Fukuyama (1992) pronounced liberal democracy the end-point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the final form of human government. “But supposing the world has become”filled up” with liberal democracies, such as there exist no tyranny and oppression worthy of the name against which to struggle? (…) if men cannot struggle on behalf of a just cause (…) they will struggle against the just cause. (…) they will struggle against that peace and prosperity, and against democracy.” - he proclaimed over three decades ago, effectively predicting the third wave of autocratization succeeding the 2008 financial crisis (Maerz et al., 2019). Now – during the time of monsters, of the old world dying and a new one struggling to be born (Gramsci, 1926) – might be the time to turn one’s eyes towards the chimera-like bodies of autocracies.
The aim of this project is to analyze the dimensionality of democracy (and hence, autocracy) in an attempt to reject the clear schism between these regimes, which are often treated as the opposite ends of the same, one-dimensional spectrum. Dimension reduction methods (PCA and rPCA) will be applied to a multi-dimensional dataset constructed by the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem), a collaborative project by V-Dem Institute (Univeristy of Gothenburg) providing granular data on the measures of democracy. The magnum opus of V-Dem Institute, besides the dataset, is the Electoral Democracy Index (EDI, Polyarchy Index) – measuring democracy on a scale of 0 to 1.
This project is structured as follows: the first section provides an overview of the employed data and describes the pre-processing: variable exclusion, the handling of missing values and the necessary transformations. Subsequently, data is inspected for suitability with the diemnsion reduction methods: correlation matrix is analyzed and Bartlett’s and K-M-O tests are carried out. Afterwards, Principal Component Analysis algorithms (PCA, rPCA) are run and its results analyzed. The section results compares the findings of this project with the Polyarchy Index.
This project will be based on Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset. It is a multidimensional dataset distinguishing between five key principles of democracy:
These principles are captured through a wide variety of variables, reflecting the complexity of democratic processes extending beyond, simply, the presence of elections. It is computed by a team of over 50 social scientists working with more than 3,000 local experts and a global International Advisory Board.
First, the dataset will be loaded into the environment using an R package especially dedicated to V-Dem data (vdemdata). The package contains the most recent V-Dem and V-Party datasets and provides additional functions, such as:
devtools::install_github("vdeminstitute/vdemdata")
## Skipping install of 'vdemdata' from a github remote, the SHA1 (c7836967) has not changed since last install.
## Use `force = TRUE` to force installation
vdem <- vdemdata::vdem
Now that the data is loaded, let’s inspect its dimensionality and content:
dim(vdem)
## [1] 27913 4607
str(vdem)
## 'data.frame': 27913 obs. of 4607 variables:
## $ country_name : chr "Mexico" "Mexico" "Mexico" "Mexico" ...
## $ country_text_id : chr "MEX" "MEX" "MEX" "MEX" ...
## $ country_id : num 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 ...
## $ year : num 1789 1790 1791 1792 1793 ...
## $ historical_date : Date, format: "1789-12-31" "1790-12-31" ...
## $ project : num 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
## $ historical : num 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
## $ histname : chr "Viceroyalty of New Spain" "Viceroyalty of New Spain" "Viceroyalty of New Spain" "Viceroyalty of New Spain" ...
## $ codingstart : num 1789 1789 1789 1789 1789 ...
## $ codingend : num 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 ...
## $ codingstart_contemp : num 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 1900 ...
## $ codingend_contemp : num 2024 2024 2024 2024 2024 ...
## $ codingstart_hist : num 1789 1789 1789 1789 1789 ...
## $ codingend_hist : num 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 1920 ...
## $ gapstart1 : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ gapstart2 : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ gapstart3 : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ gapend1 : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ gapend2 : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ gapend3 : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ gap_index : num 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ...
## $ COWcode : num 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 ...
## $ v2x_polyarchy : num 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 ...
## $ v2x_polyarchy_codelow : num 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 ...
## $ v2x_polyarchy_codehigh : num 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 ...
## $ v2x_polyarchy_sd : num 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 ...
## $ v2x_libdem : num 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 0.044 ...
## $ v2x_libdem_codelow : num 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 ...
## $ v2x_libdem_codehigh : num 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 0.055 ...
## $ v2x_libdem_sd : num 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 ...
## $ v2x_partipdem : num 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 ...
## $ v2x_partipdem_codelow : num 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 ...
## $ v2x_partipdem_codehigh : num 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 ...
## $ v2x_partipdem_sd : num 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 ...
## $ v2x_delibdem : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ v2x_delibdem_codelow : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ v2x_delibdem_codehigh : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ v2x_delibdem_sd : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ v2x_egaldem : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ v2x_egaldem_codelow : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ v2x_egaldem_codehigh : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ v2x_egaldem_sd : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ v2x_api : num 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 ...
## $ v2x_api_codelow : num 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 ...
## $ v2x_api_codehigh : num 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074 ...
## $ v2x_api_sd : num 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 ...
## $ v2x_mpi : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2x_mpi_codelow : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2x_mpi_codehigh : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2x_mpi_sd : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2x_freexp_altinf : num 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 0.175 ...
## $ v2x_freexp_altinf_codelow : num 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 0.085 ...
## $ v2x_freexp_altinf_codehigh : num 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.234 0.234 ...
## $ v2x_freexp_altinf_sd : num 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 0.078 ...
## $ v2x_frassoc_thick : num 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 0.042 ...
## $ v2x_frassoc_thick_codelow : num 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 0.009 ...
## $ v2x_frassoc_thick_codehigh : num 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 0.059 ...
## $ v2x_frassoc_thick_sd : num 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 0.033 ...
## $ v2x_suffr : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2xel_frefair : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2xel_frefair_codelow : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2xel_frefair_codehigh : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2xel_frefair_sd : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2x_elecoff : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2x_liberal : num 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.169 ...
