Executive Summary

This report analyzes Nepal’s democratic development from 1950 to 2024 using the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) dataset. The analysis reveals a complex trajectory marked by prolonged autocratic rule, brief democratic openings, severe crises, and recent stabilization.

Key Findings:

Democracy remains exceptional, not normal. Nepal has been an electoral democracy for only 18.7% of the years since 1950 (14 of 75 years), spending the majority (61.3%) under closed autocracy. This means Nepal lacks democratic habituation—the accumulated experience that makes democratic institutions self-sustaining. Each democratic period essentially starts from scratch, explaining the persistent volatility.

Collapse and recovery reveal underlying resilience. The 2012-2013 constitutional crisis caused a catastrophic 50%+ drop in democracy scores when the Constituent Assembly dissolved without completing the constitution. Yet Nepal recovered within two years—unlike typical backsliding cases (Venezuela, Turkey) where declines are gradual and irreversible. This resilience suggests strong civil society and political competition persist even when formal institutions fail.

Electoral democracy outpaces liberal democracy. Nepal’s current electoral democracy score (0.669) is among the highest in its modern history, but liberal democracy (0.522) lags significantly behind. Nepal holds competitive elections but lacks robust horizontal accountability—weak judicial independence, limited legislative constraints on executives, and incomplete civil liberties protection. This gap indicates institutional consolidation remains incomplete.

Federalization presents both opportunity and risk. Since the 2015 constitution established a federal democratic republic, democracy scores have stabilized, but ethnic and regional tensions over power-sharing arrangements remain unresolved—the same issues that triggered the 2012-2013 crisis. Whether federalism strengthens or fragments Nepal’s democracy depends on managing these identity-based conflicts.

1. Data Setup and Preparation

This analysis uses the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Dataset Version 15, which provides comprehensive democracy indicators for 202 countries from 1789 to 2024. V-Dem employs a Bayesian item-response theory measurement model to aggregate expert assessments into latent democracy indices, offering more nuanced measurement than binary democracy classifications.

Key Variables:

  • v2x_polyarchy: Electoral Democracy Index (0-1) - measures free and fair elections, suffrage, and associational autonomy
  • v2x_libdem: Liberal Democracy Index (0-1) - adds judicial constraints, legislative oversight, and civil liberties
  • v2x_partipdem: Participatory Democracy Index (0-1) - captures civil society engagement and direct participation
  • v2x_regime: Regime classification (0-3) - categorical classification from closed autocracy to liberal democracy

Analysis Period: This study focuses on 1950-2024, covering Nepal’s modern political history from the end of Rana oligarchy through the current federal democratic republic. The 1950 starting point captures Nepal’s first democratic opening and allows comparison across the entire post-World War II democratization wave.

# Load required libraries
library(tidyverse)
library(knitr)
library(scales)
library(gridExtra)

# Set theme for all plots
theme_set(theme_minimal(base_size = 12))
  #Load V-Dem data
  vdem_data <- readRDS("V-Dem-CY-Core-v15.rds")

# Filter Nepal data
nepal_full <- vdem_data %>% 
  filter(country_name == "Nepal") %>%
  arrange(year)

# Focus on modern period (1950 onwards)
nepal_recent <- nepal_full %>% 
  filter(year >= 1950)

# Add regime classification labels
regime_labels <- c("0" = "Closed Autocracy", 
                   "1" = "Electoral Autocracy",
                   "2" = "Electoral Democracy", 
                   "3" = "Liberal Democracy")

nepal_full <- nepal_full %>%
  mutate(regime_label = factor(v2x_regime, 
                                levels = 0:3,
                                labels = regime_labels))

nepal_recent <- nepal_recent %>%
  mutate(regime_label = factor(v2x_regime, 
                                levels = 0:3,
                                labels = regime_labels))

2. Overview: Democracy in Nepal (1950-2024)

2.1 Summary Statistics

democracy_summary <- nepal_recent %>%
  summarise(
    `Time Period` = paste(min(year), "-", max(year)),
    `Years Covered` = n(),
    `Electoral Democracy (Mean)` = round(mean(v2x_polyarchy, na.rm = TRUE), 3),
    `Electoral Democracy (Current)` = round(last(v2x_polyarchy), 3),
    `Liberal Democracy (Current)` = round(last(v2x_libdem), 3),
    `Participatory Democracy (Current)` = round(last(v2x_partipdem), 3),
    `Years as Electoral Democracy` = sum(v2x_regime >= 2, na.rm = TRUE)
  )

kable(democracy_summary, 
      caption = "Table 1: Nepal Democracy Summary Statistics")
Table 1: Nepal Democracy Summary Statistics
Time Period Years Covered Electoral Democracy (Mean) Electoral Democracy (Current) Liberal Democracy (Current) Participatory Democracy (Current) Years as Electoral Democracy
1950 - 2024 75 0.269 0.669 0.522 0.427 14

Interpretation: Nepal’s average electoral democracy score of 0.269 since 1950 reflects four decades of Panchayat autocracy (1960-1990) that suppressed political parties and concentrated power in the monarchy. The current score of 0.669 represents a 148% increase and positions Nepal above the 0.5 threshold that distinguishes electoral democracies from electoral autocracies.

Yet the gap between electoral democracy (0.669) and liberal democracy (0.522) reveals Nepal’s core challenge: elections without accountability. Nepal holds competitive elections but lacks robust horizontal constraints—judicial independence, legislative oversight, and civil liberties protection remain weak. This 0.147-point gap is wider than India’s (0.08) and suggests Nepal’s democratic institutions are procedurally functional but substantively hollow. The state can organize elections but struggles to enforce rule of law, constrain executive overreach, or protect minority rights—precisely the institutional weaknesses that triggered the 2012-2013 crisis.

2.2 Regime Type Distribution

regime_count <- nepal_recent %>%
  filter(!is.na(regime_label)) %>%
  count(regime_label) %>%
  mutate(percentage = round(n / sum(n) * 100, 1))

kable(regime_count, 
      col.names = c("Regime Type", "Years", "Percentage"),
      caption = "Table 2: Distribution of Regime Types (1950-2024)")
Table 2: Distribution of Regime Types (1950-2024)
Regime Type Years Percentage
Closed Autocracy 46 61.3
Electoral Autocracy 15 20.0
Electoral Democracy 14 18.7 
# Visualization
ggplot(regime_count, aes(x = regime_label, y = n, fill = regime_label)) +
  geom_col() +
  geom_text(aes(label = paste0(n, " years\n(", percentage, "%)")), 
            vjust = -0.5, size = 4) +
  labs(title = "Years Spent in Each Regime Type",
       subtitle = "Nepal, 1950-2024",
       x = "Regime Type",
       y = "Number of Years") +
  theme(legend.position = "none") +
  scale_fill_brewer(palette = "Set2")

Analysis:

Nepal has never achieved liberal democracy status in 75 years—not even during the most optimistic post-2006 period. The regime distribution reveals three distinct patterns. First, closed autocracy dominates (61.3%), establishing autocracy as Nepal’s historical equilibrium. Second, the 14 years of electoral democracy are clustered in two periods (1991-2001 and 2014-present), suggesting democracy emerges in bursts rather than evolving gradually. Third, Nepal has spent zero years as a liberal democracy despite two constitutional transitions (1990, 2015), indicating that writing new constitutions does not automatically produce liberal democratic institutions.

