Richard Martin
2021-11-24
Global warming has very likely exacerbated global economic inequality, including ∼25% increase in population-weighted between-country inequality over the past half century. Diffenbaugh & Burke (2019)
Climate change and climate variability worsen existing poverty, exacerbate inequalities, and trigger both new vulnerabilities and some opportunities for individuals and communities. Olsson et al. (2014)
Poverty and persistent inequality are the most salient of the conditions that shape climate-related vulnerability. Ribot (2013)
The income share of the top 10% increases [U.S. state-level] CO2 emissions. Jorgenson et al. (2017)
Political economy: the rich have a preference for more pollution. The greater the resources the rich have, the more likely they are able to “buy” lax environmental regulation. Boyce (1994)
Ravallion et al. (2000) and Levinson & O’Brien (2019) find that emissions are lower with higher inequality.
source: Levinson and O’Brien (2019)
inequality makes collective action more difficult. Ostrom (1990)
Inequality might create perverse incentives e.g. conspicuous consumption, Corneo & Jeanne (1997), labour market rat race, Landers et al. (1996), to the detriment of the environment. Bowles & Park (2005)
We are in the midst of the world’s 6th extinction crisis: Pimm et al. (1995), Lawton et al. (1995), De Vos et al. (2015), Pimm et al. (2014), Dı́az et al. (2019).
8 billion mouths to feed has created great stress on nitrogen and phosphorus cycles.
What is needed is a measure of how well we are doing at addressing this multifaceted problem.
source: Gorham et al. (2019)
Because the underlying methodology and data change between versions of the EPI, it is not appropriate to assemble the scores from each release into a time series (https://epi.yale.edu/faq/epi-faq)
… is like an exquisitely balanced French recipe, spelling out precisely with how many turns to mix the sauce, how many carats of spice to add, and for how many milliseconds to bake the mixture at exactly 474 degrees of temperature. But when the statistical cook turns to raw materials, he finds that hearts of cactus fruit are unavailable, so he substitutes chunks of cantaloupe; where the recipe calls for vermicelli he uses shredded wheat; and he substitutes green garment dye for curry, ping-pong balls for turtle’s eggs and, for Chalifougnac vintage 1883, a can of turpentine (Stefan Valavanis)
Environmental health contributes to economic prosperity OR
Economic prosperity allows rich countries to take costly actions to protect the environment OR
Economic prosperity allows rich countries to outsource the production of environmentally damaging goods.
Trade data and standard EPI scores can be used to create a weighted EPI score that crudely addresses these leakages.
The relationship between gdp/capita and epi scores still exists using this weighted EPI score.
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Control Of Corruption | -1.658 | -3.275 | -3.514 * | -1.676 |
| (2.388) | (1.927) | (1.676) | (2.361) | |
| Rule Of Law | -6.305 | -6.201 * | -2.700 | -5.610 |
| (3.490) | (2.674) | (2.553) | (3.322) | |
| Political Stability No Violence | 1.287 | 0.696 | 0.306 | 1.076 |
| (1.257) | (1.167) | (1.190) | (1.223) | |
| Voice And Accountability | 3.339 ** | 3.535 *** | 1.172 | 3.143 ** |
| (1.140) | (0.966) | (1.471) | (1.119) | |
| Government Effectiveness | 10.625 *** | 9.772 *** | 7.520 ** | 10.640 *** |
| (3.126) | (2.361) | (2.672) | (3.127) | |
| Regulatory Quality | -1.800 | 1.907 | 1.787 | -2.155 |
| (2.302) | (1.726) | (1.707) | (2.224) | |
| Log Gdp Per Cap | 4.292 *** | 3.823 *** | 5.144 *** | 4.211 *** |
| (0.761) | (0.738) | (0.838) | (0.748) | |
| Bottom Fifty Share | 40.476 ** | |||
| (14.554) | ||||
| Gini Disp | -0.197 * | |||
| (0.079) | ||||
| Log Num Poverty | -0.157 | |||
| (0.691) | ||||
| Top Ten Share | -21.422 ** | |||
| (6.715) | ||||
| *** P < 0.001; ** P < 0.01; * P < 0.05. | ||||
A 10% increase in GDP/capita is associated \(\approx\) .4 unit increase in EPI score.
A 10% increase in the bottom 50 share of income (from mean of .15) is associated with \(\approx\) .6 unit increase in EPI score.