## $ v2x_liberal_codelow : num 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 0.105 ...
## $ v2x_liberal_codehigh : num 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 0.218 ...
## $ v2x_liberal_sd : num 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 0.056 ...
## $ v2xcl_rol : num 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.204 0.204 ...
## $ v2xcl_rol_codelow : num 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 0.118 ...
## $ v2xcl_rol_codehigh : num 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 0.275 ...
## $ v2xcl_rol_sd : num 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 ...
## $ v2x_jucon : num 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.293 0.293 ...
## $ v2x_jucon_codelow : num 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132 0.132 ...
## $ v2x_jucon_codehigh : num 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 0.42 ...
## $ v2x_jucon_sd : num 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 0.144 ...
## $ v2xlg_legcon : num 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 ...
## $ v2xlg_legcon_codelow : num 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 ...
## $ v2xlg_legcon_codehigh : num 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 0.158 ...
## $ v2xlg_legcon_sd : num 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 0.114 ...
## $ v2x_partip : num 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 ...
## $ v2x_partip_codelow : num 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 ...
## $ v2x_partip_codehigh : num 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 ...
## $ v2x_partip_sd : num 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.027 ...
## $ v2x_cspart : num 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 0.031 ...
## $ v2x_cspart_codelow : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2x_cspart_codehigh : num 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 0.057 ...
## $ v2x_cspart_sd : num 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 0.065 ...
## $ v2xdd_dd : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ v2xel_locelec : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2xel_locelec_codelow : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2xel_locelec_codehigh : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2xel_locelec_sd : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2xel_regelec : num 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 ...
## $ v2xel_regelec_codelow : num 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 ...
## $ v2xel_regelec_codehigh : num 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 ...
## $ v2xel_regelec_sd : num 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 ...
## $ v2xdl_delib : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## $ v2xdl_delib_codelow : num NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA NA ...
## [list output truncated]
When dealing with such a large dataset as V-Dem, which contains 27,913 rows of observations and 4,607 columns, it is important to understand what exactly the variables in the data represent. This is a crucial step that needs to be taken before moving onto the further analysis – in order to be able to eliminate the redundant variables or understand the cause behind so many NA values. Therefore, this section provides an overview of the process behind the quantitative encoding of the quality of various attributes of democracy.
Before any data is collected, V-Dem breaks down the abstract concept of democracy, based on Robert Dahl’s concept of Polyarchy (the acquisition of institutions that leads to the participation of a plurality of actors), into the, previously described, five key principles (high-level democracy indices). These are then deconstructed into mid-level components, a set of aggregated indices based on yet another, even deeper, set of low-level indices. The analysis performed in this project will focus on low-level indices, seeing as, both the mid-level and high-level indices are computed with the use of those. They represent the layer, in which additional, perhaps previously uncaptured dimensions of democracy could be found. The process used for the construction of the low-level indices can be described in a following way: first, a survey is conducted among the aforementioned country experts, who rate the level of openness or strength of an institution on an ordinal scale. Subsequently, Bayesian Item Response Theory (IRT) model is used for correcting the cross-national subjectivity (Differential Item Functioning) of experts. This model treats the experts’ answers as data points and calculates each expert’s reliability and strictness threshold (e.g. if an expert is consistently harsher than others, the model adjusts their scores upward and if experts disagree significantly the model increases the uncertainty margin for a given data point). This process is partially responsible for the multi-dimensionality of data, the variables whose codes end with _sd, _codelow, _codehigh represent the subproducts of the applied model. These variables, as well as those that end with _osp (original scale posterior), will, therefore, be excluded from further analysis, as they hardly provide merit.
As described above, V-Dem recognizes several levels of aggregation, the magnum opus of which is the V-Dem Electoral Democracy Index (EDI, v2x_polyarchy) – a single index illustarting the level of democracy in a country. This index consist of five sub-components, which are, themselves, a result of yet another set of lower-level sub-components. These were selected so as to capture Dahl’s institutions of polyarchy:
Further analysis will be focused on the lower-level indices used for EDI’s calculation, excluding the 20 indices pertaining to elected officials. These will be excluded following the methodology employed by Wilson et al. (2023), who justify this decision by the binary nature of the variables.
edi_variables <- c("v2clacfree", "v2cldiscm", "v2cldiscw", "v2mebias", "v2mecenefm", "v2mecrit", "v2meharjrn", "v2merange", "v2meslfcen", # freedom of expression
"v2cseeorgs", "v2csreprss", "v2elmulpar", "v2psbars", "v2psoppaut", "v2psparban",
# freedom of association
"v2elembaut", "v2elembcap", "v2elfrfair", "v2elintim", "v2elirreg", "v2elpeace", "v2elrgstry", "v2elvotbuy", # clean elections
"v2elsuffrage") # suffrage
# selecting edi variables
vdem_edi <- vdem %>%
dplyr::select(country_name, year, dplyr::any_of(edi_variables))
dim(vdem_edi)
## [1] 27913 26
range(vdem_edi$year)
## [1] 1789 2024
The data coverage spans from 1789 to 2024 and contains information on 25 low-level indices for 27,913 observations. This project however won’t be focused on the trajectory of democracy over time, but rather on its hidden dimensions. Therefore further analysis will be devoted to a singular year – 2024 – the last year recorded in this version of V-Dem.
