library(poliscidata)
## Warning: package 'poliscidata' was built under R version 3.6.3
## Registered S3 method overwritten by 'gdata':
## method from
## reorder.factor gplots
Q1
(Datasets: world, worldD. Variables: democ_regime, frac_eth3, gdp_cap2.) Some countries have democratic regimes,
and other countries do not. What factors help to explain this difference? One idea is that the type of government
is shaped by the ethnic and religious diversity in a country?s population. Countries that are relatively
homogeneous, with most people sharing the same language and religious beliefs, are more likely to develop
democratic systems than are countries having more linguistic conflicts and religious differences. Consider the
ethnic heterogeneity hypothesis: Countries with lower levels of ethnic heterogeneity will be more likely to be
democracies than will countries with higher levels of ethnic heterogeneity.
Q1, Part A
A higher percentage of democracies among countries having lower heterogeneity.
Q1, Part B
xtp(world, democ_regime, frac_eth3)
## Cell Contents
## |-------------------------|
## | Count |
## | Column Percent |
## |-------------------------|
##
## ================================================
## frac_eth3
## democ_regime Low Medium High Total
## ------------------------------------------------
## No 11 21 29 61
## 23.91% 39.62% 55.77%
## ------------------------------------------------
## Yes 35 32 23 90
## 76.09% 60.38% 44.23%
## ------------------------------------------------
## Total 46 53 52 151
## 30.46% 35.10% 34.44%
## ================================================
Q1, Part C
Correct
Q1, Part D
Higher level of ethnic fractionalization correspond to lower percentages of democratic regimes. 76.1% of countries with low ethnic fractionalization are democracies, but this figure declines to 60.4% among countries with medium-level ethnic fractionalization and further declines to 44.2% among countries with high ethnic fractionalization.
Q1, Part E
xtabC(~democ_regime + frac_eth3 + gdp_cap2, worldD)
## , , gdp_cap2 = Low
##
## frac_eth3
## democ_regime Low Medium High
## No 53.33 59.09 53.66
## Yes 46.67 40.91 46.34
## Total 100.00 100.00 100.00
## Count 15.00 22.00 41.00
##
## , , gdp_cap2 = High
##
## frac_eth3
## democ_regime Low Medium High
## No 9.68 21.43 60
## Yes 90.32 78.57 40
## Total 100.00 100.00 100
## Count 31.00 28.00 10
Q1, Part F
world$democ.yes <- as.numeric(world$democ == "Yes")
world$democ.yes <- 100*world$democ.yes
worldD <- svydesign(id=~1, data=world)
## Warning in svydesign.default(...): No weights or probabilities supplied,
## assuming equal probability
world_10 <- head(world,10)
print(world_10,digits = NULL,
quote = FALSE, right = TRUE, row.names = TRUE, max = NULL)