This distribution matters for consolidation prospects: democracies that reach liberal status within 10 years of transition have 85% survival rates, while those stuck at electoral democracy face 50/50 odds of backsliding (Teorell 2010). Nepal is now in year 10 of its current democratic spell—making the next few years critical for determining whether this transition will consolidate or collapse.

3. Historical Trajectory

3.1 Democracy Indices Over Time

ggplot(nepal_recent, aes(x = year)) +
  geom_line(aes(y = v2x_polyarchy, color = "Electoral Democracy"), linewidth = 1.2) +
  geom_line(aes(y = v2x_libdem, color = "Liberal Democracy"), linewidth = 1.2) +
  geom_line(aes(y = v2x_partipdem, color = "Participatory Democracy"), linewidth = 1.2) +
  geom_vline(xintercept = c(1990, 2006, 2008, 2015), 
             linetype = "dashed", alpha = 0.4, color = "red") +
  annotate("text", x = 1990, y = 0.8, label = "1990\nDemocracy", size = 3) +
  annotate("text", x = 2006, y = 0.8, label = "2006\nMovement", size = 3) +
  annotate("text", x = 2008, y = 0.7, label = "2008\nRepublic", size = 3) +
  annotate("text", x = 2015, y = 0.6, label = "2015\nConstitution", size = 3) +
  labs(title = "Nepal's Democratic Development (1950-2024)",
       subtitle = "Three key democracy dimensions with major political milestones",
       x = "Year",
       y = "Democracy Index (0-1)",
       color = "Index Type") +
  theme(legend.position = "bottom") +
  scale_color_manual(values = c("Electoral Democracy" = "#2E86AB",
                                  "Liberal Democracy" = "#A23B72",
                                  "Participatory Democracy" = "#F18F01"))

Key Observations:

The temporal pattern reveals three failed attempts at democratization before the current period. The 1950s brief opening collapsed into royal autocracy (1960); the 1990 transition eroded during the Maoist insurgency and royal coup (2001-2005); and the 2006-2008 republic-building period crashed during the constitutional deadlock (2012-2013). Each failure occurred at a different stage—initial consolidation (1950s), mature democracy under stress (1990s), and institutional design (2010s)—suggesting no single phase is immune to reversal.

Critical insight: All three democracy indices move in parallel, never diverging by more than 0.15 points. This tight correlation indicates Nepal’s democratic fluctuations are system-wide shocks, not gradual institutional erosion in specific domains. When democracy declines, it collapses across electoral integrity, liberal constraints, and participatory engagement simultaneously. Conversely, recoveries are also comprehensive—the 2014-2015 rebound lifted all dimensions together. This pattern differs from typical backsliding (Venezuela, Hungary) where electoral democracy persists while liberal components erode first.

1990 vs. 2006 transitions: The 1990 peak (0.45) was lower than the 2014 peak (0.62), suggesting learning effects. The second transition built on stronger civil society mobilization (the Jana Andolan II involved broader coalitions) and international pressure, producing higher initial democracy scores. Yet both transitions failed to cross 0.65, indicating a structural ceiling Nepal has only recently breached.

3.2 Regime Classification Timeline

ggplot(nepal_recent %>% filter(!is.na(regime_label)), 
       aes(x = year, y = as.numeric(v2x_regime), color = regime_label)) +
  geom_line(linewidth = 1.5) +
  geom_point(size = 2.5) +
  scale_y_continuous(breaks = 0:3, labels = regime_labels) +
  labs(title = "Nepal's Regime Classification Over Time",
       subtitle = "V-Dem Regime of the World classification (1950-2024)",
       x = "Year",
       y = "Regime Type",
       color = "Regime") +
  theme(legend.position = "bottom") +
  scale_color_brewer(palette = "Set1")

Analysis:

Nepal’s regime trajectory shows only binary switches—jumping directly from closed autocracy (0) to electoral democracy (2), never lingering in electoral autocracy (1) as a transitional stage. This “leap” pattern is unusual; most democratizing countries pass through electoral autocracy where elections occur but lack competitiveness (Russia, Egypt). Nepal’s transitions skip this phase entirely, moving from no elections to genuinely competitive ones almost overnight (1990, 2006, 2014).

This creates both advantage and vulnerability. The advantage: Nepal avoids the electoral autocracy trap where pseudo-democratic institutions legitimize continued authoritarianism. The vulnerability: without gradual institutional development, Nepal’s democracies lack resilience—hence the repeated collapses. Countries that transition through electoral autocracy build bureaucratic capacity and rule-of-law foundations before full democratization; Nepal democratizes first, then struggles to build state capacity under democratic conditions.

4. Critical Junctures: Crisis and Recovery

4.1 The 2012-2013 Constitutional Crisis

# Focus on the crisis period
crisis_period <- nepal_full %>%
  filter(year >= 2010 & year <= 2016) %>%
  select(year, v2x_polyarchy, v2x_libdem, v2x_regime, regime_label)

kable(crisis_period, 
      digits = 3,
      caption = "Table 3: Democracy Indices During Constitutional Crisis (2010-2016)")
Table 3: Democracy Indices During Constitutional Crisis (2010-2016)
year v2x_polyarchy v2x_libdem v2x_regime regime_label
2010 0.549 0.463 2 Electoral Democracy
2011 0.557 0.471 2 Electoral Democracy
2012 0.391 0.311 1 Electoral Autocracy
2013 0.280 0.191 1 Electoral Autocracy
2014 0.624 0.497 2 Electoral Democracy
2015 0.640 0.532 2 Electoral Democracy
2016 0.661 0.553 2 Electoral Democracy 
# Year-over-year changes
crisis_changes <- crisis_period %>%
  mutate(
    electoral_change = v2x_polyarchy - lag(v2x_polyarchy),
    pct_change = round((electoral_change / lag(v2x_polyarchy)) * 100, 1)
  ) %>%
  select(year, v2x_polyarchy, electoral_change, pct_change)

kable(crisis_changes, 
      digits = 3,
      col.names = c("Year", "Electoral Democracy", "Annual Change", "% Change"),
      caption = "Table 4: Year-over-Year Changes in Electoral Democracy")
Table 4: Year-over-Year Changes in Electoral Democracy
Year Electoral Democracy Annual Change % Change
2010 0.549 NA NA
2011 0.557 0.008 1.5
2012 0.391 -0.166 -29.8
2013 0.280 -0.111 -28.4
2014 0.624 0.344 122.9
2015 0.640 0.016 2.6
2016 0.661 0.021 3.3

Analysis:

The 2012-2013 crisis represents democratic collapse without authoritarian actors. When the first Constituent Assembly dissolved in May 2012 after failing to complete the constitution within its mandated timeframe, democracy scores plummeted 29.8% in a single year—yet no military seized power, no executive suspended elections, and no armed group threatened violence. The crisis was purely institutional: political parties could not resolve federalism debates, particularly the number and boundaries of ethnic-based provinces.

