Trident D5 UGM-133A

Trident D5 UGM-133A

The prime minister’s faith

I think Theresa May told the truth about her faith in Trident D5 reliability giving no direct reply in the interview, did she know about failed test in June 2016. (http://www.bbc.com/news/uk-38708823). Why?

First, Trident D5 is very reliable SLBM. It’s reliability has been proved by 156 test flights made by the USA since 1980-s.

Second, Trident D5 reliability has been proved by math on the grounds of test results (https://rpubs.com/alex-lev/200551).

Third, UK as a member of NATO and US partner in spite of BREXIT is facing real problems with nuclear deterrence strategy where Trident D5 is the cornerstone of nuclear arsenal and has no alternative.

Some thougths about UK Trident D5 malfuction

No information is available so far about the real purpose of the test in June 2016. Can we find some reasons for the failed test? I believe we can! BREXIT and alarming US election campaign inspired UK for this test though it was regular and routine. I think it was US main initiative for this test to show its alliance some little secret near Florida. What is it?

A little secret of D5 reliability

Here is some interesting clue to the high reliability of Trident II D5 missile from GAO Report (Trident II: Reductions to MK-6 Guidance System Inventory Objectives May Be Possible, Letter Report, 07/06/94, GAO/NSIAD-94-192).

Each Trident II carries 24 D5 missiles, and each missile is equipped with the MK-6 guidance system, which is comprised of an inertial measurement unit and an electronics assembly. The Navy maintains spare MK-6 guidance systems on board each submarine and in its logistics pipeline for test and maintenance purposes. The Navy carries six spare MK-6s on board each patrolling submarine. These inventory objectives are based on maintaining the same high levels of readiness and reliability that were originally established between 1986 and 1987 during the Cold War era.

The Navy carries six spare MK-6s on board each patrolling submarine. Our analysis indicates that having three onboard spares would decrease the guidance system’s operational readiness by only 3 percent (from 0.99979 to 0.96935) and having four onboard spares would result in only a 0.66 percent decrease (from 0.99979 to 0.99318). These decreases in MK-6 guidance system operational readiness would have a minimal effect on the overall D5 missile system’s operational readiness and reliability levels.

As we can see according to GAO report our estimate of upper bound for Trident II D5 reliability (https://rpubs.com/alex-lev/200551) fits the official record as a result of maintaining MK-6 spare parts on board SSBN!

Conclusions

  1. Neither US nor UK would disclose the full information about Trident D5 failed test in June 2016.
  2. UK with the help of US has got a unique test result supporting ultimate need for the maintaining MK-6 guidance system spare parts on board SSBN with Trident D5 SLBMs.