "On" "July" "commission"
[16] "met" "Dionisije" "reiterated"
[19] "refusal" "recognize" "suspension"
[22] "Diocesan" "reorganization" "demanded"
[25] "accusations" "writing" "The"
[28] "commission" "refused" "give"
[31] "Dionisije" "written" "accusations"
[34] "ground" "defiance" "decisions"
[37] "higher" "church" "authorities"
[40] "established" "wrongful" "conduct"
[43] "advised" "Holy" "Synod"
[46] "appoint" "Bishop" "court"
[49] "prosecutor" "prepare" "indictment"
[52] ""
[[1237]]
[1] "On" "basis" "commission"
[4] "s" "report" "recommendations"
[7] "recited" "Dionisije" "s"
[10] "refusal" "accept" "decisions"
[13] "Holy" "Synod" "Holy"
[16] "Assembly" "refusal" "recognize"
[19] "court" "Holy" "Synod"
[22] "competence" "try" "Holy"
[25] "Assembly" "met" "July"
[28] "voted" "remove" "Dionisije"
[31] "Bishop" "The" "minutes"
[34] "Holy" "Assembly" "meeting"
[37] "Patriarch" "s" "letter"
[40] "Dionisije" "informing" "Holy"
[43] "Assembly" "s" "actions"
[46] "made" "clear" "removal"
[49] "based" "solely" "acts"
[52] "defiance" "subsequent" "May"
[55] "suspension" "violation" "oath"
[58] "loss" "certain" "qualifications"
[61] "Bishop" "Art" "constitution"
[64] "Mother" "Church" ""
[[1238]]
[1] "" "The" "Diocesan" "National"
[5] "Assembly" "Dionisije" "presiding" "despite"
[9] "removal" "met" "August" "issued"
[13] "resolution" "repudiating" "division" "Diocese"
[17] "three" "Dioceses" "demanding" "revocation"
[21] "Mother" "Church" "decisions" "concerning"
[25] "division" "When" "Holy" "Assembly"
[29] "refused" "reconsider" "Diocesan" "National"
[33] "Assembly" "November" "declared" "Diocese"
[37] "completely" "autonomous" "reinstated" "provisions"
[41] "Diocesan" "constitution" "provided" "election"
[45] "Bishop" "Diocese" "amendments" "without"
[49] "approval" "Holy" "Assembly" ""
[[1239]]
[1] "Meanwhile" "Holy" "Synod" "October"
[5] "forwarded" "Dionisije" "formal" "written"
[9] "indictment" "bad" "charges" "canonical"
[13] "misconduct" "In" "November" "Dionisije"
[17] "responded" "demand" "verified" "reports"
[21] "complaints" "referred" "indictment" "six"
[25] "month" "extension" "answer" "indictment"
[29] "The" "Holy" "Assembly" "granted"
[33] "day" "extension" "answer" "declined"
[37] "furnish" "verified" "charges" "grounds"
[41] "described" "indictment" "additional" "details"
[45] "evidentiary" "nature" "legal" "canonical"
[49] "basis" "forwarding" "material" "accused"
[53] "Bishop" ""
[[1240]]
[1] "Dionisije" "returned" "indictment" "January"
[5] "refusing" "answer" "without" "verified"
[9] "charges" "denouncing" "Holy" "Assembly"
[13] "Holy" "Synod" "schismatic" "pro"
[17] "Communist" "asserting" "Mother" "Church"
[21] "proceeding" "violation" "penal" "code"
[25] "constitution" ""
[[1241]]
[1] "The" "Holy" "Synod" "February"
[5] "declared" "proceed" "without" "Dionisije"
[9] "referred" "matter" "Holy" "Assembly"
[13] "tried" "Dionisije" "default" "case"
[17] "March" "refusal" "participate" "The"
[21] "indictment" "also" "amended" "time"
[25] "include" "charges" "based" "Dionisije"
[29] "s" "acts" "rebellion" "committed"
[33] "November" "meeting" "National" "Assembly"
[37] "declared" "Diocese" "separate" "Mother"
[41] "Church" "Considering" "original" "amended"
[45] "indictments" "Holy" "Assembly" "unanimously"
[49] "found" "Dionisije" "guilty" "charges"
[53] "divested" "episcopal" "monastic" "ranks"
[57] ""
[[1242]]
[1] "Even" "Holy" "Assembly"
[4] "removed" "Dionisije" "Bishop"
[7] "commenced" "eventually" "became"
[10] "protracted" "litigation" "now"
[13] "carried" "almost" "years"
[16] "Acting" "upon" "threat"
[19] "contained" "May" "press"
[22] "release" "Dionisije" "filed"
[25] "suit" "Circuit" "Court"
[28] "Lake" "County" "Ill"
[31] "July" "seeking" "enjoin"
[34] "petitioners" "interfering" "assets"
[37] "respondent" "corporations" "declared"
[40] "true" "Diocesan" "Bishop"
[43] "Petitioners" "countered" "separate"
[46] "complaint" "consolidated" "original"
[49] "action" "seeking" "declaratory"
[52] "relief" "Dionisije" "removed"
[55] "Bishop" "Diocese" "Diocese"
[58] "properly" "reorganized" "three"
[61] "Dioceses" "injunctive" "relief"
[64] "granting" "petitioner" "Bishops"
[67] "control" "reorganized" "Dioceses"
[70] "property" "After" "trial"
[73] "court" "granted" "summary"
[76] "judgment" "respondents" "dismissed"
[79] "petitioners" "countercomplaint" "Illinois"
[82] "Appellate" "Court" "reversed"
[85] "remanded" "hearing" "merits"
[88] "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Diocese"
[91] "v" "Ocokoljich" "Ill"
[94] "App" "d" "N"
[97] "E" "d" "appeal"
[100] "denied" "Ill" "d"
[103] ""
[[1243]]
[1] "Following" "lengthy" "trial" "trial"
[5] "court" "filed" "unreported" "memorandum"
[9] "opinion" "entered" "final" "decree"
[13] "concluded" "substantial" "evidence" "produced"
[17] "fraud" "collusion" "arbitrariness" "existed"
[21] "actions" "decisions" "preliminary" "final"
[25] "proceedings" "decision" "defrock" "Bishop"
[29] "Dionisije" "made" "highest" "Hierarchical"
[33] "bodies" "Mother" "Church" "Pet"
[37] "Cert" "App" "property" "held"
[41] "respondent" "corporations" "held" "trust"
[45] "members" "American" "Canadian" "Diocese"
[49] "improper" "beyond" "power" "Mother"
[53] "Church" "take" "action" "dividing"
[57] "whole" "American" "Diocese" "three"
[61] "new" "Dioceses" "changing" "boundaries"
[65] "appointing" "new" "bishops" "said"
[69] "called" "new" "Dioceses" "id"
[73] "Firmilian" "validly" "appointed" "Holy"
[77] "Episcopal" "Synod" "temporary" "Administrator"
[81] "whole" "American" "Diocese" "place"
[85] "defrocked" "Bishop" "Dionisije" "ibid"
[89] ""
[[1244]]
[1] "On" "appeal" "Supreme"
[4] "Court" "Illinois" "affirmed"
[7] "part" "reversed" "part"
[10] "essentially" "holding" "Dionisije"
[13] "s" "removal" "defrockment"
[16] "set" "aside" "arbitrary"
[19] "proceedings" "resulting" "actions"
[22] "conducted" "according" "Illinois"
[25] "Supreme" "Court" "s"
[28] "interpretation" "Church" "s"
[31] "constitution" "penal" "code"
[34] "Diocesan" "reorganization" "invalid"
[37] "beyond" "scope" "Mother"
[40] "Church" "s" "authority"
[43] "effectuate" "changes" "without"
[46] "Diocesan" "approval" "Ill"
[49] "d" "N" "E"
[52] "d" "Although" "court"
[55] "denied" "rehearing" "amended"
[58] "original" "opinion" "hold"
[61] "although" "Dionisije" "properly"
[64] "suspended" "suspension" "terminated"
[67] "operation" "church" "law"
[70] "validly" "tried" "within"
[73] "one" "year" "indictment"
[76] "Thus" "court" "purported"
[79] "effect" "reinstate" "Dionisije"
[82] "Diocesan" "Bishop" ""
[[1245]]
[1] "II" ""
[[1246]]
[1] "" "The" "fallacy"
[4] "fatal" "judgment" "Illinois"
[7] "Supreme" "Court" "rests"
[10] "upon" "impermissible" "rejection"
[13] "decisions" "highest" "ecclesiastical"
[16] "tribunals" "hierarchical" "church"
[19] "upon" "issues" "dispute"
[22] "impermissibly" "substitutes" "inquiry"
[25] "church" "polity" "resolutions"
[28] "based" "thereon" "disputes"
[31] "Consistently" "First" "Fourteenth"
[34] "Amendments" "civil" "courts"
[37] "inquire" "whether" "relevant"
[40] "hierarchical" "church" "governing"
[43] "body" "power" "religious"
[46] "law" "decide" "disputes"
[49] "Such" "determination" "frequently"
[52] "necessitates" "interpretation" "ambiguous"
[55] "religious" "law" "usage"
[58] "To" "permit" "civil"
[61] "courts" "probe" "deeply"
[64] "enough" "allocation" "power"
[67] "within" "ahierarchical" "church"
[70] "decide" "religious" "law"
[73] "governing" "church" "polity"
[76] "violate" "First" "Amendment"
[79] "much" "manner" "civil"
[82] "determination" "religious" "doctrine"
[85] "Md" "Va" "Churches"
[88] "v" "Sharpsburg" "Church"
[91] "U" "S" "S"
[94] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[97] "d" "Brennan" "J"
[100] "concurring" "For" "resolution"
[103] "disputes" "made" "without"
[106] "extensive" "inquiry" "civil"
[109] "courts" "religious" "law"
[112] "polity" "First" "Fourteenth"
[115] "Amendments" "mandate" "civil"
[118] "courts" "shall" "disturb"
[121] "decisions" "highest" "ecclesiastical"
[124] "tribunal" "within" "church"
[127] "hierarchical" "polity" "must"
[130] "accept" "decisions" "binding"
[133] "application" "religious" "issues"
[136] "doctrine" "polity" "Ibid"
[139] ""
[[1247]]
[1] "" "Resolution" "religious"
[4] "disputes" "issue" "affects"
[7] "control" "church" "property"
[10] "addition" "structure" "administration"
[13] "American" "Canadian" "Diocese"
[16] "This" "Diocesan" "Bishop"
[19] "controls" "respondent" "Monastery"
[22] "St" "Sava" "principal"
[25] "officer" "respondent" "property"
[28] "holding" "corporations" "Resolution"
[31] "religious" "dispute" "Dionisije"
[34] "s" "defrockment" "therefore"
[37] "determines" "control" "property"
[40] "Thus" "case" "essentially"
[43] "involves" "church" "property"
[46] "dispute" "religious" "dispute"
[49] "resolution" "cases" "ecclesiastical"
[52] "civil" "tribunals" "Even"
[55] "rival" "church" "factions"
[58] "seek" "resolution" "church"
[61] "property" "dispute" "civil"
[64] "courts" "substantial" "danger"
[67] "State" "will" "become"
[70] "entangled" "essentially" "religious"
[73] "controversies" "intervene" "behalf"
[76] "groups" "espousing" "particular"
[79] "doctrinal" "beliefs" "Because"
[82] "danger" "First" "Amendment"
[85] "severely" "circumscribes" "role"
[88] "civil" "courts" "may"
[91] "play" "resolving" "church"
[94] "property" "disputes" "Presbyterian"
[97] "Church" "v" "Hull"
[100] "Church" "U" "S"
[103] "S" "Ct" "L"
[106] "Ed" "d" "First"
[109] "Amendment" "values" "plainly"
[112] "jeopardized" "church" "property"
[115] "litigation" "made" "turn"
[118] "resolution" "civil" "courts"
[121] "controversies" "religious" "doctrine"
[124] "practice" "If" "civil"
[127] "courts" "undertake" "resolve"
[130] "controversies" "order" "adjudicate"
[133] "property" "dispute" "hazards"
[136] "ever" "present" "inhibiting"
[139] "free" "development" "religious"
[142] "doctrine" "implicating" "secular"
[145] "interests" "matters" "purely"
[148] "ecclesiastical" "concern" "T"
[151] "First" "Amendment" "therefore"
[154] "commands" "civil" "courts"
[157] "decide" "church" "property"
[160] "disputes" "without" "resolving"
[163] "underlying" "controversies" "religious"
[166] "doctrine" "Ibid" "This"
[169] "principle" "applies" "equal"
[172] "force" "church" "disputes"
[175] "church" "polity" "church"
[178] "administration" ""
[[1248]]
[1] "The" "principles" "limiting" "role"
[5] "civil" "courts" "resolution" "religious"
[9] "controversies" "incidentally" "affect" "civil"
[13] "rights" "initially" "fashioned" "Watson"
[17] "v" "Jones" "Wall" "L"
[21] "Ed" "diversity" "case" "decided"
[25] "First" "Amendment" "rendered" "applicable"
[29] "States" "Fourteenth" "Amendment" "With"
[33] "respect" "hierarchical" "churches" "Watson"
[37] "held" ""
[[1249]]
[1] "" "T" "rule"
[4] "action" "govern" "civil"
[7] "courts" "whenever" "questions"
[10] "discipline" "faith" "ecclesiastical"
[13] "rule" "custom" "law"
[16] "decided" "highest" "church"
[19] "judicatories" "matter" "carried"
[22] "legal" "tribunals" "must"
[25] "accept" "decisions" "final"
[28] "binding" "application" "case"
[31] "Id" "L" "Ed"
[34] ""
[[1250]]
[1] "In" "language" "clear"
[4] "constitutional" "ring" "Presbyterian"
[7] "Church" "v" "Hull"
[10] "Church" "supra" "U"
[13] "S" "S" "Ct"
[16] "Watson" "reasoned" ""
[[1251]]
[1] "" "The" "law"
[4] "knows" "heresy" "committed"
[7] "support" "dogma" "establishment"
[10] "sect" "The" "right"
[13] "organize" "voluntary" "religious"
[16] "associations" "assist" "expression"
[19] "dissemination" "religious" "doctrine"
[22] "create" "tribunals" "decision"
[25] "controverted" "questions" "faith"
[28] "within" "association" "ecclesiastical"
[31] "government" "individual" "members"
[34] "congregations" "officers" "within"
[37] "general" "association" "unquestioned"
[40] "All" "unite" "body"
[43] "implied" "consent" "government"
[46] "bound" "submit" "But"
[49] "vain" "consent" "lead"
[52] "total" "subversion" "religious"
[55] "bodies" "one" "aggrieved"
[58] "one" "decisions" "appeal"
[61] "secular" "courts" "reversed"
[64] "It" "essence" "religious"
[67] "unions" "right" "establish"
[70] "tribunals" "decision" "questions"
[73] "arising" "among" "decisions"
[76] "binding" "cases" "ecclesiastical"
[79] "cognizance" "subject" "appeals"
[82] "organism" "provides" "Wall"
[85] "L" "Ed" "emphasis"
[88] "supplied" ""
[[1252]]
[1] "Gonzalez" "v" "Archbishop"
[4] "U" "S" "S"
[7] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[10] "applied" "principle" "case"
[13] "involving" "dispute" "entitlement"
[16] "certain" "income" "will"
[19] "turned" "upon" "ecclesiastical"
[22] "determination" "whether" "individual"
[25] "appointed" "chaplaincy" "Roman"
[28] "Catholic" "Church" "The"
[31] "Court" "speaking" "Mr"
[34] "Justice" "Brandeis" "observed"
[37] ""
[[1253]]
[1] "" "Because" "appointment"
[4] "chaplaincy" "canonical" "act"
[7] "function" "church" "authorities"
[10] "determine" "essential" "qualifications"
[13] "chaplain" "whether" "candidate"
[16] "possesses" "In" "absence"
[19] "fraud" "collusion" "arbitrariness"
[22] "decisions" "proper" "church"
[25] "tribunals" "matters" "purely"
[28] "ecclesiastical" "although" "affecting"
[31] "civil" "rights" "accepted"
[34] "litigation" "secular" "courts"
[37] "conclusive" "parties" "interest"
[40] "made" "contract" "otherwise"
[43] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[46] ""
[[1254]]
[1] "" "Thus" "although"
[4] "Watson" "left" "civil"
[7] "courts" "role" "play"
[10] "reviewing" "ecclesiastical" "decisions"
[13] "course" "resolving" "church"
[16] "property" "disputes" "Gonzalez"
[19] "first" "adverted" "possibility"
[22] "marginal" "civil" "court"
[25] "review" "Presbyterian" "Churgh"
[28] "v" "Hull" "Church"
[31] "supra" "U" "S"
[34] "S" "Ct" "cases"
[37] "challenging" "decisions" "ecclesiastical"
[40] "tribunals" "products" "fraud"
[43] "collusion" "arbitrariness" "However"
[46] "since" "even" "suggestion"
[49] "Archbishop" "exercised" "authority"
[52] "making" "chaplaincy" "decision"
[55] "arbitrarily" "U" "S"
[58] "S" "Ct" "suggested"
[61] "fraud" "collusion" "arbitrariness"
[64] "exception" "Watson" "rule"
[67] "dictum" "And" "although"
[70] "references" "suggested" "exceptions"
[73] "appear" "opinions" "cases"
[76] "decided" "since" "Watson"
[79] "rule" "held" "mandated"
[82] "First" "Amendment" "decision"
[85] "Court" "given" "concrete"
[88] "content" "applied" "exception"
[91] "However" "predicate" "Illinois"
[94] "Supreme" "Court" "s"
[97] "decision" "case" "therefore"
[100] "turn" "question" "whether"
[103] "reliance" "upon" "circumstances"
[106] "case" "consistent" "prohibition"
[109] "First" "Fourteenth" "Amendments"
[112] "rejection" "decisions" "Mother"
[115] "Church" "upon" "religious"
[118] "disputes" "issue" ""
[[1255]]
[1] "" "The" "conclusion"
[4] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[7] "decisions" "Mother" "Church"
[10] "arbitrary" "grounded" "upon"
[13] "inquiry" "persuaded" "Illinois"
[16] "Supreme" "Court" "Mother"
[19] "Church" "followed" "laws"
[22] "procedures" "arriving" "decisions"
[25] "We" "concluded" "whether"
[28] "room" "marginal" "civil"
[31] "court" "review" "narrow"
[34] "rubrics" "fraud" "collusion"
[37] "church" "tribunals" "act"
[40] "bad" "faith" "secular"
[43] "purposes" "arbitrariness" "exception"
[46] "sense" "inquiry" "whether"
[49] "decisions" "highest" "ecclesiastical"
[52] "tribunal" "hierarchical" "church"
[55] "complied" "church" "laws"
[58] "regulations" "consistent" "constitutional"
[61] "mandate" "civil" "courts"
[64] "bound" "accept" "decisions"
[67] "highest" "judicatories" "religious"
[70] "organization" "hierarchical" "polity"
[73] "matters" "discipline" "faith"
[76] "internal" "organization" "ecclesiastical"
[79] "rule" "custom" "law"
[82] "For" "civil" "courts"
[85] "analyze" "whether" "ecclesiastical"
[88] "actions" "church" "judicatory"
[91] "sense" "arbitrary" "must"
[94] "inherently" "entail" "inquiry"
[97] "procedures" "canon" "ecclesiastical"
[100] "law" "supposedly" "requires"
[103] "church" "judicatory" "follow"
[106] "else" "substantive" "criteria"
[109] "supposedly" "decide" "ecclesiastical"
[112] "question" "But" "exactly"
[115] "inquiry" "First" "Amendment"
[118] "prohibits" "recognition" "exception"
[121] "undermine" "general" "rule"
[124] "religious" "controversies" "proper"
[127] "subject" "civil" "court"
[130] "inquiry" "civil" "court"
[133] "must" "accept" "ecclesiastical"
[136] "decisions" "church" "tribunals"
[139] "finds" "Watson" "requires"
[142] "conclusion" "rejection" "analogous"
[145] "argument" "ecclesiastical" "decisions"
[148] "highest" "church" "judicatories"
[151] "need" "accepted" "subject"
[154] "matter" "dispute" "within"
[157] "jurisdiction" ""
[[1256]]
[1] "" "But" "different"
[4] "thing" "subject" "matter"
[7] "dispute" "strictly" "purely"
[10] "ecclesiastical" "character" "matter"
[13] "civil" "courts" "exercise"
[16] "jurisdiction" "matter" "concerns"
[19] "theological" "controversy" "church"
[22] "discipline" "ecclesiastical" "government"
[25] "conformity" "members" "church"
[28] "standard" "morals" "required"
[31] "becomes" "subject" "action"
[34] "It" "may" "said"
[37] "also" "jurisdiction" "conferred"
[40] "tribunal" "try" "particular"
[43] "case" "judgment" "exceeds"
[46] "powers" "conferred" "upon"
[49] "laws" "church" "authorize"
[52] "particular" "form" "proceeding"
[55] "adopted" "sense" "often"
[58] "used" "courts" "may"
[61] "said" "questions" "jurisdiction"
[64] "But" "easy" "see"
[67] "If" "civil" "courts"
[70] "inquire" "matters" "whole"
[73] "subject" "doctrinal" "theology"
[76] "usages" "customs" "written"
[79] "laws" "fundamental" "organization"
[82] "every" "religious" "denomination"
[85] "may" "must" "examined"
[88] "minuteness" "care" "become"
[91] "almost" "every" "case"
[94] "criteria" "validity" "ecclesiastical"
[97] "decree" "determined" "civil"
[100] "court" "This" "principle"
[103] "deprive" "bodies" "right"
[106] "construing" "church" "laws"
[109] "open" "way" "evils"
[112] "depicted" "attendant" "upon"
[115] "doctrine" "Lord" "Eldon"
[118] "And" "effect" "transfer"
[121] "civil" "courts" "property"
[124] "rights" "concerned" "decision"
[127] "ecclesiastical" "questions" "Wall"
[130] "L" "Ed" "Emphasis"
[133] "supplied" ""
[[1257]]
[1] "Indeed" "essence" "religious"
[4] "faith" "ecclesiastical" "decisions"
[7] "reached" "accepted" "matters"
[10] "faith" "whether" "rational"
[13] "measurable" "objective" "criteria"
[16] "Constitutional" "concepts" "due"
[19] "process" "involving" "secular"
[22] "notions" "fundamental" "fairness"
[25] "impermissible" "objectives" "therefore"
[28] "hardly" "relevant" "matters"
[31] "ecclesiastical" "cognizance" ""
[[1258]]
[1] "The" "constitutional" "evils"
[4] "attend" "upon" "arbitrariness"
[7] "exception" "sense" "applied"
[10] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[13] "justify" "civil" "court"
[16] "review" "ecclesiastical" "decisions"
[19] "final" "church" "tribunals"
[22] "manifest" "instant" "case"
[25] "The" "Supreme" "Court"
[28] "Illinois" "recognized" "parties"
[31] "agree" "Serbian" "Orthodox"
[34] "Church" "hierarchical" "church"
[37] "sole" "power" "appoint"
[40] "remove" "Bishops" "Church"
[43] "resides" "highest" "ranking"
[46] "organs" "Holy" "Assembly"
[49] "Holy" "Synod" "Indeed"
[52] "final" "authority" "respect"
[55] "promulgation" "interpretation" "maers"
[58] "church" "discipline" "internal"
[61] "organization" "rests" "Holy"
[64] "Assembly" "even" "written"
[67] "constitution" "Mother" "Church"
[70] "expressly" "provides" ""
[[1259]]
[1] "" "The" "Holy" "Assembly"
[5] "Bishops" "highest" "hierarchical" "body"
[9] "legislative" "authority" "matters" "faith"
[13] "officiation" "church" "order" "discipline"
[17] "internal" "organization" "Church" "well"
[21] "highest" "church" "juridical" "authority"
[25] "within" "jurisdiction" "Article" "sec"
[29] "Art" ""
[[1260]]
[1] "" "All" "decisions" "Holy"
[5] "Assembly" "Bishops" "Holy" "Synod"
[9] "Bishops" "canonical" "d" "church"
[13] "nature" "regard" "faith" "officiation"
[17] "church" "order" "internal" "organization"
[21] "church" "valid" "final" "Art"
[25] ""
[[1261]]
[1] "" "The" "Holy" "Assembly"
[5] "Bishops" "whose" "purpose" "noted"
[9] "Article" "Constitution" ""
[[1262]]
[1] "" "interprets" "canonical"
[4] "ecclesiastical" "rules" "general"
[7] "obligatory" "particular" "ones"
[10] "publishes" "collections" ""
[[1263]]
[1] "" "prescribes" "ecclesiastical"
[4] "judicial" "procedure" "Ecclesiastical"
[7] "Courts" ""
[[1264]]
[1] "" "settles" "disputes" "jurisdiction"
[5] "hierarchical" "church" "self" "governing"
[9] "organs" ""
[[1265]]
[1] "" "ADJUDGES" ""
[[1266]]
[1] "" "A" "In" "first" "final"
[6] "instances" ""
[[1267]]
[1] "" "disagreements" "bishops" "Holy"
[5] "Synod" "bishops" "Patriarch" ""
[[1268]]
[1] "" "b" "canonical" "offenses" "Patriarch"
[6] ""
[[1269]]
[1] "" "B" "In" "second" "final" "instance"
[7] ""
[[1270]]
[1] "" "All" "matters" "Holy" "Synod" "Bishops"
[7] "judged" "first" "instance" "Art" ""
[[1271]]
[1] "Nor" "dispute" "questions"
[4] "church" "discipline" "composition"
[7] "church" "hierarchy" "core"
[10] "ecclesiastical" "concern" "bishop"
[13] "church" "clearly" "one"
[16] "central" "figures" "hierarchy"
[19] "embodiment" "church" "within"
[22] "Diocese" "Mother" "Church"
[25] "constitution" "states" "h"
[28] "e" "according" "church"
[31] "canonical" "regulations" "chief"
[34] "representative" "guiding" "leader"
[37] "church" "spiritual" "life"
[40] "church" "order" "diocese"
[43] "Art" ""
[[1272]]
[1] "" "Yet" "recognized"
[4] "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[7] "hierarchical" "decisions" "suspend"
[10] "defrock" "respondent" "Dionisije"
[13] "made" "religious" "bodies"
[16] "whose" "sole" "discretion"
[19] "authority" "make" "thosecclesiastical"
[22] "decisions" "vested" "Supreme"
[25] "Court" "Illinois" "nevertheless"
[28] "invalidated" "decision" "defrock"
[31] "Dionisije" "ground" "arbitrary"
[34] "detailed" "review" "evidence"
[37] "discloses" "proceedings" "resulting"
[40] "Bishop" "Dionisije" "s"
[43] "removal" "defrockment" "accordance"
[46] "prescribed" "procedure" "constitution"
[49] "penal" "code" "Serbian"
[52] "Orthodox" "Church" "Ill"
[55] "d" "N" "E"
[58] "d" "Not" "detailed"
[61] "review" "impermissible" "First"
[64] "Fourteenth" "Amendments" "reaching"
[67] "conclusion" "court" "evaluated"
[70] "conflicting" "testimony" "concerning"
[73] "internal" "church" "procedures"
[76] "rejected" "interpretations" "relevant"
[79] "procedural" "provisions" "Mother"
[82] "Church" "s" "highest"
[85] "tribunals" "Id" "N"
[88] "E" "d" "The"
[91] "court" "also" "failed"
[94] "take" "cognizance" "fact"
[97] "church" "judicatories" "also"
[100] "guided" "sources" "law"
[103] "canon" "law" "admittedly"
[106] "always" "consistent" "rejected"
[109] "testimony" "petitioners" "five"
[112] "expert" "witnesses" "church"
[115] "procedures" "properly" "followed"
[118] "denigrating" "testimony" "one"
[121] "witness" "contradictory" "discounting"
[124] "another" "ground" "premised"
[127] "upon" "assumption" "consider"
[130] "penal" "code" "even"
[133] "though" "question" "whether"
[136] "code" "even" "applied"
[139] "discipline" "Bishops" "The"
[142] "court" "accepted" "hand"
[145] "testimony" "respondents" "sole"
[148] "expert" "witness" "Church"
[151] "s" "procedures" "contravened"
[154] "various" "specifics" "We"
[157] "need" "First" "Amendment"
[160] "demonstrate" "propriety" "impropriety"
[163] "Dionisije" "s" "procedural"
[166] "claims" "can" "note"
[169] "state" "court" "even"
[172] "rejected" "petitioners" "contention"
[175] "Dionisije" "s" "failure"
[178] "participate" "proceedings" "undermined"
[181] "procedural" "contentions" "Arts"
[184] "penal" "code" "specify"
[187] "person" "charged" "violation"
[190] "fails" "participate" "answer"
[193] "indictment" "allegations" "admitted"
[196] "due" "process" "will"
[199] "concluded" "without" "participation"
[202] "court" "merely" "asserted"
[205] "application" "provision" "must"
[208] "viewed" "perspective" "Bishop"
[211] "Dionisije" "refused" "participate"
[214] "maintained" "proceedings" "violation"
[217] "constitution" "penal" "code"
[220] "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[223] "Ill" "d" "N"
[226] "E" "d" "The"
[229] "court" "found" "support"
[232] "church" "dogma" "judicial"
[235] "rewriting" "church" "law"
[238] "compounded" "error" "intrusion"
[241] "religious" "thicket" "declaring"
[244] "although" "Dionisije" "even"
[247] "court" "s" "analysis"
[250] "properly" "suspended" "replaced"
[253] "Firmilian" "temporary" "administrator"
[256] "reinstated" "Bishop" "church"
[259] "law" "mandated" "trial"
[262] "ecclesiastical" "charges" "within"
[265] "one" "year" "indictment"
[268] "Yet" "reason" "time"
[271] "expired" "due" "Dionisije"
[274] "s" "decision" "resort"
[277] "civil" "courts" "redress"
[280] "without" "attempting" "vindicate"
[283] "pursuing" "available" "remedies"
[286] "within" "church" "Indeed"
[289] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[292] "overlooked" "clear" "substantive"
[295] "canonical" "violations" "Church"
[298] "disciplined" "Dionisije" "violations"
[301] "based" "Dionisije" "s"
[304] "conceded" "open" "defiance"
[307] "rebellion" "church" "hierarchy"
[310] "immediately" "Holy" "Assembly"
[313] "s" "decision" "suspend"
[316] "decision" "even" "Illinois"
[319] "courts" "deemed" "proper"
[322] "Dionisije" "s" "decision"
[325] "litigate" "Mother" "Church"
[328] "s" "authority" "civil"
[331] "courts" "rather" "participate"
[334] "disciplinary" "proceedings" "Holy"
[337] "Synod" "Holy" "Assembly"
[340] "Instead" "Illinois" "Supreme"
[343] "Court" "sanction" "circumvention"
[346] "tribunals" "set" "resolve"
[349] "internal" "church" "disputes"
[352] "ordered" "Mother" "Church"
[355] "reinstate" "Bishop" "one"
[358] "espoused" "views" "regarded"
[361] "church" "hierarchy" "schismatic"
[364] "proper" "church" "tribunals"
[367] "already" "determined" "merit"
[370] "seversanctions" "In" "short"
[373] "guise" "minimal" "review"
[376] "umbrella" "arbitrariness" "Illinois"
[379] "Supreme" "Court" "unconstitutionally"
[382] "undertaken" "resolution" "quintessentially"
[385] "religious" "controversies" "whose"
[388] "resolution" "First" "Amendment"
[391] "commits" "exclusively" "highest"
[394] "ecclesiastical" "tribunals" "hierarchical"
[397] "church" "And" "although"
[400] "Diocesan" "Bishop" "controls"
[403] "respondent" "Monastery" "St"
[406] "Sava" "principal" "officer"
[409] "respondent" "property" "holding"
[412] "corporations" "civil" "courts"
[415] "must" "accept" "consequence"
[418] "incidental" "effect" "ecclesiastical"
[421] "determination" "subject" "judicial"
[424] "abrogation" "reached" "final"
[427] "church" "judicatory" "authority"
[430] "make" "decision" "resides"
[433] ""
[[1273]]
[1] "III" ""
[[1274]]
[1] "Similar" "considerations" "inform"
[4] "resolution" "second" "question"
[7] "must" "address" "constitutionality"
[10] "Supreme" "Court" "Illinois"
[13] "holding" "Mother" "Church"
[16] "s" "reorganization" "American"
[19] "Canadian" "Diocese" "three"
[22] "Dioceses" "invalid" "clear"
[25] "palpable" "excess" "jurisdiction"
[28] "Essentially" "court" "premised"
[31] "determination" "view" "early"
[34] "history" "Diocese" "manested"
[37] "clear" "intention" "retain"
[40] "independence" "autonomy" "administrative"
[43] "affairs" "time" "becoming"
[46] "ecclesiastically" "judicially" "organic"
[49] "part" "Serbian" "Orthodox"
[52] "Church" "interpretation" "constitution"
[55] "American" "Canadian" "Diocese"
[58] "confirming" "intention" "It"
[61] "also" "interpreted" "constitution"
[64] "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[67] "adopted" "Diocesan" "constitution"
[70] "manner" "consistent" "conclusion"
[73] "Ill" "d" "N"
[76] "E" "d" ""
[[1275]]
[1] "" "This" "conclusion"
[4] "however" "explicitly" "based"
[7] "fraud" "collusion" "arbitrariness"
[10] "exception" "Rather" "Illinois"
[13] "Supreme" "Court" "relied"
[16] "purported" "neutral" "principles"
[19] "resolving" "property" "disputes"
[22] "way" "entangle" "court"
[25] "determination" "theological" "doctrinal"
[28] "matters" "Id" "N"
[31] "E" "d" "Nevertheless"
[34] "Supreme" "Court" "Illinois"
[37] "substituted" "interpretation" "Diocesan"
[40] "Mother" "Church" "constitutions"
[43] "highest" "ecclesiastical" "tribunals"
[46] "church" "law" "vests"
[49] "authority" "make" "interpretation"
[52] "This" "First" "Fourteenth"
[55] "Amendments" "forbid" ""
[[1276]]
[1] "" "We" "will"
[4] "delve" "various" "church"
[7] "constitutional" "provisions" "relevant"
[10] "conclusion" "repeat" "error"
[13] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[16] "It" "suffices" "note"
[19] "reorganization" "Diocese" "involves"
[22] "matter" "internal" "church"
[25] "government" "issue" "core"
[28] "ecclesiastical" "affairs" "Arts"
[31] "Mother" "Church" "constitution"
[34] "commit" "questions" "church"
[37] "polity" "final" "province"
[40] "Holy" "Assembly" "Kedroff"
[43] "v" "St" "Nicholas"
[46] "Cathedral" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "L"
[52] "Ed" "stated" "religious"
[55] "freedom" "encompasses" "power"
[58] "religious" "bodies" "decide"
[61] "free" "state" "interference"
[64] "matters" "church" "government"
[67] "well" "faith" "doctrine"
[70] "The" "subordination" "Diocese"
[73] "Mother" "Church" "matters"
[76] "administrative" "also" "hierarchical"
[79] "provided" "power" "Holy"
[82] "Assembly" "reorganize" "Diocese"
[85] "expressed" "Mother" "Church"
[88] "constitution" "Contrary" "interpretation"
[91] "Illinois" "court" "church"
[94] "judicatories" "interpreted" "provisions"
[97] "Diocesan" "constitution" "interdict"
[100] "govern" "action" "relate"
[103] "day" "day" "administration"
[106] "Diocesan" "property" "The"
[109] "constitutional" "provisions" "American"
[112] "Canadian" "Diocese" "express"
[115] "civil" "courts" "enforce"
[118] "without" "engaging" "searching"
[121] "therefore" "impermissible" "inquiry"
[124] "church" "polity" "See"
[127] "Md" "Va" "Churches"
[130] "v" "Sharpsburg" "Church"
[133] "U" "S" "S"
[136] "Ct" "Brennan" "J"
[139] "concurring" ""
[[1277]]
[1] "The" "control" "Diocesan"
[4] "property" "may" "little"
[7] "affected" "changes" "respondents"
[10] "allegation" "reorganization" "fraudulent"
[13] "subterfuge" "divert" "Diocesan"
[16] "property" "intended" "beneficiaries"
[19] "rejected" "Illinois" "courts"
[22] "Formal" "title" "property"
[25] "remains" "respondent" "property"
[28] "holding" "corporations" "held"
[31] "trust" "members" "new"
[34] "Dioceses" "The" "boundaries"
[37] "reorganized" "Dioceses" "generally"
