Taboo Transactions: Informed/Uninformed X Rational/Irrational Seller
Background
In a 2 (informed vs. uninformed) X 2 (rational vs. irrational) between-subjects design, participants read about one of three taboo transactions (cancerous cell-phone tower; storing hazardous chemicals; testing beauty products for side effects) and were asked to indicate to what extent the seller benefited from each of them, to what extent the buyer benefited from each of them, and the power balance in each of them.
Attention check
What are the roles of Person A and Person B in the transaction
that took place?
The correct answer is: Person A paid money and Person B received
money
## `summarise()` has grouped output by 'informed', 'rational'. You can override
## using the `.groups` argument.| informed | rational | failcheck | passcheck |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 7 | 47 |
| 0 | 1 | 0 | 47 |
| 1 | 0 | 5 | 42 |
| 1 | 1 | 1 | 51 |
Ok, not bad. Pretty evenly distributed eligible participants across conditions. And we’re left 187.
Demographics
Race
| race | N | Perc |
|---|---|---|
| asian | 14 | 7.49 |
| black | 14 | 7.49 |
| hispanic | 11 | 5.88 |
| multiracial | 5 | 2.67 |
| white | 142 | 75.94 |
| NA | 1 | 0.53 |
Gender
| gender | N | Perc |
|---|---|---|
| man | 105 | 56.15 |
| woman | 80 | 42.78 |
| NA | 2 | 1.07 |
Age
| age_mean | age_sd |
|---|---|
| 40.26738 | 11.58527 |
Education
| edu | N | Perc |
|---|---|---|
| GED | 48 | 25.67 |
| 2yearColl | 22 | 11.76 |
| 4yearColl | 73 | 39.04 |
| MA | 33 | 17.65 |
| PHD | 10 | 5.35 |
| NA | 1 | 0.53 |
Income
Analysis
Manipiulation check
Participants answered the following questions:
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement
about Person B?
1. They were fully informed of the consequences of making this
transaction
2. They were fully capable of weighing the costs and the benefits of
this transaction when making their decision
| informed | rational | checkinformed_M | checkinformed_SD | checkrational_M | checkrational_SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 2.11 | 1.70 | 2.23 | 1.56 |
| 0 | 1 | 2.00 | 1.78 | 3.28 | 2.39 |
| 1 | 0 | 5.26 | 1.94 | 3.43 | 2.30 |
| 1 | 1 | 6.22 | 0.76 | 6.16 | 0.99 |
CheckInformed: Two-way ANOVA
| Effect | DFn | DFd | F | p | p<.05 | ges |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| informed | 1 | 183 | 250.770 | 0.000 |
|
0.578 |
| rational | 1 | 183 | 3.314 | 0.070 | 0.018 | |
| informed:rational | 1 | 183 | 5.187 | 0.024 |
|
0.028 |
Great. There’s a main effect of the “informed” variable on the informed manipulation check.
CheckRational: Two-way ANOVA
| Effect | DFn | DFd | F | p | p<.05 | ges |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| informed | 1 | 183 | 55.151 | 0.000 |
|
0.232 |
| rational | 1 | 183 | 47.230 | 0.000 |
|
0.205 |
| informed:rational | 1 | 183 | 9.439 | 0.002 |
|
0.049 |
Cool. Main effect for the “rational” manipulation as well.
Condition -> Benefit A
To avoid a three-way interaction, I’ll look at the effect of condition on each party’s benefit separately. And only then I’ll show everything in one plot.
Descriptives
| informed | rational | benefit_A_M | benefit_A_SD |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | 2.13 | 0.99 |
| 0 | 1 | 1.81 | 1.50 |
| 1 | 0 | 2.00 | 1.21 |
| 1 | 1 | 1.69 | 1.12 |
Benefit A: Two-way ANOVA
| Effect | DFn | DFd | F | p | p<.05 | ges |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| informed | 1 | 183 | 0.490000 | 0.485 | 3.0e-03 | |
| rational | 1 | 183 | 3.140000 | 0.078 | 1.7e-02 | |
| informed:rational | 1 | 183 | 0.000231 | 0.988 | 1.3e-06 |
Cool. We’re not seeing an effect of condition on the buyer’s benefit.
Condition -> Benefit B
Let’s take a look at the seller.
Descriptives
| informed | rational | benefit_B_M | benefit_B_SD |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | -1.30 | 1.72 |
| 0 | 1 | -1.21 | 1.64 |
| 1 | 0 | -0.81 | 2.04 |
| 1 | 1 | -0.29 | 1.85 |
Benefit B: Two-way ANOVA
| Effect | DFn | DFd | F | p | p<.05 | ges |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| informed | 1 | 183 | 7.014 | 0.009 |
|
0.037 |
| rational | 1 | 183 | 1.278 | 0.260 | 0.007 | |
| informed:rational | 1 | 183 | 0.656 | 0.419 | 0.004 |
Plot: Condition -> Buyer and Seller Benefit
Ok, this is pretty informative. Looks like we’re actually not too far from an interaction. And if, in fact, there’s an interaction, the message would be something like this: If a seller is not informed, no amount of rationality with help them: They would be harmed as much as of they were irrational. But if the seller is informed, rationality can really help. It brings them almost up to 0 (neither harmed nor benefited). We might have to up the power to see this intraction, but if we do see it, I think it’s a pretty cool take-away.