vdem_edi_2024 <- vdem_edi %>%
filter(year == 2024)
anyNA(vdem_edi_2024)
## [1] TRUE
The problem of missing values for some variables will be tackled employing the methodology proposed by Wilson et al. (2023). Variables regarding the elections (e.g. v2elfrfair) are only coded for the years in which elections took place. The authors addressed this issue by using a forward-fill method – carrying the value from the last recorded election forward for a maximum duration of five years. Their approach rightly assumes that the characteristics of the electoral process remain constant in the period between the elections or the five-year limit is reached. Following this imputation, should any missing data remain, it will be removed from the dataset listwise.
vdem_edi_2024 <- vdem_edi %>%
pivot_longer(cols = dplyr::all_of(edi_variables), names_to = "variable",
values_to = "value") %>%
group_by(country_name, variable) %>%
arrange(year) %>%
mutate(source_year = ifelse(!is.na(value), year, NA)) %>%
fill(value, source_year, .direction = "down") %>%
mutate(age = year - source_year,
value = ifelse(age>5, NA, value)) %>%
ungroup() %>%
filter(year==2024) %>%
dplyr::select(-source_year, -age, -year) %>%
pivot_wider(names_from = "variable", values_from = "value") %>%
na.omit()
# country name as row name
vdem_edi_2024 <- as.data.frame(vdem_edi_2024)
row.names(vdem_edi_2024) <- vdem_edi_2024$country_name
vdem_edi_2024 <- vdem_edi_2024[,-1]
dim(vdem_edi_2024)
## [1] 169 24
summary(vdem_edi_2024)
## v2clacfree v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2mebias
## Min. :-3.3510 Min. :-3.5820 Min. :-3.631 Min. :-3.0780
## 1st Qu.:-0.0650 1st Qu.: 0.0840 1st Qu.:-0.127 1st Qu.: 0.4090
## Median : 1.0770 Median : 1.2420 Median : 1.126 Median : 0.9730
## Mean : 0.7712 Mean : 0.9106 Mean : 0.831 Mean : 0.7686
## 3rd Qu.: 1.7900 3rd Qu.: 1.9840 3rd Qu.: 1.811 3rd Qu.: 1.5410
## Max. : 3.2430 Max. : 3.0860 Max. : 2.993 Max. : 3.0170
## v2mecenefm v2mecrit v2meharjrn v2merange
## Min. :-2.8230 Min. :-2.9780 Min. :-2.9980 Min. :-2.7750
## 1st Qu.:-0.5810 1st Qu.:-0.0210 1st Qu.:-0.3020 1st Qu.: 0.3270
## Median : 0.7210 Median : 0.8910 Median : 0.6050 Median : 1.0290
## Mean : 0.4963 Mean : 0.7494 Mean : 0.5251 Mean : 0.7655
## 3rd Qu.: 1.5140 3rd Qu.: 1.6890 3rd Qu.: 1.4290 3rd Qu.: 1.7290
## Max. : 3.5070 Max. : 3.4060 Max. : 3.7190 Max. : 2.6290
## v2meslfcen v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2elmulpar
## Min. :-2.9700 Min. :-3.2890 Min. :-3.1360 Min. :-3.601
## 1st Qu.:-0.2350 1st Qu.: 0.1260 1st Qu.:-0.3670 1st Qu.:-0.110
## Median : 0.5860 Median : 1.3380 Median : 1.0660 Median : 1.203
## Mean : 0.4063 Mean : 0.9004 Mean : 0.7403 Mean : 0.544
## 3rd Qu.: 1.2280 3rd Qu.: 1.9830 3rd Qu.: 1.9350 3rd Qu.: 1.403
## Max. : 3.1220 Max. : 3.2080 Max. : 3.0850 Max. : 1.871
## v2psbars v2psoppaut v2psparban v2elembaut
## Min. :-3.246 Min. :-3.388 Min. :-3.641 Min. :-2.950
## 1st Qu.: 0.390 1st Qu.: 0.341 1st Qu.: 0.527 1st Qu.:-0.574
## Median : 1.430 Median : 1.314 Median : 1.326 Median : 0.958
## Mean : 1.057 Mean : 1.064 Mean : 1.036 Mean : 0.696
## 3rd Qu.: 2.139 3rd Qu.: 2.102 3rd Qu.: 2.004 3rd Qu.: 1.919
## Max. : 2.937 Max. : 3.305 Max. : 2.657 Max. : 3.785
## v2elembcap v2elfrfair v2elintim v2elirreg
## Min. :-3.1410 Min. :-3.2680 Min. :-3.317 Min. :-2.8820
## 1st Qu.: 0.0290 1st Qu.:-1.0510 1st Qu.:-0.961 1st Qu.:-0.9350
## Median : 0.8800 Median : 0.2810 Median : 0.202 Median : 0.1140
## Mean : 0.8574 Mean : 0.2015 Mean : 0.124 Mean : 0.1583
## 3rd Qu.: 1.8450 3rd Qu.: 1.7510 3rd Qu.: 1.512 3rd Qu.: 1.3440
## Max. : 3.2150 Max. : 2.2800 Max. : 2.136 Max. : 2.5270
## v2elpeace v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elsuffrage
## Min. :-2.424 Min. :-1.9520 Min. :-2.64200 Min. : 36.00
## 1st Qu.:-0.717 1st Qu.:-0.0890 1st Qu.:-0.99400 1st Qu.:100.00
## Median : 0.345 Median : 1.0350 Median :-0.25500 Median :100.00
## Mean : 0.214 Mean : 0.7897 Mean : 0.03216 Mean : 99.62
## 3rd Qu.: 1.310 3rd Qu.: 1.8150 3rd Qu.: 1.15000 3rd Qu.:100.00
## Max. : 2.280 Max. : 2.5810 Max. : 2.70700 Max. :100.00
Thus filtered dataset, constituting the basis for further analysis, contains information on 24 crucial, low-level indices for 169 countries. The table below provides a description and the question the experts get asked to evaluate each dimension of democracy represented by the variables employed in this project. The descriptions and and questions are retrieved using a function of vdemdata package: var_info().
