- GFM in Research on Scientific Thinking
- Review
- Simulations
- Discussion
- GFM in Broader Psychology
- Intelligence
- Personality
- Clinical
- GFM Issues
- Statistical
- Theoretical
- Indeterminacy
“a general factor (GF) is assumed to influence all observed variables”. “a general second-order factor (GF) having an influence on all first-order factors”. (Eid, Heene, & , 2016)
General factor GF: A latent random variable that directly or indirectly predicts all observed variables that belong to the represented construct.
Long interest in education, development, assessment (Blair, 1940; Nerring, 1918; Piaget & Inhelder, 1958).
Practices in the application of the Rasch Model.
Practices in the interpretation of the Rasch Model.
\(p(x_{pi})=\frac{exp(x_{pi}(\theta_p-\sigma_i))}{{1+exp(\theta_p-\sigma_i)}}\)
person ability \(\theta_p\), item difficulty \(\sigma_i\)
\(p(x_{pi})=\frac{exp(x_{pi}(\theta_p-\sigma_i))}{{1+exp(\theta_p-\sigma_i)}}\)
person ability \(\theta_p\), item difficulty \(\sigma_i\)
| Reference | Infit | Criterion | Reliability | lrt | irem | Software |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mayer at al. (2014) | x | - | EAP/PV | - | - | ConQuest |
| Koerber et al. (2014) | x | 0.85-1.15 (-) | EAP/PV | - | x | ConQuest |
| Hartmann et al. (2015) | x | - | EAP/PV | - | x | ConQuest |
| Nowak et al. (2013) | x | 0.8-1.2 (Adams, 2002) | EAP/PV | x | x | ConQuest |
| Grube (2010) | x | 0.8-1.2 (Adams, 2000) | EAP/PV | x | x | ConQuest |
| Heene (2007) | x | 0.8-1.2 (Wright, 2000) | PSR/ISR | - | x | ConQuest, WS, FC, WM |
| Brown et al. (2010) | x | - | PSR | - | - | ConQuest |
| Reference | Theoretical models | Fitted models | Best fit | Reliability | Itemfit |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mayer at al. (2014) | 4D | 1D | na | 1D | 1D |
| Koerber et al. (2014) | 1D, 5D | 1D | na | 1D | 1D |
| Hartmann et al. (2015) | 1D | 1D | na | 1D | 1D |
| Nowak et al. (2013) | 1D, 3D | 1D, 3D | 3D | 1D | 1D |
| Grube (2010) | 4D | 1D, 4D | 4D | 1D | 1D |
| Heene (2007) | 1D | 1D | na | 1D | 1D |
| Brown et al. (2010) | 1D | 1D | na | 1D | 1D |
Charles Spearman (1904)
Any alternative after 100 years?
Musek (2007)
Heavily criticized (e.g., Prinz, 2014)
Model equivalence (MacCallum, 2000; Raykov & Penev, 1999; Raykov & Marcoulides, 2001).
Bias (Murray & Johnson, 2013).
Sampling (Eid & Koch, 2014; Eid, Geiser, Koch, & Heene, 2016).
Quantity (Michell, 1997, 2008)
Interindividual vs. intra-individual structure (Borsboom, 2005; Molenaar, 2004, 2008; Molenaar & Campbell, 2009)
"a discrete quantitative difference need not be caused by a quantitative factor at all, let alone one that is a continuous quantity." (Michell, 2013)
"when the ideological support structures of a science sustain serious blind spots like this, then that science is in the grip of some kind of thought disorder." (Michell, 1997)
Scientific measurement? See also Inventing Temperature (Chang, 2007)
there is no single piece of evidence more important to a construct's definition than the causal relationship between the construct and its indicators
Argument 1: Statistically, a General Factor represents covariances. It is a behaviorist construct based on logical positivism and therefore formative. Thus, it cannot inform cognitivist theories, which the assumption of the "existence" of something going beyond covariance dynamics is.
