This gives them comparative advantages as they do not have to bear the cost of compliance
This phenomenon is referred to as the pollution haven hypothesis
Globalization & trade liberalization may in theory exacerbate pollution havens
Some empirical evidence
Mild evidence that stringent environmental policy leads to within country industrial shifts in the US:
Fewer new plants
Fewer incoming foreign investment
Environmental policy also correlates with labor costs/regulations in the US
“Labor haven” rather than “pollution haven”
NO evidence of pollution outsourcing to developing countries
Not from US to rest of the world
Not from Japan to Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines
The political economy of pollution haven
A closely related concept to the pollution haven is the idea of race to the bottom
Politicians attract investments by voluntarily lowering standards of environmental regulation
Prevalent if environmental standards are set and enforced by the local government
Weaker institutional and public oversight exacerbates the problem
Chances for bureaucrats to seek rents
Promotion Tournament and Perverse Incentives in China
China was a central-planning economy before 1982
Deng Xiaoping started the economic reform, bringing Western “market-based” economy to China
Rapid economic growth since then, the “China miracle”
Lifted 1 BILLION people out of poverty
Bureaucrat incentives
Economic development was the No.1 imperative in the 1990s to early 2000s
Deng: “It doesn’t matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice.”
Promotions of bureaucrats were (almost) entirely based on economic performance
Bureaucrats do not directly answer to constituents. Rather they answer to the Party HR (the Organization Department of CCP)
GDP was the Key Performance Indicator (KPI) to determine promotion
Best way to boost GDP: attract Foreign Direct Investments (FDI)
FDI brought in capital and technology, quickly lifted the economy up
Also gained the opportunity to seek rents (bribes)
Race to the bottom
This quickly turns into a tournament for FDI:
Every city would go up and down to attract investment
Environmental protection was often sidelined
Environmental protection bureau was under direct control of the city Mayor/Party Secretary
Negligence
Why would an official care about the environment if that did not affect his/her promotion?
Kong and Chen (2015)
“Combining the opportunity (to seek rents) with the pressure of time (that bureaucrats are actually in power), attracting FDI often becomes the top priority for the local (government), with almost all their manpower and at all costs. Because that the (incentive) of getting FDI is so high, it is not difficult to understand that the government gives out (public) lands for free, offers subsequent tax breaks, and turns a blind eye to environmental pollution”
To be fair
FDI usually have better environmental performance than private or state-owned enterprises
Better technology
Environmental indicators have been added into bureaucrats’ KPI
President Hu Jintao: Sustainable development
President Xi Jinping: “Green mountains and clear water are equal to mountains of gold and silver.”
A different type of incentives
Once bureaucrats started to care about the environment, things quickly turned around
Strong regulatory steps
Carbon cap-and-trade
Pollution fees
Improved environmental performance
Are there really “free lunches”?
Environmental taxes can:
Correct the externality from pollution
What a tax/cap-and-trade is intended to do
Raise governmental revenue
Can be used to correct other distortionary taxes
Income tax, capital gain tax, etc.
Economists call that the “double-dividend” hypothesis.
Deadweight loss in regular taxes
The top priority for any environmental policy is to correct for market failures
Revenue-generating policy may or may not be the most efficient/feasible one to achieve that goal
Lots of real-world policies are revenue neutral, or even revenue-losing
Sulfur dioxide trading: permits are handed out for free
Conservation reserves: providing subsidies to landowners for conservation
Even when environmental taxes do raise revenue
Welfare gains depend on the type of revenue rebates
Rebate with a lump-sum payment (freedom-dividend): welfare losses
Cutting existing capital taxes: small welfare gains
Cutting existing labor taxes: almost no effect
These effects are really small in magnitude
Comparing to the main objective of the environmental tax
Takeaways from the module
Engineering cost is a benchmark, but not the full cost of environmental regulation
Environmental regulation can potentially encourage innovation
Porter hypothesis
Employment effects
The job-killer myth
The green jobs semi-myth
Pollution haven
Double-dividend
Limited evidence supporting the free-lunch argument