1961: Map

1991: Map

2021: Map

Eight Key Nations

1961: Data

1991: Data

2021: Data

Key 8 Data

1961: Map

1991: Map

2021: Map

Eight Key Nations

1961: Data

1991: Data

2021: Data

Key 8 Data

Across Six Decades

Across Six: Key Stats

NATO Early

NATO Expands

NATO Now

Population: Key EU NATO

Russian Fears

Project Data

Using data sets (licensed CC-BY 4.0) from the renown Gapminder Foundation, this project explores issues in political economics related to the Russian-Ukraine War, including the Cold War historical context. It focuses on two key variables, Life Expectancy and Per Capita GDP (PPP), tracking them over time and space in the European NATO Theatre.

• For the Life Expectancy data source, direct URL: http://gapm.io/ilex.
• In our data, the Per Capita GDP (PPP) variable is source defined as the “Gross domestic product per person adjusted for differences in purchasing power (in international dollars, fixed 2011 prices, PPP based on ICP).” Direct URL: http://gapm.io/dgdppc.

Nota bene: some of the data reported – particularly for the Cold War years – must derive from an historical reconstruction.

The Gapminder Foundation uses the current national entities when reporting the past data. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the fallout from the Yugoslav Wars (1991-2001), the political map of Europe has obviously changed. So we should understand that some of the data reported – particularly for the Cold War years – must derive from an historical reconstruction (a “best guesstimate”).

This noted, the Gapminder Foundation is known for both its integrity and neutrality, and draws from a number of sources including the UN, the World Bank, etc. So our data is “as good as it gets.”

Life Expectancy

The Choropleth maps provide data on the general European NATO Theatre. But here we will focus on the results for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in comparison to the current European NATO members nations, tracking how each group has fared over time.

1961
In 1961 with Cold War in full swing and the Warsaw Pact intact, the European NATO average for life expectancy was 68.66.

• Belarus: 71.5 (roughly 2.84 years higher than EU NATO average)
• Russia: 69.3 (just roughly 0.64 years higher than EU NATO average)
• Ukraine: 71.1 (roughly 2.44 years higher than EU NATO average)

1991
In 1991, the year the Soviet Union dissolved and the Warsaw Pact ended, we see NATO pulling ahead. The average European NATO nation life expectancy was 73.67.

• Belarus: 70.8 (roughly 2.87 years lower than EU NATO average)
• Russia: 69.3 (roughly 4.37 years lower than EU NATO average)
• Ukraine: 69.9 (roughly 3.77 years lower than EU NATO average)

2021
In 2021, globally, life expectancy suffered because of Covid-19 and poorly designed Covid-19 policies. But since all nations suffered to some degree, we still have a basis for comparison. The average life expectancy for the European NATO nations: 79.79. The gap between our three comparison nations and the NATO nations has significantly increased.

• Belarus: 74.3 (roughly 5.49 years lower than EU NATO average)
• Russia: 73.3 (roughly 6.49 years lower than EU NATO average)
• Ukraine: 74.1 (roughly 5.69 years lower than EU NATO average)

Nota bene
Importantly, during the entire sixty year period studied, none of these three nations scored an annual life expectancy of over 75 years.

PPP

In our data, the Per Capita GDP (PPP) variable is source defined as the “Gross domestic product per person adjusted for differences in purchasing power (in international dollars, fixed 2011 prices, PPP based on ICP).” Here, again, we will focus on the results for Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in comparison to the current European NATO members nations, tracking how each group has fared over time.

1961
We start again in 1961, with the Cold War in full swing and the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact standing strong. The average European NATO member Per Capita GDP (PPP) was roughly 9351.07. Dragged down in 1961 by nations that were then in the USSR alliance but are now NATO members. Our three nations for comparison:

• Belarus: 5490 (roughly 59% of EU NATO average)
• Russia: 6870 (roughly 74% of EU NATO average)
• Ukraine: 6760 (roughly 72% of EU NATO average)

1991
In 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved and the Warsaw Pact ended. In 1991, the average European NATO member Per Capita GDP (PPP) was roughly 24489.64. In comparison:

• Belarus: 8780 (roughly 36% of EU NATO average)
• Russia: 20400 (roughly 83% of EU NATO average)
• Ukraine: 14400 (roughly 59% of EU NATO average)