Condition -> Power
Let’s take a look at the effect on power. Power was rated from -3 (Buyer has much more power) to 3 (Seller has much more power).
Descriptives
| informed | rational | power_M | power_SD |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | -1.96 | 1.46 |
| 0 | 1 | -1.77 | 1.37 |
| 1 | 0 | -0.98 | 1.70 |
| 1 | 1 | 0.00 | 1.44 |
Power: Two-way ANOVA
| Effect | DFn | DFd | F | p | p<.05 | ges |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| informed | 1 | 183 | 39.442 | 0.000 |
|
0.177 |
| rational | 1 | 183 | 7.126 | 0.008 |
|
0.037 |
| informed:rational | 1 | 183 | 3.218 | 0.074 | 0.017 |
Plot: Condition -> Power
Alright. Cool. Again, information is playing a very big role here. Basically, if the seller is uninformed, the buyer clearly has more power. That makes a lot of sense. Seller rationality doesn’t really matter much here. When the seller is informed and rational - the power is actually perfectly balanced. But when they’re informed and irrational, the power gravitates back to the buyer.
Mediation model 1: informed -> power -> seller benefit
0 = uninformed; 1 = informed
a = 1.42 (p = 0); b = 0.24 (p = 0.005); direct =
0.73 (p = 0.007); indirect = 0.38 (p = 0.184).
Ok, looks like we have a partial mediation.
Mediation model 2: rational -> power -> seller benefit
0 = irrational; 1 = rational
a = 0.65 (p = 0.008); b = 0.28 (p = 0); direct =
0.33 (p = 0.219); indirect = 0.15 (p = 0.576).
Another one. Cool.
Supplementary analysis
Let’s break these down by transaction (stats aren’t really necessary here because we’d be underpowered anyway)
Cancerous cell-phone tower
Condition -> Benefit
| party | informed | rational | benefit_M | benefit_SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| buyer | 0 | 0 | 2.83 | 0.39 |
| buyer | 0 | 1 | 1.50 | 2.26 |
| buyer | 1 | 0 | 2.27 | 1.03 |
| buyer | 1 | 1 | 2.22 | 0.94 |
| seller | 0 | 0 | -2.83 | 0.39 |
| seller | 0 | 1 | -1.67 | 2.34 |
| seller | 1 | 0 | -1.45 | 1.84 |
| seller | 1 | 1 | -2.11 | 1.13 |
Condition -> Power balance
| informed | rational | power_M | power_SD |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | -1.42 | 2.07 |
| 0 | 1 | -2.50 | 0.84 |
| 1 | 0 | -0.68 | 1.96 |
| 1 | 1 | 0.17 | 1.34 |
Storing hazardous chemicals
Condition -> Benefit
| party | informed | rational | benefit_M | benefit_SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| buyer | 0 | 0 | 2.06 | 1.00 |
| buyer | 0 | 1 | 1.96 | 1.22 |
| buyer | 1 | 0 | 1.80 | 1.40 |
| buyer | 1 | 1 | 2.00 | 1.05 |
| seller | 0 | 0 | -1.00 | 1.75 |
| seller | 0 | 1 | -1.35 | 1.23 |
| seller | 1 | 0 | -0.40 | 2.12 |
| seller | 1 | 1 | 0.50 | 1.51 |
Condition -> Power balance
| informed | rational | power_M | power_SD |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | -2.12 | 1.31 |
| 0 | 1 | -1.50 | 1.36 |
| 1 | 0 | -0.80 | 1.40 |
| 1 | 1 | -0.40 | 1.51 |
Testing beauty products for dangerous side effects
Condition -> Benefit
| party | informed | rational | benefit_M | benefit_SD |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| buyer | 0 | 0 | 1.74 | 1.05 |
| buyer | 0 | 1 | 1.67 | 1.68 |
| buyer | 1 | 0 | 1.60 | 1.35 |
| buyer | 1 | 1 | 1.13 | 1.06 |
| seller | 0 | 0 | -0.58 | 1.64 |
| seller | 0 | 1 | -0.80 | 1.97 |
| seller | 1 | 0 | 0.20 | 2.04 |
| seller | 1 | 1 | 0.78 | 1.28 |
Condition -> Power balance
| informed | rational | power_M | power_SD |
|---|---|---|---|
| 0 | 0 | -2.16 | 1.07 |
| 0 | 1 | -1.93 | 1.49 |
| 1 | 0 | -1.80 | 1.14 |
| 1 | 1 | 0.04 | 1.52 |