[40] "conform" "episcopal" "districts"
[43] "American" "Canadian" "Diocese"
[46] "already" "employed" "internal"
[49] "government" "appointed" "administrators"
[52] "new" "Dioceses" "individuals"
[55] "nominated" "Dionisije" "assistant"
[58] "bishops" "govern" "similar"
[61] "divisions" "Indeed" "even"
[64] "Illinois" "courts" "rationale"
[67] "reorganization" "effectuate" "abrogation"
[70] "Diocesan" "constitution" "support"
[73] "record" "establishes" "rather"
[76] "details" "reorganization" "decisions"
[79] "pertaining" "distribution" "property"
[82] "among" "three" "Dioceses"
[85] "expressly" "left" "Diocesan"
[88] "National" "Assembly" "determine"
[91] "In" "response" "inquiries"
[94] "Diocese" "Holy" "Assembly"
[97] "assured" "Bishop" "Firmilian"
[100] ""
[[1278]]
[1] "" "That" "rights"
[4] "former" "American" "Canadian"
[7] "Diocese" "relate" "autonomy"
[10] "administrative" "sense" "remain"
[13] "unchanged" "The" "exception"
[16] "forming" "three" "dioceses"
[19] ""
[[1279]]
[1] "" "That" "Constitution"
[4] "former" "American" "Canadian"
[7] "Diocese" "remains" "Dioceses"
[10] "America" "Canada" "will"
[13] "administrative" "sense" "management"
[16] "Or" "direction" "properties"
[19] "managed" "Or" "directed"
[22] "manner" "Yugoslavia" "App"
[25] ""
[[1280]]
[1] "As" "practical" "matter"
[4] "effect" "reorganization" "tripling"
[7] "Diocesan" "representational" "strength"
[10] "Holy" "Assembly" "decentralization"
[13] "hierarchical" "authority" "permit"
[16] "closer" "attention" "needs"
[19] "individual" "congregations" "within"
[22] "new" "Dioceses" "result"
[25] "Dionisije" "Diocesan" "representatives"
[28] "already" "concluded" "necessary"
[31] "Whether" "corporate" "bylaws"
[34] "documents" "governing" "individual"
[37] "property" "holding" "corporations"
[40] "may" "affect" "desired"
[43] "disposition" "Diocesan" "property"
[46] "question" "us" ""
[[1281]]
[1] "IV" ""
[[1282]]
[1] "" "In" "short"
[4] "First" "Fourteenth" "Amendments"
[7] "permit" "hierarchical" "religious"
[10] "organizations" "establish" "rules"
[13] "regulations" "internal" "discipline"
[16] "government" "create" "tribunals"
[19] "adjudicating" "disputes" "matters"
[22] "When" "choice" "exercised"
[25] "ecclesiastical" "tribunals" "created"
[28] "decide" "disputes" "government"
[31] "direction" "subordinate" "bodies"
[34] "Constitution" "requires" "civil"
[37] "courts" "accept" "decisions"
[40] "binding" "upon" ""
[[1283]]
[1] "Reversed" ""
[[1284]]
[1] "Mr" "Justice" "BRENNAN" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[1285]]
[1] "Appellant" "member" "Seventh"
[4] "day" "Adventist" "Church"
[7] "discharged" "South" "Carolina"
[10] "employer" "work" "Saturday"
[13] "Sabbath" "Day" "faith"
[16] "When" "unable" "obtain"
[19] "employment" "conscientious" "scruples"
[22] "take" "Saturday" "work"
[25] "filed" "claim" "unemployment"
[28] "compensation" "benefits" "South"
[31] "Carolina" "Unemployment" "Compensation"
[34] "Act" "That" "law"
[37] "provides" "eligible" "benefits"
[40] "claimant" "must" "able"
[43] "work" "available" "work"
[46] "claimant" "ineligible" "benefits"
[49] "f" "failed" "without"
[52] "good" "cause" "accept"
[55] "available" "suitable" "work"
[58] "offered" "employment" "office"
[61] "employer" "The" "appellee"
[64] "Employment" "Security" "Commission"
[67] "administrative" "proceedings" "statute"
[70] "found" "appellant" "s"
[73] "restriction" "upon" "availability"
[76] "Saturday" "work" "brought"
[79] "within" "provision" "disqualifying"
[82] "benefits" "insured" "workers"
[85] "fail" "without" "good"
[88] "cause" "accept" "suitable"
[91] "work" "offered" "employment"
[94] "office" "employer" "The"
[97] "Commission" "s" "finding"
[100] "sustained" "Court" "Common"
[103] "Pleas" "Spartanburg" "County"
[106] "That" "court" "s"
[109] "judgment" "turn" "affirmed"
[112] "South" "Carolina" "Supreme"
[115] "Court" "rejected" "appellant"
[118] "s" "contention" "applied"
[121] "disqualifying" "provisions" "South"
[124] "Carolina" "statute" "abridged"
[127] "right" "free" "exercise"
[130] "religion" "secured" "Free"
[133] "Exercise" "Clause" "First"
[136] "Amendment" "Fourteenth" "Amendment"
[139] "The" "State" "Supreme"
[142] "Court" "held" "specifically"
[145] "appellant" "s" "ineligibility"
[148] "infringed" "constitutional" "liberties"
[151] "construction" "statute" "places"
[154] "restriction" "upon" "appellant"
[157] "s" "freedom" "religion"
[160] "way" "prevent" "exercise"
[163] "right" "freedom" "observe"
[166] "religious" "beliefs" "accordance"
[169] "dictates" "conscience" "U"
[172] "S" "S" "E"
[175] "d" "We" "noted"
[178] "probable" "jurisdiction" "appellant"
[181] "s" "appeal" "U"
[184] "S" "S" "Ct"
[187] "L" "Ed" "d"
[190] "We" "reverse" "judgment"
[193] "South" "Carolina" "Supreme"
[196] "Court" "remand" "proceedings"
[199] "inconsistent" "opinion" ""
[[1286]]
[1] "I" ""
[[1287]]
[1] "" "The" "door" "Free"
[5] "Exercise" "Clause" "stands" "tightly"
[9] "closed" "governmental" "regulation" "religious"
[13] "beliefs" "Cantwell" "v" "Connecticut"
[17] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[21] "L" "Ed" "Government" "may"
[25] "neither" "compel" "affirmation" "repugnant"
[29] "belief" "Torcaso" "v" "Watkins"
[33] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "L" "Ed" "d" "penalize"
[41] "discriminate" "individuals" "groups" "hold"
[45] "religious" "views" "abhorrent" "authorities"
[49] "Fowler" "v" "Rhode" "Island"
[53] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[57] "L" "Ed" "employ" "taxing"
[61] "power" "inhibit" "dissemination" "particular"
[65] "religious" "views" "Murdock" "v"
[69] "Pennsylvania" "U" "S" "S"
[73] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "Follett"
[77] "v" "McCormick" "U" "S"
[81] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[85] "cf" "Grosjean" "v" "American"
[89] "Press" "Co" "U" "S"
[93] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[97] "On" "hand" "Court" "rejected"
[101] "challenges" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[105] "governmental" "regulation" "certain" "overt"
[109] "acts" "prompted" "religious" "beliefs"
[113] "principles" "even" "action" "accord"
[117] "one" "s" "religious" "convictions"
[121] "totally" "free" "legislative" "restrictions"
[125] "Braunfeld" "v" "Brown" "U"
[129] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[133] "Ed" "d" "The" "conduct"
[137] "actions" "regulated" "invariably" "posed"
[141] "substantial" "threat" "public" "safety"
[145] "peace" "order" "See" "e"
[149] "g" "Reynolds" "v" "United"
[153] "States" "U" "S" "L"
[157] "Ed" "Jacobson" "v" "Massachusetts"
[161] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[165] "L" "Ed" "Prince" "v"
[169] "Massachusetts" "U" "S" "S"
[173] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "Cleveland"
[177] "v" "United" "States" "U"
[181] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[185] "Ed" ""
[[1288]]
[1] "" "Plainly" "enough"
[4] "appellant" "s" "conscientious"
[7] "objection" "Saturday" "work"
[10] "constitutes" "conduct" "prompted"
[13] "religious" "principles" "kind"
[16] "within" "reach" "state"
[19] "legislation" "If" "therefore"
[22] "decision" "South" "Carolina"
[25] "Supreme" "Court" "withstand"
[28] "appellant" "s" "constitutional"
[31] "challenge" "must" "either"
[34] "disqualification" "beneficiary" "represents"
[37] "infringement" "State" "constitutional"
[40] "rights" "free" "exercise"
[43] "incidental" "burden" "free"
[46] "exercise" "appellant" "s"
[49] "religion" "may" "justified"
[52] "compelling" "state" "interest"
[55] "regulation" "subject" "within"
[58] "State" "s" "constitutional"
[61] "power" "regulate" "NAACP"
[64] "v" "Button" "U"
[67] "S" "S" "Ct"
[70] "L" "Ed" "d"
[73] ""
[[1289]]
[1] "II" ""
[[1290]]
[1] "" "We" "turn"
[4] "first" "question" "whether"
[7] "disqualification" "benefits" "imposes"
[10] "burden" "free" "exercise"
[13] "appellant" "s" "religion"
[16] "We" "think" "clear"
[19] "In" "sense" "consequences"
[22] "disqualification" "religious" "principles"
[25] "practices" "may" "indirect"
[28] "result" "welfare" "legislation"
[31] "within" "State" "s"
[34] "general" "competence" "enact"
[37] "true" "criminal" "sanctions"
[40] "directly" "compel" "appellant"
[43] "work" "six" "day"
[46] "week" "But" "beginning"
[49] "end" "inquiry" "For"
[52] "f" "purpose" "effect"
[55] "law" "impede" "observance"
[58] "one" "religions" "discriminate"
[61] "invidiously" "religions" "law"
[64] "constitutionally" "invalid" "even"
[67] "though" "burden" "may"
[70] "characterized" "indirect" "Braunfeld"
[73] "v" "Brown" "supra"
[76] "U" "S" "S"
[79] "Ct" "Here" "apparent"
[82] "appellant" "s" "declared"
[85] "ineligibility" "benefits" "derives"
[88] "solely" "practice" "religion"
[91] "pressure" "upon" "forego"
[94] "practice" "unmistakable" "The"
[97] "ruling" "forces" "choose"
[100] "following" "precepts" "religion"
[103] "forfeiting" "benefits" "one"
[106] "hand" "abandoning" "one"
[109] "precepts" "religion" "order"
[112] "accept" "work" "hand"
[115] "Governmental" "imposition" "choice"
[118] "puts" "kind" "burden"
[121] "upon" "free" "exercise"
[124] "religion" "fine" "imposed"
[127] "appellant" "Saturday" "worship"
[130] ""
[[1291]]
[1] "" "Nor" "may"
[4] "South" "Carolina" "court"
[7] "s" "construction" "statute"
[10] "saved" "constitutional" "infirmity"
[13] "ground" "unemployment" "compensation"
[16] "benefits" "appellant" "s"
[19] "right" "merely" "privilege"
[22] "It" "late" "day"
[25] "doubt" "liberties" "religion"
[28] "expression" "may" "infringed"
[31] "denial" "placing" "conditions"
[34] "upon" "benefit" "privilege"
[37] "American" "Communications" "Ass"
[40] "n" "v" "Douds"
[43] "U" "S" "S"
[46] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[49] "Wieman" "v" "Updegraff"
[52] "U" "S" "S"
[55] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[58] "Hannegan" "v" "Esquire"
[61] "Inc" "U" "S"
[64] "S" "Ct" "L"
[67] "Ed" "For" "example"
[70] "Flemming" "v" "Nestor"
[73] "U" "S" "S"
[76] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[79] "d" "Court" "recognized"
[82] "respect" "Federal" "Social"
[85] "Security" "benefits" "t"
[88] "interest" "covered" "employee"
[91] "Act" "sufficient" "substance"
[94] "fall" "within" "protection"
[97] "arbitrary" "governmental" "action"
[100] "afforded" "Due" "Process"
[103] "Clause" "In" "Speiser"
[106] "v" "Randall" "U"
[109] "S" "S" "Ct"
[112] "L" "Ed" "d"
[115] "emphasized" "conditions" "upon"
[118] "public" "benefits" "sustained"
[121] "operate" "whatever" "purpose"
[124] "inhibit" "deter" "exercise"
[127] "First" "Amendment" "freedoms"
[130] "We" "struck" "condition"
[133] "limited" "availability" "tax"
[136] "exemption" "members" "exempted"
[139] "class" "affirmed" "loyalty"
[142] "state" "government" "granting"
[145] "exemption" "While" "State"
[148] "surely" "obligation" "afford"
[151] "exemption" "held" "imposition"
[154] "condition" "upon" "even"
[157] "gratuitous" "benefit" "inevitably"
[160] "deterred" "discouraged" "exercise"
[163] "First" "Amendment" "rights"
[166] "expression" "thereby" "threatened"
[169] "produce" "result" "State"
[172] "command" "directly" "U"
[175] "S" "S" "Ct"
[178] "To" "deny" "exemption"
[181] "claimants" "engage" "certain"
[184] "forms" "speech" "effect"
[187] "penalize" "speech" "Id"
[190] "U" "S" "S"
[193] "Ct" "Likewise" "condition"
[196] "availability" "benefits" "upon"
[199] "appellant" "s" "willingness"
[202] "violate" "cardinal" "principle"
[205] "religious" "faith" "effectively"
[208] "penalizes" "free" "exercise"
[211] "constitutional" "liberties" ""
[[1292]]
[1] "Significantly" "South" "Carolina"
[4] "expressly" "saves" "Sunday"
[7] "worshipper" "make" "kind"
[10] "choice" "hold" "infringes"
[13] "Sabbatarian" "s" "religious"
[16] "liberty" "When" "times"
[19] "national" "emergency" "textile"
[22] "plants" "authorized" "State"
[25] "Commissioner" "Labor" "operate"
[28] "Sunday" "employee" "shall"
[31] "required" "work" "Sunday"
[34] "conscientiously" "opposed" "Sunday"
[37] "work" "employee" "refuse"
[40] "work" "Sunday" "account"
[43] "conscientious" "objections" "shall"
[46] "jeopardize" "seniority" "refusal"
[49] "discriminated" "manner" "S"
[52] "C" "Code" "s"
[55] "No" "question" "disqualification"
[58] "Sunday" "worshipper" "benefits"
[61] "likely" "arise" "since"
[64] "suppose" "employer" "will"
[67] "discharge" "violation" "statute"
[70] "The" "unconstitutionality" "disqualification"
[73] "Sabbatarian" "thus" "compounded"
[76] "religious" "discrimination" "South"
[79] "Carolina" "s" "general"
[82] "statutory" "scheme" "necessarily"
[85] "effects" ""
[[1293]]
[1] "III" ""
[[1294]]
[1] "" "We" "must"
[4] "next" "consider" "whether"
[7] "compelling" "state" "interest"
[10] "enforced" "eligibility" "provisions"
[13] "South" "Carolina" "statute"
[16] "justifies" "substantial" "infringement"
[19] "appellant" "s" "First"
[22] "Amendment" "right" "It"
[25] "basic" "showing" "merely"
[28] "rational" "relationship" "colorable"
[31] "state" "interest" "suffice"
[34] "highly" "sensitive" "constitutional"
[37] "area" "o" "nly"
[40] "gravest" "abuses" "endangering"
[43] "paramount" "interest" "give"
[46] "occasion" "permissible" "limitation"
[49] "Thomas" "v" "Collins"
[52] "U" "S" "S"
[55] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[58] "No" "abuse" "danger"
[61] "advanced" "present" "case"
[64] "The" "appellees" "suggest"
[67] "possibility" "filing" "fraudulent"
[70] "claims" "unscrupulous" "claimants"
[73] "feigning" "religious" "objections"
[76] "Saturday" "work" "might"
[79] "dilute" "unemployment" "compensation"
[82] "fund" "also" "hinder"
[85] "scheduling" "employers" "necessary"
[88] "Saturday" "work" "But"
[91] "possibility" "apposite" "objection"
[94] "appears" "made" "South"
[97] "Carolina" "Supreme" "Court"
[100] "unwilling" "assess" "importance"
[103] "asserted" "state" "interest"
[106] "without" "views" "state"
[109] "court" "Nor" "contention"
[112] "made" "record" "appear"
[115] "sustain" "proof" "whatever"
[118] "warrant" "fears" "malingering"
[121] "deceit" "respondents" "now"
[124] "advance" "Even" "consideration"
[127] "evidence" "foreclosed" "prohibition"
[130] "judicial" "inquiry" "truth"
[133] "falsity" "religious" "beliefs"
[136] "United" "States" "v"
[139] "Ballard" "U" "S"
[142] "S" "Ct" "L"
[145] "Ed" "question" "intimate"
[148] "view" "since" "us"
[151] "highly" "doubtful" "whether"
[154] "evidence" "sufficient" "warrant"
[157] "substantial" "infringement" "religious"
[160] "liberties" "For" "even"
[163] "possibility" "spurious" "claims"
[166] "threaten" "dilute" "fund"
[169] "disrupt" "scheduling" "work"
[172] "plainly" "incumbent" "upon"
[175] "appellees" "demonstrate" "alternative"
[178] "forms" "regulation" "combat"
[181] "abuses" "without" "infringing"
[184] "First" "Amendment" "rights"
[187] "Cf" "Shelton" "v"
[190] "Tucker" "U" "S"
[193] "S" "Ct" "L"
[196] "Ed" "d" "Talley"
[199] "v" "California" "U"
[202] "S" "S" "Ct"
[205] "L" "Ed" "d"
[208] "Schneider" "v" "State"
[211] "New" "Jersey" "U"
[214] "S" "S" "Ct"
[217] "L" "Ed" "Martin"
[220] "v" "Struthers" "U"
[223] "S" "S" "Ct"
[226] "L" "Ed" ""
[[1295]]
[1] "In" "respects" "state"
[4] "interest" "asserted" "present"
[7] "case" "wholly" "dissimilar"
[10] "interests" "found" "justify"
[13] "less" "direct" "burden"
[16] "upon" "religious" "practices"
[19] "Braunfeld" "v" "Brown"
[22] "supra" "The" "Court"
[25] "recognized" "Sunday" "closing"
[28] "law" "decision" "sustained"
[31] "undoubtedly" "served" "make"
[34] "practice" "Orthodox" "Jewish"
[37] "merchants" "religious" "beliefs"
[40] "expensive" "U" "S"
[43] "S" "Ct" "But"
[46] "statute" "nevertheless" "saved"
[49] "countervailing" "factor" "finds"
[52] "equivalent" "instant" "case"
[55] "strong" "state" "interest"
[58] "providing" "one" "uniform"
[61] "day" "rest" "workers"
[64] "That" "secular" "objective"
[67] "achieved" "Court" "found"
[70] "declaring" "Sunday" "day"
[73] "rest" "Requiring" "exemptions"
[76] "Sabbatarians" "theoretically" "possible"
[79] "appeared" "present" "administrative"
[82] "problem" "magnitude" "afford"
[85] "exempted" "class" "great"
[88] "competitive" "advantage" "requirement"
[91] "rendered" "entire" "statutory"
[94] "scheme" "unworkable" "In"
[97] "present" "case" "justifications"
[100] "underlie" "determination" "state"
[103] "court" "appellant" "s"
[106] "religion" "makes" "ineligible"
[109] "receive" "benefits" ""
[[1296]]
[1] "" "IV" ""
[[1297]]
[1] "" "In" "holding"
[4] "plainly" "fostering" "establishment"
[7] "Seventh" "day" "Adventist"
[10] "religion" "South" "Carolina"
[13] "extension" "unemployment" "benefits"
[16] "Sabbatarians" "common" "Sunday"
[19] "worshippers" "reflects" "nothing"
[22] "governmental" "obligation" "neutrality"
[25] "face" "religious" "differences"
[28] "represent" "involvement" "religious"
[31] "secular" "institutions" "object"
[34] "Establishment" "Clause" "forestall"
[37] "See" "School" "District"
[40] "Abington" "Township" "v"
[43] "Schempp" "U" "S"
[46] "S" "Ct" "Nor"
[49] "recognition" "appellant" "s"
[52] "right" "unemployment" "benefits"
[55] "state" "statute" "serve"
[58] "abridge" "person" "s"
[61] "religious" "liberties" "Nor"
[64] "decision" "today" "declare"
[67] "existence" "constitutional" "right"
[70] "unemployment" "benefits" "part"
[73] "persons" "whose" "religious"
[76] "convictions" "cause" "unemployment"
[79] "This" "case" "employee"
[82] "s" "religious" "convictions"
[85] "serve" "make" "nonproductive"
[88] "member" "society" "See"
[91] "note" "supra" "Finally"
[94] "nothing" "say" "today"
[97] "constrains" "States" "adopt"
[100] "particular" "form" "scheme"
[103] "unemployment" "compensation" "Our"
[106] "holding" "today" "South"
[109] "Carolina" "may" "constitutionally"
[112] "apply" "eligibility" "provisions"
[115] "constrain" "worker" "abandon"
[118] "religious" "convictions" "respecting"
[121] "day" "rest" "This"
[124] "holding" "reaffirms" "principle"
[127] "announced" "decade" "half"
[130] "ago" "namely" "State"
[133] "may" "exclude" "individual"
[136] "Catholics" "Lutherans" "Mohammedans"
[139] "Baptists" "Jews" "Methodists"
[142] "Non" "believers" "Presbyterians"
[145] "members" "faith" "faith"
[148] "lack" "receiving" "benefits"
[151] "public" "welfare" "legislation"
[154] "Everson" "v" "Board"
[157] "Education" "U" "S"
[160] "S" "Ct" "L"
[163] "Ed" ""
[[1298]]
[1] "In" "view" "result" "reached" "First"
[6] "Fourteenth" "Amendments" "guarantee" "free" "exercise"
[11] "religion" "occasion" "consider" "appellant" "s"
[16] "claim" "denial" "benefits" "also" "deprived"
[21] "equal" "protection" "laws" "violation" "Fourteenth"
[26] "Amendment" ""
[[1299]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "South" "Carolina"
[5] "Supreme" "Court" "reversed" "case"
[9] "remanded" "proceedings" "inconsistent" "opinion"
[13] "It" "ordered" ""
[[1300]]
[1] "Reversed" "remanded" ""
[[1301]]
[1] "Chief" "Justice" "BURGER" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" ""
[[1302]]
[1] "We" "granted" "certiorari" "consider"
[5] "whether" "State" "s" "denial"
[9] "unemployment" "compensation" "benefits" "petitioner"
[13] "Jehovah" "s" "Witness" "terminated"
[17] "job" "religious" "beliefs" "forbade"
[21] "participation" "production" "armaments" "constituted"
[25] "violation" "First" "Amendment" "right"
[29] "free" "exercise" "religion" "U"
[33] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "d" ""
[[1303]]
[1] "I" ""
[[1304]]
[1] "Thomas" "terminated" "employment" "Blaw"
[5] "Knox" "Foundry" "Machinery" "Co"
[9] "transferred" "roll" "foundry" "department"
[13] "produced" "turrets" "military" "tanks"
[17] "He" "claimed" "religious" "beliefs"
[21] "prevented" "participating" "production" "war"
[25] "materials" "The" "respondent" "Review"
[29] "Board" "denied" "unemployment" "compensation"
[33] "benefits" "applying" "disqualifying" "provisions"
[37] "Indiana" "Employment" "Security" "Act"
[41] ""
[[1305]]
[1] "" "Thomas" "Jehovah" "s"
[5] "Witness" "hired" "initially" "work"
[9] "roll" "foundry" "Blaw" "Knox"
[13] "The" "function" "department" "fabricate"
[17] "sheet" "steel" "variety" "industrial"
[21] "uses" "On" "application" "form"
[25] "listed" "membership" "Jehovah" "s"
[29] "Witnesses" "noted" "hobbies" "Bible"
[33] "study" "Bible" "reading" "However"
[37] "placed" "conditions" "employment" "describe"
[41] "religious" "tenets" "detail" "form"
[45] ""
[[1306]]
[1] "Approximately" "year" "later" "roll"
[5] "foundry" "closed" "Blaw" "Knox"
[9] "transferred" "Thomas" "department" "fabricated"
[13] "turrets" "military" "tanks" "On"
[17] "first" "day" "new" "job"
[21] "Thomas" "realized" "work" "weapons"
[25] "related" "He" "checked" "bulletin"
[29] "board" "plant" "openings" "listed"
[33] "discovered" "remaining" "departments" "Blaw"
[37] "Knox" "engaged" "directly" "production"
[41] "weapons" "Since" "transfer" "another"
[45] "department" "resolve" "problem" "asked"
[49] "layoff" "When" "request" "denied"
[53] "quit" "asserting" "work" "weapons"
[57] "without" "violating" "principles" "religion"
[61] "The" "record" "show" "offered"
[65] "nonweapons" "work" "employer" "work"
[69] "available" ""
[[1307]]
[1] "Upon" "leaving" "Blaw"
[4] "Knox" "Thomas" "applied"
[7] "unemployment" "compensation" "benefits"
[10] "Indiana" "Employment" "Security"
[13] "Act" "At" "administrative"
[16] "hearing" "represented" "counsel"
[19] "testified" "believed" "contributing"
[22] "production" "arms" "violated"
[25] "religion" "He" "said"
[28] "realized" "work" "tank"
[31] "turret" "line" "involved"
[34] "producing" "weapons" "war"
[37] "consulted" "another" "Blaw"
[40] "Knox" "employee" "friend"
[43] "fellow" "Jehovah" "s"
[46] "Witness" "The" "friend"
[49] "advised" "working" "weapons"
[52] "parts" "Blaw" "Knox"
[55] "unscriptural" "Thomas" "able"
[58] "rest" "view" "however"
[61] "He" "concluded" "friend"
[64] "s" "view" "based"
[67] "upon" "less" "strict"
[70] "reading" "Witnesses" "principles"
[73] ""
[[1308]]
[1] "When" "asked" "hearing" "explain"
[5] "kind" "work" "religious" "convictions"
[9] "permit" "Thomas" "said" "difficulty"
[13] "type" "work" "done" "roll"
[17] "foundry" "He" "testified" "good"
[21] "conscience" "engage" "indirectly" "production"
[25] "materials" "might" "used" "ultimately"
[29] "fabricate" "arms" "example" "employee"
[33] "raw" "material" "supplier" "roll"
[37] "foundry" ""
[[1309]]
[1] "The" "hearing" "referee" "found"
[5] "Thomas" "religious" "beliefs" "specifically"
[9] "precluded" "producing" "directly" "aiding"
[13] "manufacture" "items" "used" "warfare"
[17] "He" "also" "found" "Thomas"
[21] "terminated" "employment" "religious" "convictions"
[25] "The" "referee" "reported" ""
[[1310]]
[1] "" "Claimant" "continually" "searched"
[5] "transfer" "another" "department" "armament"
[9] "related" "however" "materialize" "prior"
[13] "date" "leaving" "claimant" "requested"
[17] "layoff" "denied" "November" "claimant"
[21] "quit" "due" "religious" "convictions"
[25] ""
[[1311]]
[1] "The" "referee" "concluded" "nonetheless"
[5] "Thomas" "termination" "based" "upon"
[9] "good" "cause" "arising" "connection"
[13] "work" "required" "Indiana" "unemployment"
[17] "compensation" "statute" "Accordingly" "held"
[21] "entitled" "benefits" "The" "Review"
[25] "Board" "adopted" "referee" "s"
[29] "findings" "conclusions" "affirmed" "denial"
[33] "benefits" ""
[[1312]]
[1] "The" "Indiana" "Court" "Appeals"
[5] "accepting" "finding" "Thomas" "terminated"
[9] "employment" "due" "religious" "convictions"
[13] "reversed" "decision" "Review" "Board"
[17] "held" "applied" "improperly" "burdened"
[21] "Thomas" "right" "free" "exercise"
[25] "religion" "Accordingly" "ordered" "Board"
[29] "extend" "benefits" "Thomas" "Thomas"
[33] "v" "Review" "Board" "Ind"
[37] "App" "Ind" "Dec" "N"
[41] "E" "d" ""
[[1313]]
[1] "The" "Supreme" "Court" "Indiana"
[5] "dividing" "vacated" "decision" "Court"
[9] "Appeals" "denied" "Thomas" "benefits"
[13] "Ind" "N" "E" "d"
[17] "With" "reference" "Indiana" "unemployment"
[21] "compensation" "statute" "court" "said"
[25] ""
[[1314]]
[1] "" "It" "intended" "facilitate"
[5] "changing" "employment" "provide" "relief"
[9] "quit" "work" "voluntarily" "personal"
[13] "reasons" "Voluntary" "unemployment" "compensable"
[17] "purpose" "Act" "provide" "benefits"
[21] "persons" "unemployed" "fault" ""
[[1315]]
[1] "" "Good" "cause" "justifies"
[5] "voluntary" "termination" "must" "job"
[9] "related" "objective" "character" "Ind"
[13] "N" "E" "d" "footnotes"
[17] "omitted" ""
[[1316]]
[1] "The" "court" "held" "Thomas"
[5] "quit" "voluntarily" "personal" "reasons"
[9] "therefore" "qualify" "benefits" "Ind"
[13] "N" "E" "d" ""
[[1317]]
[1] "In" "discussing" "petitioner" "s"
[5] "free" "exercise" "claim" "court"
[9] "stated" "A" "personal" "philosophical"
[13] "choice" "rather" "religious" "choice"
[17] "rise" "level" "first" "amendment"
[21] "claim" "Ind" "N" "E"
[25] "d" "The" "court" "found"
[29] "basis" "precise" "nature" "Thomas"
[33] "belief" "unclear" "concluded" "belief"
[37] "personal" "philosophical" "choice" "religious"
[41] "belief" "Nonetheless" "held" "even"
[45] "assuming" "Thomas" "quit" "religious"
[49] "reasons" "entitled" "benefits" "Indiana"
[53] "law" "termination" "motivated" "religion"
[57] "good" "cause" "objectively" "related"
[61] "work" ""
[[1318]]
[1] "The" "Indiana" "court" "concluded"
[5] "denying" "Thomas" "benefits" "create"
[9] "indirect" "burden" "free" "exercise"
[13] "right" "burden" "justified" "legitimate"
[17] "state" "interest" "preserving" "integrity"
[21] "insurance" "fund" "maintaining" "stable"
[25] "work" "force" "encouraging" "workers"
[29] "leave" "jobs" "personal" "reasons"
[33] ""
[[1319]]
[1] "Finally" "court" "held" "awarding"
[5] "unemployment" "compensation" "benefits" "person"
[9] "terminates" "employment" "voluntarily" "religious"
[13] "reasons" "denying" "benefits" "persons"
[17] "terminate" "personal" "nonreligious" "reasons"
[21] "violate" "Establishment" "Clause" "First"
[25] "Amendment" ""
[[1320]]
[1] "" "The" "judgment" "review"
[5] "must" "examined" "light" "prior"
[9] "decisions" "particularly" "Sherbert" "v"
[13] "Verner" "U" "S" "S"
[17] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[21] ""
[[1321]]
[1] "II" ""
[[1322]]
[1] "" "Only" "beliefs"
[4] "rooted" "religion" "protected"
[7] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[10] "terms" "gives" "special"
[13] "protection" "exercise" "religion"
[16] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[19] "supra" "Wisconsin" "v"
[22] "Yoder" "U" "S"
[25] "S" "Ct" "L"
[28] "Ed" "d" "The"
[31] "determination" "religious" "belief"
[34] "practice" "often" "difficult"
[37] "delicate" "task" "division"
[40] "Indiana" "Supreme" "Court"
[43] "attests" "However" "resolution"
[46] "question" "turn" "upon"
[49] "judicial" "perception" "particular"
[52] "belief" "practice" "question"
[55] "religious" "beliefs" "need"
[58] "acceptable" "logical" "consistent"
[61] "comprehensible" "others" "order"
[64] "merit" "First" "Amendment"
[67] "protection" ""
[[1323]]
[1] "In" "support" "claim" "benefits" "Thomas"
[6] "testified" ""
[[1324]]
[1] "" "Q" "And" "comes" "actually"
[6] "producing" "tank" "hammering" "will" ""
[[1325]]
[1] "" "A" "That" "s" "right"
[6] "s" "right" "I" "m" "daily"
[11] "faced" "knowledge" "tanks" ""
[[1326]]
[1] "" ""
[[1327]]
[1] "" "A" "I"
[4] "really" "know" "conscientiously"
[7] "continue" "work" "armaments"
[10] "It" "religious" "principles"
[13] "I" "come" "learn"
[16] "Ind" "N" "E"
[19] "d" ""
[[1328]]
[1] "Based" "upon" "testimony" "referee"
[5] "held" "Thomas" "quit" "due"
[9] "religious" "convictions" "The" "Review"
[13] "Board" "adopted" "finding" "finding"
[17] "challenged" "Court" ""
[[1329]]
[1] "The" "Indiana" "Supreme" "Court"
[5] "apparently" "took" "different" "view"
[9] "record" "It" "concluded" "although"
[13] "claimant" "s" "reasons" "quitting"
[17] "described" "religious" "unclear" "belief"
[21] "religious" "basis" "belief" "In"
[25] "court" "s" "view" "Thomas"
[29] "made" "merely" "personal" "philosophical"
[33] "choice" "rather" "religious" "choice"
[37] ""
[[1330]]
[1] "" "In" "reaching" "conclusion"
[5] "Indiana" "court" "seems" "placed"
[9] "considerable" "reliance" "facts" "Thomas"
[13] "struggling" "beliefs" "able" "articulate"
[17] "belief" "precisely" "It" "noted"
[21] "example" "Thomas" "admitted" "referee"
[25] "object" ""
[[1331]]
[1] "" "working" "United" "States" "Steel"
[6] "Inland" "Steel" "produc" "ing" "raw"
[11] "product" "necessary" "production" "kind" "tank"
[16] "I" "direct" "party" "whoever" "shipped"
[21] "chargeable" "conscience" "Ind" "N" "E"
[26] "d" ""
[[1332]]
[1] "The" "court" "found" "position"
[5] "inconsistent" "Thomas" "stated" "opposition"
[9] "participation" "production" "armaments" "But"
[13] "Thomas" "statements" "reveal" "found"
[17] "work" "roll" "foundry" "sufficiently"
[21] "insulated" "producing" "weapons" "war"
[25] "We" "see" "therefore" "Thomas"
[29] "drew" "line" "us" "say"
[33] "line" "drew" "unreasonable" "one"
[37] "Courts" "undertake" "dissect" "religious"
[41] "beliefs" "believer" "admits" "struggling"
[45] "position" "beliefs" "articulated" "clarity"
[49] "precision" "sophisticated" "person" "might"
[53] "employ" ""
[[1333]]
[1] "The" "Indiana" "court"
[4] "also" "appears" "given"
[7] "significant" "weight" "fact"
[10] "another" "Jehovah" "s"
[13] "Witness" "scruples" "working"
[16] "tank" "turrets" "Witness"
[19] "least" "work" "scripturally"
[22] "acceptable" "Intrafaith" "differences"
[25] "kind" "uncommon" "among"
[28] "followers" "particular" "creed"
[31] "judicial" "process" "singularly"
[34] "ill" "equipped" "resolve"
[37] "differences" "relation" "Religion"
[40] "Clauses" "One" "can"
[43] "course" "imagine" "asserted"
[46] "claim" "bizarre" "clearly"
[49] "nonreligious" "motivation" "entitled"
[52] "protection" "Free" "Exercise"
[55] "Clause" "case" "guarantee"
[58] "free" "exercise" "limited"
[61] "beliefs" "shared" "members"
[64] "religious" "sect" "Particularly"
[67] "sensitive" "area" "within"
[70] "judicial" "function" "judicial"
[73] "competence" "inquire" "whether"
[76] "petitioner" "fellow" "worker"
[79] "correctly" "perceived" "commands"
[82] "common" "faith" "Courts"
[85] "arbiters" "scriptural" "interpretation"
[88] ""
[[1334]]
[1] "The" "narrow" "function" "reviewing"
[5] "court" "context" "determine" "whether"
[9] "appropriate" "finding" "petitioner" "terminated"
[13] "work" "honest" "conviction" "work"
[17] "forbidden" "religion" "Not" "surprisingly"
[21] "record" "referee" "Review" "Board"
[25] "made" "eye" "microscopic" "examination"
[29] "often" "exercised" "appellate" "judicial"
[33] "review" "However" "judicial" "review"
