Croissant and Haynes (2021)1 argue Asia is one of the central arenas of contemporary autocratisation.

We can see a variety of political regimes, ranging from the democratic (e.g. India) to the hybrid (e.g. Thailand) and the autocratic (e.g. Cambodia) undergoing autocratisation.

##Examining the rise and fall of electoral democracy scores in Asia

One reason why we should focus on Asia: it is a principal theatre of multipolar geopolitical competition (China, Russia, US)(Fong, 20??)

Puzzle # 1 why are some countries autocratising in Asia and others are not?

Puzzle # 2 are international or domestic factors able to explain variation in level of militarisation? I.E. What accounts for more variation? Domestic factors such as over-sized role of strongmen in political fabric of the state? Or international factors such as the role of China and Russia in diffusing / socialising anti-democratic norms?

Puzzle # 3 Militarisation is not a unitary concept - we can divide it into material, political and social militarisation. Which aspects of militarisation are related to auocratisation? Are they mediated by domestic or international factors?

International correlates: authoritarian black knights

Students of comparative democratization debate whether global powers like Russia and China have been “rolling back” democracy and engaging in “authoritarianism promotion” (cf. Gat, 2007)

Policy analysts have expressed particular concern about an “authoritarian resurgence” (Diamond, 20??). Scholars associate stagnant democratisation with non-democratic powers (most prominently China and Russia) within a changing world order (Kagan 2008, Puddington 2008).

Brownlee (2016: 1326) argues that authoritarian powers have regionally shored up existing regimes, rather than globally subverting democracy. Brownlee (2016) argues that democracy has remained tenuous in lower-income countries, and democratic breakdowns have owed more to unfavourable local conditions than predacious external actors.

Weyland

Operationalising international drivers of autocratisation: - Foreign aid from Russia, China, US, EU - FDI from Russia, China, US, EU - Trade volume with Russia, China, US, EU(Data: Gravity) - Similarity UN voting from Russia, China, US, EU (UNGA vote records)

NB READ AND ADD TO LIT REVIEW Some commentators have recently suggested that a clear causal link exists between the rise of authoritarian powers such as China and Russia, and another trend according to which, on a global scale, democracy is no longer progressing as it was in the 1990s. In fact, democracy was on the retreat in 2010s (Puddington 2007, Diamond 2008, Kagan 2008).

In the case of China, for example, it has been argued that ‘[its] foreign policy is more mercantilist then pro-authoritarian’ (Carothers 2009). China has much to gain from reliable economic ties with both neighbouring countries and resource exporters worldwide – but why should autocratic rule, such as in Myanmar and North Korea, be an asset in that regard?

  • Julia Bader, Jörn Grävingholt and Antje Kästner, ‘Would autocracies promote autocracy? A political economy perspective on regime-type export in regional neighbourhoods’, Contemporary Politics 16: 1, 2010, pp. 81–100,

  • Marianne Kneuer and Thomas Demmelhuber, ‘Gravity centres of authoritarian rule: a conceptual approach’, Democratization 23: 5, 2016, pp. 775–96

  • Stephen G. F. Hall and Thomas Ambrosio, ‘Authoritarian learning: a conceptual overview’, East European Politics 33: 2, 2017, pp. 143–61

  • Antje Kästner, ‘Autocracy promotion’, in Wolfgang Merkel, Raj Kollmorgen and Hans-Jürgen Wagener, eds, The handbook of political, social, and economic transformation (Oxford: Oxford Academic, 2019).

Material, political and social militarization

Examining different types of militarization and international variables

Material Militarization

First graph looks at the relationship between average tradeflows with China and average MATERIAL militarization levels.

Material Militarization includes variables related to expenditure, personnel, and heavy weapons.

Next graph looks at the relationship between average tradeflows with US and average material militarization levels.

## Warning: Removed 1 row containing non-finite outside the scale range
## (`stat_smooth()`).

Direct comparison side by side

Next graph looks at the relationship between average levels of diplomatic disagreement with China and average material militarization levels.

## Warning: Removed 2 rows containing non-finite outside the scale range
## (`stat_smooth()`).

Next graph looks at the relationship between average levels of diplomatic disagreement with US and average material militarization levels.

Social Militarisation

Next we look at social militarisation

Social Militarization comprises recruitment, military policing, and economic influence of the military.

Next graph looks at the relationship between average tradeflows with US and average material militarization levels.

## Warning: Removed 2 rows containing non-finite outside the scale range
## (`stat_smooth()`).

Next graph looks at the relationship between average levels of diplomatic disagreement with China and average material militarization levels.

## Warning: Removed 3 rows containing non-finite outside the scale range
## (`stat_smooth()`).

Graph the relationship between average levels of diplomatic disagreement with America and average material militarization levels.

