Introduction

Beginning in 2012, the Syrian government, led by President Bashar al-Assad, launched a campaign of chemical warfare against the nation’s civilian population. Despite widespread international condemnation, sanctions, and treaties, Assad has yet to formally close his chemical weapons program; its most recent confirmed strike came in 2019. Assad has relied on a network of individuals, organizations, and international alliances to commit more than 100 chemical attacks against Syrian civilians, who have tragically suffered at the hands of their government for nearly a decade. Conflict bloomed out of anti-Assad discontent following the Arab spring in 2011; today the Syrian civil war has grown into an international catastrophe involving Russia, the United States, and the Islamic State, among other domestic and international power brokers.

The purpose of this study is to use network analysis to unravel the links between key organizations, individuals, entities, and timelines of the Syrian chemical weapons program. All information was collected using open-source research and collated into data analytics software including Microsoft Excel, IBM Analyst’s Notebook, and R. Together, these resources have disclosed when, where, and how the Syrian government has used chemical weapons and can direct policy responses aimed at dismantling Assad’s chemical network.

Analysis

Syrian government

Known links of the Syrian chemical weapons program. See bottom of page for a higher-resolution copy

Known links of the Syrian chemical weapons program. See bottom of page for a higher-resolution copy

While the Assad regime is the driving force behind the Syrian chemical weapons program, the Scientific Studies Research Center (SSRC) is responsible for building and deploying Syria’s chemical arsenal. The SSRC is a Syria-based entity and is closely linked to the Syrian military. Its functional network, however, is global; the SSRC is dependent on international organizations and governments for funding and resource management.

The SSRC’s operations rely on a compartmentalized internal structure. Each of the four primary divisions are responsible for separate functions ranging from manufacturing and technology to weapon deployment. SSRC subsidiaries are organized as follows:

  • Division 1000; develops electronics
  • Division 2000; produces rocket launchers
  • Division 3000; develops and produces biological weapons
    • Department 3100: synthesizes chemical weapons and antidotes
    • Department 3600: produces chemical weapons
    • Unit 450: protects, stores, and deploys chemical weapons
  • Division 4000; oversees aviation, missile/rocket programs
    • Project 99: develops SCUD missiles in cooperation with North Korea
    • Project 111: develops surface-to-air missiles
    • Project 350: develops surface-to-surface missiles
    • Project 702: develops propellants in conjunction with Iran

Division 3000’s secretive Unit 450 is perhaps the most critical entity within the SSRC because it is responsible for deploying chemical attacks on behalf of the Syrian government. As an all-Alawite branch of the SSRC, its constituency is highly loyal to the Assad regime and its leadership structure is private information.

The SSRC depends on the Syrian armed forces to deliver chemical attacks. Most attacks are aerial; the Syrian Air Force has been an integral component of the chemical program since its inception. Other known governmental entities connected to the SSRC’s network include the Office of the Prime Minister, the Office of the President, and the Syrian Arab Republican Guard. In addition to Assad, key individuals in the network include: Bassam al-Hassan, a Brigadier General in the Syrian Armed Forces, SSRC representative, and Assad’s strategic affairs advisor; Zuhair Fadlun, Director of the SSRC’s Division 3000; Maher al-Assad, the president’s brother and a high-ranking military official; and Muhammad Mahmud Mahalla, Director and Major General of Syrian Military Intelligence. Collectively, this network of individuals and government branches is responsible for the production and operationalization of Syria’s chemical weapons.

Civilian network

The SSRC’s civilian network reaches across the globe. Individuals and entities in the Middle East, Asia, North America, and Europe are known to be connected with the SSRC, which has also utilized the Higher Institute of Applied Science and Technology, a Damascus-based university, as a research branch.

Three crucial organizations demonstrate the international reach of the SSRC network. Electronic Katrangi Trading (EKT) is a Lebanon-based electronics supplier with links to multiple Lebanese electronics production companies. MHD Nazier Houranieh Sons & Co. is a Damascus-based metal trader and importer owned and operated by the Syrian-Canadian Houranieh family. Finally, TopTech US was a Massachusetts-based industrial supplier of EKT. Its former director, Amir Hachem Katrangi, is the son of Mohammed Katrangi, EKT’s founder.