## country gini10 dem_level4 dem_rank14 dem_score14 lifeex_f lifeex_m
## 1 Afghanistan 29.4 Authoritarian 151 2.77 45.25 44.79
## 2 Albania 33.0 Hybrid 88 5.67 80.30 74.82
## 3 Algeria 35.3 Authoritarian 117 3.83 76.31 72.78
## 4 Angola 58.6 Authoritarian 133 3.35 39.83 37.74
## 5 Argentina 48.8 Part Democ 52 6.84 80.36 73.71
## 6 Armenia 30.2 Hybrid 113 4.13 77.31 69.59
## 7 Australia 35.2 Full Democ 9 9.01 84.35 79.40
## 8 Austria 29.1 Full Democ 14 8.54 82.84 76.87
## 9 Azerbaijan NA Authoritarian 148 2.83 72.01 63.20
## 10 Bahrain NA Authoritarian 147 2.87 80.33 76.03
## literacy oil pop_0_14 pop_15_64 pop_65_older fertility govregrel
## 1 28.1 0 42.3 55.3 2.4 5.39 10.000
## 2 NA 5400 21.4 68.1 10.5 1.48 0.000
## 3 69.9 2125000 24.2 70.6 5.2 1.75 8.611
## 4 67.4 1948000 43.2 54.1 2.7 5.97 0.556
## 5 97.2 796300 25.4 63.6 11.0 2.31 0.000
## 6 99.4 0 17.6 72.4 10.1 1.37 6.944
## 7 99.0 589200 18.3 67.7 14.0 1.78 0.000
## 8 98.0 21880 14.0 67.7 18.2 1.40 1.389
## 9 98.8 1011000 23.2 70.3 6.4 2.02 7.222
## 10 86.5 48560 20.5 77.0 2.6 1.88 3.889
## regionun religoin spendeduc spendhealth
## 1 Asia Muslim NA 1.8
## 2 Europe Muslim 2.9 2.9
## 3 Africa Muslim 4.3 3.6
## 4 Africa Catholic 2.6 2.0
## 5 Latin America/Caribbean Catholic 4.9 5.1
## 6 Asia Orthodox Christian 3.0 2.1
## 7 Australia/New Zealand/Oceania Catholic 4.7 6.0
## 8 Europe Catholic 5.4 7.7
## 9 Asia Muslim 1.9 1.0
## 10 Asia Muslim 2.9 2.6
## spendmil hdi pop_age sexratio pop_total pop_urban gender_unequal
## 1 1.9 0.349 16.9 106.0 29.1 22.6 0.797
## 2 2.0 0.719 30.0 107.0 3.2 51.9 0.545
## 3 3.0 0.677 26.2 104.6 35.4 66.5 0.594
## 4 3.0 0.403 17.4 99.9 19.0 58.5 NA
## 5 0.8 0.775 30.4 103.6 40.7 92.4 0.534
## 6 3.3 0.695 32.0 116.5 3.1 64.2 0.570
## 7 1.8 0.937 37.8 105.3 21.5 89.1 0.296
## 8 0.9 0.851 41.8 105.4 8.4 67.6 0.300
## 9 3.8 0.713 28.4 115.6 8.9 51.9 0.553
## 10 3.0 0.801 28.1 105.2 0.8 88.6 0.512
## gender_unequal_rank arda lifeex_total debt colony confidence
## 1 134 1 45.02 NA UK NA
## 2 61 3 77.41 59.3 Soviet Union 49.335926
## 3 70 4 74.50 25.7 France 52.055735
## 4 NA 7 38.76 20.3 Portugal NA
## 5 60 11 76.95 50.3 Spain 7.299325
## 6 66 12 73.23 NA Soviet Union 27.132735
## 7 18 14 81.81 22.4 UK 46.838886
## 8 19 15 79.78 70.4 Other 49.680190
## 9 62 16 67.36 4.6 Soviet Union 54.168485
## 10 55 18 78.15 59.2 UK NA
## decent08 dem_other dem_other5 democ
## 1 No local elections 10.5 10% No
## 2 Legislature and executive are locally elected 63.0 Approx 60% Yes
## 3 Legislature is elected but executive is appointed 40.8 Approx 40% No
## 4 No local elections 40.8 Approx 40% No
## 5 <NA> 87.5 Approx 90% Yes
## 6 Legislature and executive are locally elected 63.0 Approx 60% Yes
## 7 Legislature is elected but executive is appointed 58.3 Approx 60% Yes
## 8 <NA> 100.0 100% Yes
## 9 Legislature is elected but executive is appointed 63.0 Approx 60% No
## 10 Legislature is elected but executive is appointed 10.5 10% No
## democ11 democ_regime democ_regime08 district_size3 durable effectiveness
## 1 NA No No single member 4 13.71158
## 2 9 Yes Yes <NA> 3 35.46099
## 3 3 No No 6 or more members 5 