Introduction
In their landmark paper Distributional National Accounts,
Professors Saez and Zucman argue that the rise in top-end inequality
since the late 1990s is driven not by wages, but by capital income —
dividends, business profits, interest, and capital gains. This claim
challenges the popular narrative of the “working rich” and suggests a
return to a rentier-dominated elite.
Using Distributional National Accounts (DINA) data, we tested this
hypothesis directly by computing the share of capital income within the
Top 1% of earners from 1962 to 2019. The results are striking — and they
confirm the professors’ claim with empirical clarity.
Capital vs. Labor Income
Capital income refers to the returns individuals receive from owning
assets rather than from working. In the DINA framework, this includes
dividends, interest, business profits, rental income, and realized
capital gains — essentially, the income that flows from wealth.
By contrast, labor income consists of wages, salaries, bonuses,
employer‑provided benefits, and pensions. Together, labor and capital
income make up pre‑tax factor income, the broadest measure of what
people earn before government taxes and transfers. Understanding the
balance between these two sources is crucial, because shifts in their
relative importance reveal whether top earners are primarily “working
rich” or “rentiers” whose income is driven by asset ownership.
A Long Decline: 1960s to 2000
From the early 1960s through the end of the 20th century, the capital
income share of the Top 1% fell steadily. In 1965, capital income
accounted for roughly 72% of total pre-tax factor income for the Top 1%.
By 2000, that share had dropped to just over 51%.
This decline wasn’t sudden — it was structural. It reflected a shift
in the composition of top incomes:
- The rise of high-salaried professionals, executives, and
entrepreneurs
- The expansion of stock-based compensation and bonuses
- The cultural valorization of labor over passive wealth
- Tax reforms in the 1980s that favored earned income
- The decline of traditional rentier classes and inherited wealth
This era — often described as the age of the “working rich” — saw
labor income dominate the top of the distribution.
Chart: Capital Income Share of the Top 1% Over Time
library(dplyr)
library(ggplot2)
yearly_summary <- readRDS("../../dina_yearly_summary.rds")
# Create a clean dataset focused on the Top 1%'s labor, capital, and total income
# These fields come directly from your yearly_summary object and align with DINA definitions
df_capital_top1 <- yearly_summary %>%
transmute(
year, # calendar year
# Total capital income for the Top 1% (dividends, interest, business income, rents, etc.)
capital_top1 = top1_ttl_income_factor_capital,
# Total labor income for the Top 1% (wages, salaries, pensions, employer contributions)
labor_top1 = top1_ttl_income_factor_labor,
# Total pre-tax factor income for the Top 1%
total_top1 = top1_ttl_income_factor,
# Capital share of total income for the Top 1%
capital_share_top1 = capital_top1 / total_top1,
# Labor share of total income for the Top 1%
labor_share_top1 = labor_top1 / total_top1
)
df_capital_decline <- df_capital_top1 %>%
filter(year >= 1962, year <= 2000)
ggplot(df_capital_decline, aes(x = year, y = capital_share_top1)) +
# Actual observed capital-share line
geom_line(color = "firebrick", linewidth = 1.2) +
# Regression line showing the long-term downward trend
geom_smooth(
method = "lm",
se = FALSE,
color = "black",
linewidth = 1
) +
labs(
title = "Capital Income Share of the Top 1% (1962–2000)",
subtitle = "A long, steady decline in capital’s role at the top",
x = "Year",
y = "Capital Income Share"
) +
theme_minimal(base_size = 14)
# Source: Piketty, Saez, and Zucman (2016), Distributional National Accounts. Author’s calculations.
# Data: Saez & Zucman’s Distributional National Accounts (DINA). Analysis by the author.
The Inflection Point: Around 2000
The year 2000 marks a clear turning point. After decades of decline,
the capital income share of the Top 1% begins to rise — sharply and
persistently.
Between 2000 and 2008, capital share surged from ~51% to ~60%. By
2019, it had reached 62.5%. This reversal is not a statistical anomaly —
it’s a structural shift.
What changed?
- The bursting of the tech bubble shifted wealth from labor-heavy tech
roles to capital-heavy finance and asset ownership
- The rise of private equity, hedge funds, and pass-through business
income
- A surge in dividend payouts and capital gains during the post-crisis
recovery
- Tax policy changes that favored capital income (e.g., lower rates on
dividends and gains)
- The aging of top earners, many of whom transitioned from labor to
asset income
Chart: Capital vs Labor Income Share of the Top 1%
# Overlay capital and labor income shares for the Top 1%
# Adds a vertical line at the year 2000 to highlight the structural break
#library(ggplot2)
ggplot(df_capital_top1, aes(x = year)) +
# Capital share line
geom_line(
aes(y = capital_share_top1, color = "Capital share"),
linewidth = 1.2
) +
# Labor share line
geom_line(
aes(y = labor_share_top1, color = "Labor share"),
linewidth = 1.2
) +
# Vertical line marking the inflection point around 2000
geom_vline(
xintercept = 2000,
color = "gray30",
linewidth = 0.9,
linetype = "dashed"
) +
labs(
title = "Capital vs Labor Income Share of the Top 1% (Pre-tax Factor Income)",
subtitle = "The year 2000 marks a clear turning point in income composition",
x = "Year",
y = "Share of Total Income",
color = "Income Type"
) +
scale_color_manual(
values = c(
"Capital share" = "firebrick",
"Labor share" = "steelblue"
)
) +
theme_minimal(base_size = 14)
A Return to Rentier Dominance
The crossover between labor and capital shares around 2000 is
visually unmistakable. Labor income, which had dominated for decades,
begins to decline. Capital income rises and overtakes it — reclaiming
its historical role as the primary driver of top-end inequality.
This pattern directly supports Saez and Zucman’s claim:
“The working rich are either turning into or being replaced by
rentiers.”
Implications
This shift has profound implications for how we understand
inequality:
- Policy targeting wages alone may miss the real drivers of
inequality
- Capital taxation, wealth taxes, and corporate transparency
become central tools
- Redistribution efforts must grapple with the concentration
of asset ownership, not just income flows
It also reframes the narrative: inequality today is not just about
high salaries — it’s about who owns the capital.
Conclusion
The data confirms what Saez and Zucman hypothesized: since 2000,
capital income has driven the rise in top-end inequality. The long
decline from the 1960s to 2000 gave way to a capital resurgence — one
that continues to shape the economic landscape today.
This isn’t just a story about numbers. It’s a story about power,
ownership, and the evolving structure of the American elite.
###END