On-cycle elections illustration

I. Why Local Elections Matter

In 2021, State and Local government spent on $3.7 trillion (approximately 16% of entire U.S. economy), which affect all perspective of individual daily life. Your child’s school is funded locally. The school your child attends is funded by the locals. The police officer that patrols your area is employed by the locals. The local decision makes zoning for placing affordable housing near public transit (Tai 2025).

However, elections for school boards, city councils, special districts, and municipal judges consistently attract less than 20% of eligible voters when conducted off-cycle from federal elections (Devine 2022). This creates an accountability gap within our structure. The most important decisions about roads, schools, housing, and public safety are made by officials who are elected by a small, unrepresentative segment of the population.

$1.9T Annual U.S. local government spending (FY 2021)
~10% Share of GDP controlled by local governments
~80% Municpal elections held different from federal calendar
<15% Typical turnout in off-cycle local elections

The core issue is that Local elections scheduled away from federal election cycles (the Tuesday after the first Monday of November in even-numbered year) create extra costs for the electorate, such as learning the date of the election, identifying the polling location, and making the actual trip to the polls. These costs fall disproportionately on some groups when compared to others. High-propensity voters, who are older, white, and higher-income, are largely unaffected as they have developed a habit of voting. On the other hand, occasional voters, who are younger, minorities, and lower income, will be dissuaded from even small-cost elections, as they are sensitive to costs (Hajnal, Kogan, and Markarian 2022). This increases the likelihood of them not voting in stand-alone elections.

Thus, the representation gap is not an accident of voter apathy. It is a structural feature of how American election calendars were designed that can be corrected.

II. Issue: Election Timing as Partisan Control

Voting, which takes place on Tuesday in November of even-numbered years, is a primary impression for many Americans. However, taking into account all types of elections, the calendar continues the whole year long. In November of odd-numbered years, some states conduct their state elections, while many local elections occur in the spring or fall, independent of federal elections. The election calendar of the United States is more like a patchwork (U.S. Election Assistance Commission & National Conference of State Legislatures, 2025). However, what are the historical roots of the inconsistent timing of elections in the United States?

History How Election-timing is utilized by mean of interest group to conduct election manipulation

Since 1845, federal elections have been held on the first Tuesday after the first Monday of November, and the dates for state officials' elections, such as legislators and governors, were soon established by the state constitution.

In constrast, municipalities and local districts have historically scheduled elections on an ad hoc basis, which means it depends on the whim of local leaders. During the Progressive Era, many state offices standardized their local election calendar and process in the 1890s. They purposely choose to hold local elections separately from federal elections due to the larger administrative costs (such as the increased need for paper and ink) that arise from aggregating multiple elections together. Furthermore, the deeper issue was that they intended to keep local elections focused on local affairs through a non-partisan approach, which could be undermined by influences from a national partisan agenda.

However, Political Scienctist Sarah Anzia from Goldman School of Public Policy, University of Calfornia, Berekley, repudiated this argument. In her work, Timing & turnout: How off-cycle elections favor organized groups, of exmaining New York, San Francisco, and Philadelphia across the entire nineteenth century, Anzia showed that off-cycle election was mot a neutral admisnirative choice but a dileberate partisan infilteration long predating the Progressive Era.

The reasoning was straightforward: less competition meant better chances of winning. If parties suspected indifferent voters — voters likely to show up only for presidential or gubernatorial elections — would side with the opposition, they would initiate a strategy to divide elections by moving municipal elections to a different day to allow those voters to sit out. In the meantime, a party with an efficient network of ward bosses and precinct captains prospered in an inconspicuous constituency; the disciplined electorate provided them with a disproportionate advantage. In summary, strategically scheduling an election was a technique for choosing your voters before they had the opportunity to choose you.

During the 1890s, the reformers associated with the National Municipal League comprehended the situation and utilized the same approach against the urban machines. The surprising part is that it backfired. Regardless of the timing of elections, urban machines, like Tammany Hall, had the most organized groups in the city. As municipal participation dwindled, the organized city employees and neighborhood loyalists who relied on patronage made up an increasingly larger proportion of the small turnout. Tammany's power increased.