| Code | Name | Question |
|---|---|---|
| v2clacfree | Freedom of academic and cultural expression | Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues? |
| v2cldiscm | Freedom of discussion for men | Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? |
| v2cldiscw | Freedom of discussion for women | Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces? |
| v2mebias | Media bias | Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates? |
| v2mecenefm | Government censorship effort — Media | Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media? |
| v2mecrit | Print/broadcast media critical | Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government? |
| v2meharjrn | Harassment of journalists | Are individual journalists harassed — i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed — by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities? |
| v2merange | Print/broadcast media perspectives | Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives? |
| v2meslfcen | Media self-censorship | Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive? |
| v2cseeorgs | CSO entry and exit | To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life? |
| v2csreprss | CSO repression | Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)? |
| v2elmulpar | Elections multiparty | Was this national election multiparty? |
| v2psbars | Barriers to parties | How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party? |
| v2psoppaut | Opposition parties autonomy | Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime? |
| v2psparban | Party ban | Are any parties banned? |
| v2elembaut | EMB autonomy | Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections? |
| v2elembcap | EMB capacity | Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election? |
| v2elfrfair | Election free and fair | Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair? |
| v2elintim | Election government intimidation | In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment by the government, the ruling party, or their agents? |
| v2elirreg | Election other voting irregularities | In this national election, was there evidence of other intentional irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud? |
| v2elpeace | Election other electoral violence | In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)? |
| v2elrgstry | Election voter registry | In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used? |
| v2elvotbuy | Election vote buying | In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying? |
| v2elsuffrage | Percentage of population with suffrage | What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections? |
Dimension reduction methods require the data to be numeric and normalized. I will, therefore, convert the data frame into a numeric matrix suitable for algebraic operations and normalize it, so that the variance in the dataset is not dominated entirely by variables that, simply, possess a different scale
vdem_M <- as.matrix(vdem_edi_2024)
vdem_z <- data.Normalization(vdem_M, type = "n1", normalization = "column")
Finally, the correlation matrix is computed using Pearson’s method. The correlation matrix plot makes it apparent that most of the variables are, indeed, highly correlated. This suggests a high level of information redundancy, deeming the data suitable for PCA.
M_cor <- cor(vdem_M, method = "pearson")
corrplot(M_cor, tl.cex = 0.6)
To base further analysis on statistical measures, rather than simple suppositions, Bartlett’s test and Measure of Sampling Adequacy (MSA, K-M-O) will be performed on the previously computed correlation matrix (Hair et al., 2019).
It is a statistical test for the presence of correlations among the variables. It indicates whether the correlation matrix has significant correlations across at least some of the variables. The desired result would be to reject the test’s following null hypothesis:
\(H_0\) : The correlation matrix is an identity matrix (i.e., variables are orthogonal and completely unrelated).
bartlett_test <- cortest.bartlett(M_cor, n = nrow(vdem_z))
print(bartlett_test$p.value)
## [1] 0
The p-value for Bartlett test is zero, therefore the null hypothesis is rejected and further analysis can proceed.
MSA or the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test is an index ranging from 0 to 1, when data is perfectly predicted by other variables. Hair et al. (2019) provide the following guidelines of result’s interpretation: 0.8 or above – meritorous, 0.7 or above – middling, 0.6 or above – mediocre, 0.5 or above – miserable and below 0.5 – unacceptable. MSA increases alongside the size of the sample, average correlations or the number of variables.
kmo <- KMO(M_cor)
print(kmo)
## Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin factor adequacy
## Call: KMO(r = M_cor)
## Overall MSA = 0.96
## MSA for each item =
## v2clacfree v2cldiscm v2cldiscw v2mebias v2mecenefm v2mecrit
## 0.98 0.95 0.94 0.97 0.98 0.98
## v2meharjrn v2merange v2meslfcen v2cseeorgs v2csreprss v2elmulpar
## 0.97 0.98 0.98 0.97 0.97 0.96
## v2psbars v2psoppaut v2psparban v2elembaut v2elembcap v2elfrfair
## 0.96 0.98 0.97 0.98 0.96 0.94
## v2elintim v2elirreg v2elpeace v2elrgstry v2elvotbuy v2elsuffrage
## 0.95 0.92 0.95 0.96 0.90 0.55
The result of overall MSA equal to 0.96, exceeding the threshold of 0.7, indicates that the data is almost perfectly predicted. Similarly, the results for every variable, save for suffrage, remain not lower than 0.9, meaning that the variables share sufficient variance.