2021
In 2021, the average European NATO member Per Capita GDP (PPP) was roughly 40053.57. In comparison:

• Belarus: 19100 (roughly 48% of EU NATO average)
• Russia: 27200 (roughly 68% of EU NATO average)
• Ukraine: 12900 (roughly 32% of EU NATO average)

Summary
From 1961 to 1991 to 2021, Ukraine has gone from 72% to 59% to 32% of the the average European NATO member Per Capita GDP (PPP). So much for the promises of the Orange Revolution. Specifically, the years from 2004 to 2021 show strong regress, not progress, relative to the NATO average.

The raw scores for Ukraine are 2004: 10600 and 2021: 12900; or, stagnated growth in absolute terms. This stagnation compares well with that of Spain, 2004: 37400 and 2021: 38800, but Spain passed the 30K threshold in 1997 and has remained safely above it. Spain’s 2021: 38800 result does trail the EU NATO average: 2021: 40053.57.

In comparison to the NATO average for Per Capita GDP (PPP), Russia likewise has declined: from 74% to 83% to 68% (1961, 1991, and 2021, respectively). And Belarus, also poor results: 59% to 36% to 48%.

Eight Key Nations

Context
These graphs start in 1949, the year NATO was founded, and end in 2021, the last year for which we have good data. They compare Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine to the five major (in terms of economic power and population size) EU NATO nations: Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and the United Kingdom.

Life Expectancy
In 1986, all of the five NATO nations considered scored an average life expectancy of 75 years or higher. And all have made steady, incremental progress until 2020 – the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic. In contrast, starting in 1988, Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine experienced dramatic drops in life expectancy – and did not recover this lost ground until about 2012!

Nota bene
To date, none of these three nations has passed the 75 year threshold.

Per Capita GDP (PPP)
Starting around 1986, Russia: 21200, Belarus: 9279, and Ukraine: 14800 experienced dramatic drops in Per Capita GDP (PPP). Russia recovered to stagnant growth in 2006: 21800; Belarus, recovered in 2003: 9660 with steady real growth to our last year of data, 2021: 19100. Ukraine has yet to recover from its peak in 1989: 16400; after two decades of stagnation, corruption, and regression, we have the dismal result of2021: 12900.

Nota bene
None of these three nations has crossed the 30K threshold. In contrast, Germany passed the 30K threshold in 1980; and the other key EU NATO nations followed, with Spain crossing last in 1997. Since Spain and Russia were virtually identical from 1949 to 1986, their differing trajectories since 1986 offer a sharp contrast.

Across Six Decades

Purpose & Design
This graph is segmented to show the results for each year studied: 1961, 1991, and 2021. Each plot is divided into four uneven quadrants. The “bad” or baseline quadrant contains a result which has a Life Expectancy below 75 years of age, and Per Capita GDP (PPP) below 30,000. NATO members are the blue points; Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus, the red points.

Key Findings
For year 1961, ALL the nations are in the baseline or “bad” quadrant: Life Expectancy < 75 years & Per Capita GDP (PPP) < 30,000. But please pay attention to how membership in the “bad” quadrant changes over time: the red points stay, most of the blue points advance.

In 2021 only the nations of Belarus, Russia, Ukraine, and the NATO nations of Bulgaria and North Macedonia remain. Russia is the red point with the lowest expectancy; Bulgaria is the NATO nation with the lowest Per Capita GDP (PPP). Bulgaria still outperforms Russia for Life Expectancy and matches closely with Per Capita GDP (PPP).

Russian Weakness
If a nation such as Russia is on the level of Bulgaria in terms of Life Expectancy and Per Capita GDP (PPP), it can only be a major power in highly limited aspects. In so far as Russia is a major power, Russia has clout only because of its Pandora’s box filled with weapons of mass destruction and disruption: nuclear, biological, and cyber.

Russia does not have the conventional military strength or economic support for grand adventures in Europe or Eurasia. Period. Russia presents NO conventional military threat to NATO Europe, which has an overwhelming balance of power advantage: militarily, economically, and even in terms of raw population.