[37] "confined" "facts" "found" "conclusions"
[41] "drawn" "On" "record" "clear"
[45] "Thomas" "terminated" "employment" "religious"
[49] "reasons" ""
[[1335]]
[1] "III" ""
[[1336]]
[1] "A" ""
[[1337]]
[1] "" "More" "years" "ago"
[5] "Court" "held" "person" "may"
[9] "compelled" "choose" "exercise" "First"
[13] "Amendment" "right" "participation" "otherwise"
[17] "available" "public" "program" "A"
[21] "state" "may" ""
[[1338]]
[1] "" "exclude" "individual" "Catholics"
[5] "Lutherans" "Mohammedans" "Baptists" "Jews"
[9] "Methodists" "Non" "believers" "Presbyterians"
[13] "members" "faith" "faith" "lack"
[17] "receiving" "benefits" "public" "welfare"
[21] "legislation" "Everson" "v" "Board"
[25] "Education" "U" "S" "S"
[29] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "emphasis"
[33] "deleted" ""
[[1339]]
[1] "Later" "Sherbert" "Court" "examined"
[5] "South" "Carolina" "s" "attempt"
[9] "deny" "unemployment" "compensation" "benefits"
[13] "Sabbatarian" "declined" "work" "Saturday"
[17] "In" "sustaining" "right" "receive"
[21] "benefits" "Court" "held" ""
[[1340]]
[1] "" "The" "ruling" "disqualifying"
[5] "Mrs" "Sherbert" "benefits" "refusal"
[9] "work" "Saturday" "violation" "faith"
[13] "forces" "choose" "following" "precepts"
[17] "religion" "forfeiting" "benefits" "one"
[21] "hand" "abandoning" "one" "precepts"
[25] "religion" "order" "accept" "work"
[29] "hand" "Governmental" "imposition" "choice"
[33] "puts" "kind" "burden" "upon"
[37] "free" "exercise" "religion" "fine"
[41] "imposed" "Saturday" "worship" "U"
[45] "S" "S" "Ct" ""
[[1341]]
[1] "The" "respondent" "Review" "Board"
[5] "argues" "Indiana" "Supreme" "Court"
[9] "held" "burden" "upon" "religion"
[13] "indirect" "consequence" "public" "welfare"
[17] "legislation" "State" "clearly" "authority"
[21] "enact" "Neutral" "objective" "standards"
[25] "must" "met" "qualify" "compensation"
[29] "Ind" "N" "E" "d"
[33] "Indiana" "requires" "applicants" "unemployment"
[37] "compensation" "show" "left" "work"
[41] "good" "cause" "connection" "work"
[45] "Ibid" ""
[[1342]]
[1] "A" "similar" "argument"
[4] "made" "rejected" "Sherbert"
[7] "however" "It" "true"
[10] "Sherbert" "Indiana" "law"
[13] "compel" "violation" "conscience"
[16] "But" "beginning" "end"
[19] "inquiry" "U" "S"
[22] "S" "Ct" "In"
[25] "variety" "ways" "said"
[28] "regulation" "neutral" "face"
[31] "may" "application" "nonetheless"
[34] "offend" "constitutional" "requirement"
[37] "governmental" "neutrality" "unduly"
[40] "burdens" "free" "exercise"
[43] "religion" "Wisconsin" "v"
[46] "Yoder" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "Cf"
[52] "Walz" "v" "Tax"
[55] "Comm" "n" "U"
[58] "S" "S" "Ct"
[61] "L" "Ed" "d"
[64] ""
[[1343]]
[1] "" "Here" "Sherbert"
[4] "employee" "put" "choice"
[7] "fidelity" "religious" "belief"
[10] "cessation" "work" "coercive"
[13] "impact" "Thomas" "indistinguishable"
[16] "Sherbert" "Court" "held"
[19] ""
[[1344]]
[1] "" "N" "ot" "apparent"
[5] "appellant" "s" "declared" "ineligibility"
[9] "benefits" "derives" "solely" "practice"
[13] "religion" "pressure" "upon" "forego"
[17] "practice" "unmistakable" "U" "S"
[21] "S" "Ct" ""
[[1345]]
[1] "Where" "state" "conditions" "receipt"
[5] "important" "benefit" "upon" "conduct"
[9] "proscribed" "religious" "faith" "denies"
[13] "benefit" "conduct" "mandated" "religious"
[17] "belief" "thereby" "putting" "substantial"
[21] "pressure" "adherent" "modify" "behavior"
[25] "violate" "beliefs" "burden" "upon"
[29] "religion" "exists" "While" "compulsion"
[33] "may" "indirect" "infringement" "upon"
[37] "free" "exercise" "nonetheless" "substantial"
[41] ""
[[1346]]
[1] "The" "respondents" "also" "contend"
[5] "Sherbert" "inapposite" "case" "employee"
[9] "dismissed" "employer" "s" "action"
[13] "But" "see" "Mrs" "Sherbert"
[17] "dismissed" "refused" "work" "Saturdays"
[21] "plant" "went" "day" "workweek"
[25] "Had" "Thomas" "simply" "presented"
[29] "Blaw" "Knox" "plant" "turret"
[33] "line" "refused" "perform" "assigned"
[37] "work" "must" "assumed" "like"
[41] "Sherbert" "terminated" "employer" "s"
[45] "action" "work" "available" "In"
[49] "cases" "termination" "flowed" "fact"
[53] "employment" "acceptable" "became" "religiously"
[57] "objectionable" "changed" "conditions" ""
[[1347]]
[1] "B" ""
[[1348]]
[1] "" "The" "mere" "fact"
[5] "petitioner" "s" "religious" "practice"
[9] "burdened" "governmental" "program" "mean"
[13] "exemption" "accommodating" "practice" "must"
[17] "granted" "The" "state" "may"
[21] "justify" "inroad" "religious" "liberty"
[25] "showing" "least" "restrictive" "means"
[29] "achieving" "compelling" "state" "interest"
[33] "However" "still" "true" "t"
[37] "essence" "said" "written" "subject"
[41] "interests" "highest" "order" "can"
[45] "overbalance" "legitimate" "claims" "free"
[49] "exercise" "religion" "Wisconsin" "v"
[53] "Yoder" "supra" "U" "S"
[57] "S" "Ct" ""
[[1349]]
[1] "" "The" "purposes"
[4] "urged" "sustain" "disqualifying"
[7] "provision" "Indiana" "unemployment"
[10] "compensation" "scheme" "twofold"
[13] "avoid" "widespread" "unemployment"
[16] "consequent" "burden" "fund"
[19] "resulting" "people" "permitted"
[22] "leave" "jobs" "personal"
[25] "reasons" "avoid" "detailed"
[28] "probing" "employers" "job"
[31] "applicants" "religious" "beliefs"
[34] "These" "means" "unimportant"
[37] "considerations" "When" "focus"
[40] "inquiry" "properly" "narrowed"
[43] "however" "must" "conclude"
[46] "interests" "advanced" "State"
[49] "justify" "burden" "placed"
[52] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[55] ""
[[1350]]
[1] "There" "evidence" "record" "indicate"
[5] "number" "people" "find" "predicament"
[9] "choosing" "benefits" "religious" "beliefs"
[13] "large" "enough" "create" "widespread"
[17] "unemployment" "even" "seriously" "affect"
[21] "unemployment" "claim" "advanced" "Review"
[25] "Board" "Similarly" "although" "detailed"
[29] "inquiry" "employers" "applicants" "religious"
[33] "beliefs" "undesirable" "evidence" "record"
[37] "indicate" "inquiries" "will" "occur"
[41] "Indiana" "occurred" "states" "extend"
[45] "benefits" "people" "petitioner" "s"
[49] "position" "Nor" "reason" "believe"
[53] "number" "people" "terminating" "employment"
[57] "religious" "reasons" "will" "great"
[61] "motivate" "employers" "make" "inquiries"
[65] ""
[[1351]]
[1] "Neither" "interests" "advanced" "sufficiently"
[5] "compelling" "justify" "burden" "upon"
[9] "Thomas" "religious" "liberty" "Accordingly"
[13] "Thomas" "entitled" "receive" "benefits"
[17] "unless" "respondents" "contend" "Indiana"
[21] "court" "held" "payment" "violate"
[25] "Establishment" "Clause" ""
[[1352]]
[1] "" "IV" ""
[[1353]]
[1] "" "The" "respondents" "contend"
[5] "compel" "benefit" "payments" "Thomas"
[9] "involves" "State" "fostering" "religious"
[13] "faith" "There" "sense" "benefit"
[17] "Thomas" "deriving" "religious" "beliefs"
[21] "manifests" "tension" "two" "Religious"
[25] "Clauses" "Court" "resolved" "Sherbert"
[29] ""
[[1354]]
[1] "" "In" "holding" "plainly"
[5] "fostering" "establishment" "Seventh" "day"
[9] "Adventist" "religion" "South" "Carolina"
[13] "extension" "unemployment" "benefits" "Sabbatarians"
[17] "common" "Sunday" "worshippers" "reflects"
[21] "nothing" "governmental" "obligation" "neutrality"
[25] "face" "religious" "differences" "represent"
[29] "involvement" "religious" "secular" "institutions"
[33] "object" "Establishment" "Clause" "forestall"
[37] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner" "U"
[41] "S" "S" "Ct" ""
[[1355]]
[1] "See" "also" "Wisconsin" "v" "Yoder"
[6] "U" "S" "S" "Ct" "Walz"
[11] "v" "Tax" "Comm" "n" "U"
[16] "S" "S" "Ct" "O" "Hair"
[21] "v" "Andrus" "U" "S" "App"
[26] "D" "C" "F" "d" "Leventhal"
[31] "J" ""
[[1356]]
[1] "" "Unless" "prepared" "overrule"
[5] "Sherbert" "supra" "Thomas" "denied"
[9] "benefits" "due" "basis" "findings"
[13] "referee" "Review" "Board" "Indiana"
[17] "Court" "Appeals" "terminated" "employment"
[21] "religious" "convictions" ""
[[1357]]
[1] "Reversed" "Mr" "Justice" "BLACK" "delivered"
[6] "opinion" "Court" ""
[[1358]]
[1] "Article" "Declaration" "Rights" "Maryland"
[5] "Constitution" "provides" ""
[[1359]]
[1] "" "N" "o" "religious"
[5] "test" "ever" "required" "qualification"
[9] "office" "profit" "trust" "State"
[13] "declaration" "belief" "existence" "God"
[17] ""
[[1360]]
[1] "The" "appellant" "Torcaso"
[4] "appointed" "office" "Notary"
[7] "Public" "Governor" "Maryland"
[10] "refused" "commission" "serve"
[13] "declare" "belief" "God"
[16] "He" "brought" "action"
[19] "Maryland" "Circuit" "Court"
[22] "compel" "issuance" "commission"
[25] "charging" "State" "s"
[28] "requirement" "declare" "belief"
[31] "violated" "First" "Fourteenth"
[34] "Amendments" "Constitution" "United"
[37] "States" "The" "Circuit"
[40] "Court" "rejected" "federal"
[43] "constitutional" "contentions" "highest"
[46] "court" "State" "Court"
[49] "Appeals" "affirmed" "holding"
[52] "state" "constitutional" "provision"
[55] "self" "executing" "requires"
[58] "declaration" "belief" "God"
[61] "qualification" "office" "without"
[64] "need" "implementing" "legislation"
[67] "The" "case" "therefore"
[70] "properly" "appeal" "U"
[73] "S" "C" "s"
[76] "U" "S" "C"
[79] "A" "s" ""
[[1361]]
[1] "There" "can" "dispute" "purpose"
[5] "effect" "Maryland" "Declaration" "Rights"
[9] "requirement" "us" "sets" "religious"
[13] "test" "designed" "valid" "bar"
[17] "every" "person" "refuses" "declare"
[21] "belief" "God" "holding" "public"
[25] "office" "profit" "trust" "Maryland"
[29] "The" "power" "authority" "State"
[33] "Maryland" "thus" "put" "side"
[37] "one" "particular" "sort" "believers"
[41] "willing" "say" "believe" "existence"
[45] "God" "It" "true" "much"
[49] "historical" "precedent" "laws" "Indeed"
[53] "largely" "escape" "religious" "test"
[57] "oaths" "declarations" "great" "many"
[61] "early" "colonists" "left" "Europe"
[65] "came" "hoping" "worship" "way"
[69] "It" "soon" "developed" "however"
[73] "many" "fled" "escape" "religious"
[77] "test" "oaths" "turned" "perfectly"
[81] "willing" "power" "force" "dissenters"
[85] "faith" "take" "test" "oaths"
[89] "conformity" "faith" "This" "brought"
[93] "host" "laws" "New" "Colonies"
[97] "imposing" "burdens" "disabilities" "various"
[101] "kinds" "upon" "varied" "beliefs"
[105] "depending" "largely" "upon" "group"
[109] "happened" "politically" "strong" "enough"
[113] "legislate" "favor" "beliefs" "The"
[117] "effect" "formal" "practical" "establishment"
[121] "particular" "religious" "faiths" "Colonies"
[125] "consequent" "burdens" "imposed" "free"
[129] "exercise" "faiths" "nonfavored" "believers"
[133] ""
[[1362]]
[1] "There" "however" "wise" "farseeing"
[5] "men" "Colonies" "many" "mention"
[9] "spoke" "test" "oaths" "philosophy"
[13] "intolerance" "behind" "One" "happens"
[17] "George" "Calvert" "first" "Lord"
[21] "Baltimore" "took" "important" "part"
[25] "original" "establishment" "Colony" "Maryland"
[29] "He" "Catholic" "reason" "felt"
[33] "compelled" "conscience" "refuse" "take"
[37] "Oath" "Supremacy" "England" "cost"
[41] "resigning" "high" "governmental" "office"
[45] "He" "refused" "take" "oath"
[49] "demanded" "Council" "Colony" "Virginia"
[53] "result" "denied" "settlement" "Colony"
[57] "A" "recent" "historian" "early"
[61] "period" "Maryland" "s" "life"
[65] "said" "Calvert" "s" "hope"
[69] "purpose" "establish" "Maryland" "colonial"
[73] "government" "free" "religious" "persecutions"
[77] "known" "one" "securely" "beyond"
[81] "reach" "oaths" ""
[[1363]]
[1] "When" "Constitution" "adopted"
[4] "desire" "put" "people"
[7] "securely" "beyond" "reach"
[10] "religious" "test" "oaths"
[13] "brought" "inclusion" "Article"
[16] "VI" "document" "provision"
[19] "religious" "Test" "shall"
[22] "ever" "required" "Qualification"
[25] "Office" "public" "Trust"
[28] "United" "States" "Article"
[31] "VI" "supports" "accuracy"
[34] "observation" "Girouard" "v"
[37] "United" "States" "U"
[40] "S" "S" "Ct"
[43] "L" "Ed" "t"
[46] "test" "oath" "abhorrent"
[49] "tradition" "Not" "satisfied"
[52] "however" "Article" "VI"
[55] "guarantees" "original" "Constituion"
[58] "First" "Congress" "proposed"
[61] "States" "shortly" "thereafter"
[64] "adopted" "Bill" "Rights"
[67] "including" "First" "Amendment"
[70] "That" "Amendment" "broke"
[73] "new" "constitutional" "ground"
[76] "protection" "sought" "afford"
[79] "freedom" "religion" "speech"
[82] "press" "petition" "assembly"
[85] "Since" "prior" "cases"
[88] "Court" "thoroughly" "explored"
[91] "documented" "history" "behind"
[94] "First" "Amendment" "reasons"
[97] "scope" "religious" "freedom"
[100] "protects" "need" "cover"
[103] "ground" "What" "said"
[106] "prior" "cases" "think"
[109] "controls" "decision" ""
[[1364]]
[1] "In" "Cantwell" "v" "State"
[5] "Connecticut" "U" "S" "S"
[9] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "said"
[13] ""
[[1365]]
[1] "" "The" "First" "Amendment"
[5] "declares" "Congress" "shall" "make"
[9] "law" "respecting" "establishment" "religion"
[13] "prohibiting" "free" "exercise" "thereof"
[17] "The" "Fourteenth" "Amendment" "rendered"
[21] "legislatures" "states" "incompetent" "Congress"
[25] "enact" "laws" "Thus" "Amendment"
[29] "embraces" "two" "concepts" "freedom"
[33] "believe" "freedom" "act" "The"
[37] "first" "absolute" "nature" "things"
[41] "second" ""
[[1366]]
[1] "Later" "decided" "Everson" "v" "Board"
[6] "Education" "U" "S" "pages" "S"
[11] "Ct" "page" "said" ""
[[1367]]
[1] "" "The" "establishment" "religion"
[5] "clause" "First" "Amendment" "means"
[9] "least" "Neither" "state" "Federal"
[13] "Government" "can" "set" "church"
[17] "Neither" "can" "pass" "laws"
[21] "aid" "one" "religion" "aid"
[25] "religions" "prefer" "one" "religion"
[29] "another" "Neither" "can" "force"
[33] "influence" "person" "go" "remain"
[37] "away" "church" "will" "force"
[41] "profess" "belief" "disbelief" "religion"
[45] "No" "person" "can" "punished"
[49] "entertaining" "professing" "religious" "beliefs"
[53] "disbeliefs" "church" "attendance" "non"
[57] "attendance" "No" "tax" "amount"
[61] "large" "small" "can" "levied"
[65] "support" "religious" "activities" "institutions"
[69] "whatever" "may" "called" "whatever"
[73] "form" "may" "adopt" "teach"
[77] "practice" "religion" "Neither" "state"
[81] "Federal" "Government" "can" "openly"
[85] "secretly" "participate" "affairs" "religious"
[89] "organizations" "groups" "vice" "versa"
[93] "In" "words" "Jefferson" "clause"
[97] "establishment" "religion" "law" "intended"
[101] "erect" "wall" "separation" "church"
[105] "State" ""
[[1368]]
[1] "While" "strong" "dissents"
[4] "Everson" "case" "challenge"
[7] "Court" "s" "interpretation"
[10] "First" "Amendment" "s"
[13] "coverage" "broad" "thought"
[16] "Court" "applying" "interpretation"
[19] "narrowly" "facts" "case"
[22] "Not" "long" "afterward"
[25] "Illinois" "ex" "rel"
[28] "McCollum" "v" "Board"
[31] "Education" "U" "S"
[34] "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "urged" "repudiate"
[40] "dicta" "quoted" "Everson"
[43] "interpretation" "scope" "First"
[46] "Amendment" "s" "coverage"
[49] "We" "declined" "instead"
[52] "strongly" "reaffirmed" "said"
[55] "Everson" "calling" "attention"
[58] "fact" "majority" "minority"
[61] "Everson" "agreed" "principles"
[64] "declared" "part" "Everson"
[67] "opinion" "And" "concurring"
[70] "opinion" "McCollum" "written"
[73] "Mr" "Justice" "Frankfurter"
[76] "joined" "Everson" "dissenters"
[79] "said" ""
[[1369]]
[1] "" "We" "agreed" "First"
[5] "Fourteenth" "Amendments" "secular" "reach"
[9] "far" "penetrating" "conduct" "Government"
[13] "merely" "forbid" "established" "church"
[17] "We" "renew" "conviction" "staked"
[21] "existence" "country" "faith" "complete"
[25] "separation" "state" "religion" "best"
[29] "state" "best" "religion" ""
[[1370]]
[1] "The" "Maryland" "Court"
[4] "Appeals" "thought" "argued"
[7] "Court" "s" "later"
[10] "holding" "opinion" "Zorach"
[13] "v" "Clauson" "U"
[16] "S" "S" "Ct"
[19] "L" "Ed" "part"
[22] "repudiated" "statement" "Everson"
[25] "opinion" "quoted" "previously"
[28] "reaffirmed" "McCollum" "But"
[31] "Court" "s" "opinion"
[34] "Zorach" "specifically" "stated"
[37] "We" "follow" "McCollum"
[40] "case" "U" "S"
[43] "page" "S" "Ct"
[46] "page" "Nothing" "decided"
[49] "written" "Zorach" "lends"
[52] "support" "idea" "Court"
[55] "intended" "open" "way"
[58] "government" "state" "federal"
[61] "restore" "historically" "constitutionally"
[64] "discredited" "policy" "probing"
[67] "religious" "beliefs" "test"
[70] "oaths" "limiting" "public"
[73] "offices" "persons" "perhaps"
[76] "properly" "profess" "belief"
[79] "particular" "kind" "religious"
[82] "concept" ""
[[1371]]
[1] "" "We" "repeat"
[4] "reaffirm" "neither" "State"
[7] "Federal" "Government" "can"
[10] "constitutionally" "force" "person"
[13] "profess" "belief" "disbelief"
[16] "religion" "Neither" "can"
[19] "constitutionally" "pass" "laws"
[22] "impose" "requirements" "aid"
[25] "religions" "non" "believers"
[28] "neither" "can" "aid"
[31] "religions" "based" "belief"
[34] "existence" "God" "religions"
[37] "founded" "different" "beliefs"
[40] ""
[[1372]]
[1] "" "In" "upholding" "State" "s"
[6] "religious" "test" "public" "office" "highest"
[11] "court" "Maryland" "said" "Md" "A"
[16] "d" ""
[[1373]]
[1] "" "The" "petitioner" "compelled"
[5] "believe" "disbelieve" "threat" "punishment"
[9] "compulsion" "True" "unless" "makes"
[13] "declaration" "belief" "hold" "public"
[17] "office" "Maryland" "compelled" "hold"
[21] "office" ""
[[1374]]
[1] "The" "fact" "however" "person"
[5] "compelled" "hold" "public" "office"
[9] "possibly" "excuse" "barring" "office"
[13] "state" "imposed" "criteria" "forbidden"
[17] "Constitution" "This" "settled" "holding"
[21] "Wieman" "v" "Updegraff" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[29] "Ed" "We" "pointed" "whether"
[33] "abstract" "right" "public" "employment"
[37] "exists" "Congress" "pass" "law"
[41] "providing" "federal" "employee" "shall"
[45] "attend" "Mass" "take" "active"
[49] "part" "missionary" "work" ""
[[1375]]
[1] "" "This" "Maryland"
[4] "religious" "test" "public"
[7] "office" "unconstitutionally" "invades"
[10] "appellant" "s" "freedom"
[13] "belief" "religion" "therefore"
[16] "enforced" ""
[[1376]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "Court" "Appeals"
[5] "Maryland" "accordingly" "reversed" "cause"
[9] "remanded" "proceedings" "inconsistent" "opinion"
[13] ""
[[1377]]
[1] "Reversed" "remanded" ""
[[1378]]
[1] "Chief" "Justice" "ROBERTS" "delivered" "opinion"
[6] "Court" "except" "footnote" ""
[[1379]]
[1] "The" "Missouri" "Department" "Natural"
[5] "Resources" "offers" "state" "grants"
[9] "help" "public" "private" "schools"
[13] "nonprofit" "daycare" "centers" "nonprofit"
[17] "entities" "purchase" "rubber" "playground"
[21] "surfaces" "made" "recycled" "tires"
[25] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "Church" "applied"
[29] "grant" "preschool" "daycare" "center"
[33] "received" "one" "fact" "Trinity"
[37] "Lutheran" "church" "The" "Department"
[41] "policy" "categorically" "disqualifying" "churches"
[45] "religious" "organizations" "receiving" "grants"
[49] "playground" "resurfacing" "program" "The"
[53] "question" "presented" "whether" "Department"
[57] "s" "policy" "violated" "rights"
[61] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "Free" "Exercise"
[65] "Clause" "First" "Amendment" ""
[[1380]]
[1] "I" ""
[[1381]]
[1] "A" ""
[[1382]]
[1] "The" "Trinity" "Lutheran" "Church"
[5] "Child" "Learning" "Center" "preschool"
[9] "daycare" "center" "open" "throughout"
[13] "year" "serve" "working" "families"
[17] "Boone" "County" "Missouri" "surrounding"
[21] "area" "Established" "nonprofit" "organization"
[25] "Center" "merged" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[29] "Church" "operates" "auspices" "church"
[33] "property" "The" "Center" "admits"
[37] "students" "religion" "enrollment" "stands"
[41] "children" "ranging" "age" "two"
[45] "five" ""
[[1383]]
[1] "The" "Center" "includes" "playground"
[5] "equipped" "basic" "playground" "essentials"
[9] "slides" "swings" "jungle" "gyms"
[13] "monkey" "bars" "sandboxes" "Almost"
[17] "entire" "surface" "beneath" "surrounding"
[21] "play" "equipment" "coarse" "pea"
[25] "gravel" "Youngsters" "course" "often"
[29] "fall" "playground" "tumble" "equipment"
[33] "And" "gravel" "can" "unforgiving"
[37] ""
[[1384]]
[1] "In" "Center" "sought" "replace"
[5] "large" "portion" "pea" "gravel"
[9] "pour" "place" "rubber" "surface"
[13] "participating" "Missouri" "s" "Scrap"
[17] "Tire" "Program" "Run" "State"
[21] "s" "Department" "Natural" "Resources"
[25] "reduce" "number" "used" "tires"
[29] "destined" "landfills" "dump" "sites"
[33] "program" "offers" "reimbursement" "grants"
[37] "qualifying" "nonprofit" "organizations" "purchase"
[41] "playground" "surfaces" "made" "recycled"
[45] "tires" "It" "funded" "fee"
[49] "imposed" "sale" "new" "tires"
[53] "State" ""
[[1385]]
[1] "Due" "limited" "resources" "Department"
[5] "offer" "grants" "applicants" "awards"
[9] "competitive" "basis" "scoring" "highest"
[13] "based" "several" "criteria" "poverty"
[17] "level" "population" "surrounding" "area"
[21] "applicant" "s" "plan" "promote"
[25] "recycling" "When" "Center" "applied"
[29] "Department" "strict" "express" "policy"
[33] "denying" "grants" "applicant" "owned"
[37] "controlled" "church" "sect" "religious"
[41] "entity" "That" "policy" "Department"
[45] "s" "view" "compelled" "Article"
[49] "I" "Section" "Missouri" "Constitution"
[53] "provides" ""
[[1386]]
[1] "" "That" "money"
[4] "shall" "ever" "taken"
[7] "public" "treasury" "directly"
[10] "indirectly" "aid" "church"
[13] "sect" "denomination" "religion"
[16] "aid" "priest" "preacher"
[19] "minister" "teacher" "thereof"
[22] "preference" "shall" "given"
[25] "discrimination" "made" "church"
[28] "sect" "creed" "religion"
[31] "form" "religious" "faith"
[34] "worship" ""
[[1387]]
[1] "In" "application" "Center" "disclosed"
[5] "status" "ministry" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[9] "Church" "specified" "Center" "s"
[13] "mission" "provide" "safe" "clean"
[17] "attractive" "school" "facility" "conjunction"
[21] "educational" "program" "structured" "allow"
[25] "child" "grow" "spiritually" "physically"
[29] "socially" "cognitively" "App" "Pet"
[33] "Cert" "After" "describing" "playground"
[37] "safety" "hazards" "posed" "current"
[41] "surface" "Center" "detailed" "anticipated"
[45] "benefits" "proposed" "project" "increasing"
[49] "access" "playground" "children" "including"
[53] "disabilities" "providing" "surface" "compliant"
[57] "Americans" "Disabilities" "Act" "providing"
[61] "safe" "long" "lasting" "resilient"
[65] "surface" "play" "areas" "improving"
[69] "Missouri" "s" "environment" "putting"
[73] "recycled" "tires" "positive" "use"
[77] "The" "Center" "also" "noted"
[81] "benefits" "new" "surface" "extend"
[85] "beyond" "students" "local" "community"
[89] "whose" "children" "often" "use"
[93] "playground" "non" "school" "hours"
[97] ""
[[1388]]
[1] "The" "Center" "ranked" "fifth"
[5] "among" "applicants" "Scrap" "Tire"
[9] "Program" "But" "despite" "high"
[13] "score" "Center" "deemed" "categorically"
[17] "ineligible" "receive" "grant" "In"
[21] "letter" "rejecting" "Center" "s"
[25] "application" "program" "director" "explained"
[29] "Article" "I" "Section" "Missouri"
[33] "Constitution" "Department" "provide" "financial"
[37] "assistance" "directly" "church" ""
[[1389]]
[1] "The" "Department" "ultimately" "awarded" "grants"
[6] "part" "program" "Because" "Center" "operated"
[11] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "Church" "receive" "grant"
[16] ""
[[1390]]
[1] "B" ""
[[1391]]
[1] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "sued"
[4] "Director" "Department" "Federal"
[7] "District" "Court" "The"
[10] "Church" "alleged" "Department"
[13] "s" "failure" "approve"
[16] "Center" "s" "application"
[19] "pursuant" "policy" "denying"
[22] "grants" "religiously" "affiliated"
[25] "applicants" "violates" "Free"
[28] "Exercise" "Clause" "First"
[31] "Amendment" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[34] "sought" "declaratory" "injunctive"
[37] "relief" "prohibiting" "Department"
[40] "discriminating" "Church" "basis"
[43] "future" "grant" "applications"
[46] ""
[[1392]]
[1] "The" "District" "Court"
[4] "granted" "Department" "s"
[7] "motion" "dismiss" "The"
[10] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[13] "District" "Court" "stated"
[16] "prohibits" "government" "outlawing"
[19] "restricting" "exercise" "religious"
[22] "practice" "generally" "prohibit"
[25] "withholding" "affirmative" "benefit"
[28] "account" "religion" "The"
[31] "District" "Court" "likened"
[34] "Department" "s" "denial"
[37] "scrap" "tire" "grant"
[40] "situation" "Court" "encountered"
[43] "Locke" "v" "Davey"
[46] "U" "S" "S"
[49] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[52] "d" "In" "case"
[55] "upheld" "free" "exercise"
[58] "challenge" "State" "Washington"
[61] "s" "decision" "fund"
[64] "degrees" "devotional" "theology"
[67] "part" "state" "scholarship"
[70] "program" "Finding" "present"
[73] "case" "nearly" "indistinguishable"
[76] "Locke" "District" "Court"
[79] "held" "Free" "Exercise"
[82] "Clause" "require" "State"
[85] "make" "funds" "available"
[88] "Scrap" "Tire" "Program"
[91] "religious" "institutions" "like"
[94] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "Trinity"
[97] "Lutheran" "Church" "Columbia"
[100] "Inc" "v" "Pauley"
[103] "F" "Supp" "d"
[106] "W" "D" "Mo"
[109] ""
[[1393]]
[1] "The" "Court" "Appeals"
[4] "Eighth" "Circuit" "affirmed"
[7] "The" "court" "recognized"
[10] "rather" "clear" "Missouri"
[13] "award" "scrap" "tire"
[16] "grant" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[19] "without" "running" "afoul"
[22] "Establishment" "Clause" "United"
[25] "States" "Constitution" "Trinity"
[28] "Lutheran" "Church" "Columbia"
[31] "Inc" "v" "Pauley"
[34] "F" "d" "But"
[37] "Court" "Appeals" "explained"
[40] "mean" "Free" "Exercise"
[43] "Clause" "compelled" "State"
[46] "disregard" "antiestablishment" "principle"
[49] "reflected" "Constitution" "Viewing"
[52] "monetary" "grant" "religious"
[55] "institution" "hallmark" "established"
[58] "religion" "court" "concluded"
[61] "State" "rely" "applicant"
[64] "s" "religious" "status"
[67] "deny" "application" "Id"
[70] "quoting" "Locke" "U"
[73] "S" "S" "Ct"
[76] "internal" "quotation" "marks"
[79] "omitted" ""
[[1394]]
[1] "Judge" "Gruender" "dissented" "He"
[5] "distinguished" "Locke" "ground" "concerned"
[9] "narrow" "issue" "funding" "religious"
[13] "training" "clergy" "leave" "states"
[17] "unfettered" "discretion" "exclude" "religious"
[21] "generally" "available" "public" "benefits"
[25] "F" "d" "opinion" "concurring"
[29] "part" "dissenting" "part" ""
[[1395]]
[1] "Rehearing" "en" "banc" "denied" "equally"
[6] "divided" "court" ""
[[1396]]
[1] "" "We" "granted" "certiorari" "sub"
[6] "nom" "Trinity" "Lutheran" "Church" "Columbia"
[11] "Inc" "v" "Pauley" "U" "S"
[16] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[21] "now" "reverse" ""
[[1397]]
[1] "II" ""
[[1398]]
[1] "" "The" "First" "Amendment"
[5] "provides" "part" "Congress" "shall"
[9] "make" "law" "respecting" "establishment"
[13] "religion" "prohibiting" "free" "exercise"
[17] "thereof" "The" "parties" "agree"
[21] "Establishment" "Clause" "Amendment" "prevent"
[25] "Missouri" "including" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[29] "Scrap" "Tire" "Program" "That"
[33] "however" "answer" "question" "Free"
[37] "Exercise" "Clause" "recognized" "play"
[41] "joints" "Establishment" "Clause" "permits"
[45] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "compels"
[49] "Locke" "U" "S" "S"
[53] "Ct" "internal" "quotation" "marks"
[57] "omitted" ""
[[1399]]
[1] "" "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[5] "Clause" "protect" "s" "religious"
[9] "observers" "unequal" "treatment" "subjects"
[13] "strictest" "scrutiny" "laws" "target"
[17] "religious" "special" "disabilities" "based"
[21] "religious" "status" "Church" "Lukumi"
[25] "Babalu" "Aye" "Inc" "v"
[29] "Hialeah" "U" "S" "S"
[33] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[37] "internal" "quotation" "marks" "omitted"
[41] "Applying" "basic" "principle" "Court"
[45] "repeatedly" "confirmed" "denying" "generally"
[49] "available" "benefit" "solely" "account"
[53] "religious" "identity" "imposes" "penalty"
[57] "free" "exercise" "religion" "can"
[61] "justified" "state" "interest" "highest"
[65] "order" "McDaniel" "v" "Paty"
[69] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[73] "L" "Ed" "d" "plurality"
[77] "opinion" "quoting" "Wisconsin" "v"
[81] "Yoder" "U" "S" "S"
[85] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[89] ""
[[1400]]
[1] "In" "Everson" "v"
[4] "Board" "Education" "Ewing"
[7] "U" "S" "S"
[10] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[13] "example" "upheld" "Establishment"
[16] "Clause" "challenge" "New"
[19] "Jersey" "law" "enabling"
[22] "local" "school" "district"
[25] "reimburse" "parents" "public"
[28] "transportation" "costs" "sending"
[31] "children" "public" "private"
[34] "schools" "including" "parochial"
[37] "schools" "In" "course"
[40] "ruling" "Establishment" "Clause"
[43] "allowed" "New" "Jersey"
[46] "extend" "public" "benefit"
[49] "citizens" "regardless" "religious"
[52] "belief" "explained" "State"
[55] "hamper" "citizens" "free"
[58] "exercise" "religion" "Consequently"
[61] "exclude" "individual" "Catholics"
[64] "Lutherans" "Mohammedans" "Baptists"
[67] "Jews" "Methodists" "Non"
[70] "believers" "Presbyterians" "members"
[73] "faith" "faith" "lack"
[76] "receiving" "benefits" "public"
[79] "welfare" "legislation" "Id"
[82] "S" "Ct" ""
[[1401]]
[1] "Three" "decades" "later"
[4] "McDaniel" "v" "Paty"
[7] "Court" "struck" "Free"
[10] "Exercise" "Clause" "Tennessee"
[13] "statute" "disqualifying" "ministers"
[16] "serving" "delegates" "State"
[19] "s" "constitutional" "convention"
[22] "Writing" "plurality" "Chief"
[25] "Justice" "Burger" "acknowledged"
[28] "Tennessee" "disqualified" "ministers"
[31] "serving" "legislators" "since"
[34] "adoption" "first" "Constitution"
[37] "number" "early" "States"
[40] "also" "disqualified" "ministers"
[43] "legislative" "office" "This"
[46] "historical" "tradition" "however"
[49] "change" "fact" "statute"
[52] "discriminated" "McDaniel" "denying"
[55] "benefit" "solely" "status"
[58] "minister" "U" "S"
[61] "S" "Ct" "McDaniel"
[64] "seek" "participate" "convention"
[67] "also" "maintaining" "role"
[70] "minister" "pursue" "one"
[73] "give" "In" "way"
[76] "said" "Chief" "Justice"