To reduce the dimensionality of the V-Dem dataset and identify latent regime patterns, this project employs Principal Component Analysis (PCA). PCA is a linear dimensionality reduction technique. It transforms a large set of correlated variables into smaller sets of variables – Principal Components (PCs), which are orthogonal to one another. It does so with retaining as much of the original information as possible by finding the axes that account for the largest variance in the dataset.
pca <- prcomp(vdem_M, center = TRUE, scale = TRUE)
The step succeeding covariance analysis in PCA algorithms is the eigenvalue decomposition of the covariance matrix. It is the process of finding a set of scalars (eigenvalues) and vectors (eigenvectors) that complete the following equation:
\[{\Sigma}*v = {\lambda}*v\]
Where \({\Sigma}\) is the covariance matrix, \(v\) is a non-zero eigenvector and \({\lambda}\) is the eigenvalue. Eigenvector indicate the directions of maximum variance in the data, while eigenvalues quantify the variance captured by each principal component.
The eigenvalues for this project’s covariance matrix are computed below.
eigen(M_cor)$values
## [1] 16.19574516 2.61040445 1.01651417 0.62463023 0.46549319 0.41371661
## [7] 0.36441841 0.29674948 0.25355807 0.22859219 0.19688679 0.16425697
## [13] 0.15947244 0.14179693 0.13742931 0.12371808 0.10607827 0.10103766
## [19] 0.09316266 0.08904539 0.07592003 0.06517182 0.04798190 0.02821979
Eigenvalues are also used to determine the the number of components to retain. According to Kaiser’s rule: only components with eigenvalues greater than 1 should be retained. The number of components that exceed Kaiser’s threshold of 1 in this dataset is equal to 3 (granted, the third one barely exceeds it). It is said that Kaiser’s criterion can overestimate the number of components to be retained in datasets characterized by a large number of variables, which are highly correlated. However, employing Cattell’s (1966) the elbow rule leads to a similar conclusion. The first substantial drop in eigenvalues can be observed when there are two components and the second one at \(n = 3\), which is suceeded by a gradual, near-flat drop continuing all the way to the end.
fviz_eig(pca, choice = "eigenvalue", ylim=c(0,20), ncp = 24, addlabels = TRUE, main = "Eigenvalues")
The first three components collectively explain 82.6% of the total variance. That level of variance preservation ensures that noise is filtered out, while the vast majority of characteristics are retained.
summary(pca)
## Importance of components:
## PC1 PC2 PC3 PC4 PC5 PC6 PC7
## Standard deviation 4.0244 1.6157 1.00822 0.79034 0.6823 0.64321 0.60367
## Proportion of Variance 0.6748 0.1088 0.04235 0.02603 0.0194 0.01724 0.01518
## Cumulative Proportion 0.6748 0.7836 0.82594 0.85197 0.8714 0.88860 0.90379
## PC8 PC9 PC10 PC11 PC12 PC13 PC14
## Standard deviation 0.54475 0.50355 0.47811 0.4437 0.40529 0.39934 0.37656
## Proportion of Variance 0.01236 0.01056 0.00952 0.0082 0.00684 0.00664 0.00591
## Cumulative Proportion 0.91615 0.92672 0.93624 0.9445 0.95129 0.95793 0.96384
## PC15 PC16 PC17 PC18 PC19 PC20 PC21
## Standard deviation 0.37071 0.35174 0.32570 0.31786 0.30523 0.29840 0.27554
## Proportion of Variance 0.00573 0.00515 0.00442 0.00421 0.00388 0.00371 0.00316
## Cumulative Proportion 0.96957 0.97472 0.97914 0.98335 0.98724 0.99095 0.99411
## PC22 PC23 PC24
## Standard deviation 0.25529 0.2190 0.16799
## Proportion of Variance 0.00272 0.0020 0.00118
## Cumulative Proportion 0.99682 0.9988 1.00000
The scree plot, illustrating the proportion of variance explained per component, allows for a visual interpretation of results. A distinct elbow can be observed at the second and third component, which is consistent with the number of components this analysis retains.
fviz_eig(pca, addlabels = TRUE, ylim = c(0,100), main = "Variance Explained")
The plot displayed below illustrates a projection of the 24 features in the dataset onto a two-dimensional space formed by the first two Principal Components, which, together, account for 78% of variance in the data. It illustrates how the variables relate to the PC1 and PC2. The x axis explained the majority of differences between the countries. The arrows are concentrated on the right side of the plot, with none of the arrows representing variables pointing to the left. This confirms, both, that the variables are strongly correlated and that democracy is largely a single, coherent concept. The second dimension, plotted on the y-axis, it explains 10.9% of variance - representing the hidden nuances within regimes. The vertical dimension is comprised of variables measuring administrative quality and orderliness of the election process (e.g. election peace, no irregularities, no vote buying) – the arrows pointing upwards, and , on the other side: variables measuring the freedom of speech and association (media bias, media criticism, party bans, academic freedom). The PC2 reveals a distinction between administrative election quality and civil liberties. There is one distinct variable whose contribution is exceptionally low – an indicator measuring the level of suffrage – it’s probably due to current high level of suffrage across countries. Overall, the measures of democracy seem to be, indeed, mostly one-dimensional and homogeneous (67.5%), however upon a closer inspection they reveal a more subtle, nuanced dimension of democracy.