As time transitioned to the new century, the old machines disappeared, and partisan control of local affairs weakened, but the logic persisted. Today, professional lobbying organizations have replaced local leaders—and they inherited the strategy that Tammany Hall had: fewer voters means more influence per vote, which has led to a significant concentration of power among these organizations in shaping local policies. Between 2001 and 2011, over 200 bills were introduced by state legislatures regarding the consolidation of elections. More than 70% of the bills died before entering a single floor vote. The remaining bills were passed, but the bills were essentially useless—making consolidation optional or limited in jurisdiction, which failed to achieve the intended goal of streamlining the electoral process and improving voter participation.

Public employee unions have a direct interest in local elections, which contributes to such phenomena. For example, school boards control the pay and working conditions of the public school employees. When voter turnout is under 10%, an organized group is no longer a matter of concern; they are the decision-making bloc. Because of this interest, the public employee unions lobby to ensure no changes take place, and the state legislators depend on those interest groups for campaign support. This interest group lobbying with state government is the reason that by 2012, majority of America's cities are governed by a locally controlled system that does not reflect the preference of the people,instead the preference of the special interests that have the most organizational resources.

HOW OFF-CYCLE ELECTIONS ARE MAINTAINED TODAY Voters ~70% prefer on-cycle elections ignored Organized interest groups Public employee unions, school board associations lobby pressure State legislature Sets local election timing rules blocks Consolidation bills 200+ introduced 2001–2011 70%+ killed before first vote protects Off-cycle elections 80% of U.S. cities — low turnout amplifies group influence strong interest group influence weak voter influence reinforcing feedback loop

“Political scientists have tended to ignore the one institutional arrangement that is the most powerful predictor of turnout: the day an election is held.” — Political Science Quarterly review of Anzia’s work

Current State Overview of Local Election Timing

However, statewide efforts to pass election consolidation legislation have persisted to boost turnout during the 2010s. As of early 2026, 7 states have enacted laws to require elections to be held on a cycle, and 19 states provide the cities the option to determine it. According to NCSL records, 17 states passed legislation for either comprehensive election consolidation or specific local-level elections (e.g., school board elections) to be held on cycle, indicating that election timing has become a more pressing issue. However, 24 states still prevent cities from holding on-cycle elections, and most cities that choose to determine their election timing remain off-cycle. Here is the current status of local elections in each state.

III. The Reform – Synchronizing Local Election to Federal Calendar

To boost the turnout and local accountability, requiring local jurisdictions to hold their general elections during the same window as federal general elections—November of even-numbered years—is necessary. A current study that has examined on-cycle election consolidation finds a substantial positive effect on turnout and representation with an additional benefit regarding administrative costs.

How Consolidation Raises Turnout and Its Benefit

Mechanism
Time Saving for Voters
  • Vote is costly which requires time, money and civil skills (Brady, Verba, Schlozman 1995)
  • Consolidation elimiates the information cost of tracking multiple election dates and physical costs of attending polling place multiple times
  • A voter who turns out in November can simultaneously vote for city council and school board at no additional effort.
Direct Effect
Turnout Gain & Representational Equity
  • By Lowering the cost of political participation would directly increase turnout.
  • Turnout gains are largest in communities with lower information, such as those that are predominantly color, low-income, and young neighborhoods.
  • Thus, consolidation can also narrow the gap between the electorate and the population being governed to foster more political accountability.
Benefit
Administrative Cost Savings
  • Fewer standalone local elections mean fewer poll workers, facility rentals, and printing runs.
  • The The NYC Independent Budget Office estimates that shifting the election to an even year in 2026 could save the city approximately $42 million every other year (Brennan Center for Justice 2025).
  • Savings accrue to every jurisdiction that consolidates, large or small
Response to Criticism
Ballot Fatigue, Partisan Advantage?
  • Critics argue consolidation makes ballots longer, which may cause voter fatigue and roll-off, leaving local races no better served than before.
  • They also argue that this method is a partisan approach to mobilizing voters, particularly low-income minority voters who largely affiliate with the Democratic Party.
  • However, current literature provides no empirical evidence for supporting these claims compared to the positive effect brought by the election consolidation.

IV. Case Study — California

California offers the most comprehensive natural experiment in election consolidation available in the United States. Historcially, on-cycle elections had been adopted disproportionately across California, with some counties shifting independently while hundreds of cities remained on odd-year schedules. The state’s 2015 Voter Participation Rights Act (VPRA) created a turnout-trigger mechanism that required hundreds of cities to move their elections on-cycle — producing dramatic, measurable results.