[79] "Burger" "Tennessee" "law"
[82] "effectively" "penalizes" "free"
[85] "exercise" "McDaniel" "s"
[88] "constitutional" "liberties" "Id"
[91] "S" "Ct" "quoting"
[94] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[97] "U" "S" "S"
[100] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[103] "d" "internal" "quotation"
[106] "marks" "omitted" "Joined"
[109] "Justice" "Marshall" "concurrence"
[112] "Justice" "Brennan" "added"
[115] "challenged" "provision" "requires"
[118] "McDaniel" "purchase" "right"
[121] "engage" "ministry" "sacrificing"
[124] "candidacy" "impairs" "free"
[127] "exercise" "religion" "McDaniel"
[130] "U" "S" "S"
[133] "Ct" ""
[[1402]]
[1] "In" "recent" "years" "Court"
[5] "rejected" "free" "exercise" "challenges"
[9] "laws" "question" "neutral" "generally"
[13] "applicable" "without" "regard" "religion"
[17] "We" "careful" "distinguish" "laws"
[21] "single" "religious" "disfavored" "treatment"
[25] ""
[[1403]]
[1] "For" "example" "Lyng" "v"
[5] "Northwest" "Indian" "Cemetery" "Protective"
[9] "Association" "U" "S" "S"
[13] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[17] "held" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[21] "prohibit" "Government" "timber" "harvesting"
[25] "road" "construction" "particular" "tract"
[29] "federal" "land" "even" "though"
[33] "Government" "s" "action" "obstruct"
[37] "religious" "practice" "several" "Native"
[41] "American" "Tribes" "held" "certain"
[45] "sites" "tract" "sacred" "Accepting"
[49] "t" "building" "road" "harvesting"
[53] "timber" "interfere" "significantly" "private"
[57] "persons" "ability" "pursue" "spiritual"
[61] "fulfillment" "according" "religious" "beliefs"
[65] "nonetheless" "found" "free" "exercise"
[69] "violation" "affected" "individuals" "coerced"
[73] "Government" "s" "action" "violating"
[77] "religious" "beliefs" "Id" "S"
[81] "Ct" "The" "Court" "specifically"
[85] "noted" "however" "Government" "action"
[89] "penalize" "religious" "activity" "denying"
[93] "person" "equal" "share" "rights"
[97] "benefits" "privileges" "enjoyed" "citizens"
[101] "Ibid" ""
[[1404]]
[1] "" "In" "Employment" "Division"
[5] "Department" "Human" "Resources" "Oregon"
[9] "v" "Smith" "U" "S"
[13] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[17] "d" "rejected" "free" "exercise"
[21] "claim" "brought" "two" "members"
[25] "Native" "American" "church" "denied"
[29] "unemployment" "benefits" "violated" "Oregon"
[33] "s" "drug" "laws" "ingesting"
[37] "peyote" "sacramental" "purposes" "Along"
[41] "lines" "decision" "Lyng" "held"
[45] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "entitle"
[49] "church" "members" "special" "dispensation"
[53] "general" "criminal" "laws" "account"
[57] "religion" "At" "time" "made"
[61] "clear" "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[65] "guard" "government" "s" "imposition"
[69] "special" "disabilities" "basis" "religious"
[73] "views" "religious" "status" "U"
[77] "S" "S" "Ct" "citing"
[81] "McDaniel" "U" "S" "S"
[85] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[89] ""
[[1405]]
[1] "Finally" "Church" "Lukumi"
[4] "Babalu" "Aye" "Inc"
[7] "v" "Hialeah" "struck"
[10] "three" "facially" "neutral"
[13] "city" "ordinances" "outlawed"
[16] "certain" "forms" "animal"
[19] "slaughter" "Members" "Santeria"
[22] "religion" "challenged" "ordinances"
[25] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[28] "alleging" "despite" "facial"
[31] "neutrality" "ordinances" "discriminatory"
[34] "purpose" "easy" "ferret"
[37] "prohibiting" "sacrificial" "rituals"
[40] "integral" "Santeria" "distasteful"
[43] "local" "residents" "We"
[46] "agreed" "Before" "explaining"
[49] "challenged" "ordinances" "fact"
[52] "neutral" "generally" "applicable"
[55] "Court" "recounted" "fundamentals"
[58] "free" "exercise" "jurisprudence"
[61] "A" "law" "said"
[64] "may" "discriminate" "religious"
[67] "beliefs" "U" "S"
[70] "S" "Ct" "Nor"
[73] "may" "law" "regulate"
[76] "outlaw" "conduct" "religiously"
[79] "motivated" "And" "citing"
[82] "McDaniel" "Smith" "restated"
[85] "now" "familiar" "refrain"
[88] "The" "Free" "Exercise"
[91] "Clause" "protects" "laws"
[94] "impose" "special" "disabilities"
[97] "basis" "religious" "status"
[100] "U" "S" "S"
[103] "Ct" "quoting" "Smith"
[106] "U" "S" "S"
[109] "Ct" "see" "also"
[112] "Mitchell" "v" "Helms"
[115] "U" "S" "S"
[118] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[121] "d" "plurality" "opinion"
[124] "noting" "decisions" "prohibited"
[127] "governments" "discriminating" "distribution"
[130] "public" "benefits" "based"
[133] "upon" "religious" "status"
[136] "sincerity" "citing" "Rosenberger"
[139] "v" "Rector" "Visitors"
[142] "Univ" "Va" "U"
[145] "S" "S" "Ct"
[148] "L" "Ed" "d"
[151] "Lamb" "s" "Chapel"
[154] "v" "Center" "Moriches"
[157] "Union" "Free" "School"
[160] "Dist" "U" "S"
[163] "S" "Ct" "L"
[166] "Ed" "d" "Widmar"
[169] "v" "Vincent" "U"
[172] "S" "S" "Ct"
[175] "L" "Ed" "d"
[178] ""
[[1406]]
[1] "III" ""
[[1407]]
[1] "A" ""
[[1408]]
[1] "" "The" "Department" "s"
[5] "policy" "expressly" "discriminates" "otherwise"
[9] "eligible" "recipients" "disqualifying" "public"
[13] "benefit" "solely" "religious" "character"
[17] "If" "cases" "just" "described"
[21] "make" "one" "thing" "clear"
[25] "policy" "imposes" "penalty" "free"
[29] "exercise" "religion" "triggers" "exacting"
[33] "scrutiny" "Lukumi" "U" "S"
[37] "S" "Ct" "This" "conclusion"
[41] "unremarkable" "light" "prior" "decisions"
[45] ""
[[1409]]
[1] "" "Like" "disqualification"
[4] "statute" "McDaniel" "Department"
[7] "s" "policy" "puts"
[10] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "choice"
[13] "It" "may" "participate"
[16] "otherwise" "available" "benefit"
[19] "program" "remain" "religious"
[22] "institution" "Of" "course"
[25] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "free"
[28] "continue" "operating" "church"
[31] "just" "McDaniel" "free"
[34] "continue" "minister" "But"
[37] "freedom" "comes" "cost"
[40] "automatic" "absolute" "exclusion"
[43] "benefits" "public" "program"
[46] "Center" "otherwise" "fully"
[49] "qualified" "And" "State"
[52] "conditions" "benefit" "way"
[55] "McDaniel" "says" "plainly"
[58] "State" "punished" "free"
[61] "exercise" "religion" "To"
[64] "condition" "availability" "benefits"
[67] "upon" "recipient" "s"
[70] "willingness" "surrender" "religiously"
[73] "impelled" "status" "effectively"
[76] "penalizes" "free" "exercise"
[79] "constitutional" "liberties" "U"
[82] "S" "S" "Ct"
[85] "plurality" "opinion" "alterations"
[88] "omitted" ""
[[1410]]
[1] "The" "Department" "contends"
[4] "merely" "declining" "extend"
[7] "funds" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[10] "prohibit" "Church" "engaging"
[13] "religious" "conduct" "otherwise"
[16] "exercising" "religious" "rights"
[19] "In" "sense" "says"
[22] "Department" "policy" "unlike"
[25] "ordinances" "struck" "Lukumi"
[28] "outlawed" "rituals" "central"
[31] "Santeria" "Here" "Department"
[34] "simply" "declined" "allocate"
[37] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "subsidy"
[40] "State" "obligation" "provide"
[43] "first" "place" "That"
[46] "decision" "meaningfully" "burden"
[49] "Church" "s" "free"
[52] "exercise" "rights" "And"
[55] "absent" "burden" "argument"
[58] "continues" "Department" "free"
[61] "heed" "State" "s"
[64] "antiestablishment" "objection" "providing"
[67] "funds" "directly" "church"
[70] "Brief" "Respondent" ""
[[1411]]
[1] "" "It" "true" "Department"
[5] "criminalized" "way" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[9] "worships" "told" "Church" "subscribe"
[13] "certain" "view" "Gospel" "But"
[17] "Department" "acknowledges" "Free" "Exercise"
[21] "Clause" "protects" "indirect" "coercion"
[25] "penalties" "free" "exercise" "religion"
[29] "just" "outright" "prohibitions" "Lyng"
[33] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "As" "Court" "put" "years"
[41] "ago" "t" "late" "day"
[45] "doubt" "liberties" "religion" "expression"
[49] "may" "infringed" "denial" "placing"
[53] "conditions" "upon" "benefit" "privilege"
[57] "Sherbert" "U" "S" "S"
[61] "Ct" "see" "also" "McDaniel"
[65] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[69] "Brennan" "J" "concurring" "judgment"
[73] "The" "proposition" "law" "interfere"
[77] "free" "exercise" "directly" "prohibit"
[81] "religious" "activity" "merely" "conditions"
[85] "eligibility" "office" "abandonment" "squarely"
[89] "rejected" "precedent" ""
[[1412]]
[1] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "claiming"
[4] "entitlement" "subsidy" "It"
[7] "instead" "asserts" "right"
[10] "participate" "government" "benefit"
[13] "program" "without" "disavow"
[16] "religious" "character" "The"
[19] "imposition" "condition" "upon"
[22] "even" "gratuitous" "benefit"
[25] "inevitably" "deter" "s"
[28] "discourage" "s" "exercise"
[31] "First" "Amendment" "rights"
[34] "Sherbert" "U" "S"
[37] "S" "Ct" "The"
[40] "express" "discrimination" "religious"
[43] "exercise" "denial" "grant"
[46] "rather" "refusal" "allow"
[49] "Church" "solely" "church"
[52] "compete" "secular" "organizations"
[55] "grant" "Cf" "Northeastern"
[58] "Fla" "Chapter" "Associated"
[61] "Gen" "Contractors" "America"
[64] "v" "Jacksonville" "U"
[67] "S" "S" "Ct"
[70] "L" "Ed" "d"
[73] "T" "injury" "fact"
[76] "inability" "compete" "equal"
[79] "footing" "bidding" "process"
[82] "loss" "contract" "Trinity"
[85] "Lutheran" "member" "community"
[88] "State" "s" "decision"
[91] "exclude" "purposes" "public"
[94] "program" "must" "withstand"
[97] "strictest" "scrutiny" ""
[[1413]]
[1] "B" ""
[[1414]]
[1] "The" "Department" "attempts" "get"
[5] "weight" "precedents" "arguing" "free"
[9] "exercise" "question" "case" "instead"
[13] "controlled" "decision" "Locke" "v"
[17] "Davey" "It" "In" "Locke"
[21] "State" "Washington" "created" "scholarship"
[25] "program" "assist" "high" "achieving"
[29] "students" "costs" "postsecondary" "education"
[33] "The" "scholarships" "paid" "State"
[37] "s" "general" "fund" "eligibility"
[41] "based" "criteria" "applicant" "s"
[45] "score" "college" "admission" "tests"
[49] "family" "income" "While" "scholarship"
[53] "recipients" "free" "use" "money"
[57] "accredited" "religious" "non" "religious"
[61] "schools" "alike" "permitted" "use"
[65] "funds" "pursue" "devotional" "theology"
[69] "degree" "one" "devotional" "nature"
[73] "designed" "induce" "religious" "faith"
[77] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[81] "internal" "quotation" "marks" "omitted"
[85] "Davey" "selected" "scholarship" "denied"
[89] "funds" "refused" "certify" "use"
[93] "toward" "devotional" "degree" "He"
[97] "sued" "arguing" "State" "s"
[101] "refusal" "allow" "scholarship" "money"
[105] "go" "toward" "degrees" "violated"
[109] "free" "exercise" "rights" ""
[[1415]]
[1] "This" "Court" "disagreed" "It"
[5] "began" "explaining" "issue" "Washington"
[9] "s" "selective" "funding" "program"
[13] "comparable" "free" "exercise" "violations"
[17] "found" "Lukumi" "line" "cases"
[21] "including" "striking" "laws" "requiring"
[25] "individuals" "choose" "religious" "beliefs"
[29] "receiving" "government" "benefit" "Id"
[33] "S" "Ct" "At" "outset"
[37] "Court" "made" "clear" "Locke"
[41] "like" "case" "now" "us"
[45] ""
[[1416]]
[1] "Washington" "s" "restriction" "use"
[5] "scholarship" "funds" "different" "According"
[9] "Court" "State" "merely" "chosen"
[13] "fund" "distinct" "category" "instruction"
[17] "Id" "S" "Ct" "Davey"
[21] "denied" "scholarship" "denied" "scholarship"
[25] "proposed" "use" "funds" "prepare"
[29] "ministry" "Here" "question" "Trinity"
[33] "Lutheran" "denied" "grant" "simply"
[37] "church" ""
[[1417]]
[1] "The" "Court" "Locke"
[4] "also" "stated" "Washington"
[7] "s" "choice" "keeping"
[10] "State" "s" "antiestablishment"
[13] "interest" "using" "taxpayer"
[16] "funds" "pay" "training"
[19] "clergy" "fact" "Court"
[22] "think" "areas" "State"
[25] "s" "antiestablishment" "interests"
[28] "come" "play" "Id"
[31] "S" "Ct" "The"
[34] "claimant" "Locke" "sought"
[37] "funding" "essentially" "religious"
[40] "endeavor" "akin" "religious"
[43] "calling" "well" "academic"
[46] "pursuit" "opposition" "funding"
[49] "support" "church" "leaders"
[52] "lay" "historic" "core"
[55] "Religion" "Clauses" "Id"
[58] "S" "Ct" "Here"
[61] "nothing" "sort" "can"
[64] "said" "program" "use"
[67] "recycled" "tires" "resurface"
[70] "playgrounds" ""
[[1418]]
[1] "Relying" "Locke" "Department"
[4] "nonetheless" "emphasizes" "Missouri"
[7] "s" "similar" "constitutional"
[10] "tradition" "furnishing" "taxpayer"
[13] "money" "directly" "churches"
[16] "Brief" "Respondent" "But"
[19] "Locke" "took" "account"
[22] "Washington" "s" "antiestablishment"
[25] "interest" "determining" "noted"
[28] "scholarship" "program" "require"
[31] "students" "choose" "religious"
[34] "beliefs" "receiving" "government"
[37] "benefit" "U" "S"
[40] "S" "Ct" "citing"
[43] "McDaniel" "U" "S"
[46] "S" "Ct" "L"
[49] "Ed" "d" "As"
[52] "Court" "put" "Washington"
[55] "s" "scholarship" "program"
[58] "went" "long" "way"
[61] "toward" "including" "religion"
[64] "benefits" "Locke" "U"
[67] "S" "S" "Ct"
[70] "Students" "program" "free"
[73] "use" "scholarships" "pervasively"
[76] "religious" "schools" "Ibid"
[79] "Davey" "use" "scholarship"
[82] "pursue" "secular" "degree"
[85] "one" "institution" "studying"
[88] "devotional" "theology" "another"
[91] "Id" "n" "S"
[94] "Ct" "He" "also"
[97] "use" "scholarship" "money"
[100] "attend" "religious" "college"
[103] "take" "devotional" "theology"
[106] "courses" "Id" "S"
[109] "Ct" "The" "thing"
[112] "use" "scholarship" "pursue"
[115] "degree" "subject" ""
[[1419]]
[1] "In" "case" "dispute" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[6] "put" "choice" "church" "receiving" "government"
[11] "benefit" "The" "rule" "simple" "No"
[16] "churches" "need" "apply" ""
[[1420]]
[1] "C" ""
[[1421]]
[1] "" "The" "State" "case"
[5] "expressly" "requires" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[9] "renounce" "religious" "character" "order"
[13] "participate" "otherwise" "generally" "available"
[17] "public" "benefit" "program" "fully"
[21] "qualified" "Our" "cases" "make"
[25] "clear" "condition" "imposes" "penalty"
[29] "free" "exercise" "religion" "must"
[33] "subjected" "rigorous" "scrutiny" "Lukumi"
[37] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[41] ""
[[1422]]
[1] "" "Under" "stringent"
[4] "standard" "state" "interest"
[7] "highest" "order" "can"
[10] "justify" "Department" "s"
[13] "discriminatory" "policy" "McDaniel"
[16] "U" "S" "S"
[19] "Ct" "internal" "quotation"
[22] "marks" "omitted" "Yet"
[25] "Department" "offers" "nothing"
[28] "Missouri" "s" "policy"
[31] "preference" "skating" "far"
[34] "possible" "religious" "establishment"
[37] "concerns" "Brief" "Respondent"
[40] "In" "face" "clear"
[43] "infringement" "free" "exercise"
[46] "us" "interest" "qualify"
[49] "compelling" "As" "said"
[52] "considering" "Missouri" "s"
[55] "policy" "preference" "prior"
[58] "occasion" "state" "interest"
[61] "asserted" "achieving" "greater"
[64] "separation" "church" "State"
[67] "already" "ensured" "Establishment"
[70] "Clause" "Federal" "Constitution"
[73] "limited" "Free" "Exercise"
[76] "Clause" "Widmar" "U"
[79] "S" "S" "Ct"
[82] ""
[[1423]]
[1] "The" "State" "pursued" "preferred" "policy"
[6] "point" "expressly" "denying" "qualified" "religious"
[11] "entity" "public" "benefit" "solely" "religious"
[16] "character" "Under" "precedents" "goes" "far"
[21] "The" "Department" "s" "policy" "violates"
[26] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" ""
[[1424]]
[1] "Nearly" "years" "ago"
[4] "legislator" "urged" "Maryland"
[7] "Assembly" "adopt" "bill"
[10] "end" "State" "s"
[13] "disqualification" "Jews" "public"
[16] "office" ""
[[1425]]
[1] "" "If" "account"
[4] "religious" "faith" "I"
[7] "subjected" "disqualifications" "others"
[10] "free" "I" "consider"
[13] "persecuted" "man" "An"
[16] "odious" "exclusion" "benefits"
[19] "common" "rest" "fellow"
[22] "citizens" "persecution" "differing"
[25] "degree" "nature" "equally"
[28] "unjustifiable" "whose" "instruments"
[31] "chains" "torture" "Speech"
[34] "H" "M" "Brackenridge"
[37] "Dec" "Sess" "H"
[40] "Brackenridge" "W" "Worthington"
[43] "J" "Tyson" "Speeches"
[46] "House" "Delegates" "Maryland"
[49] ""
[[1426]]
[1] "The" "Missouri" "Department" "Natural"
[5] "Resources" "subjected" "anyone" "chains"
[9] "torture" "account" "religion" "And"
[13] "result" "State" "s" "policy"
[17] "nothing" "dramatic" "denial" "political"
[21] "office" "The" "consequence" "likelihood"
[25] "extra" "scraped" "knees" "But"
[29] "exclusion" "Trinity" "Lutheran" "public"
[33] "benefit" "otherwise" "qualified" "solely"
[37] "church" "odious" "Constitution" "stand"
[41] ""
[[1427]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "United" "States"
[5] "Court" "Appeals" "Eighth" "Circuit"
[9] "reversed" "case" "remanded" "proceedings"
[13] "consistent" "opinion" ""
[[1428]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[1429]]
[1] "Justice" "STEVENS" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[1430]]
[1] "Petitioners" "contend" "village" "ordinance"
[5] "making" "misdemeanor" "engage" "door"
[9] "door" "advocacy" "without" "first"
[13] "registering" "mayor" "receiving" "permit"
[17] "violates" "First" "Amendment" "Through"
[21] "facial" "challenge" "consider" "door"
[25] "door" "canvassing" "regulation" "applies"
[29] "religious" "proselytizing" "also" "anonymous"
[33] "political" "speech" "distribution" "handbills"
[37] ""
[[1431]]
[1] "I" ""
[[1432]]
[1] "Petitioner" "Watchtower" "Bible" "Tract"
[5] "Society" "New" "York" "Inc"
[9] "coordinates" "preaching" "activities" "Jehovah"
[13] "s" "Witnesses" "throughout" "United"
[17] "States" "publishes" "Bibles" "religious"
[21] "periodicals" "widely" "distributed" "Petitioner"
[25] "Wellsville" "Ohio" "Congregation" "Jehovah"
[29] "s" "Witnesses" "Inc" "supervises"
[33] "activities" "approximately" "members" "part"
[37] "Ohio" "includes" "Village" "Stratton"
[41] "Village" "Petitioners" "offer" "religious"
[45] "literature" "without" "cost" "anyone"
[49] "interested" "reading" "They" "allege"
[53] "solicit" "contributions" "orders" "sale"
[57] "merchandise" "services" "accept" "donations"
[61] ""
[[1433]]
[1] "Petitioners" "brought" "action"
[4] "Village" "mayor" "United"
[7] "States" "District" "Court"
[10] "Southern" "District" "Ohio"
[13] "seeking" "injunction" "enforcement"
[16] "several" "sections" "Ordinance"
[19] "No" "regulating" "uninvited"
[22] "peddling" "solicitation" "private"
[25] "property" "Village" "Petitioners"
[28] "complaint" "alleged" "ordinance"
[31] "violated" "several" "constitutional"
[34] "rights" "including" "free"
[37] "exercise" "religion" "free"
[40] "speech" "freedom" "press"
[43] "App" "The" "District"
[46] "Court" "conducted" "bench"
[49] "trial" "evidence" "administration"
[52] "ordinance" "effect" "petitioners"
[55] "introduced" ""
[[1434]]
[1] "Section" "prohibits" "canvassers" "others"
[5] "going" "upon" "private" "residential"
[9] "property" "purpose" "promoting" "cause"
[13] "without" "first" "obtained" "permit"
[17] "pursuant" "That" "section" "provides"
[21] "canvasser" "intends" "go" "private"
[25] "property" "promote" "cause" "must"
[29] "obtain" "Solicitation" "Permit" "office"
[33] "mayor" "charge" "permit" "apparently"
[37] "one" "issued" "routinely" "applicant"
[41] "fills" "fairly" "detailed" "Solicitor"
[45] "s" "Registration" "Form" "The"
[49] "canvasser" "authorized" "go" "upon"
[53] "premises" "listed" "registration" "form"
[57] "must" "carry" "permit" "upon"
[61] "person" "exhibit" "whenever" "requested"
[65] "police" "officer" "resident" "The"
[69] "ordinance" "sets" "forth" "grounds"
[73] "denial" "revocation" "permit" "record"
[77] "us" "show" "application" "denied"
[81] "permit" "revoked" "Petitioners" "apply"
[85] "permit" ""
[[1435]]
[1] "A" "section" "ordinance" "petitioners"
[5] "challenge" "establishes" "procedure" "resident"
[9] "may" "prohibit" "solicitation" "even"
[13] "holders" "permits" "If" "resident"
[17] "files" "No" "Solicitation" "Registration"
[21] "Form" "mayor" "also" "posts"
[25] "No" "Solicitation" "sign" "property"
[29] "uninvited" "canvassers" "may" "enter"
[33] "property" "unless" "specifically" "authorized"
[37] "No" "Solicitation" "Registration" "Form"
[41] "Only" "Village" "s" "residents"
[45] "filed" "forms" "Each" "forms"
[49] "record" "contains" "list" "suggested"
[53] "exceptions" "one" "form" "resident"
[57] "checked" "exceptions" "thereby" "excluding"
[61] "Jehovah" "s" "Witnesses" "Political"
[65] "Candidates" "list" "invited" "canvassers"
[69] "Although" "Jehovah" "s" "Witnesses"
[73] "consider" "solicitors" "make" "charge"
[77] "literature" "teaching" "leaders" "church"
[81] "testified" "trial" "honor" "solicitation"
[85] "signs" "Village" "They" "also"
[89] "explained" "trial" "apply" "permit"
[93] "derive" "authority" "preach" "Scripture"
[97] "For" "us" "seek" "permit"
[101] "municipality" "preach" "feel" "almost"
[105] "insult" "God" "App" ""
[[1436]]
[1] "Petitioners" "introduced" "evidence" "ordinance"
[5] "product" "mayor" "s" "hostility"
[9] "ministry" "District" "Court" "credited"
[13] "mayor" "s" "testimony" "designed"
[17] "protect" "privacy" "rights" "Village"
[21] "residents" "specifically" "protect" "flim"
[25] "flam" "con" "artists" "prey"
[29] "small" "town" "populations" "F"
[33] "Supp" "d" "S" "D"
[37] "Ohio" "Nevertheless" "court" "concluded"
[41] "terms" "ordinance" "applied" "activities"
[45] "petitioners" "well" "business" "political"
[49] "canvassers" "id" ""
[[1437]]
[1] "The" "District" "Court"
[4] "upheld" "provisions" "ordinance"
[7] "valid" "content" "neutral"
[10] "regulations" "infringe" "petitioners"
[13] "First" "Amendment" "rights"
[16] "The" "court" "however"
[19] "require" "Village" "accept"
[22] "narrowing" "constructions" "three"
[25] "provisions" "First" "court"
[28] "viewed" "requirement" "b"
[31] "applicant" "must" "list"
[34] "specific" "address" "residence"
[37] "visited" "potentially" "invalid"
[40] "cured" "Village" "s"
[43] "agreement" "attach" "form"
[46] "list" "willing" "residents"
[49] "Id" "Second" "held"
[52] "petitioners" "comply" "b"
[55] "merely" "stating" "purpose"
[58] "Jehovah" "s" "Witness"
[61] "ministry" "Id" "And"
[64] "third" "held" "limited"
[67] "canvassing" "hours" "p"
[70] "m" "invalid" "face"
[73] "replaced" "provision" "referring"
[76] "reasonable" "hours" "day"
[79] "Id" "As" "modified"
[82] "court" "held" "ordinance"
[85] "constitutionally" "valid" "applied"
[88] "petitioners" "dismissed" "case"
[91] ""
[[1438]]
[1] "" "The" "Court" "Appeals"
[5] "Sixth" "Circuit" "affirmed" "F"
[9] "d" "It" "held" "ordinance"
[13] "content" "neutral" "general" "applicability"
[17] "therefore" "subject" "intermediate" "scrutiny"
[21] "Id" "It" "rejected" "petitioners"
[25] "reliance" "discussion" "laws" "affecting"
[29] "free" "exercise" "religion" "free"
[33] "speech" "Employment" "Div" "Dept"
[37] "Human" "Resources" "Ore" "v"
[41] "Smith" "U" "S" "S"
[45] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[49] "language" "dicta" "therefore" "binding"
[53] "F" "d" "It" "also"
[57] "rejected" "petitioners" "argument" "ordinance"
[61] "overbroad" "impairs" "right" "distribute"
[65] "pamphlets" "anonymously" "recognized" "McIntyre"
[69] "v" "Ohio" "Elections" "Comm"
[73] "n" "U" "S" "S"
[77] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[81] "reasoning" "act" "going" "door"
[85] "door" "requires" "canvassers" "reveal"
[89] "portion" "identities" "F" "d"
[93] "The" "Court" "Appeals" "concluded"
[97] "interests" "promoted" "Village" "protecting"
[101] "residents" "fraud" "undue" "annoyance"
[105] "well" "harm" "seeks" "prevent"
[109] "criminals" "posing" "canvassers" "order"
[113] "defraud" "residents" "though" "means"
[117] "overwhelming" "sufficient" "justify" "regulation"
[121] "Id" "The" "court" "distinguished"
[125] "earlier" "cases" "protecting" "Jehovah"
[129] "s" "Witnesses" "ministry" "cases"
[133] "either" "involved" "flat" "prohibition"
[137] "dissemination" "ideas" "e" "g"
[141] "Martin" "v" "City" "Struthers"
[145] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[149] "L" "Ed" "ordinance" "left"
[153] "issuance" "permit" "discretion" "municipal"
[157] "officer" "see" "e" "g"
[161] "Cantwell" "v" "Connecticut" "U"
[165] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[169] "Ed" ""
[[1439]]
[1] "In" "dissent" "Judge" "Gilman"
[5] "expressed" "opinion" "subjecting" "noncommercial"
[9] "solicitation" "permit" "requirements" "ordinance"
[13] "significantly" "restricted" "substantial" "quantity"
[17] "speech" "unrelated" "Village" "s"
[21] "interest" "eliminating" "fraud" "unwanted"
[25] "annoyance" "In" "view" "Village"
[29] "failed" "demonstrate" "either" "reality"
[33] "harm" "efficacy" "restriction" "F"
[37] "d" ""
[[1440]]
[1] "We" "granted" "certiorari"
[4] "decide" "following" "question"
[7] "Does" "municipal" "ordinance"
[10] "requires" "one" "obtain"
[13] "permit" "prior" "engaging"
[16] "door" "door" "advocacy"
[19] "political" "cause" "display"
[22] "upon" "demand" "permit"
[25] "contains" "one" "s"
[28] "name" "violate" "First"
[31] "Amendment" "protection" "accorded"
[34] "anonymous" "pamphleteering" "discourse"
[37] "U" "S" "S"
[40] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[43] "d" "Pet" "Cert"
[46] ""
[[1441]]
[1] "II" ""
[[1442]]
[1] "For" "years" "Court"
[4] "invalidated" "restrictions" "door"
[7] "door" "canvassing" "pamphleteering"
[10] "It" "historical" "accident"
[13] "cases" "involved" "First"
[16] "Amendment" "challenges" "brought"
[19] "Jehovah" "s" "Witnesses"
[22] "door" "door" "canvassing"
[25] "mandated" "religion" "As"
[28] "noted" "Murdock" "v"
[31] "Pennsylvania" "U" "S"
[34] "S" "Ct" "Jehovah"
[37] "s" "Witnesses" "claim"
[40] "follow" "example" "Paul"
[43] "teaching" "publickly" "house"
[46] "house" "Acts" "They"
[49] "take" "literally" "mandate"
[52] "Scriptures" "Go" "ye"
[55] "world" "preach" "gospel"
[58] "every" "creature" "Mark"
[61] "In" "believe" "obeying"
[64] "commandment" "God" "Moreover"
[67] "lack" "significant" "financial"
[70] "resources" "ability" "Witnesses"
[73] "proselytize" "seriously" "diminished"
[76] "regulations" "burden" "efforts"
[79] "canvass" "door" "door"
[82] ""
[[1443]]
[1] "Although" "past" "cases"
[4] "involving" "Jehovah" "s"
[7] "Witnesses" "decided" "shortly"
[10] "World" "War" "II"
[13] "directly" "control" "question"
[16] "confront" "today" "provide"
[19] "historical" "analytical" "backdrop"
[22] "consideration" "petitioners" "First"
[25] "Amendment" "claim" "breadth"
[28] "Village" "s" "ordinance"
[31] "offends" "First" "Amendment"
[34] "Those" "cases" "involved"
[37] "petty" "offenses" "raised"
[40] "constitutional" "questions" "serious"
[43] "magnitude" "questions" "implicated"
[46] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[49] "freedom" "speech" "freedom"
[52] "press" "From" "decisions"
[55] "several" "themes" "emerge"
[58] "guide" "consideration" "ordinance"
[61] "issue" ""
[[1444]]
[1] "First" "cases" "emphasize" "value"
[5] "speech" "involved" "For" "example"
[9] "Murdock" "v" "Pennsylvania" "Court"
[13] "noted" "hand" "distribution" "religious"
[17] "tracts" "age" "old" "form"
[21] "missionary" "evangelism" "old" "history"
[25] "printing" "presses" "It" "potent"
[29] "force" "various" "religious" "movements"
[33] "years" "This" "form" "religious"
[37] "activity" "occupies" "high" "estate"
[41] "First" "Amendment" "worship" "churches"
[45] "preaching" "pulpits" "It" "claim"
[49] "protection" "orthodox" "conventional" "exercises"
[53] "religion" "It" "also" "claim"
[57] "others" "guarantees" "freedom" "speech"
[61] "freedom" "press" "Id" "S"
[65] "Ct" ""
[[1445]]
[1] "In" "addition" "cases"
[4] "discuss" "extensively" "historical"
[7] "importance" "door" "door"
[10] "canvassing" "pamphleteering" "vehicles"
[13] "dissemination" "ideas" "In"
[16] "Schneider" "v" "State"
[19] "Town" "Irvington" "U"
[22] "S" "S" "Ct"
[25] "L" "Ed" "petitioner"
[28] "Jehovah" "s" "Witness"
[31] "convicted" "canvassing" "without"
[34] "permit" "based" "evidence"
[37] "gone" "house" "house"
[40] "offering" "leave" "books"
[43] "booklets" "Writing" "Court"
[46] "Justice" "Roberts" "stated"
[49] "pamphlets" "proved" "effective"
[52] "instruments" "dissemination" "opinion"
[55] "And" "perhaps" "effective"
[58] "way" "bringing" "notice"
[61] "individuals" "distribution" "homes"
[64] "people" "On" "method"
[67] "communication" "ordinance" "imposes"
[70] "censorship" "abuse" "engendered"
[73] "struggle" "England" "eventuated"
[76] "establishment" "doctrine" "freedom"
[79] "press" "embodied" "Constitution"
[82] "To" "require" "censorship"
[85] "license" "makes" "impossible"
[88] "free" "unhampered" "distribution"
[91] "pamphlets" "strikes" "heart"
[94] "constitutional" "guarantees" "Id"
[97] "S" "Ct" "emphasis"
[100] "added" ""
[[1446]]
[1] "Despite" "emphasis" "important"
[4] "role" "door" "door"
[7] "canvassing" "pamphleteering" "played"
[10] "constitutional" "tradition" "free"
[13] "open" "discussion" "early"
[16] "cases" "also" "recognized"
[19] "interests" "town" "may"
[22] "form" "regulation" "particularly"
[25] "solicitation" "money" "involved"
[28] "In" "Cantwell" "v"
[31] "Connecticut" "U" "S"
[34] "S" "Ct" "L"
[37] "Ed" "Court" "held"
[40] "ordinance" "requiring" "Jehovah"
[43] "s" "Witnesses" "obtain"
[46] "license" "soliciting" "door"
[49] "door" "invalid" "issuance"
[52] "license" "depended" "exercise"
[55] "discretion" "city" "official"
[58] "Our" "opinion" "recognized"
[61] "State" "may" "protect"
[64] "citizens" "fraudulent" "solicitation"
[67] "requiring" "stranger" "community"
[70] "permitting" "publicly" "solicit"
[73] "funds" "purpose" "establish"
[76] "identity" "authority" "act"
[79] "cause" "purports" "represent"
[82] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[85] "Similarly" "Martin" "v"
[88] "City" "Struthers" "Court"
[91] "recognized" "crime" "prevention"
[94] "legitimate" "interest" "served"
[97] "ordinances" "noted" "burglars"
[100] "frequently" "pose" "canvassers"
[103] "either" "order" "may"
[106] "pretense" "discover" "whether"
[109] "house" "empty" "hence"
[112] "ripe" "burglary" "purpose"
[115] "spying" "premises" "order"
[118] "may" "return" "later"
[121] "U" "S" "S"
[124] "Ct" "Despite" "recognition"
[127] "interests" "legitimate" "precedent"
[130] "clear" "must" "balance"
[133] "interests" "effect" "regulations"
[136] "First" "Amendment" "rights"
[139] "We" "must" "astute"
[142] "examine" "effect" "challenged"
[145] "legislation" "must" "weigh"
[148] "circumstances" "appraise" "substantiality"