GFM is applied behaviorist
GFM is interpreted cognitivist
Argument 2: Correlational data cannot be used to test the assumption of a reflective latent construct because it is a causal assumption. Thus, GFM cannot be used to test the assumption of a GF. This needs experimental or longitudinal data. This renders degrees of freedom meaningless.
GFM is applied correlationally.
GFM is interpreted causally.
van der Maas et al. (2016): If we just count parameters, the g-factor model seems simpler than an unconstrained mutualism model. This might not be true for constrained versions of the mutualism model. But more importantly, what are the costs of introducing a mysterious latent variable, as the common cause of ‘everything’ in the g-factor model?
Underestimation of the flexibility and thereby the complexity of GF-theories.
Degrees of freedom are not a valid means of model comparison in GFM.
Alternative routes:
Theoretical Research into model complexity.
Bollen, K. A., & Lennox, R. (1991). Conventional wisdom on measurement: A structural equation perspective. Psychological Bulletin, 100, 305-314.
Borsboom, D. (2005). Measuring the Mind. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
Burdick, D. S., Stone, M. H., & Stenner, A. J. (2006). The combined gas law and a Rasch reading law. Rasch Measurement Transactions, 20, 1059-1060.
Cronbach, L. J., & Meehl, P. E. (1955). Construct validity in psychological tests. Psychological Bulletin, 52, 281–302.
Edwards, J. R., & Bagozzi, R. P. (2000). On the nature and direction of relationships between constructs and measures. Psychological Methods, 5, 155-174.
Eid, M., Geiser, C., Koch, T., & Heene, M. (2016). Anomalous Results in G-Factor Models: Explanations and Alternatives. Psychological Methods. Advance online publication. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/met0000083
Eid, M., & Koch, T. (2014) The Meaning of Higher-Order Factors in Reflective-Measurement Models, Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research and Perspectives, 12, 96-101.
Hoefer, C., & Rosenberg, A. (1994). Empirical Equivalence, Underdetermination, and Systems of the World. Philosophy of Science, 61, pp. 592-607.
Holzinger, K. J., & Swineford, F. (1937). The bi-factor method. Psychometrika, 2, 41–54.
Michell, J. (1997). Quantitative science and the definition of measurement in psychology. British Journal of Psychology, 88, 355–383.
Michell, J. (2008). Is Psychometrics Pathological Science? Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research & Perspective, 6, 7–24. http://doi.org/10.1080/15366360802035489
Molenaar, P. C. M. (2004). A Manifesto on Psychology as Idiographic Science: Bringing the Person Back Into Scientific Psychology, This Time Forever. Measurement: Interdisciplinary Research & Perspective, 2, 201–218. http://doi.org/10.1207/s15366359mea0204_1
Molenaar, P. C. M. (2008). On the implications of the classical ergodic theorems: Analysis of developmental processes has to focus on intra-individual variation. Developmental Psychobiology, 50, 60–69. http://doi.org/10.1002/dev.20262
Molenaar, P. C. M., & Campbell, C. G. (2009). The New Person-Specific Paradigm in Psychology. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 18, 112–117. http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8721.2009.01619.x
Murray, A. L., & Johnson, W. (2013). The limitations of model fit in comparing the bi-factor versus higher-order models of human cognitive ability structure. Intelligence, 41, 407–422. http://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2013.06.004
Musek, J. (2007). A general factor of personality: Evidence for the Big One in the five-factor model. Journal of Research in Personality, 41, 1213-1233. doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2007.02.003
Perline, R., Wainer H., & Wright, B. D. (1979). The Rasch model as additive conjoint measurement. Applied Psychological Measurement, 3, 237-255.
Raykov, T., & Marcoulides, G. A. (2001). Can there be infinitely many models equivalent to a given covariance structure model? Structural Equation Modeling, 8, 142–149.
Raykov, T., & Penev, S. (1999). On Structural Equation Model Equivalence. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 34, 199–244. http://doi.org/10.1207/S15327906Mb340204
Reise, S. P. (2012). The Rediscovery of Bifactor Measurement Models. Multivariate Behavioral Research, 47, 667–696. http://doi.org/10.1080/00273171.2012.715555