Evidence from a Voucher Lottery
Standard Static Labor Supply Model
In-kind / Cash transfer?
How it constrains consumption?
Complement or substitute to leisure?
(Murray, 1980; Leonesio, 1988; Shroder, 2002; Moffitt, 2002)
Maintain min. level of consumption?
(Schone, 1992)
Reduce the price of complements to work?
Residential stability
Neighborhood quality
Proximity to job
Welfare to Work (Gubits et al., 2006)
TANF recipients only (Temporary Assistance for Needy Families)
Eligibility determined by local housing agencies
Chicago Housing Authority Corporation, Inc. (CHAC) 1997
Eligibility: Income (~$14,000), Family size
Random positions on the waiting list
Subsidy:
Fair Market Rent — Family’s contribution(30% adj. income)
Max. FRM: 50th percentile of local private market rent (~$12,000)
82,607 applied, 18,110 received by 2003
Top 35,000 were notified the number and told would receive in 3yr
Sample: 90 % applicants living in private-market housing
Treatment: received voucher (1~18,110)
Control: told would not get (35,000~) 30,662
Exclusion: expecting to get but not getting (18,110~35,000)
Low take-up: half of the treatment did not use it
Baseline: Income ~$14,000 Rent ~$8,160
~Subsidy $8,265 = FMR $12,000 — Contribution $3,735
Pre-lottery
CHAC application (household head)
Illinois Dept of Human Service (other family members)
Voucher utilization
Labor participation
Social assistance
Residential location
\[ y_{it} = \alpha + \beta_1(PostOffer_{it}) + \beta_2(PreOffer_{it}) + X\Gamma + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it}. \]
Landlords were not willing to deal with paperwork
Limited time to lease an unit
Assume vouchers do not affect who choose not to take it
\[ Leased_{it} = \alpha + \theta_1(PostOffer_{it}) + \theta_2(PreOffer_{it}) + X\Gamma + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it}. \]
\[ y_{it} = \alpha + \pi_1(Leased_{it}) + X\Gamma + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it}. \]
Include those who used it then gave it up (out of eligibility)
Include other voucher allocations (8% of control HHs)
Disadvantaged HHs are more likely to lease up
Larger impacts among
Women (lower baseline employment among men)
Non-social benefits recipients (full marginal tax rate)
\[ y_{it} = \alpha + \delta_k(\sum_{k} D_{it}^k) + X\Gamma + \gamma_t + \epsilon_{it}. \]
Time-sensitive behavioral responses
Fraction of HHs that have leased up
Changes in the economy condition
Reject “disruption” account
Anticipation effect increased labor participation
Not work enhancing
Increase in pre-voucher labor supply
Consistent with life-cycle labor supply model
Work more when the expected wage rate is high
Defer moving until receiving offers
Generaliable to other in-kind transfers
Leaky bucket
Perception of gains or losses? (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979)
Anticipatory utility? (Loewenstein, 1985)