Timeline of reform

2015
California Voter Participation Rights Act (VPRA) signed into law

Governor Jerry Brown signs legislation requiring cities whose off-cycle local elections produce turnout at least 25% below the four-election statewide average to consolidate with state or federal election dates.

2018
VRRA Took Effect

The entire chapter becomes operative in January 1st, 2018, granting the political subdivisions roughly two years after law enactment to prepare or adopt a consolidation. Note: The special election is not included under this law.

2016–20
54 cities consolidate — turnout nearly triples

Common Clause California (Meneses and Spencer 2021) studies 54 cities that switched to on-cycle elections after VPRA, over 187 municipal elections between the 2012 and 2020 cycles. They found out that the average registration rate dramatically rose from 25.54% to 75.81% among these cities. As a consequence, the number of ballots cast increased by 297% in 29 cities. The effect is even larger in cities with large historically underrepresented communities, like Pico Rivera; its turnout rate increased by 5 times.

2020–Current
City of Redondo Beach v. Padilla — home-rule doctrine constraints VPRA

The Second District Court of Appeal applied the home-rule doctrine (Cal. Const. art. XI, §5), which granted charter cities full control over "municipal affairs" under the state constitution, including election time. The held means that the VRPA didn't apply to charter city, thus creating double creteria.

Robust Evidence of Local Turnout Gain and Minority Representation Increase

Descriptve Analysis: Turnout before vs. after consolidation by VPRA

The results where reform has happened are striking. Following California’s VPRA, average registered voter turnout across 54 consolidated cities tripled — from roughly 25% to 75%. Cities like Woodside, Agoura Hills, and Pico Rivera surged from under 20% to above 65%.

Empirical Evidence of Local Election Consolidation:

However, descriptive gains only provide a partial view of the situation. Two decades of painstaking research on California reach the same conclusions. Hajnal & Lewis (2003) established that on-cycle elections raised turnout by 25–36 percentage points. Berry & Gersen (2010) confirmed an off-cycle timing election turnout suppression of 20–30%. The most recent causal study by Hajnal, Kogan & Markarian (2024) analyzes 2,500 elections and concludes that cycle elections boost turnout by approximately 21 percentage points and have a significantly more diverse electorate. Ornstein (2024) finds that consolidation also increased representation of Latino populations, which is an equity dividend beyond turnout.

Summary of empirical literature on election timing and voter turnout
Author Year Type Election Approach Main Finding
Hajnal & Lewis 2003 Peer-reviewed Mayor & city council elections | City-level | 1998–2000 Cross-sectional OLS On-cycle elections → higher turnout (~25–36 percentage points)
Berry & Gersen 2010 Law-journal Municipal & school board elections | Local-level | 1996–2006 Difference-in-differences Off-cycle elections → lower turnout (~20–30 percentage points)
Hajnal, Kogan, & Markarian 2022 Peer-reviewed Municipal elections | ~2,000 elections (~500 cities) | 2008–2016 Two-way fixed effects Off-cycle timing → higher incumbency advantage and less policy responsiveness
Ornstein 2024 Working-paper Municipal & school district elections | 480 cities (100 switched under VPRA) | 2010–2023 Two-way fixed effects + difference-in-differences On-cycle elections → increased Latino representation
Hajnal, Kogan, Markarian 2024 Peer-reviewed Municipal elections | ~2,500 elections | 2008–2020 Two-way fixed effects + difference-in-differences On-cycle elections → higher turnout (~21 percentage points) and more diverse voters

The evidence is unambiguous: when local election move on cycle, more people vote, and democracy works better for everyone.

Administrative Cost for Holding Election

Consolidation also has fiscal benefits, although the measurement requires nuance. Holding elections on-cycle reduces the total number of standalone elections, saving money by eliminating duplicate costs for staffing, equipment, and polling. However, consolidation means more elections are added to a single ballot, necessitating more administrative effort. The net savings result from this trade-off. Meanwhile, as previously demonstrated, consolidating elections during the same cycle will increase voter turnout, which in turn adds to the administrative burden. Thus, the best measure of election cost should be the cost per voter.