fviz_pca_var(pca, col.var = "contrib",
gradient.cols = viridis::plasma(3),
repel = TRUE,
title = "Variables Factor Map")
The quality plot is inspected in order to validate the analysis. This plot illustrates the 169 countries plotted reduced to a two-dimensional space. The color gradient represents the values of the squared cosine (cos2), which is a measure of the quality of representation of each observation (here: country) on a 2D map. The map, plotted below, reveals a U-shape of reliability – the points on the edges exhibit high squared cosine values, which is illustrated by their bright yellow and orange. On the right side of the plot, if one really squints one’s eyes, countries such as: Belgium, Norway, Germany, United Kingdom and Australia (among others) can be seen – they fit the model perfectly, representing the standard democracies. On the other end of that spectrum are countries such as North Korea, Belarus and Nicaragua – constituting perfect representations of the other end of a spectrum: autocracies. There is one point that strikes the observer with a force uncomparable to that of the dense, nearly incomprehensible mass of points condensed near the x-axis – that is, the United Arab Emirates on the top left side of the plot. It exemplifies a country with low democracy (Dim 1), but high state capacity and order (Dim 2). The dense mass of points concentrated near the coordinate origin represents countries that don’t necessarily fit the primary dimensions of democracy-autocarcy, or order-chaos neatly.Their low cosine values suggest that the complex characteristics possessed by those transitional or unstable regimes (e.g. Somalia, Mali) are not fully represented by the two-dimensional model.
fviz_pca_ind(pca,
geom = c("point", "text"),
repel = TRUE,
labelsize = 2,
pointsize = 3,
alpha.ind = 0.6,
col.ind = "cos2",
gradient.cols = viridis::plasma(3),
title = "Quality of Representation")
To further understand the structure of principal components, the contribution of each feature to the first three PCs is analyzed. For the sake of adequate qualification of dimensions represented by these components, this section will employ the definition of a variable (vdem_info()) accompanying with its super-category, rather than its code. The red dashed line represents the average contribution if all variables contributed equally – significant variables constituting each component are considered to be those that exceed the level of that line. As expected, the first dimension is comprised of the largest number of variables, these include:
The first dimension is defined by a broad mix of civic freedoms and the autonomy of political actors, mostly reflected in freedom of association and expression. Each super-category of low-level indices, save from the one-element suffrage subgroup, is represented in this dimension. This wide variety of the first component does not make for an easy interpretation, but then again, should democracy pose such a simple concept, this analysis would not be carried out in the first place. PC1 dimension can, thus, be defined as the civic liberty axis, representing the freedom and autonomy of individual actors within the political body. The first component is, thus, associated more closely with the quality of civil rights and liberties.
my_theme <- theme_minimal() +
theme(axis.text.y = element_text(size = 7),
plot.title = element_text(size = 12, face = "bold"))
fviz_contrib(pca, choice = "var", axes = 1, fill = "blueviolet", color = "blueviolet", title = "Contributions to Dim1") +
coord_flip() +
my_theme
The second dimension, with its smaller number of significant variables, is easier to interpret. The variables contributing significantly to PC2 include:
This dimension is defined almost exclusively by the technical integrity and peaceful conduct of elections, it captures the electoral order of a given country. The second component is, thus, connected to the state’s ability to effectively carry out elections.
fviz_contrib(pca, choice = "var", axes = 2, fill = "orchid", color = "orchid", title = "Contributions to Dim2") +
coord_flip() +
my_theme
The third dimension is unequivocally dominated by the measure of suffrage with a barely significant contribution of election voter registry. Suffrage is a measure capturing the share of population allowed to vote, similarly voter registry variable captures proper representation of voters.
fviz_contrib(pca, choice = "var", axes = 3, fill = "lightpink", color = "lightpink", title = "Contributions to Dim3") +
coord_flip() +
my_theme
To deepen the analysis, loadings will be analyzed. Loadings represent the correlation coefficients between the original variables and the newly derived Principal Components. Essentially, loadings illustrate how much a given variable contributes to a given component. However, seeing as standard PCA algorithm can be greedy and force the first components to explain a too-huge-of-a-portion of variance, for the purpose of loading analysis, a varimax perpendicular rotation will be applied to PCA. Rotation uses an optimization algorithm (axes rotation) to better align with the clusters of variables and maximize interpretability. The varimax algorithm looks for a rotation of matrix that maximizes the variance of the squared loadings, forcing hard separation. The new components (RC1, etc.) must remain uncorrelated.
The Varimax rotation successfully divided the dataset into three components, the explained variance of which exhibits a slightly more equal distribution. RC1 is comprised of a similar set of variables as PC1 – a highly-differentiated cluster representing civil liberties and political autonomy– responsible for 54% of variance. RC2 explains 23.7% of variance and is mostly comprised of variables regarding the coduct of elections. However, as a result of rotation, it now consists also of tow variabels regarding the governmenal and sel- censorship of media. The third component (RC3) is comprised solely of suffrage and explains 4.8% of variance In social sciences hard separation, forced by the varimax algorithms can be inefficient as the data is often correlated and hard to represent unambiguously, by nature.