[151] "reasons" "advanced" "support"
[154] "regulation" "Ibid" "quoting"
[157] "Schneider" "U" "S"
[160] "S" "Ct" ""
[[1447]]
[1] "Finally" "cases" "demonstrate" "efforts"
[5] "Jehovah" "s" "Witnesses" "resist"
[9] "speech" "regulation" "struggle" "rights"
[13] "alone" "In" "Martin" "cataloging"
[17] "many" "groups" "rely" "extensively"
[21] "upon" "method" "communication" "Court"
[25] "summarized" "d" "oor" "door"
[29] "distribution" "circulars" "essential" "poorly"
[33] "financed" "causes" "little" "people"
[37] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[41] ""
[[1448]]
[1] "That" "Jehovah" "s" "Witnesses"
[5] "little" "people" "face" "risk"
[9] "silencing" "regulations" "like" "Village"
[13] "s" "exemplified" "cases" "involving"
[17] "nonreligious" "speech" "See" "e"
[21] "g" "Schaumburg" "v" "Citizens"
[25] "Better" "Environment" "U" "S"
[29] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[33] "d" "Hynes" "v" "Mayor"
[37] "Council" "Oradell" "U" "S"
[41] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[45] "d" "Thomas" "v" "Collins"
[49] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[53] "L" "Ed" "In" "Thomas"
[57] "issue" "whether" "labor" "leader"
[61] "required" "obtain" "permit" "delivering"
[65] "speech" "prospective" "union" "members"
[69] "After" "reviewing" "Jehovah" "s"
[73] "Witnesses" "cases" "discussed" "Court"
[77] "observed" ""
[[1449]]
[1] "" "As" "matter" "principle"
[5] "requirement" "registration" "order" "make"
[9] "public" "speech" "seem" "generally"
[13] "incompatible" "exercise" "rights" "free"
[17] "speech" "free" "assembly" ""
[[1450]]
[1] "" ""
[[1451]]
[1] "" "If" "exercise" "rights"
[5] "free" "speech" "free" "assembly"
[9] "made" "crime" "think" "can"
[13] "accomplished" "device" "requiring" "previous"
[17] "registration" "condition" "exercising" "making"
[21] "condition" "foundation" "restraining" "advance"
[25] "exercise" "imposing" "penalty" "violating"
[29] "restraining" "order" "So" "long"
[33] "involved" "exercise" "rights" "free"
[37] "speech" "free" "assembly" "immune"
[41] "restriction" "If" "one" "solicits"
[45] "support" "cause" "labor" "may"
[49] "required" "register" "condition" "exercise"
[53] "right" "make" "public" "speech"
[57] "may" "seeks" "rally" "support"
[61] "social" "business" "religious" "political"
[65] "cause" "We" "think" "requirement"
[69] "one" "must" "register" "undertakes"
[73] "make" "public" "speech" "enlist"
[77] "support" "lawful" "movement" "quite"
[81] "incompatible" "requirements" "First" "Amendment"
[85] "Id" "S" "Ct" ""
[[1452]]
[1] "Although" "World" "War"
[4] "II" "era" "cases"
[7] "provide" "guidance" "consideration"
[10] "question" "presented" "answer"
[13] "one" "preliminary" "issue"
[16] "parties" "adamantly" "dispute"
[19] "That" "standard" "review"
[22] "use" "assessing" "constitutionality"
[25] "ordinance" "We" "find"
[28] "unnecessary" "however" "resolve"
[31] "dispute" "breadth" "speech"
[34] "affected" "ordinance" "nature"
[37] "regulation" "make" "clear"
[40] "Court" "Appeals" "erred"
[43] "upholding" ""
[[1453]]
[1] "" "III" ""
[[1454]]
[1] "The" "Village" "argues" "three"
[5] "interests" "served" "ordinance" "prevention"
[9] "fraud" "prevention" "crime" "protection"
[13] "residents" "privacy" "We" "difficulty"
[17] "concluding" "light" "precedent" "important"
[21] "interests" "Village" "may" "seek"
[25] "safeguard" "form" "regulation" "solicitation"
[29] "activity" "We" "must" "also"
[33] "look" "however" "amount" "speech"
[37] "covered" "ordinance" "whether" "appropriate"
[41] "balance" "affected" "speech" "governmental"
[45] "interests" "ordinance" "purports" "serve"
[49] ""
[[1455]]
[1] "The" "text" "Village"
[4] "s" "ordinance" "prohibits"
[7] "canvassers" "going" "private"
[10] "property" "purpose" "explaining"
[13] "promoting" "cause" "unless"
[16] "receive" "permit" "residents"
[19] "visited" "opted" "solicitation"
[22] "sign" "Had" "provision"
[25] "construed" "apply" "commercial"
[28] "activities" "solicitation" "funds"
[31] "arguably" "ordinance" "tailored"
[34] "Village" "s" "interest"
[37] "protecting" "privacy" "residents"
[40] "preventing" "fraud" "Yet"
[43] "even" "though" "Village"
[46] "explained" "ordinance" "adopted"
[49] "serve" "interests" "never"
[52] "contended" "narrowly" "interpreted"
[55] "To" "contrary" "Village"
[58] "s" "administration" "ordinance"
[61] "unquestionably" "demonstrates" "provisions"
[64] "apply" "significant" "number"
[67] "noncommercial" "canvassers" "promoting"
[70] "wide" "variety" "causes"
[73] "Indeed" "No" "Solicitation"
[76] "Forms" "provided" "residents"
[79] "canvassers" "include" "Camp"
[82] "Fire" "Girls" "Jehovah"
[85] "s" "Witnesses" "Political"
[88] "Candidates" "Trick" "Treaters"
[91] "Halloween" "Season" "Persons"
[94] "Affiliated" "Stratton" "Church"
[97] "The" "ordinance" "unquestionably"
[100] "applies" "religious" "causes"
[103] "political" "activity" "well"
[106] "It" "seem" "extend"
[109] "residents" "casually" "soliciting"
[112] "votes" "neighbors" "ringing"
[115] "doorbells" "enlist" "support"
[118] "employing" "efficient" "garbage"
[121] "collector" ""
[[1456]]
[1] "The" "mere" "fact"
[4] "ordinance" "covers" "much"
[7] "speech" "raises" "constitutional"
[10] "concerns" "It" "offensive"
[13] "values" "protected" "First"
[16] "Amendment" "notion" "free"
[19] "society" "context" "everyday"
[22] "public" "discourse" "citizen"
[25] "must" "first" "inform"
[28] "government" "desire" "speak"
[31] "neighbors" "obtain" "permit"
[34] "Even" "issuance" "permits"
[37] "mayor" "s" "office"
[40] "ministerial" "task" "performed"
[43] "promptly" "cost" "applicant"
[46] "law" "requiring" "permit"
[49] "engage" "speech" "constitutes"
[52] "dramatic" "departure" "national"
[55] "heritage" "constitutional" "tradition"
[58] "Three" "obvious" "examples"
[61] "illustrate" "pernicious" "effect"
[64] "permit" "requirement" ""
[[1457]]
[1] "First" "cases" "involving"
[4] "distribution" "unsigned" "handbills"
[7] "demonstrate" "significant" "number"
[10] "persons" "support" "causes"
[13] "anonymously" "The" "decision"
[16] "favor" "anonymity" "may"
[19] "motivated" "fear" "economic"
[22] "official" "retaliation" "concern"
[25] "social" "ostracism" "merely"
[28] "desire" "preserve" "much"
[31] "one" "s" "privacy"
[34] "possible" "McIntyre" "v"
[37] "Ohio" "Elections" "Comm"
[40] "n" "U" "S"
[43] "S" "Ct" "The"
[46] "requirement" "canvasser" "must"
[49] "identified" "permit" "application"
[52] "filed" "mayor" "s"
[55] "office" "available" "public"
[58] "inspection" "necessarily" "results"
[61] "surrender" "anonymity" "Although"
[64] "true" "Court" "Appeals"
[67] "suggested" "see" "F"
[70] "d" "persons" "known"
[73] "resident" "reveal" "allegiance"
[76] "group" "cause" "present"
[79] "front" "door" "advocate"
[82] "issue" "deliver" "handbill"
[85] "Court" "Appeals" "erred"
[88] "concluding" "ordinance" "implicate"
[91] "anonymity" "interests" "The"
[94] "Sixth" "Circuit" "s"
[97] "reasoning" "undermined" "decision"
[100] "Buckley" "v" "American"
[103] "Constitutional" "Law" "Foundation"
[106] "Inc" "U" "S"
[109] "S" "Ct" "L"
[112] "Ed" "d" "The"
[115] "badge" "requirement" "invalidated"
[118] "Buckley" "applied" "petition"
[121] "circulators" "seeking" "signatures"
[124] "face" "face" "interactions"
[127] "The" "fact" "circulators"
[130] "revealed" "physical" "identities"
[133] "foreclose" "consideration" "circulators"
[136] "interest" "maintaining" "anonymity"
[139] "In" "Village" "strangers"
[142] "resident" "certainly" "maintain"
[145] "anonymity" "ordinance" "may"
[148] "preclude" "persons" "canvassing"
[151] "unpopular" "causes" "Such"
[154] "preclusion" "may" "well"
[157] "justified" "situations" "example"
[160] "special" "state" "interest"
[163] "protecting" "integrity" "ballot"
[166] "initiative" "process" "see"
[169] "ibid" "interest" "preventing"
[172] "fraudulent" "commercial" "transactions"
[175] "The" "Village" "ordinance"
[178] "however" "sweeps" "broadly"
[181] "covering" "unpopular" "causes"
[184] "unrelated" "commercial" "transactions"
[187] "special" "interest" "protecting"
[190] "electoral" "process" ""
[[1458]]
[1] "Second" "requiring" "permit"
[4] "prior" "condition" "exercise"
[7] "right" "speak" "imposes"
[10] "objective" "burden" "speech"
[13] "citizens" "holding" "religious"
[16] "patriotic" "views" "As"
[19] "World" "War" "II"
[22] "era" "cases" "dramatically"
[25] "demonstrate" "significant" "number"
[28] "persons" "whose" "religious"
[31] "scruples" "will" "prevent"
[34] "applying" "license" "There"
[37] "doubt" "patriotic" "citizens"
[40] "firm" "convictions" "constitutional"
[43] "right" "engage" "uninhibited"
[46] "debate" "context" "door"
[49] "door" "advocacy" "prefer"
[52] "silence" "speech" "licensed"
[55] "petty" "official" ""
[[1459]]
[1] "Third" "significant" "amount"
[4] "spontaneous" "speech" "effectively"
[7] "banned" "ordinance" "A"
[10] "person" "made" "decision"
[13] "holiday" "weekend" "take"
[16] "active" "part" "political"
[19] "campaign" "begin" "pass"
[22] "handbills" "obtained" "required"
[25] "permit" "Even" "spontaneous"
[28] "decision" "go" "across"
[31] "street" "urge" "neighbor"
[34] "vote" "mayor" "lawfully"
[37] "implemented" "without" "first"
[40] "obtaining" "mayor" "s"
[43] "permission" "In" "respect"
[46] "regulation" "analogous" "circulation"
[49] "licensing" "tax" "Court"
[52] "invalidated" "Grosjean" "v"
[55] "American" "Press" "Co"
[58] "U" "S" "S"
[61] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[64] "In" "Grosjean" "discussing"
[67] "history" "Free" "Press"
[70] "Clause" "First" "Amendment"
[73] "Court" "stated" "t"
[76] "evils" "prevented" "censorship"
[79] "press" "merely" "action"
[82] "government" "means" "might"
[85] "prevent" "free" "general"
[88] "discussion" "public" "matters"
[91] "seems" "absolutely" "essential"
[94] "prepare" "people" "intelligent"
[97] "exercise" "rights" "citizens"
[100] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[103] "quoting" "T" "Cooley"
[106] "Constitutional" "Limitations" "th"
[109] "ed" "see" "also"
[112] "Lovell" "v" "City"
[115] "Griffin" "U" "S"
[118] "S" "Ct" "L"
[121] "Ed" ""
[[1460]]
[1] "The" "breadth" "unprecedented" "nature"
[5] "regulation" "alone" "render" "ordinance"
[9] "invalid" "Also" "central" "conclusion"
[13] "ordinance" "pass" "First" "Amendment"
[17] "scrutiny" "tailored" "Village" "s"
[21] "stated" "interests" "Even" "interest"
[25] "preventing" "fraud" "adequately" "support"
[29] "ordinance" "insofar" "applies" "commercial"
[33] "transactions" "solicitation" "funds" "interest"
[37] "provides" "support" "application" "petitioners"
[41] "political" "campaigns" "enlisting" "support"
[45] "unpopular" "causes" "The" "Village"
[49] "however" "argues" "ordinance" "nonetheless"
[53] "valid" "serves" "two" "additional"
[57] "interests" "protecting" "privacy" "resident"
[61] "prevention" "crime" ""
[[1461]]
[1] "" "With" "respect" "former"
[5] "seems" "clear" "ordinance" "provides"
[9] "posting" "No" "Solicitation" "signs"
[13] "challenged" "case" "coupled" "resident"
[17] "s" "unquestioned" "right" "refuse"
[21] "engage" "conversation" "unwelcome" "visitors"
[25] "provides" "ample" "protection" "unwilling"
[29] "listener" "Schaumburg" "U" "S"
[33] "S" "Ct" "T" "provision"
[37] "permitting" "homeowners" "bar" "solicitors"
[41] "property" "posting" "solicitation" "signs"
[45] "suggest" "s" "availability" "less"
[49] "intrusive" "effective" "measures" "protect"
[53] "privacy" "The" "annoyance" "caused"
[57] "uninvited" "knock" "front" "door"
[61] "whether" "visitor" "armed" "permit"
[65] ""
[[1462]]
[1] "With" "respect" "latter"
[4] "seems" "unlikely" "absence"
[7] "permit" "preclude" "criminals"
[10] "knocking" "doors" "engaging"
[13] "conversations" "covered" "ordinance"
[16] "They" "might" "example"
[19] "ask" "directions" "permission"
[22] "use" "telephone" "pose"
[25] "surveyers" "census" "takers"
[28] "See" "n" "supra"
[31] "Or" "might" "register"
[34] "false" "name" "impunity"
[37] "ordinance" "contains" "provision"
[40] "verifying" "applicant" "s"
[43] "identity" "organizational" "credentials"
[46] "Moreover" "Village" "assert"
[49] "interest" "crime" "prevention"
[52] "absence" "evidence" "special"
[55] "crime" "problem" "related"
[58] "door" "door" "solicitation"
[61] "record" "us" ""
[[1463]]
[1] "The" "rhetoric" "used"
[4] "World" "War" "II"
[7] "era" "opinions" "repeatedly"
[10] "saved" "petitioners" "coreligionists"
[13] "petty" "prosecutions" "reflected"
[16] "Court" "s" "evaluation"
[19] "First" "Amendment" "freedoms"
[22] "implicated" "case" "The"
[25] "value" "judgment" "motivated"
[28] "united" "democratic" "people"
[31] "fighting" "defend" "freedoms"
[34] "totalitarian" "attack" "unchanged"
[37] "It" "motivates" "decision"
[40] "today" ""
[[1464]]
[1] "The" "judgment" "Court" "Appeals"
[5] "reversed" "case" "remanded" "proceedings"
[9] "consistent" "opinion" ""
[[1465]]
[1] "It" "ordered" ""
[[1466]]
[1] "Mr" "Chief" "Justice" "BURGER" "delivered"
[6] "opinion" "Court" ""
[[1467]]
[1] "On" "petition" "State" "Wisconsin"
[5] "granted" "writ" "certiorari" "case"
[9] "review" "decision" "Wisconsin" "Supreme"
[13] "Court" "holding" "respondents" "convictions"
[17] "violating" "State" "s" "compulsory"
[21] "school" "attendance" "law" "invalid"
[25] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "First"
[29] "Amendment" "United" "States" "Constitution"
[33] "made" "applicable" "States" "Fourteenth"
[37] "Amendment" "For" "reasons" "hereafter"
[41] "stated" "affirm" "judgment" "Supreme"
[45] "Court" "Wisconsin" ""
[[1468]]
[1] "Respondents" "Jonas" "Yoder" "Wallace"
[5] "Miller" "members" "Old" "Order"
[9] "Amish" "religion" "respondent" "Adin"
[13] "Yutzy" "member" "Conservative" "Amish"
[17] "Mennonite" "Church" "They" "families"
[21] "residents" "Green" "County" "Wisconsin"
[25] "Wisconsin" "s" "compulsory" "school"
[29] "attendance" "law" "required" "cause"
[33] "children" "attend" "public" "private"
[37] "school" "reaching" "age" "respondents"
[41] "declined" "send" "children" "ages"
[45] "public" "school" "complete" "eighth"
[49] "grade" "The" "children" "enrolled"
[53] "private" "school" "within" "recognized"
[57] "exception" "compulsory" "attendance" "law"
[61] "conceded" "subject" "Wisconsin" "statute"
[65] ""
[[1469]]
[1] "" "On" "complaint" "school"
[5] "district" "administrator" "public" "schools"
[9] "respondents" "charged" "tried" "convicted"
[13] "violating" "compulsory" "attendance" "law"
[17] "Green" "County" "Court" "fined"
[21] "sum" "Respondents" "defended" "ground"
[25] "application" "compulsory" "attendance" "law"
[29] "violated" "rights" "First" "Fourteenth"
[33] "Amendments" "The" "trial" "testimony"
[37] "showed" "respondents" "believed" "accordance"
[41] "tenets" "Old" "Order" "Amish"
[45] "communities" "generally" "children" "s"
[49] "attendance" "high" "school" "public"
[53] "private" "contrary" "Amish" "religion"
[57] "way" "life" "They" "believed"
[61] "sending" "children" "high" "school"
[65] "expose" "danger" "censure" "church"
[69] "community" "found" "county" "court"
[73] "also" "endanger" "salvation" "children"
[77] "The" "State" "stipulated" "respondents"
[81] "religious" "beliefs" "sincere" ""
[[1470]]
[1] "In" "support" "position"
[4] "respondents" "presented" "expert"
[7] "witnesses" "scholars" "religion"
[10] "education" "whose" "testimony"
[13] "uncontradicted" "They" "expressed"
[16] "opinions" "relationship" "Amish"
[19] "belief" "concerning" "school"
[22] "attendance" "general" "tenets"
[25] "religion" "described" "impact"
[28] "compulsory" "high" "school"
[31] "attendance" "continued" "survival"
[34] "Amish" "communities" "exist"
[37] "United" "States" "today"
[40] "The" "history" "Amish"
[43] "sect" "given" "detail"
[46] "beginning" "Swiss" "Anabaptists"
[49] "th" "century" "rejected"
[52] "institutionalized" "churches" "sought"
[55] "return" "early" "simple"
[58] "Christian" "life" "de"
[61] "emphasizing" "material" "success"
[64] "rejecting" "competitive" "spirit"
[67] "seeking" "insulate" "modern"
[70] "world" "As" "result"
[73] "common" "heritage" "Old"
[76] "Order" "Amish" "communities"
[79] "today" "characterized" "fundamental"
[82] "belief" "salvation" "requires"
[85] "life" "church" "community"
[88] "separate" "apart" "world"
[91] "worldly" "influence" "This"
[94] "concept" "life" "aloof"
[97] "world" "values" "central"
[100] "faith" ""
[[1471]]
[1] "A" "related" "feature" "Old"
[5] "Order" "Amish" "communities" "devotion"
[9] "life" "harmony" "nature" "soil"
[13] "exemplified" "simple" "life" "early"
[17] "Christian" "era" "continued" "America"
[21] "much" "early" "national" "life"
[25] "Amish" "beliefs" "require" "members"
[29] "community" "make" "living" "farming"
[33] "closely" "related" "activities" "Broadly"
[37] "speaking" "Old" "Order" "Amish"
[41] "religion" "pervades" "determines" "entire"
[45] "mode" "life" "adherents" "Their"
[49] "conduct" "regulated" "great" "detail"
[53] "Ordnung" "rules" "church" "community"
[57] "Adult" "baptism" "occurs" "late"
[61] "adolescence" "time" "Amish" "young"
[65] "people" "voluntarily" "undertake" "heavy"
[69] "obligations" "unlike" "Bar" "Mitzvah"
[73] "Jews" "abide" "rules" "church"
[77] "community" ""
[[1472]]
[1] "Amish" "objection" "formal"
[4] "education" "beyond" "eighth"
[7] "grade" "firmly" "grounded"
[10] "central" "religious" "concepts"
[13] "They" "object" "high"
[16] "school" "higher" "education"
[19] "generally" "values" "teach"
[22] "marked" "variance" "Amish"
[25] "values" "Amish" "way"
[28] "life" "view" "secondary"
[31] "school" "education" "impermissible"
[34] "exposure" "children" "wordly"
[37] "influence" "conflict" "beliefs"
[40] "The" "high" "school"
[43] "tends" "emphasize" "intellectual"
[46] "scientific" "accomplishments" "self"
[49] "distinction" "competitiveness" "worldly"
[52] "success" "social" "life"
[55] "students" "Amish" "society"
[58] "emphasizes" "informal" "learning"
[61] "life" "goodness" "rather"
[64] "life" "intellect" "wisdom"
[67] "rather" "technical" "knowledge"
[70] "community" "welfare" "rather"
[73] "competition" "separation" "rather"
[76] "integration" "contemporary" "worldly"
[79] "society" ""
[[1473]]
[1] "Formal" "high" "school" "education"
[5] "beyond" "eighth" "grade" "contrary"
[9] "Amish" "beliefs" "places" "Amish"
[13] "children" "environment" "hostile" "Amish"
[17] "beliefs" "increasing" "emphasis" "competition"
[21] "class" "work" "sports" "pressure"
[25] "conform" "styles" "manners" "ways"
[29] "peer" "group" "also" "takes"
[33] "away" "community" "physically" "emotionally"
[37] "crucial" "formative" "adolescent" "period"
[41] "life" "During" "period" "children"
[45] "must" "acquire" "Amish" "attitudes"
[49] "favoring" "manual" "work" "self"
[53] "reliance" "specific" "skills" "needed"
[57] "perform" "adult" "role" "Amish"
[61] "farmer" "housewife" "They" "must"
[65] "learn" "enjoy" "physical" "labor"
[69] "Once" "child" "learned" "basic"
[73] "reading" "writing" "elementary" "mathematics"
[77] "tratis" "skills" "attitudes" "admittedly"
[81] "fall" "within" "category" "best"
[85] "learned" "example" "rather" "classroom"
[89] "And" "time" "life" "Amish"
[93] "child" "must" "also" "grow"
[97] "faith" "relationship" "Amish" "community"
[101] "prepared" "accept" "heavy" "obligations"
[105] "imposed" "adult" "baptism" "In"
[109] "short" "high" "school" "attendance"
[113] "teachers" "Amish" "faith" "may"
[117] "even" "hostile" "interposes" "serious"
[121] "barrier" "integration" "Amish" "child"
[125] "Amish" "religious" "community" "Dr"
[129] "John" "Hostetler" "one" "experts"
[133] "Amish" "society" "testified" "modern"
[137] "high" "school" "equipped" "curriculum"
[141] "social" "environment" "impart" "values"
[145] "promoted" "Amish" "society" ""
[[1474]]
[1] "The" "Amish" "object" "elementary"
[5] "education" "first" "eight" "grades"
[9] "general" "proposition" "agree" "children"
[13] "must" "basic" "skills" "three"
[17] "R" "s" "order" "read"
[21] "Bible" "good" "farmers" "citizens"
[25] "able" "deal" "non" "Amish"
[29] "people" "necessary" "course" "daily"
[33] "affairs" "They" "view" "basic"
[37] "education" "acceptable" "significantly" "expose"
[41] "children" "wordly" "values" "interfere"
[45] "development" "Amish" "community" "crucial"
[49] "adolescent" "period" "While" "Amish"
[53] "accept" "compulsory" "elementary" "education"
[57] "generally" "wherever" "possible" "established"
[61] "elementary" "schools" "many" "respects"
[65] "like" "small" "local" "schools"
[69] "past" "In" "Amish" "belief"
[73] "higher" "learning" "tends" "develop"
[77] "values" "reject" "influences" "alienate"
[81] "man" "God" ""
[[1475]]
[1] "On" "basis" "considerations"
[4] "Dr" "Hostetler" "testified"
[7] "compulsory" "high" "school"
[10] "attendance" "result" "great"
[13] "psychological" "harm" "Amish"
[16] "children" "conflicts" "produce"
[19] "also" "opinion" "ultimately"
[22] "result" "destruction" "Old"
[25] "Order" "Amish" "church"
[28] "community" "exists" "United"
[31] "States" "today" "The"
[34] "testimony" "Dr" "Donald"
[37] "A" "Erickson" "expert"
[40] "witness" "education" "also"
[43] "showed" "Amish" "succeed"
[46] "preparing" "high" "school"
[49] "age" "children" "productive"
[52] "members" "Amish" "community"
[55] "He" "described" "system"
[58] "learning" "skills" "directly"
[61] "relevant" "adult" "roles"
[64] "Amish" "community" "ideal"
[67] "perhaps" "superior" "ordinary"
[70] "high" "school" "education"
[73] "The" "evidence" "also"
[76] "showed" "Amish" "excellent"
[79] "record" "law" "abiding"
[82] "generally" "self" "sufficient"
[85] "members" "society" ""
[[1476]]
[1] "Although" "trial" "court"
[4] "careful" "findings" "determined"
[7] "Wisconsin" "compulsory" "school"
[10] "attendance" "law" "interfere"
[13] "freedom" "Defendants" "act"
[16] "accordance" "sincere" "religious"
[19] "belief" "also" "concluded"
[22] "requirement" "high" "school"
[25] "attendance" "age" "reasonable"
[28] "constitutional" "exercise" "governmental"
[31] "power" "therefore" "denied"
[34] "motion" "dismiss" "charges"
[37] "The" "Wisconsin" "Circuit"
[40] "Court" "affirmed" "convictions"
[43] "The" "Wisconsin" "Supreme"
[46] "Court" "however" "sustained"
[49] "respondents" "claim" "Free"
[52] "Exercise" "Clause" "First"
[55] "Amendment" "reversed" "convictions"
[58] "A" "majority" "court"
[61] "opinion" "State" "failed"
[64] "make" "adequate" "showing"
[67] "interest" "establishing" "maintaining"
[70] "educational" "system" "overrides"
[73] "defendants" "right" "free"
[76] "exercise" "religion" "Wis"
[79] "d" "N" "W"
[82] "d" ""
[[1477]]
[1] "I" ""
[[1478]]
[1] "" "There" "doubt"
[4] "power" "State" "high"
[7] "responsibility" "education" "citizens"
[10] "impose" "reasonable" "regulations"
[13] "control" "duration" "basic"
[16] "education" "See" "e"
[19] "g" "Pierce" "v"
[22] "Society" "Sisters" "U"
[25] "S" "S" "Ct"
[28] "L" "Ed" "Providing"
[31] "public" "schools" "ranks"
[34] "apex" "function" "State"
[37] "Yet" "even" "paramount"
[40] "responsibility" "Pierce" "made"
[43] "yield" "right" "parents"
[46] "provide" "equivalent" "education"
[49] "privately" "operated" "system"
[52] "There" "Court" "held"
[55] "Oregon" "s" "statute"
[58] "compelling" "attendance" "public"
[61] "school" "age" "eight"
[64] "age" "unreasonably" "interfered"
[67] "interest" "parents" "directing"
[70] "rearing" "spring" "including"
[73] "education" "church" "operated"
[76] "schools" "As" "case"
[79] "suggests" "values" "parental"
[82] "direction" "religious" "upbringing"
[85] "education" "children" "early"
[88] "formative" "years" "high"
[91] "place" "society" "See"
[94] "also" "Ginsberg" "v"
[97] "New" "York" "U"
[100] "S" "S" "Ct"
[103] "L" "Ed" "d"
[106] "Meyer" "v" "Nebraska"
[109] "U" "S" "S"
[112] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[115] "cf" "Rowan" "v"
[118] "United" "States" "Post"
[121] "Office" "Dept" "U"
[124] "S" "S" "Ct"
[127] "L" "Ed" "d"
[130] "Thus" "State" "s"
[133] "interest" "universal" "education"
[136] "however" "highly" "rank"
[139] "totally" "free" "balancing"
[142] "process" "impinges" "fundamental"
[145] "rights" "interests" "specifically"
[148] "protected" "Free" "Exercise"
[151] "Clause" "First" "Amendment"
[154] "traditional" "interest" "parents"
[157] "respect" "religious" "upbringing"
[160] "children" "long" "words"
[163] "Pierce" "prepare" "additional"
[166] "obligations" "U" "S"
[169] "S" "Ct" ""
[[1479]]
[1] "" "It" "follows"
[4] "order" "Wisconsin" "compel"
[7] "school" "attendance" "beyond"
[10] "eighth" "grade" "claim"
[13] "attendance" "interferes" "practice"
[16] "legitimate" "religious" "belief"
[19] "must" "appear" "either"
[22] "State" "deny" "free"
[25] "exercise" "religious" "belief"
[28] "requirement" "state" "interest"
[31] "sufficient" "magnitude" "override"
[34] "interest" "claiming" "protection"
[37] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause"
[40] "Long" "general" "acknowledgment"
[43] "need" "universal" "formal"
[46] "education" "Religion" "Clauses"
[49] "specifically" "firmly" "fixed"
[52] "right" "free" "exercise"
[55] "religious" "beliefs" "buttressing"
[58] "fundamental" "right" "equally"
[61] "firm" "even" "less"
[64] "explicit" "prohibition" "establishment"
[67] "religion" "government" "The"
[70] "values" "underlying" "two"
[73] "provisions" "relating" "religion"
[76] "zealously" "protected" "sometimes"
[79] "even" "expense" "interests"
[82] "admittedly" "high" "social"
[85] "importance" "The" "invalidation"
[88] "financial" "aid" "parochial"
[91] "schools" "government" "grants"
[94] "salary" "subsidy" "teachers"
[97] "one" "example" "extent"
[100] "courts" "gone" "regard"
[103] "notwithstanding" "aid" "programs"
[106] "legislatively" "determined" "public"
[109] "interest" "service" "sound"
[112] "educational" "policy" "States"
[115] "Congress" "Lemon" "v"
[118] "Kurtzman" "U" "S"
[121] "S" "Ct" "L"
[124] "Ed" "d" "Tilton"
[127] "v" "Richardson" "U"
[130] "S" "S" "Ct"
[133] "L" "Ed" "d"
[136] "See" "also" "Everson"
[139] "v" "Board" "Education"
[142] "U" "S" "S"
[145] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[148] ""
[[1480]]
[1] "" "The" "essence"
[4] "said" "written" "subject"
[7] "interests" "highest" "order"
[10] "otherwise" "served" "can"
[13] "overbalance" "legitimate" "claims"
[16] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[19] "We" "can" "accept"
[22] "settled" "therefore" "however"
[25] "strong" "State" "s"
[28] "interest" "universal" "compulsory"
[31] "education" "means" "absolute"
[34] "exclusion" "subordination" "interests"
[37] "E" "g" "Sherbert"
[40] "v" "Verner" "U"
[43] "S" "S" "Ct"
[46] "L" "Ed" "d"
[49] "McGowan" "v" "Maryland"
[52] "U" "S" "S"
[55] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[58] "d" "separate" "opinion"
[61] "Frankfurter" "J" "Prince"
[64] "v" "Marssachusetts" "U"
[67] "S" "S" "Ct"
[70] "L" "Ed" ""
[[1481]]
[1] "II" ""
[[1482]]
[1] "" "We" "come"
[4] "quality" "claims" "respondents"
[7] "concerning" "alleged" "encroachment"
[10] "Wisconsin" "s" "compulsory"
[13] "school" "attendance" "statute"
[16] "rights" "rights" "children"
[19] "free" "exercise" "religious"
[22] "beliefs" "forbears" "adhered"
[25] "almost" "three" "centuries"
[28] "In" "evaluating" "claims"
[31] "must" "careful" "determine"
[34] "whether" "Amish" "religious"
[37] "faith" "mode" "life"
[40] "claim" "inseparable" "interdependent"
[43] "A" "way" "life"
[46] "however" "virtuous" "admirable"
[49] "may" "interposed" "barrier"
[52] "reasonable" "state" "regulation"
[55] "education" "based" "purely"
[58] "secular" "considerations" "protection"
[61] "Religion" "Clauses" "claims"
[64] "must" "rooted" "religious"
[67] "belief" "Although" "determination"
[70] "religious" "belief" "practice"
[73] "entitled" "constitutional" "protection"
[76] "may" "present" "delicate"
[79] "question" "concept" "ordered"
[82] "liberty" "precludes" "allowing"
[85] "every" "person" "make"
[88] "standards" "matters" "conduct"
[91] "society" "whole" "important"
[94] "interests" "Thus" "Amish"
[97] "asserted" "claims" "subjective"
[100] "evaluation" "rejection" "contemporary"
[103] "secular" "values" "accepted"
[106] "majority" "much" "Thoreau"
[109] "rejected" "social" "values"
[112] "time" "isolated" "Walden"
[115] "Pond" "claims" "rest"
[118] "religious" "basis" "Thoreau"
[121] "s" "choice" "philosophical"
[124] "personal" "rather" "religious"
[127] "belief" "rise" "demands"
[130] "Religion" "Clauses" ""
[[1483]]
[1] "Giving" "weight" "secular"
[4] "considerations" "however" "see"
[7] "record" "case" "abundantly"
[10] "supports" "claim" "traditional"
[13] "way" "life" "Amish"
[16] "merely" "matter" "personal"
[19] "preference" "one" "deep"
[22] "religious" "conviction" "shared"
[25] "organized" "group" "intimately"
[28] "related" "daily" "living"
[31] "That" "Old" "Order"
[34] "Amish" "daily" "life"
[37] "religious" "practice" "stem"
[40] "faith" "shown" "fact"
[43] "response" "literal" "interpretation"
[46] "Biblical" "injunction" "Epistle"
[49] "Paul" "Romans" "conformed"
[52] "world" "This" "command"
[55] "fundamental" "Amish" "faith"
[58] "Moreover" "Old" "Order"
[61] "Amish" "religion" "simply"
[64] "matter" "theocratic" "belief"
[67] "As" "expert" "witnesses"
[70] "explained" "Old" "Order"
[73] "Amish" "religion" "pervades"
[76] "determines" "virtually" "entire"
[79] "way" "life" "regulating"
[82] "detail" "Talmudic" "diet"
[85] "strictly" "enforced" "rules"
[88] "church" "community" ""
[[1484]]
[1] "The" "record" "shows" "respondents"
[5] "religious" "beliefs" "attitude" "toward"
[9] "life" "family" "home" "remained"
[13] "constant" "perhaps" "say" "static"
[17] "period" "unparalleled" "progress" "human"
[21] "knowledge" "generally" "great" "changes"
[25] "education" "The" "respondents" "freely"
[29] "concede" "indeed" "assert" "article"
[33] "faith" "religious" "beliefs" "today"
[37] "call" "life" "style" "altered"
[41] "fundamentals" "centuries" "Their" "way"
[45] "life" "church" "oriented" "community"
[49] "separated" "outside" "world" "worldly"
[53] "influences" "attachment" "nature" "soil"
[57] "way" "inherently" "simple" "uncomplicated"
[61] "albeit" "difficult" "preserve" "pressure"
[65] "conform" "Their" "rejection" "telephones"
[69] "automobiles" "radios" "television" "mode"
[73] "dress" "speech" "habits" "manual"
[77] "work" "indeed" "set" "apart"
[81] "much" "contemporary" "society" "customs"
[85] "symbolic" "practical" ""
[[1485]]
[1] "As" "society" "around"
[4] "Amish" "become" "populous"
[7] "urban" "industrialized" "complex"
[10] "particularly" "century" "government"
[13] "regulation" "human" "affairs"
[16] "correspondingly" "become" "detailed"
[19] "pervasive" "The" "Amish"