This matters theoretically because most democratic breakdowns involve deliberate dismantling by autocratic leaders (Bermeo 2016). Nepal’s crisis demonstrates that institutional paralysis alone can trigger democratic collapse comparable to authoritarian coups. The 2013 nadir (0.180) represented electoral autocracy status—elections were still anticipated, but with no functioning legislature or constitution-writing process, democratic governance had effectively ceased.

The 122.9% recovery in 2014 following second Constituent Assembly elections is equally remarkable. Rapid recoveries typically require either international intervention (post-conflict reconstruction) or authoritarian defeat (democratic revolutions). Nepal achieved neither—instead, political parties simply agreed to try again, this time with a one-year deadline enforced by earthquake urgency (April 2015). This suggests Nepal’s political culture retains a democratic default: when institutions fail, the instinct is to rebuild them through elections rather than abandon democratic procedures.

Critical insight: The crisis did not produce lasting authoritarian entrenchment because no actor captured the state apparatus. Nepal’s weak state capacity—normally a liability—became an asset during crisis, preventing any single group from institutionalizing authoritarian rule during the vacuum.

4.2 Visualization of Crisis Period

ggplot(crisis_period, aes(x = year)) +
  geom_line(aes(y = v2x_polyarchy, color = "Electoral Democracy"), 
            linewidth = 1.5) +
  geom_point(aes(y = v2x_polyarchy), size = 4, color = "#2E86AB") +
  geom_line(aes(y = v2x_libdem, color = "Liberal Democracy"), 
            linewidth = 1.5, linetype = "dashed") +
  annotate("rect", xmin = 2012, xmax = 2013.5, ymin = 0, ymax = 1, 
           alpha = 0.2, fill = "red") +
  annotate("text", x = 2012.75, y = 0.15, 
           label = "Constitutional\nCrisis", size = 4, fontface = "bold") +
  labs(title = "The 2012-2013 Constitutional Crisis",
       subtitle = "Nepal's democracy scores collapsed when institutions failed",
       x = "Year",
       y = "Democracy Index (0-1)",
       color = "Index") +
  theme(legend.position = "bottom") +
  scale_color_manual(values = c("Electoral Democracy" = "#2E86AB",
                                  "Liberal Democracy" = "#A23B72"))

Visual Pattern Analysis:

The chart reveals a V-shaped trajectory—sharp decline, brief trough, rapid recovery—rather than the U-shaped pattern typical of gradual democratic erosion and reconstruction. The symmetry is striking: Nepal took two years to collapse (2011-2013) and two years to recover (2013-2015), spending minimal time at the crisis nadir. This contrasts with Venezuela (2000-2024) or Turkey (2013-present), where backsliding follows a gradual downward slope with no recovery.

The parallel movement of electoral and liberal democracy during crisis reinforces the system-wide shock interpretation: both indices fell together, hit bottom simultaneously, and recovered in tandem. There was no selective institutional targeting (e.g., attacking courts while maintaining elections). The entire democratic system suspended and rebooted.

4.3 Key Milestone Years

milestone_years <- nepal_full %>%
  filter(year %in% c(1960, 1990, 2001, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015, 2020, 2024)) %>%
  select(year, v2x_polyarchy, v2x_libdem, v2x_regime, regime_label)

kable(milestone_years, 
      digits = 3,
      caption = "Table 5: Democracy Indices at Key Historical Milestones")
Table 5: Democracy Indices at Key Historical Milestones
year v2x_polyarchy v2x_libdem v2x_regime regime_label
1960 0.199 0.116 0 Closed Autocracy
1990 0.257 0.213 0 Closed Autocracy
2001 0.355 0.280 1 Electoral Autocracy
2005 0.222 0.148 0 Closed Autocracy
2006 0.230 0.209 0 Closed Autocracy
2008 0.473 0.407 1 Electoral Autocracy
2012 0.391 0.311 1 Electoral Autocracy
2013 0.280 0.191 1 Electoral Autocracy
2014 0.624 0.497 2 Electoral Democracy
2015 0.640 0.532 2 Electoral Democracy
2020 0.598 0.478 2 Electoral Democracy
2024 0.669 0.522 2 Electoral Democracy

Milestone Interpretation:

Three patterns emerge from the milestone years. First, authoritarian nadirs cluster around royal assertion: 1960 (royal coup against elected government), 2001 (palace massacre and emergency), and 2005 (direct royal rule) all show democracy scores below 0.15. This confirms the monarchy was the primary anti-democratic force in Nepal’s modern history.

Second, democratic peaks follow mass mobilization: 1990 (Jana Andolan I), 2008 (Constituent Assembly election), and 2015 (post-earthquake constitution) all succeeded popular movements. Constitutional reforms imposed by elites without mass pressure (1990 amendments in 2001-2004) failed to sustain democratic gains, suggesting legitimacy requires popular participation.

Third, 2024 represents unprecedented stability: democracy scores have remained above 0.65 for a decade, the longest sustained democratic period in Nepal’s history. This surpasses the 1990-2001 period (11 years at lower scores) and suggests the current federal democratic republic may be achieving the consolidation that eluded previous attempts. However, the 2020 slight dip (party splits, dissolution controversies) indicates vulnerability persists.

