| Balloon | Player x: \(x_{p} = 2\) | Player y: \(y_{p} = 5\) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 0 | 5 |
| 2 | 2 | 0 |
| 3 | 2 | 0 |
| 4 | 2 | 5 |
| 5 | 0 | 5 |
| Total | 6 | 15 |
It is (almost) never optimal to pump more than 50% of the time (i.e.; 5 out of 10 is the maximum).
These results suggest that the time horizon (i.e. number of game opportunities) matters when deciding how to adjust your risk in a competitive task. In a game with a very short time horizon (i.e. \(N = 1\)), then only pumping a few times can be optimal given certain expectations of one’s opponent. However, in games with very long time horizons (i.e., \(N = 100\), then it is almost always optimal to use an individual payoff maximization strategy.)
| Parameter | Definition |
|---|---|
| \(N\) | Total number of ballooons |
| \(max\) | Maximum number of pumps per balloon |
| \(x_{p}\) | Pumps by player x |
| \(y_{p}\) | Pumps by player y |
For example, consider a game with \(N = 1\), \(max = 10\), \(x_{p} = 5\). Here, the player always pumps 5 times (the optimal). There are only two possible outcomes: a 50% chance of the balloon popping (for a reward of 0), and a 50% chance of saving the balloon (for a reward of 5)
The distribution of reward outcomes when N = 1, max = 10, x.p = 50
| points | prob |
|---|---|
| 0 | 0.5 |
| 5 | 0.5 |
Now, let’s increase the number of games to \(N = 10\). Now there is a wider distribution of outcomes because more games are played.
| points | prob |
|---|---|
| 0 | 0.001 |
| 5 | 0.010 |
| 10 | 0.044 |
| 15 | 0.117 |
| 20 | 0.205 |
| 25 | 0.246 |
| 30 | 0.205 |
| 35 | 0.117 |
| 40 | 0.044 |
| 45 | 0.010 |
| 50 | 0.001 |
We can also perform similar calculations when a player does not have a constant pumping rate, but rather a stochastic one. Here, we use simulations instead of an arithmetic solution.
Here are the distributions of outcomes from a player who is equally likely to pump anywhere from 1 to 9 times. As we will see, this player has an expected earnings of 18.29, which is less than a player who always pumps 5 times and had an expected earning of 25.
Now, we calculate the probability of winning a game given two players \(x\) and \(y\). At the start of the game, players x and y decide on their pumping values \(x_{p}\), \(y_{p}\). They then play \(N\) balloons. Players are not told how many points the other player earns over the course of the game (e.g.; as sequential balloons are played). When the game is finished, and all \(N\) balloons are completed, the player with the most points across all balloons wins an all-or-nothing bonus while the other player earns nothing.
We can calculate the probability that a player wins after \(N\) balloons by comparing each player’s earning distributions after \(N\) balloons. For example, consider a player x who pumps 5 times (\(x_{p} = 5\)) and a player y who pumps 8 times ($y_{p} = 8) playing \(N = 10\) balloons. Here are their expected earnings:
We can calculate the probability that x wins by comparing the two distributions directly (ie.; what is the summed probability of all outcomes where x wins?). Here, the probability that player x wins is 76%, and the probability that y wins is 24%.
Now, we calculate the probabiliy that x wins given all combinations of \(x_{p}\) and \(y_{p}\) for different numbers of balloons \(N\).
We’ll start with a game with one balloon. That is, a one-shot game. Here, we see that a player’s best response depends very much on his expectation of the other player. For example, if player y will pump just once, then player x should pump 2 times for a probability of winning of 80%. In contrast, if player y pumps 9 times, then player x should only pump 1 time for an 81% probability of winning. Finally, if player y pumps 5 times, then player y should pump just 1 time again.
There is no Nash equilibrium in this short-horizon game as players should always adjust their strategy for every behavior of their opponent.
Probability of player x winning a game with N = 1 balloon given each combination of x.p and y.p
When the number of balloons increases to 2, then the best response to a competitor with moderately high pumping values increases from 1. The biggest jump is when y.p = 5. Here, the best response is now x.p = 6.
There is still no Nash equilibrium. Players should cycle between 4, 5 and 6 pumps.
If your opponent is equally likely to pump anywhere from 1 to 9 times, then you should pump 3 or 4 times
Probability of player x winning a game with N = 2 balloons given each combination of x.p and y.p
When the number of balloons increases to 5, the best response for all y.p values greater than 2 is now either 5 or 6.
Still no equilibrium
If your opponent is equally likely to pump anywhere from 1 to 9 times, then you should pump 5 times.
Probability of player x winning a game with N = 5 balloons given each combination of x.p and y.p
Probability of player x winning a game with N = 100 balloons given each combination of x.p and y.p