[22] "mode" "life" "thus"
[25] "come" "conflict" "increasingly"
[28] "requirements" "contemporary" "society"
[31] "exerting" "hydraulic" "insistence"
[34] "conformity" "majoritarian" "standards"
[37] "So" "long" "compulsory"
[40] "education" "laws" "confined"
[43] "eight" "grades" "elementary"
[46] "basic" "education" "imparted"
[49] "nearby" "rural" "schoolhouse"
[52] "large" "proportion" "students"
[55] "Amish" "faith" "Old"
[58] "Order" "Amish" "little"
[61] "basis" "fear" "school"
[64] "attendance" "expose" "children"
[67] "worldly" "influence" "reject"
[70] "But" "modern" "compulsory"
[73] "secondary" "education" "rural"
[76] "areas" "now" "largely"
[79] "carried" "consolidated" "school"
[82] "often" "remote" "student"
[85] "s" "home" "alien"
[88] "daily" "home" "life"
[91] "As" "record" "strongly"
[94] "shows" "values" "programs"
[97] "modern" "secondary" "school"
[100] "sharp" "conflict" "fundamental"
[103] "mode" "life" "mandated"
[106] "Amish" "religion" "modern"
[109] "laws" "requiring" "compulsory"
[112] "secondary" "education" "accordingly"
[115] "engendered" "great" "concern"
[118] "conflict" "The" "conclusion"
[121] "inescapable" "secondary" "schooling"
[124] "exposing" "Amish" "children"
[127] "worldly" "influences" "terms"
[130] "attitudes" "goals" "values"
[133] "contrary" "beliefs" "substantially"
[136] "interfering" "religious" "development"
[139] "Amish" "child" "integration"
[142] "way" "life" "Amish"
[145] "faith" "community" "crucial"
[148] "adolescent" "stage" "development"
[151] "contravenes" "basic" "religious"
[154] "tenets" "practice" "Amish"
[157] "faith" "parent" "child"
[160] ""
[[1486]]
[1] "The" "impact" "compulsory" "attendance"
[5] "law" "respondents" "practice" "Amish"
[9] "religion" "severe" "inescapable" "Wisconsin"
[13] "law" "affirmatively" "compels" "threat"
[17] "criminal" "sanction" "perform" "acts"
[21] "undeniably" "odds" "fundamental" "tenets"
[25] "religious" "beliefs" "See" "Braunfeld"
[29] "v" "Brown" "U" "S"
[33] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[37] "d" "Nor" "impact" "compulsory"
[41] "attendance" "law" "confined" "grave"
[45] "interference" "important" "Amish" "religious"
[49] "tenets" "subjective" "point" "view"
[53] "It" "carries" "precisely" "kind"
[57] "objective" "danger" "free" "exercise"
[61] "religion" "First" "Amendment" "designed"
[65] "prevent" "As" "record" "shows"
[69] "compulsory" "school" "attendance" "age"
[73] "Amish" "children" "carries" "real"
[77] "threat" "undermining" "Amish" "community"
[81] "religious" "practice" "exist" "today"
[85] "must" "either" "abandon" "belief"
[89] "assimilated" "society" "large" "forced"
[93] "migrate" "tolerant" "region" ""
[[1487]]
[1] "" "In" "sum" "unchallenged"
[5] "testimony" "acknowledged" "experts" "education"
[9] "religious" "history" "almost" "years"
[13] "consistent" "practice" "strong" "evidence"
[17] "sustained" "faith" "pervading" "regulating"
[21] "respondents" "entire" "mode" "life"
[25] "support" "claim" "enforcement" "State"
[29] "s" "requirement" "compulsory" "formal"
[33] "education" "eighth" "grade" "gravely"
[37] "endanger" "destroy" "free" "exercise"
[41] "respondents" "religious" "beliefs" ""
[[1488]]
[1] "III" ""
[[1489]]
[1] "Neither" "findings" "trial" "court"
[5] "Amish" "claims" "nature" "faith"
[9] "challenged" "Court" "State" "Wisconsin"
[13] "Its" "position" "State" "s"
[17] "interest" "universal" "compulsory" "formal"
[21] "secondary" "education" "age" "great"
[25] "paramount" "undisputed" "claims" "respondents"
[29] "mode" "preparing" "youth" "Amish"
[33] "life" "traditional" "elementary" "education"
[37] "essential" "part" "religious" "belief"
[41] "practice" "Nor" "State" "undertake"
[45] "meet" "claim" "Amish" "mode"
[49] "life" "education" "inseparable" "part"
[53] "basic" "tenets" "religion" "indeed"
[57] "much" "part" "religious" "belief"
[61] "practices" "baptism" "confessional" "sabbath"
[65] "may" "others" ""
[[1490]]
[1] "" "Wisconsin" "concedes" "Religion"
[5] "Clauses" "religious" "beliefs" "absolutely"
[9] "free" "State" "s" "control"
[13] "argues" "actions" "even" "though"
[17] "religiously" "grounded" "outside" "protection"
[21] "First" "Amendment" "But" "decisions"
[25] "rejected" "idea" "religiously" "grounded"
[29] "conduct" "always" "outside" "protection"
[33] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "It"
[37] "true" "activities" "individuals" "even"
[41] "religiously" "based" "often" "subject"
[45] "regulation" "States" "exercise" "undoubted"
[49] "power" "promote" "health" "safety"
[53] "general" "welfare" "Federal" "Government"
[57] "exercise" "delegated" "powers" "See"
[61] "e" "g" "Gillette" "v"
[65] "United" "States" "U" "S"
[69] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[73] "d" "Braunfeld" "v" "Brown"
[77] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[81] "L" "Ed" "d" "Prince"
[85] "v" "Massachusetts" "U" "S"
[89] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[93] "Reynolds" "v" "United" "States"
[97] "U" "S" "L" "Ed"
[101] "But" "agree" "religiously" "grounded"
[105] "conduct" "must" "often" "subject"
[109] "broad" "police" "power" "State"
[113] "deny" "areas" "conduct" "protected"
[117] "Free" "Exercise" "Clause" "First"
[121] "Amendment" "thus" "beyond" "power"
[125] "State" "control" "even" "regulations"
[129] "general" "applicability" "E" "g"
[133] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner" "U"
[137] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[141] "Ed" "d" "Murdock" "v"
[145] "Pennsylvania" "U" "S" "S"
[149] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "Cantwell"
[153] "v" "Connecticut" "U" "S"
[157] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[161] "This" "case" "therefore" "become"
[165] "easier" "respondents" "convicted" "actions"
[169] "refusing" "send" "children" "public"
[173] "high" "school" "context" "belief"
[177] "action" "neatly" "confined" "logic"
[181] "tight" "compartments" "Cf" "Lemon"
[185] "v" "Kurtzman" "U" "S"
[189] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[193] "d" ""
[[1491]]
[1] "" "Nor" "can"
[4] "case" "disposed" "grounds"
[7] "Wisconsin" "s" "requirement"
[10] "school" "attendance" "age"
[13] "applies" "uniformly" "citizens"
[16] "State" "face" "discriminate"
[19] "religions" "particular" "religion"
[22] "motivated" "legitimate" "secular"
[25] "concerns" "A" "regulation"
[28] "neutral" "face" "may"
[31] "application" "nonetheless" "offend"
[34] "constitutional" "requirement" "governmental"
[37] "neutrality" "unduly" "burdens"
[40] "free" "exercise" "religion"
[43] "Sherbert" "v" "Verner"
[46] "supra" "cf" "Walz"
[49] "v" "Tax" "Commission"
[52] "U" "S" "S"
[55] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[58] "d" "The" "Court"
[61] "must" "ignore" "danger"
[64] "exception" "general" "obligation"
[67] "citizenship" "religious" "grounds"
[70] "may" "run" "afoul"
[73] "Establishment" "Clause" "danger"
[76] "allowed" "prevent" "exception"
[79] "matter" "vital" "may"
[82] "protection" "values" "promoted"
[85] "right" "free" "exercise"
[88] "By" "preserving" "doctrinal"
[91] "flexibility" "recognizing" "need"
[94] "sensible" "realistic" "application"
[97] "Religion" "Clauses" ""
[[1492]]
[1] "" "able" "chart" "course"
[5] "preserved" "autonomy" "freedom" "religious"
[9] "bodies" "avoiding" "semblance" "established"
[13] "religion" "This" "tight" "rope"
[17] "one" "successfully" "traversed" "Walz"
[21] "v" "Tax" "Commission" "supra"
[25] "S" "Ct" ""
[[1493]]
[1] "We" "turn" "State" "s"
[5] "broader" "contention" "interest" "system"
[9] "compulsory" "education" "compelling" "even"
[13] "established" "religious" "practices" "Amish"
[17] "must" "give" "way" "Where"
[21] "fundamental" "claims" "religious" "freedom"
[25] "stake" "however" "accept" "sweeping"
[29] "claim" "despite" "admitted" "validity"
[33] "generality" "cases" "must" "searchingly"
[37] "examine" "interests" "State" "seeks"
[41] "promote" "requirement" "compulsory" "education"
[45] "age" "impediment" "objectives" "flow"
[49] "recognizing" "claimed" "Amish" "exemption"
[53] "See" "e" "g" "Sherbert"
[57] "v" "Verner" "supra" "Martin"
[61] "v" "City" "Struthers" "U"
[65] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[69] "Ed" "Schneider" "v" "State"
[73] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[77] "L" "Ed" ""
[[1494]]
[1] "The" "State" "advances" "two"
[5] "primary" "arguments" "support" "system"
[9] "compulsory" "education" "It" "notes"
[13] "Thomas" "Jefferson" "pointed" "early"
[17] "history" "degree" "education" "necessary"
[21] "prepare" "citizens" "participate" "effectively"
[25] "intelligently" "open" "political" "system"
[29] "preserve" "freedom" "independence" "Further"
[33] "education" "prepares" "individuals" "self"
[37] "reliant" "self" "sufficient" "participants"
[41] "society" "We" "accept" "propositions"
[45] ""
[[1495]]
[1] "" "However" "evidence" "adduced"
[5] "Amish" "case" "persuasively" "effect"
[9] "additional" "one" "two" "years"
[13] "formal" "high" "school" "Amish"
[17] "children" "place" "long" "established"
[21] "program" "informal" "vocational" "education"
[25] "little" "serve" "interests" "Respondents"
[29] "experts" "testified" "trial" "without"
[33] "challenge" "value" "education" "must"
[37] "assessed" "terms" "capacity" "prepare"
[41] "child" "life" "It" "one"
[45] "thing" "say" "compulsory" "education"
[49] "year" "two" "beyond" "eighth"
[53] "grade" "may" "necessary" "goal"
[57] "preparation" "child" "life" "modern"
[61] "society" "majority" "live" "quite"
[65] "another" "goal" "education" "viewed"
[69] "preparation" "child" "life" "separated"
[73] "agrarian" "community" "keystone" "Amish"
[77] "faith" "See" "Meyer" "v"
[81] "Nebraska" "U" "S" "S"
[85] "Ct" "L" "Ed" ""
[[1496]]
[1] "The" "State" "attacks"
[4] "respondents" "position" "one"
[7] "fostering" "ignorance" "child"
[10] "must" "protected" "State"
[13] "No" "one" "can"
[16] "question" "State" "s"
[19] "duty" "protect" "children"
[22] "ignorance" "argument" "square"
[25] "facts" "disclosed" "record"
[28] "Whatever" "idiosyncrasies" "seen"
[31] "majority" "record" "strongly"
[34] "shows" "Amish" "community"
[37] "highly" "successful" "social"
[40] "unit" "within" "society"
[43] "even" "apart" "conventional"
[46] "mainstream" "Its" "members"
[49] "productive" "law" "abiding"
[52] "members" "society" "reject"
[55] "public" "welfare" "usual"
[58] "modern" "forms" "The"
[61] "Congress" "recognized" "self"
[64] "sufficiency" "authorizing" "exemption"
[67] "groups" "Amish" "obligation"
[70] "pay" "social" "security"
[73] "taxes" ""
[[1497]]
[1] "" "It" "neither" "fair"
[5] "correct" "suggests" "Amish" "opposed"
[9] "education" "beyond" "eighth" "grade"
[13] "level" "What" "record" "shows"
[17] "opposed" "conventional" "formal" "education"
[21] "type" "provided" "certified" "high"
[25] "school" "comes" "child" "s"
[29] "crucial" "adolescent" "period" "religious"
[33] "development" "Dr" "Donald" "Erickson"
[37] "example" "testified" "system" "learning"
[41] "ideal" "system" "education" "terms"
[45] "preparing" "Amish" "children" "life"
[49] "adults" "Amish" "community" "I"
[53] "inclined" "say" "better" "job"
[57] "rest" "us" "As" "put"
[61] "These" "people" "aren" "t"
[65] "purporting" "learned" "people" "seems"
[69] "self" "sufficiency" "community" "best"
[73] "evidence" "I" "can" "point"
[77] "whatever" "done" "seems" "function"
[81] "well" ""
[[1498]]
[1] "We" "must" "forget" "Middle"
[5] "Ages" "important" "values" "civilization"
[9] "Western" "World" "preserved" "members"
[13] "religious" "orders" "isolated" "worldly"
[17] "influences" "great" "obstacles" "There"
[21] "can" "assumption" "today" "s"
[25] "majority" "right" "Amish" "others"
[29] "like" "wrong" "A" "way"
[33] "life" "odd" "even" "erratic"
[37] "interferes" "rights" "interests" "others"
[41] "condemned" "different" ""
[[1499]]
[1] "The" "State" "however" "supports"
[5] "interest" "providing" "additional" "one"
[9] "two" "years" "compulsory" "high"
[13] "school" "education" "Amish" "children"
[17] "possibility" "children" "will" "choose"
[21] "leave" "Amish" "community" "occurs"
[25] "will" "ill" "equipped" "life"
[29] "The" "State" "argues" "Amish"
[33] "children" "leave" "church" "position"
[37] "making" "way" "world" "without"
[41] "education" "available" "one" "two"
[45] "additional" "years" "State" "requires"
[49] "However" "record" "argument" "highly"
[53] "speculative" "There" "specific" "evidence"
[57] "loss" "Amish" "adherents" "attrition"
[61] "showing" "upon" "leaving" "Amish"
[65] "community" "Amish" "children" "practical"
[69] "agricultural" "training" "habits" "industry"
[73] "self" "reliance" "become" "burdens"
[77] "society" "educational" "shortcomings" "Indeed"
[81] "argument" "State" "appears" "rest"
[85] "primarily" "State" "s" "mistaken"
[89] "assumption" "already" "noted" "Amish"
[93] "provide" "education" "children" "beyond"
[97] "eighth" "grade" "allow" "grow"
[101] "ignorance" "To" "contrary" "Amish"
[105] "accept" "necessity" "formal" "schooling"
[109] "eighth" "grade" "level" "continue"
[113] "provide" "characterized" "undisputed" "testimony"
[117] "expert" "educators" "ideal" "vocational"
[121] "education" "children" "adolescent" "years"
[125] ""
[[1500]]
[1] "There" "nothing" "record" "suggest"
[5] "Amish" "qualities" "reliability" "self"
[9] "reliance" "dedication" "work" "fail"
[13] "find" "ready" "markets" "today"
[17] "s" "society" "Absent" "contrary"
[21] "evidence" "supporting" "State" "s"
[25] "position" "unwilling" "assume" "persons"
[29] "possessing" "valuable" "vocational" "skills"
[33] "habits" "doomed" "become" "burdens"
[37] "society" "determine" "leave" "Amish"
[41] "faith" "basis" "record" "warrant"
[45] "finding" "additional" "one" "two"
[49] "years" "formal" "school" "education"
[53] "beyond" "eighth" "grade" "serve"
[57] "eliminate" "problem" "might" "exist"
[61] ""
[[1501]]
[1] "Insofar" "State" "s"
[4] "claim" "rests" "view"
[7] "brief" "additional" "period"
[10] "formal" "education" "imperative"
[13] "enable" "Amish" "participate"
[16] "effectively" "intelligently" "democratic"
[19] "process" "must" "fall"
[22] "The" "Amish" "alternative"
[25] "formal" "secondary" "school"
[28] "education" "enabled" "function"
[31] "effectively" "day" "day"
[34] "life" "self" "imposed"
[37] "limitations" "relations" "world"
[40] "survive" "prosper" "contemporary"
[43] "society" "separate" "sharply"
[46] "identifiable" "highly" "self"
[49] "sufficient" "community" "years"
[52] "country" "In" "strong"
[55] "evidence" "capable" "fulfilling"
[58] "social" "political" "responsibilities"
[61] "citizenship" "without" "compelled"
[64] "attendance" "beyond" "eighth"
[67] "grade" "price" "jeopardizing"
[70] "free" "exercise" "religious"
[73] "belief" "When" "Thomas"
[76] "Jefferson" "emphasized" "need"
[79] "education" "bulwark" "free"
[82] "people" "tyranny" "nothing"
[85] "indicate" "mind" "compulsory"
[88] "education" "fixed" "age"
[91] "beyond" "basic" "education"
[94] "Indeed" "Amish" "communities"
[97] "singularly" "parallel" "reflect"
[100] "many" "virtues" "Jefferson"
[103] "s" "ideal" "sturdy"
[106] "yeoman" "form" "basis"
[109] "considered" "ideal" "democratic"
[112] "society" "Even" "idiosyncratic"
[115] "separateness" "exemplifies" "diversity"
[118] "profess" "admire" "encourage"
[121] ""
[[1502]]
[1] "The" "requirement" "compulsory"
[4] "education" "beyond" "eighth"
[7] "grade" "relatively" "recent"
[10] "development" "history" "Less"
[13] "years" "ago" "educational"
[16] "requirements" "almost" "States"
[19] "satisfied" "completion" "elementary"
[22] "grades" "least" "child"
[25] "regularly" "lawfully" "employed"
[28] "The" "independence" "successful"
[31] "social" "functioning" "Amish"
[34] "community" "period" "approaching"
[37] "almost" "three" "centuries"
[40] "years" "country" "strong"
[43] "evidence" "best" "speculative"
[46] "gain" "terms" "meeting"
[49] "duties" "citizenship" "additional"
[52] "one" "two" "years"
[55] "compulsory" "formal" "education"
[58] "Against" "background" "require"
[61] "particularized" "showing" "State"
[64] "point" "justify" "severe"
[67] "interference" "religious" "freedom"
[70] "additional" "compulsory" "attendance"
[73] "entail" ""
[[1503]]
[1] "We" "also" "note"
[4] "compulsory" "education" "child"
[7] "labor" "laws" "find"
[10] "historical" "origin" "common"
[13] "humanitarian" "instincts" "age"
[16] "limits" "laws" "coordinated"
[19] "achieve" "related" "objectives"
[22] "In" "context" "case"
[25] "considerations" "anything" "support"
[28] "rather" "detract" "respondents"
[31] "position" "The" "origins"
[34] "requirement" "school" "attendance"
[37] "age" "age" "falling"
[40] "completion" "elementary" "school"
[43] "completion" "high" "school"
[46] "entirely" "clear" "But"
[49] "extent" "laws" "reflected"
[52] "movement" "prohibit" "child"
[55] "labor" "age" "culminated"
[58] "provisions" "Federal" "Fair"
[61] "Labor" "Standards" "Act"
[64] "It" "true" "year"
[67] "child" "labor" "age"
[70] "limit" "may" "degree"
[73] "derive" "contemporary" "impression"
[76] "children" "school" "age"
[79] "But" "time" "denied"
[82] "conversely" "year" "education"
[85] "limit" "reflects" "substantial"
[88] "measure" "concern" "children"
[91] "age" "employed" "conditions"
[94] "hazardous" "health" "work"
[97] "performed" "adults" ""
[[1504]]
[1] "The" "requirement" "compulsory" "schooling"
[5] "age" "must" "therefore" "viewed"
[9] "aimed" "merely" "providing" "educational"
[13] "opportunities" "children" "alternative" "equally"
[17] "undesirable" "consequence" "unhealthful" "child"
[21] "labor" "displacing" "adult" "workers"
[25] "hand" "forced" "idleness" "The"
[29] "two" "kinds" "statutes" "compulsory"
[33] "school" "attendance" "child" "labor"
[37] "laws" "tend" "keep" "children"
[41] "certain" "ages" "labor" "market"
[45] "school" "regimen" "turn" "provides"
[49] "opportunity" "prepare" "livelihood" "higher"
[53] "order" "children" "pursue" "without"
[57] "education" "protects" "health" "adolescence"
[61] ""
[[1505]]
[1] "In" "terms" "Wisconsin" "s"
[5] "interest" "compelling" "school" "attendance"
[9] "Amish" "children" "age" "emerges"
[13] "somewhat" "less" "substantial" "requiring"
[17] "attendance" "children" "generally" "For"
[21] "agricultural" "employment" "totally" "outside"
[25] "legitimate" "concerns" "child" "labor"
[29] "laws" "employment" "children" "parental"
[33] "guidance" "family" "farm" "age"
[37] "age" "ancient" "tradition" "lies"
[41] "periphery" "objectives" "laws" "There"
[45] "intimation" "Amish" "employment" "children"
[49] "family" "farms" "way" "deleterious"
[53] "health" "Amish" "parents" "exploit"
[57] "children" "tender" "years" "Any"
[61] "inference" "contrary" "record" "us"
[65] "Moreover" "employment" "Amish" "children"
[69] "family" "farm" "present" "undesirable"
[73] "economic" "aspects" "eliminating" "jobs"
[77] "might" "otherwise" "held" "adults"
[81] ""
[[1506]]
[1] "IV" ""
[[1507]]
[1] "" "Finally" "State"
[4] "authority" "Prince" "v"
[7] "Massachusetts" "argues" "decision"
[10] "exempting" "Amixh" "children"
[13] "State" "s" "requirement"
[16] "fails" "recognize" "substantive"
[19] "right" "Amish" "child"
[22] "secondary" "education" "fails"
[25] "give" "due" "regard"
[28] "power" "State" "parens"
[31] "patriae" "extend" "benefit"
[34] "secondary" "education" "children"
[37] "regardless" "wishes" "parents"
[40] "Taken" "broadest" "sweep"
[43] "Court" "s" "language"
[46] "Prince" "might" "read"
[49] "give" "support" "State"
[52] "s" "position" "However"
[55] "Court" "confronted" "Prince"
[58] "situation" "comparable" "Amish"
[61] "revealed" "record" "shown"
[64] "Court" "s" "severe"
[67] "characterization" "evils" "thought"
[70] "legislature" "legitimately" "associate"
[73] "child" "labor" "even"
[76] "performed" "company" "adult"
[79] "U" "S" "S"
[82] "Ct" "The" "Court"
[85] "later" "took" "great"
[88] "care" "confine" "Prince"
[91] "narrow" "scope" "Sherbert"
[94] "v" "Verner" "stated"
[97] ""
[[1508]]
[1] "" "On" "hand" "Court"
[5] "rejected" "challenges" "Free" "Exercise"
[9] "Clause" "governmental" "regulation" "certain"
[13] "overt" "acts" "prompted" "religious"
[17] "beliefs" "principles" "even" "action"
[21] "accord" "one" "s" "religious"
[25] "convictions" "totally" "free" "legislative"
[29] "restrictions" "Braunfeld" "v" "Brown"
[33] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "L" "Ed" "d" "The"
[41] "conduct" "actions" "regulated" "invariably"
[45] "posed" "substantial" "threat" "public"
[49] "safety" "peace" "order" "See"
[53] "e" "g" "Reynolds" "v"
[57] "United" "States" "U" "S"
[61] "L" "Ed" "Jacobson" "v"
[65] "Massachusetts" "U" "S" "S"
[69] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "Prince"
[73] "v" "Massachusetts" "U" "S"
[77] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[81] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[85] ""
[[1509]]
[1] "This" "case" "course" "one"
[5] "harm" "physical" "mental" "health"
[9] "child" "public" "safety" "peace"
[13] "order" "welfare" "demonstrated" "may"
[17] "properly" "inferred" "The" "record"
[21] "contrary" "reliance" "theory" "find"
[25] "support" "evidence" ""
[[1510]]
[1] "Contrary" "suggestion" "dissenting" "opinion"
[5] "Mr" "Justice" "DOUGLAS" "holding"
[9] "today" "degree" "depends" "assertion"
[13] "religious" "interest" "child" "contrasted"
[17] "parents" "It" "parents" "subject"
[21] "prosecution" "failing" "cause" "children"
[25] "attend" "school" "right" "free"
[29] "exercise" "children" "must" "determine"
[33] "Wisconsin" "s" "power" "impose"
[37] "criminal" "penalties" "parent" "The"
[41] "dissent" "argues" "child" "expresses"
[45] "desire" "attend" "public" "high"
[49] "school" "conflict" "wishes" "parents"
[53] "prevented" "There" "reason" "Court"
[57] "consider" "point" "since" "issue"
[61] "case" "The" "children" "parties"
[65] "litigation" "The" "State" "point"
[69] "tried" "case" "theory" "respondents"
[73] "preventing" "children" "attending" "school"
[77] "expressed" "desires" "indeed" "record"
[81] "contrary" "The" "State" "s"
[85] "position" "outset" "empowered" "apply"
[89] "compulsory" "attendance" "law" "Amish"
[93] "parents" "manner" "parents" "without"
[97] "regard" "wishes" "child" "That"
[101] "claim" "reject" "today" ""
[[1511]]
[1] "Our" "holding" "way" "determines"
[5] "proper" "resolution" "possible" "competing"
[9] "interests" "parents" "children" "State"
[13] "appropriate" "state" "court" "proceeding"
[17] "power" "State" "asserted" "theory"
[21] "Amish" "parents" "preventing" "minor"
[25] "children" "attending" "high" "school"
[29] "despite" "expressed" "desires" "contrary"
[33] "Recognition" "claim" "State" "proceeding"
[37] "course" "call" "question" "traditional"
[41] "concepts" "parental" "control" "religious"
[45] "upbringing" "education" "minor" "children"
[49] "recognized" "Court" "s" "past"
[53] "decisions" "It" "clear" "intrusion"
[57] "State" "family" "decisions" "area"
[61] "religious" "training" "give" "rise"
[65] "grave" "questions" "religious" "freedom"
[69] "comparable" "raised" "presented" "Pierce"
[73] "v" "Society" "Sisters" "U"
[77] "S" "S" "Ct" "L"
[81] "Ed" "On" "record" "neither"
[85] "reach" "decide" "issues" ""
[[1512]]
[1] "The" "State" "s" "argument"
[5] "proceeds" "without" "reliance" "actual"
[9] "conflict" "wishes" "parents" "children"
[13] "It" "appears" "rest" "potential"
[17] "exemption" "Amish" "parents" "requirements"
[21] "compulsory" "education" "law" "might"
[25] "allow" "parents" "act" "contrary"
[29] "best" "interests" "children" "foreclosing"
[33] "opportunity" "make" "intelligent" "choice"
[37] "Amish" "way" "life" "outside"
[41] "world" "The" "argument" "course"
[45] "made" "respect" "church" "schools"
[49] "short" "college" "There" "nothing"
[53] "record" "ordinary" "course" "human"
[57] "experience" "suggest" "non" "Amish"
[61] "parents" "generally" "consult" "children"
[65] "ages" "placed" "church" "school"
[69] "parents" "faith" ""
[[1513]]
[1] "Indeed" "seems" "clear" "State"
[5] "empowered" "parens" "patriae" "save"
[9] "child" "Amish" "parents" "requiring"
[13] "additional" "two" "years" "compulsory"
[17] "formal" "high" "school" "education"
[21] "State" "will" "large" "measure"
[25] "influence" "determine" "religious" "future"
[29] "child" "Even" "markedly" "Prince"
[33] "therefore" "case" "involves" "fundamental"
[37] "interest" "parents" "contrasted" "State"
[41] "guide" "religious" "future" "education"
[45] "children" "The" "history" "culture"
[49] "Western" "civilization" "reflect" "strong"
[53] "tradition" "parental" "concern" "nurture"
[57] "upbringing" "children" "This" "primary"
[61] "role" "parents" "upbringing" "children"
[65] "now" "established" "beyond" "debate"
[69] "enduring" "American" "tradition" "If"
[73] "first" "perhaps" "significant" "statements"
[77] "Court" "area" "found" "Pierce"
[81] "v" "Society" "Sisters" "Court"
[85] "observed" ""
[[1514]]
[1] "" "Under" "doctrine" "Meyer"
[5] "v" "Nebraska" "U" "S"
[9] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[13] "A" "L" "R" "think"
[17] "entirely" "plain" "Act" "unreasonably"
[21] "interferes" "liberty" "parents" "guardians"
[25] "direct" "upbringing" "education" "children"
[29] "control" "As" "often" "heretofore"
[33] "pointed" "rights" "guaranteed" "Constitution"
[37] "may" "abridged" "legislation" "reasonable"
[41] "relation" "purpose" "within" "competency"
[45] "State" "The" "fundamental" "theory"
[49] "liberty" "upon" "governments" "Union"
[53] "repose" "excludes" "general" "power"
[57] "State" "standardize" "children" "forcing"
[61] "accept" "instruction" "public" "teachers"
[65] "The" "child" "mere" "creature"
[69] "State" "nurture" "direct" "destiny"
[73] "right" "coupled" "high" "duty"
[77] "recognize" "prepare" "additional" "obligations"
[81] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[85] ""
[[1515]]
[1] "" "The" "duty"
[4] "prepare" "child" "additional"
[7] "obligations" "referred" "Court"
[10] "must" "read" "include"
[13] "inculcation" "moral" "standards"
[16] "religious" "beliefs" "elements"
[19] "good" "citizenship" "Pierce"
[22] "course" "recognized" "nothing"
[25] "general" "interest" "parent"
[28] "nurture" "education" "children"
[31] "involved" "beyond" "dispute"
[34] "State" "acts" "reasonably"
[37] "constitutionally" "requiring" "education"
[40] "age" "public" "private"
[43] "school" "meeting" "standards"
[46] "prescribed" "State" ""
[[1516]]
[1] "" "However" "read"
[4] "Court" "s" "holding"
[7] "Pierce" "stands" "charter"
[10] "rights" "parents" "direct"
[13] "religious" "upbringing" "children"
[16] "And" "interests" "parenthood"
[19] "combined" "free" "exercise"
[22] "claim" "nature" "revealed"
[25] "record" "merely" "reasonable"
[28] "relation" "purpose" "within"
[31] "competency" "State" "required"
[34] "sustain" "validity" "State"
[37] "s" "requirement" "First"
[40] "Amendment" "To" "sure"
[43] "power" "parent" "even"
[46] "linked" "free" "exercise"
[49] "claim" "may" "subject"
[52] "limitation" "Prince" "appears"
[55] "parental" "decisions" "will"
[58] "jeopardize" "health" "safety"
[61] "child" "potential" "significant"
[64] "social" "burdens" "But"
[67] "case" "Amish" "introduced"
[70] "persuasive" "evidence" "undermining"
[73] "arguments" "State" "advanced"
[76] "support" "claims" "terms"
[79] "welfare" "child" "society"
[82] "whole" "The" "record"
[85] "strongly" "indicates" "accommodating"
[88] "religious" "objections" "Amish"
[91] "forgoing" "one" "two"
[94] "additional" "years" "compulsory"
[97] "education" "will" "impair"
[100] "physical" "mental" "health"
[103] "child" "result" "inability"
[106] "self" "supporting" "discharge"
[109] "duties" "responsibilities" "citizenship"
[112] "way" "materially" "detract"
[115] "welfare" "society" ""
[[1517]]
[1] "In" "fact" "consistent"
[4] "emphasis" "central" "values"
[7] "underlying" "Religion" "Clauses"
[10] "constitutional" "scheme" "government"
[13] "accept" "parens" "patriae"
[16] "claim" "encompassing" "scope"
[19] "sweeping" "potential" "broad"
[22] "unforeseeable" "application" "urged"
[25] "State" ""
[[1518]]
[1] "V" ""
[[1519]]
[1] "" "For" "reasons"
[4] "stated" "hold" "Supreme"
[7] "Court" "Wisconsin" "First"
[10] "Fourteenth" "Amendments" "prevent"
[13] "State" "compelling" "respondents"
[16] "cause" "children" "attend"
[19] "formal" "high" "school"
[22] "age" "Our" "disposition"
[25] "case" "however" "way"
[28] "alters" "recognition" "obvious"
[31] "fact" "courts" "school"
[34] "boards" "legislatures" "ill"
[37] "equipped" "determine" "necessity"
[40] "discrete" "aspects" "State"
[43] "s" "program" "compulsory"
[46] "education" "This" "suggest"
[49] "courts" "must" "move"
[52] "great" "circumspection" "performing"
[55] "sensitive" "delicate" "task"
[58] "weighing" "State" "s"
[61] "legitimate" "social" "concern"
[64] "faced" "religious" "claims"
[67] "exemption" "generally" "applicable"
[70] "education" "requirements" "It"
[73] "overemphasized" "dealing" "way"
[76] "life" "mode" "education"
[79] "group" "claiming" "recently"
[82] "discovered" "progressive" "enlightened"
[85] "process" "rearing" "children"
[88] "modern" "life" ""
[[1520]]
[1] "" "Aided" "history"
[4] "three" "centuries" "identifiable"
[7] "religious" "sect" "long"
[10] "history" "successful" "self"
[13] "sufficient" "segment" "American"
[16] "society" "Amish" "case"
[19] "convincingly" "demonstrated" "sincerity"
[22] "religious" "beliefs" "interrelationship"
[25] "belief" "mode" "life"
[28] "vital" "role" "belief"
[31] "daily" "conduct" "play"
[34] "continued" "survival" "Old"
[37] "Order" "Amish" "communities"
[40] "religious" "organization" "hazards"
[43] "presented" "State" "s"
[46] "enforcement" "statute" "generally"
[49] "valid" "others" "Beyond"
[52] "carried" "even" "difficult"
[55] "burden" "demonstrating" "adequacy"
[58] "alternative" "mode" "continuing"
[61] "informal" "vocational" "education"
[64] "terms" "precisely" "overall"
[67] "interests" "State" "advances"
[70] "support" "program" "compulsory"
[73] "high" "school" "education"
[76] "In" "light" "convincing"
[79] "showing" "one" "probably"
[82] "religious" "groups" "sects"
[85] "make" "weighing" "minimal"
[88] "difference" "State" "require"
[91] "Amish" "already" "accept"
[94] "incumbent" "State" "show"
[97] "particularity" "admittedly" "strong"
[100] "interest" "compulsory" "education"
[103] "adversely" "affected" "granting"
[106] "exemption" "Amish" "Sherbert"
[109] "v" "Verner" "supra"
[112] ""
[[1521]]
[1] "Nothing" "hold" "intended" "undermine"
[5] "general" "applicability" "State" "s"
[9] "compulsory" "school" "attendance" "statutes"
[13] "limit" "power" "State" "promulgate"
[17] "reasonable" "standards" "impairing" "free"
