Lecture 5

Converts, Event Driven, Distressed, and 13F Replication

Terry Leitch

Copyright © 2018 T Leitch & J Liew

Agenda

Analysis of Convertible Bonds

Follows: Fabozzi 5th Edition (2004), “Bond Markets, Analysis, and Strategies”

Convertible Bond Terms

Exercise: Consider XYZ Convertible Bond

Maturity: 10 years
Coupon Rate: 10%
Conversion Ratio: 50
Par Value: $1,000
Curr. Mkt price convert: $950
Curr. Mkt price stocks: $17
Dividend per share: $1

The conversion price = ?

Answer

$1,000/50 = $20 (=Strike Price)

Background Info on Convert Industry

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Source: Mongan Stanley

Academic Evidence

Convertible Arb

How to hedge?

What are the risks? Or how do you hedge each component? Interest Rate (bond) + Corporate Default Risk (health of issuer) + Call Option (delta)

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Convert Example

Security Description


Q: What is DHI or D.R. Horton?
Defn: Parity is the market value of stock shares if you converted now
Ex. (76.5697) * $10.49 = $803.216153, quoted as a percentage of par ($1000 or 100%), so you get “80.32” or 80.32% (= $803.216153/$1000)

Defn: Premium is the difference between convert price and parity as percent of parity Premium = (Bond Price – Parity) / Parity Ex. (107.678 – 80.3216153)/ 80.3216153 = 0.340586 or 34.06(%)

DHI 2 05/15/2014

Issuer D.R. Horton Inc. (DHI)
Title of security 2.00% Convertible Senior Notes due 2014 (CUSIP: 23331ABB4, ISIN: US23331ABB44)
Coupon 2% (Semi-Annual)
Issue Amount $500M
Maturity Date May 15, 2014, subject to earlier repurchase or conversion
Interest Dates May 15 and Nov 15, beginning Nov 15, 2009
Offering Price 100%
Conversion Ratio 76.5697 shares of issuer’s common stock per $1,000 principal amount of notes
Trade Date May 7, 2009
Settlement Date May 13, 2009 (T+4)

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More convertible bonds…

Convertible Arb Cycle…

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Convert Classification Confusion, even among institutions-quality organizations…

Distressed Securities

Securities (typically bonds/bank loans) of companies that are in default or under bankruptcy protection, or headed for such a “distressed” condition

What do “Distressed” managers hold?

Historical Universe of Defaulted Bonds from NYU Salomon Center Stern School of Business


Performance of Defaulted Bond Index

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Some notable Distressed Hedge Fund Managers

Avenue Capital, Mark Lasry, $12B AUM

Stephen Feinberg, Cerberus Capital
Size: $19.15 billion (1997); Style: Distressed investor; Location: Manhattan
Worked at Drexel Burnham Lambert in the Milken era. King of the vulture investors—currently sniffing around car-company wrecks in Detroit. Likes Republicans: Dan Quayle is on Cerberus team; former Treasury secretary John Snow is chairman.

David Tepper, Appaloosa Management Size: $5.3 billion (1997); Style: Distressed investor; Location: Chatham, N.J. Ran the junk-bond desk at Goldman. Joined ever-growing roster of ex-Goldmanites after founding Appaloosa in 1993. Like Cerberus, lurking around automotive industry. Worked with Cerberus on the Delphi automotive deal.
http://nymag.com/news/features/2007/hedgefunds/30342/
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1006438/000100643810000003/0001006438-10-000003.txt

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Long/Short

“Gross” vs “Net” Exposure

In order to better understand the risks associated with long/short hedge funds, investors will ask about their “gross” and “net” exposures.
What is this?
Gross Exposure = Total $ Long + abs(Total $ Short)
Net Exposure = Total $ Long – Total $ Short

\[ Total \$ Long = \Sigma^{k}_{i=1}(SharesLong_{i}*Price_{i}) \]
\[ Total \$ Short = \Sigma^{m}_{j=1}(SharesShort_{j}*Price_{j}) \]

Pop Quiz on Gross/Net

Suppose manager A has $100m long, $50 m short. What is her gross and net exposures?

Answer

Gross = $100m + abs(-$50m) = $150m Net = $100m - $50m = $50m

Assuming she had $100m of assets, some refer to Gross as 150% ($150m/$100m) and Net of 50% ($50m/$100m)

How can you learn from the best Long/Short (value) managers?

Let’s make some assumptions… and learn!

Who is?

“His trade made his hedge fund $15 billion in 2007 alone. It propelled him from relative obscurity to stardom and his hedge fund to become the third largest in the world.”

http://www.ibtimes.com/top-10-greatest-trades-all-time-253039

Case Study: Paulson & Co

“13-F for you”

Background: Institutional investment managers with more than $100m, must report their holdings in Form 13F with SEC. Positions are publically disclosed within 45 days after the end of each quarter.

