This file pertain to the analyses of organisational strength of the Congress party from various vantage points.The first section looks at the the organisational strength of the party at the state level across state-level elections using the coded-data from Pradeep Chhibber and Francesca Jensenius. The second section and third sections are based on the surveys conducted by Adam Auerbach and Tariq Thachil in Jaipur and Bhopal aimed to study the party organisation at Municipal Councilor and Slum Leadership levels respectively.
In this section, we look at the organisational strength of the Congress party as evaluated by scholars on a scale of one to three where 1 represent Weak Party Organisation and 3 represent Strong Party Organisation. Out of the fifteen states existing in the dataset, four were selected - Bihar, karnataka, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh.
Congress party has been categorised a coalition of state and local parties which differed substantially among themselves in the groups and interests they represented where the political rationale was tied to the fissures and conflicts of the state and community (Chibber & Petrocik, 2004). Congress party as a dominant, consensus party was a hegemonic construct – an inevitable product of the central cleavage instituted by the national movement which aggregated and neutralised the social cleavages with the electoral system at its aid where the mere plurality of votes was enough for the party with historic legitimacy to win a majority of seats in parliament (Yadav & Palshikar, 2006). The major consequence of this is that, as the party is displaced from power, its organisational strength wanes and at many states the party has been pushed to political irrelevance.
Comparative long-term decline in the support for the Congress party initiated right from the Hindi-heartland states of Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh in 1962 and 1967 (Vanderbok and Sisson, 1984). Looking at the below representation of the organisational strength of the party, we can observe that evaluated strength of the party is in agreement with the existing literature on electoral support for the party and other pertinent conceptualisations in place. As the electoral popularity the party held started declining in many states at the dawn of the 1960s. It was further exacerbated by the rise of broad-based multiparty systems in these states which went on to challenge the dominance of the party. The states where the electoral competition has between two parties, the party has witnessed fluctuation in their organisational strength which is evident in states like Karnataka and Rajasthan. The reason why the former has a far more fluctution in their evaluated orgnisational strength is plausibly an outcome of the strong anti-incumbency factors that is absent in Rajasthan.
We make use the municipal councilor survey with 343 respondents across Jaipur and Bhopal to study the organisational strength of the Congress party in comparison to that of the Bharatiya Janata Party. Vanderbok and Sisson (1984) argues that for historical and pratical reasons, political parties in India have tended to be organised at district or lower echelons rather than at the constituency level. Therefore, gauging the organisational presence of the party at these lower echelons is of more interest and political realignment at these levels determine the impending trajectory of the electoral support for the party.
Looking at the demographic facets of the respondents, both the parties attract similar levels of men and women, women are lesser than their male counterparts. Divergence exist when it comes to religion and caste as the BJP is more capable of bringing Hindus and Upper Castes to its fold compared to INC.Though not much difference exited in terms of mean years of schooling, a discernible divide exist in terms of household income and respondent income.
## # A tibble: 3 × 3
## current_relation_which_party n perc
## <chr> <int> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 179 52
## 2 INC 138 40
## 3 <NA> 26 8
## # A tibble: 2 × 4
## gender BJP INC `NA`
## <fct> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 Male 59 56 58
## 2 Female 41 44 42
## # A tibble: 4 × 4
## religion BJP INC `NA`
## <fct> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 Hindu 92 78 77
## 2 Muslim 6 17 23
## 3 Sikh 2 0 0
## 4 Jain 1 5 0
## # A tibble: 5 × 4
## caste BJP INC `NA`
## <fct> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 SC 14 13 15
## 2 ST 3 5 0
## 3 OBC 32 38 19
## 4 General 51 41 65
## 5 Other 1 3 0
## # A tibble: 3 × 2
## current_relation_which_party mean_edu_years
## <chr> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 12.5
## 2 INC 11.9
## 3 <NA> 11.4
## # A tibble: 3 × 3
## current_relation_which_party mean_household_income mean_income
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 120. 44.3
## 2 INC 94.6 42.1
## 3 <NA> 61.4 24.4
## [1] "Note: The mean incomes are in thousands"
Respondents associated with the BJP (2 per cent) were lesser in proportion in having switched parties compared to those with INC(7 per cent) and this is evident in the mean years of association with the parties where a respondent associated with BJP (31 years) has spent roughly twice the number of years with the party than their INC (18 years) counterparts.Ideology emerges as the main reason for the respondents to join the parties.