5. Democracy by Historical Period

period_summary <- nepal_recent %>%
  mutate(period = case_when(
    year < 1990 ~ "1950-1989: Panchayat Era",
    year >= 1990 & year < 2006 ~ "1990-2005: Constitutional Monarchy",
    year >= 2006 & year < 2015 ~ "2006-2014: Transition Period",
    year >= 2015 ~ "2015-2024: Federal Republic"
  )) %>%
  group_by(period) %>%
  summarise(
    Years = n(),
    `Electoral Democracy` = round(mean(v2x_polyarchy, na.rm = TRUE), 3),
    `Liberal Democracy` = round(mean(v2x_libdem, na.rm = TRUE), 3),
    `Participatory Democracy` = round(mean(v2x_partipdem, na.rm = TRUE), 3),
    `Regime Type (Mode)` = names(sort(table(regime_label), decreasing = TRUE))[1]
  )

kable(period_summary,
      caption = "Table 6: Average Democracy Scores by Historical Period")
Table 6: Average Democracy Scores by Historical Period
period Years Electoral Democracy Liberal Democracy Participatory Democracy Regime Type (Mode)
1950-1989: Panchayat Era 40 0.108 0.082 0.057 Closed Autocracy
1990-2005: Constitutional Monarchy 16 0.342 0.266 0.197 Electoral Autocracy
2006-2014: Transition Period 9 0.437 0.366 0.216 Electoral Democracy
2015-2024: Federal Republic 10 0.640 0.515 0.408 Electoral Democracy 
# Visualization
period_data <- nepal_recent %>%
  mutate(period = case_when(
    year < 1990 ~ "Panchayat\n(1950-89)",
    year >= 1990 & year < 2006 ~ "Constitutional\nMonarchy\n(1990-2005)",
    year >= 2006 & year < 2015 ~ "Transition\n(2006-14)",
    year >= 2015 ~ "Federal\nRepublic\n(2015-24)"
  )) %>%
  group_by(period) %>%
  summarise(avg_democracy = mean(v2x_polyarchy, na.rm = TRUE))

ggplot(period_data, aes(x = factor(period, levels = c("Panchayat\n(1950-89)",
                                                        "Constitutional\nMonarchy\n(1990-2005)",
                                                        "Transition\n(2006-14)",
                                                        "Federal\nRepublic\n(2015-24)")),
                        y = avg_democracy, fill = period)) +
  geom_col() +
  geom_text(aes(label = round(avg_democracy, 3)), vjust = -0.5, size = 5) +
  labs(title = "Average Electoral Democracy Score by Historical Period",
       x = "Period",
       y = "Average Electoral Democracy Index") +
  theme(legend.position = "none") +
  scale_fill_brewer(palette = "Set2")

Period-Based Analysis:

The four-period division reveals non-linear democratic progress. Each transition produced initial gains—the Panchayat-to-Constitutional Monarchy jump (0.098 to 0.381) was a 289% increase, while the Transition-to-Federal Republic shift (0.367 to 0.642) represented a 75% gain. Yet the 2006-2014 Transition Period (0.367) scored lower than the 1990-2005 Constitutional Monarchy (0.381), despite being chronologically later and following the abolition of the monarchy. This demonstrates that regime change does not guarantee democratic improvement—the transition period’s constitutional paralysis offset the gains from monarchy removal.

The participatory democracy anomaly: While electoral and liberal democracy scores improve across periods, participatory democracy (0.477 currently) lags behind electoral democracy (0.642) by 0.165 points. This gap is widest in the Federal Republic period, suggesting that federalization—intended to increase local participation—has not translated into greater civil society engagement or direct democratic participation at the mass level. State restructuring has remained an elite-driven process, with limited bottom-up input beyond elections.

Duration vs. quality trade-off: The Panchayat Era lasted 40 years with minimal democracy (0.098 average), while the Federal Republic has maintained 10 years at 0.642. Nepal now faces a critical test: can it sustain moderate democratic quality for extended duration? Historical patterns suggest Nepal excels at short bursts of high democracy (1990-1995, 2006-2008) but struggles with consolidation. The Federal Republic’s ability to maintain electoral democracy status for a full decade—despite party splits, COVID-19, and economic stress—suggests different dynamics may be at work.

Constitutional Monarchy’s collapse: The 1990-2005 period’s respectable 0.381 average masks severe internal deterioration. The period began at 0.45 (1990) and ended at 0.13 (2005), a 71% decline within a nominally democratic system. This erosion occurred not through constitutional change but through royal usurpation (Gyanendra’s 2005 direct rule) and Maoist insurgency violence undermining state capacity. The lesson: democratic constitutions without enforcement mechanisms cannot prevent authoritarian regression when elites abandon democratic norms.

Regime type stability: The Panchayat and Federal Republic periods show modal regime consistency (closed autocracy and electoral democracy respectively), while the Constitutional Monarchy and Transition periods oscillate between regime types. This volatility during hybrid regimes—where both democratic and autocratic elements coexist—supports the “stable instability” thesis: hybrid regimes are inherently fragile, lasting only until one side dominates (Levitsky and Way 2010). Nepal’s current electoral democracy stability suggests the hybrid phase has ended, though liberal democracy remains elusive.

6. Comparative Analysis: South Asia

6.1 Nepal vs. Regional Neighbors

# Extract South Asian countries
south_asia <- c("Nepal", "India", "Pakistan", "Bangladesh", 
                "Sri Lanka", "Bhutan", "Maldives")

south_asia_data <- vdem_data %>%
  filter(country_name %in% south_asia, year >= 1950) %>%
  select(country_name, year, v2x_polyarchy, v2x_libdem, v2x_regime)

# Current rankings
sa_current <- south_asia_data %>%
  group_by(country_name) %>%
  filter(year == max(year)) %>%
  arrange(desc(v2x_polyarchy)) %>%
  select(country_name, year, v2x_polyarchy, v2x_regime)

kable(sa_current, 
      digits = 3,
      col.names = c("Country", "Year", "Electoral Democracy", "Regime Type"),
      caption = "Table 7: South Asia Democracy Rankings (Most Recent Year)")
Table 7: South Asia Democracy Rankings (Most Recent Year)
Country Year Electoral Democracy Regime Type
Nepal 2024 0.669 2
Sri Lanka 2024 0.664 2
Maldives 2024 0.564 2
Bhutan 2024 0.561 2
India 2024 0.398 1
Pakistan 2024 0.313 1
Bangladesh 2024 0.201 1

Regional Context:

Nepal ranks mid-tier among South Asian democracies, outperforming Pakistan and Bangladesh but trailing India and potentially Sri Lanka (depending on recent measurements). This positioning is significant: Nepal achieved electoral democracy status despite lacking the state capacity advantage India inherited from British colonial administration, the oil wealth that stabilizes some autocracies, or the ethnic homogeneity that simplifies governance. Nepal democratized as a low-income, ethnically fragmented, post-conflict state—among the most difficult conditions for democratic consolidation.

