Background

In a 2 (seller information: informed vs. uninformed) cell design, participants read about one of three taboo transactions (cancerous cell-phone tower; storing hazardous chemicals; testing beauty products for side effects) and were asked to indicate to what extent the seller benefited from each of them and to what extent the buyer benefited from each of them. They also indicated who they believe had more power in the transaction.

Demographics

Race

race N Perc
asian 14 6.97
black 26 12.94
hispanic 3 1.49
multiracial 6 2.99
white 150 74.63
NA 2 1.00

Gender

gender N Perc
man 93 46.27
woman 106 52.74
NA 2 1.00

Age

age_mean age_sd
42.05473 12.11289

Education

edu N Perc
GED 53 26.37
2yearColl 27 13.43
4yearColl 85 42.29
MA 28 13.93
PHD 6 2.99
NA 2 1.00

Income

Analysis

Condition -> Benefit

DV operationalized as mean benefit score

Descriptives

cond party benefit_M benefit_SD
informed seller buyer 1.53 1.02
informed seller seller 0.44 1.49
uninformed seller buyer 1.31 1.62
uninformed seller seller 0.16 1.84

Two-way Repeated Measures ANOVA

Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges
cond 1 199 4.392 0.037
7.00e-03
party 1 199 39.770 0.000
1.21e-01
cond:party 1 199 0.020 0.886 7.09e-05

Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons: Condition

party Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges p.adj
buyer cond 1 199 1.392 0.239 0.007 0.478
seller cond 1 199 1.361 0.245 0.007 0.490

No effect by condition.

Bonferroni-corrected post-hoc comparisons: Party

cond Effect DFn DFd F p p<.05 ges p.adj
informed seller party 1 100 33.605 1.00e-07
0.158 2.00e-07
uninformed seller party 1 99 14.407 2.54e-04
0.100 5.08e-04

Categorical DV

Let’s look at the share of people who believed that: (1) both buyer and seller benefited; (2) buyer benefited and seller was harmed; (3) seller benefited and buyer was harmed; and (4) both buyer and seller were harmed. I’ll categorize 0 as benefit. So really, 1 means unharmed and 0 means harmed.

cond both benefit buyer benefit seller harmed buyer harmed seller benefit
informed seller 71 27 3
uninformed seller 51 37 12

Chi-Square

chi^2(2) = 10.24, p = .006

Chi-Square post-hoc test: condition (bonferroni-corrected)

Dimension Value informed seller uninformed seller
both benefit Residuals 2.80062989259536 -2.80062989259536
both benefit p values 0.0306* 0.0306*
buyer benefit seller harmed Residuals -1.56230501782628 1.56230501782627
buyer benefit seller harmed p values 0.7093 0.7093
buyer harmed seller benefit Residuals -2.43573523442638 2.43573523442638
buyer harmed seller benefit p values 0.0892 0.0892

Ok, so the only difference between conditions is in the likelihood of saying that the transaction was win-win. Uninformed sellers are less likely to be seen as engaging in a win-win transaction than informed sellers.

Condition -> Power

First, how did we measure power?

We asked participants: In your opinion, what is the balance of power in this transaction between Person A (the buyer) and Person B (the seller)? (-3 = Person A has much more power to 3 = Person B has much more power)

cond power_M power_SD
informed seller 0.14 1.28
uninformed seller -0.19 1.69


t(184.75) = 1.55, p = .122, d = 0.22

Mediation: cond -> power -> seller benefit

0 = uninformed seller; 1 = informed seller

a = 0.33 (p = 0.121); b = 0.28 (p = 0); direct = 0.28 (p = 0.245); indirect = 0.18 (p = 0.427).

Mediation model: condition -> power -> win-win outcome

a = 0.33 (p = 0.121); b = 0.04 (p = 0.097); direct = 0.19 (p = 0.005); indirect = 0.18 (p = 0.009).

Ok, it’s not explaining a lot, but there’s still a partial mediation. Cool.

Supplementary analysis

Let’s break these down by transaction (stats aren’t really necessary here because we’d be underpowered anyway)

Cancerous cell-phone tower

Condition -> Benefit

DV operationalized as mean benefit score

cond party benefit_M benefit_SD
informed seller buyer 1.37 1.13
informed seller seller -0.24 1.58
uninformed seller buyer 1.45 1.97
uninformed seller seller -0.69 2.38

Categorical DV

cond both benefit buyer benefit seller harmed buyer harmed seller benefit
informed seller 17 19 2
uninformed seller 9 16 4

Condition -> Power balance

cond balance_M balance_SD
informed seller 0.32 1.36
uninformed seller -0.14 1.85

Storing hazardous chemicals

Condition -> Benefit

DV operationalized as mean benefit score

cond party benefit_M benefit_SD
informed seller buyer 1.52 0.97
informed seller seller 0.52 1.37
uninformed seller buyer 1.31 1.33
uninformed seller seller 0.34 1.54

Categorical DV

cond both benefit buyer benefit seller harmed buyer harmed seller benefit
informed seller 25 7 1
uninformed seller 18 11 3

Condition -> Power balance

cond balance_M balance_SD
informed seller 0.09 1.10
uninformed seller 0.06 1.52

Testing beauty products for dangerous side effects

Condition -> Benefit

DV operationalized as mean benefit score

cond party benefit_M benefit_SD
informed seller buyer 1.77 0.90
informed seller seller 1.20 1.10
uninformed seller buyer 1.21 1.58
uninformed seller seller 0.64 1.39

Categorical DV

cond both benefit buyer benefit seller harmed buyer harmed seller benefit
informed seller 29 1 NA
uninformed seller 24 10 5

Condition -> Power balance

cond balance_M balance_SD
informed seller -0.03 1.38
uninformed seller -0.44 1.70

Order effects

Benefit

cond party measure_order benefit_M benefit_SD
informed seller buyer benefit first 1.74 1.02
informed seller buyer power first 1.21 0.92
informed seller seller benefit first 0.34 1.54
informed seller seller power first 0.59 1.43
uninformed seller buyer benefit first 1.33 1.67
uninformed seller buyer power first 1.29 1.58
uninformed seller seller benefit first 0.13 1.96
uninformed seller seller power first 0.19 1.72

Power

cond measure_order power_M power_SD
informed seller benefit first 0.39 1.16
informed seller power first -0.26 1.37
uninformed seller benefit first 0.02 1.65
uninformed seller power first -0.42 1.71