However, current empirical research on cost-saving analysis for local election consolidation in California is limited. The most cited studies come from the Greenline Institute (2013), which proves cities switching off-cycle to on-cycle in 2011, like San Diego and San Jose, have more than a 90% reduction in election costs per voter. In addition, the official letter (2012) from the San Francisco controller to the Board of Supervisors proposed local election consolidation by arguing that it could save $1 million in election costs per year for the first four years. 

Currently, the nonpartisan think tank Sightline Institute (2023) is still investigating the cost savings of election consolidation and asserts that their estimation indicates a lower administrative cost; therefore, we remain optimistic about the benefits.

Response to Criticism

The opponent, like the Desert Water Agency (citation), argued that consolidating the local election would make the ballot longer, thus switching the burden to the voter. Specifically, they have more choices to select, which would cause voter fatigue and “roll-off” (e.g., undervote). Even though Augenblick and Nicholson (2016) support this argument, another mechanism needs to be taken into account. Election consolidation reduces the election frequency, as Garmann (2017) points out that more frequent elections would cause lower turnout, especially for some low-salience elections, like local-level ones. Both mechanisms exist, and the current literature has not rigorously disentangled them. Thus, the agency’s assumption that within-ballot fatigue leads to voter fatigue is unsupported.

Since the current literature cannot determine which mechanism is more dominant, the most direct evidence is the net turnout gain observed after consolidation. In her letter to Los Angeles, Sarah Anzia cited empirical evidence showing that concurrent local elections boost participation, asserting that the benefits outweigh the minimal burden on voters.

V. Policy Recommendations

California’s struggle under City of Redondo Beach v. Padilla is not a constitutional barrier but a drafting failure. When charter cities invoked Article XI home rule to exempt themselves from SB415, the court didn’t say the state lacked authority to consolidate elections, rather it said a threshold-based mechanism is too weak to carry that authority. In New York, read that lesson carefully. The Even Year Election Law passed in 2023 asserted statewide concern directly and universally, and when counties push back under home rule, the Court of Appeals held firm: civil engagement is a substantial state interest that overrides local control over election timing. That ruling provides legislators and judges in other states with a clear path; therefore, we are here to make several suggestions for election consolidation.

1. Mandatory Consolidation Statute

The legislature should require all local elections to switch to the same date as federal elections in even-numbered years. Critically, the statute must clearly state that increasing voter turnout is a compelling state interest; while administrative convenience is beneficial, it should not be the primary factor for the law’s passage. California’s SB415 under implementation constraints is a due-threshold trigger rather than a direct declaration of state interest. The Court of Appeals validates the logic of state interest, leading to New York’s success. A well-drafted statute should front-load this rationale in its findings section so that any home-rule challenge meets a judicially anchored state interest from the outset.

2. Address Home Rule Proactively

Home rule is the single greatest legal vulnerability for any consolidation effort. Redondo Beach shows that charter cities will invoke state constitution provisions to exempt themselves and succeed if the statute provides them the opening. Thus, the statue can close this opening in two ways: first, clearly asserting election timing as a matter of statewide concern. Second, the mandate should be applied universally by default instead of relying on opt-in or threshold mechanisms, which complicates implementation in reactionary circumstances. A universal mandate paired with a clear statewide interest mirrors New York’s approach and eliminates the legal barrier California’s design created.

3. Transition Framework

Opponents will raise legitimate practical concerns: longer ballots, transition costs, and term-alignment disruption. The statue should address these directly. It should implement a phased implementation timeline of three or four years to let municipal and local offices fully prepare for this reform. Meanwhile, state reimbursement for transition costs and term-length adjustment provisions is required to assist with universal reform as well as allow the current officeholder’s term to shift by up to one year to align with the new schedule. Apart from lessening political opposition, this approach fortifies the legal argument—a state that reduces the burden on localities shows that its interest in involvement is earnest, an element the judiciary considers in home-rule conflicts.

4. Dual Evidentiary Record: Participation and Spending

The statue’s constitutional validity depends on the empirical claim that consolidation increases political participation and reduces public expenditure. Thus, the state should build a dual evidentiary record to prove both over time. On participation, the Secretary of State should report the turnout rate, the rate of ballot roll-off, and demographic data after each election cycle. On the spending side, localities should standardize their expenditure on election holding—cost per election event, cost per voter, and transition cost—enabling them to track the year-over-year comparison. Together, building these two databases is crucial since it directly answers the most likely vector of the future—the state interest is not achieved, and there is a disproportionate burden on localities. A well-documented and growing record is the best defense against the possible repeal or invalidation.