Some say that: “13F information is released with such a long lag, this can’t be useful…”

http://www.sec.gov/answers/form13f.htm

Steps to construct “13-F for you”

Step 1: Visit www.sec.gov, search for hedge fund of interest, helpful if manager builds positions over time, i.e. value-trained better than high-frequency, why?
http://www.sec.gov/cgi-bin/browse-edgar?action=getcompany&CIK=0001035674&owner=exclude&count=40

Step 2: Ex. Look up “Paulson & Co” or CIK: 0001035674 (Central Index Key)

Step 3: Find 13-F information http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1035674/000114036113021112/0001140361-13-021112-index.htm

Step 4: Cut into excel, parse it, combine with price data,
Note: securities are assigned by CUSIP, need a map to tickers

Step 5: Examine historical performance

Paulson’s 13-F top positions over the past 3 quarters


Let’s examine the historical performance of the 5 largest positions from 9/30/2012: What portion of his portfolio does the 5 largest position represent? Did he beat the “market”?

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Let’s look at Paulson’s recent holdings…

“Uncovering Hedge Fund Skill from the Portfolios They Hide”

Background Info

Contributions

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45.7% = (106/232), 30.2% = (942/3,134)

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“The triggering event for the 1998 rule tightening was the confusion over the 13F reporting of investor Warren Buffett, which caused a significant decline in the share price of Wells Fargo & Co. in August 1997. The 13F form did not show Berkshire Hathaway’s well-known 8% stake in the bank because it was reported in a confidential filing. But the misunderstanding in the market caused Wells Fargo’s stock price to drop 5.8% in 1 hour after Buffett’s 13F Filing.”

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Hedge Funds — Confidential vs Original Holdings

Statistically Significant Differences:

Stocks are smaller, more value, less analysts’ coverage, higher probability of default, more volatile both absolute and relative, and higher number of announced merger targets in prior year

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How can we combine, 13-F info and publically announced merger info?

First, learn how to implement

Merger Arb:

  1. Cash and
  2. Stock for Stock

Merger Arb

  1. Cash Deal
    Ex. Cash deal, Intel acquires McAfee for $48 per share
    Deal terms below:

    The announcement date is 8/19/2010, what do you think happens to the price of McAfee around the announcement date?

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Announcement date 8/19/2010, price spikes upward toward $48, why not all the way?

Top Deals





Stock for Stock Deal

Ex. Stock for stock deal, FirstEnergy to acquire Allegheny for 0.667 (Aq sh/Tg sh)

Upon completion (0.667 * FE) will equal AYE,
So, trade is to (1) buy the target AYE and (2) sell 0.667 of acquirer FE

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Stock for stock deal: AYE vs 0.667 * FE

Upon completion for every 1,000 shares of AYE, holders will receive 667 shares of FE.

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Pulling it all together, 13-Fs and merger announced deals: Merger Arb Index

Easy Construction

Hedge Fund Manager List and Rebalance Date

Hedge Fund Manager List
1. Brencourt Advisors LLC
2. EAC (Soros) Management, LP
3. Eton Park Capital Management, L.P.
4. Glazer Capital, LLC
5. Gruss Asset Management LP
6. Halcyon Asset Management LLC
7. Paulson & Co Inc
8. Shorewater Advisors LLC
9. Taconic Capital Advisors LP
10. Westchester Capital Management, Inc.

Ex. Positions Over Time (Quarters)

Example for 9/30/2009


If deal consummates then leave final-value in index until next re-balancing period.

Historical Back-Test*


Merger Arb Benchmark Index
Annual Returns: 17.4%
Annualized Standard Dev.: 6.0%
Sharpe Ratio (2% Rf): 2.57
232 days from Feb 17, 2009 to Jan 15, 2009


HFRX Merger Arb Index

Annual Returns: 7.6%
Annualized Standard Dev.: 3.0%
Sharpe Ratio (2% Rf): 1.86
231 days from Feb 17, 2009 to Jan 14, 2009

Twice as volatile as HFRX Merger Arb but more than twice the historical returns results in higher Sharpe Ratio

Conclusion

Current Merger Arb Products

Performance of MERFX


Over a longer time-span looking at monthly date, we find a slight edge to the index of risk-arb managers versus one position-level merger arb mutual fund (MERFX)

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Some Investment Models to Generate Alpha from CAPM Extensions

Sharpe-Lintner’s CAPM:
\[R_{i,t} = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{i}R_{m,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]

Fama-French’s 3 Factor Model:

\[R_{i,t} = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{i}R_{m,t} + s_{i}SMB_{t}+ h_{i}HML_{t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]
Carhart’s Model:

\[R_{i,t} = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{i}R_{m,t} + s_{i}SMB_{t}+ h_{i}HML_{t} + m_{i}WML_{t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]

