Two key indicators of a nation’s condition are Life Expectancy and Per Capita GDP (PPP). What insights can these indicators provide us with about the current war between Russia and Ukraine? About the ongoing conflict between Russia and NATO? The presentation below explores and attempts to answer those two related questions.

Project Data

Using data sets (licensed CC-BY 4.0) from the renown Gapminder Foundation, this project explores issues in political economics related to the Russian-Ukraine War, including the Cold War historical context. It focuses on two key variables, Life Expectancy and Per Capita GDP (PPP), tracking them over time and space in the European NATO Theatre.

  • For the Life Expectancy data source, direct URL: http://gapm.io/ilex.
  • In our data, the Per Capita GDP (PPP) variable is source defined as the “Gross domestic product per person adjusted for differences in purchasing power (in international dollars, fixed 2011 prices, PPP based on ICP).” Direct URL: http://gapm.io/dgdppc.

Nota bene: some of the data reported – particularly for the Cold War years – must derive from an historical reconstruction.

The Gapminder Foundation uses the current national entities when reporting the past data. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the fallout from the Yugoslav Wars (1991-2001), the political map of Europe has obviously changed. So we should understand that some of the data reported – particularly for the Cold War years – must derive from an historical reconstruction (a “best guesstimate”).

This noted, the Gapminder Foundation is known for both its integrity and neutrality, and draws from a number of sources including the UN, the World Bank, etc. So our data is “as good as it gets.”

Life Expectancy

Life Expectancy is a key indicator. To consistently score a high average life expectancy, a nation must be doing a number of things right: general access to affordable, high quality medical care; general lack of violent civil unrest; and so on. Conversely, a declining life expectancy – even if only relative to the other nations in the region – typically suggests that a nation faces other domestic challenges that directly impact the health, quality of life, and even safety of its citizens and residents.

1961: Map

1991: Map

2021: Map

Life Expectancy: Notes

The Choropleth maps provide data on the general European NATO Theatre. But here we will focus on the results for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in comparison to the current European NATO members nations, tracking how each group has fared over time.

1961
In 1961 with Cold War in full swing and the Warsaw Pact intact, the European NATO average for life expectancy was 68.66.

  • Belarus: 71.5 (roughly 2.84 years higher than EU NATO average)
  • Russia: 69.3 (just roughly 0.64 years higher than EU NATO average)
  • Ukraine: 71.1 (roughly 2.44 years higher than EU NATO average)

1991
In 1991, the year the Soviet Union dissolved and the Warsaw Pact ended, we see NATO pulling ahead. The average European NATO nation life expectancy was 73.67.

  • Belarus: 70.8 (roughly 2.87 years lower than EU NATO average)
  • Russia: 69.3 (roughly 4.37 years lower than EU NATO average)
  • Ukraine: 69.9 (roughly 3.77 years lower than EU NATO average)

2021
In 2021, globally, life expectancy suffered because of Covid-19 and poorly designed Covid-19 policies. But since all nations suffered to some degree, we still have a basis for comparison. The average life expectancy for the European NATO nations: 79.79. The gap between our three comparison nations and the NATO nations has significantly increased.

  • Belarus: 74.3 (roughly 5.49 years lower than EU NATO average)
  • Russia: 73.3 (roughly 6.49 years lower than EU NATO average)
  • Ukraine: 74.1 (roughly 5.69 years lower than EU NATO average)

Nota bene
Importantly, during the entire sixty year period studied, none of these three nations scored an annual life expectancy of over 75 years.

1961: Data

1991: Data

2021: Data

Per Capita GDP (PPP)

Like Life Expectancy, Per Capita GDP (PPP) is a key indicator that also provides more general insight. To score a consistently high or generally improving Per Capita GDP (PPP), a nation must be doing a number of things right: reliable economic growth, infrastructure improvements, technological advancement, and an absence of destructive civil strife or polarized political policies regarding taxation, public spending, and so on. Conversely, a declining or stagnant Per Capita GDP (PPP) is generally bad news: it can cause problems through economic hardship, and it also typically indicates the nation has existing issues affecting economic development and even general governance.

1961: Map

1991: Map

2021: Map

PPP: Notes

In our data, the Per Capita GDP (PPP) variable is source defined as the “Gross domestic product per person adjusted for differences in purchasing power (in international dollars, fixed 2011 prices, PPP based on ICP).” Here, again, we will focus on the results for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in comparison to the current European NATO members nations, tracking how each group has fared over time.

