Background

Collateral Damage: Anti-Satellite Tests and the Impact on the Space Debris Environment

~ An ASAT by definition is an Anti Satellite Weapon. This weapon can be deployed in space or from earth atmosphere with the intent of destroying or incappacitating an orbiting object. These are often missiles or rockets but can also be satellites themselves. Many countries such as the USA, Russia, China and India have all conducted various tests of such weapons, each leading to the creation of large quantities of space debris. The danger of space debris to other objects in orbit and the overall space environment cannot be understated. This presentation utilises data from the USAF Space Command’s Satellite Catalog to understand the severity of this issue.

~ It is worth noting that all data on debris pieces in this presentation is based upon trackable objects of <10cm x 10cm. The vast majority of space debris is smaller than this, with estimates of nearly 120 million debris pieces of this size as of publication. Therefore, it must be considered that these tests generate a proportional quantity of untrackable debris, thus escalating the potential risk.

Rising Debris Over Time

This graph presents the yearly counts of trackable debris objects added to orbit. Spikes in the data correspond to major fragmentation events — several of which are ASAT tests.

The Spikes: ASAT Tests Explained

The peaks in the previous plot are largely attributable to a handful of destructive events — notably ASAT weapon tests.

  • 2007 — China (Fengyun-1C): A direct-ascent ASAT that destroyed a defunct weather satellite, producing thousands of long-lived fragments in LEO. This test was conducted in 2007 but data is presented at the date of the satellite’s launch in 1999.
  • 2019 — India (Mission Shakti): A test that produced hundreds of pieces, mostly at lower altitudes leading to much of the debris decay quickly back into earths atmosphere.
  • 2021 — Russia (Cosmos 1408): Destruction of a satellite produced debris near the ISS altitude, creating immediate risks for the crew and operational satellites in the same altitudes. The test was conducted in 2021 but data is presented at the date of the satellite’s launch in 1983.

As of 2025, at least 16 ASAT weapons tests on in-orbit satellites have been confirmed to have been conducted, but such progams are highly classified so the true number is likely much higher.

Case Study: Fengyun-1C (China, 2007)

This is the distribution of consequential debris from this test across Earth orbit .

~ Note that the debris fragments were spread over a wide variety of orbits though most had orbital perigees within Low-Earth-Orbit (apogee <10000km), posing greater risk for the vast majority of satellites which inhabit that area of space.

Average Yearly % Increase in Space Debris

~ Note that the trendline represents the average yearly increase in the total of orbital debris per year. This trend has followed a relatively consistent linear progression.

Payloads, Rocket Bodies, and Debris Compared

~ Note the recent increase in payloads to orbit, this is mostly attributed to SpaceX’s Starlink satellites. The grey line denotes ‘unidentified’ objects.

The Outlook

  • The European Space Agency publishes a yearly space environment report containing predictive modelling of the future debris environment. All recent reports have contained the same expected exponential increase in orbital debris.
  • With this increase in orbital debris comes an exponential increase in the risk of collisions occurring and further debris generation as a result.
  • Any future and current crewed and commercial missions face heightened risks as result of this with vast repercussions across scientific, economic and political spheres.
  • As of publication, there is no current international policy on ASAT tests, nor any unified attempt to mitigate and control the resulting debris. This has resulted in a distinct lack of any legal, social or financially accountability for any government, military or private entity and their respective assests in orbit.

References

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