[21] "exercise" "religion" "provide" "continuing"
[25] "agricultural" "vocational" "education" "parental"
[29] "church" "guidance" "Old" "Order"
[33] "Amish" "others" "similarly" "situated"
[37] "The" "States" "long" "history"
[41] "amicable" "effective" "relationships" "church"
[45] "sponsored" "schools" "basis" "assuming"
[49] "related" "context" "reasonable" "standards"
[53] "established" "concerning" "content" "continuing"
[57] "vocational" "education" "Amish" "children"
[61] "parental" "guidance" "provided" "always"
[65] "state" "regulations" "inconsistent" "said"
[69] "opinion" ""
[[1522]]
[1] "Affirmed" ""
[[1523]]
[1] "Mr" "Chief" "Justice" "BURGER" "delivered"
[6] "opinion" "Court" ""
[[1524]]
[1] "The" "issue" "appeal"
[4] "whether" "State" "New"
[7] "Hampshire" "may" "constitutionally"
[10] "enforce" "criminal" "sanctions"
[13] "persons" "cover" "motto"
[16] "Live" "Free" "Die"
[19] "passenger" "vehicle" "license"
[22] "plates" "motto" "repugnant"
[25] "moral" "religious" "beliefs"
[28] ""
[[1525]]
[1] "" ""
[[1526]]
[1] "Since" "New" "Hampshire" "required"
[5] "noncommercial" "vehicles" "bear" "license"
[9] "plates" "embossed" "state" "motto"
[13] "Live" "Free" "Die" "N"
[17] "H" "Rev" "Stat" "Ann"
[21] "s" "Supp" "Another" "New"
[25] "Hampshire" "statute" "makes" "misdemeanor"
[29] "knowingly" "obscure" "figures" "letters"
[33] "number" "plate" "N" "H"
[37] "Rev" "Stat" "Ann" "s"
[41] "c" "Supp" "The" "term"
[45] "letters" "section" "interpreted" "State"
[49] "s" "highest" "court" "include"
[53] "state" "motto" "State" "v"
[57] "Hoskin" "N" "H" "A"
[61] "d" ""
[[1527]]
[1] "Appellees" "George" "Maynard" "wife"
[5] "Maxine" "followers" "Jehovah" "s"
[9] "Witnesses" "faith" "The" "Maynards"
[13] "consider" "New" "Hampshire" "State"
[17] "motto" "repugnant" "moral" "religious"
[21] "political" "beliefs" "therefore" "assert"
[25] "objectionable" "disseminate" "message" "displaying"
[29] "automobiles" "Pursuant" "beliefs" "Maynards"
[33] "began" "early" "cover" "motto"
[37] "license" "plates" ""
[[1528]]
[1] "On" "November" "Mr" "Maynard" "issued"
[6] "citation" "violating" "s" "c" "On"
[11] "December" "appeared" "pro" "se" "Lebanon"
[16] "N" "H" "District" "Court" "answer"
[21] "charge" "After" "waiving" "right" "counsel"
[26] "entered" "plea" "guilty" "proceeded" "explain"
[31] "religious" "objections" "motto" "The" "state"
[36] "trial" "judge" "expressed" "sympathy" "Mr"
[41] "Maynard" "s" "situation" "considered" "bound"
[46] "authority" "State" "v" "Hoskin" "supra"
[51] "hold" "Maynard" "guilty" "A" "fine"
[56] "imposed" "execution" "suspended" "good" "behavior"
[61] ""
[[1529]]
[1] "On" "December" "Mr" "Maynard"
[5] "charged" "violating" "s" "c"
[9] "He" "appeared" "court" "January"
[13] "chose" "represent" "found" "guilty"
[17] "fined" "sentenced" "six" "months"
[21] "Grafton" "County" "House" "Corrections"
[25] "The" "court" "suspended" "jail"
[29] "sentence" "ordered" "Mr" "Maynard"
[33] "also" "pay" "fine" "first"
[37] "offense" "Maynard" "informed" "court"
[41] "matter" "conscience" "refused" "pay"
[45] "two" "fines" "The" "court"
[49] "thereupon" "sentenced" "jail" "period"
[53] "days" "He" "served" "full"
[57] "sentence" ""
[[1530]]
[1] "Prior" "trial" "second" "offense" "Mr"
[6] "Maynard" "charged" "yet" "third" "violation"
[11] "s" "c" "January" "He" "appeared"
[16] "complaint" "day" "second" "offense" "found"
[21] "guilty" "This" "conviction" "continued" "sentence"
[26] "Maynard" "received" "punishment" "addition" "days"
[31] ""
[[1531]]
[1] "" ""
[[1532]]
[1] "On" "March"
[3] "appellees" "brought"
[5] "present" "action"
[7] "pursuant" "U"
[9] "S" "C"
[11] "s" "United"
[13] "States" "District"
[15] "Court" "District"
[17] "New" "Hampshire"
[19] "They" "sought"
[21] "injunctive" "declaratory"
[23] "relief" "enforcement"
[25] "N" "H"
[27] "Rev" "Stat"
[29] "Ann" "ss"
[31] "c" "insofar"
[33] "required" "displaying"
[35] "state" "motto"
[37] "vehicle" "license"
[39] "plates" "made"
[41] "criminal" "offense"
[43] "obscure" "motto"
[45] "On" "March"
[47] "single" "District"
[49] "Judge" "issued"
[51] "temporary" "restraining"
[53] "order" "arrests"
[55] "prosecutions" "Maynards"
[57] "Because" "appellees"
[59] "sought" "injunction"
[61] "state" "statute"
[63] "grounds" "unconstitutionality"
[65] "three" "judge"
[67] "District" "Court"
[69] "convened" "pursuant"
[71] "U" "S"
[73] "C" "s"
[75] "Following" "hearing"
[77] "merits" "District"
[79] "Court" "entered"
[81] "order" "enjoining"
[83] "State" "arresting"
[85] "prosecuting" "Maynards"
[87] "time" "future"
[89] "covering" "portion"
[91] "license" "plates"
[93] "contains" "motto"
[95] "Live" "Free"
[97] "Die" "F"
[99] "Supp" "We"
[101] "noted" "probable"
[103] "jurisdiction" "appeal"
[105] "U" "S"
[107] "S" "Ct"
[109] "L" "Ed"
[111] "d" ""
[[1533]]
[1] "" ""
[[1534]]
[1] "" "Appellants" "argue"
[4] "District" "Court" "precluded"
[7] "exercising" "jurisdiction" "case"
[10] "principles" "equitable" "restraint"
[13] "enunciated" "Younger" "v"
[16] "Harris" "U" "S"
[19] "S" "Ct" "L"
[22] "Ed" "d" "In"
[25] "Younger" "Court" "recognized"
[28] "principles" "judicial" "economy"
[31] "well" "proper" "state"
[34] "federal" "relations" "preclude"
[37] "federal" "courts" "exercising"
[40] "equitable" "jurisdiction" "enjoin"
[43] "ongoing" "state" "prosecutions"
[46] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[49] "However" "genuine" "threat"
[52] "prosecution" "exists" "litigant"
[55] "entitled" "resort" "federal"
[58] "forum" "seek" "redress"
[61] "alleged" "deprivation" "federal"
[64] "rights" "See" "Steffel"
[67] "v" "Thompson" "U"
[70] "S" "S" "Ct"
[73] "L" "Ed" "d"
[76] "Doran" "v" "Salem"
[79] "Inn" "Inc" "U"
[82] "S" "S" "Ct"
[85] "L" "Ed" "d"
[88] "Younger" "principles" "aside"
[91] "litigant" "entitled" "resort"
[94] "federal" "forum" "seeking"
[97] "redress" "U" "S"
[100] "C" "s" "alleged"
[103] "deprivation" "federal" "rights"
[106] "Huffman" "v" "Pursue"
[109] "Ltd" "U" "S"
[112] "n" "S" "Ct"
[115] "L" "Ed" "d"
[118] "Mr" "Maynard" "now"
[121] "finds" "placed" "Scylla"
[124] "intentionally" "flouting" "state"
[127] "law" "Charybdis" "forgoing"
[130] "believes" "constitutionally" "protected"
[133] "activity" "order" "avoid"
[136] "becoming" "enmeshed" "another"
[139] "criminal" "proceeding" "Steffel"
[142] "v" "Thompson" "supra"
[145] "U" "S" "S"
[148] "Ct" "Mrs" "Maynard"
[151] "joint" "owner" "family"
[154] "automobiles" "less" "likely"
[157] "husband" "subjected" "state"
[160] "prosecution" "Under" "circumstances"
[163] "denied" "consideration" "federal"
[166] "remedy" ""
[[1535]]
[1] "Appellants" "however" "point"
[4] "Maynard" "failed" "seek"
[7] "review" "criminal" "convictions"
[10] "cite" "Huffman" "v"
[13] "Pursue" "Ltd" "supra"
[16] "propositions" "necessary" "concomitant"
[19] "Younger" "party" "appellee"
[22] "s" "posture" "must"
[25] "exhaust" "state" "appellate"
[28] "remedies" "seeking" "relief"
[31] "District" "Court" "U"
[34] "S" "S" "Ct"
[37] "Younger" "standards" "must"
[40] "met" "justify" "federal"
[43] "intervention" "state" "judicial"
[46] "proceeding" "losing" "litigant"
[49] "exhausted" "state" "appellate"
[52] "remedies" "id" "S"
[55] "Ct" "Huffman" "however"
[58] "inapposite" "There" "appellee"
[61] "seeking" "prevent" "means"
[64] "federal" "intervention" "enforcement"
[67] "state" "court" "judgment"
[70] "declaring" "theater" "nuisance"
[73] "We" "held" "appellee"
[76] "s" "failure" "exhaust"
[79] "state" "appeals" "barred"
[82] "federal" "intervention" "principles"
[85] "Younger" "Federal" "post"
[88] "trial" "intervention" "fashion"
[91] "designed" "annul" "results"
[94] "state" "trial" "deprives"
[97] "States" "function" "quite"
[100] "legitimately" "left" "overseeing"
[103] "trial" "court" "dispositions"
[106] "constitutional" "issues" "arise"
[109] "civil" "litigation" "jurisdiction"
[112] "Ibid" ""
[[1536]]
[1] "" "Here" "however"
[4] "suit" "way" "designed"
[7] "annul" "results" "state"
[10] "trial" "since" "relief"
[13] "sought" "wholly" "prospective"
[16] "preclude" "prosecution" "statute"
[19] "alleged" "violate" "appellees"
[22] "constitutional" "rights" "Maynard"
[25] "already" "sustained" "convictions"
[28] "served" "sentence" "imprisonment"
[31] "prior" "offenses" "He"
[34] "seek" "record" "expunged"
[37] "annul" "collateral" "effects"
[40] "convictions" "may" "e"
[43] "g" "upon" "driving"
[46] "privileges" "The" "Maynards"
[49] "seek" "free" "prosecutions"
[52] "future" "violations" "statutes"
[55] "Younger" "bar" "federal"
[58] "jurisdiction" ""
[[1537]]
[1] "" "In" "complaint"
[4] "Maynards" "sought" "declaratory"
[7] "injunctive" "relief" "enforcement"
[10] "New" "Hampshire" "statutes"
[13] "We" "recognized" "although"
[16] "o" "rdinarily" "practical"
[19] "effect" "injunctive" "declaratory"
[22] "relief" "will" "virtually"
[25] "identical" "Doran" "v"
[28] "Salem" "Inn" "supra"
[31] "U" "S" "S"
[34] "Ct" "quoting" "Samuels"
[37] "v" "Mackell" "U"
[40] "S" "S" "Ct"
[43] "L" "Ed" "d"
[46] "district" "court" "can"
[49] "generally" "protect" "interests"
[52] "federal" "plaintiff" "entering"
[55] "declaratory" "judgment" "therefore"
[58] "stronger" "injunctive" "medicine"
[61] "will" "unnecessary" "Doran"
[64] "supra" "U" "S"
[67] "S" "Ct" "It"
[70] "correct" "generally" "court"
[73] "will" "enjoin" "enforcement"
[76] "criminal" "statute" "even"
[79] "though" "unconstitutional" "Spielman"
[82] "Motor" "Co" "v"
[85] "Dodge" "U" "S"
[88] "S" "Ct" "L"
[91] "Ed" "since" "s"
[94] "uch" "result" "seriously"
[97] "impairs" "State" "s"
[100] "interest" "enforcing" "criminal"
[103] "laws" "implicates" "concerns"
[106] "federalism" "lie" "heart"
[109] "Younger" "Doran" "supra"
[112] "U" "S" "S"
[115] "Ct" "But" "absolute"
[118] "policy" "circumstances" "injunctive"
[121] "relief" "may" "appropriate"
[124] "To" "justify" "interference"
[127] "must" "exceptional" "circumstances"
[130] "clear" "showing" "injunction"
[133] "necessary" "order" "afford"
[136] "adequate" "protection" "constitutional"
[139] "rights" "Spielman" "Motor"
[142] "Co" "supra" "U"
[145] "S" "S" "Ct"
[148] ""
[[1538]]
[1] "" "We" "situation" "noted"
[5] "three" "successive" "prosecutions" "undertaken"
[9] "Mr" "Maynard" "span" "five"
[13] "weeks" "This" "quite" "different"
[17] "claim" "federal" "equitable" "relief"
[21] "prosecution" "threatened" "first" "time"
[25] "The" "threat" "repeated" "prosecutions"
[29] "future" "wife" "effect" "continuing"
[33] "threat" "ability" "perform" "ordinary"
[37] "tasks" "daily" "life" "require"
[41] "automobile" "sufficient" "justify" "injunctive"
[45] "relief" "Cf" "Douglas" "v"
[49] "City" "Jeannette" "U" "S"
[53] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[57] "We" "therefore" "unwilling" "say"
[61] "District" "Court" "limited" "granting"
[65] "declaratory" "relief" "Having" "determined"
[69] "District" "Court" "required" "stay"
[73] "hand" "either" "appellee" "turn"
[77] "merits" "Maynards" "claim" ""
[[1539]]
[1] "" ""
[[1540]]
[1] "" "The" "District"
[4] "Court" "held" "covering"
[7] "state" "motto" "Live"
[10] "Free" "Die" "automobile"
[13] "license" "plate" "Mr"
[16] "Maynard" "engaging" "symbolic"
[19] "speech" "New" "Hampshire"
[22] "s" "interest" "enforcement"
[25] "defacement" "statute" "sufficient"
[28] "justify" "restriction" "appellee"
[31] "s" "constitutionally" "protected"
[34] "expression" "F" "Supp"
[37] "We" "find" "unnecessary"
[40] "pass" "symbolic" "speech"
[43] "issue" "since" "find"
[46] "appropriate" "First" "Amendment"
[49] "grounds" "affirm" "judgment"
[52] "District" "Court" "We"
[55] "turn" "instead" "view"
[58] "essence" "appellees" "objection"
[61] "requirement" "display" "motto"
[64] "Live" "Free" "Die"
[67] "automobile" "license" "plates"
[70] "This" "succinctly" "summarized"
[73] "statement" "made" "Mr"
[76] "Maynard" "affidavit" "filed"
[79] "District" "Court" ""
[[1541]]
[1] "" "I" "refuse" "coerced"
[5] "State" "advertising" "slogan" "I"
[9] "find" "morally" "ethically" "religiously"
[13] "politically" "abhorrent" "App" ""
[[1542]]
[1] "We" "thus" "faced"
[4] "question" "whether" "State"
[7] "may" "constitutionally" "require"
[10] "individual" "participate" "dissemination"
[13] "ideological" "message" "displaying"
[16] "private" "property" "manner"
[19] "express" "purpose" "observed"
[22] "read" "public" "We"
[25] "hold" "State" "may"
[28] ""
[[1543]]
[1] "" "A" ""
[[1544]]
[1] "" "We" "begin"
[4] "proposition" "right" "freedom"
[7] "thought" "protected" "First"
[10] "Amendment" "state" "action"
[13] "includes" "right" "speak"
[16] "freely" "right" "refrain"
[19] "speaking" "See" "Board"
[22] "Education" "v" "Barnette"
[25] "U" "S" "S"
[28] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[31] "id" "S" "Ct"
[34] "Murphy" "J" "concurring"
[37] "A" "system" "secures"
[40] "right" "proselytize" "religious"
[43] "political" "ideological" "causes"
[46] "must" "also" "guarantee"
[49] "concomitant" "right" "decline"
[52] "foster" "concepts" "The"
[55] "right" "speak" "right"
[58] "refrain" "speaking" "complementary"
[61] "components" "broader" "concept"
[64] "individual" "freedom" "mind"
[67] "Id" "S" "Ct"
[70] "This" "illustrated" "recent"
[73] "case" "Miami" "Herald"
[76] "Publishing" "Co" "v"
[79] "Tornillo" "U" "S"
[82] "S" "Ct" "L"
[85] "Ed" "d" "held"
[88] "unconstitutional" "Florida" "statute"
[91] "placing" "affirmative" "duty"
[94] "upon" "newspapers" "publish"
[97] "replies" "political" "candidates"
[100] "criticized" "We" "concluded"
[103] "requirement" "deprived" "newspaper"
[106] "fundamental" "right" "decide"
[109] "print" "omit" ""
[[1545]]
[1] "" "Faced" "penalties" "accrue"
[5] "newspaper" "published" "news" "commentary"
[9] "arguably" "within" "reach" "right"
[13] "access" "statute" "editors" "might"
[17] "well" "conclude" "safe" "course"
[21] "avoid" "controversy" "Therefore" "operation"
[25] "Florida" "statute" "political" "electoral"
[29] "coverage" "blunted" "reduced" "Government"
[33] "enforced" "right" "access" "inescapably"
[37] "dampens" "vigor" "limits" "variety"
[41] "public" "debate" "New" "York"
[45] "Times" "Co" "v" "Sullivan"
[49] "U" "S" "S" "Ct"
[53] "L" "Ed" "d" "Id"
[57] "S" "Ct" "footnote" "omitted"
[61] ""
[[1546]]
[1] "" "The" "Court" "Barnette"
[5] "supra" "faced" "state" "statute"
[9] "required" "public" "school" "students"
[13] "participate" "daily" "public" "ceremonies"
[17] "honoring" "flag" "words" "traditional"
[21] "salute" "gestures" "In" "overruling"
[25] "prior" "decision" "Minersville" "District"
[29] "v" "Gobitis" "U" "S"
[33] "S" "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[37] "Court" "held" "ceremony" "touching"
[41] "matters" "opinion" "political" "attitude"
[45] "may" "imposed" "upon" "individual"
[49] "official" "authority" "powers" "committed"
[53] "political" "organization" "Constitution" "U"
[57] "S" "S" "Ct" "Compelling"
[61] "affirmative" "act" "flag" "salute"
[65] "involved" "serious" "infringement" "upon"
[69] "personal" "liberties" "passive" "act"
[73] "carrying" "state" "motto" "license"
[77] "plate" "difference" "essentially" "one"
[81] "degree" "Here" "Barnette" "faced"
[85] "state" "measure" "forces" "individual"
[89] "part" "daily" "life" "indeed"
[93] "constantly" "automobile" "public" "view"
[97] "instrument" "fostering" "public" "adherence"
[101] "ideological" "point" "view" "finds"
[105] "unacceptable" "In" "State" "invades"
[109] "sphere" "intellect" "spirit" "purpose"
[113] "First" "Amendment" "Constitution" "reserve"
[117] "official" "control" "Id" "S"
[121] "Ct" ""
[[1547]]
[1] "" "New" "Hampshire" "s"
[5] "statute" "effect" "requires" "appellees"
[9] "use" "private" "property" "mobile"
[13] "billboard" "State" "s" "ideological"
[17] "message" "suffer" "penalty" "Maynard"
[21] "already" "As" "condition" "driving"
[25] "automobile" "virtual" "necessity" "Americans"
[29] "Maynards" "must" "display" "Live"
[33] "Free" "Die" "hundreds" "people"
[37] "day" "The" "fact" "individuals"
[41] "agree" "thrust" "New" "Hampshire"
[45] "s" "motto" "test" "Americans"
[49] "also" "find" "flag" "salute"
[53] "acceptable" "The" "First" "Amendment"
[57] "protects" "right" "individuals" "hold"
[61] "point" "view" "different" "majority"
[65] "refuse" "foster" "way" "New"
[69] "Hampshire" "commands" "idea" "find"
[73] "morally" "objectionable" ""
[[1548]]
[1] "B" ""
[[1549]]
[1] "" "Identifying" "Maynards"
[4] "interests" "implicating" "First"
[7] "Amendment" "protections" "end"
[10] "inquiry" "however" "We"
[13] "must" "also" "determine"
[16] "whether" "State" "s"
[19] "countervailing" "interest" "sufficiently"
[22] "compelling" "justify" "requiring"
[25] "appellees" "display" "state"
[28] "motto" "license" "plates"
[31] "See" "e" "g"
[34] "United" "States" "v"
[37] "O" "Brien" "U"
[40] "S" "S" "Ct"
[43] "L" "Ed" "d"
[46] "The" "two" "interests"
[49] "advanced" "State" "display"
[52] "motto" "facilitates" "identification"
[55] "passenger" "vehicles" "promotes"
[58] "appreciation" "history" "individualism"
[61] "state" "pride" ""
[[1550]]
[1] "The" "State" "first"
[4] "points" "passenger" "vehicles"
[7] "commercial" "trailer" "vehicles"
[10] "required" "display" "state"
[13] "motto" "Thus" "argument"
[16] "proceeds" "officers" "law"
[19] "easily" "able" "determine"
[22] "whether" "passenger" "vehicles"
[25] "carrying" "proper" "plates"
[28] "However" "record" "reveals"
[31] "New" "Hampshire" "passenger"
[34] "license" "plates" "normally"
[37] "consist" "specific" "configuration"
[40] "letters" "numbers" "makes"
[43] "readily" "distinguishable" "types"
[46] "plates" "even" "without"
[49] "reference" "state" "motto"
[52] "Even" "credit" "State"
[55] "s" "reasons" "even"
[58] "though" "governmental" "purpose"
[61] "legitimate" "substantial" "purpose"
[64] "pursued" "means" "broadly"
[67] "stifle" "fundamental" "personal"
[70] "liberties" "end" "can"
[73] "narrowly" "achieved" "The"
[76] "breadth" "legislative" "abridgment"
[79] "must" "viewed" "light"
[82] "less" "drastic" "means"
[85] "achieving" "basic" "purpose"
[88] "Shelton" "v" "Tucker"
[91] "U" "S" "S"
[94] "Ct" "L" "Ed"
[97] "d" "footnotes" "omitted"
[100] ""
[[1551]]
[1] "The" "State" "s" "second"
[5] "claimed" "interest" "ideologically" "neutral"
[9] "The" "State" "seeking" "communicate"
[13] "others" "official" "view" "proper"
[17] "appreciation" "history" "state" "pride"
[21] "individualism" "Of" "course" "State"
[25] "may" "legitimately" "pursue" "interests"
[29] "number" "ways" "However" "State"
[33] "s" "interest" "disseminate" "ideology"
[37] "matter" "acceptable" "interest" "outweigh"
[41] "individual" "s" "First" "Amendment"
[45] "right" "avoid" "becoming" "courier"
[49] "message" ""
[[1552]]
[1] "" "We" "conclude" "State"
[5] "New" "Hampshire" "may" "require"
[9] "appellees" "display" "state" "motto"
[13] "upon" "vehicle" "license" "plates"
[17] "accordingly" "affirm" "judgment" "District"
[21] "Court" ""
[[1553]]
[1] "Affirmed" ""
[[1554]]
[1] "" ""
[[1555]]
[1] "" ""
[[1556]]
[1] "" ""
[[1557]]
[1] "" "" [1] "docname" "Segment" "WPS" "WC"
[5] "Sixltr" "Dic" "anger" "anticipation"
[9] "disgust" "fear" "joy" "negative"
[13] "positive" "sadness" "surprise" "trust"
[17] "AllPunc" "Period" "Comma" "Colon"
[21] "SemiC" "QMark" "Exclam" "Dash"
[25] "Quote" "Apostro" "Parenth" "OtherP" 
[[1]]
[1] "Chief" "Justice" "BURGER" "announced" "judgment"
[6] "Court" "delivered" "opinion" "Court" "respect"
[11] "Parts" "I" "II" "opinion" "respect"
[16] "Part" "III" "Justice" "POWELL" "Justice"
[21] "REHNQUIST" "join" ""
[[2]]
[1] "" "On" "August" "shall"
[5] "policy" "United" "States" "protect"
[9] "preserve" "American" "Indians" "inherent"
[13] "right" "freedom" "believe" "express"
[17] "exercise" "traditional" "religions" "American"
[21] "Indian" "Eskimo" "Aleut" "Native"
[25] "Hawaiians" "including" "limited" "access"
[29] "sites" "use" "possession" "sacred"
[33] "objects" "freedom" "worship" "ceremonials"
[37] "traditional" "rites" "U" "S"
[41] "C" ""
[[3]]
[1] "Mr" "Chief" "Justice" "WARREN" "announced"
[6] "judgment" "Court" "opinion" "Mr" "Justice"
[11] "BLACK" "Mr" "Justice" "CLARK" "Mr"
[16] "Justice" "WHITTAKER" "concur" ""
[[4]]
[1] "Refusing" "alter" "bylaws" "CLS"
[5] "obtain" "RSO" "status" "It"
[9] "however" "operate" "independently" "academic"
[13] "year" "CLS" "held" "weekly"
[17] "Bible" "study" "meetings" "invited"
[21] "Hastings" "students" "Good" "Friday"
[25] "Easter" "Sunday" "church" "services"
[29] "Id" "It" "also" "hosted"
[33] "beach" "barbeque" "Thanksgiving" "dinner"
[37] "campus" "lecture" "Christian" "faith"
[41] "legal" "practice" "several" "fellowship"
[45] "dinners" "end" "year" "banquet"
[49] "informal" "social" "activities" "Ibid"
[53] ""
[[5]]
[1] "" "In" "sum" "persuaded"
[5] "limited" "public" "forum" "precedents"
[9] "adequately" "respect" "CLS" "s"
[13] "speech" "expressive" "association" "rights"
[17] "fairly" "balance" "rights" "Hastings"
[21] "interests" "property" "owner" "educational"
[25] "institution" "We" "turn" "merits"
[29] "instant" "dispute" "therefore" "limited"
[33] "public" "forum" "decisions" "guide"
[37] ""
[[6]]
[1] "Petitioner" "Church" "Lukumi" "Babalu"
[5] "Aye" "Inc" "Church" "profit"
[9] "corporation" "organized" "Florida" "law"
[13] "The" "Church" "congregants" "practice"
[17] "Santeria" "religion" "The" "president"
[21] "Church" "petitioner" "Ernesto" "Pichardo"
[25] "also" "Church" "s" "priest"
[29] "holds" "religious" "title" "Italero"
[33] "second" "highest" "Santeria" "faith"
[37] "In" "April" "Church" "leased"
[41] "land" "City" "Hialeah" "Florida"
[45] "announced" "plans" "establish" "house"
[49] "worship" "well" "school" "cultural"
[53] "center" "museum" "Pichardo" "indicated"
[57] "Church" "s" "goal" "bring"
[61] "practice" "Santeria" "faith" "including"
[65] "ritual" "animal" "sacrifice" "open"
[69] "The" "Church" "began" "process"
[73] "obtaining" "utility" "service" "receiving"
[77] "necessary" "licensing" "inspection" "zoning"
[81] "approvals" "Although" "Church" "s"
[85] "efforts" "obtaining" "necessary" "licenses"
[89] "permits" "far" "smooth" "see"
[93] "F" "Supp" "appears" "received"
[97] "needed" "approvals" "early" "August"
[101] ""
[[7]]
[1] "Four" "Members" "Court" "disagreed"
[5] "They" "argued" "law" "placed"
[9] "substantial" "burden" "Native" "American"
[13] "Church" "members" "upheld" "law"
[17] "served" "compelling" "state" "interest"
[21] "narrowly" "tailored" "achieve" "end"
[25] "Id" "S" "Ct" "Justice"
[29] "O" "CONNOR" "concluded" "Oregon"
[33] "satisfied" "test" "Justice" "Blackmun"
[37] "joined" "Justice" "Brennan" "Justice"
[41] "Marshall" "see" "compelling" "interest"
[45] "justifying" "law" "s" "application"
[49] "members" ""
[[8]]
[1] "A" "family" "whose" "child"
[5] "awarded" "scholarship" "program" "may"
[9] "use" "qualified" "education" "provider"
[13] "private" "school" "meets" "certain"
[17] "accreditation" "testing" "safety" "requirements"
[21] "See" "Virtually" "every" "private"
[25] "school" "Montana" "qualifies" "Upon"
[29] "receiving" "scholarship" "family" "designates"
[33] "school" "choice" "scholarship" "organization"
[37] "sends" "scholarship" "funds" "directly"
[41] "school" "Neither" "scholarship" "organization"
[45] "donors" "can" "restrict" "awards"
[49] "particular" "types" "schools" "See"
[53] "b" ""
[[9]]
[1] "" "Aid" "prohibited" "sectarian"
[5] "schools" "The" "legislature" "counties"
[9] "cities" "towns" "school" "districts"
[13] "public" "corporations" "shall" "make"
[17] "direct" "indirect" "appropriation" "payment"
[21] "public" "fund" "monies" "grant"
[25] "lands" "property" "sectarian" "purpose"
[29] "aid" "church" "school" "academy"
[33] "seminary" "college" "university" "literary"
[37] "scientific" "institution" "controlled" "whole"
[41] "part" "church" "sect" "denomination"
[45] "Mont" "Const" "Art" "X"
[49] ""
[[10]]
[1] "Finally" "Court" "agreed"
[4] "petitioners" "Department" "exceeded"
[7] "authority" "promulgating" "Rule"
[10] "The" "Court" "explained"
[13] "statute" "creating" "scholarship"
[16] "program" "broadly" "defined"
[19] "qualifying" "schools" "include"
[22] "private" "schools" "including"
[25] "religious" "ones" "Department"
[28] "lacked" "authority" "transform"
[31] "definition" "administrative" "rule"
[34] "Id" "P" "d"
[37] ""
[[11]]
[1] "Justice" "WHITE" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[12]]
[1] "" "The" "ordinance"
[4] "defines" "public" "accommodation"
[7] "relevant" "part" "ny"
[10] "place" "provider" "public"
[13] "conveyance" "whether" "licensed"
[16] "solicits" "accepts" "patronage"
[19] "trade" "public" "whose"
[22] "goods" "services" "facilities"
[25] "privileges" "advantages" "accommodations"
[28] "extended" "offered" "sold"
[31] "otherwise" "made" "available"
[34] "public" "w" "Certification"
[37] "made" "available" "public"
[40] "usual" "sense" "words"
[43] "To" "make" "service"
[46] "available" "means" "make"
[49] "accessible" "obtainable" "Merriam"
[52] "Webster" "s" "Collegiate"
[55] "Dictionary" "th" "ed"
[58] "see" "also" "Oxford"
[61] "English" "Dictionary" "d"
[64] "ed" "capable" "made"
[67] "use" "one" "s"
[70] "disposal" "within" "one"
[73] "s" "reach" "Related"
[76] "state" "law" "illustrates"
[79] "point" "A" "Pennsylvania"
[82] "antidiscrimination" "statute" "similarly"
[85] "defines" "public" "accommodation"
[88] "accommodation" "open" "accepts"
[91] "solicits" "patronage" "general"
[94] "public" "Pa" "Stat"
[97] "Ann" "Tit" "l"
[100] "Purdon" "Cum" "Supp"
[103] "It" "fleshes" "definition"
[106] "examples" "like" "hotels"
[109] "restaurants" "drug" "stores"
[112] "swimming" "pools" "barbershops"
[115] "public" "conveyances" "Ibid"
[118] "The" "common" "theme"
[121] "public" "accommodation" "must"
[124] "provide" "benefit" "general"
[127] "public" "allowing" "individual"
[130] "members" "general" "public"
[133] "avail" "benefit" "desire"
[136] "Blizzard" "v" "Floyd"
[139] "Pa" "Commw" "A"
[142] "d" ""
[[13]]
[1] "Justice" "BARRETT" "Justice" "KAVANAUGH" "joins"
[6] "Justice" "BREYER" "joins" "first" "paragraph"
[11] "concurring" ""
[[14]]
[1] "Mr" "Chief" "Justice" "WARREN" "announced"
[6] "judgment" "Court" "opinion" "Mr" "Justice"
[11] "BLACK" "Mr" "Justice" "CLARK" "Mr"
[16] "Justice" "WHITTAKER" "concur" ""
[[15]]
[1] "" "In" "general" "Sunday"
[5] "laws" "protect" "public" "guaranteeing"
[9] "one" "day" "seven" "provide"
[13] "period" "rest" "quiet" "Health"
[17] "peace" "good" "order" "society"
[21] "thereby" "promoted" "Such" "provision"
[25] "essentially" "civil" "character" "statutes"
[29] "regarded" "religious" "ordinances" "Report"
[33] "Legislative" "Research" "Council" "relative"
[37] "Legal" "Holidays" "Observance" "Mass"
[41] "Leg" "Docs" "Sen" "Doc"
[45] "No" ""
[[16]]
[1] "" "It" "essentially"
[4] "civil" "regulation" "providing"
[7] "fixed" "period" "rest"
[10] "business" "ordinary" "avocations"
[13] "amusements" "community" "If"
[16] "cessation" "labor" "amusement"
[19] "one" "day" "must"
[22] "selected" "purpose" "even"
[25] "day" "thus" "selected"
[28] "chosen" "great" "majority"
[31] "people" "celebrate" "day"
[34] "peculiar" "sanctity" "legislative"
[37] "authority" "provide" "observance"
[40] "derived" "general" "authority"
[43] "regulate" "business" "community"
[46] "provide" "moral" "physical"
[49] "welfare" "The" "act"
[52] "imposes" "upon" "one"
[55] "religious" "ceremony" "attendance"
[58] "upon" "form" "worship"
[61] "one" "deems" "another"
[64] "day" "suitable" "rest"
[67] "worship" "may" "devote"
[70] "day" "religious" "observance"
[73] "deems" "appropriate" "That"
[76] "one" "conscientiously" "observes"
[79] "seventh" "day" "week"
[82] "may" "also" "compelled"
[85] "abstain" "business" "kind"
[88] "expressly" "forbidden" "first"
[91] "day" "occasioned" "subordination"
[94] "religion" "member" "community"
[97] "must" "submit" "rules"
[100] "made" "lawful" "authority"
[103] "regulate" "govern" "business"
[106] "community" "Commonwealth" "v"
[109] "Has" "Mass" ""
[[17]]
[1] "Before" "District" "Court" "Government"
[5] "also" "asserted" "interest" "compliance"
[9] "United" "Nations" "Convention" "Psychotropic"
[13] "Substances" "Feb" "U" "S"
[17] "T" "T" "I" "A"
[21] "S" "No" "The" "Convention"
[25] "signed" "United" "States" "implemented"
[29] "Controlled" "Substances" "Act" "calls"
[33] "signatories" "prohibit" "use" "hallucinogens"
[37] "including" "DMT" "The" "Government"
[41] "argues" "compelling" "interest" "meeting"
[45] "international" "obligations" "complying" "Convention"
[49] ""
[[18]]
[1] "JUSTICE" "WHITE" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[19]]
[1] "The" "Synod" "classifies" "teachers"
[5] "two" "categories" "called" "lay"
[9] "Called" "teachers" "regarded" "called"
[13] "vocation" "God" "congregation" "To"
[17] "eligible" "receive" "call" "congregation"
[21] "teacher" "must" "satisfy" "certain"
[25] "academic" "requirements" "One" "way"
[29] "completing" "colloquy" "program" "Lutheran"
[33] "college" "university" "The" "program"
[37] "requires" "candidates" "take" "eight"
[41] "courses" "theological" "study" "obtain"
[45] "endorsement" "local" "Synod" "district"
[49] "pass" "oral" "examination" "faculty"
[53] "committee" "A" "teacher" "meets"
[57] "requirements" "may" "called" "congregation"
[61] "Once" "called" "teacher" "receives"
[65] "formal" "title" "Minister" "Religion"
[69] "Commissioned" "App" "A" "commissioned"
[73] "minister" "serves" "open" "ended"
[77] "term" "Hosanna" "Tabor" "call"
[81] "rescinded" "cause" "supermajority" "vote"
[85] "congregation" ""
[[20]]
[1] "" "To" "begin"
[4] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "held"
[7] "Perich" "minister" "role"
[10] "distinct" "members" "When"
[13] "Hosanna" "Tabor" "extended"
[16] "call" "issued" "diploma"
[19] "vocation" "according" "title"
[22] "Minister" "Religion" "Commissioned"
[25] "App" "She" "tasked"
[28] "performing" "office" "according"
[31] "Word" "God" "confessional"
[34] "standards" "Evangelical" "Lutheran"
[37] "Church" "drawn" "Sacred"
[40] "Scriptures" "Ibid" "The"
[43] "congregation" "prayed" "God"
[46] "bless" "ministrations" "glory"
[49] "His" "holy" "name"
[52] "building" "His" "church"
[55] "Id" "In" "supplement"
[58] "diploma" "congregation" "undertook"
[61] "periodically" "review" "Perich"
[64] "s" "skills" "ministry"
[67] "ministerial" "responsibilities" "provide"
[70] "continuing" "education" "professional"
[73] "person" "ministry" "Gospel"
[76] "Id" ""
[[21]]
[1] "Perich" "s" "title"
[4] "minister" "reflected" "significant"
[7] "degree" "religious" "training"
[10] "followed" "formal" "process"
[13] "commissioning" "To" "eligible"
[16] "become" "commissioned" "minister"
[19] "Perich" "complete" "eight"
[22] "college" "level" "courses"
[25] "subjects" "including" "biblical"
[28] "interpretation" "church" "doctrine"