rot <- principal(vdem_z, nfactors = 3, rotate = "varimax")
print(loadings(rot), digits = 3, cutoff = 0.4, sort = TRUE)
##
## Loadings:
## RC1 RC2 RC3
## v2clacfree 0.859
## v2cldiscm 0.866
## v2cldiscw 0.856
## v2mebias 0.907
## v2mecenefm 0.794 0.432
## v2mecrit 0.843
## v2meharjrn 0.799 0.432
## v2merange 0.882
## v2meslfcen 0.855
## v2cseeorgs 0.898
## v2csreprss 0.843
## v2elmulpar 0.856
## v2psbars 0.865
## v2psoppaut 0.859
## v2psparban 0.868
## v2elembaut 0.792 0.503
## v2elfrfair 0.654 0.633
## v2elembcap 0.785
## v2elintim 0.605 0.652
## v2elirreg 0.868
## v2elpeace 0.856
## v2elrgstry 0.533 0.658
## v2elvotbuy 0.859
## v2elsuffrage 0.962
##
## RC1 RC2 RC3
## SS loadings 12.97 5.695 1.157
## Proportion Var 0.54 0.237 0.048
## Cumulative Var 0.54 0.778 0.826
The plot below displays how variables score on the dimension of uniqueness and complexity. Uniqueness is the proportion of variance that is not shared with other variables, which, ideally, should be low as then reducing the space into a smaller number of dimensions is easier. Complexity, however, relates to how many variables constitute a single factor. Similarly, the desired output of complexity should be low as it provides easier interpretation. Uniqueness is plotted on the y-axis and complexity on x-axis – most of the variables fall into the low-complexity, low-uniquness quadrant, however the data is also distributed across high-uniqueness, low-complexity and low-uniqueness, high-complexity quadrants. However, it is important to note that the highest value of uniqueness is 0.3, which means that even for the worst variable, the factors still explain 70% of variance. Variables such as suffrage and civil liberties show ideal simple structure (low complexity and uniqueness) – anchoring their respective dimensions. Conversely, administartive variables such as EMB autonomy exhibit higher complexity, which reflect their role in both ensuring electoral integrity and representing democratic institutional capacity.
plot <- data.frame(Name = names(rot$uniquenesses),
Complexity = rot$complexity,
Uniqueness = rot$uniquenesses)
ggplot(plot, aes(x = Complexity, y = Uniqueness, label = Name)) +
geom_point(color = "black") +
geom_vline(xintercept = mean(rot$complexity), col = "red", linetype = "dashed") +
geom_hline(yintercept = mean(rot$uniquenesses), col = "red", linetype = "dashed")+
geom_text_repel(size = 3.5, box.padding = 0.5) +
labs(title = "Complexity vs Uniqueness",
x = "Complexity",
y = "Uniqueness") +
theme_minimal()
I have to confess to a slight distortion of reality of which I have been guilty throughout the preceding analysis. Namely, while claiming that the first component manages to capture the notion of democracy with a near-perfect accuracy, I have not presented the evidence behind such a bold of a claim. I will proceed to account for my mishaps, or blasphemies, what the reader will, in the following section.
If the first principal component is to account for the general notion of democracy, it should then be perfectly correlated with the established V-Dem Polyarchy Index (also known and referenced as the Electoral Democracy Index). Therefore, a near-perfect linear relationship between PC1 and EDI is expected. To test this hypothesis the unprocessed version of dataset is used to retrieve the EDI (v2x_polyarchy) and the type of regime of a given country (v2x_regime), for future purposes.
The relationship between the first component and the Polyarchy (EDI) index is plotted below. The correlation coefficient, as well as the p-value are displayed above the regression line. Visual analysis of the plot indicates that the relationship between PC1 and the EDI is, indeed, near-perfectly linear. The correlation coefficient exceeds 0.95, legitimizing my previous claims: the PC1 effectively captures the latent concept of democraticness.
# country coordinates from the UNROTATED PCA
pca_scores <- data.frame(get_pca_ind(pca)$coord)
pca_scores$country_name <- rownames(pca_scores)
# original V-Dem indices for validation (polyarchy and regime type)
validation_data <- vdem %>%
dplyr::filter(year == 2024) %>%
dplyr::select(country_name, v2x_polyarchy, v2x_regime)
# merge
analysis_df <- left_join(pca_scores, validation_data, by = "country_name")
# pc1 and polyarchy
ggplot(analysis_df, aes(x = Dim.1, y = v2x_polyarchy)) +
geom_point(alpha = 0.5) +
geom_smooth(method = "lm", color = "red") +
stat_cor(method = "pearson", label.x = -5, label.y = 0.8) +
labs(title = "Relationship between PC1 and EDI",
x = "PC1", y = "Electoral Democracy Index") +
theme_minimal()
## `geom_smooth()` using formula = 'y ~ x'
This finding, while interesting itself, provokes yet another probing question on the nature of the second component – does it represent merely more democracy or is it, rather, a dimension of democracy operating on a level distinct from the Polyarchy Index? Following the methodology employed to the analysis of PC1 – a locally estimated scatterplot smoothing (LOESS) of the EDI against the second principal component is illustarted below. It reveals a strikingly different, non-linear relationship, further confirmed by the low correlation coefficient (0.16). The LOESS curve exposes a structural asymmetry: liberal democracies form a rather condensed cluster on top of the plot, while the authoritarian regimes are highly scattered – ranging from high-capacity electoral autocracies to disordered, low-capacity states.
# pc2 and edi
ggplot(analysis_df, aes(x = Dim.2, y = v2x_polyarchy)) +
geom_point(alpha = 0.5) +
geom_smooth(method = "loess", color = "blue") +
stat_cor(method = "pearson", label.x = -5, label.y = 0.8) +
labs(title = "Relatonship between PC2 and EDI",
x = "PC2", y = "Electoral Democracy Index") +
theme_minimal()
## `geom_smooth()` using formula = 'y ~ x'
The previously retrieved v2x_regime numeric index is reassigned its original text labels, the description of which is, as follows:
This classification will now be used to evaluate the results of PCA, namely do the dimensions of principal components align with the regime types separated according to the polyarchy index?