References

  • Anzia, Sarah F. 2014. Timing and Turnout: How Off-Cycle Elections Favor Organized Groups. University of Chicago Press.
  • Anzia, Sarah F. 2014. Letter to the City Council of the City of Los Angeles on Election Timing and Voter Turnout. Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley, October 30.
  • Augenblick, Ned, and Scott Nicholson. 2016. “Ballot Position, Choice Fatigue, and Voter Behaviour.” Review of Economic Studies 83(2): 460–480.
  • Berry, Christopher R., and Jacob E. Gersen. 2010. “The Timing of Elections.” University of Chicago Law Review 77(1): 37–64.
  • California Senate Rules Committee, Office of Senate Floor Analyses. 2015. Floor Analysis of SB 415 (Hueso): Voter Participation. Sacramento: California State Senate, May 1.
  • California SB 415, Voter Participation Rights Act. 2015.
  • City of Redondo Beach v. Padilla, California Court of Appeal, Second District, 2020.
  • County of Onondaga v. State of New York, 86 Misc 3d 214 (Sup. Ct., Onondaga County 2024), rev’d, 2025 NY Slip Op 02818 (App. Div. 4th Dep’t May 7, 2025), aff’d, 2025 NY Slip Op 05737 (Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2025).
  • Common Cause California. Voter Participation Rights Act: Implementation Report, 2020.
  • Devine, Kelly. 2022. “Visualizing Voter Turnout in Local and School Board Elections.” Carnegie Corporation of New York, November 2. https://www.carnegie.org/our-work/article/visualizing-voter-turnout-local-school-board-election/.
  • Durning, Alan, and Todd Newman. 2024. “When Do Cities Hold Elections?” Sightline Institute, June 10. https://www.sightline.org/2024/06/10/when-do-cities-hold-elections/.
  • Garmann, Sebastian. 2017. “Election Frequency, Choice Fatigue, and Voter Turnout.” European Journal of Political Economy 47: 19–35.
  • Hajnal, Zoltan, Paul G. Lewis, and Hugh Louch. Municipal Elections in California: Turnout, Timing, and Competition. Public Policy Institute of California, 2002.
  • Hajnal, Zoltan L., Vladimir Kogan, and G. Agustin Markarian. 2022. “Who Votes: City Election Timing and Voter Composition.” American Political Science Review 116(1): 374–383.
  • Hajnal, Zoltan L., Vladimir Kogan, and G. Agustin Markarian. 2025. “Who Wins When? Election Timing and Descriptive Representation.” American Journal of Political Science 69(4): 1454–1468.
  • Hernandez, Jose P. 2013. Research Brief: Odd-Year vs. Even-Year Consolidated Elections in California. The Greenlining Institute, October.
  • Rosenfield, Ben. 2012. Letter to Angela Calvillo, Clerk of the Board of Supervisors, City and County of San Francisco, Re: File 111330 — Charter Amendment Consolidating Odd Year Elections. Office of the Controller, City and County of San Francisco, January 25.
  • Skoufis, James. 2023. “An Act to Amend the Town Law, the Village Law, the County Law, and the Municipal Home Rule Law, in Relation to Moving Certain Elections to Even-Numbered Years.” S3505B. New York State Senate. https://www.nysenate.gov/legislation/bills/2023/S3505/amendment/B.
  • Tai, Thomas. 2025. “Why Local Elections Are Critical to Democracy.” League of Women Voters (blog), July 15. https://www.lwv.org/blog/why-local-elections-are-critical-democracy.
  • Underhill, Wendy. 2014. “Consolidating Election Dates: Summary of Testimony to the Kansas Special Committee on Ethics, Elections and Local Government.” National Conference of State Legislatures, November 21.
  • U.S. Election Assistance Commission and National Conference of State Legislatures. 2025. Helping America Vote: Election Administration in the United States 2024. Washington, DC: U.S. Election Assistance Commission. https://www.eac.gov/election-officials/helping-america-vote-election-administration-united-states-2024.

Last updated: April 2026