NATO Maps

NATO Enlargement
In his now prophetic Foreign Affairs essay “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,” John J. Mearsheimer (2014) argued:

The taproot of the trouble is NATO enlargement, the central element of a larger strategy to move Ukraine out of Russia’s orbit and integrate it into the West. At the same time, the EU’s expansion eastward and the West’s backing of the pro-democracy movement in Ukraine—beginning with the Orange Revolution in 2004—were critical elements, too.

To avoid conflict – such as the war we are currently witnessing, Mearsheimer (2014) understood that “granting Ukraine NATO membership could put Russia and the West on a collision course” and so instead “the United States and its allies should publicly rule out NATO’s expansion into both Georgia and Ukraine.”

These maps show the geographical process of NATO enlargement.

Included is a bar chart showing the current populations of Russia and Belarus in comparison with six key EU NATO nations that would defend Europe. The balance of power in terms of conventional military strength, economic resources, and total population is overwhelmingly in favor of NATO. The entire NATO alliance has a population estimated at over 1 billion people.

Russian Fears

Geography & Security
If Ukraine were to join NATO, Russia’s western border would become indefensible by conventional military means. How so?

To invade Russia from Western Europe, armies travel across the relatively flat expanse – the Northern European plain – which starts in Poland but expands greatly as one enters Ukraine (and to a lesser extent, Belarus). Invading Russia across the mountainous territories to the south, or across the mountainous area of fjords to the north, has never been practical for large military formations.

So why should Russia fear an invasion from Europe? Tim Marshall answers that for us:

The Poles came across the North European Plain in 1605, followed by the Swedes under Charles XII in 1708, the French under Napoleon in 1812, and the Germans—twice, in both world wars, in 1914 and 1941. Looking at it another way, if you count from Napoleon’s invasion of 1812, but this time include the Crimean War of 1853–56 and the two world wars up to 1945, then the Russians were fighting on average in or around the North European Plain once every thirty-three years.

So Russians were defending their western borders roughly once every thirty-three years from 1812 to 1945. But with a history which stretches back far longer. The Russian leadership knows this for certain: the road to the Russian heartland, including Moscow, is through Ukraine.

In Summary

The evidence shows Russia has been in steep decline. Hence we need to update our thinking, world-view, and policies accordingly. Understanding that Russia is in decline provides much needed context both for dealing with with Putin’s desperate invasion of Ukraine, and for assessing Russia’s future threat potential.

Nevertheless, our experts such as the Foreign Affairs pundits Michael Kofman and Andrea Kendall-Taylor (2021) assert otherwise: “The Myth of Russian Decline.” But all such denials fail the reality test.

As a major power, Russia is Bulgaria: but with a Pandora’s box of nuclear, cyber, and bio-weapons. Weakness and desperation make Russia more likely – not less likely – to use unconventional weapons to defend itself: Russia knows it cannot win a conventional military war against even a semi-united Europe.

Even more dangerous, perhaps, would be a externally-supported failed attempt at regime change. Such a failure would almost certainly result in unconventional weapons leaving via fire sale to various other nations and to non-governmental actors such as criminal gangs and terrorist groups.

Effectively, we will have opened Pandora’s deadliest box: without control or accountability, we will have globalized the proliferation of nuclear, cyber, and bio-weapons. The generational nightmare which could become our reality: attacks of mass destruction by non-state actors, ill-defined antagonists engaged in borderless forever wars.

One key to ending this war and ensuring that stability and even some degree of prosperity will follow: we must understand Russia’s external security concerns, and Russia’s internal weaknesses which exacerbate those external security concerns.

In the USA and elsewhere, we have a current, dominant, and pervasive narrative: Russia is a major power which seeks to conquer much of Europe and restore a version of the Russian empire. Or, if you prefer the HRC version: Russia is the global bogeyman ready to destroy democracies across the globe unless we act now and you sacrifice!

This narrative greatly exaggerates Russia’s strength, distorts Russia’s purpose, and ignores Russia’s security concerns. It also increases the risk of escalating and expanding the war. We should be dedicated instead to ending the war, and ensuring a workable and durable peace.

Such a peace must include the primarily European-financed equivalent of a Marshall Plan for Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, and Belarus. It is time for the EU to lead, not NATO, and for the USA to support rather than dominate the EU leadership.

Thomas J. Haslam, PhD
Data Humanist
8 March 2022; (revised, 10 March 2022).