Projecting the 2024 regime data onto the previously established two dimensions reveals that while liberal democracies form a tight and concise cluster characterized by relatively high scores in both dimensions, closed autocracies exhibit significant dispersion across the entirety of the second component. The x-axis (PC1: Civic Liberty) demarcates the level of liberal democracy, separating free regimes from autocracies, but the y-axis (PC2: Electoral Order/State Capacity) exposes a deep ramification within the authoritarian groups. What may strike the viewer the most upon a first, granted, brief glance on the plot are the countries occupying the upper-left quadrant – the high-capacity autocracies. It is the stomping ground of closed autocracies such as North Korea, which manage to obtain high scores of electoral variables constituting the PC2 Electoral Order/State Capacity dimension, while, rightfully so, scoring low on civic liberties. This finding might seem conflicting (it certainly appeared so to me), but upon a longer consideration: these countries, indeed, maintain perfect electoral peace, enforce accurate voter registration and prevent irregularities, even more effectively than some democracies, through absolute state control (hence, high state capacity) and monopoly on violence. The autocracies occupying the lower-left quadrant, however, lack both the freedom of democracy and the organizational power of effective dictatorship.
The PCA map reveals that while the path of freedom is singular, the path of subjugation/unfreedom, like Frost’s road in a yellow wood, diverges in two: the chaos of the weak state and the rigid, Orwellian order of the strong state.
# labels for regime types
analysis_df$RegimeType <- factor(analysis_df$v2x_regime,
levels = 0:3,
labels = c("Closed Autocracy",
"Electoral Autocracy",
"Electoral Democracy",
"Liberal Democracy"))
top_contributors <- analysis_df %>%
mutate(pca_contribution = Dim.1^2 + Dim.2^2) %>%
group_by(RegimeType) %>%
slice_max(order_by = pca_contribution, n = 5) %>%
pull(country_name)
# regime map
ggplot(analysis_df, aes(x = Dim.1, y = Dim.2, color = RegimeType)) +
geom_point(size = 2.5, alpha = 0.7) +
geom_text_repel(aes(label = ifelse(country_name %in% top_contributors, yes = country_name, "")),
size = 3.5,
box.padding = 0.5,
max.overlaps = Inf,
show.legend = FALSE,
force = 10) +
geom_hline(yintercept = 0, linetype = "dashed") +
geom_vline(xintercept = 0, linetype = "dashed") +
scale_color_viridis_d() +
labs(title = "V-Dem Regimes vs PCA",
x = "PC1: Civic Liberty",
y = "PC2: Electoral Order/State Capacity") +
theme_minimal() +
theme(legend.position = "bottom")
The main conclusion of the preceding analysis is that behind the broadly popularized, one-dimensional metrics of democracy lie dimensions, which do not necessarily substitute one another or behave in the same direction, that would explain their subsumption. This is, of course, in line with the centuries of theoretical discourse on democracy, which has always treated democracy as a multifaceted notion. V-Dem’s Polyarchy Index, while eventually single-dimensional, is comprised of over 40 low-level indices, which are supposed to illustrate five dimensions of democracy based on Dahl’s conception of polyarchy. The EDI is merely, and understandably so, a simplified metric of an outstandingly complex concept. I am not claiming to discover anything revolutionary, when I say that such simplified symbols of democracy are, indeed, simplified – this is the sole purpose of this metric. However, what truly makes my findings interesting is the distinct relationship between EDI and the first and second component. Thee first component (Civic Liberty), by itself captures 67.5% of variance and exhibits a near-perfect linear relationship with the Polyarchy Index, while the second component (Electoral Order/State Capacity) behaves almost independently of EDI in a manner that does not resemble a linear relationship. Thus, the first component captures the standard definition of democracy, while the second component poses a distinct dimension of administartive capability of a state to manage elections and maintain civil order. Quintesentially, while the two dimensions capture the differences between V-Dem’s definition of democratic states (Liberal Democarcy – high freedom, high state capacity, and Electoral Democracy – high, but lower freedom, low state capacity), there is a substantial divergence between V-Dem’s definition of autocracies and their scores on PC1 and PC2. It would seem as though V-Dem’s standard definition of autocracies does not fully manage to capture the institutional differences within the cluster of Closed Autocracies, which does not occupy a specific quadrant, but rather scatters across the entire dimension of Electoral Order/State Capacity. This vertical bifurcation shines a light on a distinction of autocracies seemingly invisible to the Polyarchy Index – the difference between coercive order of high-capacity totalitarian states and the disorder of fragile or failed states. State capacity is not a prerequisite for closed autocracies in the same way it is for liberal democracies. This would suggest that the paths to autocracy are diverse, while the path to liberal democracy appears to be captured well by the one-dimensional EDI.
Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Marquardt, K. L., … & Wilson, S. L. (2024). V-Dem Methodology v14. V-Dem Dataset.
Dahl, R. A. (2008). Polyarchy: Participation and opposition. Yale university press.
Fukuyama, F. (1992). The end of history and the last man. Hamish Hamilton, London.
Gramsci, A. (1926). Prison Notebooks.
Hair, J. F., Black, W. C., Babin, B. J., Anderson, R. E., & Tatham, R. L. (2019). Multivariate data analysis.
Maerz, Seraphine F., Lührmann, Anna, Hellmeier, Sebastian, Grahn, Sandra; Lindberg, Staffan I. (18 May 2020). “State of the world 2019: autocratization surges – resistance grows”. Democratization. 27 (6): 909–927.
Wilson, M. C., Wiesner, K., & Bien, S. (2023). The Hidden Dimension in Democracy. V-Dem Working Paper, 137.