Electronic Katrangi Trading network map

Electronic Katrangi Trading network map

Other global partners of the SSRC include the North Korean entity Tangun Trading Company and the Chinese firm Guangzhou ZK Trading, which have provided financial management and electronics production support respectively. Emirati-based shipping companies, Yona Star International and Mahrouz Trading FZE, are known SSRC collaborators. In Europe, Smart Green Power and Lumière Elysees have operated out of France as alias groups of EKT. Finally, the Iranian Shahid Hemat Industrial Group has supplied the SSRC with explosives.

State actors

Russia, Iran, and North Korea are known SSRC benefactors. The Russian government has directly supported the Assad regime over the course of the conflict despite the latter repeatedly and openly targeting its civilian population with chemical weapons. Iran is the primary financier of the SSRC and has supplied the organization with additional chemical resources and personnel support. Iran has also supported the North Korean government’s efforts to prop up the SSRC with financial assets.

Attack history

Chemical and missile types

The primary chemical agents in the SSRC’s arsenal are sarin and chlorine. According to information from the French government and armscontrol.org, sarin has seven confirmed uses, while chlorine has been operationalized twenty-eight times. In total, 133 confirmed chemical attacks have occurred since 2012, although the chemical of use is unconfirmed in ninety-eight instances. The SSRC has also been known to produce VX, a synthetic nerve agent, and sulfur mustard gas, although their usages are unconfirmed.

Syria relies on aerial mechanisms to launch chemical attacks. According to Bellingcat, MYM6000 and M4000 missiles have been known vectors of sarin, while chlorine has been dropped in improvised explosive devices.

Targets

Idlib, the last rebel-held territory in Syria, has been the most frequent target of chemical attacks with thirty-five reported chemical incidents. Other heavily-targeted urban areas include Aleppo (twenty-nine confirmed), Damascus (fourteen confirmed), and Hama (twelve confirmed). Eastern Ghouta region (twenty-nine confirmed) has also seen considerable chemical damage in cities including Douma, Mesraba, Arbin, and some suburbs of Damascus.

Locations of known chemical attacks by region, scaled by number of attacks

Locations of known chemical attacks by region, scaled by number of attacks

Policy routes

The Syrian chemical weapons program, and the SSRC in particular, are network-dependent entities. The two institutions are dependent on both each other and their international network to operate a chemical weapons program. Targeting known links within the network will effectively reduce the SSRC’s operational capabilities because the organization is unable to exist as a singular entity.

Multiple avenues can lead to this outcome. First, further sanctions on known entities in the SSRC’s network will reduce chemical production capabilities, both on individual and collective levels. Intelligence gathering is crucial to the success of this approach because additional sanction targets can be exposed if more network components are confirmed. The network’s hierarchical structure is another potential vulnerability; reducing capacity at higher levels of the program could produce a trickle-down effect that would inhibit lower-level operations.

Second, directly engaging known SSRC production sites and Syrian military components has the potential to curb chemical production. The SSRC operates multiple production sites, laboratories, warehouses, and production sites throughout Syria. In addition, the Syrian Armed Forces launches operations from air bases, all of which are in known locations. Missile strikes that target SSRC sites and Syrian bases could generate favorable outcomes. However, such attacks must be done with just intent and complete accuracy to maximize efficacy.

A final avenue to confronting Syria’s chemical weapons program is monitoring the spread of natural resources and chemicals within the region. Again, efficient intelligence gathering can streamline this process and identify how SSRC resources spread into and within Syria. While there are certainly limitations to this route, including a lack of access to distribution networks, reducing chemical and material diffusion in the region will limit the resources available to the SSRC.

Conclusion

While the chemical attack rate has slowed in past years, the Assad regime has demonstrated an unwillingness to comprehensively dismantle its chemical weapons program. As long as civil war lasts in Syria, the potential for chemical attacks will persist. However, as the SSRC’s network shrinks, so too will its capabilities. A strategic intelligence-based approach to Assad’s chemical program has the capability to reduce the likelihood of future attacks on Syrian civilians.