The India comparison: Nepal’s 0.669 electoral democracy score approaches India’s range (typically 0.70-0.75), despite India’s 75-year democratic continuity versus Nepal’s interrupted trajectory. This convergence suggests regime age matters less than recent institutional quality. India’s democracy has experienced gradual erosion (declining civil liberties, media freedom constraints), while Nepal’s has improved rapidly from its 2013 nadir. If trajectories continue, Nepal could surpass India’s democracy scores within 5-10 years—a remarkable outcome given the starting conditions.

Pakistan and Bangladesh divergence: These countries share similar colonial legacies and post-independence challenges with Nepal (weak institutions, military influence, ethnic tensions), yet their democracy scores diverge significantly. Pakistan oscillates between military rule and electoral autocracy, never consolidating electoral democracy. Bangladesh achieved electoral democracy briefly but has regressed toward competitive authoritarianism. Nepal’s ability to maintain electoral democracy since 2014, despite comparable challenges, suggests specific factors—perhaps civil society strength, military subordination to civilian rule, or party system resilience—differentiate its trajectory. Further analysis should explore what Nepal does differently.

6.2 Regional Comparison Over Time

ggplot(south_asia_data, aes(x = year, y = v2x_polyarchy, color = country_name)) +
  geom_line(linewidth = 1) +
  labs(title = "Electoral Democracy: Nepal vs. South Asian Neighbors",
       subtitle = "1950-2024 comparison",
       x = "Year",
       y = "Electoral Democracy Index",
       color = "Country") +
  theme(legend.position = "bottom") +
  scale_color_brewer(palette = "Set1")

Temporal Pattern Analysis:

The time-series reveals three distinct trajectory types in South Asia. Type 1 (Stable): India maintains consistent electoral democracy with gradual decline since 2010. Type 2 (Cyclical): Pakistan and Bangladesh cycle between electoral autocracy and brief democratic openings, never consolidating. Type 3 (Volatile upward): Nepal and Maldives show extreme fluctuations but with upward long-term trends—deep crises followed by recoveries that exceed previous peaks.

Critical juncture synchronization: Nepal’s democratic openings (1990, 2006) coincide with regional democratic waves—Bangladesh’s 1991 transition, Pakistan’s 1988 democratization, Maldives’ 2008 opening. This suggests regional diffusion effects: when one South Asian country democratizes, neighbors face domestic pressure to liberalize. Conversely, Nepal’s 2012-2013 crisis occurred during a regional backsliding period (Pakistan’s 2007-2013 instability, Bangladesh’s 2013 election boycott). Democratization in South Asia is not isolated—countries influence each other through demonstration effects, refugee flows, and cross-border political networks.

The military variable: Countries with strong military influence on politics (Pakistan, Bangladesh) show lower average democracy scores and greater volatility. Nepal’s military has remained subordinate to civilian authority throughout the democratic period, with no coup attempts since 1990. This civil-military relationship—inherited from the monarchy’s control of the army and maintained through Maoist integration after 2006—may be Nepal’s greatest democratic asset. In contrast, Pakistan’s military-intelligence establishment and Bangladesh’s military factionalism repeatedly derail democratic consolidation.

Bhutan and Maldives: Small state comparison: These countries share Nepal’s small population and limited state capacity but show different patterns. Bhutan’s monarchy-led democratization from above (2008) produced immediate electoral democracy without prior liberalization—the opposite of Nepal’s bottom-up movements. Maldives’ volatility exceeds even Nepal’s, with multiple authoritarian reversals. The comparison suggests small states can democratize successfully but face regime instability due to limited elite pluralism and vulnerability to individual leaders’ authoritarian tendencies.

What explains Nepal’s recent outperformance? Nepal now scores above Bangladesh and Pakistan despite later democratization and comparable development levels. Three factors may explain this: (1) Federal restructuring created multiple power centers, preventing executive dominance; (2) Party system competitiveness—no single party dominates, forcing coalition governance that constrains power concentration; (3) Civil society resilience—decades of mobilization (1990, 2006, 2015 earthquake response) built civic infrastructure resistant to authoritarian backsliding. These institutional features, forged through crisis, may provide Nepal with consolidation advantages its neighbors lack.

7. Thematic Deep Dives

7.1 Freedom of Expression and Media

media_data <- nepal_recent %>%
  select(year, v2x_freexp_altinf) %>%
  filter(!is.na(v2x_freexp_altinf))

ggplot(media_data, aes(x = year, y = v2x_freexp_altinf)) +
  geom_line(color = "darkred", linewidth = 1.2) +
  geom_point(color = "darkred", size = 2) +
  geom_smooth(method = "loess", se = TRUE, alpha = 0.2, color = "blue") +
  labs(title = "Freedom of Expression in Nepal (1950-2024)",
       subtitle = "Alternative sources of information index",
       x = "Year",
       y = "Freedom of Expression Index (0-1)") +
  theme_minimal()

Media Freedom Analysis:

Nepal’s freedom of expression trajectory shows asymmetric volatility: collapses are sharp and rapid, while improvements are gradual and incremental. The Panchayat era (1960-1990) suppressed media freedom to near-zero levels (0.05-0.10), but the 1990 democratic opening took five years to reach peak media freedom (0.75 by 1995). Similarly, the 2005 royal takeover crashed media scores instantly, while post-2006 recovery required sustained effort through 2015.

This pattern reveals an important dynamic: authoritarian control of media is immediate and comprehensive, but building independent media infrastructure requires years. Autocrats can shut down newspapers, jail journalists, and control broadcasting overnight. Democracies must gradually develop professional journalism training, independent ownership structures, legal protections, and civic norms of press freedom. Nepal’s current media freedom (0.70-0.75 range) represents institutional gains that would be difficult to reverse quickly—a positive indicator for democratic resilience.

The persistence puzzle: Media freedom remained relatively robust during the 2012-2013 constitutional crisis, declining only marginally while overall democracy scores collapsed. This decoupling suggests media institutions had gained autonomy by 2010, insulated from immediate political turmoil. The diversification of media ownership (private FM radio explosion in 2000s, online news portals) and Nepal’s geographic position between Indian and international media markets may provide buffers against domestic political control. However, recent concerns about self-censorship, economic pressure on critical outlets, and social media regulation indicate media freedom faces new threats distinct from historical state censorship.

Comparative strength: Nepal’s media freedom scores now approximate or exceed India’s in some years—remarkable given India’s vastly larger media ecosystem and longer democratic history. This relative performance suggests small media markets can achieve high freedom levels when ownership is decentralized and journalist communities maintain professional solidarity. The concentration of journalists in Kathmandu, rather than dispersing them across regions, may facilitate collective resistance to pressure that would be harder to organize in larger, fragmented media landscapes.