## # A tibble: 2 × 4
## party_switch BJP INC `NA`
## <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 0 98 93 96
## 2 1 2 7 4
## # A tibble: 3 × 2
## current_relation_which_party mean_yrs_party
## <chr> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 30.9
## 2 INC 18.3
## 3 <NA> 15.5
## # A tibble: 9 × 4
## why_party_preference BJP INC `NA`
## <fct> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 Party in Office 1 1 0
## 2 Ideology 59 55 4
## 3 Looks after my caste community 3 5 0
## 4 Easier to get Pad 1 0 0
## 5 Local workers recruited me 3 4 0
## 6 Big party leaders recruited me 2 7 0
## 7 Party works for development 11 10 0
## 8 Other 20 18 0
## 9 <NA> 0 0 96
Though selection/nomination is the primary means of promotion within both the parties, the importance placed for internal election is greater within the BJP (23 per cent) than INC (14 per cent).And similarly, BJP (68 per cent) places greater emphasis on internal election performance compared to INC (57 per cent) for promotion. Whereas, popular following takes higher precedence in INC (22 per cent) compared to BJP (14 per cent). When it comes to monitoring of cadre, both parties are fairly (76 and 78 per cent for BJP and INC respectively) at par with each other.
## # A tibble: 4 × 4
## party_promotion_how BJP INC `NA`
## <fct> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 Internal Election 23 14 0
## 2 Selection/Nomination 73 82 4
## 3 Other 4 4 0
## 4 <NA> 0 0 96
## # A tibble: 8 × 4
## party_promotion_qualities BJP INC `NA`
## <fct> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 Seniority 6 7 0
## 2 Contact with big leader 7 7 0
## 3 Giving party money 1 0 0
## 4 Party internal election performance 68 57 0
## 5 Popular following 14 22 4
## 6 Other 5 8 0
## 7 Same caste as big leader 0 1 0
## 8 <NA> 0 0 96
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## can_you_monitor_cadre BJP INC `NA`
## <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 0 23 22 42
## 2 1 76 78 54
## 3 99 1 1 4
Among the respondents across party lines, greater proportion of those who associate with the BJP (70 per cent) has become Parshad than those with INC (44 per cent). While internal party elections take precedence in giving out tickets in BJP (36 per cent) compared to INC (25 per cent). Popularity among voters take slight edge for the INC (50 per cent) compared to BJP (46 per cent).
For both the parties, publicity remain the biggest campaign expense, followed by campaign rallies and paying party cadres. While BJP slightly surpasses the INC in the first two fronts, INC reverses the position in the last - paying the cadre. BJP (73 per cent) on the ground has a better perception of voting pattern than INC (67 per cent). Finally, BJP (61 per cent) is said to engage slightly more in practices of vote buying than INC (59 per cent).
## # A tibble: 2 × 4
## ever_parshad BJP INC `NA`
## <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 0 30 56 42
## 2 1 70 44 58
## # A tibble: 7 × 4
## getting_ticket_reason BJP INC `NA`
## <fct> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 Seniority 2 8 12
## 2 Personal tie to big leader in party 6 8 15
## 3 Internal Party elections 36 25 23
## 4 Popularity among voters 46 50 42
## 5 Other 10 7 4
## 6 Jati/Religion 0 1 0
## 7 Giving party money 0 0 4
## # A tibble: 6 × 4
## biggest_campaign_expense BJP INC `NA`
## <dbl+lbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 2 [Paying Party Cadres] 10 14 19
## 2 3 [Campaign Rallies] 28 23 19
## 3 4 [Publicity Materials/Posters] 55 54 50
## 4 5 [Vote-buying] 3 4 4
## 5 6 [Advertising/Media] 1 4 0
## 6 7 [Other] 2 2 8
## # A tibble: 2 × 4
## know_area_voted BJP INC `NA`
## <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 0 27 33 31
## 2 1 73 67 69
## # A tibble: 2 × 4
## vote_buying BJP INC `NA`
## <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 0 39 41 35
## 2 1 61 59 65
In this section, we make use of another survey conducted across Jaipur and Bhopal with 629 respondents. Here we look at the slum leaders and their association with INC and BJP to comprehend their on-ground organisational rationale and activities.