Lagged Betas

Apply Scholes and Williams (1977) and Dimson (1979) simple techniques

\[R_{i,t} = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{0i}R_{m,t} + \beta_{1i}R_{m,t-1} + \beta_{2i}R_{m,t-2} + \beta_{3i}R_{m,t-3}+...+\varepsilon_{i,t}\]

Sharpe-Lintner’s CAPM: Sharpe Screening with PeerPerformance Package

\[R_{i,t} = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{i}R_{m,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]

library("PeerPerformance", lib.loc="/opt/microsoft/ropen/3.4.3/lib64/R/library")
hfrets=readRDS("data/hfrets.rds")[,1:10]

## Sharpe screening 
knitr::kable(cbind(HFname=colnames(hfrets),outperform=sharpeScreening(hfrets, control = list(nCore = 1))$pipos))
HFname outperform
HFI 0.353123446117909
Converts 0.0639887827529013
ShortBias 0
EMF 0.0535714285714285
EquityNeutral 0.0387817643696677
EventDriven 0.75
Distressed 0.816176470588235
MultiSstrat 0.382917515973302
RiskArb 0.728223365686532
FIArb 0.181691935263858
## Modified Sharpe screening 
knitr::kable(cbind(HFname=colnames(hfrets),outperform=msharpeScreening(hfrets, control = list(nCore = 1))$pipos))
HFname outperform
HFI 0.163781764369668
Converts 1
ShortBias 0
EMF 0.142857142857143
EquityNeutral NA
EventDriven 0.527874016416601
Distressed 0.73109243697479
MultiSstrat 0.193559266034737
RiskArb 0.509887933719684
FIArb 0.65933703238995
## Alpha screening
ctr = list(nCore = 1)
knitr::kable(cbind(HFname=colnames(hfrets),outperform=alphaScreening(hfrets, control = ctr)$pipos))
HFname outperform
HFI 0.371079858404362
Converts 0.316240381740769
ShortBias 0
EMF 0
EquityNeutral 0
EventDriven 0.673202614379085
Distressed 1
MultiSstrat 0.539453331698549
RiskArb 0.193615434164776
FIArb 0
![Ardia & Boudt 2012](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000901)

Fama-French’s 3 Factor Model:

\[R_{i,t} = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{i}R_{m,t} + s_{i}SMB_{t}+ h_{i}HML_{t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]

library(quantmod)
source("http://www.stat.cmu.edu/~cschafer/MSCF/getFamaFrench.txt")

#Get Fama French factors
ffhold = getFamaFrench(from="2012-1-1", to="2012-6-30")

#Get Apple stock's data
AAPL=getSymbols("AAPL", from="2012-1-1", to="2012-6-30", auto.assign=F)

#Find excess return
ffhold$AAPLexret = 100*dailyReturn(AAPL) - ffhold$RF

#Multiple Linear Regression
ff3modAAPL = lm(AAPLexret ~ Mkt.RF + SMB + HML, data=ffhold)

#Summary of regression
summary(ff3modAAPL)
## 
## Call:
## lm(formula = AAPLexret ~ Mkt.RF + SMB + HML, data = ffhold)
## 
## Residuals:
##     Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
## -3.0164 -0.8426 -0.0340  0.7748  5.0299 
## 
## Coefficients:
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
## (Intercept)   0.1908     0.1225   1.558  0.12190    
## Mkt.RF        1.3617     0.1584   8.597 3.45e-14 ***
## SMB          -0.8402     0.3082  -2.726  0.00735 ** 
## HML          -1.9321     0.3091  -6.251 6.35e-09 ***
## ---
## Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
## 
## Residual standard error: 1.363 on 121 degrees of freedom
## Multiple R-squared:  0.4744, Adjusted R-squared:  0.4613 
## F-statistic:  36.4 on 3 and 121 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16

Sharpe-Lintner’s CAPM Rewritten for Execution



\[\alpha_{i} = R_{i,t} - \beta_{i}R_{m,t} - \varepsilon_{i,t}\]


Fama-French’s 3 Factor Model Rewritten for Execution


\[\alpha_{i} = R_{i,t} - \beta_{i}R_{m,t} - s_{i}SMB_{t}- h_{i}HML_{t} -\varepsilon_{i,t}\]



Last step for portfolio contruction

Optimise for Sharpe by minimizing \(sigma(P)\)



Sharpe-Lintner’s CAPM: Sharpe Screening with PeerPerformance Package


\[R_{i,t} = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{i}R_{m,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]

library("PeerPerformance", lib.loc="~/R/x86_64-pc-linux-gnu-library/3.4")
hfrets=readRDS("data/hfrets.rds")[,1:10]