A 10% decrease in the top 10 share of income (from mean of .45) is associated with \(\approx\) 1 unit increase in EPI score.
A 10% decrease in gini coefficient (from mean of 40) is associated with \(\approx\) .8 unit increase in EPI score.
No strong relationship between EPI scores and the absolute number of people living in poverty.
Caveat: EPI scores do not account for leakages between countries. Next up: weighted EPI
Rich countries might have high EPI scores because they import, rather than produce, environmentally damaging goods.
If we believe in Homo economicus, then the entire environmental impact should be attributed to (the country of) the consumer.
In contrast, EPI scores attribute pollution to (the country of) the producer.
source:NRDC.org
Create a weighted average of a country’s EPI score and an import EPI.
Consider Canada:
| indicator | Value in 2018 |
|---|---|
| GDP (current US$ Mil) | 1713341.7 |
| Exports (in US$ Mil) | 450277.7 |
| Imports (in US$ Mil) | 459866.3 |
Weight on import EPI is \(w_{i}=\frac{M}{GDP-X+M}=\) 0.27
| partner | year | share_imports | epi |
|---|---|---|---|
| China | 2018 | 12.68 | 50.74 |
| Germany | 2018 | 3.20 | 78.37 |
| Japan | 2018 | 2.83 | 74.69 |
| Mexico | 2018 | 6.17 | 59.69 |
| United States | 2018 | 51.13 | 71.19 |
Import EPI is a weighted average of top 5 trading partner’s EPI’s.
To calculate the weights we pretend each country only trades with these top five trade partners.
A non-exhaustive list of problems with my “back of the envelope” adjustment.
Some other attempts at environmental accounting
cover a very limited set of countries/industries/pollutants: Muradian et al. (2002)
focus exclusively on \(CO_2\): Peters et al. (2011)
| (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Control Of Corruption | -2.590 | -3.801 | -3.901 * | -2.494 |
| (2.309) | (1.992) | (1.715) | (2.262) | |
| Rule Of Law | -3.905 | -2.529 | 0.224 | -3.399 |
| (3.200) | (2.697) | (2.540) | (3.019) | |
| Political Stability No Violence | 1.830 | 1.644 | 1.466 | 1.655 |
| (1.315) | (1.177) | (1.239) | (1.282) | |
| Voice And Accountability | 3.393 ** | 3.728 *** | 1.641 | 3.170 ** |
| (1.203) | (1.003) | (1.475) | (1.168) | |
| Government Effectiveness | 6.782 * | 5.884 * | 3.877 | 6.724 * |
| (3.390) | (2.716) | (3.131) | (3.374) | |
| Regulatory Quality | -2.177 | -0.535 | -0.746 | -2.473 |
| (2.175) | (1.724) | (1.494) | (2.092) | |
| Log Gdp Per Cap | 4.175 *** | 3.636 *** | 4.705 *** | 4.090 *** |
| (0.855) | (0.819) | (0.952) | (0.839) | |
| Bottom Fifty Share | 34.608 ** | |||
| (12.381) | ||||
| Gini Disp | -0.157 * | |||
| (0.069) | ||||
| Log Num Poverty | -0.382 | |||
| (0.650) | ||||
| Top Ten Share | -20.324 *** | |||
| (5.538) | ||||
| *** P < 0.001; ** P < 0.01; * P < 0.05. | ||||
If the total effort is 45, the probability there is enough fish is .25.
The expected profit function for player 1 is:
\(E[\pi_1]=\left[\alpha e_1+\frac{1-\alpha}{3}(e_1+e_2+e_3)\right]\left(\frac{60-e_1-e_2-e_3}{60}\right)-\frac{e_1}{3}\)
| effort | Profit |
|---|---|
| 2 | -0.67 |
| 5 | -1.67 |
| 9 | -3 |
So in your treatment the expected profit function for player 1 is:
\(E[\pi_1]= \left(\frac{e_1}{2}+\frac{1}{6}(e_1+e_2+e_3)\right) \left(\frac{60-e_1-e_2-e_3}{60}\right)-\frac{e_1}{3}\)
How much effort do you want to put into fishing in round 3?
| \(\alpha\) | \(e^{\star}\) (Nash Equilibrium) | \(e^{\star\star}\)(Joint payoff maximizing) |
|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | \(\frac{20}{3}\) |
| \(\frac12\) | \(\frac{20}{3}\) | \(\frac{20}{3}\) |
| 1 | 10 | \(\frac{20}{3}\) |