Looking at the demography, we can draw that both the parties at slum leader level attract more men than women which is plausibly due to the societal relations of gender operating at these margins. Apart from that, as expected, BJP attracts more Hindus to their fold than the INC and the contrary in the case of Muslims.
## # A tibble: 3 × 3
## Relationship_Which_Party n perc
## <chr> <int> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 321 51
## 2 INC 215 34
## 3 Others 94 15
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `1` `2` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 87 13 0
## 2 INC 89 11 0
## 3 Others 87 12 1
## # A tibble: 3 × 7
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `1` `2` `3` `4` `5` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 83 14 3 0 0 0
## 2 INC 53 45 1 0 1 0
## 3 Others 71 28 0 0 0 1
BJP (18 per cent) has a greater proportion of leaders who have switched parties than INC (10 per cent).
On the rationale of promotion within the party, both the parties were at par with each other on many fronts.
On average, the BJP conducts 15 party meetings whereas the INC conducts roughly 10 party meetings.
INC (87 per cent) is said to have an edge over the BJP (83 per cent) in terms of rally mobilisations.
Whereas, in member recruitment, BJP (88 per cent) is ahead of INC (83 per cent) by a small margin.
## # A tibble: 3 × 3
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 82 18
## 2 INC 90 10
## 3 Others 4 96
## # A tibble: 3 × 11
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `1` `2` `3` `4` `5` `6` `7` `8` `9`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 7 4 1 10 2 11 57 5 3
## 2 INC 7 3 1 10 2 9 57 6 7
## 3 Others 0 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 1
## # ℹ 1 more variable: `NA` <dbl>
## # A tibble: 3 × 2
## Relationship_Which_Party mean_party_meetings
## <chr> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 14.7
## 2 INC 10.3
## 3 Others 16.4
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 17 83 0
## 2 INC 13 87 0
## 3 Others 3 5 91
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 12 88 1
## 2 INC 15 83 1
## 3 Others 0 7 93
In terms of mobilisation of voters, INC (93 per cent) is said to have a marginal edge over BJP (91 per cent) by leaders across the party line. While both the parties are tied on door-to-door canvassing (both at 94 per cent), INC (83 per cent) is said to be slightly ahead of BJP (78 per cent) in terms of publicity.
When it comes to the perception of how slums and slum-residents vote, leaders associated with the BJP, the party (93 and 48 per cent) is said to have an edge over INC (89 and 39 per cent).
While both the parties are fairly at par with each other in persuading voters through advice, INC (19 per cent) is slightly greater in proportion of giving gifts to voters compared to the BJP (16 per cent). And on the front of vote buying, leaders associated with BJP (52 per cent) were more in their affirmative response than their INC (47 per cent) counterparts.
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 9 91 0
## 2 INC 7 93 0
## 3 Others 3 5 91
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 6 94 0
## 2 INC 6 94 0
## 3 Others 0 9 91
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 22 78 0
## 2 INC 17 83 0
## 3 Others 1 7 91
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 7 93 0
## 2 INC 11 89 0
## 3 Others 23 76 1
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 52 48 0
## 2 INC 61 39 0
## 3 Others 60 39 1
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 9 91 0
## 2 INC 8 92 0
## 3 Others 34 65 1
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 84 16 0
## 2 INC 81 19 0
## 3 Others 7 1 91
## # A tibble: 3 × 4
## # Groups: Relationship_Which_Party [3]
## Relationship_Which_Party `0` `1` `NA`
## <chr> <dbl> <dbl> <dbl>
## 1 BJP 48 52 0
## 2 INC 53 47 0
## 3 Others 62 37 1