## Warning: Removed 2 rows containing non-finite outside the scale range
## (`stat_smooth()`).

Political Militarisation

Finally we look at political militarisation

Political Militarization includes elite recruitment, veto power, and repression-related variables.

Next graph looks at the relationship between average tradeflows with US and average material militarization levels.

## Warning: Removed 2 rows containing non-finite outside the scale range
## (`stat_smooth()`).

Next graph looks at the relationship between average levels of diplomatic disagreement with China and average material militarization levels.

## Warning: Removed 3 rows containing non-finite outside the scale range
## (`stat_smooth()`).

## Warning: Removed 2 rows containing non-finite outside the scale range
## (`stat_smooth()`).

Domestic correlates

The domestically driven explanation highlights ‘domestic drivers’, namely autocratic strongmen’s executive aggrandizement or promissory coups, as the primary cause of autocratization (cf. Fong, DATE: PAGE)

Level of military / strongman rule Executive aggrandizement Promissory coup

Fong (2023: PAGE) argues executive aggrandizement appears in countries which hold regular multiparty elections, where elected strongmen rise to power by way of inflaming divisions within their countries.

(EXAMINE POLARISATION?)

By virtue of their electoral mandate, these elected strongmen claim overriding power by steadily weakening check-and-balance mechanisms such as legislatures and judiciaries in the absence of a change in government

Barmeo (2016: 8) argues that in a promissory coup, an incumbent elected government is deposed in a coup d’etat by coup leaders who claim to defend democracy and promise to hold elections to restore democracy. In these situations, coup-makers emphasise the temporary and necessary nature of their intervention to ensure democracy in the future (e.g. Thailand?)

For literature of domestically driven explanation, see Bermeo, ‘On democratic backsliding’; Milan W. Svolik, ‘Polarization versus democracy’, Journal of Democracy 30: 3, 2019, pp. 20–32; Roberto Stefan Foa, ‘Why strongmen win in weak states’, Journal of Democracy 32: 1, 2021, pp. 52–65; Haggard and Kaufman, ‘The anatomy of democratic backsliding’.

Comparing Asian countries on tradeflow

Comparing Asian countries on Diplomatic Disagreement

Regression output

First we will look at international variables that are related to the three different types of militarisation

Tradeflow

tinytable_eynbhsufqw7gx68vk2my
Types of Militarization
Material Political Social
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All independent variables lagged by two years
All independent variables exponentiated
China Tradeflow 0.003 0.003 -0.009
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
Russia Tradeflow -0.018** 0.015*** -0.025***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007)
US Tradeflow 0.023* -0.031*** 0.009
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010)
Num.Obs. 3351 3351 3351
R2 0.009 0.035 0.028
R2 Adj. -0.039 -0.011 -0.019
AIC 7367.3 3869.6 7253.7
BIC 7391.7 3894.0 7278.2
RMSE 0.73 0.43 0.71
Std.Errors Custom Custom Custom

UN Diplomatic Disagreement

tinytable_n45bx5rivkh5a7b39ezl
Types of Militarization
Material Political Social
+ p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001
All independent variables lagged by two years
All independent variables exponentiated
China UN Disagreement -0.114+ -0.014 0.212**
(0.065) (0.040) (0.066)
Russia UN Disagreement -0.593*** 0.076* -0.286***
(0.057) (0.035) (0.057)
US UN Disagreement 0.411*** -0.094+ 0.132
(0.087) (0.053) (0.088)
Num.Obs. 3351 3351 3351
R2 0.036 0.002 0.010
R2 Adj. -0.010 -0.046 -0.037
AIC 7274.1 3982.8 7314.5
BIC 7298.6 4007.3 7339.0
RMSE 0.72 0.44 0.72
Std.Errors Custom Custom Custom

Interpreting and comparing AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) and RMSE (Root Mean Square Error):

Lower AIC and RMSE are better. The Political model appears to be the best model.

AIC = useful when comparing models with the same dependent variable, as it accounts for model complexity. A simple model with a marginally higher RMSE might still be preferable if it has a much lower AIC.

RMSE = useful for understanding the actual average deviation of the model’s predictions from the observed values, which can be particularly intuitive in terms of the units of the dependent variable.

Bader et al (2010: 84) highlights concepts of (neo-)patrimonialism have been employed to explain the resilience of autocratic rule, implicitly also contributing to a better understanding of why transitory regimes that seem to have opened up for democratisation may fall back into authoritarian equilibria (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003, Erdmann and Engel 2007, Schlumberger 2008)

References

  1. Croissant, A., & Haynes, J. (2021). Democratic regression in Asia: introduction. Democratization, 28(1), 1-21.↩︎