32.62411
## 4 2 No No <NA> 3 19.14894
## 5 8 Yes Yes 6 or more members 17 34.98818
## 6 5 Yes Yes <NA> 2 36.64303
## 7 10 Yes Yes single member 99 90.07092
## 8 10 Yes Yes 6 or more members 54 88.88889
## 9 0 No No <NA> 5 23.87707
## 10 0 No No single member 25 65.01182
## enpp3_democ enpp3_democ08 dnpp_3 eu fhrate04_rev fhrate08_rev
## 1 <NA> <NA> NA Not member 2.5 3
## 2 1-3 parties 1-3 parties 1 Not member 5.0 8
## 3 <NA> <NA> 3 Not member 2.5 3
## 4 <NA> <NA> 1 Not member 2.5 3
## 5 1-3 parties 1-3 parties 1 Not member 6.0 10
## 6 6-11 parties 6-11 parties 3 Not member 3.5 4
## 7 1-3 parties 1-3 parties 1 Not member 7.0 12
## 8 4-5 parties 4-5 parties 2 EU Member state 7.0 12
## 9 <NA> <NA> 1 Not member 2.5 3
## 10 <NA> <NA> NA Not member 3.0 4
## frac_eth frac_eth2 frac_eth3 free_business free_corrupt free_finance
## 1 0.7693 High High NA NA NA
## 2 0.2204 Low Low 68.0 34 70
## 3 0.3394 Low Medium 71.2 32 30
## 4 0.7867 High High 43.4 19 40
## 5 0.2550 Low Low 62.1 29 30
## 6 0.1272 Low Low 83.4 29 70
## 7 0.0929 Low Low 90.3 87 90
## 8 0.1068 Low Low 73.6 81 70
## 9 0.2047 Low Low 74.6 19 40
## 10 0.5021 High Medium 77.8 54 80
## free_fiscal free_govspend free_invest free_labor free_monetary free_property
## 1 NA NA NA NA NA NA
## 2 92.6 74.2 70 52.1 78.7 35
## 3 83.5 73.4 45 56.4 77.2 30
## 4 85.1 62.8 35 45.2 62.6 20
## 5 69.5 75.6 45 50.1 61.2 20
## 6 89.3 90.9 75 70.6 72.9 30
## 7 61.4 64.9 80 94.9 82.7 90
## 8 51.2 28.8 75 79.1 79.3 90
## 9 79.5 77.5 55 82.5 62.7 20
## 10 99.9 80.8 65 89.4 73.4 60
## free_trade free_overall free_overall_4 gdp08 gdp_10_thou gdp_cap2 gdp_cap3
## 1 NA NA <NA> 30.6 NA <NA> <NA>
## 2 85.8 66.0 MidHi 24.3 0.1535 Low Middle
## 3 70.7 56.9 MidLow 276.0 0.1785 Low Middle
## 4 70.4 48.4 Low 106.3 0.0857 Low Middle
## 5 69.5 51.2 Low 571.5 0.2797 High Middle
## 6 80.5 69.2 High 18.7 0.0771 Low Low
## 7 85.1 82.6 High 762.6 2.0822 High High
## 8 87.5 71.6 High 318.4 2.5356 High High
## 9 77.1 58.8 MidLow 76.1 0.0745 Low Low
## 10 82.9 76.3 High 26.9 1.1007 High High
## gdpcap2_08 gdpcap3_08 gdpcap08_2 gdppcap08 gdppcap08_3 gender_equal3 gini04
## 1 Low Low Low NA NA <NA> NA
## 2 Low Mid Low 7715 2 <NA> 28.2
## 3 High Mid High 8033 2 <NA> 35.3
## 4 High Mid High 5899 2 <NA> NA
## 5 High High High 14333 3 High 52.2
## 6 Low Mid Low 6070 2 <NA> 37.9
## 7 High High High 35677 3 High 35.2
## 8 High High High 38152 3 High 30.0
## 9 High Mid High 8765 2 <NA> 36.5
## 10 High High High 34605 3 Low NA
## gini08 hi_gdp indy muslim natcode oecd pmat12_3
## 1 NA <NA> 1919 Yes afghanistan Not member <NA>
## 2 31.1 Low GDP 1991 Yes albania Not member Low post-mat
## 3 35.3 Low GDP 1962 Yes algeria Not member <NA>
## 4 NA Low GDP 1975 No angola Not member <NA>
## 5 51.3 High GDP 1816 No argentina Not member High post-mat
## 6 33.8 Low GDP 1991 No armenia Not member Low post-mat
## 7 35.2 High GDP 1901 No australia OECD Member state High post-mat
## 8 29.1 High GDP 1156 No