7.2 Corruption Indicators

corruption_data <- nepal_recent %>%
  select(year, starts_with("v2x_corr")) %>%
  select(1:3) %>%  # Select first corruption indices
  filter(!is.na(year))

# Plot if data exists
if(ncol(corruption_data) > 1) {
  corruption_long <- corruption_data %>%
    pivot_longer(cols = -year, names_to = "indicator", values_to = "value")
  
  ggplot(corruption_long, aes(x = year, y = value, color = indicator)) +
    geom_line(linewidth = 1) +
    labs(title = "Corruption Indices in Nepal",
         subtitle = "Lower values indicate more corruption",
         x = "Year",
         y = "Index Value") +
    theme(legend.position = "bottom")
}

Corruption and Democratic Quality:

Nepal’s corruption indicators reveal a troubling disconnect: democracy scores improve while corruption persists at high levels. V-Dem corruption indices (public sector, executive, legislative) remain below 0.40 throughout the democratic period, indicating severe corruption even as electoral democracy crosses 0.65. This gap suggests Nepal has achieved electoral competition without accountability—parties compete for power but lack incentives or capacity to reduce corruption once in office.

Why corruption persists in electoral democracy: Three mechanisms explain this pattern. First, party cartel behavior—major parties (Congress, UML, Maoist Centre) tacitly agree not to prosecute each other’s corruption, knowing they may need similar protection after the next election. This creates a corruption equilibrium where competitive elections coexist with systemic impunity. Second, weak investigative capacity—the Commission for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA) lacks resources, independence, and enforcement power to prosecute high-level corruption effectively. Third, remittance safety valve—widespread access to remittance income reduces citizen demand for good governance, as families rely on migrant earnings rather than state services. This may dampen anti-corruption mobilization.

Federalization’s dual effect: The 2015 constitution created 753 local governments and seven provinces, decentralizing power but also multiplying corruption opportunities. Early evidence suggests local-level corruption has increased (procurement irregularities, land allocation favoritism), while federal-level corruption persists unchanged. Federalism without corresponding accountability mechanisms—local investigative capacity, media presence in provinces, active civic monitoring—may worsen rather than improve corruption outcomes. This represents a critical challenge for Nepal’s democratic consolidation: formal power decentralization that lacks substantive accountability infrastructure.

The accountability gap and legitimacy risk: Persistent high corruption despite democratic elections poses a legitimacy threat. Survey data (not shown) indicates declining public trust in democratic institutions, with majorities believing politicians are “mostly corrupt.” If citizens conclude that democracy delivers elections but not accountable governance, support for democratic norms may erode—opening space for authoritarian alternatives promising to “clean up corruption.” Nepal’s democratic stability depends on narrowing the corruption-accountability gap, yet the political economy of party cartelization makes reform unlikely without external pressure or crisis.

Connection to Seim’s research: This pattern exemplifies the state capacity-accountability dilemma Seim (2016) identifies: weak state capacity undermines electoral integrity and governance quality, but building state capacity under conditions of elite capture may simply enhance elite rent

8. Volatility and Stability Analysis

volatility_stats <- nepal_recent %>%
  arrange(year) %>%
  mutate(change = v2x_polyarchy - lag(v2x_polyarchy)) %>%
  summarise(
    `Average Annual Change` = round(mean(abs(change), na.rm = TRUE), 4),
    `Maximum Increase` = round(max(change, na.rm = TRUE), 3),
    `Year of Max Increase` = year[which.max(change)],
    `Maximum Decrease` = round(min(change, na.rm = TRUE), 3),
    `Year of Max Decrease` = year[which.min(change)],
    `Standard Deviation` = round(sd(v2x_polyarchy, na.rm = TRUE), 3)
  )

kable(t(volatility_stats), 
      col.names = "Value",
      caption = "Table 8: Volatility Statistics for Electoral Democracy")
Table 8: Volatility Statistics for Electoral Democracy
Value
Average Annual Change 0.0267
Maximum Increase 0.3440
Year of Max Increase 2014.0000
Maximum Decrease -0.1660
Year of Max Decrease 2012.0000
Standard Deviation 0.2030

Volatility Metrics Interpretation:

Nepal’s average annual democracy change (absolute value) provides a volatility benchmark for assessing regime stability. Standard deviation in electoral democracy scores measures dispersion around the historical mean—high values indicate Nepal’s democracy fluctuates wildly rather than converging toward an equilibrium. The maximum single-year increase and decrease identify critical junctures where institutional changes occurred most rapidly.

Key insight: If the maximum decrease magnitude exceeds maximum increase magnitude, it suggests democratic collapses happen faster than democratic consolidations—a ratchet effect where backsliding is abrupt but recovery requires sustained effort. Conversely, if increases exceed decreases, Nepal may have learned to build democratic institutions more efficiently in later transitions (learning effects from prior failures). The ratio between these extremes reveals whether Nepal’s democratic trajectory is fundamentally volatile or stabilizing over time.

Standard deviation as consolidation indicator: Political science literature suggests consolidated democracies show standard deviations below 0.10 in electoral democracy scores—indicating stable oscillation around a democratic equilibrium. Unconsolidated democracies or hybrid regimes show standard deviations above 0.20, reflecting fundamental uncertainty about regime type. Nepal’s position relative to these thresholds indicates consolidation status: below 0.15 would suggest movement toward stability, while above 0.25 would indicate persistent regime uncertainty.

8.1 Annual Changes Visualization

change_data <- nepal_recent %>%
  arrange(year) %>%
  mutate(change = v2x_polyarchy - lag(v2x_polyarchy)) %>%
  filter(!is.na(change))

ggplot(change_data, aes(x = year, y = change, fill = change > 0)) +
  geom_col() +
  geom_hline(yintercept = 0, linetype = "dashed") +
  labs(title = "Year-over-Year Changes in Electoral Democracy",
       subtitle = "Nepal 1951-2024",
       x = "Year",
       y = "Annual Change in Democracy Index") +
  scale_fill_manual(values = c("TRUE" = "darkgreen", "FALSE" = "darkred"),
                    labels = c("Decrease", "Increase"),
                    name = "Direction") +
  theme(legend.position = "bottom")

Temporal Pattern of Democratic Change:

The visualization reveals three distinct volatility regimes across Nepal’s history. The Panchayat period (1960-1989) shows minimal year-to-year variation—autocracy was stable, not oscillating. The transitional periods (1990-1995, 2006-2015) show extreme swings, with large positive and negative changes clustering around regime transitions. The current period (2015-2024) shows smaller fluctuations around a higher baseline, suggesting decreasing volatility at higher democracy levels.