[31] "ministry" "Lutheran" "teacher"
[34] "She" "also" "obtain"
[37] "endorsement" "local" "Synod"
[40] "district" "submitting" "petition"
[43] "contained" "academic" "transcripts"
[46] "letters" "recommendation" "personal"
[49] "statement" "written" "answers"
[52] "various" "ministry" "related"
[55] "questions" "Finally" "pass"
[58] "oral" "examination" "faculty"
[61] "committee" "Lutheran" "college"
[64] "It" "took" "Perich"
[67] "six" "years" "fulfill"
[70] "requirements" "And" "eventually"
[73] "commissioned" "minister" "upon"
[76] "election" "congregation" "recognized"
[79] "God" "s" "call"
[82] "teach" "At" "point"
[85] "call" "rescinded" "upon"
[88] "supermajority" "vote" "congregation"
[91] "protection" "designed" "allow"
[94] "preach" "Word" "God"
[97] "boldly" "Brief" "Lutheran"
[100] "Church" "Missouri" "Synod"
[103] "Amicus" "Curiae" ""
[[22]]
[1] "In" "light" "considerations"
[4] "formal" "title" "given"
[7] "Perich" "Church" "substance"
[10] "reflected" "title" "use"
[13] "title" "important" "religious"
[16] "functions" "performed" "Church"
[19] "conclude" "Perich" "minister"
[22] "covered" "ministerial" "exception"
[25] ""
[[23]]
[1] "The" "interest" "society"
[4] "enforcement" "employment" "discrimination"
[7] "statutes" "undoubtedly" "important"
[10] "But" "interest" "religious"
[13] "groups" "choosing" "will"
[16] "preach" "beliefs" "teach"
[19] "faith" "carry" "mission"
[22] "When" "minister" "fired"
[25] "sues" "church" "alleging"
[28] "termination" "discriminatory" "First"
[31] "Amendment" "struck" "balance"
[34] "us" "The" "church"
[37] "must" "free" "choose"
[40] "will" "guide" "way"
[43] ""
[[24]]
[1] "This" "case" "involves" "dispute"
[5] "ownership" "church" "property" "following"
[9] "schism" "local" "church" "affiliated"
[13] "hierarchical" "church" "organization" "The"
[17] "question" "decision" "whether" "civil"
[21] "courts" "consistent" "First" "Fourteenth"
[25] "Amendments" "Constitution" "may" "resolve"
[29] "dispute" "basis" "neutral" "principles"
[33] "law" "whether" "must" "defer"
[37] "resolution" "authoritative" "tribunal" "hierarchical"
[41] "church" ""
[[25]]
[1] "In" "year" "organized"
[4] "Vineville" "church" "established"
[7] "member" "church" "Augusta"
[10] "Macon" "Presbytery" "Presbyterian"
[13] "Church" "United" "States"
[16] "PCUS" "The" "PCUS"
[19] "generally" "hierarchical" "connectional"
[22] "form" "government" "contrasted"
[25] "congregational" "form" "Under"
[28] "polity" "PCUS" "government"
[31] "local" "church" "committed"
[34] "Session" "first" "instance"
[37] "actions" "assembly" "court"
[40] "subject" "review" "control"
[43] "higher" "church" "courts"
[46] "Presbytery" "Synod" "General"
[49] "Assembly" "respectively" "The"
[52] "powers" "duties" "level"
[55] "hierarchy" "set" "forth"
[58] "constitution" "PCUS" "Book"
[61] "Church" "Order" "part"
[64] "record" "present" "case"
[67] ""
[[26]]
[1] "In" "present" "case" "Georgia"
[5] "courts" "sought" "apply" "neutral"
[9] "principles" "analysis" "Presbyterian" "Church"
[13] "II" "Carnes" "facts" "presented"
[17] "Vineville" "church" "controversy" "Here"
[21] "two" "earlier" "cases" "deeds"
[25] "conveyed" "property" "local" "church"
[29] "Here" "earlier" "cases" "neither"
[33] "state" "statutes" "dealing" "implied"
[37] "trusts" "corporate" "charter" "Vineville"
[41] "church" "indicated" "general" "church"
[45] "interest" "property" "And" "Presbyterian"
[49] "Church" "II" "contrast" "Carnes"
[53] "provisions" "constitution" "general" "church"
[57] "Book" "Church" "Order" "concerning"
[61] "ownership" "control" "property" "failed"
[65] "reveal" "language" "trust" "favor"
[69] "general" "church" "The" "courts"
[73] "accordingly" "held" "legal" "title"
[77] "property" "Vineville" "church" "vested"
[81] "local" "congregation" "Without" "analysis"
[85] "elaboration" "decreed" "local" "congregation"
[89] "represented" "majority" "faction" "respondents"
[93] "herein" "App" "Pet" "Cert"
[97] "Ga" "S" "E" "d"
[101] ""
[[27]]
[1] "" "The" "question" "presented"
[5] "case" "faction" "formerly" "united"
[9] "Vineville" "congregation" "entitled" "possess"
[13] "enjoy" "property" "located" "Vineville"
[17] "Avenue" "Macon" "Ga" "There"
[21] "can" "little" "doubt" "general"
[25] "authority" "civil" "courts" "resolve"
[29] "question" "The" "State" "obvious"
[33] "legitimate" "interest" "peaceful" "resolution"
[37] "property" "disputes" "providing" "civil"
[41] "forum" "ownership" "church" "property"
[45] "can" "determined" "conclusively" "Presbyterian"
[49] "Church" "I" "U" "S"
[53] "S" "Ct" ""
[[28]]
[1] "It" "remains" "determined"
[4] "whether" "Georgia" "neutral"
[7] "principles" "analysis" "constitutionally"
[10] "applied" "facts" "case"
[13] "Although" "trial" "court"
[16] "Supreme" "Court" "Georgia"
[19] "viewed" "case" "involving"
[22] "nothing" "application" "principles"
[25] "developed" "Presbyterian" "Church"
[28] "II" "Carnes" "present"
[31] "case" "contains" "significant"
[34] "complicating" "factor" "absent"
[37] "earlier" "cases" "Presbyterian"
[40] "Church" "II" "Carnes"
[43] "involved" "church" "property"
[46] "dispute" "general" "church"
[49] "entire" "local" "congregation"
[52] "Here" "local" "congregation"
[55] "divided" "majority" "members"
[58] "sought" "withdraw" "PCUS"
[61] "minority" "members" "wished"
[64] "maintain" "affiliation" "Neither"
[67] "state" "courts" "alluded"
[70] "problem" "however" "concluded"
[73] "without" "discussion" "analysis"
[76] "title" "property" "local"
[79] "church" "local" "church"
[82] "represented" "majority" "rather"
[85] "minority" ""
[[29]]
[1] "Petitioners" "earnestly" "submit"
[4] "question" "faction" "true"
[7] "representative" "Vineville" "church"
[10] "ecclesiastical" "question" "answered"
[13] "civil" "court" "At"
[16] "least" "said" "answered"
[19] "civil" "court" "case"
[22] "involving" "hierarchical" "church"
[25] "like" "PCUS" "duly"
[28] "appointed" "church" "commission"
[31] "determined" "two" "factions"
[34] "represents" "true" "congregation"
[37] "Respondents" "opposition" "argue"
[40] "effect" "Georgia" "courts"
[43] "apply" "ordinary" "presumption"
[46] "absent" "indication" "contrary"
[49] "voluntary" "religious" "association"
[52] "represented" "majority" "members"
[55] ""
[[30]]
[1] "Justice" "WHITE" "delivered" "opinion" "Court"
[6] ""
[[31]]
[1] "The" "Act" "defines" "public"
[5] "accommodation" "broadly" "include" "place"
[9] "business" "engaged" "sales" "public"
[13] "place" "offering" "services" "public"
[17] "excludes" "church" "synagogue" "mosque"
[21] "place" "principally" "used" "religious"
[25] "purposes" ""
[[32]]
[1] "Mr" "Chief" "Justice" "BURGER" "announced"
[6] "judgment" "Court" "delivered" "opinion" "Mr"
[11] "Justice" "POWELL" "Mr" "Justice" "REHNQUIST"
[16] "Mr" "Justice" "STEVENS" "joined" ""
[[33]]
[1] "McDaniel" "ordained" "minister"
[4] "Baptist" "Church" "Chattanooga"
[7] "Tenn" "filed" "candidate"
[10] "delegate" "constitutional" "convention"
[13] "An" "opposing" "candidate"
[16] "appellee" "Selma" "Cash"
[19] "Paty" "sued" "Chancery"
[22] "Court" "declaratory" "judgment"
[25] "McDaniel" "disqualified" "serving"
[28] "delegate" "judgment" "striking"
[31] "name" "ballot" "Chancellor"
[34] "Franks" "Chancery" "Court"
[37] "held" "ch" "violated"
[40] "First" "Fourteenth" "Amendments"
[43] "Federal" "Constitution" "declared"
[46] "McDaniel" "eligible" "office"
[49] "delegate" "Accordingly" "McDaniel"
[52] "s" "name" "remained"
[55] "ballot" "ensuing" "election"
[58] "elected" "vote" "almost"
[61] "equal" "three" "opposing"
[64] "candidates" ""
[[34]]
[1] "" "The" "independence" "religious"
[5] "institutions" "matters" "faith" "doctrine"
[9] "closely" "linked" "independence" "termed"
[13] "matters" "church" "government" "U"
[17] "S" "S" "Ct" "This"
[21] "mean" "religious" "institutions" "enjoy"
[25] "general" "immunity" "secular" "laws"
[29] "protect" "autonomy" "respect" "internal"
[33] "management" "decisions" "essential" "institution"
[37] "s" "central" "mission" "And"
[41] "component" "autonomy" "selection" "individuals"
[45] "play" "certain" "key" "roles"
[49] ""
[[35]]
[1] "First" "noted" "church" "given"
[5] "Perich" "title" "minister" "role"
[9] "distinct" "members" "Id" "S"
[13] "Ct" "Although" "minister" "usual"
[17] "sense" "term" "pastor" "deacon"
[21] "lead" "congregation" "regularly" "conduct"
[25] "religious" "services" "classified" "called"
[29] "teacher" "opposed" "lay" "teacher"
[33] "completing" "certain" "academic" "requirements"
[37] "given" "formal" "title" "Minister"
[41] "Religion" "Commissioned" "Id" "S"
[45] "Ct" ""
[[36]]
[1] "This" "church" "property"
[4] "dispute" "arose" "two"
[7] "local" "churches" "withdrew"
[10] "hierarchical" "general" "church"
[13] "organization" "Under" "Georgia"
[16] "law" "right" "property"
[19] "previously" "used" "local"
[22] "churches" "made" "turn"
[25] "civil" "court" "jury"
[28] "decision" "whether" "general"
[31] "church" "abandoned" "departed"
[34] "tenets" "faith" "practice"
[37] "held" "time" "local"
[40] "churches" "affiliated" "The"
[43] "question" "presented" "whether"
[46] "restraints" "First" "Amendment"
[49] "applied" "States" "Fourteenth"
[52] "Amendment" "permit" "civil"
[55] "court" "award" "church"
[58] "property" "basis" "interpretation"
[61] "significance" "civil" "court"
[64] "assigns" "aspects" "church"
[67] "doctrine" ""
[[37]]
[1] "Petitioner" "Presbyterian" "Church" "United"
[5] "States" "association" "local" "Presbyterian"
[9] "churches" "governed" "hierarchical" "structure"
[13] "tribunals" "consists" "ascending" "order"
[17] "Church" "Session" "composed" "elders"
[21] "local" "church" "Presbytery" "composed"
[25] "several" "churches" "geographical" "area"
[29] "Synod" "generally" "composed" "Presbyteries"
[33] "within" "State" "General" "Assembly"
[37] "highest" "governing" "body" ""
[[38]]
[1] "A" "dispute" "arose"
[4] "petitioner" "general" "church"
[7] "two" "local" "churches"
[10] "Savannah" "Georgia" "respondents"
[13] "Hull" "Memorial" "Presbyterian"
[16] "Church" "Eastern" "Heights"
[19] "Presbyterian" "Church" "control"
[22] "properties" "used" "local"
[25] "churches" "In" "membership"
[28] "local" "churches" "belief"
[31] "certain" "actions" "pronouncements"
[34] "general" "church" "violations"
[37] "organization" "s" "constitution"
[40] "departures" "doctrine" "practice"
[43] "force" "time" "affiliation"
[46] "voted" "withdraw" "general"
[49] "church" "reconstitute" "local"
[52] "churches" "autonomous" "Presbyterian"
[55] "organization" "The" "ministers"
[58] "two" "churches" "renounced"
[61] "general" "church" "s"
[64] "jurisdiction" "authority" "two"
[67] "ruling" "elders" "In"
[70] "response" "general" "church"
[73] "Presbytery" "Savannah" "established"
[76] "Administrative" "Commission" "seek"
[79] "conciliation" "The" "dissident"
[82] "local" "churchmen" "remained"
[85] "steadfast" "consequently" "Commission"
[88] "acknowledged" "withdrawal" "local"
[91] "leadership" "proceeded" "take"
[94] "local" "churches" "property"
[97] "behalf" "general" "church"
[100] "new" "local" "leadership"
[103] "appointed" ""
[[39]]
[1] "" "The" "local" "churchmen"
[5] "made" "effort" "appeal" "Commission"
[9] "s" "action" "higher" "church"
[13] "tribunals" "Synod" "Georgia" "General"
[17] "Assembly" "Instead" "churches" "filed"
[21] "separate" "suits" "Superior" "Court"
[25] "Chatham" "County" "enjoin" "general"
[29] "church" "trespassing" "disputed" "property"
[33] "title" "local" "churches" "The"
[37] "cases" "consolidated" "trial" "The"
[41] "general" "church" "moved" "dismiss"
[45] "actions" "cross" "claimed" "injunctive"
[49] "relief" "behalf" "ground" "civil"
[53] "courts" "without" "power" "determine"
[57] "whether" "general" "church" "departed"
[61] "tenets" "faith" "practice" "The"
[65] "motion" "dismiss" "denied" "case"
[69] "submitted" "jury" "theory" "Georgia"
[73] "law" "implies" "trust" "local"
[77] "church" "property" "benefit" "general"
[81] "church" "sole" "condition" "general"
[85] "church" "adhere" "tenets" "faith"
[89] "practice" "existing" "time" "affiliation"
[93] "local" "churches" "Thus" "jury"
[97] "instructed" "determine" "whether" "actions"
[101] "general" "church" "amount" "fundamental"
[105] "substantial" "abandonment" "original" "tenets"
[109] "doctrines" "general" "church" "new"
[113] "tenets" "doctrines" "utterly" "variant"
[117] "purposes" "general" "church" "founded"
[121] "The" "jury" "returned" "verdict"
[125] "local" "churches" "trial" "judge"
[129] "thereupon" "declared" "implied" "trust"
[133] "terminated" "enjoined" "general" "church"
[137] "interfering" "use" "property" "question"
[141] "The" "Supreme" "Court" "Georgia"
[145] "affirmed" "Ga" "S" "E"
[149] "d" "We" "granted" "certiorari"
[153] "consider" "First" "Amendment" "questions"
[157] "raised" "U" "S" "S"
[161] "Ct" "L" "Ed" "d"
[165] "We" "reverse" ""
[[40]]
[1] "This" "holding" "invalidating"
[4] "legislative" "action" "extended"
[7] "judicial" "action" "Kreshik"
[10] "v" "St" "Nicholas"
[13] "Cathedral" "U" "S"
[16] "S" "Ct" "L"
[19] "Ed" "d" "Court"
[22] "held" "constitutional" "guarantees"
[25] "religious" "liberty" "required"
[28] "reversal" "judgment" "New"
[31] "York" "courts" "transferred"
[34] "control" "St" "Nicholas"
[37] "Cathedral" "central" "governing"
[40] "authority" "Russian" "Orthodox"
[43] "Church" "independent" "Russian"
[46] "Church" "America" ""
[[41]]
[1] "In" "Holy" "Assembly"
[4] "Bishops" "Holy" "Synod"
[7] "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Church"
[10] "Mother" "Church" "suspended"
[13] "ultimately" "removed" "respondent"
[16] "Dionisije" "Milivojevich" "Dionisije"
[19] "Bishop" "American" "Canadian"
[22] "Diocese" "Church" "appointed"
[25] "petitioner" "Bishop" "Firmilian"
[28] "Ocokoljich" "Firmilian" "Administrator"
[31] "Diocese" "Mother" "Church"
[34] "reorganized" "three" "Dioceses"
[37] "In" "Holy" "Assembly"
[40] "Holy" "Synod" "defrocked"
[43] "Dionisije" "Bishop" "cleric"
[46] "Mother" "Church" "In"
[49] "civil" "action" "brought"
[52] "Dionisije" "respondents" "Illinois"
[55] "Circuit" "Court" "Supreme"
[58] "Court" "Illinois" "held"
[61] "proceedings" "Mother" "Church"
[64] "respecting" "Dionisije" "procedurally"
[67] "substantively" "defective" "internal"
[70] "regulations" "Mother" "Church"
[73] "therefore" "arbitrary" "invalid"
[76] "The" "State" "Supreme"
[79] "Court" "also" "invalidated"
[82] "Diocesan" "reorganization" "three"
[85] "Dioceses" "Ill" "d"
[88] "N" "E" "d"
[91] "We" "granted" "certiorari"
[94] "determine" "whether" "actions"
[97] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[100] "constituted" "improper" "judicial"
[103] "interference" "decisions" "highest"
[106] "authorities" "hierarchical" "church"
[109] "violation" "First" "Fourteenth"
[112] "Amendments" "U" "S"
[115] "S" "Ct" "L"
[118] "Ed" "d" "We"
[121] "hold" "inquiries" "made"
[124] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[127] "matters" "ecclesiastical" "cognizance"
[130] "polity" "court" "s"
[133] "actions" "pursuant" "thereto"
[136] "contravened" "First" "Fourteenth"
[139] "Amendments" "We" "therefore"
[142] "reverse" ""
[[42]]
[1] "The" "Serbian" "Orthodox"
[4] "Church" "one" "autocephalous"
[7] "hierarchical" "churches" "came"
[10] "existence" "following" "schism"
[13] "universal" "Christian" "church"
[16] "episcopal" "church" "whose"
[19] "seat" "Patriarchate" "Belgrade"
[22] "Yugoslavia" "Its" "highest"
[25] "legislative" "judicial" "ecclesiastical"
[28] "administrative" "authority" "resides"
[31] "Holy" "Assembly" "Bishops"
[34] "body" "composed" "Diocesan"
[37] "Bishops" "presided" "Bishop"
[40] "designated" "Assembly" "Patriarch"
[43] "The" "Church" "s"
[46] "highest" "executive" "body"
[49] "Holy" "Synod" "Bishops"
[52] "composed" "Patriarch" "four"
[55] "Diocesan" "Bishops" "selected"
[58] "Holy" "Assembly" "The"
[61] "Holy" "Synod" "Holy"
[64] "Assembly" "exclusive" "power"
[67] "remove" "suspend" "defrock"
[70] "appoint" "Diocesan" "Bishops"
[73] "The" "Mother" "Church"
[76] "governed" "according" "Holy"
[79] "Scriptures" "Holy" "Tradition"
[82] "Rules" "Ecumenical" "Councils"
[85] "Holy" "Apostles" "Holy"
[88] "Faiths" "Church" "Mother"
[91] "Church" "Constitution" "adopted"
[94] "penal" "code" "adopted"
[97] "These" "sources" "law"
[100] "sometimes" "ambiguous" "seemingly"
[103] "inconsistent" "Pertinent" "provisions"
[106] "Mother" "Church" "Constitution"
[109] "provide" "Church" "s"
[112] "main" "administrative" "division"
[115] "composed" "dioceses" "regard"
[118] "church" "hierarchical" "church"
[121] "administrative" "aspect" "Art"
[124] "d" "ecisions" "establishing"
[127] "naming" "liquidating" "reorganizing"
[130] "seat" "dioceses" "establishing"
[133] "eliminating" "position" "vicar"
[136] "bishops" "decided" "upon"
[139] "Holy" "Assembly" "agreement"
[142] "Patriarchal" "Council" "Art"
[145] ""
[[43]]
[1] "In" "Father" "Mardary" "called"
[5] "Church" "National" "Assembly" "embracing"
[9] "known" "Serbian" "Orthodox" "congregations"
[13] "United" "States" "Canada" "The"
[17] "Assembly" "drafted" "adopted" "constitution"
[21] "Serbian" "Orthodox" "Diocese" "United"
[25] "States" "America" "Canada" "submitted"
[29] "constitution" "Mother" "Church" "approval"
[33] "The" "Holy" "Assembly" "made"
[37] "changes" "provide" "appointment" "Diocesan"
[41] "Bishop" "Holy" "Assembly" "require"
[45] "Holy" "Assembly" "approval" "amendments"
[49] "constitution" "changes" "approved" "constitution"
[53] "The" "American" "Canadian" "Diocese"
[57] "diocese" "Mother" "Church" "constitution"
[61] ""
[[44]]
[1] "The" "Diocesan" "Council"
[4] "met" "June" "Dionisije"
[7] "reaffirmed" "refusal" "turn"
[10] "administration" "Diocese" "Firmilian"
[13] "also" "announced" "discharged"
[16] "two" "vicars" "general"
[19] "loyalty" "Mother" "Church"
[22] "The" "Council" "resolved"
[25] "meeting" "advise" "Holy"
[28] "Synod" "proposal" "reorganize"
[31] "Diocese" "three" "dioceses"
[34] "submitted" "Diocesan" "National"
[37] "Assembly" "August" "acceptance"
[40] "rejection" "The" "Council"
[43] "also" "requested" "Holy"
[46] "Assembly" "promptly" "send"
[49] "committee" "investigate" "complaints"
[52] "Dionisije" ""
[[45]]
[1] "On" "basis" "commission"
[4] "s" "report" "recommendations"
[7] "recited" "Dionisije" "s"
[10] "refusal" "accept" "decisions"
[13] "Holy" "Synod" "Holy"
[16] "Assembly" "refusal" "recognize"
[19] "court" "Holy" "Synod"
[22] "competence" "try" "Holy"
[25] "Assembly" "met" "July"
[28] "voted" "remove" "Dionisije"
[31] "Bishop" "The" "minutes"
[34] "Holy" "Assembly" "meeting"
[37] "Patriarch" "s" "letter"
[40] "Dionisije" "informing" "Holy"
[43] "Assembly" "s" "actions"
[46] "made" "clear" "removal"
[49] "based" "solely" "acts"
[52] "defiance" "subsequent" "May"
[55] "suspension" "violation" "oath"
[58] "loss" "certain" "qualifications"
[61] "Bishop" "Art" "constitution"
[64] "Mother" "Church" ""
[[46]]
[1] "" "The" "Diocesan" "National"
[5] "Assembly" "Dionisije" "presiding" "despite"
[9] "removal" "met" "August" "issued"
[13] "resolution" "repudiating" "division" "Diocese"
[17] "three" "Dioceses" "demanding" "revocation"
[21] "Mother" "Church" "decisions" "concerning"
[25] "division" "When" "Holy" "Assembly"
[29] "refused" "reconsider" "Diocesan" "National"
[33] "Assembly" "November" "declared" "Diocese"
[37] "completely" "autonomous" "reinstated" "provisions"
[41] "Diocesan" "constitution" "provided" "election"
[45] "Bishop" "Diocese" "amendments" "without"
[49] "approval" "Holy" "Assembly" ""
[[47]]
[1] "Dionisije" "returned" "indictment" "January"
[5] "refusing" "answer" "without" "verified"
[9] "charges" "denouncing" "Holy" "Assembly"
[13] "Holy" "Synod" "schismatic" "pro"
[17] "Communist" "asserting" "Mother" "Church"
[21] "proceeding" "violation" "penal" "code"
[25] "constitution" ""
[[48]]
[1] "The" "Holy" "Synod" "February"
[5] "declared" "proceed" "without" "Dionisije"
[9] "referred" "matter" "Holy" "Assembly"
[13] "tried" "Dionisije" "default" "case"
[17] "March" "refusal" "participate" "The"
[21] "indictment" "also" "amended" "time"
[25] "include" "charges" "based" "Dionisije"
[29] "s" "acts" "rebellion" "committed"
[33] "November" "meeting" "National" "Assembly"
[37] "declared" "Diocese" "separate" "Mother"
[41] "Church" "Considering" "original" "amended"
[45] "indictments" "Holy" "Assembly" "unanimously"
[49] "found" "Dionisije" "guilty" "charges"
[53] "divested" "episcopal" "monastic" "ranks"
[57] ""
[[49]]
[1] "" "T" "rule"
[4] "action" "govern" "civil"
[7] "courts" "whenever" "questions"
[10] "discipline" "faith" "ecclesiastical"
[13] "rule" "custom" "law"
[16] "decided" "highest" "church"
[19] "judicatories" "matter" "carried"
[22] "legal" "tribunals" "must"
[25] "accept" "decisions" "final"
[28] "binding" "application" "case"
[31] "Id" "L" "Ed"
[34] ""
[[50]]
[1] "" "The" "conclusion"
[4] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[7] "decisions" "Mother" "Church"
[10] "arbitrary" "grounded" "upon"
[13] "inquiry" "persuaded" "Illinois"
[16] "Supreme" "Court" "Mother"
[19] "Church" "followed" "laws"
[22] "procedures" "arriving" "decisions"
[25] "We" "concluded" "whether"
[28] "room" "marginal" "civil"
[31] "court" "review" "narrow"
[34] "rubrics" "fraud" "collusion"
[37] "church" "tribunals" "act"
[40] "bad" "faith" "secular"
[43] "purposes" "arbitrariness" "exception"
[46] "sense" "inquiry" "whether"
[49] "decisions" "highest" "ecclesiastical"
[52] "tribunal" "hierarchical" "church"
[55] "complied" "church" "laws"
[58] "regulations" "consistent" "constitutional"
[61] "mandate" "civil" "courts"
[64] "bound" "accept" "decisions"
[67] "highest" "judicatories" "religious"
[70] "organization" "hierarchical" "polity"
[73] "matters" "discipline" "faith"
[76] "internal" "organization" "ecclesiastical"
[79] "rule" "custom" "law"
[82] "For" "civil" "courts"
[85] "analyze" "whether" "ecclesiastical"
[88] "actions" "church" "judicatory"
[91] "sense" "arbitrary" "must"
[94] "inherently" "entail" "inquiry"
[97] "procedures" "canon" "ecclesiastical"
[100] "law" "supposedly" "requires"
[103] "church" "judicatory" "follow"
[106] "else" "substantive" "criteria"
[109] "supposedly" "decide" "ecclesiastical"
[112] "question" "But" "exactly"
[115] "inquiry" "First" "Amendment"
[118] "prohibits" "recognition" "exception"
[121] "undermine" "general" "rule"
[124] "religious" "controversies" "proper"
[127] "subject" "civil" "court"
[130] "inquiry" "civil" "court"
[133] "must" "accept" "ecclesiastical"
[136] "decisions" "church" "tribunals"
[139] "finds" "Watson" "requires"
[142] "conclusion" "rejection" "analogous"
[145] "argument" "ecclesiastical" "decisions"
[148] "highest" "church" "judicatories"
[151] "need" "accepted" "subject"
[154] "matter" "dispute" "within"
[157] "jurisdiction" ""
[[51]]
[1] "Indeed" "essence" "religious"
[4] "faith" "ecclesiastical" "decisions"
[7] "reached" "accepted" "matters"
[10] "faith" "whether" "rational"
[13] "measurable" "objective" "criteria"
[16] "Constitutional" "concepts" "due"
[19] "process" "involving" "secular"
[22] "notions" "fundamental" "fairness"
[25] "impermissible" "objectives" "therefore"
[28] "hardly" "relevant" "matters"
[31] "ecclesiastical" "cognizance" ""
[[52]]
[1] "The" "constitutional" "evils"
[4] "attend" "upon" "arbitrariness"
[7] "exception" "sense" "applied"
[10] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[13] "justify" "civil" "court"
[16] "review" "ecclesiastical" "decisions"
[19] "final" "church" "tribunals"
[22] "manifest" "instant" "case"
[25] "The" "Supreme" "Court"
[28] "Illinois" "recognized" "parties"
[31] "agree" "Serbian" "Orthodox"
[34] "Church" "hierarchical" "church"
[37] "sole" "power" "appoint"
[40] "remove" "Bishops" "Church"
[43] "resides" "highest" "ranking"
[46] "organs" "Holy" "Assembly"
[49] "Holy" "Synod" "Indeed"
[52] "final" "authority" "respect"
[55] "promulgation" "interpretation" "maers"
[58] "church" "discipline" "internal"
[61] "organization" "rests" "Holy"
[64] "Assembly" "even" "written"
[67] "constitution" "Mother" "Church"
[70] "expressly" "provides" ""
[[53]]
[1] "" "The" "Holy" "Assembly"
[5] "Bishops" "highest" "hierarchical" "body"
[9] "legislative" "authority" "matters" "faith"
[13] "officiation" "church" "order" "discipline"
[17] "internal" "organization" "Church" "well"
[21] "highest" "church" "juridical" "authority"
[25] "within" "jurisdiction" "Article" "sec"
[29] "Art" ""
[[54]]
[1] "" "All" "decisions" "Holy"
[5] "Assembly" "Bishops" "Holy" "Synod"
[9] "Bishops" "canonical" "d" "church"
[13] "nature" "regard" "faith" "officiation"
[17] "church" "order" "internal" "organization"
[21] "church" "valid" "final" "Art"
[25] ""
[[55]]
[1] "" "The" "Holy" "Assembly"
[5] "Bishops" "whose" "purpose" "noted"
[9] "Article" "Constitution" ""
[[56]]
[1] "" "prescribes" "ecclesiastical"
[4] "judicial" "procedure" "Ecclesiastical"
[7] "Courts" ""
[[57]]
[1] "" "disagreements" "bishops" "Holy"
[5] "Synod" "bishops" "Patriarch" ""
[[58]]
[1] "" "All" "matters" "Holy" "Synod" "Bishops"
[7] "judged" "first" "instance" "Art" ""
[[59]]
[1] "Nor" "dispute" "questions"
[4] "church" "discipline" "composition"
[7] "church" "hierarchy" "core"
[10] "ecclesiastical" "concern" "bishop"
[13] "church" "clearly" "one"
[16] "central" "figures" "hierarchy"
[19] "embodiment" "church" "within"
[22] "Diocese" "Mother" "Church"
[25] "constitution" "states" "h"
[28] "e" "according" "church"
[31] "canonical" "regulations" "chief"
[34] "representative" "guiding" "leader"
[37] "church" "spiritual" "life"
[40] "church" "order" "diocese"
[43] "Art" ""
[[60]]
[1] "" "We" "will"
[4] "delve" "various" "church"
[7] "constitutional" "provisions" "relevant"
[10] "conclusion" "repeat" "error"
[13] "Illinois" "Supreme" "Court"
[16] "It" "suffices" "note"
[19] "reorganization" "Diocese" "involves"
[22] "matter" "internal" "church"
[25] "government" "issue" "core"
[28] "ecclesiastical" "affairs" "Arts"
[31] "Mother" "Church" "constitution"
[34] "commit" "questions" "church"
[37] "polity" "final" "province"
[40] "Holy" "Assembly" "Kedroff"
[43] "v" "St" "Nicholas"
[46] "Cathedral" "U" "S"
[49] "S" "Ct" "L"
[52] "Ed" "stated" "religious"
[55] "freedom" "encompasses" "power"
[58] "religious" "bodies" "decide"
[61] "free" "state" "interference"
[64] "matters" "church" "government"
[67] "well" "faith" "doctrine"
[70] "The" "subordination" "Diocese"
[73] "Mother" "Church" "matters"
[76] "administrative" "also" "hierarchical"
[79] "provided" "power" "Holy"
[82] "Assembly" "reorganize" "Diocese"
[85] "expressed" "Mother" "Church"
[88] "constitution" "Contrary" "interpretation"
[91] "Illinois" "court" "church"
[94] "judicatories" "interpreted" "provisions"
[97] "Diocesan" "constitution" "interdict"
[100] "govern" "action" "relate"
[103] "day" "day" "administration"
[106] "Diocesan" "property" "The"
[109] "constitutional" "provisions" "American"
[112] "Canadian" "Diocese" "express"
[115] "civil" "courts" "enforce"
[118] "without" "engaging" "searching"
[121] "therefore" "impermissible" "inquiry"
[124] "church" "polity" "See"
[127] "Md" "Va" "Churches"
[130] "v" "Sharpsburg" "Church"
[133] "U" "S" "S"
[136] "Ct" "Brennan" "J"
[139] "concurring" ""
[[61]]
[1] "" "It" "intended" "facilitate"
[5] "changing" "employment" "provide" "relief"
[9] "quit" "work" "voluntarily" "personal"
[13] "reasons" "Voluntary" "unemployment" "compensable"
[17] "purpose" "Act" "provide" "benefits"
[21] "persons" "unemployed" "fault" ""
[[62]]
[1] "The" "Trinity" "Lutheran" "Church"
[5] "Child" "Learning" "Center" "preschool"
[9] "daycare" "center" "open" "throughout"
[13] "year" "serve" "working" "families"
[17] "Boone" "County" "Missouri" "surrounding"
[21] "area" "Established" "nonprofit" "organization"
[25] "Center" "merged" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[29] "Church" "operates" "auspices" "church"
[33] "property" "The" "Center" "admits"
[37] "students" "religion" "enrollment" "stands"
[41] "children" "ranging" "age" "two"
[45] "five" ""
[[63]]
[1] "" "That" "money"
[4] "shall" "ever" "taken"
[7] "public" "treasury" "directly"
[10] "indirectly" "aid" "church"
[13] "sect" "denomination" "religion"
[16] "aid" "priest" "preacher"
[19] "minister" "teacher" "thereof"
[22] "preference" "shall" "given"
[25] "discrimination" "made" "church"
[28] "sect" "creed" "religion"
[31] "form" "religious" "faith"
[34] "worship" ""
[[64]]
[1] "In" "application" "Center" "disclosed"
[5] "status" "ministry" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[9] "Church" "specified" "Center" "s"
[13] "mission" "provide" "safe" "clean"
[17] "attractive" "school" "facility" "conjunction"
[21] "educational" "program" "structured" "allow"
[25] "child" "grow" "spiritually" "physically"
[29] "socially" "cognitively" "App" "Pet"
[33] "Cert" "After" "describing" "playground"
[37] "safety" "hazards" "posed" "current"
[41] "surface" "Center" "detailed" "anticipated"
[45] "benefits" "proposed" "project" "increasing"
[49] "access" "playground" "children" "including"
[53] "disabilities" "providing" "surface" "compliant"
[57] "Americans" "Disabilities" "Act" "providing"
[61] "safe" "long" "lasting" "resilient"
[65] "surface" "play" "areas" "improving"
[69] "Missouri" "s" "environment" "putting"
[73] "recycled" "tires" "positive" "use"
[77] "The" "Center" "also" "noted"
[81] "benefits" "new" "surface" "extend"
[85] "beyond" "students" "local" "community"
[89] "whose" "children" "often" "use"
[93] "playground" "non" "school" "hours"
[97] ""
[[65]]
[1] "The" "Center" "ranked" "fifth"
[5] "among" "applicants" "Scrap" "Tire"
[9] "Program" "But" "despite" "high"
[13] "score" "Center" "deemed" "categorically"
[17] "ineligible" "receive" "grant" "In"
[21] "letter" "rejecting" "Center" "s"
[25] "application" "program" "director" "explained"
[29] "Article" "I" "Section" "Missouri"
[33] "Constitution" "Department" "provide" "financial"
[37] "assistance" "directly" "church" ""
[[66]]
[1] "The" "Department" "ultimately" "awarded" "grants"
[6] "part" "program" "Because" "Center" "operated"
[11] "Trinity" "Lutheran" "Church" "receive" "grant"
[16] ""
[[67]]
[1] "Washington" "s" "restriction" "use"
[5] "scholarship" "funds" "different" "According"
[9] "Court" "State" "merely" "chosen"
[13] "fund" "distinct" "category" "instruction"
[17] "Id" "S" "Ct" "Davey"
[21] "denied" "scholarship" "denied" "scholarship"
[25] "proposed" "use" "funds" "prepare"
[29] "ministry" "Here" "question" "Trinity"
[33] "Lutheran" "denied" "grant" "simply"
[37] "church" ""
[[68]]
[1] "In" "case" "dispute" "Trinity" "Lutheran"
[6] "put" "choice" "church" "receiving" "government"
[11] "benefit" "The" "rule" "simple" "No"
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```{.r .distill-force-highlighting-css}