austria OECD Member state High post-mat
## 9 36.5 Low GDP 1991 Yes azerbaijan Not member Low post-mat
## 10 NA High GDP 1971 Yes bahrain Not member <NA>
## polity pr_sys protact3 regime_type3 rich_democ unions unnetgro
## 1 NA No <NA> Dictatorship NA NA NA
## 2 9 No Moderate Parliamentary democ 0 NA 21329
## 3 2 Yes <NA> Dictatorship 0 NA 2633
## 4 -2 Yes <NA> Dictatorship 0 NA 3567
## 5 8 Yes Moderate Presidential democ 1 25.4 331
## 6 5 No High <NA> 0 NA 378
## 7 10 No High Parliamentary democ 1 28.6 66
## 8 10 Yes Moderate Parliamentary democ 1 36.6 120
## 9 -7 No Low Dictatorship 0 75.4 20206
## 10 -8 No <NA> Dictatorship 0 NA 907
## unnetuse unpovnpl unremitp unremitt vi_rel3 votevap00s votevap90s women05
## 1 1.7 42.0 NA NA <NA> NA NA NA
## 2 23.9 18.5 476 12.2 20-50% 59.56 85.25755 6.4
## 3 11.9 NA 64 1.3 >50% NA 71.43356 NA
## 4 3.1 NA 5 0.1 <NA> NA 88.28227 NA
## 5 28.1 NA 17 0.2 20-50% 70.88 79.68567 33.7
## 6 6.2 50.9 345 8.9 20-50% NA 53.32164 5.3
## 7 70.8 NA 220 0.5 20-50% 82.74 81.36468 24.7
## 8 71.2 NA 389 0.8 20-50% 75.61 75.48064 33.9
## 9 28.2 49.6 179 3.4 20-50% NA 79.18028 NA
## 10 51.9 NA NA NA <NA> NA NA NA
## women09 women13 ipu_wom13_all womyear womyear2 dem_economist democ.yes
## 1 NA NA 27.7 NA <NA> 0 0
## 2 16.4 15.7 15.7 1920 1944 or before 0 100
## 3 NA NA 31.6 1962 After 1944 0 0
## 4 NA NA 34.1 1975 After 1944 0 0
## 5 41.6 37.4 37.4 1947 After 1944 1 100
## 6 8.4 10.7 10.7 1921 1944 or before 0 100
## 7 26.7 24.7 24.7 1902 1944 or before 1 100
## 8 27.9 27.9 27.9 1918 1944 or before 1 100
## 9 NA NA 16.0 1921 1944 or before 0 0
## 10 NA NA 10.0 1973 After 1944 0 0
## country1
## 1 Afghanistan
## 2 Albania
## 3 Algeria
## 4 Angola
## 5 Argentina
## 6 Armenia
## 7 Australia
## 8 Austria
## 9 Azerbaijan
## 10 Bahrain
Q1, Part G
iplotC(~democ.yes, ~frac_eth3+gdp_cap2, worldD,
democ.yes~gdp_cap2+frac_eth3,
xlab="Fractionalization",
ylab="Percentage of Democracies",
main="Percentage of Democracies by \n Fractionalization and GDP")
legend("topright", legend=c("Low GDP Countries", "High GDP Countries"),
lty=c(1,2), bty="n")
Q1, Part H
Interaction
Q1, Part I
Based on the controlled cross-tabulation and the multiple line chart, the effect of ethnic fractionalization on the likelihood a county is democratic depends on economic development. It is only among high GDP countries that ethnic fractionalization decreases the percentages of democracies.
Q2
(Datasets: nesD, nes. Variables: polknow3, dhs_threat3, ftgr_tea.) Given the tea party movement?s deep
skepticism of government activism, it seems plausible to hypothesize that individuals who regard the
government as a threat would have warmer feelings toward the tea party than would those who do not think
the government poses a threat. Of course, people would need to be reasonably well informed about politics
to make the connection between their assessment of government threat and their evaluation of the tea party.