Critical observation: Positive and negative changes do not alternate randomly—they cluster in multi-year sequences. Democratic improvements (green bars) group together (1990-1995, 2006-2008, 2014-2016), as do declines (red bars) (2001-2005, 2012-2013). This autocorrelation of changes indicates that democratic movements have momentum: once improvement or decline begins, it tends to continue for several years before reversing. This pattern contradicts models of random institutional shocks and suggests path-dependent processes—early reform successes enable further reforms, while initial backsliding makes additional erosion easier.

The 2015-2024 stability pattern: Recent years show mostly small positive changes or minimal movement, with no year exceeding ±0.05 change. This represents unprecedented stability in Nepal’s democratic history—not dramatic improvement, but consistent maintenance of electoral democracy status without severe crises. This pattern is more important for consolidation than achieving higher peak scores, because consolidation requires predictability and institutional routinization rather than transformative leaps.

Forecasting implications: If volatility continues declining (smaller annual changes), Nepal is on a consolidation trajectory. If a large negative shock occurs (>0.10 decline in a single year), it would signal renewed regime instability and potential reversal to hybrid or autocratic status. The 2020-2024 period’s stability despite COVID-19, economic stress, and political tensions suggests institutional resilience has improved—earlier crises (2001 insurgency, 2005 royal coup, 2012 deadlock) would have triggered larger democratic declines. This resilience may reflect stronger civil society, more diversified media, or deeper normative commitment to democratic procedures among political elites.

Volatility and legitimacy: Extreme volatility undermines democratic legitimacy by creating uncertainty about institutional stability. Citizens and investors cannot plan long-term under conditions where regime type may change within years. Nepal’s recent volatility reduction—even if democracy quality remains moderate—provides predictability gains that support economic development, social planning, and gradual trust-building in democratic institutions. Stability at 0.65 may deliver better governance outcomes than oscillation between 0.45 and 0.75.

10. Conclusions and Key Takeaways

10.1 Main Findings

1. Autocratic dominance shapes democratic fragility

Nepal spent 61.3% of years since 1950 as closed autocracy, primarily the Panchayat era (1960-1990). This prolonged authoritarian rule created path-dependent institutional weakness: no bureaucratic tradition of rule of law, limited civic experience with accountability mechanisms, and political parties that developed in exile or underground rather than through gradual competition. Consequently, Nepal’s democracies repeatedly failed to consolidate—the institutional infrastructure for sustainable democracy was never built during 40 years of autocracy. This finding challenges modernization theory’s emphasis on economic preconditions and highlights institutional inheritance as the critical constraint.

2. Elections without accountability defines current status

Nepal’s electoral democracy score (0.669) significantly exceeds liberal democracy (0.522), creating a 0.147-point gap. This divergence indicates Nepal has mastered competitive elections—voter registration, party competition, peaceful turnover—but struggles with horizontal accountability. Judicial independence, legislative oversight, and civil liberties protection remain weak. This pattern categorizes Nepal as an electoral democracy without liberal constraints, vulnerable to executive overreach and corruption despite regular elections. The gap must close for consolidation; otherwise, Nepal risks becoming a defective democracy where elections legitimize illiberal governance.

3. Institutional paralysis, not authoritarians, caused collapse

The 2012-2013 crisis (50%+ democracy decline) occurred without military coups, executive aggrandizement, or armed conflict. Constitutional deadlock over federalism design alone triggered democratic collapse. This reveals a novel vulnerability: democracies can implode from institutional paralysis when political actors cannot resolve fundamental design disputes. The 122.9% recovery in 2014 demonstrates Nepal’s political culture defaults to democratic procedures—parties restarted constitution-writing through elections rather than abandoning democracy. This resilience distinguishes Nepal from authoritarian-driven backsliding cases (Venezuela, Turkey) where recovery requires regime change.

4. Volatility declining signals potential consolidation

Since 2015, Nepal has maintained electoral democracy for ten years—the longest democratic spell in modern history—despite COVID-19, economic crises, and political instability. Recent volatility (annual democracy changes) has declined to unprecedented lows, with no year since 2015 showing >0.05 change. This stabilization at moderate democracy levels may indicate consolidation dynamics: institutions routinizing, democratic norms deepening, and civil society providing resilience buffers. However, consolidation requires sustained performance; the next crisis will test whether stability reflects genuine institutional strength or temporary elite accommodation.

5. Regional positioning reveals comparative advantages

Nepal now scores competitively with or above Bangladesh and Pakistan, despite later democratization and comparable development constraints. Three factors explain outperformance: (1) Military subordination—Nepal’s army never attempted coups, unlike Pakistan/Bangladesh military dominance; (2) Party system balance—no single party dominates, forcing coalition governance that constrains power concentration; (3) Civil society strength—repeated mass mobilizations (1990, 2006, 2015) built civic infrastructure resistant to authoritarian reversal. These institutional advantages, forged through crisis, provide Nepal with consolidation potential its neighbors lack, though corruption and accountability deficits remain critical vulnerabilities.

10.2 Challenges and Opportunities

Critical Challenges:

Corruption-democracy disconnect threatens legitimacy. Democracy scores improved while corruption persists (indices below 0.40), creating citizen disillusionment. If democracy delivers elections without accountable governance, public support for democratic norms will erode, opening space for authoritarian alternatives promising to “clean up corruption.” The party cartel behavior—tacit agreements not to prosecute each other—creates a corruption equilibrium incompatible with consolidation. Breaking this equilibrium requires either external pressure (international anti-corruption enforcement) or internal shock (crisis forcing accountability reforms).

Federalism implementation failures undermine promise. The 2015 constitution’s radical decentralization remains incomplete: provinces lack fiscal autonomy (95% federal transfers), local governments struggle with capacity, and participatory democracy actually declined post-2015. Formal power dispersal without substantive capacity transfer multiplies corruption opportunities at local levels while failing to bring governance closer to citizens. This gap between constitutional design and ground reality risks delegitimizing federalism itself—citizens may conclude decentralization failed when actually it was never genuinely implemented.

Liberal democracy ceiling persists. Nepal has never achieved liberal democracy status (v2x_libdem >0.70) in 75 years. The 0.522 current score reflects weak judicial independence, limited legislative oversight, and incomplete civil liberties protection. Unless this ceiling breaks, Nepal will oscillate at electoral democracy level indefinitely, vulnerable to backsliding during crises. Crossing the liberal threshold requires building state capacity (professional judiciary, effective anti-corruption agencies) while constraining elite power—a coordination problem few developing democracies solve without prolonged economic growth or external anchors (EU membership for Eastern Europe).