## Sharpe screening 
knitr::kable(cbind(HFname=colnames(hfrets),outperform=sharpeScreening(hfrets, control = list(nCore = 1))$pipos))
HFname outperform
HFI 0.353123446117909
Converts 0.0639887827529013
ShortBias 0
EMF 0.0514705882352942
EquityNeutral 0.0387817643696677
EventDriven 0.75
Distressed 0.816176470588235
MultiSstrat 0.390557815378023
RiskArb 0.728223365686532
FIArb 0.181691935263858
## Modified Sharpe screening 
knitr::kable(cbind(HFname=colnames(hfrets),outperform=msharpeScreening(hfrets, control = list(nCore = 1))$pipos))
HFname outperform
HFI 0.16666071859529
Converts 1
ShortBias 0
EMF 0.142857142857143
EquityNeutral NA
EventDriven 0.519300441735576
Distressed 0.727266783390811
MultiSstrat 0.193559266034737
RiskArb 0.49942227277714
FIArb 0.65933703238995
## Alpha screening
ctr = list(nCore = 1)
knitr::kable(cbind(HFname=colnames(hfrets),outperform=alphaScreening(hfrets, control = ctr)$pipos))
HFname outperform
HFI 0.371079858404362
Converts 0.320969238150623
ShortBias 0
EMF 0
EquityNeutral 0
EventDriven 0.682539682539683
Distressed 1
MultiSstrat 0.539453331698549
RiskArb 0.193615434164776
FIArb 0
[Ardia & Boudt 2 012](https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2000901)

Fama-French’s 3 Factor Model:

\[R_{i,t} = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{i}R_{m,t} + s_{i}SMB_{t}+ h_{i}HML_{t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]

library(quantmod)
source("http://www.stat.cmu.edu/~cschafer/MSCF/getFamaFrench.txt")

#Get Fama French factors
ffhold = getFamaFrench(from="2012-1-1", to="2012-6-30")

#Get Apple stock's data
AAPL=getSymbols("AAPL", from="2012-1-1", to="2012-6-30", auto.assign=F)

#Find excess return
ffhold$AAPLexret = 100*dailyReturn(AAPL) - ffhold$RF

#Multiple Linear Regression
ff3modAAPL = lm(AAPLexret ~ Mkt.RF + SMB + HML, data=ffhold)

#Summary of regression
summary(ff3modAAPL)
## 
## Call:
## lm(formula = AAPLexret ~ Mkt.RF + SMB + HML, data = ffhold)
## 
## Residuals:
##     Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
## -3.0164 -0.8426 -0.0340  0.7748  5.0299 
## 
## Coefficients:
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
## (Intercept)   0.1908     0.1225   1.558  0.12190    
## Mkt.RF        1.3617     0.1584   8.597 3.45e-14 ***
## SMB          -0.8402     0.3082  -2.726  0.00735 ** 
## HML          -1.9321     0.3091  -6.251 6.35e-09 ***
## ---
## Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
## 
## Residual standard error: 1.363 on 121 degrees of freedom
## Multiple R-squared:  0.4744, Adjusted R-squared:  0.4613 
## F-statistic:  36.4 on 3 and 121 DF,  p-value: < 2.2e-16
## Compare with Sharpe Lintner
#Multiple Linear Regression
ff3modAAPL = lm(AAPLexret ~ Mkt.RF, data=ffhold)

#Summary of regression
summary(ff3modAAPL)
## 
## Call:
## lm(formula = AAPLexret ~ Mkt.RF, data = ffhold)
## 
## Residuals:
##     Min      1Q  Median      3Q     Max 
## -4.2657 -0.9862 -0.1751  0.7242  7.0587 
## 
## Coefficients:
##             Estimate Std. Error t value Pr(>|t|)    
## (Intercept)   0.2184     0.1418   1.540    0.126    
## Mkt.RF        1.1091     0.1597   6.947 1.92e-10 ***
## ---
## Signif. codes:  0 '***' 0.001 '**' 0.01 '*' 0.05 '.' 0.1 ' ' 1
## 
## Residual standard error: 1.58 on 123 degrees of freedom
## Multiple R-squared:  0.2818, Adjusted R-squared:  0.2759 
## F-statistic: 48.26 on 1 and 123 DF,  p-value: 1.916e-10

Carhart’s Model:

\[R_{i,t} = \alpha_{i} + \beta_{i}R_{m,t} + s_{i}SMB_{t}+ h_{i}HML_{t} + m_{i}WML_{t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}\]

Boring Old Factors…

Cumulative Returns

Spice it Up: Simple Trend Model

New Results

New Cumulative Returns

Comparing EW vs EW* (+36%!)