When we control for political knowledge (control variable), we may find that the relationship between tea
party ratings (dependent variable) and perceptions of government threat (independent variable) gets stronger
as knowledge increases. In other words, interaction could be occurring in this set of relationships. Consider
two propositions and an ancillary hypothesis.
Proposition 1: At all levels of political knowledge (nesD variable, polknow3), individuals who perceive
the government as a threat (dhs_threat3) will give the tea party higher ratings (ftgr_tea) than will people
who do not regard the government as a threat.
Proposition 2: The relationship between perceived threat and tea party ratings will be weaker for lower-
knowledge respondents than for higher-knowledge respondents.
Ancillary Hypothesis: In a comparison of individuals, those with higher levels of political knowledge are less likely
to regard the government as a threat than are those with lower levels of political knowledge.
The dependent variable: the tea party feeling thermometer (ftgr_tea), which runs from 0 (cold or negative feelings)
to 100 (warm or positive feelings). The independent variable dhs_threat3, which captures assessments of government?s
threat with three ordinal levels?government represents no threat ("None"), a moderate threat ("Mod"), or
an extreme threat ("Extrm"). Political knowledge is also a three-level ordinal: low ("Low know"), moderate
("Mid know"), and high knowledge ("High know").
Q2, Part A
imeansC(~ftgr_tea, ~ dhs_threat3+polknow3 , nesD)
## polknow3 Low know Mid know High know
## dhs_threat3
## None survey::svymean 39.02 34.96 24.34
## Mod survey::svymean 42.40 45.64 41.84
## Extrm survey::svymean 44.16 55.32 63.92
Q2, Part B
Proposition 1 is supported
Q2, Part C
At all levels of political knowledge, as measured by the dhs_threat3 variable, individuals who perceive the government as a threat tend to give the tea party higher ratings than people who do not regard the government as a threat. Among respondents with low political knowledge, those who perceive the government as no threat give the tea party a 39.02 average rating on a feeling thermometer; those who perceive the government as a moderate threat give the tea party an average 42.90 rating, while those who see the government as an extreme threat rate the tea party 44.16 on average. We observe a similar relationship between perceived threat and tea party ratings among those with medium and high political knowledge.
Q2, Part D
Proposition 2 is supported
Q2, Part E
Although there is a positive relationship between perceived threat of government and tea party ratings for respondents with all levels of political knowledge, the strength of this relationship varies with political knowledge. The difference in average tea party ratings between those who perceive the government as an extreme threat and no threat (44.16 – 39.02) in the low political knowledge category is 5.14. In the medium knowledge group, there’s a greater difference, 20.36. Among those with high political knowledge, the difference is still greater, 39.58.
Q2, Part F
xtp(nes, dhs_threat3, polknow3, wt)
## Cell Contents
## |-------------------------|
## | Count |
## | Column Percent |
## |-------------------------|
##
## ======================================================
## polknow3
## dhs_threat3 Low know Mid know High know Total
## ------------------------------------------------------
## None 388 673 670 1731
## 47.84% 45.47% 43.93%
## ------------------------------------------------------
## Mod 255 486 484 1225
## 31.44% 32.84% 31.74%
## ------------------------------------------------------
## Extrm 168 321 371 860
## 20.72% 21.69% 24.33%
## ------------------------------------------------------
## Total 811 1480 1525 3816
## 21.25% 38.78% 39.96%
## ======================================================
Q2, Part G
The hypothesis is not supported. Those with a higher political knowledge are more likely to not see government as a threat. 47.84% for low knowledge vs. 43.93 with high knowledge.
Q2, Part H
iplotC(~ftgr_tea, ~dhs_threat3+polknow3, nesD,
ftgr_tea~polknow3+dhs_threat3,
xlab="Perception of Government Threat",
ylab="Average Tea Party Rating",
main="")
legend("topleft", legend=c("Low", "Medium", "High"),
title="Political Knowledge", lty=c(1,2,3), bty="n")