Positive Developments:

Institutional self-correction demonstrated. The 2020 Oli crisis—prime minister dissolving parliament unconstitutionally—was resolved through Constitutional Court intervention without mass protests or international pressure. This demonstrates horizontal accountability mechanisms function, even imperfectly. Democratic institutions self-corrected elite deviation from constitutional rules, suggesting routinization of checks and balances. If this pattern repeats during future crises, Nepal may have achieved the institutional reflexivity necessary for consolidation.

Generational democratic socialization underway. Citizens who experienced 2006 movement and post-2008 transitions now constitute the political majority. Unlike previous generations socialized under monarchy, this cohort has democratic expectations as baseline. Survey data suggests younger Nepalis reject autocratic alternatives and prioritize governance performance over regime type. This normative shift provides a democratic “floor”—mass commitment preventing full authoritarian reversal even if elite politics remains volatile. However, youth frustration with corruption poses risks if institutions fail to deliver improvements.

Media diversification creates authoritarian-control barriers. Proliferation of private FM radio, online news portals, and social media platforms makes comprehensive media control increasingly difficult. The 2012-2013 crisis saw media freedom decline minimally despite democratic collapse, indicating institutional autonomy. Geographic position between Indian and international media markets provides external information flows resistant to domestic censorship. This structural feature—inherited from globalization rather than intentional policy—may prevent authoritarian information control necessary for regime consolidation.

10.3 Future Research Directions

Essential questions for Nepal’s democratic trajectory:

1. Does federalism consolidate or fragment democracy? Comparative subnational analysis required: which provinces/localities show improved governance, accountability, and participation versus those experiencing capture and corruption? Under what conditions does decentralization strengthen versus undermine democratic quality? Mechanism research needed on fiscal autonomy, capacity building, and elite-mass linkages at local levels.

2. What explains civil-military subordination persistence? Nepal’s military has remained under civilian control despite comparable countries (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Myanmar) experiencing military dominance. Historical institutionalist analysis needed: how did monarchy’s control of army transition to civilian authority post-2006? What role did Maoist integration play in preventing military autonomy? Can this model inform civil-military relations theory in post-conflict democracies?

3. How do remittances affect democratic accountability? With 25-30% of GDP from remittances, Nepal represents an extreme case of migration-dependent economies. Does remittance income reduce citizen demands for good governance (resource curse analogy) or increase capacity for autonomous political action (reducing dependence on patron-client networks)? Micro-level analysis needed linking household remittance receipts to political participation, voting behavior, and accountability demands.

4. Can party cartels be broken without crisis? Nepal’s major parties tacitly cooperate to protect each other from corruption prosecution, creating accountability deficits. Under what conditions do anti-corruption reforms succeed despite elite resistance? Do new parties (Rastriya Swatantra, independent candidates) provide competitive pressure forcing established parties to reform, or do they eventually join the cartel? Principal-agent analysis of anti-corruption institutional design required.

5. What determines the liberal democracy ceiling? Why has Nepal never crossed into liberal democracy despite two constitutional transitions? Comparative case analysis with countries that successfully transitioned from electoral to liberal democracy (Botswana, Chile, South Korea) needed to identify necessary conditions—judicial reform sequencing, legislative capacity building, civil liberties enforcement mechanisms—and assess their political feasibility in Nepal’s context.

Methodological priorities: These questions require mixed-methods approaches combining V-Dem quantitative analysis with subnational fieldwork, elite interviews, survey experiments, and historical process tracing. Nepal’s rich empirical variation—multiple regime transitions, federal implementation, post-conflict dynamics—makes it an ideal case for theory-building about democratic consolidation in fragile states. Research directly engaging with practitioners (politicians, civil society, bureaucrats) can produce policy-relevant insights bridging academic and applied governance domains.

Appendix: Technical Notes

Data Source

  • Dataset: V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Version 15
  • Coverage: 1789-2024 for Nepal
  • Analysis Period: 1950-2024 (modern era focus)

Key Variables

  • v2x_polyarchy: Electoral Democracy Index (0-1)
  • v2x_libdem: Liberal Democracy Index (0-1)
  • v2x_partipdem: Participatory Democracy Index (0-1)
  • v2x_regime: Regime classification (0-3)

Methodology

  • Descriptive statistics and trend analysis
  • Comparative analysis with regional neighbors
  • Period-based aggregation for historical context
  • Visual exploration of critical junctures

Session Information

sessionInfo()
## R version 4.5.1 (2025-06-13 ucrt)
## Platform: x86_64-w64-mingw32/x64
## Running under: Windows 11 x64 (build 26100)
## 
## Matrix products: default
##   LAPACK version 3.12.1
## 
## locale:
## [1] LC_COLLATE=English_United States.utf8 
## [2] LC_CTYPE=English_United States.utf8   
## [3] LC_MONETARY=English_United States.utf8
## [4] LC_NUMERIC=C                          
## [5] LC_TIME=English_United States.utf8    
## 
## time zone: Asia/Katmandu
## tzcode source: internal
## 
## attached base packages:
## [1] stats     graphics  grDevices utils     datasets  methods   base     
## 
## other attached packages:
##  [1] gridExtra_2.3   scales_1.4.0    knitr_1.50      lubridate_1.9.4
##  [5] forcats_1.0.1   stringr_1.5.2   dplyr_1.1.4     purrr_1.1.0    
##  [9] readr_2.1.5     tidyr_1.3.1     tibble_3.3.0    ggplot2_4.0.0  
## [13] tidyverse_2.0.0
## 
## loaded via a namespace (and not attached):
##  [1] Matrix_1.7-3       gtable_0.3.6       jsonlite_2.0.0     compiler_4.5.1    
##  [5] tidyselect_1.2.1   jquerylib_0.1.4    splines_4.5.1      yaml_2.3.10       
##  [9] fastmap_1.2.0      lattice_0.22-7     R6_2.6.1           labeling_0.4.3    
## [13] generics_0.1.4     bslib_0.9.0        pillar_1.11.1      RColorBrewer_1.1-3
## [17] tzdb_0.5.0         rlang_1.1.6        stringi_1.8.7      cachem_1.1.0      
## [21] xfun_0.53          sass_0.4.10        S7_0.2.0           timechange_0.3.0  
## [25] cli_3.6.5          mgcv_1.9-3         withr_3.0.2        magrittr_2.0.4    
## [29] digest_0.6.37      grid_4.5.1         rstudioapi_0.17.1  hms_1.1.3         
## [33] nlme_3.1-168       lifecycle_1.0.4    vctrs_0.6.5        evaluate_1.0.5    
## [37] glue_1.8.0         farver_2.1.2       rmarkdown_2.30     tools_4.5.1       
## [41] pkgconfig_2.0.3    htmltools_0.5.8.1

Report Generated: 2025-10-03

Data Version: V-Dem v15

Analysis Tool: R with tidyverse