1961
We start again in 1961, with the Cold War in full swing and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact standing strong. The average European NATO member Per Capita GDP (PPP) was roughly 9351.07. Dragged down in 1961 by nations that were then in the USSR alliance but are now NATO members. Our three nations for comparison:

  • Belarus: 5490 (roughly 59% of EU NATO average)
  • Russia: 6870 (roughly 74% of EU NATO average)
  • Ukraine: 6760 (roughly 72% of EU NATO average)

1991
In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and the Warsaw Pact ended. In 1991, the average European NATO member Per Capita GDP (PPP) was roughly 24489.64. In comparison:

  • Belarus: 8780 (roughly 36% of EU NATO average)
  • Russia: 20400 (roughly 83% of EU NATO average)
  • Ukraine: 14400 (roughly 59% of EU NATO average)

2021
In 2021, the average European NATO member Per Capita GDP (PPP) was roughly 40053.57. In comparison:

  • Belarus: 19100 (roughly 48% of EU NATO average)
  • Russia: 27200 (roughly 68% of EU NATO average)
  • Ukraine: 12900 (roughly 32% of EU NATO average)

Summary
From 1961 to 1991 to 2021, Ukraine has gone from 72% to 59% to 32% of the the average European NATO member Per Capita GDP (PPP). So much for the promises of the Orange Revolution. Specifically, the years from 2004 to 2021 show strong regress, not progress, relative to the EU NATO average.

The raw scores for Ukraine are 2004: 10600 and 2021: 12900; or, stagnated growth in absolute terms. This stagnation compares well with that of Spain, 2004: 37400 and 2021: 38800, but Spain passed the 30K threshold in 1997 and has remained safely above it. Spain’s 2021: 38800 does trail the EU NATO average: 2021: 40053.57.

In comparison to the EU NATO average for Per Capita GDP (PPP), Russia likewise has declined: from 74% to 83% to 68% (1961, 1991, and 2021, respectively). And Belarus, also poor results: 59% to 36% to 48%.

1961: Data

1991: Data

2021: Data

Eight Key Nations

These graphs start in 1949, the year NATO was founded, and end in 2021, the last year for which we have good data. They compare Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine to the five major (in terms of economic power and population size) EU NATO nations: Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Life Expectancy

Per Capita GDP (PPP)

Eight Key Nations: Notes

Life Expectancy
In 1986, all of the five NATO nations considered scored an average life expectancy of 75 years or higher. And all have made steady, incremental progress until 2020 – the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic. In contrast, starting in 1988, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine experienced dramatic drops in life expectancy – and did not recover this lost ground until about 2012!

Nota bene
To date, none of these three nations has passed the 75 year threshold.

Per Capita GDP (PPP)
Starting around 1986, Russia: 21200, Belarus: 9279, and Ukraine: 14800 experienced dramatic drops in Per Capita GDP (PPP). Russia recovered to stagnant growth in 2006: 21800; Belarus, recovered in 2003: 9660 with steady real growth to our last year of data, 2021: 19100. Ukraine has yet to recover from its peak in 1989: 16400; after two decades of stagnation, corruption, and regression, we have the dismal result of2021: 12900.

Nota bene
None of these three nations has crossed the 30K threshold. In contrast, Germany passed the 30K threshold in 1980; and the other key EU NATO nations followed, with Spain crossing last in 1997. Since Spain and Russia were virtually identical from 1949 to 1986, their differing trajectories since 1986 offer a sharp contrast.

Key 8 Data: Life Expectancy

Key 8 Data: PPP

In Summary

The evidence shows Russia has been in steep decline. Hence we need to update our thinking, world-view, and policies accordingly. Understanding that Russia is in decline provides much needed context both for dealing with with Putin’s desperate invasion of Ukraine, and for assessing Russia’s future threat potential.

Nevertheless, our experts such as the Foreign Affairs pundits Michael Kofman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor (2021) assert otherwise: “The Myth of Russian Decline.” But all such denials fail the reality test.

As a major power, Russia is Bulgaria: but with a Pandora’s box of nuclear, cyber, and bio-weapons. Weakness and desperation make Russia more likely – not less likely – to use unconventional weapons to defend itself: Russia knows it cannot win a conventional military war against even a semi-united Europe.

Even more dangerous, perhaps, would be a externally-supported failed attempt at regime change. Such a failure would almost certainly result in unconventional weapons leaving via fire sale to various other nations and to non-governmental actors such as criminal gangs and terrorist groups.

Effectively, we will have opened Pandora’s deadliest box: without control or accountability, we will have globalized the proliferation of nuclear, cyber, and bio-weapons. The generational nightmare which could become our reality: attacks of mass destruction by non-state actors, ill-defined antagonists engaged in borderless forever wars.

One key to ending this war and ensuring that stability and even some degree of prosperity will follow: we must understand Russia’s external security concerns, and Russia’s internal weaknesses which exacerbate those external security concerns.

In the USA and elsewhere, we have a current, dominant, and pervasive narrative: Russia is a major power which seeks to conquer much of Europe and restore a version of the Russian empire. Or, if you prefer the HRC version: Russia is the global bogeyman ready to destroy democracies across the globe unless we act now and you sacrifice!

This narrative greatly exaggerates Russia’s strength, distorts Russia’s purpose, and ignores Russia’s security concerns. It also increases the risk of escalating and expanding the war. We should be dedicated instead to ending the war, and ensuring a workable and durable peace.

Such a peace must include the primarily European-financed equivalent of a Marshall Plan for Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Belarus. It is time for the EU to lead, not NATO, and for the USA to support rather than dominate the EU leadership.

Thomas J. Haslam, PhD
Data Humanist
10 March 2022